{"id":1019,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-30","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["77465"],"title":"Village of Glenview improperly withheld police report in its entirety","filename":"77465, issued December 30, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1813,"summary":"The Chicago Tribune requested a police report from the Village of Glenview, which the Village denied citing personal privacy and law enforcement exemptions. The PAC determined the Village improperly withheld the records and instructed them to release the report with appropriate redactions for private information.","plain_summary":"A reporter requested a police report from the Village of Glenview, but the Village denied the request in its entirety, citing exemptions for personal privacy and confidential information. The Attorney General's office reviewed the records and concluded the Village improperly withheld the entire document. The Village must now disclose a version of the report that reveals the officers' activities, but may redact information identifying the complainant, suspect, witnesses, and third parties, as well as highly personal details of the alleged assault and medical treatment information.","holding":"The Village of Glenview improperly withheld the requested police report in its entirety.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Glenview properly applied FOIA exemptions 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv) to withhold an entire police report.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)","7(1)(d)(iv)","7(1)(b)"],"public_body":"Village of Glenview","requesting_party":"Ms. Emily Hoerner (Chicago Tribune)","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought a specific police report that the Village withheld in its entirety.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Obligation-to-disclose-non-exempt-portions-of-records-that-contain-information-subject-to-redaction/77465%2C%20issued%20December%2030%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","FOIA denial","privacy exemption","redaction"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"December 30, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Emily Hoerner\nChicago Tribune\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nehoerner@chicagotribune. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie Tappendorf\nAncel Glink\n140 South Dearborn Street,  Suite 600\nChicago,  Illinois 60603\njtappendorf@ancelglink. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2023 PAC 77465\n\nDear Ms. Hoerner and Ms. Tappendorf: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Village of Glenview ( Village)  improperly withheld records all records responsive to Ms. \nEmily Hoerner' s July 12, 2023,  FOIA request.  \n\nOn that date, Ms. Hoerner,  on behalf of the Chicago Tribune, submitted a FOIA\nrequest to the Village seeking a copy of a specified police report.   On July 14, 2023,  the Village\ndenied Ms. Hoerner' s FOIA request in its entirety pursuant to sections 7(1)( c) and 7(1)(d)( iv) of\nFOIA. 2 On July 25, 2023,  Ms. Hoerner submitted the above- referenced Request for Review\nchallenging the Village' s denial.   \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(c), (1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fMs. Emily Hoerner\nMs. Julie Tappendorf\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 2\n\nOn August 11, 2023,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nVillage and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the withheld records for our confidential\nreview,  and a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of sections\n7(1)(c) and 7(1)( d)(iv) of FOIA.  On August 14, 2023,  the Village provided this office with the\nrequested materials.   On August 24, 2023,  this office forwarded a copy of the Village' s response\nto Ms. Hoerner;  she replied on August 29, 2023. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).   Section 7(1) of FOIA generally requires public bodies to disclose the non-exempt\nportions of responsive records,  though a request may be denied in its entirety if the records\ncannot be redacted in a manner that would protect the identity of the individual\nwhose privacy interest is at stake.\" 3 Schonberger v. National Transportation Safety Board, 508\nF. Supp.  941, 945 ( D.D.C. 1981).   \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"   Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject' s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining\nthe information[,]\"  except that \"[ t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of\npublic employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.\"   A\npublic body' s assertion that the release of information would constitute an unwarranted invasion\nof personal privacy is evaluated on a case- by-case basis.   Chicago Journeymen Plumbers'  Local\nUnion 130 v. Dep't of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, 196 ( 2001).   \n\nThis office has consistently determined that the disclosure of information\n\nidentifying a victim of a criminal offense would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of\n\n3Section 7(1) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1) (West 2023 Supp.)),  provides,  in relevant part: \n\nWhen a request is made to inspect or copy a public record that contains\ninformation that is exempt from disclosure under this Section,  but also contains\ninformation that is not exempt from disclosure,  the public body may elect to\nredact the information that is exempt.  The public body shall make the remaining\ninformation available for inspection and copying. \n\n\fMs. Emily Hoerner\nMs. Julie Tappendorf\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 3\n\npersonal privacy and therefore that such information may be redacted from a record pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(c).  See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 26904,  issued April 16, 2014,  at 2.  \nAdditionally,  this office has previously determined that a police department may redact from an\nincident report the names and other identifying information of suspects who were never arrested\nor charged in connection with the incident.   See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 31526, \nissued November 26, 2014,  at 6; see also Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. \nUnited States Dep' t of Justice,  846 F. Supp.  2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2012) ( the right to privacy \" is\nstrongest where the individuals in question ' have been investigated but never publicly charged.'\" \nquoting American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Dep't of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. \nCir. 2011))).   Further,  the disclosure of the identities of third parties and witnesses would be an\nunwarranted invasion of those individuals'  personal privacy interests.   See Coleman v. F.B.I., 13\nF. Supp.  2d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 1998) ( disclosure of FBI documents would constitute an unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy because \" it is evident that release of any portion would reveal the\nidentities of innocent third parties,  witnesses or victims.\").  \n\nAdditionally,  disclosure of details of alleged sex crimes constitutes an\n\nunwarranted invasion of the victim' s right to privacy.   McGee v. Kelley, 2017 IL App (3d) \n160324, ¶¶  18-20 (2017) (\" The public has an interest in monitoring law enforcement to ensure it\nis acting in the public' s interest.  However,  it is doubtful that the public has any interest in the\nactual details of the victim' s sexual assault and battery.\").   See also State Journal- Register v. \nUniversity of Illinois Springfield,  2013 IL App ( 4th) 120881, ¶  56 (2013) (\" details of * * *  sexual\nmisconduct are highly personal,  which weighs heavily in favor of exemption.\");  Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 67495,  issued June 29, 2021,  at 4 (redactions in the narrative section of\nreport consisting of a graphic description of alleged sexual offense properly redacted). \n\nIn its non- confidential response to this office, the Village explained that its\n\ndenial letter noted that no arrest had been made and no charges\nbrought so the privacy interests of the subject of the report in\nhaving this report withheld from release outweighed any public\ninterest in the release of the report.  The [ denial]  letter also noted\nthat the privacy interests of the witnesses and complainants in the\nreport outweighed any public interest in disclosure.  In addition to\nthe invasion of personal privacy that would result from disclosure\nof this report,  the Village' s denial letter noted that disclosing the\nreport would reveal the identities of victims,  witnesses and\ncomplaints and confidential\nsection 7(1)(d)(iv).  The Village' s denial letter explained that the\n\ninformation that is exempt under\n\n\fMs. Emily Hoerner\nMs. Julie Tappendorf\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 4\n\nreport could not be meaningfully redacted to protect these\nimportant privacy interests.[ 4] \n\nThe Village also noted in its response that Ms. Hoerner \" does not * * *  dispute any of the\nreasons the Village raised for denying the request.\" 5\n\nIn her reply, Ms. Hoerner maintained that the reports should not be withheld in\n\ntheir entireties,  arguing that the Village must disclose any information that is not considered\nconfidential.  \n\nThis office' s review of the unredacted records confirms that the incident did not\n\ninvolve an arrest.   The report contains information that would identify the suspect,  the\ncomplainant,  and other third parties and witnesses.   Because disclosure of information\nidentifying those individuals would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy,  this office concludes that such information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section\n7(1)(c). \n\nThe narrative section of the report discusses the alleged assault in detail as well as\ninformation about the victim' s treatment at a hospital.   That information is\n\nhighly personal\nexempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)( c) of FOIA.  McGee,  2017 IL App (3d) 160324, \n18.  However,  the report also includes descriptions of the investigating officers'  activities.   That\n\ninformation bears on the public duties of public employees and,  subject to the redaction of\nspecific details of the alleged offense and information identifying the complainant,  suspect, \nwitnesses,  and other third parties,  may not be withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.  \nWhile there is a compelling public interest in disclosure of records that shed light on the manner\nin which law enforcement officials perform their public duties ( Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. \n12-006, issued March 16, 2012,  at 7), there is no legitimate public interest in the highly personal\nportions of the narrative that would outweigh the subjects'  privacy rights under the circumstances\nof this matter.   \n\nAccordingly,  this office requests that the Village disclose to Ms. Hoerner a\n\nversion of the responsive report that reveals the officers'  activities.   The Village may withhold\ninformation identifying the complainant,  suspect,  and any witnesses or third parties mentioned in\nthe report as well as the highly personal details of the alleged assault and other medical treatment\n\nOffice of the Attorney General ( August 14, 2023),  at [ 1].  \n\n4Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf,  Ancel Glink, to Victoria Frazier,  Assistant Attorney General, \n\nAccess Bureau ( August 14, 2023),  at [ 1]. \n\n5Letter from Julie Tappendorf,  Ancel Glink to Victoria Frazier,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public\n\n\fMs. Emily Hoerner\nMs. Julie Tappendorf\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 5\n\ninformation. 6 The Village may also redact private information pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of\nFOIA. 7\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov.  Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77465 f 71c proper improper mun\n\nAcc.  Op.  No.  16- 009,  issued November 7, 2016,  at 12. \n\n6The Village may also withhold dates of birth pursuant to section 7(1)(c). See Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub. \n\nSupp.))  defines \" private information\"  as : \n\n75 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) ( West 2023 Supp.).  Section 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023\n\nunique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number,  driver's license\nnumber,  employee identification number,  biometric identifiers,  personal\nfinancial information,  passwords or other access codes,  medical records,  home\nor personal telephone numbers,  and personal email addresses.  Private\ninformation also includes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to\nany person. \n\nlicense plates,  except as\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A police report withheld by a village","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-77465/","full_text":"December 30, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Emily Hoerner\nChicago Tribune\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nehoerner@chicagotribune. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie Tappendorf\nAncel Glink\n140 South Dearborn Street, Suite 600\nChicago, Illinois 60603\njtappendorf@ancelglink. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 77465\n\nDear Ms. Hoerner and Ms. Tappendorf: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Village of Glenview (Village) improperly withheld records all records responsive to Ms. \nEmily Hoerner's July 12, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Ms. Hoerner, on behalf of the Chicago Tribune, submitted a FOIA\nrequest to the Village seeking a copy of a specified police report. On July 14, 2023, the Village\ndenied Ms. Hoerner's FOIA request in its entirety pursuant to sections 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv) of\n\nOn August 11, 2023, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nVillage and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the withheld records for our confidential\nreview, and a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of sections\n7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA. On August 14, 2023, the Village provided this office with the\nrequested materials. On August 24, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's response\nto Ms. Hoerner; she replied on August 29, 2023. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). Section 7(1) of FOIA generally requires public bodies to disclose the non-exempt\nportions of responsive records, though a request may be denied in its entirety if the records\ncannot be redacted in a manner that would protect the identity of the individual\nwhose privacy interest is at stake.\" 3 Schonberger v. National Transportation Safety Board, 508\nF. Supp. 941, 945 (D.D.C. 1981). \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\" Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining\nthe information[,]\" except that \"[ t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of\npublic employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.\" A\npublic body's assertion that the release of information would constitute an unwarranted invasion\nof personal privacy is evaluated on a case- by-case basis. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local\nUnion 130 v. Dep't of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, 196 (2001). \n\nThis office has consistently determined that the disclosure of information\n\nidentifying a victim of a criminal offense would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of\n\n3 Section 7(1) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1) (West 2023 Supp.)), provides, in relevant part: \n\nWhen a request is made to inspect or copy a public record that contains\n\npersonal privacy and therefore that such information may be redacted from a record pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(c). See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26904, issued April 16, 2014, at 2. \nAdditionally, this office has previously determined that a police department may redact from an\nincident report the names and other identifying information of suspects who were never arrested\nor charged in connection with the incident. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 31526, \nissued November 26, 2014, at 6; see also Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. \nUnited States Dep' t of Justice, 846 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (the right to privacy \" is\nstrongest where the individuals in question ' have been investigated but never publicly charged.'\" \nquoting American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Dep't of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. \nCir. 2011))). Further, the disclosure of the identities of third parties and witnesses would be an\nunwarranted invasion of those individuals' personal privacy interests. See Coleman v. F.B.I., 13\nF. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 1998) (disclosure of FBI documents would constitute an unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy because \" it is evident that release of any portion would reveal the\nidentities of innocent third parties, witnesses or victims.\"). \n\nAdditionally, disclosure of details of alleged sex crimes constitutes an\n\nunwarranted invasion of the victim's right to privacy. McGee v. Kelley, 2017 IL App (3d) \n160324, ¶¶ 18-20 (2017) (\" The public has an interest in monitoring law enforcement to ensure it\nis acting in the public's interest. However, it is doubtful that the public has any interest in the\nactual details of the victim's sexual assault and battery.\"). See also State Journal- Register v. \nUniversity of Illinois Springfield, 2013 IL App (4th) 120881, ¶ 56 (2013) (\" details of * * * sexual\nmisconduct are highly personal, which weighs heavily in favor of exemption.\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 67495, issued June 29, 2021, at 4 (redactions in the narrative section of\nreport consisting of a graphic description of alleged sexual offense properly redacted). \n\nIn its non- confidential response to this office, the Village explained that its\n\ndenial letter noted that no arrest had been made and no charges\nbrought so the privacy interests of the subject of the report in\nhaving this report withheld from release outweighed any public\ninterest in the release of the report. The [ denial] letter also noted\nthat the privacy interests of the witnesses and complainants in the\nreport outweighed any public interest in disclosure. In addition to\nthe invasion of personal privacy that would result from disclosure\nof this report, the Village's denial letter noted that disclosing the\n\nreport could not be meaningfully redacted to protect these\nimportant privacy interests.[ 4] \n\nThe Village also noted in its response that Ms. Hoerner \" does not * * * dispute any of the\nreasons the Village raised for denying the request.\" 5\n\nIn her reply, Ms. Hoerner maintained that the reports should not be withheld in\n\ntheir entireties, arguing that the Village must disclose any information that is not considered\nconfidential. \n\nThis office's review of the unredacted records confirms that the incident did not\n\ninvolve an arrest. The report contains information that would identify the suspect, the\ncomplainant, and other third parties and witnesses. Because disclosure of information\nidentifying those individuals would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy, this office concludes that such information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section\n7(1)(c). \n\nThe narrative section of the report discusses the alleged assault in detail as well as\ninformation about the victim's treatment at a hospital. That information is\n\nhighly personal\nexempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. McGee, 2017 IL App (3d) 160324, \n18. However, the report also includes descriptions of the investigating officers' activities. That\n\ninformation bears on the public duties of public employees and, subject to the redaction of\nspecific details of the alleged offense and information identifying the complainant, suspect, \nwitnesses, and other third parties, may not be withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. \nWhile there is a compelling public interest in disclosure of records that shed light on the manner\nin which law enforcement officials perform their public duties (Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. \n12-006, issued March 16, 2012, at 7), there is no legitimate public interest in the highly personal\nportions of the narrative that would outweigh the subjects' privacy rights under the circumstances\nof this matter. \n\nAccordingly, this office requests that the Village disclose to Ms. Hoerner a\n\nversion of the responsive report that reveals the officers' activities. The Village may withhold\ninformation identifying the complainant, suspect, and any witnesses or third parties mentioned in\nthe report as well as the highly personal details of the alleged assault and other medical treatment\n\nOffice of the Attorney General (August 14, 2023), at [ 1]. \n\n4 Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Victoria Frazier, Assistant Attorney General, \n\nAccess Bureau (August 14, 2023), at [ 1]. \n\n5 Letter from Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink to Victoria Frazier, Assistant Attorney General, Public\n\ninformation. 6 The Village may also redact private information pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of\nFOIA. 7\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77465 f 71c proper improper mun\n\nAcc. Op. No. 16- 009, issued November 7, 2016, at 12. \n\n6 The Village may also withhold dates of birth pursuant to section 7(1)(c). See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. \n\nSupp.)) defines \" private information\" as: \n\n75 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2023 Supp.). Section 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023\n\nunique identifiers, including a person's social security number, driver's license\nnumber, employee identification number, biometric identifiers, personal\nfinancial information, passwords or other access codes, medical records, home\nor personal telephone numbers, and personal email addresses. Private\ninformation also includes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to\nany person. \n\nlicense plates, except as"}
{"id":1020,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-04-10","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["77566"],"title":"Village of Hanover Park improperly withheld business lease agreements under 7(1)(g)","filename":"77566, issued April 10, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1106,"summary":"The requester sought copies of business or remodeling lease agreements submitted to the Village of Hanover Park, which the Village denied under section 7(1)(g). The PAC determined the Village improperly withheld the records and ordered their disclosure, subject to redaction of signatures.","plain_summary":"A resident requested copies of business leases submitted to the Village of Hanover Park, but the Village refused to provide them, claiming they were exempt from disclosure. The Attorney General's office reviewed the documents and found that the Village's denial was incorrect. The Village must now release the leases to the requester, though they are allowed to black out personal signatures.","holding":"The Village of Hanover Park improperly withheld the requested lease agreements under section 7(1)(g) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Hanover Park properly invoked section 7(1)(g) of FOIA to withhold lease agreements submitted for business or remodeling licenses.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(g)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(g)","7(1)(b)"],"public_body":"Village of Hanover Park","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"business records","subject_description":"The request concerned lease agreements submitted to the Village for the purpose of obtaining business or remodeling licenses.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_g/77566%2C%20issued%20April%2010%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["lease agreements","business license","FOIA denial","private information"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Legal & Financial Records","full_text_pre_clean":"April 10, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Tish Clark\nDeputy Village Clerk\nVillage of Hanover Park\n2121 Lake Street\nHanover Park,  Illinois 60133\ntclark@hpil. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2023 PAC 77566;  FOIA #23-0217\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Clark: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nJuly 3, 2023,  FOIA\nthe response by the Village of Hanover Park ( Village)  to\nrequest violated the requirements of FOIA. \n\nOn July 3, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village seeking,  in\n\nrelevant part, \"[ c]opies of all leases that were submitted to the City of Hanover Park to obtain\nbusiness or remodeling licenses for [designated addresses]. ( Since 2020).\" 2 On July 25, 2023, \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto [Village of Hanover Park] ( July 3, 2023). \n\n\fMs. Tish Clark\nApril 10, 2024\nPage 2\n\nthe Village denied\nAugust 3, 2023,  this office received\nVillage' s denial of the leases.  \n\nrequest for the leases pursuant to section 7(1)(g) of FOIA. 3 On\ncompleted Request for Review challenging the\n\nOn August 10, 2023,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office's\nconfidential review,  together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nFOIA exemptions it asserted.   On August 11, 2023,  the Village provided the requested materials.  \nwith an\nOn August 18, 2023,  this office forwarded a copy of the Village' s response to\nopportunity to reply;  he did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.   Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\"   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   Section 7(1)( g) of FOIA, exempts from disclosure: \n\ninformation are furnished under a claim\n\nTrade secrets and commercial or financial\n\ninformation\nobtained from a person or business where the trade secrets or\ncommercial or financial\nthat they are proprietary,  privileged or confidential,  and that\ndisclosure of the trade secrets or commercial or financial\ninformation would cause competitive harm to the person or\nbusiness,  and only insofar as the claim directly applies to the\nrecords requested.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nFor a record to be exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(g): \n\ninformation, ( 2) that was obtained from a person or\n\nT]he document must contain ( 1) a trade secret,  commercial,  or\nfinancial\nbusiness where the trade secrets or commercial or financial\ninformation are furnished under a claim that they are either ( a) \nproprietary, ( b) privileged,  or (c) confidential,  and ( 3) that\ndisclosure of the trade secrets or commercial or financial\ninformation would cause competitive harm to the person or\nbusiness.  ( Emphasis in original.)   Chicago v. Janssen\nPharmaceuticals,  Inc, 2017 IL App (1st)  150870, ¶  27. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(g) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023. \n\n\fMs. Tish Clark\nApril 10, 2024\nPage 3\n\nThus,  a public body must demonstrate that disclosing documents would cause competitive harm\nin order for the documents to be withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(g).  Janssen,  Inc., 2017 IL\nApp (1st)  150870, ¶  29.  \"' To show substantial competitive harm,  the agency must show by\nspecific factual or evidentiary material that:  ( 1) the person or entity from which information was\nobtained actually faces competition;  and ( 2) substantial harm to a competitive position would\nlikely result from disclosure of the information in the agency' s records.'\"   Cooper v. Dep' t of the\nLottery, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1007,  1013 ( 1994) ( quoting Calhoun v. Lyng, 864 F.2d 34, 36 (5th Cir. \n1988)).\"   Parties opposing disclosure need not demonstrate actual competitive harm;  instead, \nthey need only show actual competition and a likelihood of substantial competitive injury in\norder to 'bring [ that]  commercial\nHampshire Right to Life v. United States Dept of Health &  Human Services,  778 F.3d 43, 50 (1st\nCir. 2015) ( quoting Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food Drug Administration,  704\nF.2d 1280,  1291 ( D.C. Cir. 1983)). \n\ninformation within the realm of confidentiality.\"'   New\n\nIn its response to this office, the Village clarified that the business owner who\n\nsubmitted the application and lease at issue \" questioned as to why we were requesting a copy of\nhis lease as part of the business license application process\"  and \" noted that he considered his\nlease agreement as personal and confidential[.]\" 4 Based on the business owner' s concerns,  the\nVillage stated that it denied\nFOIA.   \n\nrequest for the lease pursuant to section 7(1)(g) of\n\nAlthough the business owner may have submitted the lease under the assumption\nthat it would be maintained confidentially,  the plain language of section 7(1)( g) also requires a\npublic body to show that disclosure of the records would result in competitive harm.   The Village\ndid not address the issue of competitive harm,  nor is it apparent to this office how disclosure of\nwhat appears to be a standard form commercial\nlease would result in competitive harm to the\nbusiness owner.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the Village improperly withheld the\nlease agreement in its entirety.   This office requests the Village provide\nlease,  subject only to appropriate redactions of signatures pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 5\nIll. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 46798,  issued March 16, 2017 ( signatures are a form of\nprivate information\"  that may be withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(b)). \n\na copy of the\n\nAssistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau, ( August 11, 2023).  \n\n4E- mail from Tish Clark, Deputy Village Clerk, Village of Hanover Park,  to Victoria Frazier, \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)( b) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fMs. Tish Clark\nApril 10, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at (217)  782- 9054 or victoria. frazier@ilag. gov.  Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \nVictoria Frazier\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77566 f 71g improper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Lease agreements for business or remodeling licenses","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-77566/","full_text":"April 10, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Tish Clark\nDeputy Village Clerk\nVillage of Hanover Park\n2121 Lake Street\nHanover Park, Illinois 60133\ntclark@hpil. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 77566; FOIA #23-0217\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Clark: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nJuly 3, 2023, FOIA\nthe response by the Village of Hanover Park (Village) to\nrequest violated the requirements of FOIA. \n\nOn July 3, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village seeking, in\n\nrelevant part, \"[ c]opies of all leases that were submitted to the City of Hanover Park to obtain\nbusiness or remodeling licenses for [designated addresses]. (Since 2020).\" 2 On July 25, 2023, \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\nthe Village denied\nAugust 3, 2023, this office received\nVillage's denial of the leases. \n\nrequest for the leases pursuant to section 7(1)(g) of FOIA. 3 On\ncompleted Request for Review challenging the\n\nOn August 10, 2023, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office's\nconfidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nFOIA exemptions it asserted. On August 11, 2023, the Village provided the requested materials. \nwith an\nOn August 18, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's response to\nopportunity to reply; he did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). Section 7(1)(g) of FOIA, exempts from disclosure: \n\ninformation are furnished under a claim\n\nTrade secrets and commercial or financial\n\ninformation\nobtained from a person or business where the trade secrets or\ncommercial or financial\nthat they are proprietary, privileged or confidential, and that\ndisclosure of the trade secrets or commercial or financial\ninformation would cause competitive harm to the person or\nbusiness, and only insofar as the claim directly applies to the\nrecords requested. (Emphasis added.) \n\nFor a record to be exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(g): \n\ninformation, (2) that was obtained from a person or\n\nT]he document must contain (1) a trade secret, commercial, or\nfinancial\nbusiness where the trade secrets or commercial or financial\ninformation are furnished under a claim that they are either (a) \nproprietary, (b) privileged, or (c) confidential, and (3) that\ndisclosure of the trade secrets or commercial or financial\ninformation would cause competitive harm to the person or\nbusiness. (Emphasis in original.) Chicago v. Janssen\nPharmaceuticals, Inc, 2017 IL App (1st) 150870, ¶ 27. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(g) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023. \n\nThus, a public body must demonstrate that disclosing documents would cause competitive harm\nin order for the documents to be withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(g). Janssen, Inc., 2017 IL\nApp (1st) 150870, ¶ 29. \"' To show substantial competitive harm, the agency must show by\nspecific factual or evidentiary material that: (1) the person or entity from which information was\nobtained actually faces competition; and (2) substantial harm to a competitive position would\nlikely result from disclosure of the information in the agency's records.'\" Cooper v. Dep' t of the\nLottery, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1013 (1994) (quoting Calhoun v. Lyng, 864 F.2d 34, 36 (5th Cir. \n1988)).\" Parties opposing disclosure need not demonstrate actual competitive harm; instead, \nthey need only show actual competition and a likelihood of substantial competitive injury in\norder to 'bring [ that] commercial\nHampshire Right to Life v. United States Dept of Health & Human Services, 778 F.3d 43, 50 (1st\nCir. 2015) (quoting Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food Drug Administration, 704\nF.2d 1280, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). \n\ninformation within the realm of confidentiality.\"' New\n\nIn its response to this office, the Village clarified that the business owner who\n\nsubmitted the application and lease at issue \" questioned as to why we were requesting a copy of\nhis lease as part of the business license application process\" and \" noted that he considered his\nlease agreement as personal and confidential[.]\" 4 Based on the business owner's concerns, the\nVillage stated that it denied\nFOIA. \n\nrequest for the lease pursuant to section 7(1)(g) of\n\nAlthough the business owner may have submitted the lease under the assumption\nthat it would be maintained confidentially, the plain language of section 7(1)(g) also requires a\npublic body to show that disclosure of the records would result in competitive harm. The Village\ndid not address the issue of competitive harm, nor is it apparent to this office how disclosure of\nwhat appears to be a standard form commercial\nlease would result in competitive harm to the\nbusiness owner. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Village improperly withheld the\nlease agreement in its entirety. This office requests the Village provide\nlease, subject only to appropriate redactions of signatures pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 5\nIll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 46798, issued March 16, 2017 (signatures are a form of\nprivate information\" that may be withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(b)). \n\na copy of the\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, (August 11, 2023). \n\n4E- mail from Tish Clark, Deputy Village Clerk, Village of Hanover Park, to Victoria Frazier, \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (217) 782- 9054 or victoria. frazier@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \nVictoria Frazier\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77566 f 71g improper mun"}
{"id":1021,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2023-09-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["77586"],"title":"Illinois Department of Human Services denial of home care worker personal info under section 7.5(zz) closed without action","filename":"77586, issued September 20, 2023.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1215,"summary":"The Freedom Foundation requested personal information for home care workers from the Illinois Department of Human Services, which the Department denied citing the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act. The PAC determined that no further action was warranted regarding the denial.","plain_summary":"The Freedom Foundation asked the Illinois Department of Human Services for a list of personal details about home care workers, including their names, ages, and hire dates. The Department refused to provide this information, arguing that a state law protecting labor relations information prohibited the disclosure. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and decided not to take any further action, effectively closing the matter.","holding":"The PAC concluded that no further action is warranted regarding the Department's denial of the request under section 7.5(zz) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois Department of Human Services properly denied a FOIA request for personal information of home care workers under section 7.5(zz) of FOIA and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(zz)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(zz)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Human Services","requesting_party":"Mr. Maxford Nelsen, Freedom Foundation","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought personal identifying information and employment data for home care workers in Illinois.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_zz/77586%2C%20issued%20September%2020%2C%202023.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["home care workers","labor relations","personnel records","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSeptember 20, 2023\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Maxford Nelsen\nDirector of Labor Policy\nFreedom Foundation\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmnelsen@freedomfoundation.com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 77586\n\nDear Mr. Nelsen: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022)).   For the reasons that follow,  the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn June 12, 2023, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nHuman Services ( Department)  on behalf of the Freedom Foundation,  stating: \n\nI am requesting the following information for all personal\nassistants, home health workers, and/or home care workers\ncurrently working in the State of Illinois: \n\n1. First name\n2. Middle name (or initial, if name is unavailable) \n3. Last name\n4. Age\n5. Gender\n6. Job title\n7. Hire date[ 1] \n\n12, 2023). \n\n1E- mail from Maxford Nelsen, Director of Labor Policy, Freedom Foundation, to DHS Staff (June\n\n500 South Second Street,  Springfield,  Illinois 62701 • ( 217)  782- 1090 •  TTY: ( 877)  844- 5461 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale,  Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529-6400 • TTY: (877) 675-9339 • Fax: ( 618) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Maxford Nelsen\nSeptember 20, 2023\nPage 2\n\nOn June 21, 2023, the Department denied your request pursuant to section 7.5(zz) \n\nof FOIA, 2 which exempts from disclosure:  \" Information prohibited from being disclosed under\nthe Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.\"  The Department stated: \n\nPlease note that the positions identified in your request are all\ncovered under the collective bargaining agreement between the\nIllinois Department of Central Management Services (CMS)/ \nIllinois Department of Human Services ( IDHS)  and the Services\nEmployees International Union, Healthcare Illinois & Indiana\nSEIU- HII). Please also note that the Illinois Public Labor\nRelations Act prohibits the release of information personally\nidentifying employee membership or membership status in a labor\norganization or other voluntary association affiliated with a labor\norganization or a labor federation. [ Citation.]  Disclosure of the\nrequested names, demographic information, job titles and hire\ndates would necessarily reveal\nmembership or membership status. Specifically, disclosure would\nreveal which employees are either members of SEIU- HII or\neligible to join the union as part of a bargaining unit.[3] \n\ninformation concerning employee\n\nOn August 2, 2023,  you submitted a Request for Review contesting that denial.  \n\nYou argued that your request does not seek any of the information prohibited from disclosure\nunder section 6(c-5) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act ( IPLRA). 4 Section 6(c-5) \nprovides, in relevant part: \n\nNo employer shall disclose the following information of\nany employee: ( 1) the employee' s home address ( including ZIP\ncode and county); (2) the employee's date of birth; (3) the\nemployee' s home and personal phone number; ( 4) the employee' s\npersonal email address; ( 5) any information personally identifying\nemployee membership or membership status in a labor\norganization or other voluntary association affiliated with a labor\norganization or a labor federation ( including whether employees\nare members of such organization, the identity of such\n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023.    \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(zz) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; \n\n3E- mail from Thomas D. Mulcrone, Associate General Counsel, Illinois Department of Human\n\nServices, to Maxford Nelsen (June 21, 2023). \n\n45 ILCS 315/6(c-5) (West 2022). \n\n\fMr. Maxford Nelsen\nSeptember 20, 2023\nPage 3\n\norganization, whether or not employees pay or authorize the\npayment of any dues or moneys to such organization,  and the\namounts of such dues or moneys); and (6) emails or other\ncommunications between a labor organization and its members. \n\nIf an employer discloses information in violation of this\n\nsubsection (c-5), an aggrieved employee of the employer or his or\nher exclusive bargaining representative may file an unfair labor\npractice charge with the Illinois Labor Relations Board pursuant to\nSection 10 of this Act or commence an action in the circuit court to\nenforce the provisions of this Act, including actions to compel\ncompliance,  if an employer willfully and wantonly discloses\ninformation in violation of this subsection.  (Emphases added.) \n\nOn June 30, 2022, the Public Access Counselor issued a binding opinion (Ill. \nAtt'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No. 22- 009)  concluding that a public body did not violate FOIA by\ndenying a similar FOIA request from the Freedom Foundation under section 7.5(zz) of FOIA.  \nUnlike the request at issue in this matter,  the request that underlies Binding Opinion 22- 009 did\nseek each employee' s \" union\"  such that compliance with the request would have required the\nCity to indicate whether or not each employee was a member of Service Employees International\nUnion ( SEIU)  Local 73.   That portion of the request,  however,  was not dispositive in this office' s\ndetermination that the IPLRA prohibited disclosure of the requested information.  The binding\nopinion explained that \"[ s] ection 6(c-5) of the IPLRA expressly applies not just to 'any\ninformation personally identifying employee membership' but to 'membership status' as well.5\nEmphasis added.)   Because the request was limited to employees covered by a collective\nbargaining agreement with Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 73, disclosure\nof the requested information would reveal the \" membership or membership status\"  of the\nemployees as either current or eligible members of the union.6\n\nIn this instance, your request similarly targets the identities of current or eligible\nmembers of a particular union,  SEIU- HII.  After the Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME, \nCouncil 31, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), the General Assembly amended the IPLRA to\nexempt such information from disclosure under FOIA.   Although you argue that \" nothing in\nIllinois law prohibits the disclosure of information about public employees who might be\n\n5Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 22-009, at 9-10. \n\n6Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 22-009, at 10. \n\n\fr. Maxford Nelsen\nSeptember 20, 2023\nPage 4\n\neligible' to join a labor organization[,]\" 7 you have not offered an interpretation of \"membership\nor membership status\"  and \" the identity of such organization\"  that both gives effect to all terms\nof the IPLRA amendments and requires disclosure under these circumstances.8 This office has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted as to the Department' s denial under section\n7.5(zz). \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have questions, you may contact me at\n\njoshua. jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77586 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas D. Mulcrone\nAssociate General Counsel\nIllinois Department of Human Services\n69 West Washington Street, 9th Floor\nChicago,  Illinois 60602\nDHS.FOIAOfficer@illinois.gov\n\nPublic Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (August 2, 2023). \n\n7Letter from Maxford Nelsen, Director of Labor Policy, Freedom Foundation, to Leah [Bartelt], \n\n8This office notes that although the workers at issue in your request qualify as \" public employees\" \nfor purposes of the IPLRA (5 ILCS 315/7 (West 2022)), this request is distinct from a request for a staff roster for a\nState agency or other public body.   \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Personal information of state home care workers","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-77586/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSeptember 20, 2023\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Maxford Nelsen\nDirector of Labor Policy\nFreedom Foundation\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmnelsen@freedomfoundation.com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 77586\n\nDear Mr. Nelsen: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn June 12, 2023, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nHuman Services (Department) on behalf of the Freedom Foundation, stating: \n\nI am requesting the following information for all personal\nassistants, home health workers, and/or home care workers\ncurrently working in the State of Illinois: \n\n1. First name\n2. Middle name (or initial, if name is unavailable) \n3. Last name\n4. Age\n5. Gender\n6. Job title\n7. Hire date[ 1] \n\n12, 2023). \n\n1E- mail from Maxford Nelsen, Director of Labor Policy, Freedom Foundation, to DHS Staff (June\n\nOn June 21, 2023, the Department denied your request pursuant to section 7.5(zz) \n\nof FOIA, 2 which exempts from disclosure: \" Information prohibited from being disclosed under\nthe Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.\" The Department stated: \n\nPlease note that the positions identified in your request are all\ncovered under the collective bargaining agreement between the\nIllinois Department of Central Management Services (CMS)/ \nIllinois Department of Human Services (IDHS) and the Services\nEmployees International Union, Healthcare Illinois & Indiana\nSEIU- HII). Please also note that the Illinois Public Labor\nRelations Act prohibits the release of information personally\nidentifying employee membership or membership status in a labor\norganization or other voluntary association affiliated with a labor\norganization or a labor federation. [ Citation.] Disclosure of the\nrequested names, demographic information, job titles and hire\ndates would necessarily reveal\nmembership or membership status. Specifically, disclosure would\nreveal which employees are either members of SEIU- HII or\neligible to join the union as part of a bargaining unit.[3] \n\ninformation concerning employee\n\nOn August 2, 2023, you submitted a Request for Review contesting that denial. \n\nYou argued that your request does not seek any of the information prohibited from disclosure\nunder section 6(c-5) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA). 4 Section 6(c-5) \nprovides, in relevant part: \n\nNo employer shall disclose the following information of\nany employee: (1) the employee's home address (including ZIP\ncode and county); (2) the employee's date of birth; (3) the\nemployee's home and personal phone number; (4) the employee's\npersonal email address; (5) any information personally identifying\nemployee membership or membership status in a labor\norganization or other voluntary association affiliated with a labor\norganization or a labor federation (including whether employees\nare members of such organization, the identity of such\n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(zz) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; \n\norganization, whether or not employees pay or authorize the\npayment of any dues or moneys to such organization, and the\namounts of such dues or moneys); and (6) emails or other\ncommunications between a labor organization and its members. \n\nIf an employer discloses information in violation of this\n\nsubsection (c-5), an aggrieved employee of the employer or his or\nher exclusive bargaining representative may file an unfair labor\npractice charge with the Illinois Labor Relations Board pursuant to\nSection 10 of this Act or commence an action in the circuit court to\nenforce the provisions of this Act, including actions to compel\ncompliance, if an employer willfully and wantonly discloses\ninformation in violation of this subsection. (Emphases added.) \n\nOn June 30, 2022, the Public Access Counselor issued a binding opinion (Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 22- 009) concluding that a public body did not violate FOIA by\ndenying a similar FOIA request from the Freedom Foundation under section 7.5(zz) of FOIA. \nUnlike the request at issue in this matter, the request that underlies Binding Opinion 22- 009 did\nseek each employee's \" union\" such that compliance with the request would have required the\nCity to indicate whether or not each employee was a member of Service Employees International\nUnion (SEIU) Local 73. That portion of the request, however, was not dispositive in this office's\ndetermination that the IPLRA prohibited disclosure of the requested information. The binding\nopinion explained that \"[ s] ection 6(c-5) of the IPLRA expressly applies not just to 'any\ninformation personally identifying employee membership' but to 'membership status' as well.5\nEmphasis added.) Because the request was limited to employees covered by a collective\nbargaining agreement with Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 73, disclosure\nof the requested information would reveal the \" membership or membership status\" of the\nemployees as either current or eligible members of the union.6\n\nIn this instance, your request similarly targets the identities of current or eligible\nmembers of a particular union, SEIU- HII. After the Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME, \n\neligible' to join a labor organization[,]\" 7 you have not offered an interpretation of \"membership\nor membership status\" and \" the identity of such organization\" that both gives effect to all terms\nof the IPLRA amendments and requires disclosure under these circumstances.8 This office has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted as to the Department's denial under section\n7.5(zz). \n\nThis file is closed. If you have questions, you may contact me at\n\njoshua. jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77586 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas D. Mulcrone\nAssociate General Counsel\nIllinois Department of Human Services\n69 West Washington Street, 9th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60602\nDHS.FOIAOfficer@illinois.gov\n\nPublic Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (August 2, 2023). \n\n7 Letter from Maxford Nelsen, Director of Labor Policy, Freedom Foundation, to Leah [Bartelt], \n\n8 This office notes that although the workers at issue in your request qualify as \" public employees\" \nfor purposes of the IPLRA (5 ILCS 315/7 (West 2022)), this request is distinct from a request for a staff roster for a\nState agency or other public body."}
{"id":1022,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2023-12-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["77825"],"title":"Will County State's Attorney's Office improperly denied FOIA request citing court order","filename":"77825, issued December 20, 2023.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2178,"summary":"The PAC determined that the Will County State's Attorney's Office improperly denied a FOIA request for communications with a judge because the office failed to provide the requested records to the PAC for confidential review as required by law.","plain_summary":"A reporter sought communications between the state's attorney's office and a judge in a high-profile case, which the office denied citing court orders it said prohibited disclosure. The PAC determined that none of the court orders actually barred the office from releasing the records - one order only impounded copies filed with the court, and a later order expressly noted the records could still be sought through FOIA or from the office directly - so the denial was improper. The office was directed to issue a new response applying any FOIA exemptions narrowly and disclosing all non-exempt material.","holding":"The Will County State's Attorney's Office improperly denied Mr. Sarver's FOIA request.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates FOIA by failing to provide records to the Public Access Counselor for confidential review during a Request for Review process.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/9.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Will County State's Attorney's Office","requesting_party":"Mr. Felix Sarver (The Herald-News)","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOIA procedure","subject_description":"The request sought communications between the State's Attorney's Office and a judge regarding a wrongful death lawsuit involving Samantha Harer.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":88.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_a/protective-orders/77825%2C%20issued%20December%2020%2C%202023.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA request","State's Attorney","confidential review","records access","procedural violation"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 20, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Felix Sarver\nThe Herald- News\nJoliet, Illinois\nfsarver@gmail. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kevin Meyers\nAssistant State' s Attorney\nWill County State's Attorney's Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nsaofoia@willcountyillinois. com\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2023 PAC 77825\n\nDear Mr. Sarver and Mr. Meyers: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022)).  For the reasons set forth below, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Will County State' s Attorney' s Office ( State' s Attorney' s\nOffice) improperly denied Mr. Felix Sarver's August 15, 2023, FOIA request.  \n\nOn that date, Mr. Sarver submitted a FOIA request to the State's Attorney's Office\non behalf of The Herald- News seeking copies of any communications to Will County Judge John\nAnderson regarding Samantha Harer since July 1, 2023.  The request related to a wrongful death\nlawsuit brought by Ms. Harer' s parents;  according to a July 20,  2023,  news article, \" Judge John\nAnderson issued a $15 million total default judgment against former Crest Hill Police Officer\nPhil Flores in the deadly shooting of Flores'  estranged girlfriend,  Samantha Harer,  23[,]\"  but Mr. \nFlores had never been charged in connection with Ms. Harer' s death. 1 On August 18, 2023,  the\n\n20, 2023, 12:24 p.m.), https://patch.com/illinois/joliet/phil-flores-must-pay-15-million-samantha-harers-death-judge. \n\n1John Ferak, Phil Flores Must Pay $15 Million For Samantha Harer's Death: Judge, Patch (July\n\n500 South Second Street,  Springfield,  Illinois 62701 • ( 217)  782- 1090 •  TTY: ( 877)  844- 5461 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale,  Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529-6400 • TTY: (877) 675-9339 • Fax: ( 618) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Felix Sarver\nMr. Kevin Meyers\nDecember 20,  2023\nPage 2\n\nState's Attorney's Office responded by denying the request pursuant to section 7(1)(a) FOIA,2\nasserting that the judge \" has impounded that communication,  and recently ruled that he would\nnot unseal the records.\" 3 On August 22, 2023, Mr. Sarver submitted a Request for Review\ncontesting the denial of his request.   Mr. Sarver enclosed copies of court orders issued in the case\non July 20, 2023,4 July 27, 2023,5 and August 15, 2023,6 as well as the original complaint.7 He\nargued: \n\nAs the judge indicates in his August 15, 2023 court order, \n\nhis ruling does not prohibit disclosure of the record through FOIA. \nHe' s addressing the plaintiffs in the lawsuit case but by saying they\ncould obtain the record through FOIA, that means anyone can\nobtain the document\n\nthrough that means as well.[ 8] \n\nOn August 28,  2023,  this office forwarded a copy of Mr. Sarver' s Request for\n\nReview to the State's Attorney's Office and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the\nresponsive records for this office' s confidential\nlegal and factual bases for denying the request.  Having received no response, on September 12, \n2023,  this office again sent a copy of the Request for Review to the State' s Attorney' s Office and\nreiterated the prior request for the same materials.  On September 29, 2023, the State's Attorney's\nOffice furnished a written response but no records to review.   On October 2, 2023,  Mr. Sarver\nnotified this office that he had no reply to that response. \n\nreview,  and a detailed written explanation of its\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n3Letter from Kevin Meyers,  Assistant State's Attorney,  to Felix Sarver, The Herald- News ( August\n\n18, 2023). \n\n22, 2023). \n\n4Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, July 20, 2023). \n\n5Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, July 27, 2023).  \n\n6Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, August 15, 2023).   \n\n7Complaint,  Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, October 7, 2022).   \n\n8E- mail from Felix Sarver, The Herald-News, Joliet, Illinois, to Public Access [ Bureau] ( August\n\n\fMr. Felix Sarver\nMr. Kevin Meyers\nDecember 20,  2023\nPage 3\n\nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body \"has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS\n140/1.2 (West 2022).  When a court issues a protective order that prohibits a public body from\ndisclosing certain records,  the public body does not violate FOIA by withholding those records.  \nIn re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 66.   \n\nThe first of the three court orders Mr. Sarver provided is Judge Anderson's July\n\n20, 2023,  decision that Mr. Flores likely caused Ms. Harer' s death and was liable for $15 million\nin compensatory damages.  The second order, dated July 27, 2023, begins as follows:  \"The\nCourt is in receipt of communications from the State' s Attorney' s office,  dated July 24,  2023, \nconsisting of a cover letter and what appears (at a glance) to include investigative information\nregarding the death of Samantha Harer.\" 9 Emphasizing that the case before the court was a civil\nmatter rather than a criminal one, Judge Anderson then explained: \n\nThe communication from the State's Attorney's office\n\nreflects that the letter is submitted in accordance with the rules of\nprofessional conduct. However, the State's Attorney's office is not\na party to this case,  and has never asked to intervene in the case.  \nAccordingly, the Court is not in an appropriate position to accept\nor consider evidence submitted to the Court in this fashion. \n\nThe Clerk of the Court is directed to place the July 24, \n\n2023 communication (with enclosures) in the Court file and\nimpound it because it does not constitute evidence that is properly\nbefore the Court.[10] \n\nPlainly, no language in this order directed the State's Attorney's Office to keep the records\nconfidential;  this order concerned the court' s receipt of the records,  and served to prevent the\nrecords from being immediately disclosed to the public in full as part of the court file.   \n\nIn the third and final order, issued August 15, 2023, the court denied plaintiffs' \n\nmotion to unseal the documents that were enclosed with the cover letter from the State' s\nAttorney's Office's \" unsolicited communication\" to the judge.11 The court denied the motion for\n\n9Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666, at 1 (Circuit Court, Will County, July 27, 2023). \n\n10Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666, at 1-2 (Circuit Court, Will County, July 27, 2023). \n\n11Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666, at 1 (Circuit Court, Will County, August 15, 2023). \n\n\fMr. Felix Sarver\nMr. Kevin Meyers\nDecember 20,  2023\nPage 4\n\nvarious reasons, including that the court lacked sufficient information about the scope and\npurpose of the records,  that the case had already been decided and the records were not relevant\nto that decision, that plaintiffs' counsel had been advised of the substance of the documents by\nreceiving the cover letter and had also received most if not all of the documents in a related\nfederal case, and that the civil case was not the correct forum to argue over whether Mr. Flores\nshould be charged or whether ethical violations occurred. 12 Nonetheless,  the order then stated: \n\nNothing in this order should be interpreted as prohibiting\n\nplaintiffs from seeking the Documents through the court files in the\nrelated federal case,  through the Freedom of Information Act,  from\nthe State's Attorney's office directly, through separate litigation, \nfrom the ARDC,  or through any other means.  ( Emphasis\nadded.)[13] \n\nIn its answer to this office, the State's Attorney's Office argued that it properly\n\ndenied Mr. Sarver' s FOIA request because although it \"has no major objection to the release of\nthe records in general,\"  it \"may face the specter of contempt proceedings should [it] voluntarily\nrelease the records.\" 14 The State' s Attorney' s Office argued that the language in Judge\nAnderson's most recent order about obtaining the documents through FOIA and from the State's\nAttorney' s Office directly is not dispositive of this matter because \" the passage only deals with\nthe Plaintiffs in the Harer case[,]\"  and \"it is not definitive in determining whether the documents\nare available under FOIA,  only simply that the Court has not prejudged the ability of the\nPlaintiffs to avail themselves to the act.\" 15 The State's Attorney's Office continued:  \"This is\nneither a clear declaration that this office may release the impounded documents,  nor is it a\nshield to a contempt proceeding.  We are at best left in limbo. For the same reason we have not\nincluded the records for the PAC to review.\" 16\n\nThe State' s Attorney' s Office has not demonstrated that any of Judge Anderson' s\ncourt orders prohibit the State's Attorney's Office from disclosing the requested records to Mr. \n\n12Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666, at 1-2 (Circuit Court, Will County,  August 15, 2023).  \n\n13Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666, at 3 (Circuit Court, Will County, August 15, 2023).  \n\nJones, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (September 29, 2023), at 1-2.  \n\n14Letter from Kevin Meyers, Assistant State's Attorney, to Assistant Attorney General Joshua\n\nJones, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (September 29, 2023), at 2. \n\n15Letter from Kevin Meyers, Assistant State's Attorney, to Assistant Attorney General Joshua\n\nJones, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (September 29, 2023), at 2. \n\n16Letter from Kevin Meyers, Assistant State's Attorney, to Assistant Attorney General Joshua\n\n\fMr. Felix Sarver\nMr. Kevin Meyers\nDecember 20,  2023\nPage 5\n\nSarver.  The State's Attorney's Office did not identify any portion of the orders in which the court\ninstructed the State' s Attorney' s Office to keep the records confidential.   Had the court meant that\nthe records sent to the court by the State's Attorney's Office must be kept confidential by the\nState' s Attorney' s Office,  it could have expressly said so rather than stating that the records may\nbe sought from the State's Attorney's Office pursuant to FOIA.  The matter that the court did not\nprejudge is the extent to which FOIA exemptions pertaining to ongoing criminal\napply to the records, not whether the records are beyond the reach of FOIA because of a\nprotective order.   \n\ninvestigations\n\nrecords to the light of public\n\nMoreover,  in listing FOIA as an available means of seeking the records,  the court\ndid not convey that the records are subject to disclosure only to the plaintiffs in the Harer case.  \nRather, \" the purpose of the FOIA is to open governmental\nscrutiny.\"  (Emphasis added.)  Bowie v. Evanston Community Consolidated School District No. \n65,  128 Ill. 2d 373,  378 ( 1989);  see also 5 ILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022) (\"[ I]t is declared to be the\npublic policy of the State of Illinois that all persons are entitled to full and complete information\nthem\nregarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent\nas public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act.\"  (Emphasis\nadded.)).   Again,  the extent to which the records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to one or\nmore FOIA exemptions is a separate matter from whether the court order impounding the copies\nof the records the State' s Attorney' s Office provided to the court prohibits the State' s Attorney' s\nOffice from releasing copies of the records it maintains in response to Mr. Sarver's request. \nAccordingly,  the State' s Attorney' s Office did not prove that it properly denied Mr. Sarver' s\nFOIA request in its entirety.   \n\nBecause the State's Attorney's Office refused to provide this office with copies of\n\nreview as expressly required under section 9.5(c) of FOIA ( 5\n\nthe records for our confidential\nILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022)), this office is not in a position to analyze the extent to which the\nrecords may contain pieces of information that fall within the scope of the exemptions set out in\nFOIA.  This office asks the State's Attorney's Office to provide a revised response to Mr. Sarver, \nnarrowly applying any pertinent FOIA exemptions and disclosing all non- exempt portions of the\nrecords.  To the extent that it redacts or withholds any information, the State's Attorney's Office\nmust issue a detailed explanation for the denial in accordance with section 9 of FOIA ( 5 ILCS\n140/9 (West 2022)). \n\n\fr. Felix Sarver\nMr. Kevin Meyers\nDecember 20,  2023\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This file is closed.   If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at joshua.jones@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77825 f prot order improper sao\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A reporter requested communications between the Will County State's Attorney's Office and a judge about a specific case. The office denied the request, citing a court order that it said required confidentiality. The reporter asked the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau to review the denial. The Bureau concluded that the State's Attorney's Office improperly denied the FOIA request because the court orders did not prohibit the office from disclosing the records.","card_headline":"Communications with a judge about a wrongful death lawsuit","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-77825/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 20, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Felix Sarver\nThe Herald- News\nJoliet, Illinois\nfsarver@gmail. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kevin Meyers\nAssistant State's Attorney\nWill County State's Attorney's Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nsaofoia@willcountyillinois. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 77825\n\nDear Mr. Sarver and Mr. Meyers: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022)). For the reasons set forth below, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Will County State's Attorney's Office (State's Attorney's\nOffice) improperly denied Mr. Felix Sarver's August 15, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Mr. Sarver submitted a FOIA request to the State's Attorney's Office\non behalf of The Herald- News seeking copies of any communications to Will County Judge John\nAnderson regarding Samantha Harer since July 1, 2023. The request related to a wrongful death\nlawsuit brought by Ms. Harer's parents; according to a July 20, 2023, news article, \" Judge John\nAnderson issued a $15 million total default judgment against former Crest Hill Police Officer\nPhil Flores in the deadly shooting of Flores' estranged girlfriend, Samantha Harer, 23[,]\" but Mr. \nFlores had never been charged in connection with Ms. Harer's death. 1 On August 18, 2023, the\n\n20, 2023, 12:24 p.m.), https://patch.com/illinois/joliet/phil-flores-must-pay-15-million-samantha-harers-death-judge. \n\n1 John Ferak, Phil Flores Must Pay $15 Million For Samantha Harer's Death: Judge, Patch (July\n\nState's Attorney's Office responded by denying the request pursuant to section 7(1)(a) FOIA,2\nasserting that the judge \" has impounded that communication, and recently ruled that he would\nnot unseal the records.\" 3 On August 22, 2023, Mr. Sarver submitted a Request for Review\ncontesting the denial of his request. Mr. Sarver enclosed copies of court orders issued in the case\non July 20, 2023,4 July 27, 2023,5 and August 15, 2023,6 as well as the original complaint.7 He\nargued: \n\nAs the judge indicates in his August 15, 2023 court order, \n\nhis ruling does not prohibit disclosure of the record through FOIA. \nHe's addressing the plaintiffs in the lawsuit case but by saying they\ncould obtain the record through FOIA, that means anyone can\nobtain the document\n\nthrough that means as well.[ 8] \n\nOn August 28, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of Mr. Sarver's Request for\n\nReview to the State's Attorney's Office and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the\nresponsive records for this office's confidential\nlegal and factual bases for denying the request. Having received no response, on September 12, \n2023, this office again sent a copy of the Request for Review to the State's Attorney's Office and\nreiterated the prior request for the same materials. On September 29, 2023, the State's Attorney's\nOffice furnished a written response but no records to review. On October 2, 2023, Mr. Sarver\nnotified this office that he had no reply to that response. \n\nreview, and a detailed written explanation of its\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n3 Letter from Kevin Meyers, Assistant State's Attorney, to Felix Sarver, The Herald- News (August\n\n18, 2023). \n\n22, 2023). \n\n4 Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, July 20, 2023). \n\n5 Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, July 27, 2023). \n\n6 Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, August 15, 2023). \n\n7 Complaint, Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666 (Circuit Court, Will County, October 7, 2022). \n\n8E- mail from Felix Sarver, The Herald-News, Joliet, Illinois, to Public Access [ Bureau] (August\n\nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \"has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/1.2 (West 2022). When a court issues a protective order that prohibits a public body from\ndisclosing certain records, the public body does not violate FOIA by withholding those records. \nIn re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 66. \n\nThe first of the three court orders Mr. Sarver provided is Judge Anderson's July\n\n20, 2023, decision that Mr. Flores likely caused Ms. Harer's death and was liable for $15 million\nin compensatory damages. The second order, dated July 27, 2023, begins as follows: \"The\nCourt is in receipt of communications from the State's Attorney's office, dated July 24, 2023, \nconsisting of a cover letter and what appears (at a glance) to include investigative information\nregarding the death of Samantha Harer.\" 9 Emphasizing that the case before the court was a civil\nmatter rather than a criminal one, Judge Anderson then explained: \n\nThe communication from the State's Attorney's office\n\nreflects that the letter is submitted in accordance with the rules of\nprofessional conduct. However, the State's Attorney's office is not\na party to this case, and has never asked to intervene in the case. \nAccordingly, the Court is not in an appropriate position to accept\nor consider evidence submitted to the Court in this fashion. \n\nThe Clerk of the Court is directed to place the July 24, \n\n2023 communication (with enclosures) in the Court file and\nimpound it because it does not constitute evidence that is properly\nbefore the Court.[10] \n\nPlainly, no language in this order directed the State's Attorney's Office to keep the records\nconfidential; this order concerned the court's receipt of the records, and served to prevent the\nrecords from being immediately disclosed to the public in full as part of the court file. \n\nIn the third and final order, issued August 15, 2023, the court denied plaintiffs' \n\nmotion to unseal the documents that were enclosed with the cover letter from the State's\nAttorney's Office's \" unsolicited communication\" to the judge.11 The court denied the motion for\n\nvarious reasons, including that the court lacked sufficient information about the scope and\npurpose of the records, that the case had already been decided and the records were not relevant\nto that decision, that plaintiffs' counsel had been advised of the substance of the documents by\nreceiving the cover letter and had also received most if not all of the documents in a related\nfederal case, and that the civil case was not the correct forum to argue over whether Mr. Flores\nshould be charged or whether ethical violations occurred. 12 Nonetheless, the order then stated: \n\nNothing in this order should be interpreted as prohibiting\n\nplaintiffs from seeking the Documents through the court files in the\nrelated federal case, through the Freedom of Information Act, from\nthe State's Attorney's office directly, through separate litigation, \nfrom the ARDC, or through any other means. (Emphasis\nadded.)[13] \n\nIn its answer to this office, the State's Attorney's Office argued that it properly\n\ndenied Mr. Sarver's FOIA request because although it \"has no major objection to the release of\nthe records in general,\" it \"may face the specter of contempt proceedings should [it] voluntarily\nrelease the records.\" 14 The State's Attorney's Office argued that the language in Judge\nAnderson's most recent order about obtaining the documents through FOIA and from the State's\nAttorney's Office directly is not dispositive of this matter because \" the passage only deals with\nthe Plaintiffs in the Harer case[,]\" and \"it is not definitive in determining whether the documents\nare available under FOIA, only simply that the Court has not prejudged the ability of the\nPlaintiffs to avail themselves to the act.\" 15 The State's Attorney's Office continued: \"This is\nneither a clear declaration that this office may release the impounded documents, nor is it a\nshield to a contempt proceeding. We are at best left in limbo. For the same reason we have not\nincluded the records for the PAC to review.\" 16\n\nThe State's Attorney's Office has not demonstrated that any of Judge Anderson's\ncourt orders prohibit the State's Attorney's Office from disclosing the requested records to Mr. \n\n12 Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666, at 1-2 (Circuit Court, Will County, August 15, 2023). \n\n13 Harer v. Flores, No. 22 LA 666, at 3 (Circuit Court, Will County, August 15, 2023). \n\nJones, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (September 29, 2023), at 1-2. \n\n14 Letter from Kevin Meyers, Assistant State's Attorney, to Assistant Attorney General Joshua\n\nJones, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (September 29, 2023), at 2. \n\n15 Letter from Kevin Meyers, Assistant State's Attorney, to Assistant Attorney General Joshua\n\nJones, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (September 29, 2023), at 2. \n\n16 Letter from Kevin Meyers, Assistant State's Attorney, to Assistant Attorney General Joshua\n\nSarver. The State's Attorney's Office did not identify any portion of the orders in which the court\ninstructed the State's Attorney's Office to keep the records confidential. Had the court meant that\nthe records sent to the court by the State's Attorney's Office must be kept confidential by the\nState's Attorney's Office, it could have expressly said so rather than stating that the records may\nbe sought from the State's Attorney's Office pursuant to FOIA. The matter that the court did not\nprejudge is the extent to which FOIA exemptions pertaining to ongoing criminal\napply to the records, not whether the records are beyond the reach of FOIA because of a\nprotective order. \n\ninvestigations\n\nrecords to the light of public\n\nMoreover, in listing FOIA as an available means of seeking the records, the court\ndid not convey that the records are subject to disclosure only to the plaintiffs in the Harer case. \nRather, \" the purpose of the FOIA is to open governmental\nscrutiny.\" (Emphasis added.) Bowie v. Evanston Community Consolidated School District No. \n65, 128 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1989); see also 5 ILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022) (\"[ I]t is declared to be the\npublic policy of the State of Illinois that all persons are entitled to full and complete information\nthem\nregarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent\nas public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act.\" (Emphasis\nadded.)). Again, the extent to which the records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to one or\nmore FOIA exemptions is a separate matter from whether the court order impounding the copies\nof the records the State's Attorney's Office provided to the court prohibits the State's Attorney's\nOffice from releasing copies of the records it maintains in response to Mr. Sarver's request. \nAccordingly, the State's Attorney's Office did not prove that it properly denied Mr. Sarver's\nFOIA request in its entirety. \n\nBecause the State's Attorney's Office refused to provide this office with copies of\n\nreview as expressly required under section 9.5(c) of FOIA (5\n\nthe records for our confidential\nILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022)), this office is not in a position to analyze the extent to which the\nrecords may contain pieces of information that fall within the scope of the exemptions set out in\nFOIA. This office asks the State's Attorney's Office to provide a revised response to Mr. Sarver, \nnarrowly applying any pertinent FOIA exemptions and disclosing all non- exempt portions of the\nrecords. To the extent that it redacts or withholds any information, the State's Attorney's Office\nmust issue a detailed explanation for the denial in accordance with section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at joshua.jones@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77825 f prot order improper sao"}
{"id":1023,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-06-21","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["77963"],"title":"Chicago Public Schools improperly withheld employee compensation emails under 7(1)(n)","filename":"77963, issued June 21, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1858,"summary":"The requester sought emails regarding an employee's compensation, which Chicago Public Schools (CPS) withheld under the claim that they related to a grievance; the PAC determined the records were not exempt and should be disclosed.","plain_summary":"A requester asked Chicago Public Schools for emails about an employee's pay. The school district refused to release them, claiming they were part of a legal grievance process. The Attorney General's office disagreed, finding the emails existed independently of the grievance and must be released.","holding":"Chicago Public Schools improperly withheld the requested emails because they were not exempt under section 7(1)(n) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether emails regarding an employee's compensation are exempt from disclosure under FOIA section 7(1)(n) as records relating to an adjudication of a grievance.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/7(1)(n)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(n)"],"public_body":"Chicago Public Schools","requesting_party":"Mr. Josiah A. Groff","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought communications regarding the compensation of a specific Chicago Public Schools employee.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_n/77963%2C%20issued%20June%2021%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["personnel records","compensation","FOIA exemption","grievance"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Josiah A. Groff\n\nDowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich\n8 South Michigan Avenue, 19th Floor\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njgroff@laboradvocates.com\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Ana Diaz\n\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nChicago Public Schools\n\n1 North Dearborn Street, 9th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60602\napdiaz2@cps.edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2023 PAC 77963; CPS no. N013898-070623\n\nDear Mr. Groff and Ms. Diaz:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069,\neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Counselor concludes\nthat Chicago Public Schools (CPS) improperly withheld certain e-mails responsive to Mr. Josiah\n\nA. Groff's July 6, 2023, FOIA request.\n\nOn that date, Mr. Groff submitted a FOIA request to CPS seeking copies of:\n\nAll written communications about the level of\ncompensation received or to be received by your employee Elba\nM. Iniguez for her work as an Instructional Support Leader,\n\n500 South 2mt Street 115 South LaSalle Street\nSpring lield, Minois 62701 ‘Chicago, Mimois 60603\n(207) 782-1090 © Fax, (217) 7R2-7046 (E32) S14-300H) « Fax: (312) BE4-3806\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite €\nCarbondale. Mlinois 62903\n(G18) S29-6410) * Fax: (618) $29.64 16\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach ws by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nwiww TlinotsAttioneyGeneral gov\n\nMr. Josiah A. Groff\nMs. Ana Diaz\n\nJune 21, 2024\n\nPage 2\n\nincluding emails on that subject matter sent to or from the email\n\naddresses EMIniguez@cps.edu and yy\"!\n\nOn August 3, 2023, CPS responded by providing a copy of an offer letter, but\nredacted discrete information pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and withheld\ncertain communications pursuant to 7(1)(f) of FOIA.2 On August 30, 2023, Mr. Groff submitted\nthis Request for Review contesting the partial denial of his request. He argued that section\n7(1)(f) cannot apply to communications with Ms. Iniguez before she was hired.\n\nOn September 5, 2023, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the\nRequest for Review to CPS and requested unredacted copies of any withheld records for this\noffice's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for\nwithholding them. On November 3, 2023, CPS provided those materials, additionally citing\nsection 7(1)(n) of FOIA. On November 15, 2023, Mr. Groff replied to that response. He stated:\n\"The FOIA request does not seek correspondences related to deliberations by management,\nrather it requests discussions between a member of management and a prospective employee. \"4\nThus, although Mr. Groff's FOIA request was not limited to communications between CPS and\nMs. Iniguez, he narrowed the scope of this Request for Review to such communications.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, all public records in the possession or custody of a public body are\n\"presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body\n\"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).\n\nSection 7(1)(f) exempts from inspection and copying \"[p]reliminary drafts, notes,\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" The\npurpose of section 7(1)(f) is to allow government officials to fully and frankly discuss matters of\ngovernmental concern in order to make informed policy decisions. Harwood v. McDonough,\n\n'FOIA portal message from Josiah A. Groff to Chicago Public Schools (July 6, 2023).\n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(£) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June\n30, 2023.\n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(n) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023.\n\n‘Letter from Josiah A. Groff to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 15,2023), at | -\n\nOffice of the Mlinois Attomey General\n\nMr. Josiah A. Groff\nMs. Ana Diaz\n\nJune 21, 2024\n\nPage 3\n\n344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248 (2003). \"[I]n order to be exempt under this provision, the responsive\nmaterials must be both (1) inter or intra agency and (2) predecisional and deliberative.\" Fisher v.\nOffice of Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (lst) 200225, 4 19.\n\nIn response to Mr. Groff's Request for Review, CPS defended its partial denial\nunder section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. CPS stated that \"pre-decisional content in which opinions are\nexpressed, drafts are shared, and decision-making is occurring were withheld in accordance with\nsection 7(1)(f) of the FOIA.\" CPS described the withheld records as follows:\n\nThe responsive emails reflect communications between the\nCPS Office of Diverse Learner Supports and Services and the CPS\nTalent Office and Ms. Iniguez, in which employees provide their\nopinions and engage in open and frank discussion in order to\nappropriately determine how to respond to a request concerning a\nsalary matter. Those emails contain pre-decisional content,\nexpression of opinions, and comments designed to formulate a\nresponse and are therefore exempt from disclosure. [6\n\nCPS also denied Mr. Groff's allegation that Ms. Iniguez was not employed by CPS at the time of\nthe communications, stating that she \"was using her District-provided email address in addition\nto a personal email address to discuss these matters.\"’\n\nIn his reply, Mr. Groff argued that \"[t]he fact that Iniguez was employed by CPS\nat the time the correspondences occurred may meet the standard of an 'intra-agency'\ncommunication. But that does not automatically render the communications exempt. The\ncommunications must also be pre-decisional or deliberative.\" (Emphasis in original.)® Mr.\nGroff contended:\n\nIt is our understanding that an individual seeking an employee\ntransfer does not possess the power to set the terms under which\nthey are negotiating. Therefore, we suspect that the requested\nemails do not address the development of an internal policy or\n\n‘Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School{s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [1].\n\n‘Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School[s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [1-2].\n\n7Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School[s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [2].\n\n‘Letter from Josiah A. Groff to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 15,2023), at 1.\n\nOffice of the Minois Attormey General\n\nMr. Josiah A. Groff\nMs. Ana Diaz\n\nJune 21, 2024\n\nPage 4\n\nintra-agency deliberations as to salary policies at CPS writ large.\nRather, we are requesting factual exchanges related to where an\nindividual's salary will fall within an already existing policy, not\nexchanges among hiring personnel about the development of\nvarious salary thresholds.|°!\n\nThis office's review of the withheld communications between Ms. Iniguez and\nCPS administrators confirmed that although they are predecisional in nature, they are not\ndeliberative. \"In order to qualify for the deliberative process exemption, a document must be * *\n* deliberative in the sense that it is actually related to the process by which policies are\nformulated.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Cook County Assessor's Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455,\n428. The communications with Ms. Iniguez contrast with the communications among CPS\nadministrators that CPS provided for this office's confidential review, as the communications\namong CPS administrators clearly evince deliberations in which opinions are expressed and\npolicies or actions are formulated. The administrators are engaged in a decision-making process\nwith each other in those e-mails, about Ms. Iniguez. Section 7(1)(f) protects their ability to fully\nand frankly discuss salary matters among themselves in order to arrive at the best possible\noutcomes for the public without fear of outside interference. Yet, Mr. Groff is not interested in\nsuch e-mails. Rather, he seeks the e-mails between Ms. Iniguez and CPS administrators, in\nwhich Ms. Iniguez is not part of the decision-making process. Because disclosure of the e-mails\nbetween Ms. Iniguez and CPS administrators would not expose the administrators’ deliberative\ndiscussions related to her salary, this office concludes that CPS improperly denied the\ncommunications pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.\n\nSection 7(1)(n) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(n) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying \"[r]ecords relating\nto a public body's adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases; however, this\nexemption shall not extend to the final outcome of cases in which discipline is imposed.\"\n(Emphasis added.) In section 7(1)(n), \"the phrase 'relating to' must be read narrowly and in light\nof FOIA's purpose to generally provide open access to public records.\" Peoria Journal Star v.\nCity of Peoria, 2016 IL App (3d) 140838, { 13. In Peoria Journal Star, the Illinois Appellate\nCourt concluded that a report of an employee grievance was not exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(n) because it \"was created well before any adjudication took place and existed\nindependent of any adjudication.\" Peoria Journal Star, 2016 IL App (3d) 140838, § 16.\n\nIn its answer to this office, CPS asserted that section 7(1)(n) exempts the\ncommunications with Ms. Iniguez because:\n\n°Letter from Josiah A. Groff to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 15,2023), at 2.\n\nOffice of the Minois Attormey General\n\nMr. Josiah A. Groff\nMs. Ana Diaz\n\nJune 21, 2024\n\nPage 5\n\n[T]he records being sought are related to the adjudication of a\ngrievance submitted by another employee. This employee, who is\ncurrently employed in a similar position, filed a grievance alleging\nthat she was being unfairly paid less * * *. Iniguez's\ncommunications about her compensation are directly connected to\nthe pending grievance. As such, the emails requested by Mr. Groff\n(who, it should be respectfully noted, is routinely retained by the\nChicago Teachers Union to pursue employee grievance matters\nfiled by its members) are exempt from disclosure pursuant to\n[section 7(1)(n)].0°\n\nIn reply, Mr. Groff argued that this matter is analogous to Peoria Journal Star\nbecause the e-mails between Ms. Iniguez and the administrators predated the grievance to which\nCPS refers and exist independently of any adjudication of that grievance. This office agrees.\nThe communications between Ms. Iniguez and the CPS administrators precede and exist without\nregard to the grievance materials CPS supplied to this office. Construing the phrase \"relating to\"\nnarrowly, CPS did not demonstrate that the later, separate grievance retroactively made Ms.\nIniguez's communications exempt under section 7(1)(n).\n\nTo remedy its improper denial, this office asks CPS to provide Mr. Groff with\ncopies of the responsive communications between Ms. Iniguez and CPS administrators.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at joshua.jones@ilag. gov or (773) 590-7951.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77963 f 71f improper 71n improper sd\n\n‘Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School[s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [2].\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Emails about a school employee's compensation","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-77963/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Josiah A. Groff\n\nDowd, Bloch, Bennett, Cervone, Auerbach & Yokich\n8 South Michigan Avenue, 19th Floor\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njgroff@laboradvocates.com\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Ana Diaz\n\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nChicago Public Schools\n\n1 North Dearborn Street, 9th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60602\napdiaz2@cps.edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2023 PAC 77963; CPS no. N013898-070623\n\nDear Mr. Groff and Ms. Diaz:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069,\neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Counselor concludes\nthat Chicago Public Schools (CPS) improperly withheld certain e-mails responsive to Mr. Josiah\n\nA. Groff's July 6, 2023, FOIA request.\n\nOn that date, Mr. Groff submitted a FOIA request to CPS seeking copies of:\n\nAll written communications about the level of\ncompensation received or to be received by your employee Elba\nM. Iniguez for her work as an Instructional Support Leader,\n\n500 South 2mt Street 115 South LaSalle Street\nSpring lield, Minois 62701 ‘Chicago, Mimois 60603\n(207) 782-1090 © Fax, (217) 7R2-7046 (E32) S14-300H) « Fax: (312) BE4-3806\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite €\nCarbondale. Mlinois 62903\n(G18) S29-6410) * Fax: (618) $29.64 16\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach ws by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nincluding emails on that subject matter sent to or from the email\n\naddresses EMIniguez@cps.edu and yy\"!\n\nOn August 3, 2023, CPS responded by providing a copy of an offer letter, but\nredacted discrete information pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and withheld\ncertain communications pursuant to 7(1)(f) of FOIA.2 On August 30, 2023, Mr. Groff submitted\nthis Request for Review contesting the partial denial of his request. He argued that section\n7(1)(f) cannot apply to communications with Ms. Iniguez before she was hired.\n\nOn September 5, 2023, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the\nRequest for Review to CPS and requested unredacted copies of any withheld records for this\noffice's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for\nwithholding them. On November 3, 2023, CPS provided those materials, additionally citing\nsection 7(1)(n) of FOIA. On November 15, 2023, Mr. Groff replied to that response. He stated:\n\"The FOIA request does not seek correspondences related to deliberations by management,\nrather it requests discussions between a member of management and a prospective employee. \"4\nThus, although Mr. Groff's FOIA request was not limited to communications between CPS and\nMs. Iniguez, he narrowed the scope of this Request for Review to such communications.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, all public records in the possession or custody of a public body are\n\"presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body\n\"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).\n\nSection 7(1)(f) exempts from inspection and copying \"[p]reliminary drafts, notes,\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" The\npurpose of section 7(1)(f) is to allow government officials to fully and frankly discuss matters of\ngovernmental concern in order to make informed policy decisions. Harwood v. McDonough,\n\n'FOIA portal message from Josiah A. Groff to Chicago Public Schools (July 6, 2023).\n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(£) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June\n30, 2023.\n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(n) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023.\n\n‘Letter from Josiah A. Groff to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 15,2023), at | -\n\n344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248 (2003). \"[I]n order to be exempt under this provision, the responsive\nmaterials must be both (1) inter or intra agency and (2) predecisional and deliberative.\" Fisher v.\nOffice of Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (lst) 200225, 4 19.\n\nIn response to Mr. Groff's Request for Review, CPS defended its partial denial\nunder section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. CPS stated that \"pre-decisional content in which opinions are\nexpressed, drafts are shared, and decision-making is occurring were withheld in accordance with\nsection 7(1)(f) of the FOIA.\" CPS described the withheld records as follows:\n\nThe responsive emails reflect communications between the\nCPS Office of Diverse Learner Supports and Services and the CPS\nTalent Office and Ms. Iniguez, in which employees provide their\nopinions and engage in open and frank discussion in order to\nappropriately determine how to respond to a request concerning a\nsalary matter. Those emails contain pre-decisional content,\nexpression of opinions, and comments designed to formulate a\nresponse and are therefore exempt from disclosure. [6\n\nCPS also denied Mr. Groff's allegation that Ms. Iniguez was not employed by CPS at the time of\nthe communications, stating that she \"was using her District-provided email address in addition\nto a personal email address to discuss these matters.\"’\n\nIn his reply, Mr. Groff argued that \"[t]he fact that Iniguez was employed by CPS\nat the time the correspondences occurred may meet the standard of an 'intra-agency'\ncommunication. But that does not automatically render the communications exempt. The\ncommunications must also be pre-decisional or deliberative.\" (Emphasis in original.)® Mr.\nGroff contended:\n\nIt is our understanding that an individual seeking an employee\ntransfer does not possess the power to set the terms under which\nthey are negotiating. Therefore, we suspect that the requested\nemails do not address the development of an internal policy or\n\n‘Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School{s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [1].\n\n‘Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School[s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [1-2].\n\n7 Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School[s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [2].\n\n‘Letter from Josiah A. Groff to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 15,2023), at 1.\n\nintra-agency deliberations as to salary policies at CPS writ large.\nRather, we are requesting factual exchanges related to where an\nindividual's salary will fall within an already existing policy, not\nexchanges among hiring personnel about the development of\nvarious salary thresholds.|°!\n\nThis office's review of the withheld communications between Ms. Iniguez and\nCPS administrators confirmed that although they are predecisional in nature, they are not\ndeliberative. \"In order to qualify for the deliberative process exemption, a document must be * *\n* deliberative in the sense that it is actually related to the process by which policies are\nformulated.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Cook County Assessor's Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455,\n428. The communications with Ms. Iniguez contrast with the communications among CPS\nadministrators that CPS provided for this office's confidential review, as the communications\namong CPS administrators clearly evince deliberations in which opinions are expressed and\npolicies or actions are formulated. The administrators are engaged in a decision-making process\nwith each other in those e-mails, about Ms. Iniguez. Section 7(1)(f) protects their ability to fully\nand frankly discuss salary matters among themselves in order to arrive at the best possible\noutcomes for the public without fear of outside interference. Yet, Mr. Groff is not interested in\nsuch e-mails. Rather, he seeks the e-mails between Ms. Iniguez and CPS administrators, in\nwhich Ms. Iniguez is not part of the decision-making process. Because disclosure of the e-mails\nbetween Ms. Iniguez and CPS administrators would not expose the administrators’ deliberative\ndiscussions related to her salary, this office concludes that CPS improperly denied the\ncommunications pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.\n\nSection 7(1)(n) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(n) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying \"[r]ecords relating\nto a public body's adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases; however, this\nexemption shall not extend to the final outcome of cases in which discipline is imposed.\"\n(Emphasis added.) In section 7(1)(n), \"the phrase 'relating to' must be read narrowly and in light\nof FOIA's purpose to generally provide open access to public records.\" Peoria Journal Star v.\nCity of Peoria, 2016 IL App (3d) 140838, { 13. In Peoria Journal Star, the Illinois Appellate\nCourt concluded that a report of an employee grievance was not exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(n) because it \"was created well before any adjudication took place and existed\nindependent of any adjudication.\" Peoria Journal Star, 2016 IL App (3d) 140838, § 16.\n\nIn its answer to this office, CPS asserted that section 7(1)(n) exempts the\ncommunications with Ms. Iniguez because:\n\n°Letter from Josiah A. Groff to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 15,2023), at 2.\n\n[T]he records being sought are related to the adjudication of a\ngrievance submitted by another employee. This employee, who is\ncurrently employed in a similar position, filed a grievance alleging\nthat she was being unfairly paid less * * *. Iniguez's\ncommunications about her compensation are directly connected to\nthe pending grievance. As such, the emails requested by Mr. Groff\n(who, it should be respectfully noted, is routinely retained by the\nChicago Teachers Union to pursue employee grievance matters\nfiled by its members) are exempt from disclosure pursuant to\n[section 7(1)(n)].0°\n\nIn reply, Mr. Groff argued that this matter is analogous to Peoria Journal Star\nbecause the e-mails between Ms. Iniguez and the administrators predated the grievance to which\nCPS refers and exist independently of any adjudication of that grievance. This office agrees.\nThe communications between Ms. Iniguez and the CPS administrators precede and exist without\nregard to the grievance materials CPS supplied to this office. Construing the phrase \"relating to\"\nnarrowly, CPS did not demonstrate that the later, separate grievance retroactively made Ms.\nIniguez's communications exempt under section 7(1)(n).\n\nTo remedy its improper denial, this office asks CPS to provide Mr. Groff with\ncopies of the responsive communications between Ms. Iniguez and CPS administrators.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at joshua.jones@ilag. gov or (773) 590-7951.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n77963 f 71f improper 71n improper sd\n\n‘Letter from Ana Diaz, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public School[s], to Joshua\nM. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief (November 3, 2023), at [2].\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1024,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-01-05","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["78019"],"title":"Chicago Public Schools properly withheld curriculum materials as proprietary under 7(1)(j)(iv)","filename":"78019, issued January 5, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1150,"summary":"The requester sought curriculum materials provided by a vendor to Chicago Public Schools, which the district denied under FOIA exemption 7(1)(j)(iv). The PAC determined that the district properly withheld the records as they constituted proprietary instructional materials.","plain_summary":"A requester asked Chicago Public Schools for educational materials used in gender and sexuality sessions provided by an outside vendor. The school district refused to release the documents, arguing they were proprietary teaching materials. The Attorney General's office reviewed the documents and agreed that the district was legally allowed to keep them private.","holding":"Chicago Public Schools did not improperly withhold the requested records because they fall within the scope of the exemption for proprietary instructional materials.","legal_question":"Whether the requested curriculum materials and slideshows are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA as proprietary instructional materials.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(j)(iv)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(j)(iv)"],"public_body":"Chicago Public Schools","requesting_party":"EY (on behalf of the Daily Caller)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"educational records","subject_description":"The request sought various instructional materials and curriculum documents related to gender and sexuality education sessions provided by a third-party vendor.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_j/78019%2C%20issued%20January%205%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["curriculum","proprietary materials","school records","vendor contracts"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 5, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Andrew Mason\n\nManaging FOIA Officer\n\nLaw Department, Chicago Public Schools\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\namason19@cps.edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2023 PAC 78019; CPS no. N014006-080423\n\nDear and Mr. Mason:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that Chicago Public Schools (CPS) did not improperly withhold\n\nrecords responsive to i) FOIA request.\n\nOn August 4, 2023, EY submitted a FOIA request to CPS on behalf of the\nDaily Caller seeking copies of:\n\n[A]ny/all links, presentations, slideshows, curriculum materials,\nvideos, handouts, videos of presentations, and PDF's, associated\nwith any/all of the Gender & Sexuality Education Sessions\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 * (217) 782-1090 * TTY: (877) 844-5461 * Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, IIlinois 60601 + (312) 814-3000 + TTY: (800) 964-3013 + Fax: (312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale, Illinois 62901 * (618) 529-6400 * TTY: (877) 675-9339 + Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\nMr. Andrew Mason\nJanuary 5, 2024\nPage 2\n\nprovided by Lurie Children's (CPS Vendor # 40737) to Chicago\nPublic Schools, from January 1, 2021, to July 14, 2023.\n\nOn August 25, 2023, CPS denied the request in its entirety pursuant to section\n7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA.? On September 6, 2023, IEE submitted a Request for Review\ncontesting the denial of her request. She enclosed a spreadsheet of payments from CPS to Lurie\nChildren's Hospital of Chicago (Lurie) with 68 line items, some of which are for workshops,\ntrainings, or other sessions about gender, sexuality, or both.\n\nOn September 11, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review\nto CPS and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of any and all withheld records\nfor this office's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual\nbases for the applicability of the asserted exemption. On September 29, 2023, CPS furnished a\nwritten answer and a copy of a representative sample of the responsive records, maintaining that\nits denial was proper. On December 7, 2023, EM submitted a reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). A public body\n\"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\n\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).\n\n(j) The following information pertaining to educational\nmatters:\n\n(iv) course materials or research materials used by\nfaculty members.\n\nThere are no published judicial decisions construing this exemption.\n\nIn its answer to this office, CPS explained:\n\n‘FOIA portal message from EE 0 Chicago Public Schools (August 4, 2023).\n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(j)(iv) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023;\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023.\n\nMr. Andrew Mason\nJanuary 5, 2024\nPage 3\n\nUpon receipt of the request, the CPS FOIA office consulted\nwith the CPS Office of Student Health and Wellness and was\nadvised that course materials provided by Lurie Children's\nHospital of Chicago are not collected centrally in the regular\ncourse of business as Lurie Hospital works with individual CPS\nteachers and administrators at the school level to provide tailored\ninstructional and support services as an educational vendor. Based\non this information, the District denied this request under 5 ILCS\n140/7(1)G)(iv), which exempts from release course materials or\nresearch materials used by faculty members.\n\n* Fe\n\nAs the FOIA office was similarly advised, the requestor\nstates in her associated writing that teachers, counselors and\nprincipals in Chicago Public Schools and other school districts\ndirectly utilize Lurie's services and materials to support and\nprovide instruction to the students they serve every day. The plain\nlanguage of 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(j)(iv) indicates that the legislature\nclearly intended that materials such as this were to be exempt from\nrelease under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act.?!\n\nGE veplicd: \"My response would be that public has a right to review all public education\ncurriculum materials. The agency providing this sex ed curriculum is being paid by Chicago\nschools * * * and therefore should be subject to public review.\"4\n\nAlthough {J argued that a FOIA requester is entitled to receive all\ncurriculum materials from public schools, the section 7(1)(j)(iv) exemption expressly exempts\nfrom disclosure \"course materials\" used in public schools. FOIA does not define \"course\nmaterials,\" but the scope of J request for \"links, presentations, slideshows, curriculum\nmaterials, videos, handouts, videos of presentations, and PDF's\" used by CPS for education is\ncoterminous with the plain meaning of the term. Although dictionaries do not define this\ncompound term, the University of California's policy on \"Ownership of Course Materials\"\nprovides an example of the common meaning in defining \"course materials\" as\n\nsLetter from Andrew Mason, Managing Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public\nSchools, to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General\n(September 29, 2023), at 1-2.\n\n‘E-mail from 0 Joshua Jones (December 7, 2023).\n\nMr. Andrew Mason\nJanuary 5, 2024\nPage 4\n\nMaterials prepared for use in teaching, fixed or unfixed, in\nany form, including, but not limited to, digital, print, audio, visual,\nor any combination thereof. Course materials include, but are not\nlimited to, lectures, lecture notes, and materials, syllabi, study\nguides, bibliographies, visual aids, images, diagrams, multimedia\npresentations, web-ready content, and educational software.'!\n\nIn matching this scope, FOIA request thus sought to obtain only the kinds of records\nthe section 7(1)(j)(iv) exemption serves to protect. The fact that CPS paid Lurie for the\nrequested course materials does not negate or otherwise impact the applicability of the\nexemption; exempt records are often created using public funds. What matters is whether the\nrecords fall within the scope of a FOIA exemption, and these do, CPS' response to this office\nexplained how Lurie works with individual teachers and administrators at the school level to\ndevelop customized instructional materials. This office's review of the sample responsive\nrecords that CPS provided for our confidential review confirmed that CPS withheld educational\nslideshows and other materials prepared for use in teaching. Under these circumstances, CPS\nsustained its burden of demonstrating that the responsive records are exempt from disclosure\nunder section 7(1)(j)(iv).\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at (773) 590-7951 or joshua.jones@ilag.gov.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78019 f 7 ljiv proper sd\n\n‘University of California Policy, Ownership of Course Materials § I] (effective September 25,\n2003), https://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2 100004/CourseMaterials.\n\n","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Curriculum materials on gender and sexuality education from a third-party vendor","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-78019/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 5, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Andrew Mason\n\nManaging FOIA Officer\n\nLaw Department, Chicago Public Schools\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\namason19@cps.edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2023 PAC 78019; CPS no. N014006-080423\n\nDear and Mr. Mason:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that Chicago Public Schools (CPS) did not improperly withhold\n\nrecords responsive to i) FOIA request.\n\nprovided by Lurie Children's (CPS Vendor # 40737) to Chicago\nPublic Schools, from January 1, 2021, to July 14, 2023.\n\nOn August 25, 2023, CPS denied the request in its entirety pursuant to section\n7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA.? On September 6, 2023, IEE submitted a Request for Review\ncontesting the denial of her request. She enclosed a spreadsheet of payments from CPS to Lurie\nChildren's Hospital of Chicago (Lurie) with 68 line items, some of which are for workshops,\ntrainings, or other sessions about gender, sexuality, or both.\n\nOn September 11, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review\nto CPS and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of any and all withheld records\nfor this office's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual\nbases for the applicability of the asserted exemption. On September 29, 2023, CPS furnished a\nwritten answer and a copy of a representative sample of the responsive records, maintaining that\nits denial was proper. On December 7, 2023, EM submitted a reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). A public body\n\"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\n\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).\n\n(j) The following information pertaining to educational\nmatters:\n\n(iv) course materials or research materials used by\nfaculty members.\n\nThere are no published judicial decisions construing this exemption.\n\nIn its answer to this office, CPS explained:\n\n‘FOIA portal message from EE 0 Chicago Public Schools (August 4, 2023).\n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(j)(iv) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023;\n\nUpon receipt of the request, the CPS FOIA office consulted\nwith the CPS Office of Student Health and Wellness and was\nadvised that course materials provided by Lurie Children's\nHospital of Chicago are not collected centrally in the regular\ncourse of business as Lurie Hospital works with individual CPS\nteachers and administrators at the school level to provide tailored\ninstructional and support services as an educational vendor. Based\non this information, the District denied this request under 5 ILCS\n140/7(1)G)(iv), which exempts from release course materials or\nresearch materials used by faculty members.\n\n* Fe\n\nAs the FOIA office was similarly advised, the requestor\nstates in her associated writing that teachers, counselors and\nprincipals in Chicago Public Schools and other school districts\ndirectly utilize Lurie's services and materials to support and\nprovide instruction to the students they serve every day. The plain\nlanguage of 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(j)(iv) indicates that the legislature\nclearly intended that materials such as this were to be exempt from\nrelease under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act.?!\n\nGE veplicd: \"My response would be that public has a right to review all public education\ncurriculum materials. The agency providing this sex ed curriculum is being paid by Chicago\nschools * * * and therefore should be subject to public review.\"4\n\nAlthough {J argued that a FOIA requester is entitled to receive all\ncurriculum materials from public schools, the section 7(1)(j)(iv) exemption expressly exempts\nfrom disclosure \"course materials\" used in public schools. FOIA does not define \"course\nmaterials,\" but the scope of J request for \"links, presentations, slideshows, curriculum\nmaterials, videos, handouts, videos of presentations, and PDF's\" used by CPS for education is\ncoterminous with the plain meaning of the term. Although dictionaries do not define this\ncompound term, the University of California's policy on \"Ownership of Course Materials\"\nprovides an example of the common meaning in defining \"course materials\" as\n\nsLetter from Andrew Mason, Managing Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public\nSchools, to Joshua M. Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nMaterials prepared for use in teaching, fixed or unfixed, in\nany form, including, but not limited to, digital, print, audio, visual,\nor any combination thereof. Course materials include, but are not\nlimited to, lectures, lecture notes, and materials, syllabi, study\nguides, bibliographies, visual aids, images, diagrams, multimedia\npresentations, web-ready content, and educational software.'!\n\nIn matching this scope, FOIA request thus sought to obtain only the kinds of records\nthe section 7(1)(j)(iv) exemption serves to protect. The fact that CPS paid Lurie for the\nrequested course materials does not negate or otherwise impact the applicability of the\nexemption; exempt records are often created using public funds. What matters is whether the\nrecords fall within the scope of a FOIA exemption, and these do, CPS' response to this office\nexplained how Lurie works with individual teachers and administrators at the school level to\ndevelop customized instructional materials. This office's review of the sample responsive\nrecords that CPS provided for our confidential review confirmed that CPS withheld educational\nslideshows and other materials prepared for use in teaching. Under these circumstances, CPS\nsustained its burden of demonstrating that the responsive records are exempt from disclosure\nunder section 7(1)(j)(iv).\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at (773) 590-7951 or joshua.jones@ilag.gov.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78019 f 7 ljiv proper sd\n\n‘University of California Policy, Ownership of Course Materials § I] (effective September 25,\n2003), https://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2 100004/CourseMaterials."}
{"id":1025,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2023-12-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["78284"],"title":"Chicago Human Resources properly withheld employee lists under 7.5(zz)","filename":"78284, Issued December 13, 2023.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2165,"summary":"The requester sought citywide motor truck driver lists, which the Chicago Department of Human Resources denied citing section 7.5(zz) of FOIA. The PAC determined that the Department properly withheld the records under the cited exemption.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for lists of city motor truck drivers, but the City denied the request, arguing that state law prohibits the release of this specific information. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and agreed that the City was legally allowed to withhold the records under a specific FOIA exemption. This means the City does not have to provide the requested lists.","holding":"The Chicago Department of Human Resources did not violate FOIA by withholding the requested employee lists pursuant to section 7.5(zz).","legal_question":"Whether the Chicago Department of Human Resources properly withheld employee lists under section 7.5(zz) of FOIA, which exempts information prohibited from disclosure under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(zz)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(zz)"],"public_body":"Chicago Department of Human Resources","requesting_party":"Requester (name redacted in source document)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought official citywide motor truck driver and pool motor truck driver lists.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_zz/78284%2C%20Issued%20December%2013%2C%202023.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["employee lists","FOIA exemption","labor relations","personnel records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 13, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Melissa Nunchuck\nCompliance Officer\nChicago Department of Human Resources\n121 North LaSalle Street, Room 1100\nChicago,  Illinois 60602\ndhrfoia@cityofchicago.org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 78284\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Nunchuck: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022)).   For the reasons that follow,  the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the City of Chicago Department of Human Resources\nDepartment)  did not improperly withhold information responsive to\nSeptember 14, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Department\nseeking copies of \" the Official Citywide Motor Truck Driver ( 7183)  List and the Official\nCitywide Pool Motor Truck Driver (7184) List.\"1 On September 21, 2023, the Department\nin its entirety pursuant to section 7.5(zz)  of FOIA, 2 which exempts from\ndenied the request\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto DHR FOIA Representatives ( September 14, 2023).  \n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023; 103-508, effective July 1, 2023.   \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(zz) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; \n\n500 South Second Street,  Springfield,  Illinois 62701 • ( 217)  782- 1090 •  TTY: ( 877)  844- 5461 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale,  Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529-6400 • TTY: (877) 675-9339 • Fax: ( 618) 529-6416\n\n\fMs. Melissa Nunchuck\nDecember 13,  2023\nPage 2\n\ndisclosure \"[ i]nformation prohibited from being disclosed under the Illinois Public Labor\nRelations Act.\"  Section 6(c-5) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA)3 provides: \n\nNo employer shall disclose the following information of\nany employee: ( 1) the employee' s home address ( including ZIP\ncode and county); (2) the employee's date of birth; (3) the\nemployee' s home and personal phone number; ( 4)  the employee' s\npersonal email address; ( 5) any information personally identifying\nemployee membership or membership status in a labor\norganization or other voluntary association affiliated with a labor\norganization or a labor federation ( including whether employees\nare members of such organization, the identity of such\norganization,  whether or not employees pay or authorize the\npayment of any dues or moneys to such organization, and the\namounts of such dues or moneys);  and ( 6) emails or other\ncommunications between a labor organization and its members. \n\nIf an employer discloses information in violation of this\n\nsubsection (c-5), an aggrieved employee of the employer or his or\nher exclusive bargaining representative may file an unfair labor\npractice charge with the Illinois Labor Relations Board pursuant to\nSection 10 of this Act or commence an action in the circuit court to\nenforce the provisions of this Act, including actions to compel\ncompliance,  if an employer willfully and wantonly discloses\ninformation in violation of this subsection.  (Emphases added.) \n\nThe Department stated:  \" Because requested seniority lists identify members\n\nwithin specific bargaining units,  they are therefore exempt under FOIA.\" 4 On September 29, \nsubmitted a Request for Review contesting the denial.  The Request for\n2023, \nReview argued that this office' s binding opinion5 upholding a city' s denial of a FOIA request\nfrom the Freedom Foundation under section 7.5(zz) does not apply to her request; she argued\n\n35 ILCS 315/6(c-5) (West 2022). \n\n4Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to\n\nSeptember 21, 2023). \n\n5Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 22-009, issued June 30, 2022 (Binding Opinion 22-009). \n\n\fMs. Melissa Nunchuck\nDecember 13,  2023\nPage 3\n\nthat because the requester in that matter was an \" outside entity,\"  the analysis in the binding\nopinion \"does not apply to [her] and [her] fellow union members.\" 6\nthe purpose of her request was to ensure the lists are accurate and current. \n\nstated that\n\nOn October 5, 2023,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nfurnished those materials,  as well as a copy of a collective bargaining agreement\n\nDepartment and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of the responsive records\nfor this office' s confidential\nreview,  together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual\nbases for denying the request under the asserted exemption.  On October 31, 2023, the\nDepartment\nwith Teamsters Local 700, and an \" Employee Work History\" report about\nthat\nthe Department stated it had provided to her on March 15, 2022.   The Department stated that all\nof the employees in the lists \"are members of Teamsters Local 700 or eligible to join the union as\npart of the bargaining unit.\" 7 The Department also provided\nwith copies of the\nrecords in which it redacted all of the employees' names and other information about them, such\nas employee identification number and bargaining unit in list 71838 and \" Pool Seniority Date,\" \nStart Date Bargaining Unit,\" and \" Driver Start Date\"  in list 7184.9 On that same date, \n\nreplied:  \" A redacted list to an actual member,  myself for personal observation,  does\n\nnot give me the information I need.\" 10\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).  A public body\nhas the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure.  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nAfter the Supreme Court struck down the provision of the IPLRA that authorized\n\nautomatic deductions of fair share fees from non- union members'  wages in Janus v. AFSCME, \n\n6E- mail from\n\nto whom it may concern ( September 24, 2023). \n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 3.  \n\n7Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\n\nReport, 7183-Motor Truck Driver (October 23, 2023).  \n\n8City of Chicago Department of Human Resources, Records Management, Department Seniority\n\nDriver Seniority List (October 23, 2023). \n\n9City of Chicago Department of Human Resources, Records Management, Pool Motor Truck\n\n10E- mail from\n\nto DHRFOIA@cityofchicago. org and Joshua.Jones@ilag.gov\n\nOctober 31, 2023). \n\n\fMs. Melissa Nunchuck\nDecember 13,  2023\nPage 4\n\nCouncil 31,  138 S. Ct. 2448 ( 2018),  the General Assembly passed legislation to affirm and\nfacilitate the exercise of collective bargaining rights by, among other measures, adding sections\n6(c-5),  10( a)( 8),  and 10( a)( 9)11 to the IPLRA. 12 In Binding Opinion 22- 009,  this office explained\nthat because the FOIA request expressly concerned only employees of a public body who were\ncovered by a collective bargaining agreement with Service Employees International Union\nSEIU) 73, revealing the requested employee names and other requested details about them\nwould necessarily reveal their \" membership or membership status\"  as either current or eligible\nmembers of an identified labor organization.13 Accordingly, this office concluded that the denial\nof the request under section 7.5(zz)  did not violate FOIA. 14\n\nIn its answer to this office,  the Department maintained that it similarly properly\n\ndenied the request pursuant to section 7.5(zz) because: \n\nThe City of Chicago has a clear duty toward the protection\n\nof public employees'  right to organize established by the Illinois\n\n115 ILCS 315/10(a)(8), (a)(9) (West 2022). \n\nIPLRA provide, in relevant part: \n\n12See Public Act 101-620, effective December 20, 2019.  Sections 10(a)(8) and 10(a)(9) of the\n\na)  It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer or its agents: \n\n8) to interfere with, restrain, coerce, deter, or discourage public\n\nemployees or applicants to be public employees from: (i) becoming or\nremaining members of a labor organization; ( ii) authorizing representation by a\nlabor organization; or (iii) authorizing dues or fee deductions to a labor\norganization, nor shall the employer intentionally permit outside third parties to\nuse its email or other communication systems to engage in that conduct. An\nemployer's good faith implementation of a policy to block the use of its email or\nother communication systems for such purposes shall be a defense to an unfair\nlabor practice; [ or] \n\n9) to disclose to any person or entity information set forth in\n\nsubsection (c-5) of Section 6 of this Act that the employer knows or should\nknow will be used to interfere with, restrain, coerce, deter, or discourage any\npublic employee from: (i) becoming or remaining members of a labor\norganization, (ii) authorizing representation by a labor organization, or (iii) \nauthorizing dues or fee deductions to a labor organization[.] \n\n13Ill.  Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 22-009, at 10. \n\n14Ill.  Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 22-009, at 12.  \n\n\fMs. Melissa Nunchuck\nDecember 13,  2023\nPage 5\n\nGeneral Assembly under sections 6(c-5),  10( a)( 8),  and 10( a)( 9) of\nthe IPLRA. Because seniority lists identify members within\nspecific bargaining units and provide their ranked seniority as\nmembers of that bargaining unit within a specific job title, any\ninformation that would identify individuals on that list must be\nredacted. In the Pool [Motor Truck Driver] document, this includes\npool numbers,  pool seniority dates,  job title code,  start dates in the\nbargaining unit, departments, driver start dates, continuous service\ndates,  and employee names.  In the regular [ Motor Truck Driver] \ndocument, this includes employee names, bargaining unit, job title\ncode,  continuous service dates,  start present position ( SPP)  dates, \nand seniority dates. [ Citation.] Without the information exempted\nunder 7.5(zz),  the lists are rendered wholly unusable to determine\nor track seniority in a specific bargaining unit, which is their\nintended purpose.  To provide this information,  which is limited to\na specific job title within a specific bargaining unit, would be to\ngive the requester back- door- entry to determine the names and\nidentities of union members.[15] \n\nindicated that\n\nmight be able to obtain the information from her\n\nThe Department\nunion, stating:  \"As section 6(c) of the IPLRA specifies, seniority lists are provided to the\napplicable labor organization' s exclusive representatives.  This is done twice per month. \nEmployees may freely request this information from their bargaining unit as members of the\nunion.\" 16 For purposes of requesting records under FOIA,  in contrast,  the Department argued\nthat\nFoundation,  by virtue of being a member of the union herself.   The Department also noted that\n\nhas no greater rights than any other requester, including the Freedom\n\ncould obtain a work history report containing her own seniority information\n\nunder the Personnel Record Review Act ( 820 ILCS 40/ 1 et seq. ( West 2022)),  and that \"[ t]o the\nextent that employees have questions or disputes regarding their own seniority information, there\nis a mechanism through their union' s collective bargaining agreement [ citation]  with the City of\nChicago to have questions answered, grievances filed, or corrections made.\" 17\n\n15Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 2. \n\n16Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 3. \n\n17Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 3\nciting Collective Bargaining Agreement, Teamsters Local 700 – City of Chicago, § 14.8 (ratified January 17, \n2018)).   \n\n\fMs. Melissa Nunchuck\nDecember 13,  2023\nPage 6\n\nIn this instance,  as in Binding Opinion 22- 009, \n\nrequest concerns\n\nthe identities of current or eligible members of a particular union, Teamsters Local 700.  \nAlthough the General Assembly' s post- Janus amendments to the IPLRA may have been aimed\nprincipally at deterring anti-union outreach efforts towards employees, section 6(c-5) of the\nIPLRA prohibits disclosure of an employee' s \" membership or membership status\"  in a union and\nthe identity of such organization,\" regardless of the identity of the requester.  Thus, although\nthere is no indication that\nwith, restrain, coerce, deter, or discourage any public employee from joining a union or\nremaining a dues- paying member,  the Department was not required to demonstrate that her\nrequest had such a purpose.  To the extent\nlists directly from the Department\nobligate the Department to furnish the lists responsive to the present request in light of an\napplicable FOIA exemption,  section 7.5(zz).   Accordingly,  this office has determined that the\nDepartment's denial of the employees' information under section 7.5(zz) did not violate FOIA. \n\nfor previous years,  her prior ability to obtain the lists did not\n\nas a union member,  requested the lists to interfere\n\npreviously obtained the same kinds of\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at (312) 814-8413 or joshua.jones@ilag.gov.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78284 f 75zz proper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Citywide truck driver employee lists","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-78284/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 13, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Melissa Nunchuck\nCompliance Officer\nChicago Department of Human Resources\n121 North LaSalle Street, Room 1100\nChicago, Illinois 60602\ndhrfoia@cityofchicago.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 78284\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Nunchuck: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the City of Chicago Department of Human Resources\nDepartment) did not improperly withhold information responsive to\nSeptember 14, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Department\nseeking copies of \" the Official Citywide Motor Truck Driver (7183) List and the Official\nCitywide Pool Motor Truck Driver (7184) List.\"1 On September 21, 2023, the Department\nin its entirety pursuant to section 7.5(zz) of FOIA, 2 which exempts from\ndenied the request\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto DHR FOIA Representatives (September 14, 2023). \n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023; 103-508, effective July 1, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(zz) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; \n\ndisclosure \"[ i]nformation prohibited from being disclosed under the Illinois Public Labor\nRelations Act.\" Section 6(c-5) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA)3 provides: \n\nNo employer shall disclose the following information of\nany employee: (1) the employee's home address (including ZIP\ncode and county); (2) the employee's date of birth; (3) the\nemployee's home and personal phone number; (4) the employee's\npersonal email address; (5) any information personally identifying\nemployee membership or membership status in a labor\norganization or other voluntary association affiliated with a labor\norganization or a labor federation (including whether employees\nare members of such organization, the identity of such\norganization, whether or not employees pay or authorize the\npayment of any dues or moneys to such organization, and the\namounts of such dues or moneys); and (6) emails or other\ncommunications between a labor organization and its members. \n\nIf an employer discloses information in violation of this\n\nsubsection (c-5), an aggrieved employee of the employer or his or\nher exclusive bargaining representative may file an unfair labor\npractice charge with the Illinois Labor Relations Board pursuant to\nSection 10 of this Act or commence an action in the circuit court to\nenforce the provisions of this Act, including actions to compel\ncompliance, if an employer willfully and wantonly discloses\ninformation in violation of this subsection. (Emphases added.) \n\nThe Department stated: \" Because requested seniority lists identify members\n\nwithin specific bargaining units, they are therefore exempt under FOIA.\" 4 On September 29, \nsubmitted a Request for Review contesting the denial. The Request for\n2023, \nReview argued that this office's binding opinion5 upholding a city's denial of a FOIA request\nfrom the Freedom Foundation under section 7.5(zz) does not apply to her request; she argued\n\nthat because the requester in that matter was an \" outside entity,\" the analysis in the binding\nopinion \"does not apply to [her] and [her] fellow union members.\" 6\nthe purpose of her request was to ensure the lists are accurate and current. \n\nstated that\n\nOn October 5, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nfurnished those materials, as well as a copy of a collective bargaining agreement\n\nDepartment and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of the responsive records\nfor this office's confidential\nreview, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual\nbases for denying the request under the asserted exemption. On October 31, 2023, the\nDepartment\nwith Teamsters Local 700, and an \" Employee Work History\" report about\nthat\nthe Department stated it had provided to her on March 15, 2022. The Department stated that all\nof the employees in the lists \"are members of Teamsters Local 700 or eligible to join the union as\npart of the bargaining unit.\" 7 The Department also provided\nwith copies of the\nrecords in which it redacted all of the employees' names and other information about them, such\nas employee identification number and bargaining unit in list 71838 and \" Pool Seniority Date,\" \nStart Date Bargaining Unit,\" and \" Driver Start Date\" in list 7184.9 On that same date, \n\nreplied: \" A redacted list to an actual member, myself for personal observation, does\n\nnot give me the information I need.\" 10\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). A public body\nhas the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nAfter the Supreme Court struck down the provision of the IPLRA that authorized\n\nautomatic deductions of fair share fees from non- union members' wages in Janus v. AFSCME, \n\n6E- mail from\n\nto whom it may concern (September 24, 2023). \n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 3. \n\n7 Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\n\nReport, 7183-Motor Truck Driver (October 23, 2023). \n\n8 City of Chicago Department of Human Resources, Records Management, Department Seniority\n\nCouncil 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), the General Assembly passed legislation to affirm and\nfacilitate the exercise of collective bargaining rights by, among other measures, adding sections\n6(c-5), 10(a)(8), and 10(a)(9)11 to the IPLRA. 12 In Binding Opinion 22- 009, this office explained\nthat because the FOIA request expressly concerned only employees of a public body who were\ncovered by a collective bargaining agreement with Service Employees International Union\nSEIU) 73, revealing the requested employee names and other requested details about them\nwould necessarily reveal their \" membership or membership status\" as either current or eligible\nmembers of an identified labor organization.13 Accordingly, this office concluded that the denial\nof the request under section 7.5(zz) did not violate FOIA. 14\n\nIn its answer to this office, the Department maintained that it similarly properly\n\ndenied the request pursuant to section 7.5(zz) because: \n\nThe City of Chicago has a clear duty toward the protection\n\nof public employees' right to organize established by the Illinois\n\n115 ILCS 315/10(a)(8), (a)(9) (West 2022). \n\nIPLRA provide, in relevant part: \n\n12 See Public Act 101-620, effective December 20, 2019. Sections 10(a)(8) and 10(a)(9) of the\n\na) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer or its agents: \n\n8) to interfere with, restrain, coerce, deter, or discourage public\n\nemployees or applicants to be public employees from: (i) becoming or\nremaining members of a labor organization; (ii) authorizing representation by a\nlabor organization; or (iii) authorizing dues or fee deductions to a labor\norganization, nor shall the employer intentionally permit outside third parties to\nuse its email or other communication systems to engage in that conduct. An\nemployer's good faith implementation of a policy to block the use of its email or\nother communication systems for such purposes shall be a defense to an unfair\nlabor practice; [ or] \n\n9) to disclose to any person or entity information set forth in\n\nsubsection (c-5) of Section 6 of this Act that the employer knows or should\nknow will be used to interfere with, restrain, coerce, deter, or discourage any\n\nGeneral Assembly under sections 6(c-5), 10(a)(8), and 10(a)(9) of\nthe IPLRA. Because seniority lists identify members within\nspecific bargaining units and provide their ranked seniority as\nmembers of that bargaining unit within a specific job title, any\ninformation that would identify individuals on that list must be\nredacted. In the Pool [Motor Truck Driver] document, this includes\npool numbers, pool seniority dates, job title code, start dates in the\nbargaining unit, departments, driver start dates, continuous service\ndates, and employee names. In the regular [ Motor Truck Driver] \ndocument, this includes employee names, bargaining unit, job title\ncode, continuous service dates, start present position (SPP) dates, \nand seniority dates. [ Citation.] Without the information exempted\nunder 7.5(zz), the lists are rendered wholly unusable to determine\nor track seniority in a specific bargaining unit, which is their\nintended purpose. To provide this information, which is limited to\na specific job title within a specific bargaining unit, would be to\ngive the requester back- door- entry to determine the names and\nidentities of union members.[15] \n\nindicated that\n\nmight be able to obtain the information from her\n\nThe Department\nunion, stating: \"As section 6(c) of the IPLRA specifies, seniority lists are provided to the\napplicable labor organization's exclusive representatives. This is done twice per month. \nEmployees may freely request this information from their bargaining unit as members of the\nunion.\" 16 For purposes of requesting records under FOIA, in contrast, the Department argued\nthat\nFoundation, by virtue of being a member of the union herself. The Department also noted that\n\nhas no greater rights than any other requester, including the Freedom\n\ncould obtain a work history report containing her own seniority information\n\nunder the Personnel Record Review Act (820 ILCS 40/ 1 et seq. (West 2022)), and that \"[ t]o the\nextent that employees have questions or disputes regarding their own seniority information, there\nis a mechanism through their union's collective bargaining agreement [ citation] with the City of\nChicago to have questions answered, grievances filed, or corrections made.\" 17\n\n15 Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 2. \n\n16 Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 3. \n\n17 Letter from Melissa Nunchuck, Compliance Officer, Department of Human Resources, to Joshua\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 31, 2023), at 3\nciting Collective Bargaining Agreement, Teamsters Local 700 – City of Chicago, § 14.8 (ratified January 17, \n\nIn this instance, as in Binding Opinion 22- 009, \n\nrequest concerns\n\nthe identities of current or eligible members of a particular union, Teamsters Local 700. \nAlthough the General Assembly's post- Janus amendments to the IPLRA may have been aimed\nprincipally at deterring anti-union outreach efforts towards employees, section 6(c-5) of the\nIPLRA prohibits disclosure of an employee's \" membership or membership status\" in a union and\nthe identity of such organization,\" regardless of the identity of the requester. Thus, although\nthere is no indication that\nwith, restrain, coerce, deter, or discourage any public employee from joining a union or\nremaining a dues- paying member, the Department was not required to demonstrate that her\nrequest had such a purpose. To the extent\nlists directly from the Department\nobligate the Department to furnish the lists responsive to the present request in light of an\napplicable FOIA exemption, section 7.5(zz). Accordingly, this office has determined that the\nDepartment's denial of the employees' information under section 7.5(zz) did not violate FOIA. \n\nfor previous years, her prior ability to obtain the lists did not\n\nas a union member, requested the lists to interfere\n\npreviously obtained the same kinds of\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at (312) 814-8413 or joshua.jones@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78284 f 75zz proper mun"}
{"id":1026,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2023-10-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["78380"],"title":"Illinois Department of Human Services properly withheld case file records under Public Aid Code","filename":"78380, issued October 17, 2023.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":683,"summary":"The requester sought records from the Illinois Department of Human Services regarding their own case file and communications with mental health providers. The PAC determined that the Department properly withheld the records under FOIA section 7(1)(a) because the Illinois Public Aid Code prohibits the disclosure of case file contents.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested their own case file and related communications from the Illinois Department of Human Services. The Department denied the request, citing state laws that protect public assistance records from disclosure. The Attorney General's office agreed with the Department, noting that these records are legally confidential and that the requester should follow the Department's suggested process for accessing their own file outside of FOIA.","holding":"The Illinois Department of Human Services did not improperly withhold the requested records because they are protected from disclosure by the Illinois Public Aid Code.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois Department of Human Services properly denied a FOIA request for case file records by invoking section 7(1)(a) and the confidentiality provisions of the Illinois Public Aid Code.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Human Services","requesting_party":"Anonymous","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action warranted","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought access to personal case file records and communications held by the Department of Human Services.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":99.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_dd/78380%2C%20issued%20October%2017%2C%202023.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public assistance","case file","confidentiality","IDHS"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nOctober 17, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 78380\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022)).   For the reasons set forth below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn September 25, 2023, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department\n\nof Human Services ( Department)  seeking copies of all records pertaining to yourself and\ncommunications between my case worker, Tracey Thomas, and Iroquois Mental Health, as well\nas anyone else involved in my case[.]\" 1 On October 2, 2023,  the Department denied your request\npursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA,2 which exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\"  In connection with section 7(1)(a), the Department cited provisions of the Illinois\nPublic Aid Code ( Public Aid Code)  and six other state and federal\nassistance programs.  The Department asserted that it was prohibited from releasing information\nthat would tend to identify an individual as a recipient of public assistance.   The Department\nsuggested you contact the local office where you received services to access records in your case\nfile outside of FOIA.   On September 29, 2023,  this office received your complete Request for\nReview challenging the denial.  You asserted that the requested records \"do not pertain to anyone\nelse but [ yourself].\" 3\n\nlaws governing public\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto IDHS (September 25, 2023). \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n3E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau (October 3, 2023). \n\n500 South Second Street,  Springfield,  Illinois 62701 • ( 217)  782- 1090 •  TTY: ( 877)  844- 5461 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale,  Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529-6400 • TTY: (877) 675-9339 • Fax: ( 618) 529-6416\n\n\fOctober 17, 2023\nPage 2\n\nSection 11-9 of the Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/11-9 (West 2022)) provides, in\n\npertinent part: \n\nFor the protection of applicants and recipients,  the Illinois\nDepartment, the county departments and local governmental units\nand their respective officers and employees are prohibited,  except\nas hereinafter provided, from disclosing the contents of any\nrecords,  files,  papers and communications,  except for purposes\ndirectly connected with the administration of public aid under this\nCode.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nThe plain language of section 11- 9 of the Public Aid Code prohibits the disclosure of records that\nconcern applicants and recipients of public aid, except for purposes directly connected with the\nadministration of public aid.   \n\nAlthough you only seek records related to yourself,  your Request for Review does\n\nnot indicate that you seek those records directly in connection with the administration of public\naid.   In particular,  you explained that you believe the Department\nretaliated against you for filing\na complaint related to inpatient services you received, and that you sought records related to your\ncase in connection with that complaint.   You also assert that the requested records should be in\nthe possession of the \" IDHS forensic department\"  rather than a particular local office,  but your\nrequest nonetheless seeks records pertaining to your case.  Those case-related records appear to\nbe maintained in your customer case file.  Because the Public Aid Code specifically prohibits the\nDepartment from disclosing the contents of a case file and any related communications, the\nDepartment did not improperly withhold records pursuant to section 7(1)( a)  of FOIA,  and this\noffice has determined that no further action is warranted.  \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  If you have questions, please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78380 f no fi war sa\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Personal case file records of a state human services agency","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-78380/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nOctober 17, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 78380\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022)). For the reasons set forth below, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn September 25, 2023, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department\n\nof Human Services (Department) seeking copies of all records pertaining to yourself and\ncommunications between my case worker, Tracey Thomas, and Iroquois Mental Health, as well\nas anyone else involved in my case[.]\" 1 On October 2, 2023, the Department denied your request\npursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA,2 which exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\" In connection with section 7(1)(a), the Department cited provisions of the Illinois\nPublic Aid Code (Public Aid Code) and six other state and federal\nassistance programs. The Department asserted that it was prohibited from releasing information\nthat would tend to identify an individual as a recipient of public assistance. The Department\nsuggested you contact the local office where you received services to access records in your case\nfile outside of FOIA. On September 29, 2023, this office received your complete Request for\nReview challenging the denial. You asserted that the requested records \"do not pertain to anyone\nelse but [ yourself].\" 3\n\nlaws governing public\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto IDHS (September 25, 2023). \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n3E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau (October 3, 2023). \n\nSection 11-9 of the Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/11-9 (West 2022)) provides, in\n\npertinent part: \n\nFor the protection of applicants and recipients, the Illinois\nDepartment, the county departments and local governmental units\nand their respective officers and employees are prohibited, except\nas hereinafter provided, from disclosing the contents of any\nrecords, files, papers and communications, except for purposes\ndirectly connected with the administration of public aid under this\nCode. (Emphasis added.) \n\nThe plain language of section 11- 9 of the Public Aid Code prohibits the disclosure of records that\nconcern applicants and recipients of public aid, except for purposes directly connected with the\nadministration of public aid. \n\nAlthough you only seek records related to yourself, your Request for Review does\n\nnot indicate that you seek those records directly in connection with the administration of public\naid. In particular, you explained that you believe the Department\nretaliated against you for filing\na complaint related to inpatient services you received, and that you sought records related to your\ncase in connection with that complaint. You also assert that the requested records should be in\nthe possession of the \" IDHS forensic department\" rather than a particular local office, but your\nrequest nonetheless seeks records pertaining to your case. Those case-related records appear to\nbe maintained in your customer case file. Because the Public Aid Code specifically prohibits the\nDepartment from disclosing the contents of a case file and any related communications, the\nDepartment did not improperly withhold records pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, and this\noffice has determined that no further action is warranted. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. If you have questions, please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78380 f no fi war sa"}
{"id":1027,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-06-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["78704"],"title":"Will County Sheriff's Office properly withheld juvenile police records under 7.5(bb)","filename":"78704, issued June 20, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1364,"summary":"The requester sought police records, body camera footage, and dispatch calls related to a specific case number, which the Will County Sheriff's Office denied citing FOIA exemptions. The PAC determined that the records were properly withheld under section 7.5(bb) of FOIA due to the confidentiality requirements of the Juvenile Court Act.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Will County Sheriff's Office for police records and video footage related to a specific case. The Sheriff's Office refused to release the files, and the Attorney General's office agreed, finding that the records were protected by law because they involved a juvenile. This means the public cannot access these specific records due to strict privacy rules regarding juvenile law enforcement files.","holding":"The Will County Sheriff's Office properly withheld the requested records pursuant to section 7.5(bb) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Will County Sheriff's Office properly withheld records under section 7.5(bb) of FOIA, which incorporates the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(bb)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(bb)"],"public_body":"Will County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in source)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request involved police reports, body camera footage, and dispatch calls related to a case involving a juvenile.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_bb/78704%2C%20issued%20June%2020%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police records","juvenile records","body camera footage","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"June 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Shannon Wahl\nFOIA Administration\nWill County Sheriff' s Office\n16911 West Laraway Road\nJoliet,  Illinois 60433\nfoia@willcosheriff.org\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2023 PAC 78704\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Wahl: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January 1, 2024).   \n\nOn August 27, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Will County\n\nSheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) seeking copies of the written reports, body camera and squad\ncar footage,  and dispatch calls related to Case Number 23006018.   On August 28,  2023,  the\nSheriff's Office denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA.1 The Sheriff's Office\nasserted that the matter was the subject of an active and open court case and that release of the\nrecords would jeopardize the integrity of the court proceedings. \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n\fMs. Shannon Wahl\nJune 20, 2024\nPage 2\n\nOn October 23, 2023, this office received\n\nRequest for Review\nacknowledged the Sheriff' s Office' s concern regarding\n\nchallenging the denial.  \nprotecting the integrity of the court case, but he contended that there was a significant public\ninterest in the case.   \n\nOn October 30,  2023,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Sheriff's Office and asked it to provide copies of the withheld records, together with a\ndetailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemption.  \nOn November 8, 2023, this office received the requested materials.  In its written response, the\nSheriff' s Office also asserted that: ( 1) the recorded calls fall within the scope of section\n7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA;2 ( 2) the request for videos was unduly burdensome pursuant to section 3(g) \nof FOIA; 3 and ( 3) the Juvenile Court Act of 19874 ( JCA)  applied to one of the suspects,  who was\na juvenile.   On November 15, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Sheriff's Office's\nresponse to\n\nhe replied on November 26, 2023.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).  \n\nAs noted above,  the Sheriff' s Office cited the JCA and stated that one of the two\nsuspects in the case was a juvenile.  Therefore, section 7.5(bb) of FOIA5 is relevant because it\nexempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation which is or was prohibited from disclosure by the\nJuvenile Court Act of 1987.\"  Section 1-7(A) of the JCA6 provides:   \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n35 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022). \n\n4705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. ( West 2022). \n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023; 103-508, effective July 1, 2023. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7.5(bb) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; \n\n6705 ILCS 405/1-7(A) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103-022, effective August 8, 2023. \n\n\fMs. Shannon Wahl\nJune 20, 2024\nPage 3\n\nAll juvenile records which have not been expunged are\n\nconfidential and may never be disclosed to the general public\nor otherwise made widely available. Juvenile law enforcement\nrecords may be obtained only under this Section and Section 1-8\nand Part 9 of Article V of this Act, when their use is needed for\ngood cause and with an order from the juvenile court,  as required\nby those not authorized to retain them. Inspection, copying, and\ndisclosure of juvenile law enforcement\nrecords maintained by\nlaw enforcement agencies or records of municipal ordinance\nviolations maintained by any State,  local,  or municipal agency that\nrelate to a minor who has been investigated, arrested, or taken\ninto custody before the minor' s 18th birthday shall be\nrestricted to the following[.]  (Emphasis added.) \n\nThe classes of persons who are permitted access to records concerning the investigation, arrest, \nor custodial detention of minors are then enumerated,  and they do not include FOIA requesters. \n\nIn its response to this office,  the Sheriff' s Office maintained that disclosure of the\n\nrequested records would jeopardize the open criminal court case related to the incident.  The\nSheriff' s Office further argued: \n\nDue to the nature of the crime,  it would be impossible to present\nthe factual allegations against the adult while preserving the rights\nof the minor under the Juvenile Court Act. Juveniles are entitled to\nsignificant protections under that Act, including ensuring that their\nlaw enforcement\n7(A). Those portions of the video evidence which show or\nreference the minor cannot simply be redacted but must be fully\nremoved to ensure the minor's rights are protected.[7] \n\nrecords are not made public.  705 ILCS 405/ 1-\n\nIn reply to that answer, \n\nargued that the Sheriff's Office routinely\n\ndiscloses \" this type of information to the general public through newspapers and online sources\nas a result of FOIA requests\"  and that \"a name, photo and details of the incident from this case\nwas released through the Patch Newspaper on July 24 2023.\" 8 He also stated he could reduce the\nscope of his request. \n\nSupervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau (undated). \n\n7Letter from S. Wahl, FOIA Administrator, Will County Sheriff's Office, to Teresa Lim, \n\n8E- mail from [\n\nto Teresa Lim (November 26, 2023). \n\n\fMs. Shannon Wahl\nJune 20, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe Attorney General has issued a binding opinion concluding that \"[ w]hen a\nsingle police report concerns both an adult arrestee and a minor arrestee or suspect,  the plain\nlanguage of the JCA does not permit disclosure of any portion of the police report to an\nunauthorized party,  regardless of the extent to which a portion of the report focuses on an adult\narrestee.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 23-010, issued July 12, 2023, at 11.  Further, the\nopinion explained that even if there is a public interest in the incident, \" the section 7.5(bb) \nexemption does not take the public interest in disclosure into consideration as certain other FOIA\nprovisions do[.]\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No. 23- 010,  at 11. \n\nthe investigation,  arrest,  and charging of a minor,  in addition to an adult.   Based on the\n\nreports for the\nThis office' s review of the written report and supplemental\nspecified case confirmed that they are \" juvenile law enforcement records\" because they\ndocument\nnature of the incident, any video or audio recordings, such as the body camera videos of the\nresponding officers,  related to the Sheriff' s Office' s investigation would necessarily disclose\ninformation about the minor because the adult and minor were together during the incident.  \nEven if the Sheriff' s Office has released some details to the public concerning the adult and his\ncourt case, any records concerning the arrested juvenile are subject to the strict confidentiality\nprotections of the JCA,  which requires juvenile law enforcement\nrecords to be withheld in full\nrather than disclosed in part with redactions.  The 7.5(bb) exemption also does not take into\naccount the public interest in disclosure,  as discussed above.   Accordingly,  the Sheriff' s Office\ndid not improperly withhold the records pursuant to section 7.5(bb) of FOIA.9\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78704 f 75bb proper co\n\npursuant to section 7.5(bb) of FOIA, we decline to address the remaining asserted exemptions. \n\n9Because this determination concludes that responsive records are exempt from disclosure\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports, body camera footage, and dispatch calls involving a juvenile","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-78704/","full_text":"June 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Shannon Wahl\nFOIA Administration\nWill County Sheriff's Office\n16911 West Laraway Road\nJoliet, Illinois 60433\nfoia@willcosheriff.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 78704\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Wahl: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January 1, 2024). \n\nOn August 27, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Will County\n\nSheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) seeking copies of the written reports, body camera and squad\ncar footage, and dispatch calls related to Case Number 23006018. On August 28, 2023, the\nSheriff's Office denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA.1 The Sheriff's Office\nasserted that the matter was the subject of an active and open court case and that release of the\nrecords would jeopardize the integrity of the court proceedings. \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\nOn October 23, 2023, this office received\n\nRequest for Review\nacknowledged the Sheriff's Office's concern regarding\n\nchallenging the denial. \nprotecting the integrity of the court case, but he contended that there was a significant public\ninterest in the case. \n\nOn October 30, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Sheriff's Office and asked it to provide copies of the withheld records, together with a\ndetailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemption. \nOn November 8, 2023, this office received the requested materials. In its written response, the\nSheriff's Office also asserted that: (1) the recorded calls fall within the scope of section\n7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA;2 (2) the request for videos was unduly burdensome pursuant to section 3(g) \nof FOIA; 3 and (3) the Juvenile Court Act of 19874 (JCA) applied to one of the suspects, who was\na juvenile. On November 15, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Sheriff's Office's\nresponse to\n\nhe replied on November 26, 2023. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nAs noted above, the Sheriff's Office cited the JCA and stated that one of the two\nsuspects in the case was a juvenile. Therefore, section 7.5(bb) of FOIA5 is relevant because it\nexempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation which is or was prohibited from disclosure by the\nJuvenile Court Act of 1987.\" Section 1-7(A) of the JCA6 provides: \n\n103-462, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n35 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022). \n\n4705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022). \n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023; 103-508, effective July 1, 2023. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7.5(bb) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; \n\n6705 ILCS 405/1-7(A) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-022, effective August 8, 2023. \n\nAll juvenile records which have not been expunged are\n\nconfidential and may never be disclosed to the general public\nor otherwise made widely available. Juvenile law enforcement\nrecords may be obtained only under this Section and Section 1-8\nand Part 9 of Article V of this Act, when their use is needed for\ngood cause and with an order from the juvenile court, as required\nby those not authorized to retain them. Inspection, copying, and\ndisclosure of juvenile law enforcement\nrecords maintained by\nlaw enforcement agencies or records of municipal ordinance\nviolations maintained by any State, local, or municipal agency that\nrelate to a minor who has been investigated, arrested, or taken\ninto custody before the minor's 18th birthday shall be\nrestricted to the following[.] (Emphasis added.) \n\nThe classes of persons who are permitted access to records concerning the investigation, arrest, \nor custodial detention of minors are then enumerated, and they do not include FOIA requesters. \n\nIn its response to this office, the Sheriff's Office maintained that disclosure of the\n\nrequested records would jeopardize the open criminal court case related to the incident. The\nSheriff's Office further argued: \n\nDue to the nature of the crime, it would be impossible to present\nthe factual allegations against the adult while preserving the rights\nof the minor under the Juvenile Court Act. Juveniles are entitled to\nsignificant protections under that Act, including ensuring that their\nlaw enforcement\n7(A). Those portions of the video evidence which show or\nreference the minor cannot simply be redacted but must be fully\nremoved to ensure the minor's rights are protected.[7] \n\nrecords are not made public. 705 ILCS 405/ 1-\n\nIn reply to that answer, \n\nargued that the Sheriff's Office routinely\n\ndiscloses \" this type of information to the general public through newspapers and online sources\nas a result of FOIA requests\" and that \"a name, photo and details of the incident from this case\nwas released through the Patch Newspaper on July 24 2023.\" 8 He also stated he could reduce the\n\nThe Attorney General has issued a binding opinion concluding that \"[ w]hen a\nsingle police report concerns both an adult arrestee and a minor arrestee or suspect, the plain\nlanguage of the JCA does not permit disclosure of any portion of the police report to an\nunauthorized party, regardless of the extent to which a portion of the report focuses on an adult\narrestee.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 23-010, issued July 12, 2023, at 11. Further, the\nopinion explained that even if there is a public interest in the incident, \" the section 7.5(bb) \nexemption does not take the public interest in disclosure into consideration as certain other FOIA\nprovisions do[.]\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 23- 010, at 11. \n\nthe investigation, arrest, and charging of a minor, in addition to an adult. Based on the\n\nreports for the\nThis office's review of the written report and supplemental\nspecified case confirmed that they are \" juvenile law enforcement records\" because they\ndocument\nnature of the incident, any video or audio recordings, such as the body camera videos of the\nresponding officers, related to the Sheriff's Office's investigation would necessarily disclose\ninformation about the minor because the adult and minor were together during the incident. \nEven if the Sheriff's Office has released some details to the public concerning the adult and his\ncourt case, any records concerning the arrested juvenile are subject to the strict confidentiality\nprotections of the JCA, which requires juvenile law enforcement\nrecords to be withheld in full\nrather than disclosed in part with redactions. The 7.5(bb) exemption also does not take into\naccount the public interest in disclosure, as discussed above. Accordingly, the Sheriff's Office\ndid not improperly withhold the records pursuant to section 7.5(bb) of FOIA.9\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78704 f 75bb proper co\n\npursuant to section 7.5(bb) of FOIA, we decline to address the remaining asserted exemptions. \n\n9 Because this determination concludes that responsive records are exempt from disclosure"}
{"id":1028,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["78862"],"title":"Illinois State Police properly withheld FOID card data under 7.5(v)","filename":"78862, issued May 13, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2141,"summary":"The requester sought FOID card issuance data broken down by year, county, and zip code, which the Illinois State Police denied citing a statutory exemption. The PAC concluded that the ISP did not violate FOIA because the requested data is protected from disclosure under section 7.5(v) of the Act.","plain_summary":"A journalist requested state-wide data on Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card holders broken down by location and year. The Illinois State Police denied the request, arguing that state law specifically prohibits the release of this information. The Attorney General's office agreed with the police, finding that the law exempts this specific data from public disclosure.","holding":"The Illinois State Police did not violate FOIA by withholding data regarding FOID card issuance.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois State Police properly withheld FOID card issuance data pursuant to section 7.5(v) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(v)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(v)"],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":"Ms. Samah Assad (CBS 2 Chicago)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7.5(v)","subject_description":"The request sought statistical data regarding the number of Illinois residents issued FOID cards categorized by year, county, and zip code.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_v/78862%2C%20issued%20May%2013%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOID card","Illinois State Police","data request","statutory exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"May 13, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Samah Assad\nInvestigative Producer\nCBS 2 Chicago\nsfassad@viacomcbs. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nFOIA Appeals Manager\nOffice of the Director\nIllinois State Police\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRhiann.Martynowski@illinois.gov\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2023 PAC 78862;  ISP FOIA no.  05959603\n\nDear Ms. Assad and Ms. Martynowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5( f) (West 202 2 ), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024 ).  For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Illinois State Police (ISP) did not violate FOIA by withholding data responsive to Ms. Samah\nAssad 's August 29, 2023 , FOIA request. \n\nOn that date,  Ms.  Assad submitted a FOIA request to ISP on behalf of CBS 2\n\nChicago seeking \"data, in its original Excel/spreadsheet format, showing the number of Illinois\nresidents who were issued a FOID [1] card, broken down by year and by county, from Jan. 1, 2010\nthrough the day in which this request is fulfilled[,]\" as well as \" that same data, broken down by\n\n1\" FOID\" stands for \"Firearm Owner's Identification .\" \n\n\fMs.  Samah Assad\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nMay 13, 2024\nPage 2\n\nyear for the same timeframe,  for the Chicago [ sic]  specifically.\" 2 On August 31,  2023,  Ms. \nAssad added that she was \"also requesting data showing the number of Illinois residents issued a\nFOID card broken down by zip code, by year, from Jan. 1, 2010 through the day in which this\nrequest is fulfilled.\"3 On September 6, 2023, ISP denied the request pursuant to section 7.5(v) of\nFOIA.4 ISP stated that \"[ d] ata from the ISP Firearms Services Bureau's licensing database is\nexempt under Section 7.5( v) of FOIA[,]\" 5 but provided a link to certain related data on its\nwebsite. 6 ISP also suggested Ms.  Assad follow up with its Public Information Officer,  Ms. \nMelaney Arnold.   \n\nMs. Assad exchanged a series of e -mails with Ms. Arnold, which resulted in ISP\n\ndeclining to provide the data because:  \" Running historical reports containing the number of\nFOID applications broken down by county for each year going back to 2010 would requi re ISP\nto request its vendor stop working on critical, time sensitive tasks mandated by law in order to\ncreate a program to run a report.\" 7 In her Request for Review, submitted November 3, 2023, Ms. \nAssad argues: \n\nWhile ISP cites 5 ILCS 140/ 7.5( v) to justify withholding, \n\nthat exemption does not apply here. CBS 2 did not ask for the\nnames and personal information of people who have applied for or\nreceived FOID cards. CBS 2 also did not request any databases\nunder th e Firearm Concealed Carry Act, or any other records from\nthe Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board.  CBS 2 asked for\naggregate,  anonymized statistics broken down by year,  county and\nzip code.[8] \n\nISP.FOIA.Officer@illinois. gov  (August 29, 2023). \n\n2E-mail from Samah Assad,  Investigative Producer,  CBS Chicago,  to\n\nISP.FOIA.Officer@illinois. gov (August 31, 2023). \n\n3E- mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago,  to\n\n034, effective June 9, 2023;  103 -508, effective July 1, 2023.   \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 7.5(v) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n\nto Samah F Assad ( September 6, 2023). \n\n5E- mail from Illinois State Police, Freedom of Information Unit, Sarah Wheeler –  FOIA Officer, \n\n6Illinois State Police,  Statistics,  https:// isp. illinois. gov/ Foid/ Statistics .  \n\n7E-mail from Melaney Arnold to Samah Assad ( October 27, 2023). \n\n8E- mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago,  to PAC (November 3, 2023). \n\n\fMs.  Samah Assad\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nMay 13, 2024\nPage 3\n\nOn November 16, 2023 , this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nISP and asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the denial of\nMs. Assad's request.  On December 7, 2023 , this office received ISP's written response .  On\nJanuary 10, 2024, Ms. Assad submitted a reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022 ); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health , 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 202 2 ).  The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University , 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997).  \n\nSection 7.5(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nNames and information of people who have applied for\n\nor received Firearm Owner's Identification Cards under the\nFirearm Owners Identification Card Act or applied for or received\na concealed carry license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, \nunless otherwise authorized by the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; \nand databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act , records\nof the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board under the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act, and law enforcement agency objections\nunder the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nCorrespondingly,  section 10( i) of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act 9 authorizes the creation of\nthe databases at issue in section 7.5(v) of FOIA : \n\nThe Illinois State Police shall maintain a database of\n\nlicense applicants and licensees .  The database shall be available\nto all federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, State's\nAttorneys, the Attorney General, and authorized court personnel. \nWithin 180 days after July 9, 2013 (the effective date of this Act), \nthe database shall be searchable and provide all information\nincluded in the application,  including the applicant' s previous\naddresses within the 10 years prior to the license application and\nany information related to violations of this Act.  No law\nenforcement agency, State's Attorney, Attorney General, or\n\n9430 ILCS 66/ 10(i) (West 202 2 ). \n\n\fMs.  Samah Assad\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nMay 13, 2024\nPage 4\n\nmember or staff of the judiciary shall provide any information\nto a requester who is not entitled to it by law .  (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nIn its response to this office, ISP explained that  \"Ms. Assad's request was not\n\ndenied as unduly burdensome;  it was denied because data contained in ISP' s Firearms Services\nBureau' s licensing database ( FLARES)  is exempt from disclosure.\" 10 ISP asserted: \n\nThe FLARES database was established pursuant to the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act requirement that ISP maintain a database of\nconcealed carry license applicants and licensees (430 ILCS 66/1 et\nseq.).  FOID information is also housed in FLARES.  As such, \nFOID data is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(v) of\nFOIA, which provides in pertinent part: \" databases under the\nFirearm Concealed Carry Act\" are exempt from disclosure. Senior\nAssistant Attorney General Edie Steinberg most recently\nconfirmed in a determination letter dated September 1,  2023,  that\nFOID data/stats are exempt from disclosure. While aggregate data\nabout FOID cards may not necessarily be categorized as\ninformation of people \" who obtained FOID cards, that data is\nmaintained in a database that is exempt from disclosure pursuant to\n7.5( v) of FOIA.[ 11] \n\nIn this passage, ISP referenced a recent determination letter (Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n76411, issued September 1, 2023) in which this office concluded that data about returned FOID\ncards and firearm dispossession records were exempt from disclosure under section 7.5( v) of\nFOIA because they were contained in the FLARES database. \n\nISP also explained that the communications from Ms. Arnold to Ms. Assad\n\npertained to Ms. Assad's status as a member of the media, rather than the confines of FOIA: \n\nAs a courtesy to the media,  specifically requests seeking records\nnot available for release pursuant to FOIA, ISP 's FOIA Unit\ncommonly supplies ISP's Public Information Office contact\ninformation. Although the intent is not clear in the denial, this is to\ngive media requesters access to records that may be available for\n\n10Letter from Rhiann Martynowski,  FOIA Appeals Manager,  Illinois State Police,  to Joshua M. \n\nJones,  Deputy Bureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau ( December 7, 2023 ), at [ 1]. \n\n11Letter from Rhiann Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Illinois State Police, to Joshua M. \n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau ( December 7, 2023), at [1].  \n\n\fMs.  Samah Assad\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nMay 13, 2024\nPage 5\n\nrelease by the Agency but would not be released pursuant\nFOIA request. The FOID data requested by Ms. Assad will not be\nreleased through FOIA. The Agency may decide to work with its\nVendor to create a program to run specific reports to produce the\ndata that Ms. Assad requested. If the Agency completes that task, it\nmay decide to post that data on ISP' s website alongside other\nFOID- related data.  Nevertheless,  the FOID data will not be\nproduced via FOIA.[12] \n\nto a\n\nMs. Assad replied by contending that \"[ i]n its answer, the ISP heavily relies on\nsemantics and contradictions – none of which justify or even address the improper Freedom of\nInformation Act denial.\" 13 Noting that ISP denied the request because it asserted that\ninformation in the FLARES database is exempt from disclosure, Ms. Assad reiterated that she\nwas seeking anonymized information.  Ms. Assad further argued: \n\nISP also cites an exemption for databases under the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act. But that exemption applies only to \" names\nand information of people.\"  I am not seeking names and\ninformation of specific people. Again, I am seeking only\nanonymized data – like the data ISP has released in the past on its\nown volition.  \n\nISP' s letter does not explain why the specific information\n\nI'm seeking would fall under the exemptions they cited.  \n\nAnd,  in fact,  ISP acknowledges ( despite the specter of\n\nprivacy interests it raises here)  that it has affirmatively chosen to\nmake similar information publicly available to the media. \nConsidering the voluntary disclosure of this information by ISP\npreviously, it is difficult to seriously credit ISP 's privacy\narguments here.[14] \n\nISP has adequately explained that the requested data is exempt from disclosure\nbecause it is contained within the FLARES database , which was created pursuant to the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act.  Although Ms. Assad argues that the section 7.5(v) exemption is limited to\n\nJones,  Deputy Bureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau ( December 7, 2023),  at [ 1 -2 ]. \n\n12Letter from Rhiann Martynowski,  FOIA Appeals Manager,  Illinois State Police,  to Joshua M. \n\n13E-mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer,  CBS Chicago,  to PAC ( January 10, 2024). \n\n14E- mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago,  to PAC (January 10, 2024).  \n\n\fs. Samah Assad\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nMay 13, 2024\nPage 6\n\nnames and information of people\"  and does not encompass anonymized data,  the clause that\nexempts \"[ n]ames and information of people who have applied for or received Firearm Owner's\nIdentification Cards under the Firearm Owners Identification Act \" is separate and distinct from\nthe clause of the exemption that applies to \"databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry\nAct[.]\" 15 Therefore, section 7.5(v) exempts from disclosure , among other records, both (1) \nnames and information of FOID card applicants and recipients,  and ( 2)  the contents of the\nFLARES database,  in which the requested data is maintained.   Additionally,  although Ms.  Assad\ncontends that ISP's previous disclosure of similar information to the media casts doubt on ISP's\nprivacy arguments, ISP's denial of her request is based on the language of section 7.5(v) of FOIA\nthat encompasses \" databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act ,\" rather than privacy\nreasons.  ISP's past disclosures of similar data— whether pursuant to FOIA or not—do not bear\non its denial here.   Warren v.  Department of Corrections ,  2022 IL App ( 4th)  210667 -U, ¶ 52\nThe mere fact [a public body] voluntarily disclosed records of a similar nature in [one] case has\nno bearing on whether the exemption is applicable\" in another case.).   Because FOIA sets forth a\nstatutory prohibition against release of the data Ms. Assad seeks pursuant to FOIA, the Public\nAccess Bureau concludes that ISP's denial did not violate FOIA.   \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This letter shall serve to close this matter.  If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78862 f 75v proper pd sa\n\n155 ILCS 140/ 7.5(v) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -008, effective June 7, 2023;  \n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023;  103 -508, effective July 1, 2023.    \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Statistical data on FOID card issuance by year and area","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-78862/","full_text":"May 13, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Samah Assad\nInvestigative Producer\nCBS 2 Chicago\nsfassad@viacomcbs. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nFOIA Appeals Manager\nOffice of the Director\nIllinois State Police\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRhiann.Martynowski@illinois.gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 78862; ISP FOIA no. 05959603\n\nDear Ms. Assad and Ms. Martynowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 202 2), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Illinois State Police (ISP) did not violate FOIA by withholding data responsive to Ms. Samah\nAssad 's August 29, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Ms. Assad submitted a FOIA request to ISP on behalf of CBS 2\n\nChicago seeking \"data, in its original Excel/spreadsheet format, showing the number of Illinois\nresidents who were issued a FOID [1] card, broken down by year and by county, from Jan. 1, 2010\nthrough the day in which this request is fulfilled[,]\" as well as \" that same data, broken down by\n\nyear for the same timeframe, for the Chicago [ sic] specifically.\" 2 On August 31, 2023, Ms. \nAssad added that she was \"also requesting data showing the number of Illinois residents issued a\nFOID card broken down by zip code, by year, from Jan. 1, 2010 through the day in which this\nrequest is fulfilled.\"3 On September 6, 2023, ISP denied the request pursuant to section 7.5(v) of\nFOIA.4 ISP stated that \"[ d] ata from the ISP Firearms Services Bureau's licensing database is\nexempt under Section 7.5(v) of FOIA[,]\" 5 but provided a link to certain related data on its\nwebsite. 6 ISP also suggested Ms. Assad follow up with its Public Information Officer, Ms. \nMelaney Arnold. \n\nMs. Assad exchanged a series of e -mails with Ms. Arnold, which resulted in ISP\n\ndeclining to provide the data because: \" Running historical reports containing the number of\nFOID applications broken down by county for each year going back to 2010 would requi re ISP\nto request its vendor stop working on critical, time sensitive tasks mandated by law in order to\ncreate a program to run a report.\" 7 In her Request for Review, submitted November 3, 2023, Ms. \nAssad argues: \n\nWhile ISP cites 5 ILCS 140/ 7.5(v) to justify withholding, \n\nthat exemption does not apply here. CBS 2 did not ask for the\nnames and personal information of people who have applied for or\nreceived FOID cards. CBS 2 also did not request any databases\nunder th e Firearm Concealed Carry Act, or any other records from\nthe Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board. CBS 2 asked for\naggregate, anonymized statistics broken down by year, county and\nzip code.[8] \n\nISP.FOIA.Officer@illinois. gov (August 29, 2023). \n\n2E-mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago, to\n\nISP.FOIA.Officer@illinois. gov (August 31, 2023). \n\n3E- mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago, to\n\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103 -508, effective July 1, 2023. \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 7.5(v) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n\nto Samah F Assad (September 6, 2023). \n\n5E- mail from Illinois State Police, Freedom of Information Unit, Sarah Wheeler – FOIA Officer, \n\n6 Illinois State Police, Statistics, https:// isp. illinois. gov/ Foid/ Statistics. \n\n7E-mail from Melaney Arnold to Samah Assad (October 27, 2023). \n\n8E- mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago, to PAC (November 3, 2023). \n\nOn November 16, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nISP and asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the denial of\nMs. Assad's request. On December 7, 2023, this office received ISP's written response. On\nJanuary 10, 2024, Ms. Assad submitted a reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 202 2). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7.5(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nNames and information of people who have applied for\n\nor received Firearm Owner's Identification Cards under the\nFirearm Owners Identification Card Act or applied for or received\na concealed carry license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, \nunless otherwise authorized by the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; \nand databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, records\nof the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board under the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act, and law enforcement agency objections\nunder the Firearm Concealed Carry Act. (Emphasis added.) \n\nCorrespondingly, section 10(i) of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act 9 authorizes the creation of\nthe databases at issue in section 7.5(v) of FOIA: \n\nThe Illinois State Police shall maintain a database of\n\nlicense applicants and licensees. The database shall be available\nto all federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, State's\nAttorneys, the Attorney General, and authorized court personnel. \nWithin 180 days after July 9, 2013 (the effective date of this Act), \nthe database shall be searchable and provide all information\nincluded in the application, including the applicant's previous\n\nmember or staff of the judiciary shall provide any information\nto a requester who is not entitled to it by law. (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nIn its response to this office, ISP explained that \"Ms. Assad's request was not\n\ndenied as unduly burdensome; it was denied because data contained in ISP's Firearms Services\nBureau's licensing database (FLARES) is exempt from disclosure.\" 10 ISP asserted: \n\nThe FLARES database was established pursuant to the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act requirement that ISP maintain a database of\nconcealed carry license applicants and licensees (430 ILCS 66/1 et\nseq.). FOID information is also housed in FLARES. As such, \nFOID data is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(v) of\nFOIA, which provides in pertinent part: \" databases under the\nFirearm Concealed Carry Act\" are exempt from disclosure. Senior\nAssistant Attorney General Edie Steinberg most recently\nconfirmed in a determination letter dated September 1, 2023, that\nFOID data/stats are exempt from disclosure. While aggregate data\nabout FOID cards may not necessarily be categorized as\ninformation of people \" who obtained FOID cards, that data is\nmaintained in a database that is exempt from disclosure pursuant to\n7.5(v) of FOIA.[ 11] \n\nIn this passage, ISP referenced a recent determination letter (Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n76411, issued September 1, 2023) in which this office concluded that data about returned FOID\ncards and firearm dispossession records were exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(v) of\nFOIA because they were contained in the FLARES database. \n\nISP also explained that the communications from Ms. Arnold to Ms. Assad\n\npertained to Ms. Assad's status as a member of the media, rather than the confines of FOIA: \n\nAs a courtesy to the media, specifically requests seeking records\nnot available for release pursuant to FOIA, ISP 's FOIA Unit\ncommonly supplies ISP's Public Information Office contact\ninformation. Although the intent is not clear in the denial, this is to\ngive media requesters access to records that may be available for\n\n10 Letter from Rhiann Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Illinois State Police, to Joshua M. \n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau (December 7, 2023), at [ 1]. \n\n11 Letter from Rhiann Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Illinois State Police, to Joshua M. \n\nrelease by the Agency but would not be released pursuant\nFOIA request. The FOID data requested by Ms. Assad will not be\nreleased through FOIA. The Agency may decide to work with its\nVendor to create a program to run specific reports to produce the\ndata that Ms. Assad requested. If the Agency completes that task, it\nmay decide to post that data on ISP's website alongside other\nFOID- related data. Nevertheless, the FOID data will not be\nproduced via FOIA.[12] \n\nto a\n\nMs. Assad replied by contending that \"[ i]n its answer, the ISP heavily relies on\nsemantics and contradictions – none of which justify or even address the improper Freedom of\nInformation Act denial.\" 13 Noting that ISP denied the request because it asserted that\ninformation in the FLARES database is exempt from disclosure, Ms. Assad reiterated that she\nwas seeking anonymized information. Ms. Assad further argued: \n\nISP also cites an exemption for databases under the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act. But that exemption applies only to \" names\nand information of people.\" I am not seeking names and\ninformation of specific people. Again, I am seeking only\nanonymized data – like the data ISP has released in the past on its\nown volition. \n\nISP's letter does not explain why the specific information\n\nI'm seeking would fall under the exemptions they cited. \n\nAnd, in fact, ISP acknowledges (despite the specter of\n\nprivacy interests it raises here) that it has affirmatively chosen to\nmake similar information publicly available to the media. \nConsidering the voluntary disclosure of this information by ISP\npreviously, it is difficult to seriously credit ISP 's privacy\narguments here.[14] \n\nISP has adequately explained that the requested data is exempt from disclosure\nbecause it is contained within the FLARES database, which was created pursuant to the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act. Although Ms. Assad argues that the section 7.5(v) exemption is limited to\n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau (December 7, 2023), at [ 1 -2 ]. \n\n12 Letter from Rhiann Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Illinois State Police, to Joshua M. \n\n13E-mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago, to PAC (January 10, 2024). \n\n14E- mail from Samah Assad, Investigative Producer, CBS Chicago, to PAC (January 10, 2024). \n\nnames and information of people\" and does not encompass anonymized data, the clause that\nexempts \"[ n]ames and information of people who have applied for or received Firearm Owner's\nIdentification Cards under the Firearm Owners Identification Act \" is separate and distinct from\nthe clause of the exemption that applies to \"databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry\nAct[.]\" 15 Therefore, section 7.5(v) exempts from disclosure, among other records, both (1) \nnames and information of FOID card applicants and recipients, and (2) the contents of the\nFLARES database, in which the requested data is maintained. Additionally, although Ms. Assad\ncontends that ISP's previous disclosure of similar information to the media casts doubt on ISP's\nprivacy arguments, ISP's denial of her request is based on the language of section 7.5(v) of FOIA\nthat encompasses \" databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act,\" rather than privacy\nreasons. ISP's past disclosures of similar data— whether pursuant to FOIA or not—do not bear\non its denial here. Warren v. Department of Corrections, 2022 IL App (4th) 210667 -U, ¶ 52\nThe mere fact [a public body] voluntarily disclosed records of a similar nature in [one] case has\nno bearing on whether the exemption is applicable\" in another case.). Because FOIA sets forth a\nstatutory prohibition against release of the data Ms. Assad seeks pursuant to FOIA, the Public\nAccess Bureau concludes that ISP's denial did not violate FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78862 f 75v proper pd sa\n\n155 ILCS 140/ 7.5(v) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -008, effective June 7, 2023; \n\n103-034, effective June 9, 2023; 103 -508, effective July 1, 2023."}
{"id":1029,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["78934"],"title":"University of Illinois not required to create aggregated survey data under FOIA","filename":"78934, issued May 7, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1544,"summary":"The requester sought aggregated student survey data from the University of Illinois, which the University partially denied; the PAC closed the file after determining the University was not required to create new records to fulfill the request.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the University of Illinois for specific statistical summaries of student survey results. The University denied parts of the request, and the PAC found that since the University did not already have the data in the requested format, they were not legally required to create it. The case was closed without a formal violation finding.","holding":"The PAC determined that because the University does not possess records in the specific aggregated format requested, it is not obligated to create them under FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required under FOIA to create new records or perform data aggregation to satisfy a request for information.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7(1)(j)(ii)","7.5(q)"],"public_body":"University of Illinois","requesting_party":"Anonymous","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records creation","subject_description":"The request sought aggregated student survey data (ICES Online) by instructor and course name.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Data-Requests/78934%2C%20issued%20May%207%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["student surveys","data aggregation","records creation","FOIA request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Records Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"May 7, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Matt Sullard\nAssociate Director,  FOIA Administration\nUniversity of Illinois System\n506 Sough Wright Street\nUrbana,  Illinois 61801\nsullard@uillinois. edu\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2023 PAC 78934;  University no. 23-1356\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Sullard: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January 1, 2024).   \n\nOn October 26, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nUniversity of Illinois ( University)  seeking copies of the following records: \n\nI am requesting the following information,  aggregated by\n\nthe combination of instructor and course name.  Firstly,  the count of\nstudents that filled out the survey.  Additionally,  for each non- open- \nended question on the ICES Online survey,  I am requesting the\nname of the question,  and the mean and median answer to the\nquestion by the students.  \n\n\fMr. Matt Sullard\nMay 7, 2024\nPage 2\n\nFor example,  if the survey included the question \" How\n\nmuch have you learned in this course?\" ( rated on a five-point scale\nfrom \"  Very Little … A Great Deal\"),  I would want that the mean/ \nmedian answers to this question were 3.8 and 3.6 for the course\nEXAMPLE 400 taught by PROFESSOR Y, and that 100 students\nfilled out the survey including this question [ 1] \n\nOn November 2, 2023,  the University extended its time to respond to\n\nrequest pursuant to two sub- sections of section 3(e)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3(e)( vi), (vii) \n\nWest 2022).   On November 9, 2023,  the University provided certain records responsive to\n\nFOIA request but stated that \"[ p] ortions of these records have been redacted or\nwithheld pursuant to\" 2 sections 7(1)(a)  and 7(1)(j)(ii) (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(a), ( 1)(j)(ii) (West 2022), \nas amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023; \n103- 446, effective August 4, 2023)  as well as section 7.5(q) of FOIA. 3 In invoking sections\n7(1)(a)  and 7.5(q), the University cited section 10 of the Personnel Record Review Act (PRRA) \n820 ILCS 40/10 (West 2022). 4\n\nThat same day, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review\n\nto this office contesting the University' s response.  \nargued that he didn't \"believe\nthere is existing case law in the state of Illinois that covers invoking 140/ 7(1)(j)(ii) and would\nlike to get clarity on what exactly this exception is meant to cover.\" 5\n\nOn November 29, 2023,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nUniversity and asked it to provide a representative sample of the records that were withheld and\nan unredacted copy of the records that were provided to\nfor this office' s confidential\nreview.   Additionally,  this office asked the University to provide a detailed explanation of the\nfactual and legal bases for the applicability of the cited exemptions to the withheld or redacted\nrecords. \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Ruby, Kirsten ( October 26, 2023).  \n\nOfficer, [ University of Illinois,]  to\n\nNovember 9, 2023). \n\n2E- mail from Kirsten Ruby, Director,  External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\n034, effective June 9, 2023;  103- 508, effective July 1, 2023.  \n\n35 ILCS 140/7.5(q) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 008, effective June 7, 2023;  103-\n\n4In a telephone conversation and a follow- up e-mail on November 28, 2023,  with an Assistant\n\nAttorney General in the Public Access Bureau,  Mr. Sullard informed this office that although the University' s\nresponse letter referred to section 10 of the PRRA,  it intended to assert section 11 of the PRRA ( 820 ILCS 40/11\nWest 2022).   \n\n5E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau] ( November 9, 2023).  \n\n\fMr. Matt Sullard\nMay 7, 2024\nPage 3\n\nOn December 8, 2023,  the University provided this office with a confidential\n\nresponse and a non-confidential response,  the latter suitable for this office to forward to\n6 On December 11, 2023,  this office forwarded a copy of the University' s non-\n\nhe replied that same day asking whether the redacted\n\nconfidential response to\nsection contained the argument which explained why the records were not being disclosed and\ncontended that the non- confidential response did not contain arguments or knowledge he was not\nalready aware of.  On December 12, 2023,  an Assistant Attorney General from the Public Access\nBureau confirmed that the unredacted portions restated the history of the FOIA request process\nand that she could not describe what was in the redacted portions of the University' s response.  \ndid not otherwise submit a substantive reply regarding the University' s response.  \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   However,  a \" requester is\nentitled only to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\"   Yeager v. Drug\nEnforcement Administration,  678 F.2d 315, 321 ( D.C. Cir. 1982).   FOIA does not require a\npublic body to compile data that it does not ordinarily keep.   Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department\nof Financial &  Professional Regulation,  2014 IL App 4th 130427, ¶  34; see also Kenyon v. \nGarrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) ( a public body is not required to create records in order to\nrespond to a FOIA request);  5 ILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022) ( FOIA \" is not intended to create an\nobligation on the part of any public body to maintain or prepare any public record which was not\nmaintained or prepared by such public body at the time when this Act becomes effective[.]\"). \n\nIn Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial &  Professional Regulation, \n\nthe Illinois Appellate Court analyzed how a FOIA request for \"the number of claims or informal\nidentified physicians\"  had to be handled.  ( Emphasis in original.)  \ncomplaints filed against * * * \n2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶  4.  The court noted that FOIA does not obligate public bodies to\nanswer questions or generate new records,  and that \"[ a]  request to inspect or copy must\nreasonably identify a public record and not general data,  information,  or statistics.\"   Chicago\nTribune Co., 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶  33.  Because the request would have required the\npublic body to manually review its paper files and tally the number of initial claims made against\nthe identified physicians rather than provide existing responsive records ( the public body did not\npossess a record reflecting the number of claims),  the court held that it was a general inquiry\nquestion,  to which FOIA did not require a response.   Chicago Tribune Co., 2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, ¶  36. \n\n6See 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, \n2024) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for\nreview,  with any alleged confidential\n\ninformation to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\").  \n\n\fMr. Matt Sullard\nMay 7, 2024\nPage 4\n\nIn Hites v. Waubonsee Community College, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836,  the Illinois\nAppellate Court analyzed a series of requests for information contained in databases.   The Hites\ncourt distinguished requests for raw data maintained in a public body' s database from requests\nseeking information about the data which would require the creation of new records.   The\ncourt held that raw data that was previously compiled and available through computerized\nsearches of the database constituted public records subject to disclosure,  but that FOIA did not\nrequire the public body to create records reflecting totals that had not been previously complied\nfrom that data.   Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶¶  78-81. \n\nThis office has carefully reviewed the University' s confidential response,  and\nadditional e-mail correspondence with the University,  which clarified and confirmed that the\nUniversity has not compiled the mean and median information\nAlthough the University may possess the underlying data from which means and medians could\nbe derived,  FOIA does not require the University to perform calculations and/ or analysis to\ncompile records reflecting this information.   Because the University is not obligated to create\nsuch records,  this office will not address the applicability of the sections 7(1)(a),  7(1)(j)(ii), and\n7.5(q) exemptions that the University cited in denying the request.     \n\nrequested. 7\n\nTo avoid confusion,  when the University responds to FOIA requests that seek\n\nsought in this request,  the University should respond in a\nmultiple records,  as\nmanner that allows the requester to understand which parts it is granting,  which parts it is\ndenying,  and which parts seek records it does not possess.    \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.  This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78934 f no vio univ\n\n7In a May 3, 2024,  telephone conversation,  Mr. Matt Sullard,  Associate Director of FOIA\n\nAdministration for the University,  confirmed to the Assistant Attorney General assigned to this matter that this piece\nof information may be shared with\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Aggregated student survey data by instructor and course","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-78934/","full_text":"May 7, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Matt Sullard\nAssociate Director, FOIA Administration\nUniversity of Illinois System\n506 Sough Wright Street\nUrbana, Illinois 61801\nsullard@uillinois. edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 78934; University no. 23-1356\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Sullard: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January 1, 2024). \n\nOn October 26, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nUniversity of Illinois (University) seeking copies of the following records: \n\nI am requesting the following information, aggregated by\n\nFor example, if the survey included the question \" How\n\nmuch have you learned in this course?\" (rated on a five-point scale\nfrom \" Very Little … A Great Deal\"), I would want that the mean/ \nmedian answers to this question were 3.8 and 3.6 for the course\nEXAMPLE 400 taught by PROFESSOR Y, and that 100 students\nfilled out the survey including this question [ 1] \n\nOn November 2, 2023, the University extended its time to respond to\n\nrequest pursuant to two sub- sections of section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(e)(vi), (vii) \n\nWest 2022). On November 9, 2023, the University provided certain records responsive to\n\nFOIA request but stated that \"[ p] ortions of these records have been redacted or\nwithheld pursuant to\" 2 sections 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(j)(ii) (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(a), (1)(j)(ii) (West 2022), \nas amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; \n103- 446, effective August 4, 2023) as well as section 7.5(q) of FOIA. 3 In invoking sections\n7(1)(a) and 7.5(q), the University cited section 10 of the Personnel Record Review Act (PRRA) \n820 ILCS 40/10 (West 2022). 4\n\nThat same day, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review\n\nto this office contesting the University's response. \nargued that he didn't \"believe\nthere is existing case law in the state of Illinois that covers invoking 140/ 7(1)(j)(ii) and would\nlike to get clarity on what exactly this exception is meant to cover.\" 5\n\nOn November 29, 2023, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nUniversity and asked it to provide a representative sample of the records that were withheld and\nan unredacted copy of the records that were provided to\nfor this office's confidential\nreview. Additionally, this office asked the University to provide a detailed explanation of the\nfactual and legal bases for the applicability of the cited exemptions to the withheld or redacted\nrecords. \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Ruby, Kirsten (October 26, 2023). \n\nOfficer, [ University of Illinois,] to\n\nNovember 9, 2023). \n\n2E- mail from Kirsten Ruby, Director, External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103- 508, effective July 1, 2023. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7.5(q) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n\n4 In a telephone conversation and a follow- up e-mail on November 28, 2023, with an Assistant\n\nAttorney General in the Public Access Bureau, Mr. Sullard informed this office that although the University's\nresponse letter referred to section 10 of the PRRA, it intended to assert section 11 of the PRRA (820 ILCS 40/11\n\nOn December 8, 2023, the University provided this office with a confidential\n\nresponse and a non-confidential response, the latter suitable for this office to forward to\n6 On December 11, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the University's non-\n\nhe replied that same day asking whether the redacted\n\nconfidential response to\nsection contained the argument which explained why the records were not being disclosed and\ncontended that the non- confidential response did not contain arguments or knowledge he was not\nalready aware of. On December 12, 2023, an Assistant Attorney General from the Public Access\nBureau confirmed that the unredacted portions restated the history of the FOIA request process\nand that she could not describe what was in the redacted portions of the University's response. \ndid not otherwise submit a substantive reply regarding the University's response. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). However, a \" requester is\nentitled only to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug\nEnforcement Administration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982). FOIA does not require a\npublic body to compile data that it does not ordinarily keep. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department\nof Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App 4th 130427, ¶ 34; see also Kenyon v. \nGarrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) (a public body is not required to create records in order to\nrespond to a FOIA request); 5 ILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022) (FOIA \" is not intended to create an\nobligation on the part of any public body to maintain or prepare any public record which was not\nmaintained or prepared by such public body at the time when this Act becomes effective[.]\"). \n\nIn Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, \n\nthe Illinois Appellate Court analyzed how a FOIA request for \"the number of claims or informal\nidentified physicians\" had to be handled. (Emphasis in original.) \ncomplaints filed against * * * \n2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 4. The court noted that FOIA does not obligate public bodies to\nanswer questions or generate new records, and that \"[ a] request to inspect or copy must\nreasonably identify a public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\" Chicago\nTribune Co., 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33. Because the request would have required the\npublic body to manually review its paper files and tally the number of initial claims made against\nthe identified physicians rather than provide existing responsive records (the public body did not\npossess a record reflecting the number of claims), the court held that it was a general inquiry\nquestion, to which FOIA did not require a response. Chicago Tribune Co., 2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, ¶ 36. \n\n6 See 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, \n2024) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for\n\nIn Hites v. Waubonsee Community College, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, the Illinois\nAppellate Court analyzed a series of requests for information contained in databases. The Hites\ncourt distinguished requests for raw data maintained in a public body's database from requests\nseeking information about the data which would require the creation of new records. The\ncourt held that raw data that was previously compiled and available through computerized\nsearches of the database constituted public records subject to disclosure, but that FOIA did not\nrequire the public body to create records reflecting totals that had not been previously complied\nfrom that data. Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶¶ 78-81. \n\nThis office has carefully reviewed the University's confidential response, and\nadditional e-mail correspondence with the University, which clarified and confirmed that the\nUniversity has not compiled the mean and median information\nAlthough the University may possess the underlying data from which means and medians could\nbe derived, FOIA does not require the University to perform calculations and/ or analysis to\ncompile records reflecting this information. Because the University is not obligated to create\nsuch records, this office will not address the applicability of the sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(j)(ii), and\n7.5(q) exemptions that the University cited in denying the request. \n\nrequested. 7\n\nTo avoid confusion, when the University responds to FOIA requests that seek\n\nsought in this request, the University should respond in a\nmultiple records, as\nmanner that allows the requester to understand which parts it is granting, which parts it is\ndenying, and which parts seek records it does not possess. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78934 f no vio univ\n\n7 In a May 3, 2024, telephone conversation, Mr. Matt Sullard, Associate Director of FOIA\n\nAdministration for the University, confirmed to the Assistant Attorney General assigned to this matter that this piece\nof information may be shared with"}
{"id":1030,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-30","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["78983"],"title":"Chicago Public Schools did not violate FOIA by refusing to create custom report","filename":"78983, issued May 30, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3227,"summary":"The requester sought a 'Backlog Trend Report' from the Chicago Public Schools' FOIA software platform, which the district denied on the grounds that the report was not a record maintained in the ordinary course of business. The PAC concluded that CPS did not violate FOIA because the requested report did not exist in the form requested.","plain_summary":"A requester asked Chicago Public Schools for a specific 'Backlog Trend Report' generated by their FOIA software. The school district denied the request, stating that such a report does not exist as a standard document they keep. The Attorney General's office agreed, noting that FOIA does not require agencies to create new records or generate custom reports that they do not already maintain.","holding":"Chicago Public Schools did not improperly withhold records because the requested 'Backlog Trend Report' is not a record maintained by the public body in the ordinary course of business.","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required under FOIA to generate a custom report from a software platform when that specific report is not maintained in the ordinary course of business.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Chicago Public Schools","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records creation","subject_description":"The requester sought a custom data report regarding FOIA processing backlogs from the district's third-party software vendor.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_d/78983%2C%20issued%20May%2030%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["records creation","FOIA software","custom report","data request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Records Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAI. \n\nMay 30,  2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs.  Annie Righi\n\nFOIA Officer\n\nChicago Public Schools\n\n42 West Madison Street\n\nChicago,  Illinois 60602\n\narighi@cps. edu\n\nRE:  FOIA Request\n\nfor Review —  2023 PAC 78983;  CPS no.  N014319- 100923\n\nDear and Ms.  Righi: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9. 5( f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9. 5( f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1,  2024).  For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that Chicago Public Schools (CPS) did not improperly withhold rccords responsive to\n\nOctober 9,  2023,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, — \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to CPS seeking \"[ a]  Backlog\nTrend Report for the CPS FOIA Office for the year of 2023 to date.\"  I Using information from a\npresentation slide by GovQA, CPS' s software vendor for processing FOIA requests, \nexplained how he believed CPS could run the report in the GovQA platform.  On October 25, \n2023,  CPS responded that the request did not seek a record maintained in the ordinary course of\nbusiness.  On November\nsubmitted a Request for Review contesting that\nresponse.  He argued that the record he seeks exists and simply needs to be retrieved: \"[ B] ecause\nthe Backlog Trend Report is a documented feature of the system that CPS uses to manage FOIA\n\n14,  2023, \n\nIFOIA portal message from\n\nto Chicago Public Schools ( October 9,  2023). \n\n500 South 2nd Surd\n\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago,  Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive,  Suite C\n\nCarbondale.  Illinois 62903\n\n217)  782- 1090 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n\n312)  814- 3000 •  Fax: ( 312)  814- 3806\n\n618)  529- 6400 •  Fax: ( 618)  529- 6116\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can mach us by using the 7- 1-\n\n1 relay service. \n\nwww. IllinoisAttomeyGeneral.\n\ngov\n\n\fMs.  Annie Righi\n\nMay 30,  2024\nPage 2\n\nrequests,  retrieving it is trivially easy,  requiring only [ sic]  them only to set the date range and\nclick a button.\" 2\n\nattached a brief he wrote about relational databases and FOIA. \n\nOn November 20,  2023,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to CPS\nand asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for asserting that it\ndoes not maintain a responsive record,  addressing whether it used the method\ndescribed,  or any other method,  to try to furnish the record in question.  To the extent CPS\nargued that it was not required to try to run the report/ retrieve the record,  this office asked CPS\nto address whether the data concerns CPS'  transaction of public business and how retrieving the\ndata would go beyond what the court in Hites v.  Waubonsee Community College,  2016 IL App\n2d)  150836, concluded public bodies must do with respect to processing FOIA requests for such\ndata compilations.  On January 2,  2024, CPS provided a copy of a backlog trend report for this\nreview and its answer.  On January 18,  2024submitted a reply.  DETERMINATION\noffice' s confidential\n\nAll\n\nrecords in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open\n\nto inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois\nDepartment of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).  However,  a \"requester is entitled\nonly to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug\nAdministration,  678 F.2d 315, 321 ( D. C. Cir.  1982).  FOIA\nbody to compile data that it does not ordinarily keep. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of\nFinancial & Professional\n184 Ill. App.  3d 28, 32 ( 1989) ( a public body is not\nto a FOIA\n\nRegulation, 2014 IL App 4th 130427, ¶ 34;  see also Kenyon v. Garrels, \n\nrequired to create records in order to respond\n\nrequest); 5 ILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022) (FOIA \" is not\n\ndoes not requirea public\n\nintended to create an obligation\n\nEnforcement\n\non the part of any public body to maintain or prepare any public record which was not maintained\nor prepared by such public body at the time when this Act becomes effective[.]\"). In\n\nits answer to this office,  CPS maintained that it properly denied request\n\nbecause the request \" fails to cite an existing public record that is maintained in the normal\ncourse of business * * *, and\n\nis instead providing directions to a public body calling for the\ncreation of a new record that contains unique calculations about and derived from public records[.]\"\n3 CPS\nargued that in contrast to a request seeking existing data points,  request\ncalls for a calculationof the underlying data points and then the combinationof the new tallies\ninto a chart.  CPS noted that \"neither ' backlog' nor a count of 'backlogged'  requests is an Letter\n\n3Letter\n\nfrom to [\n\nPublic Access Bureau] (undated; \n\ntransmitted November 14, 2024). \n\nfrom Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformationAct Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua Jones, \n\nDeputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024),  at [1]. Office\n\nof the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Annie Righi\n\nMay 30,  2024\nPage 3\n\nexisting datapoint in GovQA.\" 4 CPS explained that it \"was,  prior to this request,  unaware of the\nBacklog Trend Report, has never prepared,  received, possessed, nor controlled this report or the\nrelated backlog calculations\nrecord,  CPS argued, \n\nfor use in conducting business[.]\"\n\n5 Rather than seeking a public\n\nis essentially submitting an inquiry seeking a count of how\n\nmany FOIA requests the district closes, how many requests the district receives,  and how many\nrequests are ' carried over'  on a monthly basis in 2023.\" 6 CPS further argued that while FOIA\nconcerns copying records,  meaning reproducing them,? \" producing this record would not\nconstitute the reproduction of any record,  but rather the initial production of a new record, \ncontaining new data.\" ( Emphasis in original.)[$] \n\nAccording to CPS,  the data compilations the court in Hites v.  Waubonsee\n\nCommunity College concluded must be disclosed are distinguishable because\nrequest seeks not information generated and stored by a public body,  but a calculation derived\nfrom that information.  CPS analogized this matter to two cases on which the Hites court relied, \n\nChicago Tribune Co.  v. Department ofFinancial do Professional Regulation,  2014 IL App ( 4th) \n130427, 133,  and National Security Counselors v.  Central Intelligence Agency,  898 F.  Supp.  2d\n233,  271 ( D. D. C.  2012).  Just as the request in Chicago Tribune Co.  asked the public body \" to\nperform an action ( a review of its investigative files) in order to prepare a new record (a tally as\nto the number of claims),\"  CPS argued,  the Backlog Trend Report would be a new record and\n\nrequested that the district perform an action,  in giving specific directions to the\n\nFOIA Office to follow in order to prepare a new record that contains backlog calculations.\" 9\nSimilarly, just as the federal district court in National Security Counselors \" held that producing a\nlisting' of a database search,  such as a listing of the first 100 FOIA requests in a given year, \nconstituted the creation of a new record * * * \ninformation about\nemphasis added), \" the Backlog Trend\n\npublic records\"  rather than \" thc records themselves\" (\n\nbecause the request sought\n\nLetter from Annie Righi,  Freedom oflnformation Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools,  to Joshua\n\nJones,  Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  at [ 2]. \n\nLetter from Annie Righi,  Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools,  to Joshua\n\nJones,  Deputy Bureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  at [ 2]. \n\nLetter from Annie Righi,  Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools,  to Joshua\n\nJones,  Deputy Bureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  at [ 2]. \n\nSection 2( d) of FOIA (5 I LCS 140/2( d) (West 2022))  defines \" copying\"  a s \" the reproduction of\nany public record by means of any photographic, electronic,  mechanical or other process, device or means now\nknown or herea fter developed and available to the public body.\" \n\nLetter from Annie Righi,  Freedom oflnformation Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools,  to Joshua\n\nJones,  Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  at [ 3]. \n\n9Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua\n\nJones,  Deputy Bureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  at [ 4]. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Annie Righi\n\nMay 30,  2024\nPage 4\n\nReport is akin to seeking information about public records,  rather than the public records\nmeaning the underlying data points)  themselves.\" ( Emphasis added.) 10 Returning to Hites,  CPS\nfor the total numbers of students in certain\nhighlighted that the court concluded that a request\n\ncategories improperly sought\nmaintain the requested totals in its databases;  CPS argued that\n\nthe creation of new records because the public body did not\n\nlike Chicago Tribune Co.,  such a\n\nrequest improperly asks a public body to perform a calculation,  and like National Security\nCounselors,  such a request seeks information about public records rather than records\nthemselves.  Hites,  2016 IL App ( 2d)  150836, ¶  79. \n\nAcknowledging that raw data in a database is subject to disclosure,  CPS\n\nsuggested tha\"\nconsider requesting only underlying data within GovQA (such as a\nreport reflecting the open and closed date of all requests received in a certain timeframe)  from\nwhich he can conduct his own calculations.\"\"  CPS additionally asserted: \n\ndetails\n\nto release,  this request still fails to cite a specific\n\nA] ssuming arguendo that the Backlog Report is an existing public\nrecord subject\npublic record for review. The slide referenced byl• \na multitude of options surrounding the production of the Backlog\nTrend Report,  such as viewing the backlog by request\nassigned department,  assigned staff, or the option to include only\npast due requests.  Accordingly,  as there are variations on how this\nreport can be pulled,  the request fails to cite a specific record for\nreview in failing to specify what filters to apply or data to include. \nThis is particularly true because the district has not created and\ndoes not utilize such a report,  so there is no uniform or already\nestablished format that can be presumed to be requested here. 11\n\ntype, \n\n1\n\nIn his reply, \n\ndid not address Hites,  but argued that the federal appellate\n\ncourt in Center for Investigative Reporting v.  United States Department ofJustice,  14 F. 4th 916\n9th Cir. 2021)  rejected CPS's position on what constitutes the creation of a new record and\nspecifically overturn[ ed]\"  National Security Counselors. 13\n\nIn Center for Investigative\n\n1° Letter from Annie Righi,  Freedom of Infonmation Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools,  to\n\nJoshua Jones,  Deputy BureauChief,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  at [ 5]. \n\nJoshua Jones,  Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  a t [ 6]. \n\nLetter from Annie Righi,  Freedom of Information Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools, \n\nto\n\n12Letter from Annie Righi,  Freedom of Information Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools,  to\n\nJoshua Jones,  Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024), a t [6]. \n\n13Letter from\n\nto Joshua Jones,  Deputy Bureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau, \n\nOffice of the Attorney General ( January 18,  2024),  at [ 2]. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Annie Righi\n\nMay 30,  2024\nPage 5\n\nReporting,  the Bureau of Alcohol,  Tobacco,  Firearms,  and Explosives ( ATF)  argued that it was\nnot required to disclose \" the '[ t] otal number of weapons traced back to former law enforcement\nownership,  annually from 2006 to the present,'  because FOIA establishes a right of access to\nexisting agency records only,  and searching its trace database would require the creation of a\nnew record.\"  Center forinvestigative Reporting,  14 F.4th at 937.  As with the court in Hites,  the\ncourt in Center for Investigative Reporting concluded that \" using a query to search for and\nextract a particular arrangement or subset of data already maintained in an agency' s database\ndoes not amount to the creation of a new record[.]\"  Centerfor Investigative Reporting,  14 F. 4th\nat 938.  ATF acknowledged that its relevant database \" include[ d] ' close- out codes' for each trace, \nincluding those related to law enforcement and government agencies [,]\"  and that it could search\nthe database to identify those law enforcement traces,  but had not searched the database in\nresponse to the request\n\nfor aggregate data.  Centerfor Investigative Reporting,  14 F.4th at 939- \n\n40.  The court explained: \n\nATF can theoretically respond to [ the]  request in at least\ntwo ways.  First,  it could search the [ relevant]  database for records\n\ntagged with the relevant close- out codes and produce the resulting\ntraces or list of traces, with any necessary redactions, for [the\n\nrequester] \n\nto tabulate. * * * \n\nSecond,  ATF could produce the\n\nprecise statistical aggregate data that [ the requester]  seeks,  with no\nfurther counting or analysis required,  if, for example,  a query or\nqueries for the relevant close- out codes produces a \" hit count\" \nreflecting the number of records involving a firearm traced to law\nenforcement,  the number of matching records is contained in [ the\ndatabase' s]  metadata,  or if the database produces an otherwise\nresponsive result separate from the trace data itself.  Center for\nInvestigative Reporting,  14 F. 4th at 940. \n\nNonetheless,  the court acknowledged that \" these are only theoretical possibilities\"  because the\nrecord in the case was insufficient to determine whether the requested data \" could be produced\nby a reasonable search of the [ relevant]  database or would require more significant human\n\nanalysis\"; \n\nthe court remanded the case to the lower court \" to provide ATF the opportunity to\nbetter explain the nature of the [ relevant]  database,  and determine whether [ the requester' s] \nsearch query will yield the responsive information it seeks.\"  Centerfor Investigative Reporting, \n14 F. 4th at 940. \n\nuncertainty * * * \n\nargued that\n\nin Center for Investigative Reporting, \"[\nwas whether the data was structured in a way that would readily permit\" the\n\nt] he only\n\ntype of aggregation\n\nneeded to produce the responsive\n\ndata, \" not whether aggregation was\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Annie Righi\n\nMay 30,  2024\nPage 6\n\nappropriate.\" \n\n14\n\nIn contrast, \n\nargued, \"[\n\nt] he report requested from CPS is a feature built\n\nby their software provider,  based on fields which the database is known to possess;  in short,  we\nknow that it can be run,  because the software platform they use has documented and advertised\nits ability to do so.\" 15\nnoted that the court in Center for Investigative Reporting took\nissue with National Security Counselors,  898 F.  Supp.  2d at 271,  as follows: \n\nWe reject the bright -line distinction some courts have made\nbetween producing \" particular points of data\"  and producing a\n\nlisting or index\"  of a database. [ Citation.] \nIt cannot be that some\narrangements of data available through a query of a database are\nrecords\" created and obtained by an agency, while others are not. \nCenterfor Investigative Reporting,  14 F.4th at n. 21. \n\nargued that National Security Counselors ultimately signifies that \" any information\nthat\n\nthe system can produce is a public record.\" 16 Yet, \nhis request did not specify parameters for the Backlog Trend Report among different available\nI would like the report as it is shown on the slide I included:  for\n\nparameters. \nall request types, for all assigned departments and staff, without restricting it to past due requests, \nviewed by month.\" 17\n\nconceded that CPS was correct\n\nstated: \"\n\nThe court in Centerfor Investigative Reporting,  though critical of certain analysis\nin National Security Counselors,  did not overturn that case because it is from a different judicial\ncircuit.  More significantly, the federal appellate court in Centerfor Investigative Reporting did\nnot,  and could not have,  overturned Hites,  because Hites is an Illinois appellate decision\n\nconstruing Illinois'  FOIA.  See Kauffman v.  Wren,  2015 IL App ( 2d)  150285, 1144 ( lower federal\ncourt decisions are not binding on Illinois courts).  Hires remains good law in Illinois and is the\ncontrolling precedent for this Illinois FOIA matter. \n\nAgain,  the Hites court concluded that a public body was not required to provide\ncertain requested aggregate data,  such as \" the total number of all out -of -district students in the\n\nfall of 2011,\"  because although it possessed underlying data,  it \"did not maintain the requested\n\nOffice of the\n\nAttorney General ( January\n\n18,  2024),  at [ 2]. \n\n14Letter from\n\nto Joshua Jones,  Deputy\n\nBureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau, \n\nOffice of the\n\nLetter from\nAttorney General ( January\n\nto Joshua Jones,  Deputy\n\nBureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau, \n\n18,  2024),  at [ 2]. \n\n16Letter\n\nfrom\n\nto Joshua Jones,  Deputy\n\nBureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau, \n\nOffice of the\n\nAttorney General ( January\n\n18,  2024),  at [ 3]. \n\nOffice of the\n\nAttorney General ( January\n\n18,  2024),  at [ 3]. \n\nLetter from\n\nto Joshua Jones,  Deputy\n\nBureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau, \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Annie Righi\n\nMay 30,  2024\nPage 7\n\ntotals in its databases.\"  Hites,  2016 IL App (2d)  150836,  1179.  The court emphasized that the\nrequests went beyond a search for records — that is,  the data in the databases — and instead\n\nimproperly sought\nthose records.\"  Hites, 2016 IL App (2d)  150836,  1179. \nCPS similarly possesses underlying data about its FOIA response times, but had not performed\ncalculations using those response times to produce sums not set forth in the source data. . \n\ninformation about\n\nabout how aggregating data does not constitute the creation of a record is\n\ncontrary to the applicable precedent of Hites.  Although a public body may choose to create a\nrecord that it is capable of generating,  FOIA does not require it to do so.  Hites,  2016 IL App\n2d)  150836, ¶  79.  Moreover, \nFOIA request did not reasonably identify public\nrecords,  as he acknowledged that the language of his request did not contain the parameters\nnecessary to determine precisely what\nCPS' s response to\n\ninformation he was seeking.  Under these circumstances, \nmay wish to take CPS\n\nrequest did not violate FOIA. \n\nup on its suggestion to \" consider requesting only underlying data within GovQA ( such as a\nreport reflecting the open and closed date of all requests received in a certain timeframe)  from\nwhich he can conduct his own calculations[,]\"  8 in alignment with the first of the two \" theoretical\n\npossibilities\" \n\nin Center for Investigative Reporting,  14 F. 4th at 940. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This letter serves to close this file.  If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at joshua.jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M.  JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78983 f no vio sd\n\nletter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to\n\nJoshua Jones,  Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General ( January 2,  2024),  at [ 6]. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A custom data report from a school district's software vendor","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-78983/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAI. \n\nMay 30, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Annie Righi\n\nFOIA Officer\n\nChicago Public Schools\n\n42 West Madison Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60602\n\narighi@cps. edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request\n\nfor Review — 2023 PAC 78983; CPS no. N014319- 100923\n\nDear and Ms. Righi: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9. 5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9. 5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that Chicago Public Schools (CPS) did not improperly withhold rccords responsive to\n\nOctober 9, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, — \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to CPS seeking \"[ a] Backlog\nTrend Report for the CPS FOIA Office for the year of 2023 to date.\" I Using information from a\npresentation slide by GovQA, CPS's software vendor for processing FOIA requests, \nexplained how he believed CPS could run the report in the GovQA platform. On October 25, \n2023, CPS responded that the request did not seek a record maintained in the ordinary course of\nbusiness. On November\nsubmitted a Request for Review contesting that\nresponse. He argued that the record he seeks exists and simply needs to be retrieved: \"[ B] ecause\nthe Backlog Trend Report is a documented feature of the system that CPS uses to manage FOIA\n\n14, 2023, \n\nIFOIA portal message from\n\nto Chicago Public Schools (October 9, 2023). \n\n500 South 2nd Surd\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\nCarbondale. Illinois 62903\n\n217) 782- 1090 • Fax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 • Fax: (312) 814- 3806\n\nrequests, retrieving it is trivially easy, requiring only [ sic] them only to set the date range and\nclick a button.\" 2\n\nattached a brief he wrote about relational databases and FOIA. \n\nOn November 20, 2023, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to CPS\nand asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for asserting that it\ndoes not maintain a responsive record, addressing whether it used the method\ndescribed, or any other method, to try to furnish the record in question. To the extent CPS\nargued that it was not required to try to run the report/ retrieve the record, this office asked CPS\nto address whether the data concerns CPS' transaction of public business and how retrieving the\ndata would go beyond what the court in Hites v. Waubonsee Community College, 2016 IL App\n2d) 150836, concluded public bodies must do with respect to processing FOIA requests for such\ndata compilations. On January 2, 2024, CPS provided a copy of a backlog trend report for this\nreview and its answer. On January 18, 2024submitted a reply. DETERMINATION\noffice's confidential\n\nAll\n\nrecords in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open\n\nto inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois\nDepartment of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). However, a \"requester is entitled\nonly to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug\nAdministration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D. C. Cir. 1982). FOIA\nbody to compile data that it does not ordinarily keep. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of\nFinancial & Professional\n184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) (a public body is not\nto a FOIA\n\nRegulation, 2014 IL App 4th 130427, ¶ 34; see also Kenyon v. Garrels, \n\nrequired to create records in order to respond\n\nrequest); 5 ILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022) (FOIA \" is not\n\ndoes not requirea public\n\nintended to create an obligation\n\nEnforcement\n\non the part of any public body to maintain or prepare any public record which was not maintained\nor prepared by such public body at the time when this Act becomes effective[.]\"). In\n\nits answer to this office, CPS maintained that it properly denied request\n\nbecause the request \" fails to cite an existing public record that is maintained in the normal\ncourse of business * * *, and\n\nis instead providing directions to a public body calling for the\ncreation of a new record that contains unique calculations about and derived from public records[.]\"\n3 CPS\nargued that in contrast to a request seeking existing data points, request\ncalls for a calculationof the underlying data points and then the combinationof the new tallies\ninto a chart. CPS noted that \"neither ' backlog' nor a count of 'backlogged' requests is an Letter\n\n3 Letter\n\nfrom to [\n\nPublic Access Bureau] (undated; \n\ntransmitted November 14, 2024). \n\nfrom Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformationAct Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua Jones, \n\nDeputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [1]. Office\n\nexisting datapoint in GovQA.\" 4 CPS explained that it \"was, prior to this request, unaware of the\nBacklog Trend Report, has never prepared, received, possessed, nor controlled this report or the\nrelated backlog calculations\nrecord, CPS argued, \n\nfor use in conducting business[.]\"\n\n5 Rather than seeking a public\n\nis essentially submitting an inquiry seeking a count of how\n\nmany FOIA requests the district closes, how many requests the district receives, and how many\nrequests are ' carried over' on a monthly basis in 2023.\" 6 CPS further argued that while FOIA\nconcerns copying records, meaning reproducing them,? \" producing this record would not\nconstitute the reproduction of any record, but rather the initial production of a new record, \ncontaining new data.\" (Emphasis in original.)[$] \n\nAccording to CPS, the data compilations the court in Hites v. Waubonsee\n\nCommunity College concluded must be disclosed are distinguishable because\nrequest seeks not information generated and stored by a public body, but a calculation derived\nfrom that information. CPS analogized this matter to two cases on which the Hites court relied, \n\nChicago Tribune Co. v. Department ofFinancial do Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, 133, and National Security Counselors v. Central Intelligence Agency, 898 F. Supp. 2d\n233, 271 (D. D. C. 2012). Just as the request in Chicago Tribune Co. asked the public body \" to\nperform an action (a review of its investigative files) in order to prepare a new record (a tally as\nto the number of claims),\" CPS argued, the Backlog Trend Report would be a new record and\n\nrequested that the district perform an action, in giving specific directions to the\n\nFOIA Office to follow in order to prepare a new record that contains backlog calculations.\" 9\nSimilarly, just as the federal district court in National Security Counselors \" held that producing a\nlisting' of a database search, such as a listing of the first 100 FOIA requests in a given year, \nconstituted the creation of a new record * * * \ninformation about\nemphasis added), \" the Backlog Trend\n\npublic records\" rather than \" thc records themselves\" (because the request sought\n\nLetter from Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua\n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\nLetter from Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua\n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\nLetter from Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua\n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\nSection 2(d) of FOIA (5 I LCS 140/2(d) (West 2022)) defines \" copying\" a s \" the reproduction of\nany public record by means of any photographic, electronic, mechanical or other process, device or means now\nknown or herea fter developed and available to the public body.\" \n\nLetter from Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua\n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [ 3]. \n\n9 Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom oflnformation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to Joshua\n\nJones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [ 4]. \n\nReport is akin to seeking information about public records, rather than the public records\nmeaning the underlying data points) themselves.\" (Emphasis added.) 10 Returning to Hites, CPS\nfor the total numbers of students in certain\nhighlighted that the court concluded that a request\n\ncategories improperly sought\nmaintain the requested totals in its databases; CPS argued that\n\nthe creation of new records because the public body did not\n\nlike Chicago Tribune Co., such a\n\nrequest improperly asks a public body to perform a calculation, and like National Security\nCounselors, such a request seeks information about public records rather than records\nthemselves. Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶ 79. \n\nAcknowledging that raw data in a database is subject to disclosure, CPS\n\nsuggested tha\"\nconsider requesting only underlying data within GovQA (such as a\nreport reflecting the open and closed date of all requests received in a certain timeframe) from\nwhich he can conduct his own calculations.\"\" CPS additionally asserted: \n\ndetails\n\nto release, this request still fails to cite a specific\n\nA] ssuming arguendo that the Backlog Report is an existing public\nrecord subject\npublic record for review. The slide referenced byl• \na multitude of options surrounding the production of the Backlog\nTrend Report, such as viewing the backlog by request\nassigned department, assigned staff, or the option to include only\npast due requests. Accordingly, as there are variations on how this\nreport can be pulled, the request fails to cite a specific record for\nreview in failing to specify what filters to apply or data to include. \nThis is particularly true because the district has not created and\ndoes not utilize such a report, so there is no uniform or already\nestablished format that can be presumed to be requested here. 11\n\ntype, \n\n1\n\nIn his reply, \n\ndid not address Hites, but argued that the federal appellate\n\ncourt in Center for Investigative Reporting v. United States Department ofJustice, 14 F. 4th 916\n9th Cir. 2021) rejected CPS's position on what constitutes the creation of a new record and\nspecifically overturn[ ed]\" National Security Counselors. 13\n\nIn Center for Investigative\n\n1° Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Infonmation Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to\n\nJoshua Jones, Deputy BureauChief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [ 5]. \n\nJoshua Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), a t [ 6]. \n\nLetter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, \n\nto\n\n12 Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to\n\nJoshua Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), a t [6]. \n\nReporting, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) argued that it was\nnot required to disclose \" the '[ t] otal number of weapons traced back to former law enforcement\nownership, annually from 2006 to the present,' because FOIA establishes a right of access to\nexisting agency records only, and searching its trace database would require the creation of a\nnew record.\" Center forinvestigative Reporting, 14 F.4th at 937. As with the court in Hites, the\ncourt in Center for Investigative Reporting concluded that \" using a query to search for and\nextract a particular arrangement or subset of data already maintained in an agency's database\ndoes not amount to the creation of a new record[.]\" Centerfor Investigative Reporting, 14 F. 4th\nat 938. ATF acknowledged that its relevant database \" include[ d] ' close- out codes' for each trace, \nincluding those related to law enforcement and government agencies [,]\" and that it could search\nthe database to identify those law enforcement traces, but had not searched the database in\nresponse to the request\n\nfor aggregate data. Centerfor Investigative Reporting, 14 F.4th at 939- \n\n40. The court explained: \n\nATF can theoretically respond to [ the] request in at least\ntwo ways. First, it could search the [ relevant] database for records\n\ntagged with the relevant close- out codes and produce the resulting\ntraces or list of traces, with any necessary redactions, for [the\n\nrequester] \n\nto tabulate. * * * \n\nSecond, ATF could produce the\n\nprecise statistical aggregate data that [ the requester] seeks, with no\nfurther counting or analysis required, if, for example, a query or\nqueries for the relevant close- out codes produces a \" hit count\" \nreflecting the number of records involving a firearm traced to law\nenforcement, the number of matching records is contained in [ the\ndatabase's] metadata, or if the database produces an otherwise\nresponsive result separate from the trace data itself. Center for\nInvestigative Reporting, 14 F. 4th at 940. \n\nNonetheless, the court acknowledged that \" these are only theoretical possibilities\" because the\nrecord in the case was insufficient to determine whether the requested data \" could be produced\nby a reasonable search of the [ relevant] database or would require more significant human\n\nanalysis\"; \n\nthe court remanded the case to the lower court \" to provide ATF the opportunity to\nbetter explain the nature of the [ relevant] database, and determine whether [ the requester's] \nsearch query will yield the responsive information it seeks.\" Centerfor Investigative Reporting, \n14 F. 4th at 940. \n\nuncertainty * * * \n\nargued that\n\nin Center for Investigative Reporting, \"[\nwas whether the data was structured in a way that would readily permit\" the\n\nappropriate.\" \n\n14\n\nIn contrast, \n\nargued, \"[\n\nt] he report requested from CPS is a feature built\n\nby their software provider, based on fields which the database is known to possess; in short, we\nknow that it can be run, because the software platform they use has documented and advertised\nits ability to do so.\" 15\nnoted that the court in Center for Investigative Reporting took\nissue with National Security Counselors, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 271, as follows: \n\nWe reject the bright -line distinction some courts have made\nbetween producing \" particular points of data\" and producing a\n\nlisting or index\" of a database. [ Citation.] \nIt cannot be that some\narrangements of data available through a query of a database are\nrecords\" created and obtained by an agency, while others are not. \nCenterfor Investigative Reporting, 14 F.4th at n. 21. \n\nargued that National Security Counselors ultimately signifies that \" any information\nthat\n\nthe system can produce is a public record.\" 16 Yet, \nhis request did not specify parameters for the Backlog Trend Report among different available\nI would like the report as it is shown on the slide I included: for\n\nparameters. \nall request types, for all assigned departments and staff, without restricting it to past due requests, \nviewed by month.\" 17\n\nconceded that CPS was correct\n\nstated: \"\n\nThe court in Centerfor Investigative Reporting, though critical of certain analysis\nin National Security Counselors, did not overturn that case because it is from a different judicial\ncircuit. More significantly, the federal appellate court in Centerfor Investigative Reporting did\nnot, and could not have, overturned Hites, because Hites is an Illinois appellate decision\n\nconstruing Illinois' FOIA. See Kauffman v. Wren, 2015 IL App (2d) 150285, 1144 (lower federal\ncourt decisions are not binding on Illinois courts). Hires remains good law in Illinois and is the\ncontrolling precedent for this Illinois FOIA matter. \n\nAgain, the Hites court concluded that a public body was not required to provide\ncertain requested aggregate data, such as \" the total number of all out -of -district students in the\n\nfall of 2011,\" because although it possessed underlying data, it \"did not maintain the requested\n\nOffice of the\n\nAttorney General (January\n\n18, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\n14 Letter from\n\nto Joshua Jones, Deputy\n\nBureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, \n\nOffice of the\n\nLetter from\nAttorney General (January\n\nto Joshua Jones, Deputy\n\nBureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, \n\n18, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\n16 Letter\n\nfrom\n\nto Joshua Jones, Deputy\n\nBureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, \n\nOffice of the\n\nAttorney General (January\n\n18, 2024), at [ 3]. \n\nOffice of the\n\nAttorney General (January\n\ntotals in its databases.\" Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, 1179. The court emphasized that the\nrequests went beyond a search for records — that is, the data in the databases — and instead\n\nimproperly sought\nthose records.\" Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, 1179. \nCPS similarly possesses underlying data about its FOIA response times, but had not performed\ncalculations using those response times to produce sums not set forth in the source data.. \n\ninformation about\n\nabout how aggregating data does not constitute the creation of a record is\n\ncontrary to the applicable precedent of Hites. Although a public body may choose to create a\nrecord that it is capable of generating, FOIA does not require it to do so. Hites, 2016 IL App\n2d) 150836, ¶ 79. Moreover, \nFOIA request did not reasonably identify public\nrecords, as he acknowledged that the language of his request did not contain the parameters\nnecessary to determine precisely what\nCPS's response to\n\ninformation he was seeking. Under these circumstances, \nmay wish to take CPS\n\nrequest did not violate FOIA. \n\nup on its suggestion to \" consider requesting only underlying data within GovQA (such as a\nreport reflecting the open and closed date of all requests received in a certain timeframe) from\nwhich he can conduct his own calculations[,]\" 8 in alignment with the first of the two \" theoretical\n\npossibilities\" \n\nin Center for Investigative Reporting, 14 F. 4th at 940. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at joshua.jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n78983 f no vio sd\n\nletter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to\n\nJoshua Jones, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 2, 2024), at [ 6]. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1031,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2023-12-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79252","79255"],"title":"PAC closes case on Village of Woodridge recurrent requester response timeline","filename":"79252 79255, issued December 18, 2023.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1269,"summary":"The requester challenged the Village of Woodridge's response time to FOIA requests, but the PAC determined that because the requester is a 'recurrent requester,' the standard response timelines do not apply.","plain_summary":"A requester complained that the Village of Woodridge took too long to respond to their FOIA request. The Attorney General's office explained that because the requester is classified as a 'recurrent requester' under Illinois law, the standard five-day response deadline does not apply. Therefore, the PAC closed the case without taking further action against the Village.","holding":"The PAC concluded that no further action is warranted because the Village's response to a recurrent requester is governed by section 3.2 of FOIA rather than the standard timelines in section 3.","legal_question":"Does the standard response timeline in section 3 of FOIA apply to requests made by a 'recurrent requester'?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3.2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Woodridge","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"fees","subject_description":"The requester sought video and audio recordings from the Village's Police Department.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3.2/79252%2079255%2C%20issued%20December%2018%2C%202023.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["recurrent requester","response time","FOIA timeline","Village of Woodridge"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 18, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Requests for Review –  2023 PAC 79252;  2023 PAC 79255\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022)).   For the reasons set forth below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action in these matters is warranted. \n\nOn October 21, 2023,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Woodridge\n\nVillage)  seeking copies of video and audio recordings at the address of the Village' s Police\nDepartment for certain dates and times.   On December 6, 2023,  the Village notified you that, \npursuant to section 3.2(b) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(b) (West 2022)),  it estimated it would take\n15 days from the date of the letter to provide you with the records you requested.   Later that\nsame day,  you sent an e-mail to this office stating:  \" It has been well over 21 days since my\nOctober 21, 2023 request.\" 1 You did not indicate whether the Village notified that it was treating\nyour request as a request from a recurrent requester within five business days after receipt\npursuant to section 3.2 of FOIA( b), 2 but it is undisputed that you were a recurrent requester at all\nrelevant times.   5 ILCS 140/ 2(g) (West 2022) ( defining \" recurrent requester\"). \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau ( December 6, 2023).  \n\n2Section 3.2(b) of FOIA provides,  in relevant part: \n\nWithin 5 business days after receiving a request from a recurrent\n\nrequester,  as defined in subsection ( g) of Section 2, the public body shall notify\nthe requester ( i) that the public body is treating the request as a request under\nsubsection ( g) of Section 2, ( ii) of the reasons why the public body is treating the\nrequest as a request under subsection ( g) of Section 2, and ( iii) that the public\nbody will send an initial response within 21 business days after receipt in\naccordance with subsection ( a)  of this Section.  \n\n500 South Second Street,  Springfield,  Illinois 62701 • ( 217)  782- 1090 •  TTY: ( 877)  844- 5461 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street,  Chicago,  Illinois 60601 • ( 312)  814-3000 •  TTY: (800)  964-3013 •  Fax: ( 312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale,  Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529-6400 •  TTY: (877) 675-9339 •  Fax: ( 618)  529- 6416\n\n\fDecember 18, 2023\nPage 2\n\nOn November 7, 2023,  you submitted at least two separate FOIA requests to the\n\nVillage,  one with nine bullet points seeking various records and one seeking certain body camera\nvideos of you at the police station.   On December 7, 2023,  the Village notified you that, pursuant\nto section 3.2(b) of FOIA, it estimated it would take 21 days from the date of the letter to provide\nyou with copies of the records you requested in the nine- part FOIA request.   You sent two\nrelated e-mails about these FOIA requests to this office.  One of your e-mails was sent on\nDecember 6, 2023,  and included copies of both November 7, 2023,  FOIA requests.   In that e-\nmail, you stated:  \" This is a request for review for the forwarded FOIA.  This request remains\nunfulfilled[.]\" 3 This e-mail did not indicate which of the two requests you were referring to.  In\nyour other e-mail on December 7, 2023,  you stated: \" This is a request for review for my\nNovember 13, 2023 FOIA request ( see attached).  It has been more than 21 days since the\nsubmission of MY request.\" 4 This e-mail did not have a FOIA request from November 13, 2023, \nattached;  the only attachment was the Village' s December 7, 2023,  letter described above.   You\ndid not provide any correspondence from the Village concerning the other November 7, 2023, \nrequest you sent to this office.  Again,  you did not indicate whether the Village notified you that\nit was treating your requests as requests from a recurrent requester within five business days after\nreceipt pursuant to section 3.2 of FOIA.  Thus,  your submissions are unclear and may be\nincomplete.   \n\nRegardless,  section 3.2(a)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(a) ( West 2022))  provides\n\nthat: \n\nNotwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary,  a\n\npublic body shall respond to a request from a recurrent requester, \nas defined in subsection ( g) of Section 2, within 21 business days\nafter receipt.  The response shall ( i) provide to the requester an\nestimate of the time required by the public body to provide the\nrecords requested and an estimate of the fees to be charged,  which\nthe public body may require the person to pay in full before\ncopying the requested documents; ( ii) deny the request pursuant to\none or more of the exemptions set out in this Act, (iii) notify the\nrequester that the request is unduly burdensome and extend an\nopportunity to the requester to attempt to reduce the request to\nmanageable proportions,  or (iv) provide the records requested. \n\nIn addition,  section 3.2(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(c) ( West 2022))  provides that \"[ u] nless the\nrecords are exempt from disclosure,  a public body shall comply with a request within a\nreasonable period considering the size and complexity of the request.\" \n\n3E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau ( December 6, 2023).  \n\n4E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau ( December 7, 2023).  \n\n\fDecember 18, 2023\nPage 3\n\nThe Village' s December 7, 2023,  initial response to you about one of your\n\nNovember 7, 2023,  requests met the requirements of section 3.2(a)  of FOIA,  as it was issued\nwithin 21 business days after receipt and provided an estimate of the time for compliance.   The\nVillage' s December 6, 2023,  initial response may have been issued more than 21 business days\nafter receipt of your October 21, 2023,  request;  if so, the Village should be mindful that it must\nprovide at least an initial response to a requester within 21 business days under section 3.2(a). 5\nNonetheless,  your FOIA requests seek a significant volume of records that the Village must\nlocate,  review,  and redact.   Given the sizes and complexity of your requests,  the time periods\nwithin which the Village has estimated it will respond are not unreasonable.   Accordingly,  this\noffice concludes that no further action is warranted in these matters. \n\nIf you have any questions,  you may contact me by e-mail at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.  This letter serves to close these files. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79252 79255 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Peggy Halik\nFreedom of Information Officer/ \nAssistant Village Administrator\n\nVillage of Woodridge\n5 Plaza Drive\nWoodridge,  Illinois 60517\nphalik@woodridgeil. gov\n\n5This office notes that the response timeframe for requests by recurrent requesters is solely\n\ngoverned by section 3.2 of FOIA; the provisions of section 3 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)),  such as\nwaiving the ability to assert section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022))  if the response is late, do not apply\nto recurrent requesters: \n\nThe time periods for compliance or denial of a request to inspect or\n\ncopy records set out in this Section shall not apply to requests for records made\nfor a commercial purpose,  requests by a recurrent requester,  or voluminous\nrequests.  Such requests shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 3.1, 3.2, \nand 3.6 of this Act, as applicable.   5 ILCS 140/ 3(i) (West 2022). \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police department video and audio recordings","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79252/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 18, 2023\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Requests for Review – 2023 PAC 79252; 2023 PAC 79255\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022)). For the reasons set forth below, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action in these matters is warranted. \n\nOn October 21, 2023, you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Woodridge\n\nVillage) seeking copies of video and audio recordings at the address of the Village's Police\nDepartment for certain dates and times. On December 6, 2023, the Village notified you that, \npursuant to section 3.2(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(b) (West 2022)), it estimated it would take\n15 days from the date of the letter to provide you with the records you requested. Later that\nsame day, you sent an e-mail to this office stating: \" It has been well over 21 days since my\nOctober 21, 2023 request.\" 1 You did not indicate whether the Village notified that it was treating\nyour request as a request from a recurrent requester within five business days after receipt\npursuant to section 3.2 of FOIA(b), 2 but it is undisputed that you were a recurrent requester at all\nrelevant times. 5 ILCS 140/ 2(g) (West 2022) (defining \" recurrent requester\"). \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau (December 6, 2023). \n\n2 Section 3.2(b) of FOIA provides, in relevant part: \n\nWithin 5 business days after receiving a request from a recurrent\n\nrequester, as defined in subsection (g) of Section 2, the public body shall notify\nthe requester (i) that the public body is treating the request as a request under\nsubsection (g) of Section 2, (ii) of the reasons why the public body is treating the\nrequest as a request under subsection (g) of Section 2, and (iii) that the public\nbody will send an initial response within 21 business days after receipt in\naccordance with subsection (a) of this Section. \n\nOn November 7, 2023, you submitted at least two separate FOIA requests to the\n\nVillage, one with nine bullet points seeking various records and one seeking certain body camera\nvideos of you at the police station. On December 7, 2023, the Village notified you that, pursuant\nto section 3.2(b) of FOIA, it estimated it would take 21 days from the date of the letter to provide\nyou with copies of the records you requested in the nine- part FOIA request. You sent two\nrelated e-mails about these FOIA requests to this office. One of your e-mails was sent on\nDecember 6, 2023, and included copies of both November 7, 2023, FOIA requests. In that e-\nmail, you stated: \" This is a request for review for the forwarded FOIA. This request remains\nunfulfilled[.]\" 3 This e-mail did not indicate which of the two requests you were referring to. In\nyour other e-mail on December 7, 2023, you stated: \" This is a request for review for my\nNovember 13, 2023 FOIA request (see attached). It has been more than 21 days since the\nsubmission of MY request.\" 4 This e-mail did not have a FOIA request from November 13, 2023, \nattached; the only attachment was the Village's December 7, 2023, letter described above. You\ndid not provide any correspondence from the Village concerning the other November 7, 2023, \nrequest you sent to this office. Again, you did not indicate whether the Village notified you that\nit was treating your requests as requests from a recurrent requester within five business days after\nreceipt pursuant to section 3.2 of FOIA. Thus, your submissions are unclear and may be\nincomplete. \n\nRegardless, section 3.2(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(a) (West 2022)) provides\n\nthat: \n\nNotwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary, a\n\npublic body shall respond to a request from a recurrent requester, \nas defined in subsection (g) of Section 2, within 21 business days\nafter receipt. The response shall (i) provide to the requester an\nestimate of the time required by the public body to provide the\nrecords requested and an estimate of the fees to be charged, which\nthe public body may require the person to pay in full before\ncopying the requested documents; (ii) deny the request pursuant to\none or more of the exemptions set out in this Act, (iii) notify the\nrequester that the request is unduly burdensome and extend an\nopportunity to the requester to attempt to reduce the request to\nmanageable proportions, or (iv) provide the records requested. \n\nIn addition, section 3.2(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(c) (West 2022)) provides that \"[ u] nless the\n\nThe Village's December 7, 2023, initial response to you about one of your\n\nNovember 7, 2023, requests met the requirements of section 3.2(a) of FOIA, as it was issued\nwithin 21 business days after receipt and provided an estimate of the time for compliance. The\nVillage's December 6, 2023, initial response may have been issued more than 21 business days\nafter receipt of your October 21, 2023, request; if so, the Village should be mindful that it must\nprovide at least an initial response to a requester within 21 business days under section 3.2(a). 5\nNonetheless, your FOIA requests seek a significant volume of records that the Village must\nlocate, review, and redact. Given the sizes and complexity of your requests, the time periods\nwithin which the Village has estimated it will respond are not unreasonable. Accordingly, this\noffice concludes that no further action is warranted in these matters. \n\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me by e-mail at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. This letter serves to close these files. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79252 79255 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Peggy Halik\nFreedom of Information Officer/ \nAssistant Village Administrator\n\nVillage of Woodridge\n5 Plaza Drive\nWoodridge, Illinois 60517\nphalik@woodridgeil. gov\n\n5 This office notes that the response timeframe for requests by recurrent requesters is solely\n\ngoverned by section 3.2 of FOIA; the provisions of section 3 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)), such as\nwaiving the ability to assert section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)) if the response is late, do not apply\nto recurrent requesters: \n\nThe time periods for compliance or denial of a request to inspect or\n\ncopy records set out in this Section shall not apply to requests for records made\nfor a commercial purpose, requests by a recurrent requester, or voluminous\nrequests. Such requests shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 3.1, 3.2, \nand 3.6 of this Act, as applicable. 5 ILCS 140/ 3(i) (West 2022)."}
{"id":1032,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2023-12-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79254"],"title":"Illinois Department of Human Rights not required to answer questions or create new records","filename":"79254, issued December 15, 2023.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":661,"summary":"The requester sought definitions for abbreviations and entries in a document created by a different state agency, and the PAC determined that the Department of Human Rights was not required to answer questions or create new records.","plain_summary":"Mr. Hunley asked the Illinois Department of Human Rights to explain abbreviations found in a document created by a different agency. The Attorney General's office concluded that FOIA is for requesting existing public records, not for asking government agencies to answer questions or create new documents. Therefore, the agency acted properly in denying the request.","holding":"The Department of Human Rights did not violate FOIA because it is not required to answer questions or create new records to explain documents it does not maintain.","legal_question":"Does FOIA require a public body to answer questions or create new records to explain the contents of a document?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/1.2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Human Rights","requesting_party":"Mr. Nick Hunley","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"request for information","subject_description":"The requester sought definitions for abbreviations and memo entries within a document maintained by the Division of Oil and Gas.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3.3/79254%2C%20issued%20December%2015%2C%202023.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["request for information","creating records","FOIA scope"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 15, 2023\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Nick Hunley\nEKN Holdings, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nnhunley@eknholdings. com\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2023 PAC 79254\n\nDear Mr. Hunley:  \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022)).  For the reasons explained below, this\noffice has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn December 4, 2023,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department\n\nof Human Rights (Department) seeking the meaning of six specified abbreviations from the\nDivision of Oil and Gas List of Wells in Plugging Fund,\"  a document attached to your request. 1\nYour request also sought \"the meaning of references in the 'Memo' column that begin with 'PRF-\nR No.5', PRF- R No. 12',  etc.\" 2 On December 6, 2023,  the Department\nrecords responsive to your request, noting that you had not requested public records of the\nDepartment.   On that same date,  you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review\ncontesting the Department's response. \n\nresponded that it had no\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  However, \"[ a] \nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \n\nHuman Rights] ( December 4, 2023). \n\n1E- mail from Nick Hunley to [Freedom of Information Act Officer], [ Illinois Department of\n\n2 E-mail from Nick Hunley to [Freedom of Information Act Officer], [Illinois Department of\n\nHuman Rights] ( December 4, 2023). \n\n500 South Second Street,  Springfield,  Illinois 62701 • ( 217)  782- 1090 •  TTY: ( 877)  844- 5461 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale,  Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529-6400 • TTY: (877) 675-9339 • Fax: ( 618) 529-6416\n\n\fr. Nick Hunley\nDecember 15, 2023\nPage 2\n\ninformation, or statistics.\"  Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional\nRegulation,  2014 IL App ( 4th)  130427, ¶ 33,  8 N.E.3d 11, 19 ( 2014).   Further,  a public body is\nnot required to answer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA request.  Kenyon v. \nGarrels,  184 Ill. App.  3d 28,  32 ( 4th Dist.  1989).   See also 5 ILCS 140/ 3.3 (West 2022) ( FOIA\nis not intended to compel public bodies to interpret or advise requesters as to the meaning or\nsignificance of the public records.\").   \n\nInstead of reasonably identifying a public record,  you asked the Department\n\nto\n\ndefine or explain the meaning of abbreviations and specific entries within a document created by\nto answer questions or create\nthe Division of Oil and Gas.   FOIA did not require the Department\na new record in response to your request.  Additionally, this office notes that the Division of Oil\nand Gas is a subunit of the Illinois Department of Natural Resources rather than the Department\nof Human Rights.  Requests for records maintained by the former may be submitted to\ndnr. foia@illinois. gov.   The Department of Natural Resources may answer questions in response\nto a request, but it is not required by FOIA to do so.  Accordingly, this office has determined that\nno further action is warranted. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  Please contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov\n\nor (773) 590-7878 if you have any questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79254 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Keisha T. Nelson\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nIllinois Department of Human Rights\n555 West Monroe Street,  7th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nIDHR. Foia@illinois. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Definitions of abbreviations and memo entries in a document","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79254/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 15, 2023\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Nick Hunley\nEKN Holdings, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nnhunley@eknholdings. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 79254\n\nDear Mr. Hunley: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022)). For the reasons explained below, this\noffice has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn December 4, 2023, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department\n\nof Human Rights (Department) seeking the meaning of six specified abbreviations from the\nDivision of Oil and Gas List of Wells in Plugging Fund,\" a document attached to your request. 1\nYour request also sought \"the meaning of references in the 'Memo' column that begin with 'PRF-\nR No.5', PRF- R No. 12', etc.\" 2 On December 6, 2023, the Department\nrecords responsive to your request, noting that you had not requested public records of the\nDepartment. On that same date, you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review\ncontesting the Department's response. \n\nresponded that it had no\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). However, \"[ a] \nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \n\nHuman Rights] (December 4, 2023). \n\n1E- mail from Nick Hunley to [Freedom of Information Act Officer], [ Illinois Department of\n\n2 E-mail from Nick Hunley to [Freedom of Information Act Officer], [Illinois Department of\n\nHuman Rights] (December 4, 2023). \n\ninformation, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional\nRegulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33, 8 N.E.3d 11, 19 (2014). Further, a public body is\nnot required to answer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA request. Kenyon v. \nGarrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (4th Dist. 1989). See also 5 ILCS 140/ 3.3 (West 2022) (FOIA\nis not intended to compel public bodies to interpret or advise requesters as to the meaning or\nsignificance of the public records.\"). \n\nInstead of reasonably identifying a public record, you asked the Department\n\nto\n\ndefine or explain the meaning of abbreviations and specific entries within a document created by\nto answer questions or create\nthe Division of Oil and Gas. FOIA did not require the Department\na new record in response to your request. Additionally, this office notes that the Division of Oil\nand Gas is a subunit of the Illinois Department of Natural Resources rather than the Department\nof Human Rights. Requests for records maintained by the former may be submitted to\ndnr. foia@illinois. gov. The Department of Natural Resources may answer questions in response\nto a request, but it is not required by FOIA to do so. Accordingly, this office has determined that\nno further action is warranted. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. Please contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov\n\nor (773) 590-7878 if you have any questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79254 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Keisha T. Nelson\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nIllinois Department of Human Rights\n555 West Monroe Street, 7th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nIDHR. Foia@illinois. gov"}
{"id":1033,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-09-25","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79406"],"title":"University of Illinois System did not violate FOIA in search for Title IX records","filename":"79406, issued September 25, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1171,"summary":"The requester sought records related to a 2016 Title IX investigation involving a former University of Illinois employee, but the University stated it had no responsive records. The PAC concluded that the University conducted an adequate search and did not violate FOIA.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the University of Illinois for records regarding a 2016 sexual assault investigation, but the University claimed it had no such records. The Attorney General's office reviewed the University's search process and determined that the University looked in the right places and followed the law. As a result, the case is closed because the University did not violate FOIA.","holding":"The University of Illinois did not violate FOIA because it conducted a reasonable search for records and properly informed the requester that no responsive documents were located.","legal_question":"Did the University of Illinois violate FOIA by failing to produce records that the requester believed should exist regarding a Title IX investigation?","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"University of Illinois System","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records search","subject_description":"The request sought documentation related to a 2016 Title IX investigation involving a former employee.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Completeness-of-Search/79406%2C%20issued%20September%2025%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["records search","Title IX","no responsive records","university records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"September 25, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nVice President, External Relations and Communications\nChief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n506 South Wright Street\nUrbana, Illinois 61801\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 79406\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Nazon: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   \n\nOn December 10, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nUniversity of Illinois (University) seeking copies of all records pertaining to any Title IX\ninvestigations performed in connection with a 2016 incident involving the sexual assault of a\nstudent by a former employee; the request included any testimony or information gathered from\npersonnel and any disciplinary actions taken.   On December 18, 2023,  the University responded\nthat it did not locate any responsive records.   \n\nThat same day, \n\nUniversity' s response.  \nassault case and explained that the former employee was a recruiter for international students.  \n\nsubmitted a Request for Review challenging the\nprovided an article and other information related to the\n\n\fMs. Adrienne Nazon\nSeptember 25, 2024\nPage 2\n\nShe contended that the University was required by Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of\n1972 ( 20 U.S.C. §§  1681- 1688)  to perform an investigation of the assault.   \n\nOn December 21, 2023,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe University and asked it to provide a detailed description of its search for responsive records.  \nOn January 3, 2024,  this office received a a complete version of the University' s written response\nfor this office's confidential review and a redacted version for this office to forward to\n\n1 On January 8, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the University' s redacted\n\nresponse to\n\nshe replied that same day.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also\nSouthern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  When\npresented with a FOIA request,  a public body must perform a reasonable search under the\nparticular circumstances of the matter.  Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL\nApp ( 1st)  190038, ¶  31 ( the crucial\nissue is whether the search was reasonably calculated to\ndiscover the requested documents).  However, \"[ a]  requester is entitled only to records that an\nagency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\"   Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,  678 F.2d\n315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. United\nStates Dep' t of Homeland Security,  516 F. Supp.  2d 83, 88 ( D.D.C. 2007) ( agency' s explanation\nof why it did not maintain the type of records requested was sufficient to demonstrate that its\nresponse to the request did not violate FOIA). \n\nIn its redacted response to this office,  the University stated that its FOIA staff\n\nrequest to several individuals and asked them to search for responsive\n\nforwarded\nrecords.   Those individuals were the University' s Associate Vice Chancellor for Human\nResources, Assistant Director for Access &  Equity, and Chief of the University of Illinois\nSpringfield Police Department.   The University also consulted with its Campus Counsel.   The\nUniversity stated that during the search, \" it was determined that the assailant in this incident was\nnot a University employee at the time the incident was reported to the University.\" 2 The\nUniversity asserted that since the individual was not \"affiliated with the University at that time, \nthe University did not have ' substantial control'  over him and had no authority to conduct a Title\n\n1See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, \n2024 (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for\nreview, with any alleged confidential information to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\n2Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney,  Public Access Bureau,  Illinois Attorney\nGeneral' s Office (January 3, 2024),  at 2. \n\n\fMs. Adrienne Nazon\nSeptember 25, 2024\nPage 3\n\nIX investigation.\" 3 Additionally, the University stated that it searched its Access &  Equity\nOffice files for records referencing the incident and located no testimony,  sanctions,  or other\nrecords responsive to the request.  The University stated that \"[ n]o other agency within the\nUniversity would have conducted a Title IX investigation.\" 4 In the confidential portion of its\nresponse, the University provided additional details regarding its search.  \n\nThe University's explanation of its search indicates that the University does not\n\npossess records concerning a Title IX investigation of the incident.   The University consulted\nwith administrators and counsel who would be knowledgeable of Title IX matters.  According to\nthose staff members,  the University did not perform a Title IX investigation related to the\nrecruiter because of jurisdictional issues.  The University also did not find responsive records in\nthe files of the office that handles such investigations.   In reply to this office, \nexpressed concern that the University did not provide adequate oversight of the recruiter and\ndirected this office to a student news article that reported that the Office of Admissions and\nCollege of Business and Management paid the recruiter a $30,000 annual salary.  The Public\nAccess Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of FOIA and the\nOpen Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2022)).  See 15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West 2022).  \nAlthough the former recruiter appears to have been paid by the University at some point,  the\nUniversity stated he was not employed around the time of the incident, and this office does not\nhave the authority to review whether the University was required to perform a Title IX\ninvestigation or otherwise complied with federal education laws.  Because the available\ninformation indicates that the University consulted with relevant personnel and searched\nlocations that would be expected to maintain responsive records, this office concludes that the\nUniversity' s response to the request did not violate FOIA. \n\n3Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (January 3, 2024), at 2. \n\n4Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney,  Public Access Bureau,  Illinois Attorney\nGeneral' s Office (January 3, 2024),  at 2. \n\n\fMs. Adrienne Nazon\nSeptember 25, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79406 f 3d response complete univ\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Records of a Title IX investigation","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79406/","full_text":"September 25, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nVice President, External Relations and Communications\nChief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n506 South Wright Street\nUrbana, Illinois 61801\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2023 PAC 79406\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Nazon: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn December 10, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nUniversity of Illinois (University) seeking copies of all records pertaining to any Title IX\ninvestigations performed in connection with a 2016 incident involving the sexual assault of a\nstudent by a former employee; the request included any testimony or information gathered from\npersonnel and any disciplinary actions taken. On December 18, 2023, the University responded\nthat it did not locate any responsive records. \n\nThat same day, \n\nUniversity's response. \nassault case and explained that the former employee was a recruiter for international students. \n\nShe contended that the University was required by Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of\n1972 (20 U.S.C. §§ 1681- 1688) to perform an investigation of the assault. \n\nOn December 21, 2023, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe University and asked it to provide a detailed description of its search for responsive records. \nOn January 3, 2024, this office received a a complete version of the University's written response\nfor this office's confidential review and a redacted version for this office to forward to\n\n1 On January 8, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the University's redacted\n\nresponse to\n\nshe replied that same day. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also\nSouthern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). When\npresented with a FOIA request, a public body must perform a reasonable search under the\nparticular circumstances of the matter. Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL\nApp (1st) 190038, ¶ 31 (the crucial\nissue is whether the search was reasonably calculated to\ndiscover the requested documents). However, \"[ a] requester is entitled only to records that an\nagency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 F.2d\n315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. United\nStates Dep' t of Homeland Security, 516 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2007) (agency's explanation\nof why it did not maintain the type of records requested was sufficient to demonstrate that its\nresponse to the request did not violate FOIA). \n\nIn its redacted response to this office, the University stated that its FOIA staff\n\nrequest to several individuals and asked them to search for responsive\n\nforwarded\nrecords. Those individuals were the University's Associate Vice Chancellor for Human\nResources, Assistant Director for Access & Equity, and Chief of the University of Illinois\nSpringfield Police Department. The University also consulted with its Campus Counsel. The\nUniversity stated that during the search, \" it was determined that the assailant in this incident was\nnot a University employee at the time the incident was reported to the University.\" 2 The\nUniversity asserted that since the individual was not \"affiliated with the University at that time, \nthe University did not have ' substantial control' over him and had no authority to conduct a Title\n\n1 See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, \n2024 (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for\nreview, with any alleged confidential information to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\n2 Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\n\nIX investigation.\" 3 Additionally, the University stated that it searched its Access & Equity\nOffice files for records referencing the incident and located no testimony, sanctions, or other\nrecords responsive to the request. The University stated that \"[ n]o other agency within the\nUniversity would have conducted a Title IX investigation.\" 4 In the confidential portion of its\nresponse, the University provided additional details regarding its search. \n\nThe University's explanation of its search indicates that the University does not\n\npossess records concerning a Title IX investigation of the incident. The University consulted\nwith administrators and counsel who would be knowledgeable of Title IX matters. According to\nthose staff members, the University did not perform a Title IX investigation related to the\nrecruiter because of jurisdictional issues. The University also did not find responsive records in\nthe files of the office that handles such investigations. In reply to this office, \nexpressed concern that the University did not provide adequate oversight of the recruiter and\ndirected this office to a student news article that reported that the Office of Admissions and\nCollege of Business and Management paid the recruiter a $30,000 annual salary. The Public\nAccess Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of FOIA and the\nOpen Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2022)). See 15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West 2022). \nAlthough the former recruiter appears to have been paid by the University at some point, the\nUniversity stated he was not employed around the time of the incident, and this office does not\nhave the authority to review whether the University was required to perform a Title IX\ninvestigation or otherwise complied with federal education laws. Because the available\ninformation indicates that the University consulted with relevant personnel and searched\nlocations that would be expected to maintain responsive records, this office concludes that the\nUniversity's response to the request did not violate FOIA. \n\n3 Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (January 3, 2024), at 2. \n\n4 Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79406 f 3d response complete univ"}
{"id":1034,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-06-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79594"],"title":"Illinois Housing Development Authority permissibly withheld pending project records but faulted for procedural denial","filename":"79594, issued June 24, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1812,"summary":"The requester sought records related to a Preliminary Project Assessment (PPA) submission for a housing development project, which the Illinois Housing Development Authority denied. The PAC determined that the Authority did not violate FOIA by withholding the records, though it noted the Authority failed to include required information in its initial denial letter.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested documents regarding a housing project application, but the Illinois Housing Development Authority refused to release them. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and found that the agency was allowed to withhold the records. However, the agency was reminded that their denial letter did not follow all the legal requirements for explaining why a request was rejected.","holding":"The Illinois Housing Development Authority did not violate FOIA by withholding the requested records, though it failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a denial notice.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois Housing Development Authority properly withheld records related to a pending project application under FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/9"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Illinois Housing Development Authority","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"pending project records","subject_description":"The request sought application materials and correspondence related to a Preliminary Project Assessment for a housing development in Glen Ellyn.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_h/79594%2C%20issued%20June%2024%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA denial","housing development","application records","procedural compliance"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Records Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAI\n\nJune 24, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Christina McClernon\n\nAssociate Corporate and Compliance Counsel\nLegal Department\n\nIllinois Housing Development Authority\n\n111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 1000\n\nChicago, Illinois 60601\nCMcClernon@ihda.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 79594; IHDA No.: 2023-271\n\nDear [and Ms. McClernon:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA).! For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Counselor\nconcludes that the Illinois Housing Development Authority (Authority) did not violate FOIA by\n\nwithholding the records responsive to SEN December 21, 2023, FOIA request.\n\nOn that date, {I} submitted a FOIA request to the Authority seeking:\n\n2024 PPA [Preliminary Project Assessment] submission for\nPID 12154 Taft and Exmoor, Glen Ellyn. Full Circle\n\nCommunities, Inc\n\n'5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024.\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\n500 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Sueet\nSpringfield, Minois 62701 Minois 60603\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 * Fax: (312) 814-3806\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nwww. IllinoisAttomeyGeneral gov\n\nMs. Christina McClernon\nJune 24, 2024\nPage 2\n\nWant: PPA workbook (excel application) all elevations, all\ntransmittal cover letters, all proformas, any and all letters or other\nforms authorizing Full Circle to apply concerning this site.\"\n\nLater that day, the Authority denied the request in its entirety stating \"this project\nwas submitted in the recent 2024 PPA round. It is under review at this point and not available\nfora FOIA.\"* On January 8, 2024, this office received the document necessary to complete fj\n) | Request for Review disputing the Authority's denial of his request.\n\nOn January 17, 2024, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request\nfor Review to the Authority and requested unredacted copies of the responsive records for this\noffice's confidential review. This office also asked the Authority to provide a written\nexplanation that identified the relevant section 7 exemptions’ that the Authority relied upon to\ndeny aaa FOIA along with a detailed legal and factual basis for the application of the\nexemptions. On January 26, 2024, the Authority provided those materials, asserting that the\nresponsive document was properly withheld under sections 7(1)(f), 7(1)(h), and 7(1)(i) of\nFOIA.° On that same date, this office forwarded a copy of the Authority's written answer to\n\nand notified him of his opportunity to reply to that response. On January 30, 2024,\nreplied by maintaining that the records were improperly withheld.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, all public records in the possession or custody of a public body are\n\"presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body\n\"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).\n\nSection 7(1)(h) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:\n\n°FOIA portal message fon iii to Illinois Housing Development Authority FOIA\n(December 21, 2023).\n\n5Letter from Sharon Hunley, FOIA Officer, Illinois Housing Development Authority, to\nHB (December 21, 2023).\n\n45 ILCS 140/7 (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; 103-\n423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540,\neffective January 1, 2024; 103-554, effective January 1, 2024.\n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(f), (1)(h), (1)(i) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June\n30, 2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023;\n103-540, effective January 1, 2024; 103-554, effective January 1, 2024.\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nMs. Christina McClernon\n\nJune 24, 2024\nPage 3\n\nProposals and bids for any contract, grant, or\nagreement, including information which if it were disclosed\nwould frustrate procurement or give an advantage to any person\nproposing to enter into a contractor agreement with the body, until\nan award or final selection is made. Information prepared by or\nfor the body in preparation of a bid solicitation shall be exempt\nuntil an award or final selection is made. (Emphasis added.)\n\nWhen construing the meaning of a statutory provision, the primary objective is to\n\nascertain the intent of the legislature. See DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). \"The\nplain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent, and if that language is clear and\n\nunambiguous,\n\nit must be given effect.\" People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, § 24. The plain\n\nlanguage of section 7(1)(h) includes, but is not limited to, information that would frustrate\nprocurement or give an advantage to an applicant for a contractor agreement with a public body.\nThe scope of the exemption broadly encompasses \"proposals and bids for any contract, grant, or\nagreement * * * until an award or final selection is made.\"\n\nIn its response to this office, the Authority asserted that the requested Preliminary\n\nProject Assessment is a constituent part of a proposal for tax credits for a housing development.\nThe Authority explained:\n\nThe Low Income Housing Tax Credit (\"Tax Credits\")\nprogram is a federal program created to promote the development\nof affordable housing for low-income individuals and families.\nThe Authority is the allocating agency for Tax Credits for the\nprogram in Illinois. * * *\n\nAll projects planning to apply to the Authority for an\nallocation of Tax Credits must first submit a Preliminary Project\nAssessment (\"PPA\") to the Authority prior to submitting an\napplication. Applicants must include required documentation in\nthe PPA, which includes the project concept, location, financing\nassumptions and information about the development team. * * *\n\nThe Authority may approve, conditionally approve, or deny\na PPA. Only after an approval may a sponsor move on to submit\nan application for Tax Credits for their project. * * *\n\n***\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nMs. Christina McClernon\nJune 24, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe PPA sought by the instant Request is still pending a\ndecision by the Authority.!4\n\nThe response added that if the Preliminary Project Assessment and subsequent application are\napproved, the applicant is required to enter into an extended use agreement governing the award\nof the tax credit. The Authority asserted that \"each PPA is the first step in a competitive bid for\nthese limited resources.\"” The Authority stated that a proposed project is not awarded tax credits\nuntil the Illinois Housing Development Board of Members (Board) reviews and votes to approve\nan award for project, which had not occurred at the time the Authority received EEE FOIA\nrequest. The Authority indicated that the Board's decisions related to a Preliminary Project\nAssessment are made public once the Board has taken a final vote on the matter.\n\nThis office's confidential review of the responsive record confirmed that the\ninformation falls within the scope of section 7(1)(h). The Preliminary Project Assessment was\nsubmitted as part of the process for seeking approval from the Board for an award of tax credits\nand entering into an agreement governing the use of tax credits. It is undisputed that no award or\nfinal selection related to the project had been made at the time of the Authority's denial. | |\n\nargued that disclosure of the requested information would not give any individual an\nadvantage because the application deadline had passed. The plain language of section 7(1)(h) is\nnot so restrictive. The Authority was not required to demonstrate that disclosure would frustrate\nthe proposal process or give an advantage to any party to withhold the records; the clause\n\"including information which if it were disclosed would frustrate procurement or give an\nadvantage to any person proposing to enter into a contractor agreement with the body\" may\nencompass additional procurement-related records, on top of the exempt \"[p]roposals and bids\nfor any contract, grant, or agreement,\" and the exempt \"[i]nformation prepared by or for the body\nin preparation of a bid solicitation.\" See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Reg. Rev. Ltr. 73332,\nissued October 21, 2021, at 2 (\"The General Assembly's use of the word 'including' rather than a\nlimiting term such as 'only' indicates that information which may frustrate procurement is not the\nonly type of information that section 7(1)(h) is intended to encompass. In other words, the scope\nof the exemption includes—but is not limited to—this type of information.\").\n\nFurther, fo argued that the requested PPA should be disclosed because the\nAuthority already publicly disclosed a notice regarding the 2024 PPA submissions, which\nincluded the names of proposed developments and the entities who submitted proposals,\nincluding the company named in his FOIA request. There is no indication, however, that the\n\n®Letter from Christina McClernon, Associate Corporate and Compliance Counsel, [Illinois\nHousing Development Authority], to Shannon Barnaby, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nCounselor, Office of the Attorney General (January 26, 2024), at 1-2.\n\n‘Letter from Christina McClernon, Associate Corporate and Compliance Counsel, [Illinois\nHousing Development Authority], to Shannon Barnaby, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nCounselor, Office of the Attorney General (January 26, 2024), at 2.\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nMs. Christina McClernon\nJune 24, 2024\nPage 5\n\nwithheld record itself was disclosed. Moreover, section 7(1)(h) does not require the identities of\nindividuals who submit proposals be kept confidential for the exemption to apply. Accordingly,\nthis office concludes that the Authority did not improperly withhold the record pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(h) of FOIA.\n\nAlthough that exemption is applicable, this office notes that the Authority's\nDecember 21, 2023, denial _ request failed to identify the exemption or provide most\nof the information required by section 9(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9(a) (West 2022)) below:\n\nEach public body denying a request for public records shall\nnotify the requester in writing of the decision to deny the request,\nthe reasons for the denial, including a detailed factual basis for the\napplication of any exemption claimed, and the names and titles or\npositions of each person responsible for the denial. Each notice of\ndenial by a public body shall also inform such person of the right\nto review by the Public Access Counselor and provide the address\nand phone number for the Public Access Counselor. Each notice of\ndenial shall inform such person of his right to judicial review under\nSection 11 of this Act.\n\nThe Authority should be mindful of its statutory obligation to fully comply with these mandatory\nrequirements when issuing denials of FOIA requests.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any FOIA\nquestions, my e-mail address is Shannon.Barnaby@ilag.gov.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79594 f 71h proper sa\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Application materials for a housing development assessment","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79594/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAI\n\nJune 24, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Christina McClernon\n\nAssociate Corporate and Compliance Counsel\nLegal Department\n\nIllinois Housing Development Authority\n\n111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 1000\n\nChicago, Illinois 60601\nCMcClernon@ihda.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 79594; IHDA No.: 2023-271\n\nDear [and Ms. McClernon:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA).! For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Counselor\nconcludes that the Illinois Housing Development Authority (Authority) did not violate FOIA by\n\nwithholding the records responsive to SEN December 21, 2023, FOIA request.\n\nOn that date, {I} submitted a FOIA request to the Authority seeking:\n\n2024 PPA [Preliminary Project Assessment] submission for\nPID 12154 Taft and Exmoor, Glen Ellyn. Full Circle\n\nCommunities, Inc\n\n'5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024.\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\n500 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Sueet\nSpringfield, Minois 62701 Minois 60603\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 * Fax: (312) 814-3806\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nWant: PPA workbook (excel application) all elevations, all\ntransmittal cover letters, all proformas, any and all letters or other\nforms authorizing Full Circle to apply concerning this site.\"\n\nLater that day, the Authority denied the request in its entirety stating \"this project\nwas submitted in the recent 2024 PPA round. It is under review at this point and not available\nfora FOIA.\"* On January 8, 2024, this office received the document necessary to complete fj) | Request for Review disputing the Authority's denial of his request.\n\nOn January 17, 2024, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request\nfor Review to the Authority and requested unredacted copies of the responsive records for this\noffice's confidential review. This office also asked the Authority to provide a written\nexplanation that identified the relevant section 7 exemptions’ that the Authority relied upon to\ndeny aaa FOIA along with a detailed legal and factual basis for the application of the\nexemptions. On January 26, 2024, the Authority provided those materials, asserting that the\nresponsive document was properly withheld under sections 7(1)(f), 7(1)(h), and 7(1)(i) of\nFOIA.° On that same date, this office forwarded a copy of the Authority's written answer to\n\nand notified him of his opportunity to reply to that response. On January 30, 2024,\nreplied by maintaining that the records were improperly withheld.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, all public records in the possession or custody of a public body are\n\"presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body\n\"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).\n\nSection 7(1)(h) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:\n\n°FOIA portal message fon iii to Illinois Housing Development Authority FOIA\n(December 21, 2023).\n\n5 Letter from Sharon Hunley, FOIA Officer, Illinois Housing Development Authority, to\nHB (December 21, 2023).\n\n45 ILCS 140/7 (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; 103-\n423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540,\neffective January 1, 2024; 103-554, effective January 1, 2024.\n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(f), (1)(h), (1)(i) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June\n30, 2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023;\n\nProposals and bids for any contract, grant, or\nagreement, including information which if it were disclosed\nwould frustrate procurement or give an advantage to any person\nproposing to enter into a contractor agreement with the body, until\nan award or final selection is made. Information prepared by or\nfor the body in preparation of a bid solicitation shall be exempt\nuntil an award or final selection is made. (Emphasis added.)\n\nWhen construing the meaning of a statutory provision, the primary objective is to\n\nascertain the intent of the legislature. See DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). \"The\nplain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent, and if that language is clear and\n\nunambiguous,\n\nit must be given effect.\" People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, § 24. The plain\n\nlanguage of section 7(1)(h) includes, but is not limited to, information that would frustrate\nprocurement or give an advantage to an applicant for a contractor agreement with a public body.\nThe scope of the exemption broadly encompasses \"proposals and bids for any contract, grant, or\nagreement * * * until an award or final selection is made.\"\n\nIn its response to this office, the Authority asserted that the requested Preliminary\n\nProject Assessment is a constituent part of a proposal for tax credits for a housing development.\nThe Authority explained:\n\nThe Low Income Housing Tax Credit (\"Tax Credits\")\nprogram is a federal program created to promote the development\nof affordable housing for low-income individuals and families.\nThe Authority is the allocating agency for Tax Credits for the\nprogram in Illinois. * * *\n\nAll projects planning to apply to the Authority for an\nallocation of Tax Credits must first submit a Preliminary Project\nAssessment (\"PPA\") to the Authority prior to submitting an\napplication. Applicants must include required documentation in\nthe PPA, which includes the project concept, location, financing\nassumptions and information about the development team. * * *\n\nThe PPA sought by the instant Request is still pending a\ndecision by the Authority.!4\n\nThe response added that if the Preliminary Project Assessment and subsequent application are\napproved, the applicant is required to enter into an extended use agreement governing the award\nof the tax credit. The Authority asserted that \"each PPA is the first step in a competitive bid for\nthese limited resources.\"” The Authority stated that a proposed project is not awarded tax credits\nuntil the Illinois Housing Development Board of Members (Board) reviews and votes to approve\nan award for project, which had not occurred at the time the Authority received EEE FOIA\nrequest. The Authority indicated that the Board's decisions related to a Preliminary Project\nAssessment are made public once the Board has taken a final vote on the matter.\n\nThis office's confidential review of the responsive record confirmed that the\ninformation falls within the scope of section 7(1)(h). The Preliminary Project Assessment was\nsubmitted as part of the process for seeking approval from the Board for an award of tax credits\nand entering into an agreement governing the use of tax credits. It is undisputed that no award or\nfinal selection related to the project had been made at the time of the Authority's denial. | |\n\nargued that disclosure of the requested information would not give any individual an\nadvantage because the application deadline had passed. The plain language of section 7(1)(h) is\nnot so restrictive. The Authority was not required to demonstrate that disclosure would frustrate\nthe proposal process or give an advantage to any party to withhold the records; the clause\n\"including information which if it were disclosed would frustrate procurement or give an\nadvantage to any person proposing to enter into a contractor agreement with the body\" may\nencompass additional procurement-related records, on top of the exempt \"[p]roposals and bids\nfor any contract, grant, or agreement,\" and the exempt \"[i]nformation prepared by or for the body\nin preparation of a bid solicitation.\" See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Reg. Rev. Ltr. 73332,\nissued October 21, 2021, at 2 (\"The General Assembly's use of the word 'including' rather than a\nlimiting term such as 'only' indicates that information which may frustrate procurement is not the\nonly type of information that section 7(1)(h) is intended to encompass. In other words, the scope\nof the exemption includes—but is not limited to—this type of information.\").\n\nFurther, fo argued that the requested PPA should be disclosed because the\nAuthority already publicly disclosed a notice regarding the 2024 PPA submissions, which\nincluded the names of proposed developments and the entities who submitted proposals,\nincluding the company named in his FOIA request. There is no indication, however, that the\n\n®Letter from Christina McClernon, Associate Corporate and Compliance Counsel, [Illinois\nHousing Development Authority], to Shannon Barnaby, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nCounselor, Office of the Attorney General (January 26, 2024), at 1-2.\n\n‘Letter from Christina McClernon, Associate Corporate and Compliance Counsel, [Illinois\nHousing Development Authority], to Shannon Barnaby, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nwithheld record itself was disclosed. Moreover, section 7(1)(h) does not require the identities of\nindividuals who submit proposals be kept confidential for the exemption to apply. Accordingly,\nthis office concludes that the Authority did not improperly withhold the record pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(h) of FOIA.\n\nAlthough that exemption is applicable, this office notes that the Authority's\nDecember 21, 2023, denial _ request failed to identify the exemption or provide most\nof the information required by section 9(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9(a) (West 2022)) below:\n\nEach public body denying a request for public records shall\nnotify the requester in writing of the decision to deny the request,\nthe reasons for the denial, including a detailed factual basis for the\napplication of any exemption claimed, and the names and titles or\npositions of each person responsible for the denial. Each notice of\ndenial by a public body shall also inform such person of the right\nto review by the Public Access Counselor and provide the address\nand phone number for the Public Access Counselor. Each notice of\ndenial shall inform such person of his right to judicial review under\nSection 11 of this Act.\n\nThe Authority should be mindful of its statutory obligation to fully comply with these mandatory\nrequirements when issuing denials of FOIA requests.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any FOIA\nquestions, my e-mail address is Shannon.Barnaby@ilag.gov.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79594 f 71h proper sa\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1035,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-03-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79596"],"title":"City of Peoria improperly withheld police interview records under 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii)","filename":"79596, issued March 1, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1836,"summary":"The requester sought records of a police phone interview, which the City of Peoria denied under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(d)(i) and (iii). The PAC determined the City improperly withheld the records and closed the file.","plain_summary":"A reporter requested records of a specific police interview, but the City of Peoria refused to release them, claiming they were exempt from disclosure. The Attorney General's Public Access Counselor reviewed the case and concluded that the City's denial was improper. This means the City should have provided the records to the requester.","holding":"The City of Peoria improperly withheld the requested police interview records.","legal_question":"Whether the City of Peoria properly invoked FOIA exemptions 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) to withhold records of a police interview.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(i)","7(1)(d)(iii)"],"public_body":"City of Peoria","requesting_party":"Ms. Meredith Newman","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request concerned records and reports of a phone interview conducted by a police officer with a private citizen.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_i/79596%2C%20issued%20March%201%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police records","FOIA denial","exemption 7(1)(d)","public records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nST A TE OF fLLT  OlS \n\nKWAMERAOUL \nATTORNEY G ,N ,RAL \n\nMarch  1, 2024 \n\nVia electronic mail \nMs. Meredith Newman \nmnewman@bettergov.org \n\nVia electronic mail \nMs. Chrissie Kapustka \nDeputy Corporation Counsel \nCity of Peoria \n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nckapustka@peoriagov.org \n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review - 2024 PAC 79596 \n\nDear Ms. Newman and Ms.  Kapustka: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of \nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January  1, 2024.).  For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Counselor \nconcludes that the City of Peoria (City) improperly withheld records responsive to Ms. Meredith \nNewman's December 18, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Ms. Newman submitted a FOIA request to the City seeking \"[a]II \n\nrecords and reports of the phone interview Officer Jonathan Irving, of Peoria Police Department \n(Police Department), had with Kathy Harvey on 2/24/22.\" 1  On January 3, 2024, the City denied \nMs. Newman's FOIA request in its entirety under sections 7(I)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA.2\nOn January 3, 2024, Ms. Newman submitted the above-referenced Request for Review \ncontesting the denial of her request. In her Request for Review, Ms. Newman argued that the \n\n1FO1A portal message from Meredith Newman to City of Peoria (December  18, 2023).\n\n25 ILCS  140/?(l)(d){i), {l)(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts  103-154, effective June\n\n30, 2023;  I 03-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n500 South 2nd \n\ntrcct \n\npringfidd, fllinois 6270 I \n(217) 782-1090 • Fax  (2 17) 782-7046\n\n115  outh L,Sallc \nlrccl \nChicago. lllinoi� 60603 \n(312)  14-3000 • Fax: (312) 814-'806\n\n1745 Innovalion Driw, Suite C \nCarbondale,  nlinois 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-Ml6 \n\nlndiYiduals with hearing or spc�-ch disabilities can rencl1 u  by u  ing the 7-1-1 relay service. \n\nwww. lllinois/\\nomeyCienerol .gov \n\n\fMs. Meredith Newman \nMs. Chrissie Kapustka \nMarch  1, 2024 \nPage 2 \n\nsection 7( l )(d)(i) and 7(l)(d)(iii) exemptions would not apply in these circumstances because the \ntwo individuals involved in the underlying police investigation had already been convicted, so no \nlaw enforcement proceedings were pending at the time of the request.  She also argued that the \nrequested records-police reports of interviews with a DCFS investigator who visited an eight­\nyear-old boy one month before his death-involved a matter of public interest. \n\nOn January 22, 2024, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request \nfor Review to the City and requested unredacted copies of the contested records for this office's \nconfidential review, along with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the \nasserted exemptions.  On January 30, 2024, the City furnished the reports and a written response \nasserting that the requested reports were properly withheld pursuant to sections 7(1 )( d)(j) and \n7( l )(d)(iii). The City argued that because the reports were related to the murder prosecutions of \ntwo individuals who were convicted less than a week before the FOIA request, and because those \nindividuals had the legal right to file post-judgment motions or appeals challenging their \nconvictions within 30 days, \"a release of the reports could have interfered with pending \nproceedings or deprive a person of a fair trial if the matters were to be re-tried. \"3  On January 31, \n2024, this office fo1warded the City's response to Ms. Newman; she did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION \n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \"presumed to \nbe open to inspection or copying.\"  5  ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept.  of Public Health, 218  Ill. 2d 390,415 (2006).  A public body \"has the burden of \nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure.  5 ILCS \n140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSections 7(1 )( d)(i) and 7(1 )( d)(iii) of FOIA \n\nSections 7(1 )( d)(i) and 7(1 )( d)(iii) of FOIA 4 exempt the disclosure of: \n\n(d) Records in the possession of any public body\n\ncreated in the course of administrative enforcement \nproceedings, and any law enforcement or correctional agency \nfor law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that \ndisclosure would: \n\n3Letter from Chrissie L. Kapustka, Deputy Corporation Counsel, City of P  oria, to Michael J. \nKnight, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bur  au, Office of the Tllinoi  Attorney General (January 30 \n2024), at 3. \n\n30, 2023;  I 03-462, effective August 4, 2023;  I 03-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n45 ILCS  140/7(1 )(d)(i), ( 1 )(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts  I 03-154, effective June \n\nOffice of the Illinois Anomey General \n\n\fMs. Meredith Newman \nMs. Chrissie Kapustka \nMarch 1, 2024 \nPage 3 \n\n(i) Inte1fere with pending or actually and reasonably\ncontemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law \nenforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient of the \nrequest;  [or] \n\n* * *\n\n(iii) Create a substantial likelihood that a person will be\n\ndeprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing[.] \n\n\"The classification of information as 'law enforcement' or 'investigatory' does not \n\nnecessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown, in a particular case, that disclosure would \ninterfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public interest.\"  Baudin v. \nCity ofC,ystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989).  \"Simply saying there is an 'ongoing \ncriminal investigation because the case has not been cleared,' with little additional explanation, is \nnot 'objective indicia' sufficient to show the ongoing investigation exemption applies.\"  Day v. \nCity of Chicago, 388  Ill. App. 3d 70, 76 (2009) (quoting Illinois Education Ass'n v.  Illinois State \nBoard of Education,  204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003)).  Accordingly, the Attorney General has issued \na binding opinion concluding that the mere commencement of an investigation or prosecution \ndoes not constitute clear and convincing evidence that any records are exempt from disclosure. \nIll. Att'y Gen.  Pub. Acc. Op. No. 17-001, issued March  14, 2017. \n\nIn its written response to this office, the City did not provide objective indicia or \narticulate with sufficient facts how or why the disclosure of these records would interfere with \nlaw enforcement proceedings conducted by the Police Department.  Because both defendants \nwere convicted before Ms. Newman submitted her request,5  there is no indication that the City's \nPolice Department was conducting an active law enforcement proceeding at the time of the \nrequest.  While the city argued that the proceedings were not final because the defendants had a \nright to file post-judgment motions or appeals that could have resulted in a new trial, the mere \npossibility of a new trial is too speculative to conclude that additional law enforcement \nproceedings were \"reasonably contemplated[]\" under section 7(1)(d)(i).  Even if law \nenforcement proceedings were reasonably contemplated, that possibility alone does not provide a \nsufficient basis for withholding the records at issue.  The City has not explained how disclosure \nof the specific records Ms. Newman requested would interfere with any potential law \nenforcement proceedings.  Accordingly, the City did not sustain its burden of demonstrating that \nthose reports are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) ofFOIA. \n\n5The City's re  ponse acknowledges that the victim's parents were convicted before the FOIA \nrequest was submitted. Brandon Walker was convicted by a jury of fir  t-degree murder on December  15, 2023; \nStephanie Jones pied guilty to first-degree murder on December 7, 2023. Collin Schopp, Brandon  Walker found \nguilty of first-degree murder in death of 8 -year-old Navin Jones, WCBU (December 15, 2023), \nhttps://www.wcbu.org/local-news/2023-12-15/brandon-walker-found-gui I ty-of-first-degree-murder-in-death-of­\neight-year-o ld-navin-j ones. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Anomey General \n\n\fMs. Meredith Newman \nMs. Chrissie Kapustka \nMarch  1, 2024 \nPage 4 \n\nSimilarly, with respect to section 7(l )(d)(iii) of FOIA, the City has not shown by \n\nclear and convincing evidence that the release of the reports would create a substantial likelihood \nthat a person will be deprived of a fair trial or impartial hearing.  In order to demonstrate that \nrecords are exempt from disclosure under the coITesponding provision of the Federal FOIA (5 \nU.S.C.A. §552(b)(7)(B) (West 2024)), an agency must establish:  \"(I) that a trial or adjudication \nis pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it is more probable than not that disclosure of the \nmaterial sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those proceedings.\"  Washington \nPost Co. v.  US. Dep 't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96,  I 02 (D.C. Cir.  1988). \n\nAs discussed above, because the subjects of the criminal proceedings were \n\nconvicted before the FOIA request was submitted, and the possibility of a new trial is mere \nspeculation, it cannot be said that \"a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent.\" \nWashington Post Co. v.  US  Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96,  102 (D.C. Cir.  1988).  Moreover, the \nCity has not articulated a factual basis as to how the disclosure of the reports would seriously \ninterfere with the fairness of any proceeding, even if a new trial were granted. The City's \nresponse provides only a conclusory assertion that the release of the reports \"could have\" \n6 \ndeprived a person of a fair trial if the cases were re-tried. \nthe City did not sustain its burden of demonstrating that responsive reports are exempt from \ndisclosure pursuant to section 7(l)(d)(iii) ofFOIA. \n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter, this office requests \nthat the City provide Ms. Newman with copies of the requested records.  The City may redact \ninformation that meets the definition of \"private information,\" such as home addresses, pursuant \nto section 7(1 )(b) of FOIA. 7  The City also may redact, pursuant to section 7( I)( c) of FOIA, \nwhich exempts information that would constitute an unwaITanted invasion of privacy,\nand identifying information of any victims other than the decedent as well as the identifying \ninformation of any third parties who appear incidentally in the records. Coleman  v. F.B.I.,  13 F. \nSupp. 2d 75, 80 (D.D.C.  1998) (exempting from disclosure information that \"would reveal the \nidentities of innocent third parties, witnesses or victims.\"). \n\n8 \n\nthe names \n\n6Letter from Chrissie L. Kapustka, Deputy Corporation Counsel, City of Peoria, to Michael J. \nKnight, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (January 30, \n2024), at 3. \n\n75 ILCS  140/7(1 )(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts  I 03-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\nI 03-462, effective August 4, 2023;  I 03-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n85 TLCS  140/7 (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts  I 03-154, effective June 30, 2023;  I 03-\n423, effective January  I, 2024;  I 03-462, effective August 4, 2023;  I 03-446, effective August 4, 2023;  I 03-540, \neffective January  I, 2024;  103-554, effective January  I, 2024. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Anomey General \n\n\fMs. Meredith Newman \nMs. Chrissie Kapustka \nMarch l, 2024 \nPage5 \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does \n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at michael.knight@ilag.gov or (773) 550-7485. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT \nAssistant Attorney General \nPublic Access Bureau \n\n79596 f 71 di improper 71 diii improper mun \n\nOffice of the TII i nois Artomey General \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police interview records of a private citizen","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79596/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nST A TE OF fLLT OlS \n\nKWAMERAOUL \nATTORNEY G,N,RAL \n\nMarch 1, 2024 \n\nVia electronic mail \nMs. Meredith Newman \nmnewman@bettergov.org \n\nVia electronic mail \nMs. Chrissie Kapustka \nDeputy Corporation Counsel \nCity of Peoria \n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nckapustka@peoriagov.org \n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review - 2024 PAC 79596 \n\nDear Ms. Newman and Ms. Kapustka: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of \nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January 1, 2024.). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Counselor \nconcludes that the City of Peoria (City) improperly withheld records responsive to Ms. Meredith \nNewman's December 18, 2023, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Ms. Newman submitted a FOIA request to the City seeking \"[a]II \n\nrecords and reports of the phone interview Officer Jonathan Irving, of Peoria Police Department \n(Police Department), had with Kathy Harvey on 2/24/22.\" 1 On January 3, 2024, the City denied \nMs. Newman's FOIA request in its entirety under sections 7(I)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA.2\nOn January 3, 2024, Ms. Newman submitted the above-referenced Request for Review \ncontesting the denial of her request. In her Request for Review, Ms. Newman argued that the \n\n1FO1A portal message from Meredith Newman to City of Peoria (December 18, 2023).\n\n25 ILCS 140/?(l)(d){i), {l)(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June\n\n30, 2023; I 03-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n500 South 2nd \n\ntrcct \n\npringfidd, fllinois 6270 I \n(217) 782-1090 • Fax (2 17) 782-7046\n\n115 outh L,Sallc \nlrccl \nChicago. lllinoi� 60603 \n(312) 14-3000 • Fax: (312) 814-'806\n\n1745 Innovalion Driw, Suite C \nCarbondale, nlinois 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-Ml6 \n\nlndiYiduals with hearing or spc�-ch disabilities can rencl1 u by u ing the 7-1-1 relay service. \n\nsection 7(l)(d)(i) and 7(l)(d)(iii) exemptions would not apply in these circumstances because the \ntwo individuals involved in the underlying police investigation had already been convicted, so no \nlaw enforcement proceedings were pending at the time of the request. She also argued that the \nrequested records-police reports of interviews with a DCFS investigator who visited an eight­\nyear-old boy one month before his death-involved a matter of public interest. \n\nOn January 22, 2024, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request \nfor Review to the City and requested unredacted copies of the contested records for this office's \nconfidential review, along with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the \nasserted exemptions. On January 30, 2024, the City furnished the reports and a written response \nasserting that the requested reports were properly withheld pursuant to sections 7(1)(d)(j) and \n7(l)(d)(iii). The City argued that because the reports were related to the murder prosecutions of \ntwo individuals who were convicted less than a week before the FOIA request, and because those \nindividuals had the legal right to file post-judgment motions or appeals challenging their \nconvictions within 30 days, \"a release of the reports could have interfered with pending \nproceedings or deprive a person of a fair trial if the matters were to be re-tried. \"3 On January 31, \n2024, this office fo1warded the City's response to Ms. Newman; she did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION \n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \"presumed to \nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept. of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390,415 (2006). A public body \"has the burden of \nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS \n140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA \n\nSections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA 4 exempt the disclosure of: \n\n(d) Records in the possession of any public body\n\ncreated in the course of administrative enforcement \nproceedings, and any law enforcement or correctional agency \nfor law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that \ndisclosure would: \n\n3 Letter from Chrissie L. Kapustka, Deputy Corporation Counsel, City of P oria, to Michael J. \nKnight, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bur au, Office of the Tllinoi Attorney General (January 30 \n2024), at 3. \n\n30, 2023; I 03-462, effective August 4, 2023; I 03-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n45 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i), (1)(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts I 03-154, effective June \n\n(i) Inte1fere with pending or actually and reasonably\ncontemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law \nenforcement or correctional agency that is the recipient of the \nrequest; [or] \n\n* * *\n\n(iii) Create a substantial likelihood that a person will be\n\ndeprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing[.] \n\n\"The classification of information as 'law enforcement' or 'investigatory' does not \n\nnecessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown, in a particular case, that disclosure would \ninterfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public interest.\" Baudin v. \nCity ofC,ystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989). \"Simply saying there is an 'ongoing \ncriminal investigation because the case has not been cleared,' with little additional explanation, is \nnot 'objective indicia' sufficient to show the ongoing investigation exemption applies.\" Day v. \nCity of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 76 (2009) (quoting Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State \nBoard of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003)). Accordingly, the Attorney General has issued \na binding opinion concluding that the mere commencement of an investigation or prosecution \ndoes not constitute clear and convincing evidence that any records are exempt from disclosure. \nIll. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 17-001, issued March 14, 2017. \n\nIn its written response to this office, the City did not provide objective indicia or \narticulate with sufficient facts how or why the disclosure of these records would interfere with \nlaw enforcement proceedings conducted by the Police Department. Because both defendants \nwere convicted before Ms. Newman submitted her request,5 there is no indication that the City's \nPolice Department was conducting an active law enforcement proceeding at the time of the \nrequest. While the city argued that the proceedings were not final because the defendants had a \nright to file post-judgment motions or appeals that could have resulted in a new trial, the mere \npossibility of a new trial is too speculative to conclude that additional law enforcement \nproceedings were \"reasonably contemplated[]\" under section 7(1)(d)(i). Even if law \nenforcement proceedings were reasonably contemplated, that possibility alone does not provide a \nsufficient basis for withholding the records at issue. The City has not explained how disclosure \nof the specific records Ms. Newman requested would interfere with any potential law \nenforcement proceedings. Accordingly, the City did not sustain its burden of demonstrating that \nthose reports are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) ofFOIA. \n\n5 The City's re ponse acknowledges that the victim's parents were convicted before the FOIA \nrequest was submitted. Brandon Walker was convicted by a jury of fir t-degree murder on December 15, 2023; \nStephanie Jones pied guilty to first-degree murder on December 7, 2023. Collin Schopp, Brandon Walker found \nguilty of first-degree murder in death of 8 -year-old Navin Jones, WCBU (December 15, 2023), \nhttps://www.wcbu.org/local-news/2023-12-15/brandon-walker-found-gui I ty-of-first-degree-murder-in-death-of­\n\nSimilarly, with respect to section 7(l)(d)(iii) of FOIA, the City has not shown by \n\nclear and convincing evidence that the release of the reports would create a substantial likelihood \nthat a person will be deprived of a fair trial or impartial hearing. In order to demonstrate that \nrecords are exempt from disclosure under the coITesponding provision of the Federal FOIA (5 \nU.S.C.A. §552(b)(7)(B) (West 2024)), an agency must establish: \"(I) that a trial or adjudication \nis pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it is more probable than not that disclosure of the \nmaterial sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those proceedings.\" Washington \nPost Co. v. US. Dep 't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, I 02 (D.C. Cir. 1988). \n\nAs discussed above, because the subjects of the criminal proceedings were \n\nconvicted before the FOIA request was submitted, and the possibility of a new trial is mere \nspeculation, it cannot be said that \"a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent.\" \nWashington Post Co. v. US Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Moreover, the \nCity has not articulated a factual basis as to how the disclosure of the reports would seriously \ninterfere with the fairness of any proceeding, even if a new trial were granted. The City's \nresponse provides only a conclusory assertion that the release of the reports \"could have\" \n6 \ndeprived a person of a fair trial if the cases were re-tried. \nthe City did not sustain its burden of demonstrating that responsive reports are exempt from \ndisclosure pursuant to section 7(l)(d)(iii) ofFOIA. \n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter, this office requests \nthat the City provide Ms. Newman with copies of the requested records. The City may redact \ninformation that meets the definition of \"private information,\" such as home addresses, pursuant \nto section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 7 The City also may redact, pursuant to section 7(I)(c) of FOIA, \nwhich exempts information that would constitute an unwaITanted invasion of privacy,\nand identifying information of any victims other than the decedent as well as the identifying \ninformation of any third parties who appear incidentally in the records. Coleman v. F.B.I., 13 F. \nSupp. 2d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 1998) (exempting from disclosure information that \"would reveal the \nidentities of innocent third parties, witnesses or victims.\"). \n\n8 \n\nthe names \n\n6 Letter from Chrissie L. Kapustka, Deputy Corporation Counsel, City of Peoria, to Michael J. \nKnight, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (January 30, \n2024), at 3. \n\n75 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts I 03-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\nI 03-462, effective August 4, 2023; I 03-446, effective August 4, 2023. \n\n85 TLCS 140/7 (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts I 03-154, effective June 30, 2023; I 03-\n423, effective January I, 2024; I 03-462, effective August 4, 2023; I 03-446, effective August 4, 2023; I 03-540, \neffective January I, 2024; 103-554, effective January I, 2024. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Anomey General \n\nMs. Meredith Newman \nMs. Chrissie Kapustka \nMarch l, 2024 \nPage5 \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does \n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at michael.knight@ilag.gov or (773) 550-7485. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT \nAssistant Attorney General \nPublic Access Bureau \n\n79596 f 71 di improper 71 diii improper mun \n\nOffice of the TII i nois Artomey General"}
{"id":1036,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-03-11","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79651"],"title":"Galesburg Police Department properly withheld body camera footage under 7.5(cc)","filename":"79651, issued March 11, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1257,"summary":"The requester sought body and dash camera footage from a September 2023 accident, which the Galesburg Police Department initially claimed was unavailable due to technical issues and later argued was exempt from disclosure. The PAC determined that the records were exempt under FOIA section 7.5(cc) because the requester was not an authorized party under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested body and dash camera footage from a September 2023 accident from the Galesburg Police Department. The department initially said the footage was unavailable due to a system issue, and later stated the video had been automatically deleted after 90 days. The Illinois Attorney General's office determined that, even if the footage existed, the requester was not entitled to it under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act because the recording captured only post-incident footage and was not flagged for disclosure. The matter is closed, and the department was advised to follow up on whether any squad car video could be recovered.","holding":"The requested body camera footage was exempt from disclosure under FOIA because the requester was not among the parties specified in section 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Galesburg Police Department properly withheld body camera footage pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA and the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(cc)"],"public_body":"Galesburg Police Department","requesting_party":"Anonymous requester","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought access to body and dash camera footage related to a traffic accident.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/Definition-of-bodily-harm/79651%2C%20issued%20March%2011%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","video footage","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAI\n\nMarch 11, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Bryan Anderson\nLieutenant\n\nGalesburg Police Department\n55 West Tompkins Street\n\nGalesburg, Illinois 61401\nc/o: jeolwell@ci.galesburg.il.us\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 79651\n\nDear MJ and Mr. Anderson:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069,\neffective January 1, 2024).\n\nOn October 19, 2023 submitted a FOIA request to the Galesburg\nPolice Department (Department) seeking, in relevant part, body and dash camera footage from\nan accident on September 28, 2023. On October 24, 2023, the Department responded that it was\nunable to provide responsive video recordings due to an operational issue with its GETAC\nsystem. On December 26, 2023, submitted a second FOIA request for the same\nrecords. On December 28, 2023, the Department responded that its GETAC system was once\nagain functional but that it was unable to recover video from the time period requested. On\nJanuary 8, 2024, this office received [J Request for Review contesting the\nDepartment's response.\n\n500 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Sueet 1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\nSpringfield, Minois 62701 Chicago, Mlinois 60603 Carbondale, Minois 62903\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 « Fax: (312) 814-3806 (618) 529-6400 « Fax: (618) 529-6416\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nwww IllinoisAttorneyGeneral gov\n\nMr. Bryan Anderson\nMarch 11, 2024\nPage 2\n\nOn January 25, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Department and asked it to provide an explanation of its search for records responsive to\n| FOIA request, including an explanation of the operational issues with the Department's\nGETAC system and any ongoing efforts to retrieve the requested records. On February 16,\n2024, the Department responded. On that same date, this office forwarded a copy of the\nDepartment's response to [- On February 27, 2024, this office received\n\nreply.\nDETERMINATION\n\n\"All records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v.\nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ul. 2d 390, 415 (2006).\n\nIn its response to his office, the Department explained that GETAC, a company\nthat the Department contracts to operate its body-worn camera system, had accidentally deleted\nall recordings, both body and dash camera footage, for the time period that included the incident\nfor which {MP requested video. The Department further explained that, although GETAC\nhad recovered a substantial amount of data, the video requested by [J had been\nautomatically deleted after 90 days on December 27, 2023, which was one day after\nsecond FOIA request.\n\nAlthough not cited by the Department, section 7.5(cc) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/7.5(cc) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-034,\neffective June 9, 2023; 103-142, effective January 1, 2024; 103-372, effective January 1, 2024;\n103-508, effective July 1, 2023; 103-580, effective December 8, 2023) expressly exempts from\ninspection and copying \"[r]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body\nCamera Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.\" (Emphasis added.)\ncontended in his Request for Review and reply to the Department's answer that the recording at\nissue should have been flagged by the Department because his brother was severely injured in\nthe traffic accident, and that flagged footage should have been saved for two years.\n\nSection 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (Body\nCamera Act) (50 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2022)) provides, in relevant part:\n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer-worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that:\n\n(1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nMr. Bryan Anderson\nMarch 11, 2024\nPage 3\n\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint,\ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if:\n\n(A) the subject of the encounter captured on\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\n(B) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative;\n\n(2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force,\narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n(3) upon request, the law enforcement agency shall\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter captured\non the recording or to the subject's attorney, or the officer\nor his or her legal representative. (Emphasis added.)\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that the plain language and intent of\nsection 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act requires only the disclosure of flagged recordings in\nwhich death or bodily harm resulted from some form of engagement with law enforcement. III.\nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. S-0634, issued September 14, 2021, at 3 (body camera footage\nexempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(cc) because \"[t]he responding officer arrived on\nscene and initiated the recording after the construction accident had occurred; there is no\nindication that the subject of the recording was injured as a result of the discharge of a firearm or\nuse of force by a police officer.\").\n\nBased on this office's review, [J was not authorized to obtain the\nrequested body camera footage under any of the exceptions that permit disclosure in section 10-\n20(b) of the Body Camera Act, even if the footage had not been inadvertently deleted.\nAccording to J FOIA request and the Department's response to this office, officers\nwere dispatched to assist following an incident that injured a bicyclist, and the recording at issue\ncaptures only footage after the incident had occurred. There is no indication that the requested\nfootage was flagged for purposes of section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act because there\nwas no injury resulting from some form of interaction with officers. Accordingly, this recording\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nMr. Bryan Anderson\nMarch 11, 2024\nPage 4\n\nis prohibited from disclosure under section 10-20(b) except to \"the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject's attorney, or the officer or his or her legal\nrepresentative.\" Because Fs was not one of the parties specified in that section, he was\nnot entitled to the recording at the time of his December 26, 2023, FOIA request, and the\nrecording was exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA.\n\nThe Department stated it would reach out to GETAC to see whether any squad car\nvideo could be recovered. If it has not already done so, the Department should advise [F\nwhether any responsive squad car footage can be provided.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\n\nany questions, please contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79651 f 75cc proper pd\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police body and dash camera footage of a traffic accident","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79651/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAI\n\nMarch 11, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Bryan Anderson\nLieutenant\n\nGalesburg Police Department\n55 West Tompkins Street\n\nGalesburg, Illinois 61401\nc/o: jeolwell@ci.galesburg.il.us\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 79651\n\nDear MJ and Mr. Anderson:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069,\neffective January 1, 2024).\n\nOn October 19, 2023 submitted a FOIA request to the Galesburg\nPolice Department (Department) seeking, in relevant part, body and dash camera footage from\nan accident on September 28, 2023. On October 24, 2023, the Department responded that it was\nunable to provide responsive video recordings due to an operational issue with its GETAC\nsystem. On December 26, 2023, submitted a second FOIA request for the same\nrecords. On December 28, 2023, the Department responded that its GETAC system was once\nagain functional but that it was unable to recover video from the time period requested. On\nJanuary 8, 2024, this office received [J Request for Review contesting the\nDepartment's response.\n\n500 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Sueet 1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\nSpringfield, Minois 62701 Chicago, Mlinois 60603 Carbondale, Minois 62903\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 « Fax: (312) 814-3806 (618) 529-6400 « Fax: (618) 529-6416\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nOn January 25, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Department and asked it to provide an explanation of its search for records responsive to\n| FOIA request, including an explanation of the operational issues with the Department's\nGETAC system and any ongoing efforts to retrieve the requested records. On February 16,\n2024, the Department responded. On that same date, this office forwarded a copy of the\nDepartment's response to [- On February 27, 2024, this office received\n\nreply.\nDETERMINATION\n\n\"All records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v.\nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ul. 2d 390, 415 (2006).\n\nIn its response to his office, the Department explained that GETAC, a company\nthat the Department contracts to operate its body-worn camera system, had accidentally deleted\nall recordings, both body and dash camera footage, for the time period that included the incident\nfor which {MP requested video. The Department further explained that, although GETAC\nhad recovered a substantial amount of data, the video requested by [J had been\nautomatically deleted after 90 days on December 27, 2023, which was one day after\nsecond FOIA request.\n\nAlthough not cited by the Department, section 7.5(cc) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/7.5(cc) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-034,\neffective June 9, 2023; 103-142, effective January 1, 2024; 103-372, effective January 1, 2024;\n103-508, effective July 1, 2023; 103-580, effective December 8, 2023) expressly exempts from\ninspection and copying \"[r]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body\nCamera Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.\" (Emphasis added.)\ncontended in his Request for Review and reply to the Department's answer that the recording at\nissue should have been flagged by the Department because his brother was severely injured in\nthe traffic accident, and that flagged footage should have been saved for two years.\n\nSection 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (Body\nCamera Act) (50 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2022)) provides, in relevant part:\n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer-worn body\n\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint,\ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if:\n\n(A) the subject of the encounter captured on\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\n(B) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative;\n\n(2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force,\narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n(3) upon request, the law enforcement agency shall\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter captured\non the recording or to the subject's attorney, or the officer\nor his or her legal representative. (Emphasis added.)\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that the plain language and intent of\nsection 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act requires only the disclosure of flagged recordings in\nwhich death or bodily harm resulted from some form of engagement with law enforcement. III.\nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. S-0634, issued September 14, 2021, at 3 (body camera footage\nexempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(cc) because \"[t]he responding officer arrived on\nscene and initiated the recording after the construction accident had occurred; there is no\nindication that the subject of the recording was injured as a result of the discharge of a firearm or\nuse of force by a police officer.\").\n\nBased on this office's review, [J was not authorized to obtain the\nrequested body camera footage under any of the exceptions that permit disclosure in section 10-\n20(b) of the Body Camera Act, even if the footage had not been inadvertently deleted.\nAccording to J FOIA request and the Department's response to this office, officers\nwere dispatched to assist following an incident that injured a bicyclist, and the recording at issue\ncaptures only footage after the incident had occurred. There is no indication that the requested\nfootage was flagged for purposes of section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act because there\nwas no injury resulting from some form of interaction with officers. Accordingly, this recording\n\nis prohibited from disclosure under section 10-20(b) except to \"the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject's attorney, or the officer or his or her legal\nrepresentative.\" Because Fs was not one of the parties specified in that section, he was\nnot entitled to the recording at the time of his December 26, 2023, FOIA request, and the\nrecording was exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA.\n\nThe Department stated it would reach out to GETAC to see whether any squad car\nvideo could be recovered. If it has not already done so, the Department should advise [F\nwhether any responsive squad car footage can be provided.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\n\nany questions, please contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79651 f 75cc proper pd\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1037,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-26","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79727"],"title":"Matteson Police Department properly withheld background check records under 7(1)(f)","filename":"79727, issued July 26, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1141,"summary":"A requester sought records from the Matteson Police Department regarding responses from a former employer, Eagle Sports Range, which the Department denied under the section 7(1)(f) exemption. The PAC determined that the Department properly withheld the records as they constituted pre-decisional, deliberative materials related to a hiring decision.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested records from the Matteson Police Department regarding his own background check and employment history. The Department refused to release the documents, claiming they were part of an internal deliberative process. The Attorney General's office agreed with the Department, finding that the records were protected because they reflected the internal decision-making process used to evaluate the requester's job application.","holding":"The Matteson Police Department did not improperly withhold the requested records pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Matteson Police Department properly invoked section 7(1)(f) of FOIA to withhold records related to a background investigation and hiring decision.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(f)"],"public_body":"Matteson Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The records at issue consist of communications regarding a background investigation conducted by the police department for employment purposes.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/Communications-with-third-parties/references-survey-takers/79727%2C%20issued%20July%2026%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["background check","employment records","deliberative process","hiring decision"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"July 26, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nCommander R. Murray\nMatteson Police Department\n20500 South Cicero Avenue\nMatteson, Illinois 60443\nrmurray@villageofmatteson. org\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 79727\n\nDear\n\nand Commander Murray: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nIn a form dated December 19, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA\n\nrequest to the Matteson Police Department (Department) seeking a copy of any responses from\nEagle Sports Range related to his past employment with the company.   On January 11, 2024,  the\nDepartment denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.1 That same day, \nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau challenging the denial.  \n\nOn January 24, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Department and asked it to provide copies of the withheld records, together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemption.   On\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, 2023;  103-540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fCommander R. Murray\nJuly 26, 2024\nPage 2\n\nJanuary 25, 2024, this office received the requested materials.  On January 30, 2024, this office\nforwarded a copy of the Department' s response to\n\nhe replied that same day.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts,  notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\"  The\nsection 7(1)( f) exemption applies to \" inter-  and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\"  Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003).  Section 7(1)(f) is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\"   Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248.  \nFactual material generally is not within the scope of section 7(1)( f) unless it cannot be\nreasonably segregated from deliberative material and, therefore, would provide insight into the\npublic body' s decision- making process.   State Journal- Register v. University of Illinois\nSpringfield, 2013 IL App (4th) 120881, ¶ 27. \n\nFurther,  section 7(1)( f) of FOIA has been interpreted as extending to\n\ncommunications between a public body and a third-party consultant when the third party's\nanalyses and recommendations ' played essentially the same part in an agency' s process of\ndeliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done.'\"  Fisher v. Office of\nthe Illinois Attorney General,  2021 IL App ( 1st)  200225, ¶  20 ( quoting Harwood,  344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248).   \n\nIn its response to this office, the Department asserted that it relied on a previous\n\ndetermination issued by this office in another Request for Review to withhold the response it\nobtained from Eagle Sports Range related to\nDepartment stated it denied the request \" based on the decision in this case that opinions of\nemployment references are exempt under section 7(1)(f).\"2\n\napplication.  In particular, the\n\nAttorney General' s Office, Public Access Bureau ( January 25, 2024). \n\n2Letter from Commander R. Murray #103, Matteson Police Department, to Teresa Lim, Illinois\n\n\fCommander R. Murray\nJuly 26, 2024\nPage 3\n\nAs the Department noted,  the Public Access Bureau has previously addressed in\nanother Request for Review, 2019 PAC 60986, whether a city department director's notes on an\napplicant' s employment\nreferences fell within the scope of the section 7(1)( f) exemption.   This\noffice determined that the notes at issue showed the \" director's impressions and opinions about\nwhat was notable or remarkable from her conversations with the employment\nwhich were then used in the City's hiring decision.  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 60986, \nissued October 13, 2022,  at 2.  Parts of the notes also recited or paraphrased the opinions of the\nemployment references, and the city similarly \"relied on their opinions in the process of\nformulating action on the application.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 60986,  at 2.  Because\nthe notes were predecisional and deliberative in nature, this office concluded that the city did not\nimproperly withhold the notes pursuant\n60986, at 2; see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 59361, issued June 5, 2020 (police\ndepartment did not improperly withhold responses of prior employers concerning an applicant\npursuant to section 7(1)(f) because they reflected the views and opinions of the employers). \n\nto section 7(1)( f).  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. \n\nreferences[,]\" \n\nThis office's review of the Department's investigation report, specifically the\n\nwhich the investigator who compiled the report\n\nlimited part related to Eagle Sports Range,  confirmed that the Department withheld information\nthat is deliberative in nature.  The information contains the opinions and views of the employer\nwho was consulted concerning\nfound to be significant.   In reply to this office, \nRange provided false information about him and questioned why he could not obtain this\ninformation.  He contended \"[ t]his is not a confidential informant on a criminal case, it[']s just a\nbackground investigation.\" 3 As discussed above,  the section 7(1)( f) exemption is intended to\nprotect the ability of public bodies to have frank and open deliberations before reaching a\ndecision on a matter,  such as a decision on hiring.   Because disclosure of this information would\nprovide insight into the Department's decision-making process as it evaluated\napplication,  this office concludes that the Department did not improperly withhold the\ninformation pursuant to section 7(1)(f).    \n\nasserted that he believed Eagle Sports\n\n3E- mail from\n\nto [Teresa]  Lim (January 30, 2024). \n\n\fCommander R. Murray\nJuly 26, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79727 f 71f proper pd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Communications about a police background investigation for employment","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79727/","full_text":"July 26, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nCommander R. Murray\nMatteson Police Department\n20500 South Cicero Avenue\nMatteson, Illinois 60443\nrmurray@villageofmatteson. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 79727\n\nDear\n\nand Commander Murray: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nIn a form dated December 19, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA\n\nrequest to the Matteson Police Department (Department) seeking a copy of any responses from\nEagle Sports Range related to his past employment with the company. On January 11, 2024, the\nDepartment denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.1 That same day, \nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau challenging the denial. \n\nOn January 24, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Department and asked it to provide copies of the withheld records, together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemption. On\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, \n\nJanuary 25, 2024, this office received the requested materials. On January 30, 2024, this office\nforwarded a copy of the Department's response to\n\nhe replied that same day. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts, notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" The\nsection 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003). Section 7(1)(f) is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248. \nFactual material generally is not within the scope of section 7(1)(f) unless it cannot be\nreasonably segregated from deliberative material and, therefore, would provide insight into the\npublic body's decision- making process. State Journal- Register v. University of Illinois\nSpringfield, 2013 IL App (4th) 120881, ¶ 27. \n\nFurther, section 7(1)(f) of FOIA has been interpreted as extending to\n\ncommunications between a public body and a third-party consultant when the third party's\nanalyses and recommendations ' played essentially the same part in an agency's process of\ndeliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done.'\" Fisher v. Office of\nthe Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (quoting Harwood, 344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Department asserted that it relied on a previous\n\ndetermination issued by this office in another Request for Review to withhold the response it\nobtained from Eagle Sports Range related to\nDepartment stated it denied the request \" based on the decision in this case that opinions of\n\nAs the Department noted, the Public Access Bureau has previously addressed in\nanother Request for Review, 2019 PAC 60986, whether a city department director's notes on an\napplicant's employment\nreferences fell within the scope of the section 7(1)(f) exemption. This\noffice determined that the notes at issue showed the \" director's impressions and opinions about\nwhat was notable or remarkable from her conversations with the employment\nwhich were then used in the City's hiring decision. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 60986, \nissued October 13, 2022, at 2. Parts of the notes also recited or paraphrased the opinions of the\nemployment references, and the city similarly \"relied on their opinions in the process of\nformulating action on the application.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 60986, at 2. Because\nthe notes were predecisional and deliberative in nature, this office concluded that the city did not\nimproperly withhold the notes pursuant\n60986, at 2; see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 59361, issued June 5, 2020 (police\ndepartment did not improperly withhold responses of prior employers concerning an applicant\npursuant to section 7(1)(f) because they reflected the views and opinions of the employers). \n\nto section 7(1)(f). Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n\nreferences[,]\" \n\nThis office's review of the Department's investigation report, specifically the\n\nwhich the investigator who compiled the report\n\nlimited part related to Eagle Sports Range, confirmed that the Department withheld information\nthat is deliberative in nature. The information contains the opinions and views of the employer\nwho was consulted concerning\nfound to be significant. In reply to this office, \nRange provided false information about him and questioned why he could not obtain this\ninformation. He contended \"[ t]his is not a confidential informant on a criminal case, it[']s just a\nbackground investigation.\" 3 As discussed above, the section 7(1)(f) exemption is intended to\nprotect the ability of public bodies to have frank and open deliberations before reaching a\ndecision on a matter, such as a decision on hiring. Because disclosure of this information would\nprovide insight into the Department's decision-making process as it evaluated\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79727 f 71f proper pd"}
{"id":1038,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-04-26","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79906"],"title":"Village of Sugar Grove did not violate FOIA by refusing to reprocess previously provided records","filename":"79906, issued April 26, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":840,"summary":"The requester challenged the Village of Sugar Grove's decision to withhold records previously provided in a prior request, citing the unduly burdensome provision of FOIA. The PAC determined that the Village acted appropriately by providing only the new records and excluding those already furnished.","plain_summary":"The requester sought ten years of communications between the village and a developer, and the village excluded records from a period already produced in response to the requester's earlier request for largely overlapping years, citing FOIA's unduly-burdensome repeated-request provision. The PAC determined that a public body may treat as unduly burdensome the portion of a new request that duplicates records already furnished to the same requester, even when the new request's scope is not identical. The village's response did not violate FOIA.","holding":"The Village of Sugar Grove did not violate FOIA by treating the portion of the request seeking previously provided records as unduly burdensome under section 3(g).","legal_question":"Whether a public body may invoke section 3(g) of FOIA to decline to re-produce records that were already provided to the same requester in a previous request.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Sugar Grove","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"fees","subject_description":"The request sought ten years of communications between the Village and a private developer.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_g/Repeated-requests/79906%2C%20issued%20April%2026%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["unduly burdensome","repeated request","FOIA request","records production"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAI\n\nApril 26, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 79906\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069,\neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthis Request for Review is unfounded.\n\nOn January 10, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request (January 2024 request) to the\nVillage of Sugar Grove (Village) seeking all communications between officials or employees of\nthe Village and Crown Community Development from January 10, 2014, through January 10,\n2024. In its response, the Village referenced your July 25, 2023, FOIA request (July 2023\nrequest), which sought, among other things, e-mails and written communications exchanged\nbetween the Village and Crown Community Development between July 24, 2013, and July 24,\n2023. The Village stated that it had responded to that previous request, and that \"[i]ncluding the\n3,000+ pages of records from 2014-1-10 to 2023-07-24 would be unduly burdensome as a\nrepeated request under section 3(g) [5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)].\"' Consequently, the Village\nstated that it was only including records that had not already been provided in response to your\nJuly 2023 request.\n\nYour Request for Review objected to the Village referencing your July 2023\nrequest, since your January 2024 request was a separate request. You later clarified to an\nAssistant Attorney General via e-mail that your main concern with the Village's response was\nthat the Village modified the period of the request without your approval, despite there being a\ndifferent scope and time period in the second request.\n\n'E-mail from Tracey R. Conti, Village Clerk, Village of Sugar Grove, to\n(January 25, 2024).\n\n500 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Street 1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\nSpringfield, Mlinois 62701 Chicago, Ilinois 60603 Carbondale, Illinois 62903\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 * Fax: (312) 814-3806 (618) 529-6400 « Fax: (618) 529-6416\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nwww. IllinoisAttomeyGeneral.gov\n\nApril 26, 2024\nPage 2\n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides, in pertinent part, that \"[r]epeated requests from\nthe same person for the same records that are unchanged or identical to records previously\nprovided or properly denied under this Act shall be deemed unduly burdensome under this\nprovision.\" 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022) (Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of\nsection 3(g), a request is an unduly burdensome repeated request if it seeks the same records that\na public body has previously provided to the same requester.\n\nThe primary objective when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain\nand give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59\n(2006). \"The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, given\nits plain and ordinary meaning.\" Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of Orland Fire Protection\nDistrict, 2012 IL 110012, § 56. However, a reviewing body \"has a duty to avoid a construction\nof the statute that would defeat the statute's purpose or yield an absurd or unjust result.\" People\nv. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998); see also Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d 161, 170\n(1989) (statutes should not be interpreted in an \"unreasonably technical\" manner that is\ninconsistent \"with the obvious legislative intent.\").\n\nAlthough your July 2023 and January 10, 2024, requests are not identical, they\nboth seek communications between the Village and Crown Community Development for\nextensive and mostly overlapping time frames. The repeated request provision in section 3(g) is\nintended to alleviate the burden of responding to redundant or duplicative requests for records\nthat a public body already has provided to the same person. It would be absurd to construe\nsection 3(g) of FOIA as requiring a public body to disclose all records that it previously\nfurnished in response to a previous request because of a slight modification to the time frame or\ncontent in a subsequent request. Construing section 3(g) as permitting a public body to treat as\nunduly burdensome those portions of a request that encompass the same records previously\nprovided to the requester, while requiring it to substantively respond to the remaining portions as\nthe Village did in this matter, gives effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Because the\nVillage was not required to provide you with the same records of communications that it had\nalready provided in response to your previous request, the Public Access Bureau has determined\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded.\n\nThis file is closed. If you have questions, you may contact me at\nmichael.knight@ilag.gov.\n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nApril 26, 2024\nPage 3\n\n79906 f unf mun\n\ncc: Via electronic mail\nMs. Tracey R. Conti\nVillage Clerk\nVillage of Sugar Grove\n160 South Municipal Drive, Suite 110\nSugar Grove, Illinois 60554\ntconti@sugargroveil.gov\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A requester asked for ten years of communications between a village and a developer, but the village only provided records from the period not covered by a previous request. The requester complained that the village shouldn't have excluded the older records. The Attorney General's office agreed with the village, stating that public bodies are not required to re-produce the same documents for the same requester.","card_headline":"Ten years of communications with a developer","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79906/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAI\n\nApril 26, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 79906\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069,\neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthis Request for Review is unfounded.\n\nOn January 10, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request (January 2024 request) to the\nVillage of Sugar Grove (Village) seeking all communications between officials or employees of\nthe Village and Crown Community Development from January 10, 2014, through January 10,\n2024. In its response, the Village referenced your July 25, 2023, FOIA request (July 2023\nrequest), which sought, among other things, e-mails and written communications exchanged\nbetween the Village and Crown Community Development between July 24, 2013, and July 24,\n2023. The Village stated that it had responded to that previous request, and that \"[i]ncluding the\n3,000+ pages of records from 2014-1-10 to 2023-07-24 would be unduly burdensome as a\nrepeated request under section 3(g) [5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)].\"' Consequently, the Village\nstated that it was only including records that had not already been provided in response to your\nJuly 2023 request.\n\nYour Request for Review objected to the Village referencing your July 2023\nrequest, since your January 2024 request was a separate request. You later clarified to an\nAssistant Attorney General via e-mail that your main concern with the Village's response was\nthat the Village modified the period of the request without your approval, despite there being a\ndifferent scope and time period in the second request.\n\n'E-mail from Tracey R. Conti, Village Clerk, Village of Sugar Grove, to\n(January 25, 2024).\n\n500 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Street 1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\nSpringfield, Mlinois 62701 Chicago, Ilinois 60603 Carbondale, Illinois 62903\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 * Fax: (312) 814-3806 (618) 529-6400 « Fax: (618) 529-6416\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides, in pertinent part, that \"[r]epeated requests from\nthe same person for the same records that are unchanged or identical to records previously\nprovided or properly denied under this Act shall be deemed unduly burdensome under this\nprovision.\" 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022) (Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of\nsection 3(g), a request is an unduly burdensome repeated request if it seeks the same records that\na public body has previously provided to the same requester.\n\nThe primary objective when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain\nand give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59\n(2006). \"The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, given\nits plain and ordinary meaning.\" Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of Orland Fire Protection\nDistrict, 2012 IL 110012, § 56. However, a reviewing body \"has a duty to avoid a construction\nof the statute that would defeat the statute's purpose or yield an absurd or unjust result.\" People\nv. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998); see also Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d 161, 170\n(1989) (statutes should not be interpreted in an \"unreasonably technical\" manner that is\ninconsistent \"with the obvious legislative intent.\").\n\nAlthough your July 2023 and January 10, 2024, requests are not identical, they\nboth seek communications between the Village and Crown Community Development for\nextensive and mostly overlapping time frames. The repeated request provision in section 3(g) is\nintended to alleviate the burden of responding to redundant or duplicative requests for records\nthat a public body already has provided to the same person. It would be absurd to construe\nsection 3(g) of FOIA as requiring a public body to disclose all records that it previously\nfurnished in response to a previous request because of a slight modification to the time frame or\ncontent in a subsequent request. Construing section 3(g) as permitting a public body to treat as\nunduly burdensome those portions of a request that encompass the same records previously\nprovided to the requester, while requiring it to substantively respond to the remaining portions as\nthe Village did in this matter, gives effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Because the\nVillage was not required to provide you with the same records of communications that it had\nalready provided in response to your previous request, the Public Access Bureau has determined\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded.\n\n79906 f unf mun\n\ncc: Via electronic mail\nMs. Tracey R. Conti\nVillage Clerk\nVillage of Sugar Grove\n160 South Municipal Drive, Suite 110\nSugar Grove, Illinois 60554\ntconti@sugargroveil.gov\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1039,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-02-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79945"],"title":"Illinois Department of Human Rights did not violate FOIA for non-specific request","filename":"79945, issued February 15, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":592,"summary":"The requester sought broad information regarding judicial and law enforcement entities from the Illinois Department of Human Rights, which denied the request for lack of responsive records. The PAC determined that no further action was warranted because the request failed to reasonably identify specific public records.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested general information about various judicial and law enforcement agencies from the Illinois Department of Human Rights. The Department stated it did not have any such records, and the Attorney General's office agreed, noting that FOIA requests must specifically identify the records sought rather than asking for general data or information.","holding":"The PAC determined that no further action is warranted because the Department of Human Rights does not possess records responsive to the requester's broad and non-specific request.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois Department of Human Rights violated FOIA by failing to provide records in response to a request that did not reasonably identify specific public records.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Human Rights","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"request specificity","subject_description":"The requester sought broad, non-specific information regarding judicial and law enforcement entities.","ocr_status":"llm_reocr","ocr_quality":91.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Doesnt-Identify/79945%2C%20issued%20February%2015%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA request","reasonable identification","responsive records","public body"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nSTATE OF  ILUNOIS \n\nFebruary 15, 2024 \n\nKWAME RAOUL \nAITORNl·Y Cil-,NERAl. \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review-2024 PAC 79945 \n\nDear-: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of \n\nInfo1mation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January  1, 2024).  For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau has \ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn January 28, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of \n\nHuman Rights (Department) stating:  \"This is a request for information of state judicial, local \njudicial ,Rockford J11inois , state law enforcement ,local law enforcement Rockford Illinois[.)\" 1 \nYou then stated \"All FOIA\" and listed variations of your name.  On January 30, 2024, the \nDepartment responded by asserting that you did not request records that were maintained by or \nwithin the jurisdiction of the Department, and that it did not have documentation responsive to \nyour request.  On January  31, 2024, this office received your complete Request for Review \nchallenging the Department's response.  You appeared to assett that your request was for a \npersonal purpose. \n\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are \n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. lllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390,415 (2006).  However, \"[a] \nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \ninformation, or statistics.\"  Chicago Tribune Co.  v.  Department of Financial & Professional \nRegulation,  2014 IL App (4th) 130427, 133, 8 N.E.3d  1 1, 19 (2014).  A FOIA request \n\n'E-mail from- to [JDHR FOIA] (January 28, 2024). \n\n500 Soulh 2nd S!rctl \nSpringfield. Illinois 62701 \n(2 I 7) 782-1090 • !:'ax; (217) 782-7046 \n\n11.5 Soulh LaSalle Sln:el \nO,icago, 111inois 60603 \n(312} R 14-3000  • Fax: (312) 814-3806 \n\n174.S ln11ovalio11  Driw. Sullc C \nCarhondalc, lllinoi� 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\nIndividuals wiLh bearing or speech disabilities cntt n:nch us by using  the 7-1-1  rclny service \n\n,v,vw.Olinoi�AuomeyGencral.gov \n\n\f\f","full_text_pre_reocr":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nSTATE OF ILUNOIS \n\nFebruary 15, 2024 \n\nKWAME RAOUL \nAITORNl·Y Cil-,NERAl. \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review-2024 PAC 79945 \n\nDear-: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of \n\nInfo1mation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau has \ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn January 28, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of \n\nHuman Rights (Department) stating: \"This is a request for information of state judicial, local \njudicial,Rockford J11inois, state law enforcement,local law enforcement Rockford Illinois[.)\" 1 \nYou then stated \"All FOIA\" and listed variations of your name. On January 30, 2024, the \nDepartment responded by asserting that you did not request records that were maintained by or \nwithin the jurisdiction of the Department, and that it did not have documentation responsive to \nyour request. On January 31, 2024, this office received your complete Request for Review \nchallenging the Department's response. You appeared to assett that your request was for a \npersonal purpose. \n\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are \n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. lllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390,415 (2006). However, \"[a] \nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \ninformation, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional \nRegulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, 133, 8 N.E.3d 1 1, 19 (2014). A FOIA request \n\n'E-mail from- to [JDHR FOIA] (January 28, 2024). \n\n500 Soulh 2nd S!rctl \nSpringfield. Illinois 62701 \n(2 I 7) 782-1090 • !:'ax; (217) 782-7046 \n\n11.5 Soulh LaSalle Sln:el \nO,icago, 111inois 60603 \n(312} R 14-3000 • Fax: (312) 814-3806 \n\n174.S ln11ovalio11 Driw. Sullc C \nCarhondalc, lllinoi� 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\nIndividuals wiLh bearing or speech disabilities cntt n:nch us by using the 7-1-1 rclny service \n\n,v,vw.Olinoi�AuomeyGencral.gov","plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A broad request for judicial and law enforcement records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79945/","full_text":"KWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 15, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n[REDACTED]\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 79945\n\nDear [REDACTED]:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.\n\nOn January 28, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department) stating: \"This is a request for information of state judicial, local judicial,Rockford Illinois, state law enforcement,local law enforcement Rockford Illinois[.]\"¹ You then stated \"All FOIA\" and listed variations of your name. On January 30, 2024, the Department responded by asserting that you did not request records that were maintained by or within the jurisdiction of the Department, and that it did not have documentation responsive to your request. On January 31, 2024, this office received your complete Request for Review challenging the Department's response. You appeared to assert that your request was for a personal purpose.\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). However, \"[a] request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶33, 8 N.E.3d 11, 19 (2014). A FOIA request\n\n¹E-mail from [REDACTED] to [IDHR FOIA] (January 28, 2024).\n\n\"reasonably describes records if 'the agency is able to determine precisely what records are being requested.'\" Kowalczyk v. Dep't of Justice, 73 F.3d 386, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 678 F.2d 315, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Public bodies are not required to search beyond the four corners of a FOIA request, nor are they required to divine the requester's intent. American Chemistry Council, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 922 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2013).\n\nRather than reasonably describing records, your request vaguely stated that it sought \"information of state judicial, local judicial * * * local law enforcement\" entities and included your name. As explained above, a request must identify a record rather than general information. The Department is charged with administering the Illinois Human Rights Act,² which prohibits discrimination based on certain protected classes and, to that end, investigates complaints of discrimination.³ The judiciary and law enforcement agencies are separate entities. Your request did not reference any complaints or charges alleging discrimination, and FOIA did not require the Department to divine the intent of your request. Accordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted.\n\nIf you are seeking records of a discrimination charge that has been filed with the Department, you may wish to submit a new request to the Department specifying the charge that was filed and describing the particular records you are seeking related to that charge.\n\nThis letter serves to close this file. If you have questions, please contact me at the Chicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\n[REDACTED]\n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79945 f no fi war mun\n\n²775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2022).\n\n³Illinois Department of Human Rights, https://dhr.illinois.gov/ (last visited February 15, 2024)."}
{"id":1040,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-06-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["79991"],"title":"Chicago Transit Authority not required to retroactively amend requester identity to avoid recurrent designation","filename":"79991, issued June 20, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1364,"summary":"The requester challenged the Chicago Transit Authority's (CTA) designation of them as a 'recurrent requester' under FOIA, arguing that one of the qualifying requests was submitted on behalf of a non-profit organization. The PAC determined that the CTA acted within its authority and did not violate FOIA by refusing to retroactively amend the requester's identity for that request.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) to change their status as a 'recurrent requester' by claiming one of their previous requests was actually made on behalf of a non-profit group. The Attorney General's office ruled that the CTA was not required to accept this change after the fact. Consequently, the CTA's original designation stands, and the agency did not violate the law.","holding":"The Chicago Transit Authority did not violate FOIA by designating the requester as a recurrent requester.","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required to allow a requester to retroactively amend the identity of the requester for a previously submitted FOIA request to avoid a 'recurrent requester' designation under 5 ILCS 140/2(g).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2(g)","5 ILCS 140/3.2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Chicago Transit Authority","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"recurrent requester","subject_description":"The requester sought to challenge their designation as a recurrent requester by amending the identity of the party behind a prior FOIA request.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_g/79991%2C%20issued%20June%2020%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["recurrent requester","FOIA request","CTA","request status"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Requester Status","full_text_pre_clean":"June 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 79991\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024).   For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat your Request for Review is unfounded.   \n\nOn January 19, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Transit\n\nAuthority ( CTA) seeking a copy of the offer letter and any other accompanying documentation\nprovided to prospective hires for positions organized within ATU 308.   On January 26, 2024, \nCTA notified you that it was treating this request as one submitted by a recurrent requester, \npursuant to section 2(g) (5 ILCS 140/ 2(g) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103-554, \neffective January 1, 2024)  and section 3.2 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.2 (West 2022)).   CTA asserted\nthat you met the definition of \"recurrent requester\"  based on seven requests you had submitted in\nthe four- day period from January 8 through January 11, 2024.   On January 31, 2024,  you\nsubmitted a Request for Review to this office contesting that designation.   You stated that one of\nthose seven requests,  the request you submitted on January 10, 2024,  and which CTA labeled as\nrequest 2024- 0131,  was submitted on behalf of a non- profit corporation rather than on your own\nbehalf.   You further explained that you had notified CTA of this fact after receiving CTA' s\nrecurrent requester designation,  but that CTA did not allow you to amend your request. \n\n\fJune 20, 2024\nPage 2\n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA defines a \" recurrent requester\"  as: \n\na person that, in the 12 months immediately preceding the request, \nhas submitted to the same public body ( i) a minimum of 50\nrequests for records, ( ii) a minimum of 15 requests for records\nwithin a 30-day period,  or (iii) a minimum of 7 requests for records\nwithin a 7-day period.   For purposes of this definition,  requests\nmade by news media and non- profit, scientific,  or academic\norganizations shall not be considered in calculating the number\nof requests made in the time periods in this definition when the\nprincipal purpose of the requests is (i) to access and\ndisseminate information concerning news and current or\npassing events, ( ii) for articles of opinion or features of interest\nto the public,  or (iii) for the purpose of academic,  scientific,  or\npublic research or education.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nYour Request for Review acknowledges that you transmitted to CTA from your e-\n\nmail account seven requests in seven days.   At this office' s request,  CTA outlined the requests it\nreceived from you: \n\nFOIA 2024- 0118,  received 1/8/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0120,  received 1/9/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0131,  received 1/10/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0134,  received 1/11/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0135,  received 1/11/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0136,  received 1/11/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0137,  received 1/11/2024\n\nCTA further explained that it also received request 2024- 0163 from you on January 18, 2024, \nand then request 2024- 0169 on January 19, 2024.   As its initial response to request 2024- 0169, \nCTA notified you that you met the definition of \"recurrent requester\"  due to the requests you\nsubmitted between January 8 and January 11. \n\nYour Request for Review states that you submitted request 2024- 0131 at the\n\nrequest of a non-profit for its use rather than for your personal use.   Request 2024- 0131 seeks a\nlog of employee Ventra card usage by 35 individuals in a two-year period.   When you submitted\nRequest 2024- 0131,  you described it in an e-mail to CTA as an amendment of request 2024-\n0106,  which sought a log of employee Ventra card usage for 12 individuals,  and which you had\nsubmitted on January 1, 2024,  on your own behalf.   As you note, FOIA request 2024- 0131 does\nnot indicate it was submitted on behalf of a non- profit.  It also does not state that the principal\n\n\fJune 20, 2024\nPage 3\n\npurpose of the request was one of the purposes outlined in section 2(g) of FOIA.  On January 28, \n2024,  you sent CTA an e-mail stating that you submitted the request \" on behalf of a non- profit, \nnot * * *  as a private citizen.  I didn't specify in the original request because that line was\noptional.\" 1 You did not, however,  identify the not-for profit organization or the principal\npurpose of the request. \n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA provides a limited exception to the definition of recurrent\n\nrequester for certain organizations when the principal purpose of the request is one listed in that\nsection.   This office has previously determined that if a requester believes their request falls\nwithin the exception to section 2(g), the requester has an obligation to notify a public body that a\nrequest is being made by news media or by a non- profit, scientific,  or academic organization.   Ill. \nAtt'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 47422 47571 47800 48007 48008,  issued July 21, 2017,  at 3\nrequester did not identify himself as news media in his requests);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  77333,  issued\nJuly 31, 2023,  at 3 (request did not state that the individual submitting was news media or that\nthe principal purpose of the request was among the three purposes excluded from section 2(g)).  \nIn order to qualify for the exception in section 2(g), request 2024- 0131 not only needed to\nproperly identify the organization submitting the request,  but also needed to identify the principal\npurpose of the organization in submitting the request.   According to the plain language of section\n2(g), a request submitted by a non-profit shall not be considered in calculating the number of\nrequests only when the principal purpose of the request is one of the three identified in that\nsection.   See also Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 73919,  issued March 27, 2024,  at 3\nconstruing the identical\nthat statement that requester was a journalist for an identified media outlet and the request was\nsubmitted to gather information for news stories of public interest was sufficient to demonstrate\nthe designation was improper).   \n\nlanguage in exception to definition of \"voluminous request\"  and finding\n\nNeither section 2(g) nor any other section of FOIA expressly affords a requester\n\nan opportunity to amend their request to provide this information when they failed to do so upon\nsubmission.   Although it is understandable that a requester may make a mistake and may forget\nto notify the public body of this information,  the public body nevertheless must be able to rely on\nthe information it possesses at the time it designates a request as a request submitted by a\nrecurrent requester.   Classifying a requester as recurrent provides the public body with a\nsignificant amount of additional time to respond to a request. 2 If CTA had been required to\naccept your amendment concerning request 2024- 0131,  and withdraw its designation of you as a\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Haley [ Lowrance] ( January 28, 2024). \n\n2See 5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(a) ( West 2022) (\" Notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary,  a\npublic body shall respond to a request from a recurrent requester,  as defined in subsection ( g) of Section 2, within 21\nbusiness days after receipt.\"). \n\n\fJune 20, 2024\nPage 4\n\nrecurrent requester,  its response to 2024- 0169 would have become untimely.   Given the statutory\nconsequences associated with an untimely response to a FOIA request,  this office cannot compel\nCTA to accept a subsequent amendment about the identity of the requester in 2024- 0131.  \n\nAccordingly,  because this office is unable to conclude that CTA violated FOIA by\n\nconsidering request 2024- 0131 in calculating the number of requests submitted by you in seven\ndays for purposes of section 2(g) of FOIA, this office concludes that your Request for Review is\nunfounded. \n\nThis letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you have questions,  please contact\n\nme at leah. bartelt@ilag. gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79991 f unf reg auth\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Brigett R. Bevan\nMs. Haley Lowrance\nChicago Transit Authority\n567 West Lake Street\nChicago,  Illinois 60661\nFOIA@transitchicago. com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Amendment of requester identity to avoid recurrent status","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-79991/","full_text":"June 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 79991\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn January 19, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Transit\n\nAuthority (CTA) seeking a copy of the offer letter and any other accompanying documentation\nprovided to prospective hires for positions organized within ATU 308. On January 26, 2024, \nCTA notified you that it was treating this request as one submitted by a recurrent requester, \npursuant to section 2(g) (5 ILCS 140/ 2(g) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-554, \neffective January 1, 2024) and section 3.2 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.2 (West 2022)). CTA asserted\nthat you met the definition of \"recurrent requester\" based on seven requests you had submitted in\nthe four- day period from January 8 through January 11, 2024. On January 31, 2024, you\nsubmitted a Request for Review to this office contesting that designation. You stated that one of\nthose seven requests, the request you submitted on January 10, 2024, and which CTA labeled as\nrequest 2024- 0131, was submitted on behalf of a non- profit corporation rather than on your own\n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA defines a \" recurrent requester\" as: \n\na person that, in the 12 months immediately preceding the request, \nhas submitted to the same public body (i) a minimum of 50\nrequests for records, (ii) a minimum of 15 requests for records\nwithin a 30-day period, or (iii) a minimum of 7 requests for records\nwithin a 7-day period. For purposes of this definition, requests\nmade by news media and non- profit, scientific, or academic\norganizations shall not be considered in calculating the number\nof requests made in the time periods in this definition when the\nprincipal purpose of the requests is (i) to access and\ndisseminate information concerning news and current or\npassing events, (ii) for articles of opinion or features of interest\nto the public, or (iii) for the purpose of academic, scientific, or\npublic research or education. (Emphasis added.) \n\nYour Request for Review acknowledges that you transmitted to CTA from your e-\n\nmail account seven requests in seven days. At this office's request, CTA outlined the requests it\nreceived from you: \n\nFOIA 2024- 0118, received 1/8/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0120, received 1/9/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0131, received 1/10/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0134, received 1/11/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0135, received 1/11/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0136, received 1/11/2024\nFOIA 2024- 0137, received 1/11/2024\n\nCTA further explained that it also received request 2024- 0163 from you on January 18, 2024, \nand then request 2024- 0169 on January 19, 2024. As its initial response to request 2024- 0169, \nCTA notified you that you met the definition of \"recurrent requester\" due to the requests you\nsubmitted between January 8 and January 11. \n\nYour Request for Review states that you submitted request 2024- 0131 at the\n\nrequest of a non-profit for its use rather than for your personal use. Request 2024- 0131 seeks a\nlog of employee Ventra card usage by 35 individuals in a two-year period. When you submitted\nRequest 2024- 0131, you described it in an e-mail to CTA as an amendment of request 2024-\n0106, which sought a log of employee Ventra card usage for 12 individuals, and which you had\nsubmitted on January 1, 2024, on your own behalf. As you note, FOIA request 2024- 0131 does\nnot indicate it was submitted on behalf of a non- profit. It also does not state that the principal\n\npurpose of the request was one of the purposes outlined in section 2(g) of FOIA. On January 28, \n2024, you sent CTA an e-mail stating that you submitted the request \" on behalf of a non- profit, \nnot * * * as a private citizen. I didn't specify in the original request because that line was\noptional.\" 1 You did not, however, identify the not-for profit organization or the principal\npurpose of the request. \n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA provides a limited exception to the definition of recurrent\n\nrequester for certain organizations when the principal purpose of the request is one listed in that\nsection. This office has previously determined that if a requester believes their request falls\nwithin the exception to section 2(g), the requester has an obligation to notify a public body that a\nrequest is being made by news media or by a non- profit, scientific, or academic organization. Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47422 47571 47800 48007 48008, issued July 21, 2017, at 3\nrequester did not identify himself as news media in his requests); Ill. Att'y Gen. 77333, issued\nJuly 31, 2023, at 3 (request did not state that the individual submitting was news media or that\nthe principal purpose of the request was among the three purposes excluded from section 2(g)). \nIn order to qualify for the exception in section 2(g), request 2024- 0131 not only needed to\nproperly identify the organization submitting the request, but also needed to identify the principal\npurpose of the organization in submitting the request. According to the plain language of section\n2(g), a request submitted by a non-profit shall not be considered in calculating the number of\nrequests only when the principal purpose of the request is one of the three identified in that\nsection. See also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 73919, issued March 27, 2024, at 3\nconstruing the identical\nthat statement that requester was a journalist for an identified media outlet and the request was\nsubmitted to gather information for news stories of public interest was sufficient to demonstrate\nthe designation was improper). \n\nlanguage in exception to definition of \"voluminous request\" and finding\n\nNeither section 2(g) nor any other section of FOIA expressly affords a requester\n\nan opportunity to amend their request to provide this information when they failed to do so upon\nsubmission. Although it is understandable that a requester may make a mistake and may forget\nto notify the public body of this information, the public body nevertheless must be able to rely on\nthe information it possesses at the time it designates a request as a request submitted by a\nrecurrent requester. Classifying a requester as recurrent provides the public body with a\nsignificant amount of additional time to respond to a request. 2 If CTA had been required to\naccept your amendment concerning request 2024- 0131, and withdraw its designation of you as a\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Haley [ Lowrance] (January 28, 2024). \n\n2 See 5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(a) (West 2022) (\" Notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary, a\npublic body shall respond to a request from a recurrent requester, as defined in subsection (g) of Section 2, within 21\n\nrecurrent requester, its response to 2024- 0169 would have become untimely. Given the statutory\nconsequences associated with an untimely response to a FOIA request, this office cannot compel\nCTA to accept a subsequent amendment about the identity of the requester in 2024- 0131. \n\nAccordingly, because this office is unable to conclude that CTA violated FOIA by\n\nconsidering request 2024- 0131 in calculating the number of requests submitted by you in seven\ndays for purposes of section 2(g) of FOIA, this office concludes that your Request for Review is\nunfounded. \n\nThis letter shall serve to close this matter. If you have questions, please contact\n\nme at leah. bartelt@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n79991 f unf reg auth\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Brigett R. Bevan\nMs. Haley Lowrance\nChicago Transit Authority\n567 West Lake Street\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nFOIA@transitchicago. com"}
{"id":1041,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-06-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80023"],"title":"Village properly withheld emails under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(m) and 7(1)(s)","filename":"80023, issued June 6, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1290,"summary":"The requester challenged the Village's partial denial of emails, and the PAC determined that the withheld records were properly exempt under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested emails from a Village, but the Village withheld some of them, claiming they were protected by legal and insurance-related exemptions. The Attorney General's office reviewed the records and agreed that the Village was legally allowed to keep those specific emails private. As a result, the case is closed with no further action required.","holding":"The Village properly withheld the requested emails pursuant to sections 7(1)(m) and 7(1)(s) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Village properly applied FOIA exemptions 7(1)(m) and 7(1)(s) to withhold emails related to legal advice and insurance claims management.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(m)","7(1)(s)","7(1)(a)"],"public_body":"Village","requesting_party":"Leslie Quade Kennedy","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(c)","subject_description":"The requester sought access to emails involving herself that the Village withheld citing attorney-client privilege and insurance claim management exemptions.","ocr_status":"ocr_copies_backfill","ocr_quality":92.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_s/80023%2C%20issued%20June%206%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["email records","attorney-client privilege","insurance claims","FOIA exemptions"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"\fMs. Leslie Quade Kennedy\nJune 6, 2024\nPage 2\n\nand 7(1)(s) of FOIA.2 On February 5, 2024,  \nVillage' s partial denial;  she stated that she' s only seeking information pertaining to herself. \n\nsubmitted a Request for Review of the\n\nreview.   This office also requested a detailed explanation of the factual and legal\n\nOn March 6, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the requested e-mails for this office's\nconfidential\nbases for withholding some of the e-mails pursuant to the section 7(1)(a), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(s) \nexemptions.   On May 3, 2024,  the Village furnished those materials and a written answer,  with\ncertain portions provided confidentially pursuant to section 9.5(d) of FOIA.3 On May 6, 2024, \nthis office forwarded a redacted copy of the Village' s answer to ; \nshe did not submit a\nreply.    \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body \"has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS\n140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:  \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney or\n\nauditor representing the public body that would not be subject to\ndiscovery in litigation,  and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect\nto internal audits of public bodies. \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m).  People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1st Dist. 1997).  A\nparty asserting that a confidential communication is protected by the attorney- client privilege\nmust show that:  \"(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it\n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), ( 1)(m), (1)(s) ( West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective\n\nJune 30, 2023;  103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, \n2023; 103-540, effective January 1, 2024; 103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024)  \nThe Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for review, \n\nwith any alleged confidential information to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\n\fMs. Leslie Quade Kennedy\nJune 6, 2024\nPage 3\n\nwas made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices;  and ( 3)  it remained confidential.\"   Cangelosi v. Capasso,  366 Ill. App.  3d 225,  228 ( 2d\nDist. 2006); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985) \n\nThe proponent of the privilege carries the burden of establishing all elements of the privilege, \nincluding confidentiality, which is not presumed\").   Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only\nto the communications of a client to his attorney,  but also to the advice of an attorney to his\nclient.\"  In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. App. 3d 363, 374 (5th Dist. 1990); see also People\nv. Radojcic,  2013 IL 114197, ¶ 40, 998 N.E.2d 1212,  1221- 22 ( 2013) (\"[ T]he modern view is that\nthe privilege is a two-way street, protecting both the client's communications to the attorney and\nthe attorney' s advice to the client.\").  \n\nBecause the Village provided a mostly confidential explanation for how the\n\nwithheld e-mails constitute privileged attorney-client communications, this office is precluded\nfrom detailing that explanation in this determination.   See 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) ( West 2022).   This\noffice has considered that explanation and reviewed the withheld e-mails, and determined that all\nbut two of them reflect communications between Village employees and the attorney\nrepresenting the Village, in which legal advice was sought or provided.  Accordingly, this office\nconcludes that those e-mails are exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( m).   \n\nSection 7(1)( s)  of FOIA\n\nWith respect to the remaining two e-mails, section 7(1)(s) of FOIA exempts from\n\ninspection and copying: \n\nAny and all proprietary information and records related to\n\nthe operation of an intergovernmental risk management association\nor self- insurance pool or jointly self- administered health and\naccident cooperative or pool.  Insurance or self insurance\nincluding any intergovernmental\nself insurance pool) claims, loss or risk management\ninformation,  records,  data,  advice or communications.  \nEmphasis added.) \n\nrisk management association or\n\nAgain, the Village provided a mostly confidential explanation for the applicability\n\nof section 7(1)( s).   This office' s review determined that the two e- mails that did not directly\ninvolve the Village's attorney instead reflected communications concerning the management of a\nclaim that were exchanged by a Village employee and representatives of an entity that processes\nits insurance claims.  This office has previously determined that similar claims management\ncommunications fall within the scope of section 7(1)( s).   See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. \nLtr. 38449, issued May 31, 2016 (communications between fire district and its insurance\ncompany concerning management of an insurance claim fell within the scope of the 7(1)( s) \nexemption); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 56329, issued May 13, 2019 (notes and\n\n\fMs. Leslie Quade Kennedy\nJune 6, 2024\nPage 4\n\ncommunications by a claims representative employed by transit authority concerning\nmanagement of a claim against the transit authority fell within the scope of the 7(1)( s) \nexemption).  Because the remaining e-mails reflect similar claims management information, this\noffice concludes that the e- mails are exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( s). 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me at michael. knight@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J.  KNIGHT\nAssistantAttorneyGeneral\nPublicAccessBureau\n\n80023 f 71m proper 71s proper mun\n\n4Because this office has determined that e-mails at issue are exempt from disclosure under either\n\nsection 7(1)(m) or 7(1)(s), it is not necessary to address the applicability of the other exemptions raised in the\nVillage's response.   \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":"and 7(1)(s) of FOIA.2 On February 5, 2024, \nVillage's partial denial; she stated that she's only seeking information pertaining to herself. \n\nsubmitted a Request for Review of the\n\nreview. This office also requested a detailed explanation of the factual and legal\n\nOn March 6, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the requested e-mails for this office's\nconfidential\nbases for withholding some of the e-mails pursuant to the section 7(1)(a), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(s) \nexemptions. On May 3, 2024, the Village furnished those materials and a written answer, with\ncertain portions provided confidentially pursuant to section 9.5(d) of FOIA.3 On May 6, 2024, \nthis office forwarded a redacted copy of the Village's answer to; \nshe did not submit a\nreply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \"has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney or\n\nauditor representing the public body that would not be subject to\ndiscovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect\nto internal audits of public bodies. \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m). People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1st Dist. 1997). A\nparty asserting that a confidential communication is protected by the attorney- client privilege\nmust show that: \"(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it\n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (1)(m), (1)(s) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective\n\nJune 30, 2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, \n2023; 103-540, effective January 1, 2024; 103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024) \nThe Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for review, \n\nwith any alleged confidential information to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\nwas made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices; and (3) it remained confidential.\" Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228 (2d\nDist. 2006); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985) \n\nThe proponent of the privilege carries the burden of establishing all elements of the privilege, \nincluding confidentiality, which is not presumed\"). Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only\nto the communications of a client to his attorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his\nclient.\" In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. App. 3d 363, 374 (5th Dist. 1990); see also People\nv. Radojcic, 2013 IL 114197, ¶ 40, 998 N.E.2d 1212, 1221- 22 (2013) (\"[ T]he modern view is that\nthe privilege is a two-way street, protecting both the client's communications to the attorney and\nthe attorney's advice to the client.\"). \n\nBecause the Village provided a mostly confidential explanation for how the\n\nwithheld e-mails constitute privileged attorney-client communications, this office is precluded\nfrom detailing that explanation in this determination. See 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) (West 2022). This\noffice has considered that explanation and reviewed the withheld e-mails, and determined that all\nbut two of them reflect communications between Village employees and the attorney\nrepresenting the Village, in which legal advice was sought or provided. Accordingly, this office\nconcludes that those e-mails are exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(m). \n\nSection 7(1)(s) of FOIA\n\nWith respect to the remaining two e-mails, section 7(1)(s) of FOIA exempts from\n\ninspection and copying: \n\nAny and all proprietary information and records related to\n\nthe operation of an intergovernmental risk management association\nor self- insurance pool or jointly self- administered health and\naccident cooperative or pool. Insurance or self insurance\nincluding any intergovernmental\nself insurance pool) claims, loss or risk management\ninformation, records, data, advice or communications. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nrisk management association or\n\nAgain, the Village provided a mostly confidential explanation for the applicability\n\nof section 7(1)(s). This office's review determined that the two e- mails that did not directly\ninvolve the Village's attorney instead reflected communications concerning the management of a\nclaim that were exchanged by a Village employee and representatives of an entity that processes\nits insurance claims. This office has previously determined that similar claims management\ncommunications fall within the scope of section 7(1)(s). See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. \n\ncommunications by a claims representative employed by transit authority concerning\nmanagement of a claim against the transit authority fell within the scope of the 7(1)(s) \nexemption). Because the remaining e-mails reflect similar claims management information, this\noffice concludes that the e- mails are exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(s). 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me at michael. knight@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT\nAssistantAttorneyGeneral\nPublicAccessBureau\n\n80023 f 71m proper 71s proper mun\n\n4Because this office has determined that e-mails at issue are exempt from disclosure under either\n\nsection 7(1)(m) or 7(1)(s), it is not necessary to address the applicability of the other exemptions raised in the\nVillage's response.","plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Emails withheld under attorney-client privilege and insurance exemptions","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80023/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 6, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Leslie Quade Kennedy\n\nSenior Partner\n\nOdelson, Murphey, Frazier & McGrath, Ltd.\n3318 West 95th Street\n\nEvergreen Park, Illinois 60805\nIkennedy@omfmlaw.com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 80023\n\nDear and Ms. Kennedy:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069,\neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Village of Bolingbrook (Village) did not improperly withhold e-mails\nresponsive a January 11, 2024, FOIA request.\n\nOn that date, submitted a FOIA request to the Village seeking \"all\nemails to and from Chief Michael Rompa pertaining to rel between March 24, 2021\n\nthrough October 18, 2021[,]\" not to include medical documents.* On January 24, 2024, the\nVillage provided some redacted records but withheld others pursuant to sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(m),\n\n'FOIA portal message fon to [Fran] Miller, FOIA Officer, Village of\nBolingbrook (January 11, 2024).\n\n$00 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Street 1745 Innovation Drive, Suite €\nSpringfield, lino’ Chicago, Illinois 60603 Carbondale, Illinois 62903\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 * Fax: (312) 814-3806 (618) 529-6400 + Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service\n\nand 7(1)(s) of FOIA.? On February 5, 2024, P| submitted a Request for Review of the\nVillage's partial denial; she stated that she's only seeking information pertaining to herself.\n\nOn March 6, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the requested e-mails for this office's\nconfidential review. This office also requested a detailed explanation of the factual and legal\nbases for withholding some of the e-mails pursuant to the section 7(1)(a), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(s)\nexemptions. On May 3, 2024, the Village furnished those materials and a written answer, with\ncertain portions provided confidentially pursuant to section 9.5(d) of FOIA.? On May 6, 2024,\nthis office forwarded a redacted copy of the Village's answer to; she did not submit a\n\nreply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \"presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v.\nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \"has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/1.2 (West 2022).\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:\n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney or\nauditor representing the public body that would not be subject to\ndiscovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect\nto internal audits of public bodies.\n\nCommunications protected by the attorney-client privilege are within the scope of\nsection 7(1)(m). People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1st Dist. 1997). A\nparty asserting that a confidential communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege\nmust show that: \"(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it\n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (1)(m), (1)(s) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective\nJune 30, 2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4,\n2023; 103-540, effective January 1, 2024; 103-554, effective January 1, 2024.\n\n35 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024)\n(\"The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for review,\nwith any alleged confidential information to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\").\n\nwas made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices; and (3) it remained confidential.\" Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228 (2d\nDist. 2006); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985)\n(\"The proponent of the privilege carries the burden of establishing all elements of the privilege,\nincluding confidentiality, which is not presumed\"). Moreover, \"[t]he privilege applies not only\nto the communications of a client to his attorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his\nclient.\" In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. App. 3d 363, 374 (Sth Dist. 1990); see also People\nv. Radojcic, 2013 IL 114197, 940, 998 N.E.2d 1212, 1221-22 (2013) (\"[T]he modern view is that\nthe privilege is a two-way street, protecting both the client's communications to the attorney and\nthe attorney's advice to the client.\").\n\nBecause the Village provided a mostly confidential explanation for how the\nwithheld e-mails constitute privileged attorney-client communications, this office is precluded\nfrom detailing that explanation in this determination. See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022). This\noffice has considered that explanation and reviewed the withheld e-mails, and determined that all\nbut two of them reflect communications between Village employees and the attorney\nrepresenting the Village, in which legal advice was sought or provided. Accordingly, this office\nconcludes that those e-mails are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(m).\n\nSection 7(1)(s) of FOIA\n\nWith respect to the remaining two e-mails, section 7(1)(s) of FOIA exempts from\ninspection and copying:\n\nAny and all proprietary information and records related to\nthe operation of an intergovernmental risk management association\nor self-insurance pool or jointly self-administered health and\naccident cooperative or pool. Insurance or self insurance\n(including any intergovernmental risk management association or\nself insurance pool) claims, loss or risk management\ninformation, records, data, advice or communications.\n(Emphasis added.)\n\nAgain, the Village provided a mostly confidential explanation for the applicability\nof section 7(1)(s). This office's review determined that the two e-mails that did not directly\ninvolve the Village's attorney instead reflected communications concerning the management of a\nclaim that were exchanged by a Village employee and representatives of an entity that processes\nits insurance claims. This office has previously determined that similar claims management\ncommunications fall within the scope of section 7(1)(s). See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev.\n\ncommunications by a claims representative employed by transit authority concerning\nmanagement of a claim against the transit authority fell within the scope of the 7(1)(s)\nexemption). Because the remaining e-mails reflect similar claims management information, this\noffice concludes that the e-mails are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(s).4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me at michael. knight@ilag.gov.\nVe\n\ntruly yours\n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80023 f 71m proper 71s proper mun\n\n‘Because this office has determined that e-mails at issue are exempt from disclosure under either\nsection 7(1)(m) or 7(1)(s), it is not necessary to address the applicability of the other exemptions raised in the\nVillage's response.\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1042,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-26","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80093","80094"],"title":"Lockport Township Assessor's Office improperly withheld property assessment records","filename":"80093 80094, issued March 26, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3669,"summary":"The requester sought various property assessment records and calculation data from the Lockport Township Assessor's Office, which the Assessor denied as 'work product' or non-existent. The PAC determined the Assessor improperly withheld certain records while clarifying that the office is not required to create new reports that do not exist.","plain_summary":"A resident made two FOIA requests for property-assessment records and calculation data. The PAC found that the assessor's office had to provide the existing Audit Trail and Hot Sheet data, but did not have to create Comparables or Land Valuation reports it had not previously generated. It also allowed a preliminary handwritten calculation to remain redacted while requiring disclosure of the rest of the sales-ratio report and assessment comments.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau found that the Lockport Township Assessor's Office improperly withheld a sales ratio report and assessment comments from the January 25 FOIA request (except for a redactable handwritten calculation). The source document does not state any holding regarding the February 1 FOIA request for Visual PAMSPro reports.","legal_question":"Whether the Assessor's Office properly withheld property assessment records under the 'work product' exemption and whether it was required to generate new reports for the requester.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Lockport Township Assessor's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"property records","subject_description":"The requester sought documentation and calculations used by the Assessor's Office to determine a 15% increase in property tax assessments.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Data-Requests/80093%2080094%2C%20issued%20March%2026%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["property assessment","tax records","work product","FOIA request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Property Records","full_text_pre_clean":"March 26, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nAssessor\nLockport Township\n1463 South Farrell Road\nLockport,  Illinois 60441\nmaryann@lockporttownship. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Requests for Review:   2024 PAC 80093;  2024 PAC 80094\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Williamson: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Lockport Township Assessor' s Office ( Assessor' s\nOffice)  improperly responded to certain portions of\nFebruary 1, 2024,  FOIA requests. \n\nJanuary 25, 2024,  and\n\nOn January 25, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Assessor' s\n\nOffice seeking \" all the records ( math calc, sales records,  sales ratio study for our street)  that were\nused to reach a conc that raised our quad assessment 15%[.] * * *  Please enclose all math used to\n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 2\n\nreach this number.\" 1 On January 30, 2024,  the Assessor' s Office denied\nmath calculations,\"  asserting that they are \" work product.\" 2\n\nrequest for\n\nOn February 1, 2024, \n\nsubmitted another FOIA request to the\n\nAssessor' s Office.  She sought,  for the specific PIN associated with her home address:  ( 1) The\nVisual PAMSPro ( a professional assessment management system tool) Audit Trail Report; ( 2) \nthe Visual PAMSPro \" hot sheet;\" ( 3) \" any comparables reports run or created[;]\" ( 4) the Property\nRecord Card from the Visual PAMSPro software; ( 5) \"[ a] ny reports on the Land Valuation\nmethod utilized to calculate the quadrennial assessment[;]\" ( 6) \"[ a] ny data or information stored\nin the VisualPAMSPro software but not able to have a report generated,  referencing the land\nvaluation method[;]\"  and ( 7) \"[ t]he land valuation analysis utilized to produce the increases in\nthe assessed value of PIN 11-04-26-400- 004- 0000 as far back as the VisualPAMSPro software\nrecords.\" 3 On February 7, 2024,  the Assessor' s Office provided\nwith a copy of her\ncurrent property record card and the previous record card from the archives.   It denied her\nrequest for the specified Visual PAMSPro reports,  stating \"[ t]he items you are requesting are\npossible features of the PAMS Pro system which are not utilized within this office.  The\nFreedom of Information Act does not require that I create records or reports for a request.\" 4 The\nAssessor' s Office also provided an explanation of the land valuation of\n\nproperty. \n\nOn February 27, 2024,  this office received the materials necessary to complete\nRequests for Review challenging the Assessor' s Office' s responses.   In particular, \n\nshe challenged the denial of her requests for the responsive math calculations and the reports\nrequested from the Visual PAMSPro software.   \n\nOn February 27, 2024,  this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to the\nAssessor' s Office and asked it to provide the Public Access Bureau with copies of the records\nwithheld as \" math calculations\"  for our confidential review along with a detailed legal and\nfactual explanation for the Assessor' s Office' s assertion that the records are exempt from\ndisclosure.    This office asked the Assessor' s Office to specify the exemptions in section 7 and/ or\n7.5 of FOIA that apply to the withheld records. 5 This office also requested that the Assessor' s\n\n1Freedom of Information Act Request from\n\nJanuary 25, 2024). \n\n2Letter from Mary Ann Williamson,  Assessor,  Lockport,  Illinois, to [\n\nJanuary 30, \n\n2024).  The Assessor' s Office' s January 30, 2024,  letter also addressed\nThat request is not at issue in this matter. \n\nJanuary 26, 2024,  FOIA request.  \n\n3Freedom of Information Act Request from\n\nto Lockport Township Government\n\nFebruary 1, 2024). \n\n2024). \n\n4Letter from Mary Ann Williamson,  Assessor,  Lockport,  Illinois, to [\n\nFebruary 7, \n\n55 ILCS 140/7 (West 2023 Supp.);  5 ILCS 140/7.5 (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 3\n\nOffice describe its efforts to determine whether it possesses the capability to run the requested\nreports in the Visual PAMSPro software.  On March 5, 2024,  the Assessor' s Office provided the\nwithheld records and a written answer.   On March 7, 2024,  this office forwarded the written\nanswer to\n\non March 10, 2024,  she replied. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.   Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\"   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).  \n\nMath Calculations\n\nIn its response to this office, the Assessor' s Office stated that it denied the records\nshowing the responsive math calculations because they reflected the Assessor' s \" work product or\nwork notes which [ the Assessor' s Office]  understood to be outside the parameters of\" FOIA. 6\nDespite this office' s request that the Assessor' s Office provide a citation to a specific exemption\nthat applies to the withheld records,  it did not do so.   This office construes the Assessor' s Office' s\ncontention as asserting section 7(1)(f) of FOIA, 7 which exempts from inspection and copying\n\np] reliminary drafts,  notes,  recommendations,  memoranda and other records in which opinions\n\nare expressed,  or policies or actions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant\nportion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the\nhead of the public body.\"   The section 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter-  and intra- agency\npredecisional and deliberative material.\"   Harwood v. McDonough,  344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247\n2003).   Section 7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank\nand open discussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\"   Harwood,  344\nIll. App. 3d at 248.  Further,  a public body that asserts the deliberative process exemption \" has\nthe burden of establishing what deliberative process is involved,  and the role played by the\ndocuments in issue in the course of that process.\"   Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of\nEnergy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 ( D.C. Cir 1980).  \n\nThe Illinois Appellate Court has stated that \" purely factual material\"  is not exempt\n\nfrom disclosure under section 7(1)(f) unless the factual material\nwith predecisional discussions.   Watkins v. McCarthy,  2012 IL App (1st)  100632, ¶  36 (quoting\nEnviro Tech International,  Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 371 F.3d 370, \n\nis \" inextricably intertwined\" \n\nBureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau ( March 5, 2024),  at [ 1]. \n\n6Letter from Mary Ann Williamson,  Lockport Township Assessor,  to Laura S. Harter,  Deputy\n\n75 ILCS 140/7(1)( f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 4\n\n374- 75 (7th Cir. 2004)).   For example,  factual material may be exempt \" if the 'manner of\nselecting or presenting those facts would reveal the deliberative process,'\"  or if the factual\nmaterials \"' reflect an agency' s preliminary positions or ruminations about how to exercise\ndiscretion on some policy matter[.]'\"   Hamilton Securities Group Inc. v. Department of Housing\nand Urban Development,  106 F. Supp.  2d 23, 33 ( D.D.C. 2000) ( internal citations omitted).   \n\nIn Chicago Tribune v. Cook Cty. Assessor' s Office, 2018 IL App (1st)  170455, ¶ \n18, the Illinois Appellate Court analyzed whether a request for certain spreadsheets and reports\npertaining to the valuation of properties in Cook County from the 2002 to 2015 tax years fell\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(f).  The Illinois Appellate Court held that the request sought the\ndisclosure of final documents and that the valuation data contained in the documents \" are\nobviously finalized,  are not changing,  and cannot possibly be described as preliminary.\"  \nChicago Tribune, 2018 IL App (1st)  170455, ¶  27.  The court further explained: \n\nJust because adjustments are made to the property value\nassessments along the way does not mean that the information\nmust fall within the exemption.  Even if analysts make adjustments\nas the process continues,  the data is the data.  There is nothing in\nthe record here that discloses the Assessor' s Office' s internal\nevaluations.  The Tribune is not seeking the regression analysis' s\nalgorithmic code nor is it seeking the divulgement of how and why\nthe analysts make the predecisions that they make— it just seeks\nthe results of that process.  ( Emphasis in original.)   Chicago\nTribune, 2018 IL App ( 1st)  170455, ¶  30. \n\nIn addition,  the court stated that \" all of the data at issue can be characterized as factual.  Even\nwhen the Assessor' s Office conducts its analysis and makes adjustments to property values based\non the objective factual data,  the ultimate result of that analysis produces another numerical\nfact— the property' s taxable new market value.\"   Chicago Tribune, 2018 IL App (1st)  170455, ¶ \n32.  Further,  this office has previously concluded that a public body' s property sales ratios were\nstatistical data that do not reveal the actual methodology used or regression analysis performed\nby the public body.  \" Rather,  the sales ratios reflect numerical data generated from calculations.  \nData resulting from such calculations are facts.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 54793, \nissued June 19, 2018,  at 5. \n\nThe records the Assessor' s Office withheld in response to\n25, 2024,  FOIA request include a sales ratio report,  one page of which has a handwritten\ncalculation,  and \" assessment comments\"  that appear to be screenshots of entries concerning\n\nJanuary\n\nproperty made in the Visual PAMSPro database.   The Assessor' s Office did not explain\n\nhow the withheld materials are used in its assessment process,  nor did it explain how disclosure\nof the withheld materials could potentially reveal the give-and- take of its deliberations or the\n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 5\n\nsignificance of any of the numerical data in the formulation of its actions.   As noted above,  this\noffice has previously determined that sales ratio statistics are not exempt from disclosure\npursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.  The \" assessment comments\"  the Assessor' s Office withheld\nappear to be the equivalent of an audit trail of factors applied to the property record.   The\nAssessor' s Office has not explained the significance of the entries and it is not apparent to this\noffice how disclosure of the entries would \" expose an agency' s decision- making process in such\na way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency' s\nability to perform its functions.'\"  Chemical Weapons Working Group v. United States\nEnvironmental Protection Agency,  185 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir 1999) ( citing Dudman\nCommunications v. Department of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565,  1568 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)).  Rather, \nthe entries appear to be factual in that they reflect the application of certain factors to the\nproperty' s assessment. \n\nBy contrast,  the handwritten calculation reflects a preliminary step in the process\nof determining the final assessment.   This office concludes that the Assessor' s Office may redact\nthe handwritten calculation pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA, but requests that it disclose the\nremaining portions of the sales ratio report and assessment comments responsive to\nJanuary 25, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nVisual PAMSPro Records\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \" public records,\"  which are records \" having\nbeen prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession of, or\nunder the control of any public body.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) (West 2023 Supp.).  \" In this expansive\ndefinition of 'public records,'  the legislature recognizes that information or documentation may\nbe stored in myriad media,  some physical and some not. Illinois case law has long held that\nelectronic records may be public records subject to FOIA.\"   Hites v. Waubonsee Community\nCollege,  2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶  57.  A public body must perform a reasonable search for\nresponsive records under the circumstances of each request.   Better Government Ass'n v. City of\nChicago,  2020 IL App (1st)  190038, ¶  31.  However, \"[ a]  requester is entitled only to records\nthat an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\"   Yeager v. Drug Enforcement\nAdministration,  678 F.2d 315, 321 ( D.C. Cir. 1982).   \n\nIn Hites, the Illinois Appellate Court analyzed a series of requests for information\ncontained in multiple databases.   The Hites court distinguished requests for raw data maintained\nin a public body' s databases from requests seeking information about the data, which would\nrequire the creation of new records.   The court analogized a database to a file cabinet and stated\nthat \" the data that populates the database is like the files.  FOIA permits a proper request for a\nsingle file, some of the files, or all of the files.\"   Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶  71.  The\ncourt held that compiling raw data already maintained in databases and available through\ncomputerized searches of the public body' s databases did not involve the creation of new records, \n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 6\n\neven if the public body had to create and apply computer programming or coding to retrieve the\ninformation.   Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶¶  75-81.   \n\nWhile raw data that were previously compiled and available through\n\ncomputerized searches of a database are subject to disclosure, \" FOIA was not designed to\ncompel the compilation of data not ordinarily kept by the public body.\"   Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) \n150836, ¶¶  75-80 (public body not obligated under FOIA to provide a listing of search results or\nto create records reflecting totals that had not been previously compiled from its data);  see also\nChicago Tribune Co. v. Dep't of Financial &  Professional Regulation,  2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, ¶  37 (State agency not required to respond to a request seeking the number of claims\nagainst certain doctors by calculating the number and creating a new record).    \n\nAs quoted above,  in her February 1, 2024,  FOIA request, \n\nsought for\n\nher property:  ( 1) The Visual PAMSPro Audit Trail Report; ( 2) the Visual PAMSPro \" hot sheet;\" \n3) \" any comparables reports run or created[;]\" ( 4) the Property Record Card from the Visual\nPAMSPro software; ( 5) \"[ a] ny reports on the Land Valuation method utilized to calculate the\nquadrennial assessment[;]\" ( 6) \"[ a] ny data or information stored in the VisualPAMSPro software\nbut not able to have a report generated,  referencing the land valuation method[;]\"  and ( 7) \"[ t]he\nland valuation analysis utilized to produce the increases in the assessed value of PIN 11-04-26-\n400- 004-0000 as far back as the VisualPAMSPro software records.\" 8 The Assessor' s Office\nwith records responsive to item ( 4) of her request. \nprovided\n\nIn its response to this office, the Assessor' s Office stated that the document\n\nresponsive to item ( 1), the \" Audit Trail Report[,]  is a feature of the CAMA system VisualPAMS\nPro that I do not use in my office. * * *  It was my opinion that because that report did not\nalready exist in my records that I was not required to create that report.\" 9 The Assessor' s Office\nmaintained that it did not possess a record responsive to item ( 3), stating that it has not run or\ncreated a Comparables report for\nresponsive to items ( 5), ( 6), and ( 7) of\npertaining to land valuation as land value is site assessed.\" 10 In a March 7, 2025,  telephone call\nwith an Assistant Attorney General in this office, George Mueller,  the attorney for the Assessor' s\nOffice,  further explained that the Assessor does not prepare Comparables reports or use the\nLand Valuation Method\"  referenced in the Visual PAMSPro software marketing materials.   Mr. \n\nproperty.   It also stated that there are no records\n\nFOIA request because \" there is no report\n\n8Freedom of Information Act Request from\n\nto Lockport Township Government\n\nFebruary 1, 2024). \n\nBureau Chief, Public Access Bureau ( March 5, 2024),  at [ 1]. \n\n9Letter from Mary Ann Williamson,  Lockport Township Assessor,  to Laura S. Harter,  Deputy\n\nBureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau ( March 5, 2024),  at [ 2]. \n\n10Letter from Mary Ann Williamson,  Lockport Township Assessor,  to Laura S. Harter,  Deputy\n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 7\n\nMueller clarified for this office that the Assessor goes in person to do on-site land valuations and\ndoes not rely on the Visual PAMSPro software to reach her conclusions. \n\nThe Assessor' s Office provided this office with copies of the Audit Trail Report\nrequest.   The Visual PAMSPro website explains that\n\nand Hot Sheet responsive to\nthe Audit Trail \" details all changes made manually by end- users or through global utilities in the\nprogram.  The system automatically tracks changes down to the field level so that you can\nmonitor work- flow and productivity.\" 11 The Audit Trail can be accessed \" using predefined\nreports,  Scratch Pad Queries,  or even create your own custom reports.\" 12 The website also\nexplained that the \" Hot Sheet\"  feature in the database allows users \" to view parcel- related\ninformation in an abbreviated format;  like a mini Visual PAMSPro™.  The Hot Sheet displays\nkey information for a given parcel that you select related to Property,  Buildings,  Sales,  Permits, \nand Assessments.\" 13 Users can \" access a parcel' s Hot Sheet from any of the Property Record\nscreens while either viewing or editing.  The Hot Sheet will display information related to the\nparcel that you are currently viewing.\" 14\n\nBased on the descriptions above and this office' s review of the responsive records, \n\nto provide the Audit Trail and Hot Sheet,  the Assessor' s Office could run simple queries of the\nspecified property to extract existing data on the property.   As explained in Hites, running reports\nof data that exist in the database,  even if such a report has not been run before,  does not create\nnew records.   It is merely a reflection of records in the Assessor' s Office' s possession. \n\nBy contrast,  the Comparables report and Land Valuation reports\n\nrequested would require the Assessor' s Office to do more than query the database using the\nproperty identifier.   The Visual PAMSPro website describes its \" Comparables\"  feature as\nfollows: \n\nThe Visual PAMSPro& trade Comparables feature allows\nyou to assign and view Comparable properties.  You can view the\nSubject and its Comparables in a spreadsheet\nformat so that you\ncan compare features and other information -  Sales,  Assessments, \n\nhttp:// www. visualpamspro. com/ AuditTrail ( last visited March 25, 2025). \n\n11Visual PAMS Pro,  Property Assessment Management System,  Audit Trail, \n\nhttp:// www.visualpamspro. com/AuditTrail ( last visited March 25, 2025). \n\n12Visual PAMS Pro,  Property Assessment Management System,  Audit Trail, \n\nhttp:// www.visualpamspro. com/HotSheets ( last visited March 25, 2025). \n\n13Visual PAMS Pro,  Property Assessment Management System,  Hot Sheets, \n\nhttp:// www. visualpamspro. com/ HotSheets ( last visited March 25, 2025). \n\n14Visual PAMS Pro,  Property Assessment Management System,  Hot Sheets, \n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 8\n\netc. You can even view the Photos side- by-side.  You can assign\nyour own Assessor Comparables,  as well as Taxpayer\nComparables.  Print out reports on both to easily show how the\nComparables stack up. There are many reports available.  Print\nthem from our Reports feature or right from the Comparables\nscreen.  You can even use our Comparable Reports at the Board of\nReview. \n\nWith our easy- to-use Comparables feature,  you can set up\n\nyour own criteria to search for Comparables.  You decide what\nfeatures are important for you when assigning the Comparables.[ 15] \n\nRather than merely entering an objective query to extract data,  to run a Comparables report for\n\nthe Assessor' s Office would have to use its judgment to assign comparable\n\nproperties based on unspecified subjective criteria.   The Assessor' s Office has stated that it has\nnot run a Comparables report in the Visual PAMSPro database for\nTherefore,  generating a Comparables report for\na new record.   Although a public body may choose to create a record that it is capable of\ngenerating,  FOIA does not require it to do so.  Hites,  2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶  79; Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 78983,  issued May 30, 2024,  at 7. \n\nproperty constitutes the creation of\n\nproperty.  \n\nThe request also sought information in the database concerning the method and\n\nanalysis for land valuation.   The Visual PAMSPro website describes the Land Valuation feature\nas follows: \n\nVisual PAMSPro™  provides many methods of land\nvaluation so that you can value land accurately and uniformly.  You\ncan value land using the Square Foot/ Acres Method,  Site Method, \nFront Foot Method,  Base Lot Method,  and Multi- Value Land\nMethod.  The Multi- Value Land allows you to value land in smaller\ncomponents,  each with its own valuation method.  You can use one\nor more of these methods to value land for a parcel,  providing you\nwith ultimate flexibility.[ 16] \n\nAlthough the database offers a variety of land valuation methods,  the Assessor' s Office does not\nuse the database for its land valuation.   FOIA does not require the Assessor' s Office to adopt one\n\nhttp:// www.visualpamspro. com/Comparables ( last visited March 25, 2025). \n\n15Visual PAMS Pro,  Property Assessment Management System,  Comparables, \n\nhttp:// www. visualpamspro. com/ LandValuation ( last visited March 25, 2025). \n\n16Visual PAMS Pro,  Property Assessment Management System,  Land Valuation, \n\n\fThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 9\n\nof the land valuation methods offered by Visual PAMSPro and generate the requested reports in\nresponse to a FOIA request.  \n\nAccordingly,  this office requests that the Assessor' s Office provide\nwith copies of the responsive Audit Trail and Hot Sheet for her property,  but it does not need to\ncreate a Comparables report or any of the Land Valuation reports requested. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of these matters does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\nlaura.harter@ilag. gov.  This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau,  Springfield\n\n80093 f 71f proper improper twp\n80094 f 3a search proper improper twp\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Property assessment documentation and calculations","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":"A resident made two FOIA requests to the Lockport Township Assessor's Office for property assessment records and calculation data. The office denied the requests, claiming some records were 'work product' and that it did not use certain software features. The Public Access Bureau (PAC) concluded that the office improperly withheld a sales ratio report and assessment comments from the January 25 request, except for a handwritten calculation that could be redacted under the deliberative-process exemption. The source document does not state any determination regarding the February 1 request for Visual PAMSPro reports, as the text is cut off before a conclusion is reached.","human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80093/","full_text":"March 26, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Mary Ann Williamson\nAssessor\nLockport Township\n1463 South Farrell Road\nLockport, Illinois 60441\nmaryann@lockporttownship. com\n\nRE: FOIA Requests for Review: 2024 PAC 80093; 2024 PAC 80094\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Williamson: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Lockport Township Assessor's Office (Assessor's\nOffice) improperly responded to certain portions of\nFebruary 1, 2024, FOIA requests. \n\nJanuary 25, 2024, and\n\nOn January 25, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Assessor's\n\nOffice seeking \" all the records (math calc, sales records, sales ratio study for our street) that were\nused to reach a conc that raised our quad assessment 15%[.] * * * Please enclose all math used to\n\nreach this number.\" 1 On January 30, 2024, the Assessor's Office denied\nmath calculations,\" asserting that they are \" work product.\" 2\n\nrequest for\n\nOn February 1, 2024, \n\nsubmitted another FOIA request to the\n\nAssessor's Office. She sought, for the specific PIN associated with her home address: (1) The\nVisual PAMSPro (a professional assessment management system tool) Audit Trail Report; (2) \nthe Visual PAMSPro \" hot sheet;\" (3) \" any comparables reports run or created[;]\" (4) the Property\nRecord Card from the Visual PAMSPro software; (5) \"[ a] ny reports on the Land Valuation\nmethod utilized to calculate the quadrennial assessment[;]\" (6) \"[ a] ny data or information stored\nin the VisualPAMSPro software but not able to have a report generated, referencing the land\nvaluation method[;]\" and (7) \"[ t]he land valuation analysis utilized to produce the increases in\nthe assessed value of PIN 11-04-26-400- 004- 0000 as far back as the VisualPAMSPro software\nrecords.\" 3 On February 7, 2024, the Assessor's Office provided\nwith a copy of her\ncurrent property record card and the previous record card from the archives. It denied her\nrequest for the specified Visual PAMSPro reports, stating \"[ t]he items you are requesting are\npossible features of the PAMS Pro system which are not utilized within this office. The\nFreedom of Information Act does not require that I create records or reports for a request.\" 4 The\nAssessor's Office also provided an explanation of the land valuation of\n\nproperty. \n\nOn February 27, 2024, this office received the materials necessary to complete\nRequests for Review challenging the Assessor's Office's responses. In particular, \n\nshe challenged the denial of her requests for the responsive math calculations and the reports\nrequested from the Visual PAMSPro software. \n\nOn February 27, 2024, this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to the\nAssessor's Office and asked it to provide the Public Access Bureau with copies of the records\nwithheld as \" math calculations\" for our confidential review along with a detailed legal and\nfactual explanation for the Assessor's Office's assertion that the records are exempt from\ndisclosure. This office asked the Assessor's Office to specify the exemptions in section 7 and/ or\n7.5 of FOIA that apply to the withheld records. 5 This office also requested that the Assessor's\n\n1 Freedom of Information Act Request from\n\nJanuary 25, 2024). \n\n2 Letter from Mary Ann Williamson, Assessor, Lockport, Illinois, to [\n\nJanuary 30, \n\n2024). The Assessor's Office's January 30, 2024, letter also addressed\nThat request is not at issue in this matter. \n\nJanuary 26, 2024, FOIA request. \n\n3 Freedom of Information Act Request from\n\nto Lockport Township Government\n\nOffice describe its efforts to determine whether it possesses the capability to run the requested\nreports in the Visual PAMSPro software. On March 5, 2024, the Assessor's Office provided the\nwithheld records and a written answer. On March 7, 2024, this office forwarded the written\nanswer to\n\non March 10, 2024, she replied. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nMath Calculations\n\nIn its response to this office, the Assessor's Office stated that it denied the records\nshowing the responsive math calculations because they reflected the Assessor's \" work product or\nwork notes which [ the Assessor's Office] understood to be outside the parameters of\" FOIA. 6\nDespite this office's request that the Assessor's Office provide a citation to a specific exemption\nthat applies to the withheld records, it did not do so. This office construes the Assessor's Office's\ncontention as asserting section 7(1)(f) of FOIA, 7 which exempts from inspection and copying\n\np] reliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions\n\nare expressed, or policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant\nportion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the\nhead of the public body.\" The section 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency\npredecisional and deliberative material.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247\n2003). Section 7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank\nand open discussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood, 344\nIll. App. 3d at 248. Further, a public body that asserts the deliberative process exemption \" has\nthe burden of establishing what deliberative process is involved, and the role played by the\ndocuments in issue in the course of that process.\" Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of\nEnergy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir 1980). \n\nThe Illinois Appellate Court has stated that \" purely factual material\" is not exempt\n\nfrom disclosure under section 7(1)(f) unless the factual material\nwith predecisional discussions. Watkins v. McCarthy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, ¶ 36 (quoting\nEnviro Tech International, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 371 F.3d 370, \n\n374- 75 (7th Cir. 2004)). For example, factual material may be exempt \" if the 'manner of\nselecting or presenting those facts would reveal the deliberative process,'\" or if the factual\nmaterials \"' reflect an agency's preliminary positions or ruminations about how to exercise\ndiscretion on some policy matter[.]'\" Hamilton Securities Group Inc. v. Department of Housing\nand Urban Development, 106 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D.D.C. 2000) (internal citations omitted). \n\nIn Chicago Tribune v. Cook Cty. Assessor's Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455, ¶ \n18, the Illinois Appellate Court analyzed whether a request for certain spreadsheets and reports\npertaining to the valuation of properties in Cook County from the 2002 to 2015 tax years fell\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(f). The Illinois Appellate Court held that the request sought the\ndisclosure of final documents and that the valuation data contained in the documents \" are\nobviously finalized, are not changing, and cannot possibly be described as preliminary.\" \nChicago Tribune, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455, ¶ 27. The court further explained: \n\nJust because adjustments are made to the property value\nassessments along the way does not mean that the information\nmust fall within the exemption. Even if analysts make adjustments\nas the process continues, the data is the data. There is nothing in\nthe record here that discloses the Assessor's Office's internal\nevaluations. The Tribune is not seeking the regression analysis's\nalgorithmic code nor is it seeking the divulgement of how and why\nthe analysts make the predecisions that they make— it just seeks\nthe results of that process. (Emphasis in original.) Chicago\nTribune, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455, ¶ 30. \n\nIn addition, the court stated that \" all of the data at issue can be characterized as factual. Even\nwhen the Assessor's Office conducts its analysis and makes adjustments to property values based\non the objective factual data, the ultimate result of that analysis produces another numerical\nfact— the property's taxable new market value.\" Chicago Tribune, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455, ¶ \n32. Further, this office has previously concluded that a public body's property sales ratios were\nstatistical data that do not reveal the actual methodology used or regression analysis performed\nby the public body. \" Rather, the sales ratios reflect numerical data generated from calculations. \nData resulting from such calculations are facts.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 54793, \nissued June 19, 2018, at 5. \n\nThe records the Assessor's Office withheld in response to\n25, 2024, FOIA request include a sales ratio report, one page of which has a handwritten\ncalculation, and \" assessment comments\" that appear to be screenshots of entries concerning\n\nJanuary\n\nproperty made in the Visual PAMSPro database. The Assessor's Office did not explain\n\nhow the withheld materials are used in its assessment process, nor did it explain how disclosure\nof the withheld materials could potentially reveal the give-and- take of its deliberations or the\n\nsignificance of any of the numerical data in the formulation of its actions. As noted above, this\noffice has previously determined that sales ratio statistics are not exempt from disclosure\npursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. The \" assessment comments\" the Assessor's Office withheld\nappear to be the equivalent of an audit trail of factors applied to the property record. The\nAssessor's Office has not explained the significance of the entries and it is not apparent to this\noffice how disclosure of the entries would \" expose an agency's decision- making process in such\na way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency's\nability to perform its functions.'\" Chemical Weapons Working Group v. United States\nEnvironmental Protection Agency, 185 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir 1999) (citing Dudman\nCommunications v. Department of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Rather, \nthe entries appear to be factual in that they reflect the application of certain factors to the\nproperty's assessment. \n\nBy contrast, the handwritten calculation reflects a preliminary step in the process\nof determining the final assessment. This office concludes that the Assessor's Office may redact\nthe handwritten calculation pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA, but requests that it disclose the\nremaining portions of the sales ratio report and assessment comments responsive to\nJanuary 25, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nVisual PAMSPro Records\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \" public records,\" which are records \" having\nbeen prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession of, or\nunder the control of any public body.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \" In this expansive\ndefinition of 'public records,' the legislature recognizes that information or documentation may\nbe stored in myriad media, some physical and some not. Illinois case law has long held that\nelectronic records may be public records subject to FOIA.\" Hites v. Waubonsee Community\nCollege, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶ 57. A public body must perform a reasonable search for\nresponsive records under the circumstances of each request. Better Government Ass'n v. City of\nChicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. However, \"[ a] requester is entitled only to records\nthat an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug Enforcement\nAdministration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982). \n\nIn Hites, the Illinois Appellate Court analyzed a series of requests for information\ncontained in multiple databases. The Hites court distinguished requests for raw data maintained\nin a public body's databases from requests seeking information about the data, which would\nrequire the creation of new records. The court analogized a database to a file cabinet and stated\nthat \" the data that populates the database is like the files. FOIA permits a proper request for a\nsingle file, some of the files, or all of the files.\" Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶ 71. The\ncourt held that compiling raw data already maintained in databases and available through\ncomputerized searches of the public body's databases did not involve the creation of new records, \n\neven if the public body had to create and apply computer programming or coding to retrieve the\ninformation. Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶¶ 75-81. \n\nWhile raw data that were previously compiled and available through\n\ncomputerized searches of a database are subject to disclosure, \" FOIA was not designed to\ncompel the compilation of data not ordinarily kept by the public body.\" Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) \n150836, ¶¶ 75-80 (public body not obligated under FOIA to provide a listing of search results or\nto create records reflecting totals that had not been previously compiled from its data); see also\nChicago Tribune Co. v. Dep't of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, ¶ 37 (State agency not required to respond to a request seeking the number of claims\nagainst certain doctors by calculating the number and creating a new record). \n\nAs quoted above, in her February 1, 2024, FOIA request, \n\nsought for\n\nher property: (1) The Visual PAMSPro Audit Trail Report; (2) the Visual PAMSPro \" hot sheet;\" \n3) \" any comparables reports run or created[;]\" (4) the Property Record Card from the Visual\nPAMSPro software; (5) \"[ a] ny reports on the Land Valuation method utilized to calculate the\nquadrennial assessment[;]\" (6) \"[ a] ny data or information stored in the VisualPAMSPro software\nbut not able to have a report generated, referencing the land valuation method[;]\" and (7) \"[ t]he\nland valuation analysis utilized to produce the increases in the assessed value of PIN 11-04-26-\n400- 004-0000 as far back as the VisualPAMSPro software records.\" 8 The Assessor's Office\nwith records responsive to item (4) of her request. \nprovided\n\nIn its response to this office, the Assessor's Office stated that the document\n\nresponsive to item (1), the \" Audit Trail Report[,] is a feature of the CAMA system VisualPAMS\nPro that I do not use in my office. * * * It was my opinion that because that report did not\nalready exist in my records that I was not required to create that report.\" 9 The Assessor's Office\nmaintained that it did not possess a record responsive to item (3), stating that it has not run or\ncreated a Comparables report for\nresponsive to items (5), (6), and (7) of\npertaining to land valuation as land value is site assessed.\" 10 In a March 7, 2025, telephone call\nwith an Assistant Attorney General in this office, George Mueller, the attorney for the Assessor's\nOffice, further explained that the Assessor does not prepare Comparables reports or use the\nLand Valuation Method\" referenced in the Visual PAMSPro software marketing materials. Mr. \n\nproperty. It also stated that there are no records\n\nFOIA request because \" there is no report\n\n8 Freedom of Information Act Request from\n\nto Lockport Township Government\n\nMueller clarified for this office that the Assessor goes in person to do on-site land valuations and\ndoes not rely on the Visual PAMSPro software to reach her conclusions. \n\nThe Assessor's Office provided this office with copies of the Audit Trail Report\nrequest. The Visual PAMSPro website explains that\n\nand Hot Sheet responsive to\nthe Audit Trail \" details all changes made manually by end- users or through global utilities in the\nprogram. The system automatically tracks changes down to the field level so that you can\nmonitor work- flow and productivity.\" 11 The Audit Trail can be accessed \" using predefined\nreports, Scratch Pad Queries, or even create your own custom reports.\" 12 The website also\nexplained that the \" Hot Sheet\" feature in the database allows users \" to view parcel- related\ninformation in an abbreviated format; like a mini Visual PAMSPro™. The Hot Sheet displays\nkey information for a given parcel that you select related to Property, Buildings, Sales, Permits, \nand Assessments.\" 13 Users can \" access a parcel's Hot Sheet from any of the Property Record\nscreens while either viewing or editing. The Hot Sheet will display information related to the\nparcel that you are currently viewing.\" 14\n\nBased on the descriptions above and this office's review of the responsive records, \n\nto provide the Audit Trail and Hot Sheet, the Assessor's Office could run simple queries of the\nspecified property to extract existing data on the property. As explained in Hites, running reports\nof data that exist in the database, even if such a report has not been run before, does not create\nnew records. It is merely a reflection of records in the Assessor's Office's possession. \n\nBy contrast, the Comparables report and Land Valuation reports\n\nrequested would require the Assessor's Office to do more than query the database using the\nproperty identifier. The Visual PAMSPro website describes its \" Comparables\" feature as\nfollows: \n\nThe Visual PAMSPro& trade Comparables feature allows\nyou to assign and view Comparable properties. You can view the\nSubject and its Comparables in a spreadsheet\nformat so that you\ncan compare features and other information - Sales, Assessments, \n\nhttp:// www. visualpamspro. com/ AuditTrail (last visited March 25, 2025). \n\n11 Visual PAMS Pro, Property Assessment Management System, Audit Trail, \n\nhttp:// www.visualpamspro. com/AuditTrail (last visited March 25, 2025). \n\netc. You can even view the Photos side- by-side. You can assign\nyour own Assessor Comparables, as well as Taxpayer\nComparables. Print out reports on both to easily show how the\nComparables stack up. There are many reports available. Print\nthem from our Reports feature or right from the Comparables\nscreen. You can even use our Comparable Reports at the Board of\nReview. \n\nWith our easy- to-use Comparables feature, you can set up\n\nyour own criteria to search for Comparables. You decide what\nfeatures are important for you when assigning the Comparables.[ 15] \n\nRather than merely entering an objective query to extract data, to run a Comparables report for\n\nthe Assessor's Office would have to use its judgment to assign comparable\n\nproperties based on unspecified subjective criteria. The Assessor's Office has stated that it has\nnot run a Comparables report in the Visual PAMSPro database for\nTherefore, generating a Comparables report for\na new record. Although a public body may choose to create a record that it is capable of\ngenerating, FOIA does not require it to do so. Hites, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836, ¶ 79; Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 78983, issued May 30, 2024, at 7. \n\nproperty constitutes the creation of\n\nproperty. \n\nThe request also sought information in the database concerning the method and\n\nanalysis for land valuation. The Visual PAMSPro website describes the Land Valuation feature\nas follows: \n\nVisual PAMSPro™ provides many methods of land\nvaluation so that you can value land accurately and uniformly. You\ncan value land using the Square Foot/ Acres Method, Site Method, \nFront Foot Method, Base Lot Method, and Multi- Value Land\nMethod. The Multi- Value Land allows you to value land in smaller\ncomponents, each with its own valuation method. You can use one\nor more of these methods to value land for a parcel, providing you\nwith ultimate flexibility.[ 16] \n\nAlthough the database offers a variety of land valuation methods, the Assessor's Office does not\nuse the database for its land valuation. FOIA does not require the Assessor's Office to adopt one\n\nof the land valuation methods offered by Visual PAMSPro and generate the requested reports in\nresponse to a FOIA request. \n\nAccordingly, this office requests that the Assessor's Office provide\nwith copies of the responsive Audit Trail and Hot Sheet for her property, but it does not need to\ncreate a Comparables report or any of the Land Valuation reports requested. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of these matters does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nlaura.harter@ilag. gov. This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau, Springfield\n\n80093 f 71f proper improper twp\n80094 f 3a search proper improper twp"}
{"id":1043,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-08-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80130"],"title":"PAC finds no further action warranted on CTA's withholding of platform video under security exemption 7(1)(v)","filename":"80130, issued August 15, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1096,"summary":"The requester sought video footage of a 2018 incident at the Fullerton 'L' platform, which the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) denied under FOIA section 7(1)(v). The PAC concluded that no further action is warranted because the CTA's assertion that the footage could jeopardize security measures is a permissible exercise of its discretion under the exemption.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) for video footage of a fatal incident at a train station. The CTA refused to release the video, arguing that it could reveal sensitive security information. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and decided not to take further action, noting that the law allows agencies to withhold records that could compromise security measures.","holding":"The PAC determined that no further action is warranted regarding the CTA's denial of video footage under the security measures exemption.","legal_question":"Whether the Chicago Transit Authority properly invoked section 7(1)(v) of FOIA to withhold video footage of a train platform incident on the grounds that it would jeopardize security measures.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(v)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(v)"],"public_body":"Chicago Transit Authority","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"security measures","subject_description":"The request involved video footage of a 2018 incident where an individual fell onto the train tracks at the Fullerton 'L' platform.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_v/80130%2C%20issued%20August%2015%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["video footage","security measures","CTA","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"August 15, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs.  Ashley P.  Neuhauser\nSenior FOIA, Compliance, &  Appeals Attorney\nChicago Transit Authority\nLaw Department\n567 West Lake Street\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nFOIA@transitchicago. com\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 80130\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Neuhauser: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA).1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn October 6, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nChicago Transit Authority (CTA) seeking reports regarding and the video footage from the\nFullerton \" L\" platform of an August 21, 2018,  incident when his brother allegedly fell onto the\ntracks and subsequently died of his injuries.  On December 15, 2023, the CTA provided\nresponsive records with redactions but denied the portion of his FOIA request seeking video\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fMs. Ashley P. Neuhauser\nAugust 15, 2024\nPage 2\n\nfootage from the Fullerton \"L\" platform pursuant to section 7(1)(v) of FOIA.2 On February 13, \nsubmitted this Request for Review disputing the denial of the platform video\n2024, \nfootage. \n\nIn an effort to resolve this matter, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\nand an attorney for the CTA to ascertain if viewing the\n\nAccess Bureau spoke to\nvideo footage at CTA offices would be a workable solution.  While\nto this solution,  CTA declined,  asserting that the video footage was exempt from release pursuant\nto section the 7(1)(v) of FOIA because it could jeopardize its security measures as explained in\nits response to\n\nSection 7(1)( v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nwas amenable\n\nVulnerability assessments,  security measures,  and response\npolicies or plans that are designed to identify, prevent, or respond\nto potential attacks upon a community' s population or systems, \nfacilities, or installations, the destruction or contamination of\nwhich would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or\nsafety of the community, but only to the extent that disclosure\ncould reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the\nmeasures or the safety of the personnel who implement them or the\npublic.   Information exempt under this item may include such\nthings as details pertaining to the mobilization or deployment of\npersonnel or equipment,  to the operation of communication\nsystems or protocols, or to tactical operations. \n\nIn Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, \n48 - 51,  after the CTA showed that surveillance cameras were installed at its rail stations after\n\ninfrastructure,  the Illinois Appellate\n\nthe September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with funds from a U.S. Department of Homeland\nSecurity program designed to protect the public and critical\nCourt held that CTA platform footage was exempt under section 7(1)(v) of FOIA.   In\nconcluding that the footage was exempt from disclosure,  the court observed that section 7(1)( v) \nis worded broadly and requires a government agency to demonstrate that release of a document\ncould reasonably be expected to' jeopardize the effectiveness of its security measures— not that\nit would jeopardize them.\"  ( Emphasis in original.)  Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL App (1st) \n192028, ¶¶  43- 45 ( explaining that \" all that the CTA had to show was that it reasonably estimated\nthat making this information public could risk making its security measures less effective.\").  In\naccordance with Chicago Sun- Times,  the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that\nrelease of other platform footage could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of\nCTA' s security system by revealing the capabilities and limitations of the cameras in the stations, \n\neffective July 1, 2024). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(v) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, \n\n\fMs. Ashley P. Neuhauser\nAugust 15, 2024\nPage 3\n\nincluding the cameras' potential blind spots.  See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 70876, \nissued April 21, 2022 ( concluding that video footage of train platform constituted a \" security\nmeasure\"  within the scope of section 7(1)(v)). \n\nIn its response to\n\nCTA explained: \n\nCTA's rail station cameras serve as a security measure designed to\nidentify and respond to potential attacks on CTA' s rail system,  or\nto identify other dangerous activity occurring in CTA's rail service\narea.   The disclosure of this video footage would reveal the\nposition of cameras installed in CTA's train station, the capabilities\nof the cameras,  the area captured by the cameras and areas where\nthe view of the cameras cannot reach.[3]   \n\nAlthough, showing this video footage to\npossibility of jeopardizing its security measures because it could not be reviewed multiple times, \nCTA has shown that disclosure of the responsive footage could reasonably be expected to make\nits security measures less effective whether providing a copy of the video or by having a viewing\nin its office.  As discussed above, the Illinois Appellate Court has held that CTA platform\nfootage is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)( v) of FOIA.   Accordingly,  this office\nwill take no further action in this matter.   \n\nin its office would appear to lessen the\n\nHowever, this office notes that a public body may elect to redact or withhold\n\nexempt information under 7(1)( v), but FOIA does not require it do so. 4 In light of the specific\ncircumstances in this matter, CTA may wish to work with\nto explore whether it\nmay be feasible for him to view at least a portion of the video in CTA' s office.  \n\n3Letter from Ashley P. Neuhauser, Senior FOIA, Compliance, &  Appeals Attorney, CTA to\n\nDecember 15, 2023).   \n\n4See,  e.g., Roehrborn v. Lambert, 277 Ill. App. 3d 181, 186 (1995) (\" The purpose of the Act is to\n\nensure disclosure of information, not to protect information from disclosure. * * *  The exemptions cannot be read to\nprohibit dissemination of such information, but rather are simply cases where disclosure is not required.\").  \nCrumpton v. Stone, 59 F.3d 1400, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (FOIA allows an agency to withhold certain information\nbut it does not limit an agency's discretion to disclose information as the exemptions are permissive rather than\nmandatory);  People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997) (legislature's use of the word \"may\"  generally indicates a\npermissive or directory reading, rather than a mandatory one).   \n\n\fMs. Ashley P. Neuhauser\nAugust 15, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at 312-814-5201, \n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov,  or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80130 f no fi war mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Train platform video of a fall onto the tracks","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80130/","full_text":"August 15, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Ashley P. Neuhauser\nSenior FOIA, Compliance, & Appeals Attorney\nChicago Transit Authority\nLaw Department\n567 West Lake Street\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nFOIA@transitchicago. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80130\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Neuhauser: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA).1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn October 6, 2023, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nChicago Transit Authority (CTA) seeking reports regarding and the video footage from the\nFullerton \" L\" platform of an August 21, 2018, incident when his brother allegedly fell onto the\ntracks and subsequently died of his injuries. On December 15, 2023, the CTA provided\nresponsive records with redactions but denied the portion of his FOIA request seeking video\n\nfootage from the Fullerton \"L\" platform pursuant to section 7(1)(v) of FOIA.2 On February 13, \nsubmitted this Request for Review disputing the denial of the platform video\n2024, \nfootage. \n\nIn an effort to resolve this matter, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\nand an attorney for the CTA to ascertain if viewing the\n\nAccess Bureau spoke to\nvideo footage at CTA offices would be a workable solution. While\nto this solution, CTA declined, asserting that the video footage was exempt from release pursuant\nto section the 7(1)(v) of FOIA because it could jeopardize its security measures as explained in\nits response to\n\nSection 7(1)(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nwas amenable\n\nVulnerability assessments, security measures, and response\npolicies or plans that are designed to identify, prevent, or respond\nto potential attacks upon a community's population or systems, \nfacilities, or installations, the destruction or contamination of\nwhich would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or\nsafety of the community, but only to the extent that disclosure\ncould reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the\nmeasures or the safety of the personnel who implement them or the\npublic. Information exempt under this item may include such\nthings as details pertaining to the mobilization or deployment of\npersonnel or equipment, to the operation of communication\nsystems or protocols, or to tactical operations. \n\nIn Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, \n48 - 51, after the CTA showed that surveillance cameras were installed at its rail stations after\n\ninfrastructure, the Illinois Appellate\n\nthe September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with funds from a U.S. Department of Homeland\nSecurity program designed to protect the public and critical\nCourt held that CTA platform footage was exempt under section 7(1)(v) of FOIA. In\nconcluding that the footage was exempt from disclosure, the court observed that section 7(1)(v) \nis worded broadly and requires a government agency to demonstrate that release of a document\ncould reasonably be expected to' jeopardize the effectiveness of its security measures— not that\nit would jeopardize them.\" (Emphasis in original.) Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL App (1st) \n192028, ¶¶ 43- 45 (explaining that \" all that the CTA had to show was that it reasonably estimated\nthat making this information public could risk making its security measures less effective.\"). In\naccordance with Chicago Sun- Times, the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that\nrelease of other platform footage could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of\nCTA's security system by revealing the capabilities and limitations of the cameras in the stations, \n\nincluding the cameras' potential blind spots. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 70876, \nissued April 21, 2022 (concluding that video footage of train platform constituted a \" security\nmeasure\" within the scope of section 7(1)(v)). \n\nIn its response to\n\nCTA explained: \n\nCTA's rail station cameras serve as a security measure designed to\nidentify and respond to potential attacks on CTA's rail system, or\nto identify other dangerous activity occurring in CTA's rail service\narea. The disclosure of this video footage would reveal the\nposition of cameras installed in CTA's train station, the capabilities\nof the cameras, the area captured by the cameras and areas where\nthe view of the cameras cannot reach.[3] \n\nAlthough, showing this video footage to\npossibility of jeopardizing its security measures because it could not be reviewed multiple times, \nCTA has shown that disclosure of the responsive footage could reasonably be expected to make\nits security measures less effective whether providing a copy of the video or by having a viewing\nin its office. As discussed above, the Illinois Appellate Court has held that CTA platform\nfootage is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(v) of FOIA. Accordingly, this office\nwill take no further action in this matter. \n\nin its office would appear to lessen the\n\nHowever, this office notes that a public body may elect to redact or withhold\n\nexempt information under 7(1)(v), but FOIA does not require it do so. 4 In light of the specific\ncircumstances in this matter, CTA may wish to work with\nto explore whether it\nmay be feasible for him to view at least a portion of the video in CTA's office. \n\n3 Letter from Ashley P. Neuhauser, Senior FOIA, Compliance, & Appeals Attorney, CTA to\n\nDecember 15, 2023). \n\n4 See, e.g., Roehrborn v. Lambert, 277 Ill. App. 3d 181, 186 (1995) (\" The purpose of the Act is to\n\nensure disclosure of information, not to protect information from disclosure. * * * The exemptions cannot be read to\nprohibit dissemination of such information, but rather are simply cases where disclosure is not required.\"). \nCrumpton v. Stone, 59 F.3d 1400, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (FOIA allows an agency to withhold certain information\nbut it does not limit an agency's discretion to disclose information as the exemptions are permissive rather than\nmandatory); People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997) (legislature's use of the word \"may\" generally indicates a\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at 312-814-5201, \n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80130 f no fi war mun"}
{"id":1044,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-11-22","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80318"],"title":"University of Illinois System properly redacted NIL group emails under 7(1)(b), 7(1)(f), 7(1)(o)","filename":"80318, issued November 22, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2774,"summary":"The requester challenged the University of Illinois's redaction of correspondence with an NIL group under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(b), 7(1)(f), and 7(1)(o). The PAC determined that while some redactions were proper, the University failed to justify the use of section 7(1)(o) regarding meeting links.","plain_summary":"A reporter requested emails between the University of Illinois athletic department and the Illini Guardians NIL group from January to August 2023. The University redacted some information, citing exemptions for private information, personal privacy, and preliminary drafts. The Illinois Attorney General's office reviewed the redactions and determined that the University properly redacted personal email addresses, phone numbers, passcodes, and one highly personal line under the cited exemptions. The source document does not state any order or remedy regarding the release of unredacted records.","holding":"","legal_question":"Whether the University of Illinois properly applied FOIA exemptions 7(1)(b), 7(1)(f), and 7(1)(o) to redact correspondence with an NIL group.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(f)","7(1)(o)"],"public_body":"University of Illinois System","requesting_party":"Mr. Tom Kacich (The News-Gazette)","pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(o)","subject_description":"The request sought correspondence between University athletic department representatives and an NIL group.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/Communications-with-third-parties/Self-interested-parties/80318%2C%20issued%20November%2022%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA redactions","University of Illinois","NIL group","exemption 7(1)(o)","meeting links"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"November 22, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Tom Kacich\nThe News-Gazette\nkacich@news- gazette. media\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nVice President,  External Relations and Communications\nChief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 80318\n\nDear Mr. Kacich and Ms. Nazon: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn January 31, 2024, Mr. Tom Kacich submitted a FOIA request to the\n\nUniversity of Illinois seeking \" copies of all correspondence between University of Illinois\nathletic department representatives and the Illini Guardians NIL group between the dates Jan. 1, \n2023,  and Aug.  31, 2023.\" 1 On February 21, 2024,  the University provided responsive e- mails\nbut redacted some information pursuant to sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(f), and 7(1)(o) of FOIA.2 On\n\n1E- mail from Tom Kacich, The News-Gazette, to University of Illinois FOIA (January 31, 2024). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(f), (1)(o) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective\n\nJune 30, 2023;  103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, \n2023;  103-540, effective January 1, 2024;  103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fMr. Tom Kacich\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nNovember 22,  2024\nPage 2\n\nFebruary 27, 2024, this office received Mr. Kacich's complete Request for Review challenging\nthe redactions. \n\nOn March 5, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nUniversity and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the records, together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions.   On\nMarch 14, 2024, this office received the requested materials, which included both a complete\nversion of its written response for this office' s confidential review and a redacted version for this\noffice to forward to Mr. Kacich.3 On March 18, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the\nUniversity' s redacted response to Mr. Kacich;  he did not submit a reply.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that redacts\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the redacted\ninformation is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from\ndisclosure are to be narrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois\nUniversity,  176 Ill. 2d 401,  407 ( 1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)( b) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information,  unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\"  \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) ( West 2022))  defines \" private information\"  as: \n\nunique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, biometric\nidentifiers,  personal financial\ninformation,  passwords or other\naccess codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers,  and personal email addresses.  Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn its partial denial e-mail to Mr. Kacich, the University stated that it redacted\n\nsome information pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( b),  such as \" personal email addresses,  personal\n\n3See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, \n2024 (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for\nreview, with any alleged confidential information to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\n\fMr. Tom Kacich\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nNovember 22,  2024\nPage 3\n\ntelephone numbers and passcodes.\" 4 This office's review of an unredacted copy of the records\nconfirmed that the University redacted the personal e-mail addresses and cell phone numbers of\ncertain individuals.  Because personal e-mail addresses and personal telephone numbers are\nprivate information\"  as the term is defined in section 2(c-5), the University did not improperly\nredact those details pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. \n\nAlthough the University did not cite section 7(1)(c) of FOIA,5 that exemption is\n\nalso relevant because it exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\nrecords, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy.\"   Section 7(1)( c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\"  as \" the disclosure\nof information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the\nsubject' s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information.\"   \n\ninformation contained within public\n\nThis office' s review determined that the University also redacted one line in an e-\nmail (page 40 of the records) pertaining to an individual.  The information is highly personal in\nnature,  and the subject' s right to privacy outweighs the public interest in the information.  \nFurther, the information does not concern public business.  Accordingly, the University did not\nimproperly redact the specified line pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( c). \n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying \"[ p] reliminary\n\ndrafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, \nor policies or actions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record\nshall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public\nbody.\"   The section 7(1)( f) exemption applies to \" inter-  and intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative material.\"  Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003).  Section\n7(1)( f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open\ndiscussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\"   Harwood, 344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248.  \"[ P] urely factual material\"  is not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)( f) unless\nthe factual material is \"inextricably intertwined\" with predecisional deliberative discussions.  \nWatkins v. McCarthy,  2012 IL App ( 1st)  100632, ¶ 36,  980 N.E.2d 733,  743 ( 2012) ( quoting\nEnviro Tech International, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 371 F.3d 370, \n374- 75 ( 7th Cir. 2004)).  \n\n4Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (March 13, 2024), at 2.  \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, 2023;  103-540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fMr. Tom Kacich\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nNovember 22,  2024\nPage 4\n\nThe section 7(1)(f) exemption has been interpreted as extending to\n\ncommunications between a public body and a third- party consultant when the third party' s\nanalyses and recommendations 'played essentially the same part in an agency's process of\ndeliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done.'\"  Fisher v. Office of\nthe Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (quoting Harwood, 344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248).   In determining whether third- party communications fall within the scope of the\ndeliberative process exemption, courts look \"to whether the third party 'functioned 'enough like' \nthe agency' s]  own personnel'; ' worked side- by- side'  with the agency to address the same\nfundamental concern'; or were 'on the same team.'\"  New York Times Co. v. United States DOJ, \n2021 U.S.  Dist.  LEXIS 20776,  at * 51 ( S.D.N.Y. Feb.  3, 2021) ( quoting Fox News Network,  LLC\nv. U.S. Department of Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Klamath, \n532 U.S.  at 12)).   For communications with a third party to qualify under the 7(1)( f) exemption, \nthe third-party \"may not represent independent interests of its own apart from those of the\nagency.\"  Fisher,  2021 IL App ( 1st)  200225, ¶  20 ( citing Harwood,  344 Ill. App.  3d at 248). \n\nThe University' s response to this office asserted that parts of the provided e- mails\n\ncontained \"drafts and pre-decisional communications containing deliberative opinions, \nrecommendations,  and notes.\" 6 In the confidential portion of its response,  the University\naddressed in further detail the nature of those communications and the applicability of the section\n7(1)( f) exemption to those parts.   \n\nAs noted above,  Mr. Kacich' s request sought communications between the\n\nUniversity's athletics department and the Illini Guardians NIL group from the past year up to\nfrom the University' s athletics\nAugust 31, 2023.   According to an August 24, 2023,  statement\ndivision, Illini Guardians was a third-party entity formed in response to legal and policy changes\ngoverning the use of name,  image,  and likeness ( NIL) of student athletes. 7 The Illini Guardians\nbegan a wind down of its operations to make way for a new third-party entity, ICON Collective\nICON): \n\nThe Division of Intercollegiate Athletics ( DIA)  announced\n\nThursday that ICON Collective (ICON) will become the sole\npreferred third- party entity supporting Fighting Illini student-\nathletes in their name, image and likeness (NIL) endeavors. Illini\nGuardians,  meanwhile,  intends to wind down operations.  ICON\npreviously worked alongside Illini Guardians, as both groups\n\n6Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (March 13, 2024), at 2. \n\n7 University of Illinois Athletics, ICON to Become Preferred NIL Collective;  Illini Guardians to\n\nWind Down Operations ( August 24, 2023),  https:// fightingillini. com/news/2023/8/24/general- icon-to-become-\npreferred- nil-collective- illini-guardians- to-wind-down- operations. aspx. \n\n\fMr. Tom Kacich\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nNovember 22,  2024\nPage 5\n\nfacilitated community-focused NIL activities exclusively for\nFighting Illini student- athletes. * * * \nsubscription service and redirect its resources and support to ICON\nin furtherance of their shared mission.[ 8] \n\nIllini Guardians will end its\n\nIllini Guardians was registered as a not- for- profit corporation with the Office of the Illinois\nSecretary of State before dissolving in May 2024.9\n\nBased on this office's review, the records at issue relate to the period of time in\n\nwhich Illini Guardians was preparing to wind down its operations.   The redacted e- mails include\ncommunications between University staff and representatives from Illini Guardians and ICON.  \nThese e-mails do not constitute \" inter-  and intra- agency\"  material and,  therefore,  the University\nmust show that Illini Guardians and ICON were acting in a consultant capacity to the University\nand did \" not represent\n2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (citing Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248). \n\ninterests of its own apart from those of the agency.\"  Fisher, \n\nindependent\n\nAccording to another statement from the University's athletics division, ICON\n\nwas officially launched in March 2023,  and its \" core function is to secure charitable\ncontributions and offer meaningful NIL partnerships to Fighting Illini student-athletes for their\nparticipation in community service initiatives in and around Champaign- Urbana and,  in some\ncases, well beyond.\" 10 The statement further explained that:   \n\nMeaningful updates to NIL guidance issued by the NCAA\n\nin October 2022 required college athletics programs to alter their\napproach in the NIL space, making strong day-to-day leadership\nand direction in collectives imperative to NIL success.  The\nguidelines limited athletics department involvement in NIL, \nputting more weight and responsibility on third- party collectives. * \n\nDuring the first several months of its existence, ICON\n\n8University of Illinois Athletics, ICON to Become Preferred NIL Collective; Illini Guardians to\n\nWind Down Operations (August 24, 2023), https:// fightingillini.com/news/2023/8/24/general-icon-to-become-\npreferred-nil-collective-illini-guardians-to-wind-down-operations.aspx. \n\nhttps://apps.ilsos.gov/businessentitysearch/ businessentitysearch ( last visited November 22, 2024). \n\n9Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, Business Entity Search,  \n\n10University of Illinois Athletics, ICON Collective Launches to Provide NIL Opportunities to\n\nIllinois Student-Athletes (March 2, 2023), https://fightingillini.com/news/2023/3/2/general-icon-collective-launches-\nto-provide- nil-opportunities- to-illinois-student- athletes. aspx. \n\n\fMr. Tom Kacich\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nNovember 22,  2024\nPage 6\n\nCollective has offered more than $1.5 million in contracts to\nIllinois student- athletes.[ 11] \n\nOn September 5, 2024,  this office asked for additional\n\ninformation from the\n\nUniversity about its relationship to Illini Guardians and ICON, including whether the University\nhad any contract with ICON.   In response,  the University confirmed that ICON was formed by\nnon-University personnel for the primary purpose of supporting NIL activities for student-\nathletes and does not have direct contracts with the University to support student- athletes.   The\nUniversity explained that Illini Guardians was similarly headed by a group of non-University\npersonnel,  but on a volunteer basis.  \n\nBased on the available information,  this office is unable to determine that ICON\nand Illini Guardians were acting solely in a consultant capacity to the University.  While ICON\nand Illini Guardians appeared to work collaboratively with the University for purposes of\nconsolidating NIL activities with one entity, ICON had independent interests of its own as the\ngroup that would become the sole entity to support student- athletes in NIL activities.   Both\nICON and Illini Guardians were formed to support the interests of student-athletes.  The\nUniversity did not illustrate how its interests were in complete alignment with the interests of\nstudent-athletes, who may now individually \"earn compensation, commensurate with market\nvalue,  for the use of the name,  image,  likeness,  or voice of the student- athlete while enrolled at a\npostsecondary educational institution and obtain and retain an agent for any matter or activity\nrelating to such compensation.\"  110 ILCS 190/ 10 ( West 2022).   Indeed,  the University' s previous\nstatement on ICON noted that NCAA guidelines limit the involvement of the athletics\nin NIL activities.   Under these circumstances,  this office concludes that the\ndepartment\nUniversity did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the e-mails involving\nICON and Illini Guardians are exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( f). \n\nThis office requests that the University provide unredacted copies of the e- mails\n\nreflecting communications between University personnel and representatives of Illini Guardians\nand ICON. \n\nSection 7(1)( o) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( o) exempts from disclosure: \n\nAdministrative or technical\n\ninformation associated with\n\nautomated data processing operations, including but not limited to\n\n11University of Illinois Athletics, ICON Collective Launches to Provide NIL Opportunities to\n\nIllinois Student-Athletes (March 2, 2023), https://fightingillini.com/news/2023/3/2/general-icon-collective-launches-\nto-provide- nil-opportunities- to-illinois-student- athletes. aspx. \n\n\fr. Tom Kacich\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nNovember 22,  2024\nPage 7\n\nsoftware, operating protocols, computer program abstracts, file\nlayouts,  source listings,  object modules,  load modules,  user guides, \ndocumentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of\ncomputerized systems,  employee manuals,  and any other\ninformation that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the\nsystem or its data or the security of materials exempt under this\nSection.  \n\nThe Illinois Appellate Court has explained that to meet its burden under section 7(1)(o), a public\nbody \" must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence more than the possibility of a threat to\nthe security\" of the computer system.  (Emphasis in original.)  Chapman v. Chicago Department\nof Finance,  2022 IL App ( 1st)  200547, ¶  36. \n\nThe University asserted that the redacted information \" includes internal meeting\n\nthat disclosure of a screen shot of its e- mail vault would make its e- mail system\n\nhyperlinks.\" 12 The Public Access Bureau has previously rejected a public body's conclusory\nargument\nvulnerable to hacking.  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 35815, at 3, issued September 10, \n2018;  see also Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 42825,  at 3, issued July 26,  2016 ( finding that\npublic body had not met its burden under section 7(1)(o) where it was not clear how disclosing\nthe entry and exit data for an individual would jeopardize the security system software).   In this\nmatter, the University's response lacks any explanation illustrating how a meeting link, \nparticularly for a past meeting,  would pose a security risk to any system if disclosed.   Absent any\ndetails or evidence to show that there was more than a possibility of a security threat, the\nUniversity improperly redacted the records pursuant\nthe University provide an unredacted copy of page 1 of the records. \n\nto section 7(1)( o).   This office requests that\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80318 f 71b proper 71f improper 71o improper univ\n\n12Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief\n\nRecords Officer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau,  Illinois\nAttorney General' s Office (March 13, 2024), at 2. \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Athletic department correspondence with an NIL group","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80318/","full_text":"November 22, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Tom Kacich\nThe News-Gazette\nkacich@news- gazette. media\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nVice President, External Relations and Communications\nChief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80318\n\nDear Mr. Kacich and Ms. Nazon: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn January 31, 2024, Mr. Tom Kacich submitted a FOIA request to the\n\nUniversity of Illinois seeking \" copies of all correspondence between University of Illinois\nathletic department representatives and the Illini Guardians NIL group between the dates Jan. 1, \n2023, and Aug. 31, 2023.\" 1 On February 21, 2024, the University provided responsive e- mails\nbut redacted some information pursuant to sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(f), and 7(1)(o) of FOIA.2 On\n\n1E- mail from Tom Kacich, The News-Gazette, to University of Illinois FOIA (January 31, 2024). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(f), (1)(o) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective\n\nJune 30, 2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, \n\nFebruary 27, 2024, this office received Mr. Kacich's complete Request for Review challenging\nthe redactions. \n\nOn March 5, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nUniversity and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the records, together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions. On\nMarch 14, 2024, this office received the requested materials, which included both a complete\nversion of its written response for this office's confidential review and a redacted version for this\noffice to forward to Mr. Kacich.3 On March 18, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the\nUniversity's redacted response to Mr. Kacich; he did not submit a reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that redacts\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the redacted\ninformation is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from\ndisclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois\nUniversity, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information, unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\" \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) (West 2022)) defines \" private information\" as: \n\nunique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, biometric\nidentifiers, personal financial\ninformation, passwords or other\naccess codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person. (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn its partial denial e-mail to Mr. Kacich, the University stated that it redacted\n\nsome information pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(b), such as \" personal email addresses, personal\n\n3 See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, \n2024 (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer to the person submitting the request for\nreview, with any alleged confidential information to which the request pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\ntelephone numbers and passcodes.\" 4 This office's review of an unredacted copy of the records\nconfirmed that the University redacted the personal e-mail addresses and cell phone numbers of\ncertain individuals. Because personal e-mail addresses and personal telephone numbers are\nprivate information\" as the term is defined in section 2(c-5), the University did not improperly\nredact those details pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. \n\nAlthough the University did not cite section 7(1)(c) of FOIA,5 that exemption is\n\nalso relevant because it exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\nrecords, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy.\" Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" as \" the disclosure\nof information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the\nsubject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information.\" \n\ninformation contained within public\n\nThis office's review determined that the University also redacted one line in an e-\nmail (page 40 of the records) pertaining to an individual. The information is highly personal in\nnature, and the subject's right to privacy outweighs the public interest in the information. \nFurther, the information does not concern public business. Accordingly, the University did not\nimproperly redact the specified line pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(c). \n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying \"[ p] reliminary\n\ndrafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, \nor policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record\nshall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public\nbody.\" The section 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative material.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003). Section\n7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open\ndiscussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood, 344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248. \"[ P] urely factual material\" is not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f) unless\nthe factual material is \"inextricably intertwined\" with predecisional deliberative discussions. \nWatkins v. McCarthy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, ¶ 36, 980 N.E.2d 733, 743 (2012) (quoting\nEnviro Tech International, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 371 F.3d 370, \n374- 75 (7th Cir. 2004)). \n\n4 Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (March 13, 2024), at 2. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, \n\nThe section 7(1)(f) exemption has been interpreted as extending to\n\ncommunications between a public body and a third- party consultant when the third party's\nanalyses and recommendations 'played essentially the same part in an agency's process of\ndeliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done.'\" Fisher v. Office of\nthe Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (quoting Harwood, 344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248). In determining whether third- party communications fall within the scope of the\ndeliberative process exemption, courts look \"to whether the third party 'functioned 'enough like' \nthe agency's] own personnel'; ' worked side- by- side' with the agency to address the same\nfundamental concern'; or were 'on the same team.'\" New York Times Co. v. United States DOJ, \n2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20776, at * 51 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2021) (quoting Fox News Network, LLC\nv. U.S. Department of Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Klamath, \n532 U.S. at 12)). For communications with a third party to qualify under the 7(1)(f) exemption, \nthe third-party \"may not represent independent interests of its own apart from those of the\nagency.\" Fisher, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (citing Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248). \n\nThe University's response to this office asserted that parts of the provided e- mails\n\ncontained \"drafts and pre-decisional communications containing deliberative opinions, \nrecommendations, and notes.\" 6 In the confidential portion of its response, the University\naddressed in further detail the nature of those communications and the applicability of the section\n7(1)(f) exemption to those parts. \n\nAs noted above, Mr. Kacich's request sought communications between the\n\nUniversity's athletics department and the Illini Guardians NIL group from the past year up to\nfrom the University's athletics\nAugust 31, 2023. According to an August 24, 2023, statement\ndivision, Illini Guardians was a third-party entity formed in response to legal and policy changes\ngoverning the use of name, image, and likeness (NIL) of student athletes. 7 The Illini Guardians\nbegan a wind down of its operations to make way for a new third-party entity, ICON Collective\nICON): \n\nThe Division of Intercollegiate Athletics (DIA) announced\n\nThursday that ICON Collective (ICON) will become the sole\npreferred third- party entity supporting Fighting Illini student-\nathletes in their name, image and likeness (NIL) endeavors. Illini\nGuardians, meanwhile, intends to wind down operations. ICON\npreviously worked alongside Illini Guardians, as both groups\n\n6 Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief Records\n\nOfficer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (March 13, 2024), at 2. \n\n7 University of Illinois Athletics, ICON to Become Preferred NIL Collective; Illini Guardians to\n\nWind Down Operations (August 24, 2023), https:// fightingillini. com/news/2023/8/24/general- icon-to-become-\n\nfacilitated community-focused NIL activities exclusively for\nFighting Illini student- athletes. * * * \nsubscription service and redirect its resources and support to ICON\nin furtherance of their shared mission.[ 8] \n\nIllini Guardians will end its\n\nIllini Guardians was registered as a not- for- profit corporation with the Office of the Illinois\nSecretary of State before dissolving in May 2024.9\n\nBased on this office's review, the records at issue relate to the period of time in\n\nwhich Illini Guardians was preparing to wind down its operations. The redacted e- mails include\ncommunications between University staff and representatives from Illini Guardians and ICON. \nThese e-mails do not constitute \" inter- and intra- agency\" material and, therefore, the University\nmust show that Illini Guardians and ICON were acting in a consultant capacity to the University\nand did \" not represent\n2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (citing Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248). \n\ninterests of its own apart from those of the agency.\" Fisher, \n\nindependent\n\nAccording to another statement from the University's athletics division, ICON\n\nwas officially launched in March 2023, and its \" core function is to secure charitable\ncontributions and offer meaningful NIL partnerships to Fighting Illini student-athletes for their\nparticipation in community service initiatives in and around Champaign- Urbana and, in some\ncases, well beyond.\" 10 The statement further explained that: \n\nMeaningful updates to NIL guidance issued by the NCAA\n\nin October 2022 required college athletics programs to alter their\napproach in the NIL space, making strong day-to-day leadership\nand direction in collectives imperative to NIL success. The\nguidelines limited athletics department involvement in NIL, \nputting more weight and responsibility on third- party collectives. * \n\nDuring the first several months of its existence, ICON\n\n8 University of Illinois Athletics, ICON to Become Preferred NIL Collective; Illini Guardians to\n\nWind Down Operations (August 24, 2023), https:// fightingillini.com/news/2023/8/24/general-icon-to-become-\npreferred-nil-collective-illini-guardians-to-wind-down-operations.aspx. \n\nhttps://apps.ilsos.gov/businessentitysearch/ businessentitysearch (last visited November 22, 2024). \n\n9 Office of the Illinois Secretary of State, Business Entity Search, \n\n10 University of Illinois Athletics, ICON Collective Launches to Provide NIL Opportunities to\n\nIllinois Student-Athletes (March 2, 2023), https://fightingillini.com/news/2023/3/2/general-icon-collective-launches-\n\nCollective has offered more than $1.5 million in contracts to\nIllinois student- athletes.[ 11] \n\nOn September 5, 2024, this office asked for additional\n\ninformation from the\n\nUniversity about its relationship to Illini Guardians and ICON, including whether the University\nhad any contract with ICON. In response, the University confirmed that ICON was formed by\nnon-University personnel for the primary purpose of supporting NIL activities for student-\nathletes and does not have direct contracts with the University to support student- athletes. The\nUniversity explained that Illini Guardians was similarly headed by a group of non-University\npersonnel, but on a volunteer basis. \n\nBased on the available information, this office is unable to determine that ICON\nand Illini Guardians were acting solely in a consultant capacity to the University. While ICON\nand Illini Guardians appeared to work collaboratively with the University for purposes of\nconsolidating NIL activities with one entity, ICON had independent interests of its own as the\ngroup that would become the sole entity to support student- athletes in NIL activities. Both\nICON and Illini Guardians were formed to support the interests of student-athletes. The\nUniversity did not illustrate how its interests were in complete alignment with the interests of\nstudent-athletes, who may now individually \"earn compensation, commensurate with market\nvalue, for the use of the name, image, likeness, or voice of the student- athlete while enrolled at a\npostsecondary educational institution and obtain and retain an agent for any matter or activity\nrelating to such compensation.\" 110 ILCS 190/ 10 (West 2022). Indeed, the University's previous\nstatement on ICON noted that NCAA guidelines limit the involvement of the athletics\nin NIL activities. Under these circumstances, this office concludes that the\ndepartment\nUniversity did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the e-mails involving\nICON and Illini Guardians are exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(f). \n\nThis office requests that the University provide unredacted copies of the e- mails\n\nreflecting communications between University personnel and representatives of Illini Guardians\nand ICON. \n\nSection 7(1)(o) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(o) exempts from disclosure: \n\nAdministrative or technical\n\ninformation associated with\n\nautomated data processing operations, including but not limited to\n\n11 University of Illinois Athletics, ICON Collective Launches to Provide NIL Opportunities to\n\nIllinois Student-Athletes (March 2, 2023), https://fightingillini.com/news/2023/3/2/general-icon-collective-launches-\n\nsoftware, operating protocols, computer program abstracts, file\nlayouts, source listings, object modules, load modules, user guides, \ndocumentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of\ncomputerized systems, employee manuals, and any other\ninformation that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the\nsystem or its data or the security of materials exempt under this\nSection. \n\nThe Illinois Appellate Court has explained that to meet its burden under section 7(1)(o), a public\nbody \" must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence more than the possibility of a threat to\nthe security\" of the computer system. (Emphasis in original.) Chapman v. Chicago Department\nof Finance, 2022 IL App (1st) 200547, ¶ 36. \n\nThe University asserted that the redacted information \" includes internal meeting\n\nthat disclosure of a screen shot of its e- mail vault would make its e- mail system\n\nhyperlinks.\" 12 The Public Access Bureau has previously rejected a public body's conclusory\nargument\nvulnerable to hacking. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 35815, at 3, issued September 10, \n2018; see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 42825, at 3, issued July 26, 2016 (finding that\npublic body had not met its burden under section 7(1)(o) where it was not clear how disclosing\nthe entry and exit data for an individual would jeopardize the security system software). In this\nmatter, the University's response lacks any explanation illustrating how a meeting link, \nparticularly for a past meeting, would pose a security risk to any system if disclosed. Absent any\ndetails or evidence to show that there was more than a possibility of a security threat, the\nUniversity improperly redacted the records pursuant\nthe University provide an unredacted copy of page 1 of the records. \n\nto section 7(1)(o). This office requests that\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80318 f 71b proper 71f improper 71o improper univ\n\n12 Letter from Kirsten Ruby, Director of External Relations and Communications and Chief\n\nRecords Officer, University of Illinois, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau, Illinois\nAttorney General's Office (March 13, 2024), at 2."}
{"id":1045,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80480"],"title":"Will County Sheriff's Office properly redacted test questions under 7(1)(q)","filename":"80480, issued May 3, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1524,"summary":"The requester challenged the Will County Sheriff's Office's redaction of qualification test questions from email correspondence. The PAC determined that the Sheriff's Office properly applied FOIA exemptions to protect the integrity of the testing process.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for emails regarding a specific questionnaire used by the Will County Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office provided the emails but redacted the actual test questions to prevent cheating or compromising the test. The Attorney General's office agreed that these redactions were legal and appropriate.","holding":"The Will County Sheriff's Office did not violate FOIA by redacting qualification test questions from the requested emails pursuant to section 7(1)(q).","legal_question":"Whether the Will County Sheriff's Office properly redacted qualification test questions from responsive records under section 7(1)(q) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(q)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(q)"],"public_body":"Will County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(q)","subject_description":"The redaction of qualification test questions from email correspondence.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":90.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_q/80480%2C%20issued%20May%203%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["test questions","redaction","Sheriff's Office","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"May 3, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nFOIA Administrator\nWill County Sheriff' s Office\n16911 West Laraway Road,  Suite 101\nJoliet,  Illinois 60433\nkpaulsen@willcosheriff. org\nfoia@willcosheriff. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 80480\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Reid: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Will County Sheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  did not improperly redact records responsive\nto\n\nFebruary 27, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff' s Office seeking\n\ncopies of: \n\nS] pecific email correspondences dated February 5, 2024, \ninvolving the questionnaire sent or received by personnel from the\nWill County Sheriff' s Department.   Specifically,  I am interested in\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fMs. Kelsey Reid\nMay 3, 2024\nPage 2\n\ncommunications related to the questionnaire sent to or received\nfrom the following individuals: \n\nSteven Mathis\nJames Eiden\nAdam Tapper\nDaniel Jungles\n\nPlease include all email correspondences,  including\n\nattachments,  related to the aforementioned questionnaire\nexchanged by the mentioned individuals on the specified date.   If\nthere are any relevant communications that involve additional\npersonnel or are connected to the subject matter,  please include\nthose as well.[ 2] \n\nrequest in part and\ndenied his request in part pursuant to section 7(1)(q) of FOIA. 3 The Sheriff' s Office provided\n\nOn March 5, 2024,  the Sheriff' s Office granted\n\nwith a redacted copy of the responsive e-mails and stated that it redacted all\n\nqualification test questions from the e-mails.   \n\nOn March 6, 2024, \ncontesting the Sheriff' s Office' s partial release.  \nwas redacted did not fall within the section 7(1)(q) FOIA exemption because \"[ t]he email subject\nlines explicitly label the content as a 'Leadership Form'  and a 'Leadership Survey,'  indicating that\nthe purpose was not to assess the qualifications of applicants for employment.\" 4 Additionally, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review\n\ncontended that the information that\n\nstated that \" the individuals mentioned in the communications are already employed by\n\nthe Will County Sheriff' s Department.   Therefore,  the information in question cannot be\nreasonably construed as examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for\na license or employment[.]\" 5\n\nOn March 11, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nSheriff' s Office and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this\noffice's confidential review,  together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for\n\n2FOIA portal message from\n\nto Will County Sheriff' s Office ( February 27, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)( q) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462, effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446, effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024.  \n\n4E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( March 6, 2024).  \n\n5E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( March 6, 2024).  \n\n\fMs. Kelsey Reid\nMay 3, 2024\nPage 3\n\nthe applicability of section 7(1)(q) of FOIA to the records.   On March 18, 2024,  the Sheriff' s\nOffice provided this office with those materials.   Later that same day, this office forwarded a\ncopy of the Sheriff' s Office' s written response to\nsubmit a reply;  he replied that day.  \n\nand notified him of his right to\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.   Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\"   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed.   Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 ( 1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ t]est questions,  scoring keys, \n\nand other examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or\nemployment.\"   Section 7(1)(q) is intended to preserve the integrity of public bodies'  hiring\nprocesses.   See Roulette v. Department of Central Management Services,  141 Ill. App. 3d 394, \n398- 99 (1986) ( results and evaluator' s notes of public employee applicant' s psychological\nexamination are exempt under section 7(1)(q) because an applicant could use insight from such\nrecords to frustrate the public body' s testing process);  see also Kopchar v. City of Chicago,  395\nIll. App. 3d 762, 768 ( 2009) (\"[ T]he results of the physical test for admission to the fire\ndepartment fall squarely within the exemption of 'other examination data'  used to determine the\nqualifications of an applicant for license or employment.\"). \n\nAs an initial matter,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that section 7(1)(q) \napplies not only to scoring information for tests given for initial employment with a public body, \nbut also to promotional exams.   See, for instance,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 72138, \nissued June 15, 2022 ( concluding that public body did not improperly withhold interview scoring\ninformation to determine qualifications for a promotion).   As the Sheriff' s Office noted,  ascribing\na meaning to Section 7(1)(q) that allows two systems of confidentiality,  fairness,  and accuracy, \ndepending on whether you want to be hired or advance your career,  would lead to an absurd\nresult.\" 6\n\nIn its response to this office, the Sheriff' s Office argued that the unredacted\n\nportions of the records provided to\nthe records pursuant to section 7(1)(q) because \"[ t]hey clearly indicate that they are seeking\ninformation about the strengths and weaknesses of individual candidates with regards to their job\n\ndemonstrate that it properly redacted portions of\n\nAssistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( March 18, 2024),  at [ 2].    \n\n6Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator,  Will County Sheriff' s [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith,  \n\n\fMs. Kelsey Reid\nMay 3, 2024\nPage 4\n\nperformance.\" 7 The Sheriff' s Office further argued that the unredacted portions of the e-mails\nmake it clear that the e-mails concern the detective sergeant position,  and that \" any question is\nemployment related and not a general inquiry about leadership qualities of individuals.\" 8\nAdditionally,  the Sheriff' s Office contended:  \" There is little case law with regard to this\nexemption or its predecessor,  but the most recent case,  Kopchar,  does indicate that the phrase\nother examination data'  can apply to any number of metrics to evaluate employees.\" 9\n\nIn reply, \n\nargued that \"[ d] espite potentially touching upon aspects of job\n\nperformance,  these documents do not inherently constitute examination data as defined by the\nstatute.\" 10 He also contended that \"[ t]he term ' other examination data'  must be construed within\nthe confines of its statutory definition,  which does not encompass general employment- related\ncommunications,  as evidenced by the labeling of the documents in question as 'leadership form' \nand ' leadership survey.'\" 11\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has carefully reviewed the unredacted responsive\npoints to the subject lines and labels of the responsive records as\n\nrecords.   While\nevidence that the records do not fall within the 7(1)(q) exemption,  this office's review confirmed\nthat the redacted portions of the records are not \" general employment- related communications.\"  \nThe redacted portions consist of test questions,  questionnaires,  and other records relied upon to\nformulate the results of a promotional examination.   The Public Access Bureau has consistently\ndetermined that such records are exempt from disclosure.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. \n26217,  issued July 10, 2014,  at 2 (concluding that \" test questions,  answer sheets,  interviewers' \nnotes,  rating forms,  and other records relied upon to formulate results\"  of a police sergeant' s\npromotional examination were \" within the scope of the section 7(1)( q) exemption.\").   Because\ndisclosure of the records would reveal examination data used to evaluate applicants for public\nemployment,  and thereby frustrate the examination process for the detective sergeant position, \nthe Sheriff' s Office did not violate FOIA by redacting the records pursuant to section 7(1)(q). \n\nAssistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( March 18, 2024),  at [ 1].   \n\n7Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator,  Will County Sheriff' s [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith,  \n\nAssistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( March 18, 2024),  at [ 1].   \n\n8Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator,  Will County Sheriff' s [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith,  \n\nAssistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( March 18, 2024),  at [ 1].  \n\n9Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator,  Will County Sheriff' s [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith,  \n\n10E- mail from\n\nto K. Reid and Katie Goldsmith ( March 18, 2024).   \n\n11E- mail from\n\nto K. Reid and Katie Goldsmith ( March 18, 2024).   \n\n\fMs. Kelsey Reid\nMay 3, 2024\nPage 5\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions,  please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80480 f 71q proper co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Redacted qualification test questions from emails","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80480/","full_text":"May 3, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nFOIA Administrator\nWill County Sheriff's Office\n16911 West Laraway Road, Suite 101\nJoliet, Illinois 60433\nkpaulsen@willcosheriff. org\nfoia@willcosheriff. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80480\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Reid: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Will County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) did not improperly redact records responsive\nto\n\nFebruary 27, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff's Office seeking\n\ncopies of: \n\nS] pecific email correspondences dated February 5, 2024, \ninvolving the questionnaire sent or received by personnel from the\nWill County Sheriff's Department. Specifically, I am interested in\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\ncommunications related to the questionnaire sent to or received\nfrom the following individuals: \n\nSteven Mathis\nJames Eiden\nAdam Tapper\nDaniel Jungles\n\nPlease include all email correspondences, including\n\nattachments, related to the aforementioned questionnaire\nexchanged by the mentioned individuals on the specified date. If\nthere are any relevant communications that involve additional\npersonnel or are connected to the subject matter, please include\nthose as well.[ 2] \n\nrequest in part and\ndenied his request in part pursuant to section 7(1)(q) of FOIA. 3 The Sheriff's Office provided\n\nOn March 5, 2024, the Sheriff's Office granted\n\nwith a redacted copy of the responsive e-mails and stated that it redacted all\n\nqualification test questions from the e-mails. \n\nOn March 6, 2024, \ncontesting the Sheriff's Office's partial release. \nwas redacted did not fall within the section 7(1)(q) FOIA exemption because \"[ t]he email subject\nlines explicitly label the content as a 'Leadership Form' and a 'Leadership Survey,' indicating that\nthe purpose was not to assess the qualifications of applicants for employment.\" 4 Additionally, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review\n\ncontended that the information that\n\nstated that \" the individuals mentioned in the communications are already employed by\n\nthe Will County Sheriff's Department. Therefore, the information in question cannot be\nreasonably construed as examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for\na license or employment[.]\" 5\n\nOn March 11, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nSheriff's Office and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this\noffice's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for\n\n2FOIA portal message from\n\nto Will County Sheriff's Office (February 27, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(q) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \n\nthe applicability of section 7(1)(q) of FOIA to the records. On March 18, 2024, the Sheriff's\nOffice provided this office with those materials. Later that same day, this office forwarded a\ncopy of the Sheriff's Office's written response to\nsubmit a reply; he replied that day. \n\nand notified him of his right to\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ t]est questions, scoring keys, \n\nand other examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or\nemployment.\" Section 7(1)(q) is intended to preserve the integrity of public bodies' hiring\nprocesses. See Roulette v. Department of Central Management Services, 141 Ill. App. 3d 394, \n398- 99 (1986) (results and evaluator's notes of public employee applicant's psychological\nexamination are exempt under section 7(1)(q) because an applicant could use insight from such\nrecords to frustrate the public body's testing process); see also Kopchar v. City of Chicago, 395\nIll. App. 3d 762, 768 (2009) (\"[ T]he results of the physical test for admission to the fire\ndepartment fall squarely within the exemption of 'other examination data' used to determine the\nqualifications of an applicant for license or employment.\"). \n\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Bureau has determined that section 7(1)(q) \napplies not only to scoring information for tests given for initial employment with a public body, \nbut also to promotional exams. See, for instance, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 72138, \nissued June 15, 2022 (concluding that public body did not improperly withhold interview scoring\ninformation to determine qualifications for a promotion). As the Sheriff's Office noted, ascribing\na meaning to Section 7(1)(q) that allows two systems of confidentiality, fairness, and accuracy, \ndepending on whether you want to be hired or advance your career, would lead to an absurd\nresult.\" 6\n\nIn its response to this office, the Sheriff's Office argued that the unredacted\n\nportions of the records provided to\nthe records pursuant to section 7(1)(q) because \"[ t]hey clearly indicate that they are seeking\ninformation about the strengths and weaknesses of individual candidates with regards to their job\n\ndemonstrate that it properly redacted portions of\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (March 18, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\n6 Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator, Will County Sheriff's [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith, \n\nperformance.\" 7 The Sheriff's Office further argued that the unredacted portions of the e-mails\nmake it clear that the e-mails concern the detective sergeant position, and that \" any question is\nemployment related and not a general inquiry about leadership qualities of individuals.\" 8\nAdditionally, the Sheriff's Office contended: \" There is little case law with regard to this\nexemption or its predecessor, but the most recent case, Kopchar, does indicate that the phrase\nother examination data' can apply to any number of metrics to evaluate employees.\" 9\n\nIn reply, \n\nargued that \"[ d] espite potentially touching upon aspects of job\n\nperformance, these documents do not inherently constitute examination data as defined by the\nstatute.\" 10 He also contended that \"[ t]he term ' other examination data' must be construed within\nthe confines of its statutory definition, which does not encompass general employment- related\ncommunications, as evidenced by the labeling of the documents in question as 'leadership form' \nand ' leadership survey.'\" 11\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has carefully reviewed the unredacted responsive\npoints to the subject lines and labels of the responsive records as\n\nrecords. While\nevidence that the records do not fall within the 7(1)(q) exemption, this office's review confirmed\nthat the redacted portions of the records are not \" general employment- related communications.\" \nThe redacted portions consist of test questions, questionnaires, and other records relied upon to\nformulate the results of a promotional examination. The Public Access Bureau has consistently\ndetermined that such records are exempt from disclosure. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n26217, issued July 10, 2014, at 2 (concluding that \" test questions, answer sheets, interviewers' \nnotes, rating forms, and other records relied upon to formulate results\" of a police sergeant's\npromotional examination were \" within the scope of the section 7(1)(q) exemption.\"). Because\ndisclosure of the records would reveal examination data used to evaluate applicants for public\nemployment, and thereby frustrate the examination process for the detective sergeant position, \nthe Sheriff's Office did not violate FOIA by redacting the records pursuant to section 7(1)(q). \n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (March 18, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n7 Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator, Will County Sheriff's [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith, \n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (March 18, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n8 Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator, Will County Sheriff's [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith, \n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (March 18, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n9 Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator, Will County Sheriff's [ O]ffice, to Katie Goldsmith, \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80480 f 71q proper co"}
{"id":1046,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-03-14","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80487"],"title":"Chicago Police Department FOIA request asking questions deemed invalid","filename":"80487, issued March 14, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":423,"summary":"The requester sought information regarding background searches performed by the Chicago Police Department and the Office of Public Safety Administration, but the PAC determined the request was invalid because it asked questions rather than seeking specific public records.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked the Chicago Police Department questions about background searches performed on them, but the department and another agency referred the requester back and forth. The Attorney General's office closed the case, explaining that FOIA is for requesting copies of existing documents, not for asking government agencies questions or demanding they create new records.","holding":"The PAC determined that no further action is warranted because the requester's submission did not constitute a valid FOIA request for public records.","legal_question":"Does a request that asks questions about agency actions rather than seeking specific public records constitute a valid FOIA request?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Chicago Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed - no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOIA request validity","subject_description":"The requester sought answers to questions regarding background searches performed by the Chicago Police Department and the Office of Public Safety Administration.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Doesnt-Identify/80487%2C%20issued%20March%2014%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA request","public records","questions to agencies","background search"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"\fMarch 14, 2024 \nPage 2 \n\nOn February  1 4, 2024, CPD responded that it had no records responsive to your \n\nrequest and that the records requested are maintained by a different department, the Office of \nPublic Safety Administration (OPSA).  CPD provided an e-mail address to direct a FOIA request \nto OPSA.  On March 6, 2 024, you submitted the above-referenced Request for Review \ncontending that you had submitted a FOIA request to OPSA as well, and that OPSA had referred \nyou back to CPD.  You asked for \"a review of these requests to determine who has these records \nfor release and that they be released. \"3 \n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to requests for \"public records,\" which are \n\nexisting records \"pertaining to the transaction of public business, * * * having been prepared by \nor for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession of, or under the control of \nany public body.\" 5 ILCS  140/2(c) (West 2022).  Tn contrast, a public body is not required to \nanswer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA request.  Kenyon v.  Garrels,  184 \nI1l. App. 3d 28, 32 (1 989).  Additionally, \"[a] request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify \na public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\"  Chicago Tribune Co.  v. \nDepartment of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, 133. \n\nRather than requesting copies of records,  you asked a series of questions about \n\nsearches performed for both of your names, who performed those searches, and why such \nsearches were perfom1ed.  FOIA does not require a public  body  to  answer questions or create a \nnew record in response to a request.  Although CPD refen-ed you to OPSA, and you state that \nOPSA referred you to CPD, your February 5, 20 24, submission to CPD did not request to inspect \nor obtain copies of public records as is necessary to constitute a valid FOIA request.  Therefore, \nthis office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  Please contact me at \n\nkatherine.goldsmith@ilag.gov if you have any questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKA TIE GOLDSMITH \nAssistant Attorney General \nPublic Access Bureau \n\n80487 f no fi war pd \n\n3E-mail from \n\nto Public Access [Bureau) (March 6, 2024). \n\nOffice of the lllinoisArtomey General \n\n\fMarch 14, 2024 \nPage3 \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail \nMr. Scott D. Spears \nActing General Counsel \nChicago Police Department \nOffice of the Superintendent \n3510 South Michigan Avenue 5th Floor \nChicago, Illinois 60653 \npacola@chicagopolice.org \n\nOffice of the lllinoisArtomey General \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Questions about police background-search practices","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80487/","full_text":"On February 1 4, 2024, CPD responded that it had no records responsive to your \n\nrequest and that the records requested are maintained by a different department, the Office of \nPublic Safety Administration (OPSA). CPD provided an e-mail address to direct a FOIA request \nto OPSA. On March 6, 2 024, you submitted the above-referenced Request for Review \ncontending that you had submitted a FOIA request to OPSA as well, and that OPSA had referred \nyou back to CPD. You asked for \"a review of these requests to determine who has these records \nfor release and that they be released. \"3 \n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to requests for \"public records,\" which are \n\nexisting records \"pertaining to the transaction of public business, * * * having been prepared by \nor for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession of, or under the control of \nany public body.\" 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2022). Tn contrast, a public body is not required to \nanswer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA request. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 \nI1l. App. 3d 28, 32 (1 989). Additionally, \"[a] request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify \na public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. \nDepartment of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, 133. \n\nRather than requesting copies of records, you asked a series of questions about \n\nsearches performed for both of your names, who performed those searches, and why such \nsearches were perfom1ed. FOIA does not require a public body to answer questions or create a \nnew record in response to a request. Although CPD refen-ed you to OPSA, and you state that \nOPSA referred you to CPD, your February 5, 20 24, submission to CPD did not request to inspect \nor obtain copies of public records as is necessary to constitute a valid FOIA request. Therefore, \nthis office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. Please contact me at \n\nkatherine.goldsmith@ilag.gov if you have any questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKA TIE GOLDSMITH \nAssistant Attorney General \nPublic Access Bureau \n\n80487 f no fi war pd \n\n3E-mail from \n\nto Public Access [Bureau) (March 6, 2024). \n\nOffice of the lllinoisArtomey General \n\nMarch 14, 2024 \nPage3 \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail \nMr. Scott D. Spears \nActing General Counsel \nChicago Police Department \nOffice of the Superintendent \n3510 South Michigan Avenue 5th Floor \nChicago, Illinois 60653 \npacola@chicagopolice.org \n\nOffice of the lllinoisArtomey General"}
{"id":1047,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-11-22","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80603"],"title":"Illinois DCEO did not violate FOIA by withholding scoring materials as deliberative under 7(1)(f)","filename":"80603, issued November 22, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2818,"summary":"The requester sought application materials, scores, and notes regarding the State-designated cultural districts program, which the Illinois Department of Commerce & Economic Opportunity (DCEO) partially withheld. The PAC determined that the DCEO properly withheld scoring materials and evaluation notes as predecisional deliberative material under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for application scores and evaluation notes from the Illinois Department of Commerce & Economic Opportunity’s state cultural district program. The agency released some records but withheld scoring materials as internal, predecisional deliberative documents. The Public Access Bureau (Attorney General’s office) concluded that the agency did not improperly withhold those records, because the score sheets and notes are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA as preliminary, deliberative materials.","holding":"The Illinois Department of Commerce & Economic Opportunity did not improperly withhold the requested scoring materials and evaluation notes.","legal_question":"Whether scoring materials and evaluation notes used in a discretionary selection process constitute exempt predecisional deliberative material under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(f)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Commerce & Economic Opportunity","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(f)","subject_description":"The request concerned applications, scores, and evaluation notes for the State-designated cultural districts program.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/80603%2C%20issued%20November%2022%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["deliberative process","predecisional","scoring materials","DCEO","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"November 22, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kate Exo\nLegal Counsel,  FOIA Officer\nIllinois Department of Commerce &  Economic Opportunity\n555 West Monroe Street,  Suite 1200\nChicago,  Illinois 60661\nkate.exo@illinois. gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 80603;  DCEO no. 2024- 0019\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Exo: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois Department of Commerce &  Economic\nOpportunity ( DCEO)  has not improperly withheld records responsive to\nFebruary 9, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a\n\ntwo- part FOIA request to DCEO regarding applications for the State- designated cultural districts\nprogram.  \nsought:  \" 1) Uprising Theater' s complete application along with its score\nas well as any notes taken relating to the application[,]\"  and \" 2) Completed applications and\nscores of all applicants who received a cultural district designation along with any notes\n\n\fMs. Kate Exo\nNovember 22, 2024\nPage 2\n\ntaken relating to the applications.\" 1 On February 27, 2024,  DCEO granted\nrequest in part and denied his request in part.  DCEO provided responsive application materials\nbut stated that scoring materials for all applicants were exempt under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA, 2\nand that it redacted signatures,  tax identification numbers,  and financial\ninformation pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 3 DCEO also stated that \"[ t]he evaluation notes and internal\ncommunications regarding applicants are preliminary because they contain incomplete\ninformation and the impressions and recommendations of the Department staff regarding the\nformation of policy and Department action.\" 4\n\nOn March 14, 2024, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for\n\nReview contesting DCEO' s partial denial of his request.  \nattachments about State- designated cultural districts,  including the history of the bill that, as\nPublic Act 102-628, effective January 1, 2022,  authorized the State- designated cultural districts\nprogram, 5 the language of that Act, and an October 2021 Block Club Chicago article about its\nenactment. 6\n\nincluded three\n\nOn March 27, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to DCEO\nand asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office' s confidential\nreview,  as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the\nasserted exemptions to these records.   On April 5, 2024,  DCEO provided\noffice with its written response.   DCEO separately provided this office with unredacted copies of\nthe withheld records.   On April 8, 2024,  this office notified\nof his right to reply;  he\nconfirmed receipt that same day and provided a substantive reply on April 17, 2024. \n\nand this\n\n2024).  \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto [ DCEO] ( February 9,  \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023;  \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023;  \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024.  \n\nOpportunity to\n\nUprising Theater ( February 27, 2024).  \n\n4Letter from Kate Exo, Legal Counsel,  FOIA Officer,  Department of Commerce and Economic\n\n520 ILCS 605/605-1057 ( West 2022). \n\n6Mina Bloom,  Heart of Humboldt Park's Puerto Rican Community Will Become ' Puerto Rico\n\nTown'  Under State Bill, Block Club Chicago ( October 15, 2021),  https:// blockclubchicago. org/2021/ 10/15/ heart- of-\nhumboldt- parks- puerto- rican- community- will-become- puerto- rico- town- under- state- bill/.    \n\n\fMs. Kate Exo\nNovember 22, 2024\nPage 3\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to\n\nbe open to inspection and copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   Any public body that asserts\nthat a record is exempt from disclosure \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing\nevidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The\nexemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed.   See Lieber v. Board of Trustees of\nSouthern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 ( 1997). \n\nAs an initial matter,  the Public Access Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes is\n\nlimited to alleged violations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. ( West\n2022)).   See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2022).   FOIA governs the disclosure of existing public\nrecords;  FOIA does not govern how awards are made under the State- designated cultural districts\nprogram.   Thus,  although\nhas set forth arguments about perceived unfairness and\ncronyism in the State- designated cultural district selection process in his communications with\nDCEO before he submitted the Request for Review,  those claims are outside of this office' s\nscope of review.   Any inequities in the State- designated cultural district selection process do not\nimpact whether the records DCEO withheld fall within the scope of the exemption that DCEO\nasserted to withhold the records,  section 7(1)( f) of FOIA.   \n\nAdditionally, \n\nnoted in his reply to DCEO' s response to this office\n\nthat he \" never requested nor planned to request ' signatures and tax identification from the\nrequested information pursuant to Section 7(1)(b) of the Act[.]\" 7 Furthermore,  he stated he is\nnot interested,  nor have I have ever been interested in 'private information'  or 'unique\nidentifiers.'\" 8\npursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 9 This office has reviewed the redacted application\nmaterials\nprovided to\n\nthus conveyed that he does not contest the redactions DCEO made\n\nit appears he has now been provided with copies of all of the requested\n\n2024).  \n\n2024).   \n\n7E- mail from\n\n8E- mail from\n\nto Katie Goldsmith ( April 17, \n\nto Katie Goldsmith ( April 17, \n\n9Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information,  unless disclosure is\n\nrequired by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law, or a court order.\"   Section 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.))  defines \" private information\"  as \"[ u] nique identifiers,  including\"  items such as\npersonal financial\n\ninformation.\" \n\n\fMs. Kate Exo\nNovember 22, 2024\nPage 4\n\napplications. 10 This determination letter therefore concerns whether section 7(1)(f) of FOIA\napplies to the withheld records:  applicants'  individual score sheets and the aggregate score sheet. \n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]reliminary drafts,  notes,  \n\nrecommendations,  memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed,  or policies or\nactions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\"   Section\n7(1)(f) is equivalent in most respects to the \" deliberative process\"  exemption in the Federal\nFOIA ( 5 U.S.C. § 552( b)(5) (2018)),  which applies to \" inter-  and intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative material.\"   Harwood v. McDonough,  344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 ( 2003).   Section\n7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open\ndiscussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\"  ( Emphasis added.)  \nHarwood,  344 Ill. App. 3d at 248.  \" In order to be exempt under this provision,  the responsive\nmaterials must be both ( 1) inter or intra agency and ( 2) predecisional and deliberative.\"   Fisher v. \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General,  2021 IL App (1st)  200225, ¶  19.   \n\nIn its response to this office, DCEO maintained that it properly withheld the\n\nrequested applicants'  score sheets because: \n\nThe score sheets meet both requirements described in Fisher.  \nFirst, the score sheets are internal to the Department.   They are\ncompleted by merit reviewers within the Department and are not\nshared externally.   Second,  they are predecisional and deliberative. \nThe scoring sheets contain the initial impressions of the merit\nreviewer and their evaluation of the application materials in key\ncategories chosen to identify the most successful applicants.  The\nevaluations performed by the reviewers are then aggregated and\nrecommendations are made based on the scoring of each of the\napplicants.[ 11]  \n\nIn reply, \n\nargued that DCEO' s analysis was incomplete because\n\nc]ourts must also balance four factors when determining whether any invasion of privacy is\n\nwarranted by granting a FOIA request: ( 1) the plaintiff' s interest in disclosure; ( 2) the public\ninterest in disclosure; ( 3) the degree of the invasion of personal privacy;  and ( 4) the availability\n\n10In his April 17, 2024,  reply, \n\nagain asked for the completed applications for\n\nUprising Theater and the successful applicants.   Based on this office's careful review of the application materials\nprovided to\nmaterials for The Springfield Project.   On August 20, 2024, DCEO provided\ncopy of The Springfield Project' s redacted application. \n\nhe was initially provided with all application materials,  except for the application\n\nand this office with a\n\nOpportunity,  to Katie Goldsmith,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( April 5, 2024),  at [ 2].  \n\n11Letter from Kate Exo, Legal Counsel,  FOIA Officer,  Department of Commerce and Economic\n\n\fMs. Kate Exo\nNovember 22, 2024\nPage 5\n\nrelied on a\n\nof any alternate means of obtaining the requested information.\" 12\nfederal case,  Minnis v. United States Department of Agriculture,  737 F.2d 784, 786 ( 9th Cir. \n1984).   That case interpreted a Federal FOIA provision,  5 U.S.C. § 552( B)(6), which exempts\nmedical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy[.]\" 13 The corresponding exemption in Illinois'  FOIA is section\n7(1)(c), 14 which DCEO did not assert to withhold the responsive records.   Unlike the section\n7(1)(c) exemption,  the section 7(1)(f) exemption does not involve weighing the public interest in\ndisclosure;  section 7(1)(f) exempts from disclosure inter-  or intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative records regardless of the extent of the public interest in disclosure.   Therefore,  the\nMinnis case is irrelevant to this matter and\ninterest in disclosure of the records do not impact the applicability of section 7(1)(f). \n\nclaims with respect to the public\n\nalso argued in his reply that \"[ o] ne of the ten designated cultural\n\ndistricts was announced to the public in October 2021 and DCEO therefore loses its exemption\nsince a portion of the record was publicly cited and identified.\" 15 As quoted above,  a public\nbody waives the applicability of section 7(1)(f) to a record or specific portion of a record if the\nrecord or specific portion is \" publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" 16 In\nDumke v. City of Chicago,  2013 IL App (1st)  121668,  the Illinois Appellate Court considered\nwhether a public statement by the mayor of the City of Chicago \" publicly cited and identified\"  a\nrecord for purposes of section 7(1)(f).  In explaining the meaning of \"publicly cited and\nidentified,\"  the court found that the terms \" cite\"  and \" identify\"  have plain meanings: \n\nCite\"  is defined as, \"[ t]o mention or bring forward as support, \nillustration,  or proof.\" [ Citation.]  \" Identify\"  means to \" 1 a: to\ncause to be or become identical b: to conceive as united ( as in\n\n12E- mail from\n\nExecutive Director,  Uprising Theater,  to Katie Goldsmith ( April\n\n17, 2024).    \n\n13Minnis,  737 F.2d at 786.  \n\n145 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(c) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023;  \n\n103- 423,  effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024 ( exempting from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information.\"). \n\ninformation\n\n17, 2024).    \n\n15E- mail from\n\nExecutive Director,  Uprising Theater,  to Katie Goldsmith ( April\n\n16FOIA defines \" head of the public body\"  as \" the president,  mayor,  chairman,  presiding officer, \ndirector,  superintendent,  manager,  supervisor or individual otherwise holding primary executive and administrative\nauthority for the public body,  or such person' s duly authorized designee.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 2(e) ( West 2023 Supp.).    \n\n\fMs. Kate Exo\nNovember 22, 2024\nPage 6\n\nspirit, outlook,  or principle) ‹ groups that are identified with\nconservation›  2 a: to establish the identity of b: to determine the\ntaxonomic position of (a biological specimen) \" establish the\nidentity of: show or prove the sameness of.\"  [Citation.]  ( Emphasis\nin original.)   Dumke, 2013 IL App (1st)  121668, ¶  20.   \n\nThe court concluded that the mayor publicly cited and identified a study about police department\nstaffing levels by describing the study and its purpose during a press conference and by\nexplaining that the police department would be increasing staffing levels as a result of the study. \nDumke, 2013 IL App (1st)  121668, ¶  24.   \n\nIn contrast, \n\ndid not provide any evidence in support of the argument\n\nreferenced in his Request for Review\n\nthat the head of DCEO cited and identified the records that DCEO withheld in response to his\nrequest.   The Block Club Chicago article\ndescribes how Governor Pritzker was joined by State and city legislators at a news conference to\ncelebrate the passage of the bill creating State- designated cultural districts. 17 At the time of that\nOctober 2021 press conference,  the scoring records and notes\nexist because applications for the program were not made available until September 22, 2023. 18\nThose records could not have been cited and identified within the meaning of section 7(1)(f) \nwhen they did not yet exist.  While the article quotes Governor Pritzker as supporting the State-\ndesignated cultural districts program,  the article is devoid of any suggestion that Governor\nPritzker identified any existing evaluation materials for the program or brought forward any such\nmaterials as support,  illustration,  or proof or any matter.   The article does not indicate that the\ndirector of DCEO was in attendance at that October 2021 event.   Absent any facts indicating that\nthe head of DCEO publicly cited and identified the specific evaluative records at issue in this\nmatter,  there is no basis from which this office could conclude that the section 7(1)(f) FOIA\nexemption was waived.   \n\nrequested did not\n\nThis office' s review of the withheld applicants'  score sheets confirmed that the\n\nscore sheets consist of scoring information that reflects DCEO employees'  intra- agency opinions\nabout the applications for State- designated cultural districts.   DCEO advised that the scoring\ninformation in these records is predecisional and deliberative because the reviewers'  opinions\nwere later aggregated to derive final scores.   The Public Access Bureau has previously\ndetermined that internal evaluator scores that a public body uses to assess bids constitute\npredecisional and deliberative material within the scope of 7(1)( f) of FOIA.  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC. \n\n17Mina Bloom,  Heart of Humboldt Park's Puerto Rican Community Will Become ' Puerto Rico\n\nTown' Under State Bill, Block Club Chicago ( October 15, 2021),  https:// blockclubchicago. org/2021/ 10/15/heart- of-\nhumboldt- parks- puerto- rican- community- will-become- puerto- rico-town- under- state- bill/.    \n\n18Illinois State-Designated Cultural Districts, Illinois Department of Commerce &  Economic\n\nOpportunity,  https:// dceo. illinois. gov/ omee/ state- cultural- districts- nodo. html (\" Governor Pritzker' s administration on\nSeptember 22, 2023,  launched the application to apply to become a State- Designated Cultural District in Illinois.\"). \n\n\fMs. Kate Exo\nNovember 22, 2024\nPage 7\n\nReq.  Rev. Ltr. 23527,  issued August 20, 2013,  at 2.  Although portions of the records at issue in\nthis matter consist of factual information,  disclosure of those facts would reveal DCEO' s process\nof formulating action concerning the applications.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the\nwithheld applicants'  score sheets are exempt pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nDCEO has also provided this office with a copy of the withheld aggregate score\n\nsheet referenced in its response.   DCEO stated that the aggregate score sheet \" would assist in the\ndetermination of the recipients of the cultural districts designation.\" 19 In response to this office's\nrequest for clarification,  DCEO explained that the scores strongly influence the selection process, \nbut DCEO has discretion to consider certain other criteria in cultural district designations.  \nBecause the scores are not dispositive of the outcome,  they constitute predecisional deliberative\nmaterial rather than final decisions.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that DCEO did not\nimproperly withhold those scores under section 7(1)( f) of FOIA.   \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter closes this file.  Please contact me at\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov if you have any questions.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80603 71f proper sa\n\nEconomic Opportunity,  to [ Katie]  Goldsmith ( August 20, 2024). \n\n19E- mail from Kate Exo, Legal Counsel,  FOIA Officer,  Illinois Department of Commerce &  \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Applications, scores, and evaluation notes for cultural districts program","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80603/","full_text":"November 22, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kate Exo\nLegal Counsel, FOIA Officer\nIllinois Department of Commerce & Economic Opportunity\n555 West Monroe Street, Suite 1200\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nkate.exo@illinois. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80603; DCEO no. 2024- 0019\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Exo: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois Department of Commerce & Economic\nOpportunity (DCEO) has not improperly withheld records responsive to\nFebruary 9, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a\n\ntwo- part FOIA request to DCEO regarding applications for the State- designated cultural districts\nprogram. \nsought: \" 1) Uprising Theater's complete application along with its score\nas well as any notes taken relating to the application[,]\" and \" 2) Completed applications and\n\ntaken relating to the applications.\" 1 On February 27, 2024, DCEO granted\nrequest in part and denied his request in part. DCEO provided responsive application materials\nbut stated that scoring materials for all applicants were exempt under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA, 2\nand that it redacted signatures, tax identification numbers, and financial\ninformation pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 3 DCEO also stated that \"[ t]he evaluation notes and internal\ncommunications regarding applicants are preliminary because they contain incomplete\ninformation and the impressions and recommendations of the Department staff regarding the\nformation of policy and Department action.\" 4\n\nOn March 14, 2024, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for\n\nReview contesting DCEO's partial denial of his request. \nattachments about State- designated cultural districts, including the history of the bill that, as\nPublic Act 102-628, effective January 1, 2022, authorized the State- designated cultural districts\nprogram, 5 the language of that Act, and an October 2021 Block Club Chicago article about its\nenactment. 6\n\nincluded three\n\nOn March 27, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to DCEO\nand asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office's confidential\nreview, as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the\nasserted exemptions to these records. On April 5, 2024, DCEO provided\noffice with its written response. DCEO separately provided this office with unredacted copies of\nthe withheld records. On April 8, 2024, this office notified\nof his right to reply; he\nconfirmed receipt that same day and provided a substantive reply on April 17, 2024. \n\nand this\n\n2024). \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto [ DCEO] (February 9, \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024; 103- 554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024; 103- 554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\nOpportunity to\n\nUprising Theater (February 27, 2024). \n\n4 Letter from Kate Exo, Legal Counsel, FOIA Officer, Department of Commerce and Economic\n\n520 ILCS 605/605-1057 (West 2022). \n\n6 Mina Bloom, Heart of Humboldt Park's Puerto Rican Community Will Become ' Puerto Rico\n\nTown' Under State Bill, Block Club Chicago (October 15, 2021), https:// blockclubchicago. org/2021/ 10/15/ heart- of-\nhumboldt- parks- puerto- rican- community- will-become- puerto- rico- town- under- state- bill/. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to\n\nbe open to inspection and copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). Any public body that asserts\nthat a record is exempt from disclosure \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing\nevidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The\nexemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed. See Lieber v. Board of Trustees of\nSouthern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is\n\nlimited to alleged violations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. (West\n2022)). See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2022). FOIA governs the disclosure of existing public\nrecords; FOIA does not govern how awards are made under the State- designated cultural districts\nprogram. Thus, although\nhas set forth arguments about perceived unfairness and\ncronyism in the State- designated cultural district selection process in his communications with\nDCEO before he submitted the Request for Review, those claims are outside of this office's\nscope of review. Any inequities in the State- designated cultural district selection process do not\nimpact whether the records DCEO withheld fall within the scope of the exemption that DCEO\nasserted to withhold the records, section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nAdditionally, \n\nnoted in his reply to DCEO's response to this office\n\nthat he \" never requested nor planned to request ' signatures and tax identification from the\nrequested information pursuant to Section 7(1)(b) of the Act[.]\" 7 Furthermore, he stated he is\nnot interested, nor have I have ever been interested in 'private information' or 'unique\nidentifiers.'\" 8\npursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 9 This office has reviewed the redacted application\nmaterials\nprovided to\n\nthus conveyed that he does not contest the redactions DCEO made\n\nit appears he has now been provided with copies of all of the requested\n\n2024). \n\n2024). \n\n7E- mail from\n\n8E- mail from\n\nto Katie Goldsmith (April 17, \n\nto Katie Goldsmith (April 17, \n\n9 Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information, unless disclosure is\n\nrequired by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law, or a court order.\" Section 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \" private information\" as \"[ u] nique identifiers, including\" items such as\n\napplications. 10 This determination letter therefore concerns whether section 7(1)(f) of FOIA\napplies to the withheld records: applicants' individual score sheets and the aggregate score sheet. \n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]reliminary drafts, notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" Section\n7(1)(f) is equivalent in most respects to the \" deliberative process\" exemption in the Federal\nFOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018)), which applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative material.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003). Section\n7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open\ndiscussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\" (Emphasis added.) \nHarwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248. \" In order to be exempt under this provision, the responsive\nmaterials must be both (1) inter or intra agency and (2) predecisional and deliberative.\" Fisher v. \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 19. \n\nIn its response to this office, DCEO maintained that it properly withheld the\n\nrequested applicants' score sheets because: \n\nThe score sheets meet both requirements described in Fisher. \nFirst, the score sheets are internal to the Department. They are\ncompleted by merit reviewers within the Department and are not\nshared externally. Second, they are predecisional and deliberative. \nThe scoring sheets contain the initial impressions of the merit\nreviewer and their evaluation of the application materials in key\ncategories chosen to identify the most successful applicants. The\nevaluations performed by the reviewers are then aggregated and\nrecommendations are made based on the scoring of each of the\napplicants.[ 11] \n\nIn reply, \n\nargued that DCEO's analysis was incomplete because\n\nc]ourts must also balance four factors when determining whether any invasion of privacy is\n\nwarranted by granting a FOIA request: (1) the plaintiff's interest in disclosure; (2) the public\ninterest in disclosure; (3) the degree of the invasion of personal privacy; and (4) the availability\n\n10 In his April 17, 2024, reply, \n\nagain asked for the completed applications for\n\nUprising Theater and the successful applicants. Based on this office's careful review of the application materials\nprovided to\nmaterials for The Springfield Project. On August 20, 2024, DCEO provided\ncopy of The Springfield Project's redacted application. \n\nhe was initially provided with all application materials, except for the application\n\nand this office with a\n\nOpportunity, to Katie Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (April 5, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\nrelied on a\n\nof any alternate means of obtaining the requested information.\" 12\nfederal case, Minnis v. United States Department of Agriculture, 737 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. \n1984). That case interpreted a Federal FOIA provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552(B)(6), which exempts\nmedical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy[.]\" 13 The corresponding exemption in Illinois' FOIA is section\n7(1)(c), 14 which DCEO did not assert to withhold the responsive records. Unlike the section\n7(1)(c) exemption, the section 7(1)(f) exemption does not involve weighing the public interest in\ndisclosure; section 7(1)(f) exempts from disclosure inter- or intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative records regardless of the extent of the public interest in disclosure. Therefore, the\nMinnis case is irrelevant to this matter and\ninterest in disclosure of the records do not impact the applicability of section 7(1)(f). \n\nclaims with respect to the public\n\nalso argued in his reply that \"[ o] ne of the ten designated cultural\n\ndistricts was announced to the public in October 2021 and DCEO therefore loses its exemption\nsince a portion of the record was publicly cited and identified.\" 15 As quoted above, a public\nbody waives the applicability of section 7(1)(f) to a record or specific portion of a record if the\nrecord or specific portion is \" publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" 16 In\nDumke v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 121668, the Illinois Appellate Court considered\nwhether a public statement by the mayor of the City of Chicago \" publicly cited and identified\" a\nrecord for purposes of section 7(1)(f). In explaining the meaning of \"publicly cited and\nidentified,\" the court found that the terms \" cite\" and \" identify\" have plain meanings: \n\nCite\" is defined as, \"[ t]o mention or bring forward as support, \nillustration, or proof.\" [ Citation.] \" Identify\" means to \" 1 a: to\ncause to be or become identical b: to conceive as united (as in\n\n12E- mail from\n\nExecutive Director, Uprising Theater, to Katie Goldsmith (April\n\n17, 2024). \n\n13 Minnis, 737 F.2d at 786. \n\n145 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024; 103- 554, effective January 1, 2024 (exempting from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information.\"). \n\ninformation\n\n17, 2024). \n\n15E- mail from\n\nExecutive Director, Uprising Theater, to Katie Goldsmith (April\n\n16FOIA defines \" head of the public body\" as \" the president, mayor, chairman, presiding officer, \ndirector, superintendent, manager, supervisor or individual otherwise holding primary executive and administrative\nauthority for the public body, or such person's duly authorized designee.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 2(e) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\nspirit, outlook, or principle) ‹ groups that are identified with\nconservation› 2 a: to establish the identity of b: to determine the\ntaxonomic position of (a biological specimen) \" establish the\nidentity of: show or prove the sameness of.\" [Citation.] (Emphasis\nin original.) Dumke, 2013 IL App (1st) 121668, ¶ 20. \n\nThe court concluded that the mayor publicly cited and identified a study about police department\nstaffing levels by describing the study and its purpose during a press conference and by\nexplaining that the police department would be increasing staffing levels as a result of the study. \nDumke, 2013 IL App (1st) 121668, ¶ 24. \n\nIn contrast, \n\ndid not provide any evidence in support of the argument\n\nreferenced in his Request for Review\n\nthat the head of DCEO cited and identified the records that DCEO withheld in response to his\nrequest. The Block Club Chicago article\ndescribes how Governor Pritzker was joined by State and city legislators at a news conference to\ncelebrate the passage of the bill creating State- designated cultural districts. 17 At the time of that\nOctober 2021 press conference, the scoring records and notes\nexist because applications for the program were not made available until September 22, 2023. 18\nThose records could not have been cited and identified within the meaning of section 7(1)(f) \nwhen they did not yet exist. While the article quotes Governor Pritzker as supporting the State-\ndesignated cultural districts program, the article is devoid of any suggestion that Governor\nPritzker identified any existing evaluation materials for the program or brought forward any such\nmaterials as support, illustration, or proof or any matter. The article does not indicate that the\ndirector of DCEO was in attendance at that October 2021 event. Absent any facts indicating that\nthe head of DCEO publicly cited and identified the specific evaluative records at issue in this\nmatter, there is no basis from which this office could conclude that the section 7(1)(f) FOIA\nexemption was waived. \n\nrequested did not\n\nThis office's review of the withheld applicants' score sheets confirmed that the\n\nscore sheets consist of scoring information that reflects DCEO employees' intra- agency opinions\nabout the applications for State- designated cultural districts. DCEO advised that the scoring\ninformation in these records is predecisional and deliberative because the reviewers' opinions\nwere later aggregated to derive final scores. The Public Access Bureau has previously\ndetermined that internal evaluator scores that a public body uses to assess bids constitute\npredecisional and deliberative material within the scope of 7(1)(f) of FOIA. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC. \n\n17 Mina Bloom, Heart of Humboldt Park's Puerto Rican Community Will Become ' Puerto Rico\n\nTown' Under State Bill, Block Club Chicago (October 15, 2021), https:// blockclubchicago. org/2021/ 10/15/heart- of-\nhumboldt- parks- puerto- rican- community- will-become- puerto- rico-town- under- state- bill/. \n\n18 Illinois State-Designated Cultural Districts, Illinois Department of Commerce & Economic\n\nOpportunity, https:// dceo. illinois. gov/ omee/ state- cultural- districts- nodo. html (\" Governor Pritzker's administration on\nSeptember 22, 2023, launched the application to apply to become a State- Designated Cultural District in Illinois.\"). \n\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 23527, issued August 20, 2013, at 2. Although portions of the records at issue in\nthis matter consist of factual information, disclosure of those facts would reveal DCEO's process\nof formulating action concerning the applications. Accordingly, this office concludes that the\nwithheld applicants' score sheets are exempt pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nDCEO has also provided this office with a copy of the withheld aggregate score\n\nsheet referenced in its response. DCEO stated that the aggregate score sheet \" would assist in the\ndetermination of the recipients of the cultural districts designation.\" 19 In response to this office's\nrequest for clarification, DCEO explained that the scores strongly influence the selection process, \nbut DCEO has discretion to consider certain other criteria in cultural district designations. \nBecause the scores are not dispositive of the outcome, they constitute predecisional deliberative\nmaterial rather than final decisions. Accordingly, this office concludes that DCEO did not\nimproperly withhold those scores under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter closes this file. Please contact me at\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov if you have any questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80603 71f proper sa\n\nEconomic Opportunity, to [ Katie] Goldsmith (August 20, 2024). \n\n19E- mail from Kate Exo, Legal Counsel, FOIA Officer, Illinois Department of Commerce &"}
{"id":1048,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2022-07-22","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80655"],"title":"City of Kankakee improperly withheld surveillance video under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(d)(i) and (iii)","filename":"80655, Issued July 22, 2022.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1294,"summary":"The requester sought surveillance video of a shooting incident, which the City of Kankakee denied citing law enforcement exemptions. The PAC determined the City failed to provide sufficient evidence that disclosure would interfere with proceedings or deprive anyone of a fair trial.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested surveillance video of a shooting from the City of Kankakee, but the City refused to release it, claiming it would interfere with an ongoing legal case. The Attorney General's office reviewed the records and found the City did not prove that releasing the video would actually harm the legal process. Consequently, the PAC directed the City to provide the records to the requester.","holding":"The City of Kankakee improperly withheld the requested surveillance video records under sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Did the City of Kankakee meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the requested surveillance video was exempt from disclosure under the law enforcement exemptions of FOIA?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i)","5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(i)","7(1)(d)(iii)"],"public_body":"City of Kankakee","requesting_party":"Anonymous requester","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request involved surveillance video footage related to a shooting incident.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_iii/80655%2C%20Issued%20July%2022%2C%202022.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["surveillance video","law enforcement records","FOIA denial","burden of proof"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"July 22, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Karla Gifford\nFOIA Officer\nCity of Kankakee\n304 South Indiana Avenue\nKankakee,  IL 60901- 3904\nkjgifford@citykankakee-il.gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80655\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Gifford: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024).  For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the City of Kankakee ( City)  improperly denied\nMarch 18,  2024,  FOIA\nrequest. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City seeking\n\nsurveillance video from a specified incident involving a shooting that occurred on or about April\n29, 2023.  On March 19, 2024, the City denied the request in its entirety pursuant to section\n7(1)( d)( iii) of FOIA. 1 The City' s response stated that \"[ t]he information pertaining to [ the] \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, \n\n2023;  103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, 2023; \n103-540, effective January 1, 2024;  103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fMs. Gifford\nJuly 22, 2024\nPage 2\n\nrequest continues to be part of an open case with the Kankakee County Circuit Court\" 2 and also\ninvoked language from section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA.3 On March 23, 2024, this office received\ncomplete Request for Review contesting the City' s denial of his request. \n\nOn April 9, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the City\n\nand asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for our confidential review, \ntogether with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for its denial.   On May 1, \n2024, this office received the City's response.  One May 2, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of\nthe City' s response to\nhe replied on May 7, 2024,  maintaining that the City failed to\ndemonstrate that the footage falls within the section 7(1)(d)(i) or 7(1)(d)(iii) exemptions. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022).   A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.  5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2020).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed.   Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nRecords in the possession of any public body created in the\n\nd) \ncourse of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ninterfere with pending or actually and reasonably\n\ni) \ncontemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by\nany law enforcement or correctional agency that is the\nrecipient of the request; [ or] \n\n2Letter from Karla Gifford, FOIA Officer, City of Kankakee, to\n\nMarch 19, 2024), at\n\n1]. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, 2023;  103-540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fMs. Gifford\nJuly 22, 2024\nPage 3\n\ncreate a substantial\n\niii) \ndeprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing[.] \n\nlikelihood that a person will be\n\nIn its response to this office, the City again cited section 7(1)(d)(iii) and reiterated\n\nthe explanation it provided in its denial\n\nletter: \n\n7(1)( d)(iii): Allows a public body to withhold records to the extent\ndisclosure would create a substantial likelihood that a person will\nbe deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing.  that would\ninterfere with pending or actually or reasonably contemplated law\nenforcement proceedings conducted by the law enforcement\nagency that received the FOIA request. 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii) \nWest 2010).  There are reasonably contemplated law enforcement\nproceedings that will be conducted that would be interfered with if\nsaid records were released.[ 4]  ( Emphasis in original.) \n\nThe City did not provide further information regarding any law enforcement proceedings,  a trial\nor a hearing related to the matter underlying the contested records, but argued in part that it could\nnot provide\ninvolvement in the incident. \n\nthe video because he did not provide an explanation as to his\n\nUnder section 7(1)(d)(i), \"[t]he classification of information as 'law enforcement' \n\nto support the assertion of the pending law enforcement proceeding exemption.   Day\n\nor 'investigatory'  does not necessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown,  in a particular\ncase, that disclosure would interfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the\npublic interest.\"   Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake,  192 Ill. App. 3d 530,  536 ( 1989).   Conclusory\nstatements that the disclosure of records would obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are\ninsufficient\nv. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74-77 (2009).  \"Simply saying there is an 'ongoing\ncriminal\ninvestigation because the case has not been cleared,'  with little additional explanation,  is\nnot 'objective indicia' sufficient to show the ongoing investigation exemption applies.\"  Day, 388\nIll. App.  3d at 76;  see also Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No. 17- 001,  issued March 14,  2017 ( the\nmere commencement of an investigation or prosecution does not constitute clear and convincing\nevidence that any records are exempt from disclosure). \n\nSection 7(1)( d)( iii) of FOIA corresponds with a provision of Federal FOIA ( 5\n\nU.S.C. 552(b)(7)(B) (2018)) that exempts records compiled for law enforcement purposes to the\nextent that disclosure would \" deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial\nadjudication.\"  In order to demonstrate that records are exempt pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(iii), a\n\nAttorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( May 1, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n4Letter from Karla Gifford, FOIA Officer, City of Kankakee,  to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant\n\n\fMs. Gifford\nJuly 22, 2024\nPage 4\n\npublic body must establish: \"( 1) that a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent;  and ( 2) \nthat it is more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere\nwith the fairness of those proceedings.\"   Washington Post Co.  v. U.S.  Dep' t of Justice,  863 F.2d\n96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1988). \n\nThe City's response to this office is conclusory.  The City did not provide\n\nobjective indicia or articulate with specific facts how or why the disclosure of the contested\nrecords would interfere with any law enforcement proceedings.  The City's response did not\nindicate that that a trial was in progress or imminent at the time of the request,  or illustrate how\nthe release of these records would create a substantial likelihood that any individual would be\ndeprived of a fair trial.   Based on this office' s confidential review of the records,  it is also unclear\nconnection to the records or underlying incident would support either\nhow\njustification for the City' s denial.   Because the City did not provide clear and convincing\nevidence demonstrating that disclosure would interfere with law enforcement proceedings or\ncreate a substantial\nwithheld the records under sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA. \n\nlikelihood that a person would be deprived of a fair trial,  the City improperly\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed above, this office requests that the\n\nCity provide\n\nwith copies of the responsive records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or ( 773)  590- 7878.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80655 f 71di improper 71diii\n\nimproper pd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Surveillance video footage of a shooting incident","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80655/","full_text":"July 22, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Karla Gifford\nFOIA Officer\nCity of Kankakee\n304 South Indiana Avenue\nKankakee, IL 60901- 3904\nkjgifford@citykankakee-il.gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80655\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Gifford: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the City of Kankakee (City) improperly denied\nMarch 18, 2024, FOIA\nrequest. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City seeking\n\nsurveillance video from a specified incident involving a shooting that occurred on or about April\n29, 2023. On March 19, 2024, the City denied the request in its entirety pursuant to section\n7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA. 1 The City's response stated that \"[ t]he information pertaining to [ the] \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, \n\n2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; \n\nrequest continues to be part of an open case with the Kankakee County Circuit Court\" 2 and also\ninvoked language from section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA.3 On March 23, 2024, this office received\ncomplete Request for Review contesting the City's denial of his request. \n\nOn April 9, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the City\n\nand asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for our confidential review, \ntogether with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for its denial. On May 1, \n2024, this office received the City's response. One May 2, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of\nthe City's response to\nhe replied on May 7, 2024, maintaining that the City failed to\ndemonstrate that the footage falls within the section 7(1)(d)(i) or 7(1)(d)(iii) exemptions. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2020). The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nRecords in the possession of any public body created in the\n\nd) \ncourse of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ninterfere with pending or actually and reasonably\n\ni) \ncontemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by\nany law enforcement or correctional agency that is the\nrecipient of the request; [ or] \n\n2 Letter from Karla Gifford, FOIA Officer, City of Kankakee, to\n\nMarch 19, 2024), at\n\n1]. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, \n\ncreate a substantial\n\niii) \ndeprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing[.] \n\nlikelihood that a person will be\n\nIn its response to this office, the City again cited section 7(1)(d)(iii) and reiterated\n\nthe explanation it provided in its denial\n\nletter: \n\n7(1)(d)(iii): Allows a public body to withhold records to the extent\ndisclosure would create a substantial likelihood that a person will\nbe deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing. that would\ninterfere with pending or actually or reasonably contemplated law\nenforcement proceedings conducted by the law enforcement\nagency that received the FOIA request. 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii) \nWest 2010). There are reasonably contemplated law enforcement\nproceedings that will be conducted that would be interfered with if\nsaid records were released.[ 4] (Emphasis in original.) \n\nThe City did not provide further information regarding any law enforcement proceedings, a trial\nor a hearing related to the matter underlying the contested records, but argued in part that it could\nnot provide\ninvolvement in the incident. \n\nthe video because he did not provide an explanation as to his\n\nUnder section 7(1)(d)(i), \"[t]he classification of information as 'law enforcement' \n\nto support the assertion of the pending law enforcement proceeding exemption. Day\n\nor 'investigatory' does not necessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown, in a particular\ncase, that disclosure would interfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the\npublic interest.\" Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989). Conclusory\nstatements that the disclosure of records would obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are\ninsufficient\nv. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74-77 (2009). \"Simply saying there is an 'ongoing\ncriminal\ninvestigation because the case has not been cleared,' with little additional explanation, is\nnot 'objective indicia' sufficient to show the ongoing investigation exemption applies.\" Day, 388\nIll. App. 3d at 76; see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 17- 001, issued March 14, 2017 (the\nmere commencement of an investigation or prosecution does not constitute clear and convincing\nevidence that any records are exempt from disclosure). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA corresponds with a provision of Federal FOIA (5\n\nU.S.C. 552(b)(7)(B) (2018)) that exempts records compiled for law enforcement purposes to the\nextent that disclosure would \" deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial\nadjudication.\" In order to demonstrate that records are exempt pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(iii), a\n\nAttorney General, Public Access Bureau (May 1, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n4 Letter from Karla Gifford, FOIA Officer, City of Kankakee, to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant\n\npublic body must establish: \"(1) that a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent; and (2) \nthat it is more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere\nwith the fairness of those proceedings.\" Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep' t of Justice, 863 F.2d\n96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1988). \n\nThe City's response to this office is conclusory. The City did not provide\n\nobjective indicia or articulate with specific facts how or why the disclosure of the contested\nrecords would interfere with any law enforcement proceedings. The City's response did not\nindicate that that a trial was in progress or imminent at the time of the request, or illustrate how\nthe release of these records would create a substantial likelihood that any individual would be\ndeprived of a fair trial. Based on this office's confidential review of the records, it is also unclear\nconnection to the records or underlying incident would support either\nhow\njustification for the City's denial. Because the City did not provide clear and convincing\nevidence demonstrating that disclosure would interfere with law enforcement proceedings or\ncreate a substantial\nwithheld the records under sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA. \n\nlikelihood that a person would be deprived of a fair trial, the City improperly\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed above, this office requests that the\n\nCity provide\n\nwith copies of the responsive records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773) 590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80655 f 71di improper 71diii\n\nimproper pd"}
{"id":1049,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-02","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80912"],"title":"Illinois State Police properly denied FOID info request under 7.5(v) privacy exemption","filename":"80912, issued May 2, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":773,"summary":"A requester sought information regarding their own Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card, which the Illinois State Police denied under section 7.5(v) of FOIA. The PAC determined that no further action was warranted because the requester can obtain this information through the Firearms Services Bureau as established by Illinois Supreme Court precedent.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested their own FOID card records from the Illinois State Police, but the agency denied the request citing a privacy exemption. The Attorney General's office closed the case, finding no further action warranted because the exemption does not allow individuals to obtain their own FOID information through FOIA. The office noted that FOID cardholders may obtain their FOID card applications and revocation letters through the Firearms Services Bureau, and that ISP's response included instructions to access the Bureau's website for FOID information.","holding":"The PAC determined that no further action is warranted because the requester's FOIA request was properly denied under section 7.5(v) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois State Police properly denied a FOIA request for an individual's own FOID card information under section 7.5(v) of FOIA.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(v)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(v)"],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOID records","subject_description":"The request concerned access to an individual's own Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card application and status records.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_v/80912%2C%20issued%20May%202%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOID card","Illinois State Police","personal records","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"May 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 80912\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5( f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024 ).  For the reasons explained below,  this office has determined that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn February 7 , 2024 , you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois State Police\n\nISP)  seeking information related to your Firearm Owner' s Identification Card ( FOID).   On\nMarch 4 , 202 4, ISP denied your request in its entirety pursuant to section 7.5( v) of FOIA. 1 On\nApril 4, 2024, you submitted the above -referenced Request for Review contesting ISP's denial of\nyour request and noting that the case only involves yourself. \n\nSection 7.5(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nNames and information of people who have applied for\n\nor received Firearm Owner's Identification Cards under the\nFirearm Owners Identification Card Act or applied for or received\na concealed carry license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, \nunless otherwise authorized by the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; \nand databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, records of\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7.5(v) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103 -142, effective January 1, 2024;  103 -372, effective January 1, 2024;  103 -508, \neffective July 1, 2023;  103 -580, effective December 8, 2023. \n\n\fMay 2, 2024\nPage 2\n\nthe Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board under the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act, and law enforcement agency objections\nunder the Firearm Concealed Carry Act. (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn Hart v. Illinois State Police , 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 27, the Illinois Supreme Court\n\nruled that the lower courts erred in concluding that the section 7.5(v) exemption did not\nencompass one's own FOID card application and other related documents .   The Supreme Court\ndetermined that section 7.5( v) imposes a blanket confidentiality provision on all FOID card\ninformation under FOIA , regardless of whether the requester is seeking their own information.  \nHart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 19.  In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court explained that the\nappellate court improperly read into section 7.5(v) an exception for people seeking their own\ninformation , which is contrary to the plain language \" explicitly exempting names and\ninformation \"  of individuals who have applied for or received FOID cards .  Hart,  2023 IL\n128275, ¶ 20; see also People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 231 Ill. 2d 370, \n386 (2008) (\" We do not depart from the plain language of the regulation by reading into it\nexceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent .\").   \n\nYour FOIA request plainly seeks information concerning a FOID card that you\nhad received but was later taken away .  Because section 7.5(v) of FOIA does not contain an\nexception that would permit FOID cardholders, or applicants, to obtain FOID information\nconcerning themselves through a FOIA request, ISP did not improperly deny your request\npursuant\nconcerning when it received your FOI D card and whether it was ever returned to you. 2\nAccordingly,  this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.   \n\nto section 7.5(v).  Additionally ,  FOIA did not require ISP to answer your questions\n\nThis office notes while FOIA is not the appropriate avenue for FOID cardholders\nto obtain their own information,  they may \" obtain their FOID card applications and revocation\nletters through the Firearms Services Bureau  [ Bureau],  the division of ISP that processes FOID\ncard applications and determines FOID card eligibility.\"   Hart,  2023 IL 128275, ¶  25 ( citing\nBrown v. Illinois State Police , 2021 IL 126153, ¶ 20). 3\n\n2A public body is not required to answer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA\n\nrequest.   Kenyon v. Garrels,  184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\n3ISP' s response to your request included instructions to access to the Bureau's website and search\n\nfor your FOID information. \n\n\fMay 2, 2024\nPage 3\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (773) 590 -7878 or benjamin.silver@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80912 f no fi war pd sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sarah Wheeler\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street, Suite 1000 -S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nISP.FOIA.Officer@illinois.gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A FOID card application and status records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80912/","full_text":"May 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80912\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons explained below, this office has determined that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn February 7, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois State Police\n\nISP) seeking information related to your Firearm Owner's Identification Card (FOID). On\nMarch 4, 202 4, ISP denied your request in its entirety pursuant to section 7.5(v) of FOIA. 1 On\nApril 4, 2024, you submitted the above -referenced Request for Review contesting ISP's denial of\nyour request and noting that the case only involves yourself. \n\nSection 7.5(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nNames and information of people who have applied for\n\nor received Firearm Owner's Identification Cards under the\nFirearm Owners Identification Card Act or applied for or received\na concealed carry license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, \nunless otherwise authorized by the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; \nand databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, records of\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7.5(v) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103 -142, effective January 1, 2024; 103 -372, effective January 1, 2024; 103 -508, \n\nthe Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board under the Firearm\nConcealed Carry Act, and law enforcement agency objections\nunder the Firearm Concealed Carry Act. (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn Hart v. Illinois State Police, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 27, the Illinois Supreme Court\n\nruled that the lower courts erred in concluding that the section 7.5(v) exemption did not\nencompass one's own FOID card application and other related documents. The Supreme Court\ndetermined that section 7.5(v) imposes a blanket confidentiality provision on all FOID card\ninformation under FOIA, regardless of whether the requester is seeking their own information. \nHart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 19. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court explained that the\nappellate court improperly read into section 7.5(v) an exception for people seeking their own\ninformation, which is contrary to the plain language \" explicitly exempting names and\ninformation \" of individuals who have applied for or received FOID cards. Hart, 2023 IL\n128275, ¶ 20; see also People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, \n386 (2008) (\" We do not depart from the plain language of the regulation by reading into it\nexceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent.\"). \n\nYour FOIA request plainly seeks information concerning a FOID card that you\nhad received but was later taken away. Because section 7.5(v) of FOIA does not contain an\nexception that would permit FOID cardholders, or applicants, to obtain FOID information\nconcerning themselves through a FOIA request, ISP did not improperly deny your request\npursuant\nconcerning when it received your FOI D card and whether it was ever returned to you. 2\nAccordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nto section 7.5(v). Additionally, FOIA did not require ISP to answer your questions\n\nThis office notes while FOIA is not the appropriate avenue for FOID cardholders\nto obtain their own information, they may \" obtain their FOID card applications and revocation\nletters through the Firearms Services Bureau [ Bureau], the division of ISP that processes FOID\ncard applications and determines FOID card eligibility.\" Hart, 2023 IL 128275, ¶ 25 (citing\nBrown v. Illinois State Police, 2021 IL 126153, ¶ 20). 3\n\n2A public body is not required to answer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA\n\nrequest. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\n3ISP's response to your request included instructions to access to the Bureau's website and search\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (773) 590 -7878 or benjamin.silver@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80912 f no fi war pd sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sarah Wheeler\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street, Suite 1000 -S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nISP.FOIA.Officer@illinois.gov"}
{"id":1050,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["80926"],"title":"Mokena Police Department properly redacted personal info, dates of birth under 7(1)(b)","filename":"80926, issued May 1, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":805,"summary":"A requester challenged the Mokena Police Department's redactions in a police report, specifically regarding personal information. The PAC determined that the redactions of private information and dates of birth were permissible under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested a police report, but the Mokena Police Department redacted certain personal details before releasing it. The citizen complained to the Attorney General's office, which reviewed the redactions. The PAC concluded that the police acted legally because the redacted information, such as home addresses and dates of birth, is protected from public disclosure.","holding":"The Mokena Police Department properly redacted private information and dates of birth from the requested police report.","legal_question":"Whether the Mokena Police Department properly redacted personal information and dates of birth from a police report pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)"],"public_body":"Mokena Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought a police report and challenged the redaction of personal identifiers and dates of birth.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_b/80926%2C%20issued%20May%201%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","redaction","private information","date of birth"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"May 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Patricia Contey\nRecords - Mokena Police Department\n10907 Front Street\nMokena, Illinois 60448\nadmin@mokenapd. com\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 80926;  Reference # M000152- \n032324\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Contey: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). \n\nOn March 23, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nMokena Police Department ( Police Department)  seeking a copy of a police report.   On March\n28, 2024, the Police Department provided records with certain information redacted pursuant to\nsection 7(1)( b)  of FOIA. 1 On April 5, 2024, \nRequest for Review disputing those redactions. \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, 2023;  103-540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103-554, effective January 1, 2024.  \n\n\fMs. Patricia Contey\nMay 1, 2024\nPage 2\n\nOn April 10, 2024,  an Assistant Attorney General ( AAG)  in the Public Access\n\nBureau reached out to\nPolice Department.   On April 11, 2024, \nsubmitted copies of all the records she received.  However, \ndid provide the AAG\nwith a copy of the handwritten note detailing the exact report number.   The note specified Case\nNumber 24-0223 and listed the name and badge number of the assisting officer.2\n\nfor a copy of the redacted record(s) she received from the\n\ntold the AAG that she already had\n\nOn April 16, 2024, this office sent a copy of\n\nRequest for Review\n\nto the Police Department and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of records\nwithheld for this office's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal\nand factual bases for the applicability of section 7(1)( b) of FOIA.   This office also asked the\nPolice Department to provide a copy of the redacted case report it gave\n28, 2024.   On that same date,  the Police Department provided this office with those materials.  \nLater that afternoon, this office forwarded a copy of the Police Department's response to\n\non March\n\nshe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept.  of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.  5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)( b) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information,  unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\"  \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) ( West 2022))  defines \" private information\"  as: \n\nU] nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, \nbiometric identifiers,  personal financial\ninformation,  passwords or\nother access codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers,  and personal email addresses.  Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  (Emphasis added.) \n\nPublic Access Bureau] ( April 12, 2024).  \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Christina Lucente- McCullough, [ Assistant Attorney General, \n\n\fMs. Patricia Contey\nMay 1, 2024\nPage 3\n\nIn its response to\n\nFOIA request,  the Police Department\n\nredacted\n\nprivate information contained in the requested police report.  This office's review of an\nunredacted copy of this report confirmed that the Police Department\nredacted the home\ntelephone number, home address, and driver's license number of an individual other than\n\nFurther,  the Police Department\n\nredacted this individual' s date of birth.   Because home\n\ntelephone numbers, home addresses, and driver's license numbers constitute \"private\ninformation\"  as defined in section 2(c-5),  the Police Department did not improperly withhold this\ninformation pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA.   Although the plain language of section 2(c-5) \ndoes not include dates of birth,  the Attorney General has concluded that the disclosure of a\nperson's date of birth would generally constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy ( Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No 16- 009,  issued November 7, 2016,  at 12),  so the Police\nDepartment permissibly redacted that information.   \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   If you have questions,  you may contact me at\nc.lucentemccullough@ilag.gov or the Chicago address on the first page.  This letter serves to\nclose this matter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80926 f 71b proper pd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A police report with redacted personal identifiers","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-80926/","full_text":"May 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Patricia Contey\nRecords - Mokena Police Department\n10907 Front Street\nMokena, Illinois 60448\nadmin@mokenapd. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 80926; Reference # M000152- \n032324\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Contey: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). \n\nOn March 23, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nMokena Police Department (Police Department) seeking a copy of a police report. On March\n28, 2024, the Police Department provided records with certain information redacted pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(b) of FOIA. 1 On April 5, 2024, \nRequest for Review disputing those redactions. \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, \n\nOn April 10, 2024, an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in the Public Access\n\nBureau reached out to\nPolice Department. On April 11, 2024, \nsubmitted copies of all the records she received. However, \ndid provide the AAG\nwith a copy of the handwritten note detailing the exact report number. The note specified Case\nNumber 24-0223 and listed the name and badge number of the assisting officer.2\n\nfor a copy of the redacted record(s) she received from the\n\ntold the AAG that she already had\n\nOn April 16, 2024, this office sent a copy of\n\nRequest for Review\n\nto the Police Department and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of records\nwithheld for this office's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal\nand factual bases for the applicability of section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. This office also asked the\nPolice Department to provide a copy of the redacted case report it gave\n28, 2024. On that same date, the Police Department provided this office with those materials. \nLater that afternoon, this office forwarded a copy of the Police Department's response to\n\non March\n\nshe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept. of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information, unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\" \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) (West 2022)) defines \" private information\" as: \n\nU] nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, \nbiometric identifiers, personal financial\ninformation, passwords or\nother access codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\n\nIn its response to\n\nFOIA request, the Police Department\n\nredacted\n\nprivate information contained in the requested police report. This office's review of an\nunredacted copy of this report confirmed that the Police Department\nredacted the home\ntelephone number, home address, and driver's license number of an individual other than\n\nFurther, the Police Department\n\nredacted this individual's date of birth. Because home\n\ntelephone numbers, home addresses, and driver's license numbers constitute \"private\ninformation\" as defined in section 2(c-5), the Police Department did not improperly withhold this\ninformation pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. Although the plain language of section 2(c-5) \ndoes not include dates of birth, the Attorney General has concluded that the disclosure of a\nperson's date of birth would generally constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy (Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No 16- 009, issued November 7, 2016, at 12), so the Police\nDepartment permissibly redacted that information. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have questions, you may contact me at\nc.lucentemccullough@ilag.gov or the Chicago address on the first page. This letter serves to\nclose this matter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n80926 f 71b proper pd"}
{"id":1051,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-04-25","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81001"],"title":"Hinsdale Public Library properly withheld library cardholder records under 7(1)(a)","filename":"81001, issued April 25, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":689,"summary":"The requester sought a list of all adult library cardholders from the Hinsdale Public Library, which the Library denied citing the Library Records Confidentiality Act. The PAC determined that the Library properly withheld the records because they are protected from disclosure by state law.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for a list of all adult library cardholders at the Hinsdale Public Library. The Library refused to provide the list, citing a state law that keeps library registration records private. The Attorney General's office agreed with the Library, confirming that these records are legally protected and do not have to be released.","holding":"The Hinsdale Public Library properly withheld the requested library cardholder records pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether library registration records are exempt from disclosure under FOIA section 7(1)(a) due to the confidentiality requirements of the Library Records Confidentiality Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)"],"public_body":"Hinsdale Public Library","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"library records","subject_description":"The request sought a list of names of all adult library cardholders.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_b/81001%2C%20issued%20April%2025%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["library records","confidentiality","privacy","library card"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"April 25, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81001\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn April 8, 2024,  the Hinsdale Public Library ( Library)  received your FOIA\n\nrequest seeking a \" list of the names of all persons over the age of 18 who currently hold a\nLibrary Card issued by the Hinsdale Library Public Library.\" 2 Later that day, the Library denied\nyour request pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA 3 citing the Library Records Confidentiality Act\nConfidentiality Act). 4 On April 11, 2024,  you submitted a Request for Review contesting the\ndenial.    \n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA allows a public body to withhold \"[ i]nformation\n\nspecifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations\nimplementing federal or State law[.]\"   Section 1(a) of the Confidentiality Act 5 is a provision of\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto foia-requests@hinsdalelibrary.\n\ninfo (April 7, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462, effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446, effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n475 ILCS 70/1 et seq. ( West 2022). \n\n575 ILCS 70/1(c)(i), (c)(ii) (West 2022).  \n\n\fApril 25, 2024\nPage 2\n\nState law that provides \"[ t]he registration and circulation records of a library are confidential\ninformation.   No person shall publish or make any information contained in such records\navailable to the public unless\"  certain conditions are met.  ( Emphasis added.)   The conditions\nunder which a person may be permitted access to those records are then enumerated. 6 Section\n1(c) of the Confidentiality Act 7 defines the term \" library\"  to include \" any public library\"  and\ndefines \" registration records\"  as \" any information a library requires a person to provide in order\nfor that person to become eligible to borrow books and other materials.\" \n\nThe Library is a public library, 8 and therefore,  meets the threshold requirement of\nthe Confidentiality Act.  Further,  the Library' s response to your FOIA request indicated that \"[ i]n\norder for a person to become eligible to borrow books and other materials,  the person is required\nto provide a name.\" 9 Therefore,  the Library card holders'  names you seek meet the definition of\nregistration records\"  and any records that may exist containing those names fall within the\nscope of the Confidentiality Act.  No provision of the Confidentiality Act permits a person to\nreceive a library' s registration records in response to a FOIA request,  and you have not indicated\nthat you have received a court order requiring the release of such information.   Therefore,  you\nare not among the individuals authorized to obtain copies of those records.  \n\nBecause the information you requested is subject to the confidentiality provisions\nof the Confidentiality Act, which specifically prohibits disclosure to an unauthorized party,  this\noffice concludes that the record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA.  \nAccordingly,  this office has determined that no further action is warranted as to this matter. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have a FOIA question,  my e-mail address is\n\nShannon. Barnaby@ilag. gov.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\nrequested by law enforcement officers under certain circumstances.   75 ILCS 70/ 1(a)( 1), (1)( a)( 2) (West 2022). \n\n6The conditions include a court order requiring the release of the information or the information is\n\n775 ILCS 70/1(a) ( West 2022). \n\n8Hinsdale Public Library, Learn About the Library,  The History https:// hinsdalelibrary. info/about/ \n\nlast visited April 12, 2024). \n\n9Email from Karen Keefe,  Executive Director,  Hinsdale Public Library,  to\n\nApril 8, 2024).  \n\n\fApril 25, 2024\nPage 3\n\n81001 f no fi war lib\n\ncc:  \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Karen Keefe\nExecutive Director\nHinsdale Public Library\n20 East Maple Street\nHinsdale,  Illinois 60521\nkkeefe@hinsdalelibrary.\n\ninfo\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"List of adult library cardholders","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81001/","full_text":"April 25, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81001\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn April 8, 2024, the Hinsdale Public Library (Library) received your FOIA\n\nrequest seeking a \" list of the names of all persons over the age of 18 who currently hold a\nLibrary Card issued by the Hinsdale Library Public Library.\" 2 Later that day, the Library denied\nyour request pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA 3 citing the Library Records Confidentiality Act\nConfidentiality Act). 4 On April 11, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review contesting the\ndenial. \n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA allows a public body to withhold \"[ i]nformation\n\nspecifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations\nimplementing federal or State law[.]\" Section 1(a) of the Confidentiality Act 5 is a provision of\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto foia-requests@hinsdalelibrary.\n\ninfo (April 7, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \n\nState law that provides \"[ t]he registration and circulation records of a library are confidential\ninformation. No person shall publish or make any information contained in such records\navailable to the public unless\" certain conditions are met. (Emphasis added.) The conditions\nunder which a person may be permitted access to those records are then enumerated. 6 Section\n1(c) of the Confidentiality Act 7 defines the term \" library\" to include \" any public library\" and\ndefines \" registration records\" as \" any information a library requires a person to provide in order\nfor that person to become eligible to borrow books and other materials.\" \n\nThe Library is a public library, 8 and therefore, meets the threshold requirement of\nthe Confidentiality Act. Further, the Library's response to your FOIA request indicated that \"[ i]n\norder for a person to become eligible to borrow books and other materials, the person is required\nto provide a name.\" 9 Therefore, the Library card holders' names you seek meet the definition of\nregistration records\" and any records that may exist containing those names fall within the\nscope of the Confidentiality Act. No provision of the Confidentiality Act permits a person to\nreceive a library's registration records in response to a FOIA request, and you have not indicated\nthat you have received a court order requiring the release of such information. Therefore, you\nare not among the individuals authorized to obtain copies of those records. \n\nBecause the information you requested is subject to the confidentiality provisions\nof the Confidentiality Act, which specifically prohibits disclosure to an unauthorized party, this\noffice concludes that the record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA. \nAccordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted as to this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have a FOIA question, my e-mail address is\n\nShannon. Barnaby@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\nrequested by law enforcement officers under certain circumstances. 75 ILCS 70/ 1(a)(1), (1)(a)(2) (West 2022). \n\n6 The conditions include a court order requiring the release of the information or the information is\n\n775 ILCS 70/1(a) (West 2022). \n\n8 Hinsdale Public Library, Learn About the Library, The History https:// hinsdalelibrary. info/about/ \n\n81001 f no fi war lib\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Karen Keefe\nExecutive Director\nHinsdale Public Library\n20 East Maple Street\nHinsdale, Illinois 60521\nkkeefe@hinsdalelibrary.\n\ninfo"}
{"id":1052,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-30","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81145"],"title":"Will County Sheriff's Office violated FOIA by withholding deputy-U.S. Marshal list","filename":"81145, issued December 30, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2354,"summary":"The Invisible Institute requested a list of Will County Sheriff's Office deputies cross-designated as U.S. Marshals, which the Sheriff's Office denied under FOIA section 7(1)(d)(vi). The PAC determined the Sheriff's Office failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that disclosure would endanger the officers' safety.","plain_summary":"A reporter requested a list of local sheriff's deputies who also serve as U.S. Marshals. The Sheriff's Office refused to release the names, claiming it would put the officers in danger. The Attorney General's office concluded that the Sheriff's Office did not provide enough evidence to prove this risk and that its response violated FOIA.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau concluded that the Will County Sheriff's Office's response to the FOIA request violated FOIA, but the source does not state an explicit order to release the records.","legal_question":"Did the Sheriff's Office meet its burden of proof to withhold records under the FOIA exemption for endangering the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(vi)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(vi)"],"public_body":"Will County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":"Ms. Farrah Anderson (Invisible Institute)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought a list of sheriff's deputies who are cross-designated as U.S. Marshals.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":90.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_vi/81145%2C%20issued%20December%2030%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police records","officer safety","FOIA denial","exemption 7(1)(d)(vi)"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"December 30, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Farrah Anderson\nInvisible Institute\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nFOIA Administrator\nWill County Sheriff' s Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nkpaulsen@willcosheriff. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review:   2024 PAC 81145\n\nDear Ms. Anderson and Ms. Reid: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons stated below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe response by the Will County Sheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  to Ms. Farrah Anderson' s\nApril 10, 2024,  FOIA request violated FOIA. \n\nOn that date,  Ms. Anderson,  on behalf of the Invisible Institute,  submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest to the Sheriff' s Office seeking,  relevant to this Request for Review, \"[ a]  list of officers\nfrom Will County Sheriff' s Office who are cross- listed as U.S. Marshals and operate in the\nregion.\" 2 The Sheriff' s Office denied that portion of the request in its entirety pursuant to section\n7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA on the basis that disclosure would endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2Freedom of Information Act Request from Farrah Anderson ( April 10, 2024). \n\n\fMs. Farrah Anderson\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 2\n\nenforcement personnel. 3 On April 23, 2024,  Ms. Anderson submitted this Request for Review\nchallenging the Sheriff' s Office' s denial.   \n\nOn April 30, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nSheriff' s Office and asked it to provide un-redacted copies of the records responsive to Ms. \nAnderson' s request along with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\napplicability of section 7(1)(d)( vi) to the withheld information.   On May 7, 2024,  the Sheriff' s\nOffice provided the requested materials and a written response.   On May 10, 2024,  this office\nforwarded the Sheriff' s Office' s response to Ms. Anderson and notified her of her opportunity to\nreply.  She did not submit a reply, other than to correct a portion of her Request for Review. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   Any public body that\ndenies a record \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the record is\nexempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)( vi) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\nvi) endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\nenforcement personnel or any other person[.] \n\nTo sustain its burden under the provision of Federal FOIA that corresponds to\n\nsection 7(1)(d)(vi),4 \"[ a] n agency must identify and explain the reasonable threat of harm\nimposed on the individuals identified in the records the agency is seeking to exempt[ ]\" ( King v. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)( d)( vi) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\nrecords that \" could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.\"  \n\n4Exemption 7(F) of Federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552( b)(7)(F) (2018))  exempts from disclosure\n\n\fMs. Farrah Anderson\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 3\n\nUnited States Dep't of Justice, 245 F. Supp.  3d 153, 162 ( D.D.C. 2017))  and \" demonstrate that it\nreasonably estimated that sensitive information could be misused for nefarious ends.\"   Public\nEmployees for Environmental Responsibility v. United States Section,  International Boundary & \nWater Comm' n, 740 F.3d 195, 206 ( D.C. Cir. 2014); 5 see also Center for National Security\nStudies v. United States Department of Justice,  331 F.3d 918, 948 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) ( records not\nexempt because agency did identify reasons that disclosure of information would pose a threat).   \n\nThis office has previously determined that section 7(1)(d)(vi) could be applied to\n\nhighly specific information,  the disclosure of which would provide the public with information\nthat could be exploited to cause identifiable harm to certain individuals.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC\nReq.  Rev. Ltr. 49142,  issued November 21, 2017,  at 4 (concluding that disclosure of the specific\nduty times and locations of correctional officers \" could endanger the life or physical safety of the\ncorrectional officers monitoring the jail by identifying their locations and potential vulnerable\nspots where officers are less supported.\");  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 39298,  39299, \nissued December 6, 2017,  at 4-5 (information that could be used to identify undercover officers\nis exempt from disclosure).   By contrast,  this office has found that public bodies failed to meet\ntheir burden under section 7(1)(d)(vi) when their assertions were conclusory and they did not\nexplain,  nor was it apparent,  how disclosure would be expected to endanger any individual.   See\nIll. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 38173,  issued February 13, 2018,  at 3 (determining that city\nhad failed to demonstrate how disclosure of a use of force report would endanger any\nindividual' s safety);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Rev. Ltr. 25887,  issued January 11, 2019,  at 3\nconcluding that police department failed to identify specific circumstances from which this\noffice could conclude that disclosure of individual police officers'  photographs could endanger\nofficers'  lives or physical safety). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Sheriff' s Office maintained that disclosure of the\nidentities of the deputies cross- designated to the U.S. Marshall' s Office would present a security\nthreat to those deputies.   The Sheriff' s Office argued: \n\nT]he deputies who are cross designated are responsible for\napprehending fugitives.   By definition these individuals are not\ncomplying with the law and have failed to appear in court or have\notherwise escaped.   To apprehend these individuals,  deputies must\noften conduct long surveillance operations to establish patterns, \nlocations,  and other information which will allow for safe arrest for\nthe deputy,  suspect,  and bystanders.   Furthermore,  in almost all\ncases the offender being sought is either a violent felon or gang\n\n5Because Illinois'  FOIA statute is based on the federal FOIA statute,  decisions construing the\n\nlatter,  while not controlling,  may provide helpful and relevant precedents in construing the state Act. Margolis v. \nDirector, Ill. Department of Revenue,  180 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1087 ( 1989). \n\n\fMs. Farrah Anderson\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 4\n\nmember. * * * [ T]he name of the cross designated deputies must\nbe kept confidential so that an individual cannot use the name to\ndiscover other information about the deputies,  such as images,  so\nthat they can avoid arrest and prosecution.   If these deputies were\nreadily recognizable the danger level would be exponentially\nincreased.[ 6] \n\nThe Sheriff' s Office argued that its position was consistent with Federal precedent interpreting\nexemption 7(F) of Federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552( b)(7)(F) (2018)).   The Sheriff' s Office cited an\nunpublished decision,  Garza v. U.S. Marshals Service,  No. 16-CV-0976,  2018 LEXIS 167379,  at\n47 (D.D.C. September 28, 2018),  concluding that the United States Drug Enforcement Agency\nDEA) could withhold the names of DEA special agents pursuant to Exemption 7(F).  The court\nfound \" that these agents are often involved with dangerous undercover operations,  and often\ninvestigate individuals with propensity for violence. [ Citation.]  These agents constitute the\ntextbook definition of persons who warrant protection under Exemption 7(F).\"   Garza,  at * 47.  \nThe Sheriff' s Office cited another case in which a court upheld the denial of information about\nDEA agents pursuant to Exemption 7(F), though the opinion did not otherwise describe the\ndocuments at issue.   Rugiero v. United States Department of Justice,  257 F.3d 534, 552 ( 6th Cir. \n2001). \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined disclosing the identities of\n\nundercover officers could endanger their lives or physical safety.   See, for example,  Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 66594 66596,  issued September 20, 2021,  at 5; Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC\nReq.  Rev. Ltr. 14982,  issued June 5, 2012,  at 4.  The dangers faced by undercover officers may\nvary widely depending on factors such as the crimes being investigated and the length of time\nundercover.   Revealing the name of an undercover officer in one investigation could jeopardize\nthe safety of the same officer in a future investigation that carries greater risks by identifying him\nor her as a police officer who works in an undercover capacity.   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. \nLtr. 66594 66596,  issued September 20, 2021,  at 5. \n\nBy contrast,  where the officers are not engaged in undercover activities,  this\n\noffice has concluded that to withhold those officers'  identities pursuant to section 7(1)(d)( vi), the\npublic body must establish that the disclosure of the records would endanger officers'  lives or\nphysical safety \" beyond the risks that are inherent in police work.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 26630,  issued January 23, 2014,  at 4.  In 2020 PAC 65941,  this office concluded that a\npolice department could not withhold a roster of police officers who were assigned to Northern\nIllinois Police Alarm System ( NIPAS), \" a joint venture of suburban municipal police\ndepartments in the Chicago metropolitan area\"  that provides member agencies with \" assistance\n\n6Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator,  Will County Sheriff' s Office, to Deputy Bureau Chief\n\nLaura]  Harter ( undated),  at [ 1]. \n\n\fMs. Farrah Anderson\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 5\n\nfor any situation its command staff believes the agency cannot handle with its own resources.\" 7\nIn that matter,  the department argued that the NIPAS officers face a heightened risk similar to\nthat of undercover officers.   This office was not persuaded by that argument,  explaining that\nunlike undercover officers,  whose physical safety would be starkly compromised if their true\nidentities as police officers were revealed to the targets of their investigations,  NIPAS officers\nopenly interacted with the public in full uniform.   This office noted that \" there is no indication\nthat the General Assembly intended the section 7(1)(d)(vi) exemption to broadly apply to the\nidentities of uniformed police officers performing their public duties in public settings.\"   Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 65941,  issued December 20, 2023,  at 6. \n\nIn 2013 PAC 26630,  this office reviewed a partial denial by a police department\n\nof a FOIA request that sought,  in part, records related to personnel who were on duty for two\ndates.   The department released responsive records but redacted the identities of officers who\nwere dispatched to an assisted living facility on those dates,  including an officer who fatally\nwounded a resident while attempting to subdue him.  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 26630, \nissued January 23, 2014,  at 2.  Although the police department demonstrated that members of the\npublic had made violent threats against the police department and its officers as a result of the\nincident,  this office concluded that the police department had failed to prove that disclosure of\nthe records would endanger officers beyond the risks inherent in police work.  Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 26630,  at 4.  \n\nThis office acknowledges that the cross- designated deputies are engaged in\n\ndangerous duties when serving in their roles with the U.S. Marshals.   Although the Sheriff' s\nOffice asserts that disclosure of the cross- designated officers'  identities could lead fugitives to\nidentify the officers and evade arrest or cause harm to the officers,  as discussed above,  this office\nhas previously rejected that argument alone as a basis to withhold officers'  identities.   This office\nhas explained that \"[ f]acing threats,  at times violent,  is an unfortunate aspect of public service for\nmany public officials,  whether engaged in law enforcement or not.  Despite such threats,  the\npublic' s ability to identify its public officials fosters transparency,  efficiency,  and\naccountability.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 26630,  at 4.   \n\nAlthough the Sheriff' s Office explained that the cross- designated deputies conduct\n\nlong- term surveillance operations,  there is no indication that such operations are currently\nongoing in an undercover capacity.   Federal courts have concluded that the identities of DEA\nagents and other law enforcement personnel working on those drug enforcement cases may be\nwithheld pursuant to Exemption 7(F) because of the covert nature of the operations.   See\nAlbuquerque Pub. Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 726 F. Supp.  851, 858 ( 1989) ( upholding\nExemption 7(F) to withhold DEA special agents and other law enforcement officers'  identities\nbased on an affidavit establishing that the officers worked in a covert capacity and disclosure of\ntheir identities could be expected to result in harm).   The Sheriff' s Office has not provided this\n\n7Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 65941,  issued December 20, 2023, at 3. \n\n\fs. Farrah Anderson\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nDecember 30, 2024\nPage 6\n\noffice with any facts to establish that the cross- listed deputies are engaged in similar covert\noperations.   The notion that disclosure of the names of cross- designated deputies to Ms. \nAnderson could lead to those deputies being identified while conducting surveillance activities is\nlargely speculative. \n\nDespite the dangers the cross- designated deputies face when serving as U.S. \nMarshals,  the Sheriff' s Office did not illustrate that disclosure of the deputies'  names would\nendanger the lives or safety of its officers beyond the risks already inherent in their duties.  \nAccordingly,  the Sheriff' s Office did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the\nrecords fall within the scope of section 7(1)( d)(vi).  This office requests that the Sheriff' s Office\nprovide Ms. Anderson with copies of the responsive records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\nlaura. harter@ilag. gov.  This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81145 f 71dvi improper co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A list of cross-designated sheriff's deputies","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81145/","full_text":"December 30, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Farrah Anderson\nInvisible Institute\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kelsey Reid\nFOIA Administrator\nWill County Sheriff's Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nkpaulsen@willcosheriff. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review: 2024 PAC 81145\n\nDear Ms. Anderson and Ms. Reid: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe response by the Will County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) to Ms. Farrah Anderson's\nApril 10, 2024, FOIA request violated FOIA. \n\nOn that date, Ms. Anderson, on behalf of the Invisible Institute, submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest to the Sheriff's Office seeking, relevant to this Request for Review, \"[ a] list of officers\nfrom Will County Sheriff's Office who are cross- listed as U.S. Marshals and operate in the\nregion.\" 2 The Sheriff's Office denied that portion of the request in its entirety pursuant to section\n7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA on the basis that disclosure would endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\nenforcement personnel. 3 On April 23, 2024, Ms. Anderson submitted this Request for Review\nchallenging the Sheriff's Office's denial. \n\nOn April 30, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nSheriff's Office and asked it to provide un-redacted copies of the records responsive to Ms. \nAnderson's request along with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\napplicability of section 7(1)(d)(vi) to the withheld information. On May 7, 2024, the Sheriff's\nOffice provided the requested materials and a written response. On May 10, 2024, this office\nforwarded the Sheriff's Office's response to Ms. Anderson and notified her of her opportunity to\nreply. She did not submit a reply, other than to correct a portion of her Request for Review. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). Any public body that\ndenies a record \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the record is\nexempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\nvi) endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\nenforcement personnel or any other person[.] \n\nTo sustain its burden under the provision of Federal FOIA that corresponds to\n\nsection 7(1)(d)(vi),4 \"[ a] n agency must identify and explain the reasonable threat of harm\nimposed on the individuals identified in the records the agency is seeking to exempt[ ]\" (King v. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(vi) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\nrecords that \" could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.\" \n\nUnited States Dep't of Justice, 245 F. Supp. 3d 153, 162 (D.D.C. 2017)) and \" demonstrate that it\nreasonably estimated that sensitive information could be misused for nefarious ends.\" Public\nEmployees for Environmental Responsibility v. United States Section, International Boundary & \nWater Comm' n, 740 F.3d 195, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 5 see also Center for National Security\nStudies v. United States Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (records not\nexempt because agency did identify reasons that disclosure of information would pose a threat). \n\nThis office has previously determined that section 7(1)(d)(vi) could be applied to\n\nhighly specific information, the disclosure of which would provide the public with information\nthat could be exploited to cause identifiable harm to certain individuals. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 49142, issued November 21, 2017, at 4 (concluding that disclosure of the specific\nduty times and locations of correctional officers \" could endanger the life or physical safety of the\ncorrectional officers monitoring the jail by identifying their locations and potential vulnerable\nspots where officers are less supported.\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 39298, 39299, \nissued December 6, 2017, at 4-5 (information that could be used to identify undercover officers\nis exempt from disclosure). By contrast, this office has found that public bodies failed to meet\ntheir burden under section 7(1)(d)(vi) when their assertions were conclusory and they did not\nexplain, nor was it apparent, how disclosure would be expected to endanger any individual. See\nIll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 38173, issued February 13, 2018, at 3 (determining that city\nhad failed to demonstrate how disclosure of a use of force report would endanger any\nindividual's safety); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Rev. Ltr. 25887, issued January 11, 2019, at 3\nconcluding that police department failed to identify specific circumstances from which this\noffice could conclude that disclosure of individual police officers' photographs could endanger\nofficers' lives or physical safety). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Sheriff's Office maintained that disclosure of the\nidentities of the deputies cross- designated to the U.S. Marshall's Office would present a security\nthreat to those deputies. The Sheriff's Office argued: \n\nT]he deputies who are cross designated are responsible for\napprehending fugitives. By definition these individuals are not\ncomplying with the law and have failed to appear in court or have\notherwise escaped. To apprehend these individuals, deputies must\noften conduct long surveillance operations to establish patterns, \nlocations, and other information which will allow for safe arrest for\nthe deputy, suspect, and bystanders. Furthermore, in almost all\ncases the offender being sought is either a violent felon or gang\n\n5 Because Illinois' FOIA statute is based on the federal FOIA statute, decisions construing the\n\nlatter, while not controlling, may provide helpful and relevant precedents in construing the state Act. Margolis v. \n\nmember. * * * [ T]he name of the cross designated deputies must\nbe kept confidential so that an individual cannot use the name to\ndiscover other information about the deputies, such as images, so\nthat they can avoid arrest and prosecution. If these deputies were\nreadily recognizable the danger level would be exponentially\nincreased.[ 6] \n\nThe Sheriff's Office argued that its position was consistent with Federal precedent interpreting\nexemption 7(F) of Federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2018)). The Sheriff's Office cited an\nunpublished decision, Garza v. U.S. Marshals Service, No. 16-CV-0976, 2018 LEXIS 167379, at\n47 (D.D.C. September 28, 2018), concluding that the United States Drug Enforcement Agency\nDEA) could withhold the names of DEA special agents pursuant to Exemption 7(F). The court\nfound \" that these agents are often involved with dangerous undercover operations, and often\ninvestigate individuals with propensity for violence. [ Citation.] These agents constitute the\ntextbook definition of persons who warrant protection under Exemption 7(F).\" Garza, at * 47. \nThe Sheriff's Office cited another case in which a court upheld the denial of information about\nDEA agents pursuant to Exemption 7(F), though the opinion did not otherwise describe the\ndocuments at issue. Rugiero v. United States Department of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. \n2001). \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined disclosing the identities of\n\nundercover officers could endanger their lives or physical safety. See, for example, Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 66594 66596, issued September 20, 2021, at 5; Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 14982, issued June 5, 2012, at 4. The dangers faced by undercover officers may\nvary widely depending on factors such as the crimes being investigated and the length of time\nundercover. Revealing the name of an undercover officer in one investigation could jeopardize\nthe safety of the same officer in a future investigation that carries greater risks by identifying him\nor her as a police officer who works in an undercover capacity. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. \nLtr. 66594 66596, issued September 20, 2021, at 5. \n\nBy contrast, where the officers are not engaged in undercover activities, this\n\noffice has concluded that to withhold those officers' identities pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(vi), the\npublic body must establish that the disclosure of the records would endanger officers' lives or\nphysical safety \" beyond the risks that are inherent in police work.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 26630, issued January 23, 2014, at 4. In 2020 PAC 65941, this office concluded that a\npolice department could not withhold a roster of police officers who were assigned to Northern\nIllinois Police Alarm System (NIPAS), \" a joint venture of suburban municipal police\ndepartments in the Chicago metropolitan area\" that provides member agencies with \" assistance\n\n6 Letter from K. Reid, FOIA Administrator, Will County Sheriff's Office, to Deputy Bureau Chief\n\nfor any situation its command staff believes the agency cannot handle with its own resources.\" 7\nIn that matter, the department argued that the NIPAS officers face a heightened risk similar to\nthat of undercover officers. This office was not persuaded by that argument, explaining that\nunlike undercover officers, whose physical safety would be starkly compromised if their true\nidentities as police officers were revealed to the targets of their investigations, NIPAS officers\nopenly interacted with the public in full uniform. This office noted that \" there is no indication\nthat the General Assembly intended the section 7(1)(d)(vi) exemption to broadly apply to the\nidentities of uniformed police officers performing their public duties in public settings.\" Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 65941, issued December 20, 2023, at 6. \n\nIn 2013 PAC 26630, this office reviewed a partial denial by a police department\n\nof a FOIA request that sought, in part, records related to personnel who were on duty for two\ndates. The department released responsive records but redacted the identities of officers who\nwere dispatched to an assisted living facility on those dates, including an officer who fatally\nwounded a resident while attempting to subdue him. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26630, \nissued January 23, 2014, at 2. Although the police department demonstrated that members of the\npublic had made violent threats against the police department and its officers as a result of the\nincident, this office concluded that the police department had failed to prove that disclosure of\nthe records would endanger officers beyond the risks inherent in police work. Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26630, at 4. \n\nThis office acknowledges that the cross- designated deputies are engaged in\n\ndangerous duties when serving in their roles with the U.S. Marshals. Although the Sheriff's\nOffice asserts that disclosure of the cross- designated officers' identities could lead fugitives to\nidentify the officers and evade arrest or cause harm to the officers, as discussed above, this office\nhas previously rejected that argument alone as a basis to withhold officers' identities. This office\nhas explained that \"[ f]acing threats, at times violent, is an unfortunate aspect of public service for\nmany public officials, whether engaged in law enforcement or not. Despite such threats, the\npublic's ability to identify its public officials fosters transparency, efficiency, and\naccountability.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26630, at 4. \n\nAlthough the Sheriff's Office explained that the cross- designated deputies conduct\n\nlong- term surveillance operations, there is no indication that such operations are currently\nongoing in an undercover capacity. Federal courts have concluded that the identities of DEA\nagents and other law enforcement personnel working on those drug enforcement cases may be\nwithheld pursuant to Exemption 7(F) because of the covert nature of the operations. See\nAlbuquerque Pub. Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 726 F. Supp. 851, 858 (1989) (upholding\nExemption 7(F) to withhold DEA special agents and other law enforcement officers' identities\nbased on an affidavit establishing that the officers worked in a covert capacity and disclosure of\ntheir identities could be expected to result in harm). The Sheriff's Office has not provided this\n\noffice with any facts to establish that the cross- listed deputies are engaged in similar covert\noperations. The notion that disclosure of the names of cross- designated deputies to Ms. \nAnderson could lead to those deputies being identified while conducting surveillance activities is\nlargely speculative. \n\nDespite the dangers the cross- designated deputies face when serving as U.S. \nMarshals, the Sheriff's Office did not illustrate that disclosure of the deputies' names would\nendanger the lives or safety of its officers beyond the risks already inherent in their duties. \nAccordingly, the Sheriff's Office did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the\nrecords fall within the scope of section 7(1)(d)(vi). This office requests that the Sheriff's Office\nprovide Ms. Anderson with copies of the responsive records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nlaura. harter@ilag. gov. This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81145 f 71dvi improper co"}
{"id":1053,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-09-23","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81194"],"title":"Illinois State Police properly withheld jail surveillance footage under 7(1)(e)","filename":"81194, issued September 23, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1287,"summary":"The requester sought surveillance video from a county jail regarding a death, and the PAC determined that the Illinois State Police properly withheld certain footage under FOIA exemptions related to security.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Illinois State Police for jail surveillance videos following a death in custody. The police provided some footage but withheld other parts, arguing that releasing them would compromise jail security. The Attorney General's office agreed with the police, concluding that the withheld videos could reveal security vulnerabilities like blind spots.","holding":"The Illinois State Police did not improperly deny the request for surveillance footage as the withheld portions were exempt under section 7(1)(e).","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois State Police properly invoked FOIA exemptions 7(1)(d)(iv) and 7(1)(e) to withhold jail surveillance footage.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(iv)","7(1)(e)"],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request involved surveillance video footage from a county jail facility.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_e/81194%2C%20issued%20September%2023%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["surveillance video","jail security","police records","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"September 23, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street,  Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov\nisp.foia.officer@illinois.gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81194\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Martynowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois State Police (ISP) did not improperly deny\n\ns February 22,  2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to ISP seeking videos\n\nassociated with report number 23-40371600043 regarding the death of\nCounty Jail.   On March 1, 2024,  ISP extended its time to respond pursuant to section 3(e)  of\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(e) ( West 2022)).  On March 8, 2024, ISP responded by asserting that\ncompliance with the request would be unduly burdensome pursuant to section 3(g) of FOIA ( 5\nan opportunity to narrow her request.  On\nILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)) and offering\nApril 22, 2024,  ISP provided\nresponse granting the request for\nrecordings of the jail lobby area but denying videos of other areas in the jail pursuant to sections\n\nwith a supplemental\n\nat Peoria\n\n\fMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nSeptember 23, 2024\nPage 2\n\n7(1)(d)(iv) and 7(1)(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv), (1)(e) ( West 2022), as amended by\nPublic Acts 103- 154,  effective June 30, 2023;  103- 423,  effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462, \neffective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, effective January 1, 2024; \n103- 554,  effective January 1, 2024).   On that same date, \nthat she wished to obtain \"video that shows the cell where\nOn April 25, 2024,  ISP responded that video footage depicting the cell was exempt pursuant\nsection 7(1)(e) of FOIA.  On that same date, \nfor Review contesting ISP' s denial of video depicting the cell. \n\nwas housed in.\"1\nto\n\nsubmitted the above-referenced Request\n\nclarified in an e- mail to ISP\n\nOn April 26, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to ISP and\n\nasked it to provide unredacted copies of the withheld videos for our confidential review, together\nwith a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted\nexemptions.  Having received no response, this office sent additional correspondence to ISP on\nMay 16, 2024,  again asking it to respond.   On May 24, 2024,  this office received the requested\nmaterials.  On May 30, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of ISP's written response to\n\nshe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep' t of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)( e)  of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecords that relate to or affect\n\nthe security of correctional institutions and detention facilities.\"  In Glynn v. Dep't of\nCorrections,  the Illinois Appellate Court held that this exemption \" applies to records that could\njeopardize the security of a correctional center or detention facility if disclosed, rather than any\nrecords merely pertaining to security in any manner whatsoever.\" 2 Therefore,  when a public\nbody withholds records under section 7(1)(e), it carries the burden of demonstrating \"that\nfacility.\" 3\ndisclosure of a requested record could pose a potential security risk to a correctional\nThe court further explained that it did \"not doubt that many prison surveillance camera footage\nwill be found to be exempt under this court' s interpretation of section 7(1)( e),\"  but that\ndetermination requires consideration of variables such as \" the type of room filmed, the contents\n\n1E- mail from Marcia Morris to [ISP FOIA Officer] (April 22, 2024). \n\n2Glynn v. Dep't of Corrections, 2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶ 34. \n\n3Glynn,  2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶  34. \n\n\fMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nSeptember 23, 2024\nPage 3\n\nof the footage; whether the recording is of most, but not all, of the room; and whether the agency\ndemonstrates that disclosure of the footage would pose a potential security risk to a correctional\ninstitution or detention facility.\"4 Because the trial court had not reviewed the footage to confirm\nthe Illinois Department of Corrections'  vague assertion that disclosure would reveal blind spots\nthat jeopardize prison security, the appellate court remanded the case for an in camera review of\nthe footage.   Glynn,  2023 IL App ( 1st)  211657, ¶¶  47- 48. \n\nReferencing this office' s previous determinations, 5 ISP argued in its response to\n\nthis office that the footage at issue likewise posed a security threat if released.  Specifically, ISP\nargued that \" video depicting the Peoria County Jail corridors,  inmate common area,  and\nemployee restricted areas were withheld for security purposes as it affects the security of the\nJail' s employees and inmates.\" 6 ISP noted that such video could reveal blind spots that could be\nexploited by detainees. \n\nAlthough ISP's justification for withholding the footage was somewhat vague and\n\nconclusory,  this office' s review of the footage confirms that its disclosure could pose a potential\ns request for \"video that shows\nsecurity risk to the facility.  The footage responsive to\nthe cell\"  depicts a jail common area that includes the doorway of the cell,  rather than merely that\ncell or its interior.7 This footage would reveal most, but not all, of the common area, including\nsignificant blind spots that potentially could be exploited by inmates to evade detection of\ndangerous or impermissible conduct.  Under these circumstances, this office concludes that ISP\ndid not improperly withhold the contested footage under section 7(1)( e). \n\n4Glynn,  2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶ 51. \n\n5Although ISP did not provide citation to specific determinations, it appears to reference several of\n\nthis office's non-binding determinations before the Appellate Court's decision in Glynn.  The Public Access Bureau\npreviously determined in certain circumstances that the disclosure of video footage of the holding or booking area of\na detention facility would pose a security threat by enabling the viewer to determine the range of the security\ncameras or by revealing blind spots that detainees could exploit to harm others while evading detection.  See, for\nexample,  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 40573, issued August 17, 2016 ( video footage depicting police\ndepartment' s jail cell and booking area exempt from disclosure because it revealed blind spots and police activity\nsuch as shift changes that could be used to undermine jail security); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 36649, issued\nNovember 28, 2018 (disclosure of surveillance footage of a jail's booking bullpen, sally port, hallways, and other\ninternal areas would enable the viewer to determine blind spots and exits that could be exploited to undermine jail\nsecurity). \n\n6E- mail from Rhiann M. Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice, Illinois State Police, to [Benjamin J. Silver], [ Assistant Attorney General], [ Public Access Bureau] ( May 24, \n2024). \n\ncell, this office notes that the interior of the cell is not visible in the footage. \n\n7Because it appears that\n\nwished to obtain footage depicting what transpired inside the\n\n\fMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nSeptember 23, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This file is closed.   If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81194 f 71e proper pd sa\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Jail surveillance video footage","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81194/","full_text":"September 23, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street, Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov\nisp.foia.officer@illinois.gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81194\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Martynowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois State Police (ISP) did not improperly deny\n\ns February 22, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to ISP seeking videos\n\nassociated with report number 23-40371600043 regarding the death of\nCounty Jail. On March 1, 2024, ISP extended its time to respond pursuant to section 3(e) of\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(e) (West 2022)). On March 8, 2024, ISP responded by asserting that\ncompliance with the request would be unduly burdensome pursuant to section 3(g) of FOIA (5\nan opportunity to narrow her request. On\nILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)) and offering\nApril 22, 2024, ISP provided\nresponse granting the request for\nrecordings of the jail lobby area but denying videos of other areas in the jail pursuant to sections\n\n7(1)(d)(iv) and 7(1)(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv), (1)(e) (West 2022), as amended by\nPublic Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; 103- 423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, \neffective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, effective January 1, 2024; \n103- 554, effective January 1, 2024). On that same date, \nthat she wished to obtain \"video that shows the cell where\nOn April 25, 2024, ISP responded that video footage depicting the cell was exempt pursuant\nsection 7(1)(e) of FOIA. On that same date, \nfor Review contesting ISP's denial of video depicting the cell. \n\nwas housed in.\"1\nto\n\nsubmitted the above-referenced Request\n\nclarified in an e- mail to ISP\n\nOn April 26, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to ISP and\n\nasked it to provide unredacted copies of the withheld videos for our confidential review, together\nwith a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted\nexemptions. Having received no response, this office sent additional correspondence to ISP on\nMay 16, 2024, again asking it to respond. On May 24, 2024, this office received the requested\nmaterials. On May 30, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of ISP's written response to\n\nshe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep' t of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(e) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecords that relate to or affect\n\nthe security of correctional institutions and detention facilities.\" In Glynn v. Dep't of\nCorrections, the Illinois Appellate Court held that this exemption \" applies to records that could\njeopardize the security of a correctional center or detention facility if disclosed, rather than any\nrecords merely pertaining to security in any manner whatsoever.\" 2 Therefore, when a public\nbody withholds records under section 7(1)(e), it carries the burden of demonstrating \"that\nfacility.\" 3\ndisclosure of a requested record could pose a potential security risk to a correctional\nThe court further explained that it did \"not doubt that many prison surveillance camera footage\nwill be found to be exempt under this court's interpretation of section 7(1)(e),\" but that\ndetermination requires consideration of variables such as \" the type of room filmed, the contents\n\nof the footage; whether the recording is of most, but not all, of the room; and whether the agency\ndemonstrates that disclosure of the footage would pose a potential security risk to a correctional\ninstitution or detention facility.\"4 Because the trial court had not reviewed the footage to confirm\nthe Illinois Department of Corrections' vague assertion that disclosure would reveal blind spots\nthat jeopardize prison security, the appellate court remanded the case for an in camera review of\nthe footage. Glynn, 2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶¶ 47- 48. \n\nReferencing this office's previous determinations, 5 ISP argued in its response to\n\nthis office that the footage at issue likewise posed a security threat if released. Specifically, ISP\nargued that \" video depicting the Peoria County Jail corridors, inmate common area, and\nemployee restricted areas were withheld for security purposes as it affects the security of the\nJail's employees and inmates.\" 6 ISP noted that such video could reveal blind spots that could be\nexploited by detainees. \n\nAlthough ISP's justification for withholding the footage was somewhat vague and\n\nconclusory, this office's review of the footage confirms that its disclosure could pose a potential\ns request for \"video that shows\nsecurity risk to the facility. The footage responsive to\nthe cell\" depicts a jail common area that includes the doorway of the cell, rather than merely that\ncell or its interior.7 This footage would reveal most, but not all, of the common area, including\nsignificant blind spots that potentially could be exploited by inmates to evade detection of\ndangerous or impermissible conduct. Under these circumstances, this office concludes that ISP\ndid not improperly withhold the contested footage under section 7(1)(e). \n\n4 Glynn, 2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶ 51. \n\n5 Although ISP did not provide citation to specific determinations, it appears to reference several of\n\nthis office's non-binding determinations before the Appellate Court's decision in Glynn. The Public Access Bureau\npreviously determined in certain circumstances that the disclosure of video footage of the holding or booking area of\na detention facility would pose a security threat by enabling the viewer to determine the range of the security\ncameras or by revealing blind spots that detainees could exploit to harm others while evading detection. See, for\nexample, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 40573, issued August 17, 2016 (video footage depicting police\ndepartment's jail cell and booking area exempt from disclosure because it revealed blind spots and police activity\nsuch as shift changes that could be used to undermine jail security); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 36649, issued\nNovember 28, 2018 (disclosure of surveillance footage of a jail's booking bullpen, sally port, hallways, and other\ninternal areas would enable the viewer to determine blind spots and exits that could be exploited to undermine jail\nsecurity). \n\n6E- mail from Rhiann M. Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice, Illinois State Police, to [Benjamin J. Silver], [ Assistant Attorney General], [ Public Access Bureau] (May 24, \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81194 f 71e proper pd sa"}
{"id":1054,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-08-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81197"],"title":"Village of Woodridge properly withheld water shutoff valve maps under 7(1)(x)","filename":"81197, issued August 13, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":615,"summary":"The requester sought maps identifying the location of water shutoff valves for specific streets in the Village of Woodridge, which the Village denied under FOIA exemptions. The PAC determined that the requested records are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(x) of FOIA.","plain_summary":"A resident asked the Village of Woodridge for maps showing the exact locations of water shutoff valves for several streets. The Village refused to provide the maps, and the Attorney General's office agreed, ruling that the records are exempt from disclosure to protect the security of the water utility infrastructure. This means the Village does not have to release these specific maps to the public.","holding":"The Village of Woodridge properly withheld the requested maps of water shutoff valves because they constitute exempt information regarding the location of water distribution facilities.","legal_question":"Whether maps identifying the location of residential water shutoff valves are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(x) of FOIA as records regarding the location of water distribution facilities.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(k)","7(1)(x)"],"public_body":"Village of Woodridge","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"infrastructure security","subject_description":"The request sought maps identifying the location of water shutoff valves for residential properties.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_x/81197%2C%20issued%20August%2013%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["water utility","infrastructure","security exemption","maps"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Legal & Financial Records","full_text_pre_clean":"August 13, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81197\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons stated below,  the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn March 28, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Woodridge\n\nVillage)  seeking \"[ c]urrent maps and other records identifying the location of stopcock\nchambers ( water shutoff valves)  for all residence[ s]  on Carolwood Lane,  Gatewood Lane, \nWestview Lane,  Edgewood Parkway,  Lindenwood Lane, and Eastwood Lane.\" 2 On April 4, \n2024,  the Village informed you that you met the definition of a recurrent requester and you\nwould receive a response to your FOIA request within 21 business days.   On April 26, 2024,  the\nVillage denied your request pursuant to section 7(1)(k) of FOIA. 3 Later the same day, you\nsubmitted this Request for Review challenging the Village' s denial.  \n\nUnder FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   Any public body\nthat denies a record \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the record\nis exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto FOIA, [ Village of Woodridge] ( March 28, 2024).  \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(k) (West 2023 Supp.).  \n\n\fAugust 13, 2024\nPage 2\n\nbe narrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d\n401, 407 ( 1997).   \n\nAlthough the Village cited section 7(1)(k) of FOIA to deny the request,  section\n\n7(1)(x) of FOIA 4 is more applicable.   Section 7(1)( x) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ m] aps\nand other records regarding the location or security of generation,  transmission,  distribution, \nstorage,  gathering,  treatment,  or switching facilities owned by a utility, by a power generator,  or\nby the Illinois Power Agency.\"   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 77360,  issued September\n27, 2023,  at 4 (concluding that locations of combined sewer outfall points constituted records\nregarding the location of a utility' s transmission and treatment facilities). \n\nIn a May 21, 2024,  telephone call with an Assistant Attorney General in the\n\nPublic Access Bureau,  the Village FOIA officer informed this office that the only responsive\nrecords were maps identifying the locations of the water shut- off valves.   The FOIA officer\nfurther explained that the shut- off valves are located where the municipality' s water utility line\nconnects with a private residence' s plumbing,  and with the use of a \" key\"  can be used to allow or\nrestrict water from the municipality to the individual' s residence.  \n\nThe requested records are maps that show the specific locations of shut- off valves\n\nused by the Village' s water utility to distribute water to the Village' s residents.   Based on the\nplain language of section 7(1)(x), maps regarding the location of the Village' s water distribution\nfacilities,  which include the locations of residential shut- off valves,  are exempt from disclosure\nunder FOIA.  Accordingly,  your allegation that the Village improperly responded to your FOIA\nrequest is unfounded.   \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at ( 217)  685-\n\n4237 or victoria. frazier@ilag. gov.  Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81197 f unf mun\n\n45 ILCS 140/7(1)(x) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fAugust 13, 2024\nPage 3\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Peggy Halik\nFOIA Officer\nVillage of Woodridge\n5 Plaza Drive\nWoodridge,  Illinois 60517\nphalik@woodridgeil. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Maps of residential water shutoff valve locations","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81197/","full_text":"August 13, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81197\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn March 28, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Woodridge\n\nVillage) seeking \"[ c]urrent maps and other records identifying the location of stopcock\nchambers (water shutoff valves) for all residence[ s] on Carolwood Lane, Gatewood Lane, \nWestview Lane, Edgewood Parkway, Lindenwood Lane, and Eastwood Lane.\" 2 On April 4, \n2024, the Village informed you that you met the definition of a recurrent requester and you\nwould receive a response to your FOIA request within 21 business days. On April 26, 2024, the\nVillage denied your request pursuant to section 7(1)(k) of FOIA. 3 Later the same day, you\nsubmitted this Request for Review challenging the Village's denial. \n\nUnder FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). Any public body\nthat denies a record \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the record\nis exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to\n\nbe narrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d\n401, 407 (1997). \n\nAlthough the Village cited section 7(1)(k) of FOIA to deny the request, section\n\n7(1)(x) of FOIA 4 is more applicable. Section 7(1)(x) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ m] aps\nand other records regarding the location or security of generation, transmission, distribution, \nstorage, gathering, treatment, or switching facilities owned by a utility, by a power generator, or\nby the Illinois Power Agency.\" See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 77360, issued September\n27, 2023, at 4 (concluding that locations of combined sewer outfall points constituted records\nregarding the location of a utility's transmission and treatment facilities). \n\nIn a May 21, 2024, telephone call with an Assistant Attorney General in the\n\nPublic Access Bureau, the Village FOIA officer informed this office that the only responsive\nrecords were maps identifying the locations of the water shut- off valves. The FOIA officer\nfurther explained that the shut- off valves are located where the municipality's water utility line\nconnects with a private residence's plumbing, and with the use of a \" key\" can be used to allow or\nrestrict water from the municipality to the individual's residence. \n\nThe requested records are maps that show the specific locations of shut- off valves\n\nused by the Village's water utility to distribute water to the Village's residents. Based on the\nplain language of section 7(1)(x), maps regarding the location of the Village's water distribution\nfacilities, which include the locations of residential shut- off valves, are exempt from disclosure\nunder FOIA. Accordingly, your allegation that the Village improperly responded to your FOIA\nrequest is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (217) 685-\n\n4237 or victoria. frazier@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Peggy Halik\nFOIA Officer\nVillage of Woodridge\n5 Plaza Drive\nWoodridge, Illinois 60517\nphalik@woodridgeil. gov"}
{"id":1055,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-16","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81203"],"title":"Manhattan School District 114 must provide records for PAC review before ruling on exemption","filename":"81203, issued October 16, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3343,"summary":"The requester sought investigative reports regarding sexual harassment allegations against two District employees, which the District denied citing attorney-client privilege. The PAC determined that the reports were prepared by legal counsel for the purpose of providing legal advice and were therefore properly withheld.","plain_summary":"A requester sought a law firm's investigative report on sexual-harassment allegations against a district employee, which the school district withheld and refused to give the PAC for confidential review, citing a risk of waiving attorney-client privilege. The PAC held that providing records for its confidential review does not waive the privilege, and that the district's refusal to do so violated FOIA's cooperation requirement, but separately determined, based on the district's affidavit, that the investigative report was prepared by counsel for confidential legal advice and was properly protected by that privilege. The district's underlying denial of the report itself was not improper.","holding":"","legal_question":"Whether investigative reports prepared by a public body's legal counsel are exempt from disclosure under FOIA's attorney-client privilege exemption.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(m)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(m)"],"public_body":"Manhattan School District 114","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(m)","subject_description":"The request sought investigative reports regarding sexual harassment allegations against specific school district employees.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_m/Attorney-client-privilege/81203%2C%20issued%20October%2016%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["attorney-client privilege","sexual harassment","investigative reports","school district"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"October 16, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nJennifer K. Schwendener\nPetrarca,  Gleason,  Boyle &  Izzo, LLC\n5121 Main Street,  Suite 3\nDowners Grove,  Illinois 60515\njschwendener@petrarcagleason. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review:   2024 PAC 81203\n\nDear\n\nand Jennifer K. Schwendener: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1\n\nOn April 22, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District\n\nseeking:  \n\n1.  All records related to any investigative reports of sexual\n\nharassment allegations made by District employees against\nRussell Ragon of Manhattan School District 114 from\n2019- 2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fJennifer K. Schwendener\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 2\n\n2.  All records related to any investigative reports of sexual\n\nharassment allegations made by District employees against\nChristina Ruddy of Manhattan School District 114 from\n2019- 2024.[ 2] \n\nOn April 26, 2024,  the District denied the request in full, citing sections 7(1)(a),  7(1)(b), 7(1)(f) \nand 7(1)(m) of FOIA. 3 Later the same day, \nReview challenging the District' s denial. \n\nsubmitted this Request for\n\nOn May 3, 2024,  this office sent copies of the Request for Review to the District\n\nand asked it to provide copies of the withheld records for our confidential review.   This office\nalso requested a detailed legal and factual explanation for the District' s assertion that the records\nare exempt from disclosure.   On May 14, 2024,  this office received the District' s written answer\nand an affidavit signed by the District' s legal counsel.   The District refused to provide this office\nwith copies of the withheld records,  asserting that it would waive the attorney- client privilege by\ndoing so.   On May 16, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the District' s answer to\n\nbut did not receive a reply. 4\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 9.5(c) of FOIA\n\nSection 9.5(c) of FOIA 5 expressly and unambiguously provides that each public\n\nbody \" shall provide copies of records requested and shall otherwise fully cooperate with the\nPublic Access Counselor.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   The District refuses to comply with the\nrequirements of section 9.5(c) of FOIA and provide this office with copies of the withheld\nrecords for our confidential review,  asserting that doing so would waive the attorney- client\nprivilege.  \n\nIllinois courts have defined \" waiver\"  as the \" voluntary relinquishment of a known\n\nright, claim or privilege[.]\"   Vaughn v. Speaker,  126 Ill. 2d 150, 161 ( 1998).   A \"voluntary\n\n2E- mail from\n\nto [ Ron]  Pacheco and [ Julie]  Hantson ( April 22, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), ( 1)(b), (1)(f), (1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n4Section 9.5(c) of FOIA prohibits this office from providing the requester with copies of the\n\naffidavit.  5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" Records or documents obtained by the Public Access Counselor\nfrom a public body for the purpose of addressing a request for review under this Section may not be disclosed to the\npublic,  including the requester,  by the Public Access Counselor.\"). \n\n55 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fJennifer K. Schwendener\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 3\n\ndisclosure by the holder of the attorney- client privilege is inconsistent with the attorney- client\nconfidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.\"   Powers v. Chicago Transit Authority, \n890 F.2d 1355,  1359 ( 7th Cir. 1989).  \"'[ V]oluntary disclosure means the documents [ at issue] \nwere not judicially compelled.'\"   Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 69, 74 (D.D.C. 2003) ( quoting\nChubb Integrated Sys.  Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Washington,  103 F.R.D. 52, 63 n.2 (D.D.C. 1984)). \n\nIn its response to this office, the District asserted that providing the withheld\n\nrecords to the Public Access Counselor would be a voluntary disclosure that would constitute a\nselective waiver of the attorney- client privilege.   The \"' selective'  or 'limited'  waiver theory * * * \nprovides that a party may disclose documents to a government agency without waiving the\nprivilege as to any other party.\"   Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., 244\nF.R.D. 412, 430 ( N.D. Ill. 2006).   Selective waiver cases generally concern situations in which\nparties cooperate with investigating agencies,  such as the United States Securities and Exchange\nCommission or the United States Department of Justice,  by choosing to disclose attorney- client\nprivileged records.   The courts are split on whether this type of limited disclosure waives the\nattorney- client privilege. 6 The rationale for rejecting the selective waiver theory is that\ndisclosure will be used to obtain a strategic advantage,  and puzzlement why if the information is\nreally confidential\nFarms v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122,  1127 ( 7th Cir. 1997).   Thus,  waiver is more likely to occur\nwhen a party voluntarily discloses records to a government agency for its own benefit.   Noval\nWilliams Films LLC v. Branca, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173279,  at * 10-11 ( S.D.N.Y. December\n14, 2016) (\" Where the disclosed information does not afford the disclosing party a tactical\nadvantage that would lead to a selective and deceptive presentation of evidence at trial, \nhowever,  selective waiver may be permissible.\").   The District implies that because of the legal\nuncertainty around the selective waiver principle,  disclosing the withheld records to the Public\nAccess Counselor would risk waiving the privilege. \n\nit was disclosed except for some nefarious strategic purpose.\"   Dellwood\n\nSection 9.5(c) mandates that public bodies \" shall provide\"  for the Public Access\nCounselor' s confidential review records that were denied in response to FOIA requests so this\n\n6Compare Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of Philippines,  951 F.2d 1414,  1425 ( 3d Cir. \n\n1991) ( rejecting selective waiver because it \"does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's\nattorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance;  it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to government\nagencies,  thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose.\")  and Permian Corp. v. United States,  665\nF.2d 1214,  1221 ( D.C. Cir. 1981) ( concluding that the party who disclosed attorney- client privileged records to the\ngovernment \" has been willing to sacrifice confidentiality in order to expedite approval of the exchange offer, and\nnow asserts that the secrecy of the attorney- client relationship precludes disclosure of the same documents in other\nadministrative litigation.   The attorney- client privilege is not designed for such tactical employment.\")  with\nDiversified Industries,  Inc. v. Meredith,  572 F.2d 596, 611 ( 8th Cir. 1978) ( concluding there was no complete\nwaiver of the attorney- client privilege where party voluntarily surrendered the material to the SEC pursuant to an\nagency subpoena. \" To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to\nemploy independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders,  potential\nstockholders and customers.\").  \n\n\fJennifer K. Schwendener\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 4\n\noffice can assess whether or not those records are exempt from disclosure.   In the selective\nwaiver cases,  the parties voluntarily choose to disclose records,  often to gain a tactical\nadvantage,  which negates the purpose of the privilege.   Further,  in those cases,  the government\nagencies are using the records in connection with investigations and other legal issues rather than\nfor the purpose of determining whether a privilege applies.   A public body does not gain a\nstrategic advantage by cooperating with section 9.5(c) of FOIA––it merely complies with the\nlaw.  Although courts have held that the attorney- client privilege may be waived when a party\ndiscloses records in response to a subpoena after entering into a confidentiality agreement with\nthe government, 7 the District has not cited and this office has not identified any authority in\nwhich a court held that a public body waived the attorney- client privilege by complying with a\nstatute that expressly required records to be disclosed to a governmental entity for its\nconfidential review. \n\nFurther,  the mandate in section 9.5(c) of FOIA is akin to a judicially- compelled in\n\ncamera review rather than a voluntary disclosure to an investigative agency.   As the United\nStates Supreme Court has held, \" disclosure of allegedly privileged materials to the district court\nfor purposes of determining the merits of a claim of privilege does not have the legal effect of\nterminating the privilege.\"  United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 ( 1989).  \" Drawing a parallel\nto in camera inspections,  examination of privileged documents by a court monitor appointed to\nensure compliance with court orders or by an administrative agency acting in a quasi- judicial\ncapacity have been held to be judicially compelled,  and therefore did not effect a waiver.\"   Paul\nR. Rice, Attorney- Client Privilege in the United States §  9:27, at 106- 107 ( 2023- 2024 ed.).   In\nJordan v. United States Dep't of Labor, 273 F. Supp.  3d 214, 234 ( D.D.C. 2017),  the United\nStates District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the attorney- client privilege was\nnot waived when allegedly privileged documents were provided to a Department of Labor\nAdministrative Law Judge ( ALJ) for a determination on whether the assertion of privilege was\nappropriate.   The court explained: \n\nThe principle established in Zolin logically applies equally\n\nto ALJs.   ALJs are judicial actors who, in the matters pending\nbefore them,  must make determinations on the propriety of\nprivilege claims asserted by the parties before them.  There is no\nbasis to conclude that they may not avail themselves of in camera\nreview as a useful tool in making those determinations.  If\nsubmission of information to such review jettisoned privilege,  the\nreview would have no purpose,  because any privileged document\nsubmitted for in camera review would be immediately eligible for\nfull disclosure under FOIA. Nor is the submission of privileged\n\n7See e.g., United State ex. rel Garbe v. Kmart Corp., No. 3:12-cv-00881- MJR- PMR, 2014 U.S. \n\nDist. LEXIS 73261,  at * 15 ( S.D. Ill. May 29, 2024). \n\n\fJennifer K. Schwendener\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 5\n\ndocuments for in camera review \" inconsistent with the confidential\nnature of the attorney— client relationship.\"  In re United Mine\nWorkers,  159 F.R.D. at 310.   Jordan, 273 F. Supp.  3d at 234. \n\nSee also Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 69, 74-75 ( D.D.C. 2003) ( finding attorney- client privilege\nnot waived by providing records to a court- appointed monitor for a determination on whether the\nprivilege applied to the records at issue).   Further,  parties submitting withheld records for in\ncamera review of a privilege claim act consistently with the attorney- client privilege— they are\nsubstantiating and maintaining their claims of privilege,  rather than choosing not to assert the\nprivilege.   See Jordan, 273 F. Supp.  3d at 235 ( finding that corporation acted consistently with\nthe attorney- client privilege in providing ALJ with copies of the records to validate its claim of\nprivilege and by submitting the basis for withholding them). \n\nWhen resolving Requests for Review,  the Public Access Counselor acts in a\n\nquasi- judicial capacity.   Black' s Law Dictionary defines \" quasi- judicial\"  as \"[ o] f, relating to, or\ninvolving an executive or administrative official' s adjudicative acts.\" 8 FOIA establishes a\nprocedural framework for the processing of a Request for Review that provides both the\nrequester and the public body the opportunity to be heard.   5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a)  through ( f) (West\n2023 Supp.).   The process may culminate in the issuance of a binding opinion in which the\nAttorney General,  through the Public Access Counselor,  makes \" findings of fact and conclusions\nof law\"  that are \" binding upon both the requester and the public body.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West\n2023 Supp.).   Such a binding opinion \" shall be considered a final decision of an administrative\nagency,  for purposes of administrative review under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS\n5/Art. III).\"  5 ILCS 140/ 11.5 (West 2022).   Because the Public Access Counselor exercises\nquasi- judicial authority to resolve disputes concerning FOIA through a statutory framework and\nmay issue binding opinions that carry the force of law, the principle established in Zolin and\nJordan also applies in the Request for Review context:   the provision of records to the Public\nAccess Counselor for a confidential review to determine if the privilege applies does not waive\nthe privilege.   Because section 9.5(c) does not afford the District discretion to disregard its\nstatutory obligation to fully cooperate with this inquiry,  the District would not waive its attorney-\nclient privilege by furnishing the records in question to the Public Access Counselor. \n\nThe General Assembly clearly recognized that the Public Access Counselor must\nhave access to all pertinent records to conduct a complete review of a public body' s compliance\nwith FOIA.  The following colloquy between Representative Elaine Nekritz and Representative\nMichael Madigan,  the House sponsor of the bill, during the House debate on Senate Bill 189\nwhich,  as Public Act 96-542, effective January 1, 2010,  created the Office of the Public Access\nCounselor),  evinces the General Assembly' s intention to vest the Public Access Counselor with\ncomplete authority to conduct confidential reviews of records. \n\n8Black' s Law Dictionary 1501 ( 11th ed. 2019). \n\n\fJennifer K. Schwendener\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 6\n\nNekritz:   Thank you Mr. Speaker.   I just have some questions * * * \nto clarify the legislative intent under this.  * * *  It's my\nunderstanding that under this Bill, an agency' s required to provide\nrecords requested by the public access counselor.   What if some\nother State or Federal Law precludes disclosure of those records to\nsome other party like HIPAA, an IG report or something like that?  \nHow does that * * *  get resolved? \n\nMadigan:   Point number one, the Attorney General will review\nthose documents in confidence.   They would be kept\nconfidential.   Point number two, if it were a Federal Law in\nconflict,  why, the Federal Law would control.   \n\nNekritz:  [ A]nd if some investigating authority such as the U.S. \nAttorney asked to have that certain records not be disclosed * * * \nwhat would be the result there? \n\nMadigan:  * * * [ T]he Office of the U.S. Attorney could interact\nwith the Office of the Attorney General,  make a request,  but the\nfinal judgment… the final decision would be made by the\nAttorney General.  ( Emphasis added.)   Remarks of Rep.  Nekritz\nand Rep.  Madigan,  May 27, 2009,  House Debate on Senate Bill\nNo. 189, at 105. \n\nIf the General Assembly wished to carve out an exception in section 9.5(c) that would have\npermitted public bodies to withhold from the Public Access Counselor records asserted to be\nexempt under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA, the General Assembly would have done so expressly.  \nThe District' s refusal to provide copies of the contested records undermines the Public Access\nCounselor' s ability to conduct the type of comprehensive review that the General Assembly\ndeemed to be crucial when it enacted Public Act 96-542.  This refusal violates section 9.5(c) of\nFOIA ( see Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 12-007, issued April 2, 2012).   Nevertheless,  this\noffice will consider whether the District' s written response to this office demonstrates that the\nrecord at issue is exempt from disclosure under FOIA.  \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.   Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\"   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   Section 3(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(a) ( West 2022))  further provides:  \nEach public body shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public\n\n\fJennifer K. Schwendener\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 7\n\nrecords,  except as otherwise provided in Sections 7 and 8.5 of this Act.\"  The exemptions from\ndisclosure contained in section 7 of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7 (West 2023 Supp.))  are to be narrowly\nconstrued.   See Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, 407\n1997). \n\nSection 7(1)( m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney\nrepresenting the public body that would not be subject to\n\ndiscovery in litigation,  and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal,  civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body[.]  \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m).  See People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 ( 1997).   A party\nasserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney- client privilege must\nshow that: \"( 1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; ( 2) it was\nmade to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices;  and ( 3) it remained confidential.\"   Cangelosi v. Capasso,  366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228\n2006).   Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only to the communications of a client to his\nattorney,  but also to the advice of an attorney to his client.\"   In re Marriage of Granger,  197 Ill. \nApp. 3d 363, 374 ( 1990);  see also People v. Radojcic, 2013 IL 114197, ¶  40 (\"[ T]he modern\nview is that the privilege is a two-way street,  protecting both the client' s communications to the\nattorney and the attorney' s advice to the client.\").   A public body that withholds records under\nsection 7(1)(m) \" can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption\nis applicable under the circumstances.\"  ( Emphasis in original.)   Illinois Education Ass'n v. \nIllinois State Board of Education,  204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 ( 2003). \n\nAn investigative report prepared by a law firm to advise a public body in\nconnection with allegations of misconduct may be exempt from disclosure under section\n7(1)(m).  See Sandra T.E. v. South Berwyn School District 100, 600 F.3d 612, 620 ( 7th Cir. \n2010) (\" Because the [ public body' s]  lawyers were hired in their capacity as lawyers to provide\nlegal services— including a factual investigation— the attorney- client privilege applies to the\ncommunications made and documents generated during that investigation.\");  see also Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 81704,  issued September 30, 2024 ( library properly withheld\ninvestigation report prepared by law firm that contained attorney' s opinions and\nrecommendations,  among other privileged information);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. \n35302,  issued July 10, 2015 ( memorandum prepared by counsel summarizing investigatory\ninterviews and setting out findings and recommendations was exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(m)). \n\n\fJennifer K. Schwendener\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 8\n\nThe affidavit the District submitted with its answer to this office stated that the\n\nonly records withheld were a February 13, 2024,  investigative report and executive summary of\nthe same report.   The affidavit stated that the District' s Board of Education ( Board)  retained the\nlaw firm Petrarca,  Gleason,  Boyle &  Izzo, LLC to investigate allegations of sexual harassment.  \nAt the conclusion of its investigation,  the law firm provided the Board with the investigation\nreport and summary.   The affidavit stated that the records contained confidential\nimpressions,  conclusions,  and opinions of the Board' s attorneys. \nmental\n\nlegal advice, \n\nBased on the available information,  the investigation report was prepared by the\n\nBoard' s attorneys to provide the Board with confidential\nlegal advice.   Such investigation reports\nare protected by the attorney- client privilege because the information they contain,  including any\nfactual information,  was developed and prepared by legal counsel while providing legal services\nto the public body.   See Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 620.   This office has not received information\nsuggesting that the District has waived the attorney- client privilege in this instance,  such as by\nvoluntarily disclosing the investigation report to an uninvolved third party.   Under these\ncircumstances,  the District demonstrated that it did not improperly withhold the responsive\nrecord;  therefore,  its response to\nviolate FOIA. \n\nApril 22, 2024,  FOIA request did not\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\nlaura. harter@ilag. gov.  This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81203 f 71m proper 95c improper sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A requester asked the Public Access Counselor to review a school district's denial of records about sexual harassment investigations. The district refused to provide the records to the counselor, claiming that doing so would waive attorney-client privilege. The counselor determined that the district must provide the records for confidential review, as required by FOIA, and that such disclosure does not waive the privilege. The document does not rule on whether the records themselves are exempt from disclosure.","card_headline":"Investigative reports on sexual harassment allegations","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":"no_violation","human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81203/","full_text":"October 16, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nJennifer K. Schwendener\nPetrarca, Gleason, Boyle & Izzo, LLC\n5121 Main Street, Suite 3\nDowners Grove, Illinois 60515\njschwendener@petrarcagleason. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review: 2024 PAC 81203\n\nDear\n\nand Jennifer K. Schwendener: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1\n\nOn April 22, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District\n\nseeking: \n\n2. All records related to any investigative reports of sexual\n\nharassment allegations made by District employees against\nChristina Ruddy of Manhattan School District 114 from\n2019- 2024.[ 2] \n\nOn April 26, 2024, the District denied the request in full, citing sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b), 7(1)(f) \nand 7(1)(m) of FOIA. 3 Later the same day, \nReview challenging the District's denial. \n\nsubmitted this Request for\n\nOn May 3, 2024, this office sent copies of the Request for Review to the District\n\nand asked it to provide copies of the withheld records for our confidential review. This office\nalso requested a detailed legal and factual explanation for the District's assertion that the records\nare exempt from disclosure. On May 14, 2024, this office received the District's written answer\nand an affidavit signed by the District's legal counsel. The District refused to provide this office\nwith copies of the withheld records, asserting that it would waive the attorney- client privilege by\ndoing so. On May 16, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the District's answer to\n\nbut did not receive a reply. 4\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 9.5(c) of FOIA\n\nSection 9.5(c) of FOIA 5 expressly and unambiguously provides that each public\n\nbody \" shall provide copies of records requested and shall otherwise fully cooperate with the\nPublic Access Counselor.\" (Emphasis added.) The District refuses to comply with the\nrequirements of section 9.5(c) of FOIA and provide this office with copies of the withheld\nrecords for our confidential review, asserting that doing so would waive the attorney- client\nprivilege. \n\nIllinois courts have defined \" waiver\" as the \" voluntary relinquishment of a known\n\nright, claim or privilege[.]\" Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (1998). A \"voluntary\n\n2E- mail from\n\nto [ Ron] Pacheco and [ Julie] Hantson (April 22, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(f), (1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n4 Section 9.5(c) of FOIA prohibits this office from providing the requester with copies of the\n\naffidavit. 5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" Records or documents obtained by the Public Access Counselor\nfrom a public body for the purpose of addressing a request for review under this Section may not be disclosed to the\n\ndisclosure by the holder of the attorney- client privilege is inconsistent with the attorney- client\nconfidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.\" Powers v. Chicago Transit Authority, \n890 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1989). \"'[ V]oluntary disclosure means the documents [ at issue] \nwere not judicially compelled.'\" Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 69, 74 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting\nChubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 63 n.2 (D.D.C. 1984)). \n\nIn its response to this office, the District asserted that providing the withheld\n\nrecords to the Public Access Counselor would be a voluntary disclosure that would constitute a\nselective waiver of the attorney- client privilege. The \"' selective' or 'limited' waiver theory * * * \nprovides that a party may disclose documents to a government agency without waiving the\nprivilege as to any other party.\" Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., 244\nF.R.D. 412, 430 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Selective waiver cases generally concern situations in which\nparties cooperate with investigating agencies, such as the United States Securities and Exchange\nCommission or the United States Department of Justice, by choosing to disclose attorney- client\nprivileged records. The courts are split on whether this type of limited disclosure waives the\nattorney- client privilege. 6 The rationale for rejecting the selective waiver theory is that\ndisclosure will be used to obtain a strategic advantage, and puzzlement why if the information is\nreally confidential\nFarms v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, waiver is more likely to occur\nwhen a party voluntarily discloses records to a government agency for its own benefit. Noval\nWilliams Films LLC v. Branca, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173279, at * 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. December\n14, 2016) (\" Where the disclosed information does not afford the disclosing party a tactical\nadvantage that would lead to a selective and deceptive presentation of evidence at trial, \nhowever, selective waiver may be permissible.\"). The District implies that because of the legal\nuncertainty around the selective waiver principle, disclosing the withheld records to the Public\nAccess Counselor would risk waiving the privilege. \n\nit was disclosed except for some nefarious strategic purpose.\" Dellwood\n\nSection 9.5(c) mandates that public bodies \" shall provide\" for the Public Access\nCounselor's confidential review records that were denied in response to FOIA requests so this\n\n6 Compare Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. \n\n1991) (rejecting selective waiver because it \"does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to one's\nattorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance; it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to government\nagencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose.\") and Permian Corp. v. United States, 665\nF.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that the party who disclosed attorney- client privileged records to the\ngovernment \" has been willing to sacrifice confidentiality in order to expedite approval of the exchange offer, and\nnow asserts that the secrecy of the attorney- client relationship precludes disclosure of the same documents in other\nadministrative litigation. The attorney- client privilege is not designed for such tactical employment.\") with\nDiversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (concluding there was no complete\nwaiver of the attorney- client privilege where party voluntarily surrendered the material to the SEC pursuant to an\nagency subpoena. \" To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to\nemploy independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential\n\noffice can assess whether or not those records are exempt from disclosure. In the selective\nwaiver cases, the parties voluntarily choose to disclose records, often to gain a tactical\nadvantage, which negates the purpose of the privilege. Further, in those cases, the government\nagencies are using the records in connection with investigations and other legal issues rather than\nfor the purpose of determining whether a privilege applies. A public body does not gain a\nstrategic advantage by cooperating with section 9.5(c) of FOIA––it merely complies with the\nlaw. Although courts have held that the attorney- client privilege may be waived when a party\ndiscloses records in response to a subpoena after entering into a confidentiality agreement with\nthe government, 7 the District has not cited and this office has not identified any authority in\nwhich a court held that a public body waived the attorney- client privilege by complying with a\nstatute that expressly required records to be disclosed to a governmental entity for its\nconfidential review. \n\nFurther, the mandate in section 9.5(c) of FOIA is akin to a judicially- compelled in\n\ncamera review rather than a voluntary disclosure to an investigative agency. As the United\nStates Supreme Court has held, \" disclosure of allegedly privileged materials to the district court\nfor purposes of determining the merits of a claim of privilege does not have the legal effect of\nterminating the privilege.\" United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989). \" Drawing a parallel\nto in camera inspections, examination of privileged documents by a court monitor appointed to\nensure compliance with court orders or by an administrative agency acting in a quasi- judicial\ncapacity have been held to be judicially compelled, and therefore did not effect a waiver.\" Paul\nR. Rice, Attorney- Client Privilege in the United States § 9:27, at 106- 107 (2023- 2024 ed.). In\nJordan v. United States Dep't of Labor, 273 F. Supp. 3d 214, 234 (D.D.C. 2017), the United\nStates District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the attorney- client privilege was\nnot waived when allegedly privileged documents were provided to a Department of Labor\nAdministrative Law Judge (ALJ) for a determination on whether the assertion of privilege was\nappropriate. The court explained: \n\nThe principle established in Zolin logically applies equally\n\nto ALJs. ALJs are judicial actors who, in the matters pending\nbefore them, must make determinations on the propriety of\nprivilege claims asserted by the parties before them. There is no\nbasis to conclude that they may not avail themselves of in camera\nreview as a useful tool in making those determinations. If\nsubmission of information to such review jettisoned privilege, the\nreview would have no purpose, because any privileged document\nsubmitted for in camera review would be immediately eligible for\nfull disclosure under FOIA. Nor is the submission of privileged\n\n7 See e.g., United State ex. rel Garbe v. Kmart Corp., No. 3:12-cv-00881- MJR- PMR, 2014 U.S. \n\ndocuments for in camera review \" inconsistent with the confidential\nnature of the attorney— client relationship.\" In re United Mine\nWorkers, 159 F.R.D. at 310. Jordan, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 234. \n\nSee also Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 69, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding attorney- client privilege\nnot waived by providing records to a court- appointed monitor for a determination on whether the\nprivilege applied to the records at issue). Further, parties submitting withheld records for in\ncamera review of a privilege claim act consistently with the attorney- client privilege— they are\nsubstantiating and maintaining their claims of privilege, rather than choosing not to assert the\nprivilege. See Jordan, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 235 (finding that corporation acted consistently with\nthe attorney- client privilege in providing ALJ with copies of the records to validate its claim of\nprivilege and by submitting the basis for withholding them). \n\nWhen resolving Requests for Review, the Public Access Counselor acts in a\n\nquasi- judicial capacity. Black's Law Dictionary defines \" quasi- judicial\" as \"[ o] f, relating to, or\ninvolving an executive or administrative official's adjudicative acts.\" 8 FOIA establishes a\nprocedural framework for the processing of a Request for Review that provides both the\nrequester and the public body the opportunity to be heard. 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) through (f) (West\n2023 Supp.). The process may culminate in the issuance of a binding opinion in which the\nAttorney General, through the Public Access Counselor, makes \" findings of fact and conclusions\nof law\" that are \" binding upon both the requester and the public body.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West\n2023 Supp.). Such a binding opinion \" shall be considered a final decision of an administrative\nagency, for purposes of administrative review under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS\n5/Art. III).\" 5 ILCS 140/ 11.5 (West 2022). Because the Public Access Counselor exercises\nquasi- judicial authority to resolve disputes concerning FOIA through a statutory framework and\nmay issue binding opinions that carry the force of law, the principle established in Zolin and\nJordan also applies in the Request for Review context: the provision of records to the Public\nAccess Counselor for a confidential review to determine if the privilege applies does not waive\nthe privilege. Because section 9.5(c) does not afford the District discretion to disregard its\nstatutory obligation to fully cooperate with this inquiry, the District would not waive its attorney-\nclient privilege by furnishing the records in question to the Public Access Counselor. \n\nThe General Assembly clearly recognized that the Public Access Counselor must\nhave access to all pertinent records to conduct a complete review of a public body's compliance\nwith FOIA. The following colloquy between Representative Elaine Nekritz and Representative\nMichael Madigan, the House sponsor of the bill, during the House debate on Senate Bill 189\nwhich, as Public Act 96-542, effective January 1, 2010, created the Office of the Public Access\nCounselor), evinces the General Assembly's intention to vest the Public Access Counselor with\n\nNekritz: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I just have some questions * * * \nto clarify the legislative intent under this. * * * It's my\nunderstanding that under this Bill, an agency's required to provide\nrecords requested by the public access counselor. What if some\nother State or Federal Law precludes disclosure of those records to\nsome other party like HIPAA, an IG report or something like that? \nHow does that * * * get resolved? \n\nMadigan: Point number one, the Attorney General will review\nthose documents in confidence. They would be kept\nconfidential. Point number two, if it were a Federal Law in\nconflict, why, the Federal Law would control. \n\nNekritz: [ A]nd if some investigating authority such as the U.S. \nAttorney asked to have that certain records not be disclosed * * * \nwhat would be the result there? \n\nMadigan: * * * [ T]he Office of the U.S. Attorney could interact\nwith the Office of the Attorney General, make a request, but the\nfinal judgment… the final decision would be made by the\nAttorney General. (Emphasis added.) Remarks of Rep. Nekritz\nand Rep. Madigan, May 27, 2009, House Debate on Senate Bill\nNo. 189, at 105. \n\nIf the General Assembly wished to carve out an exception in section 9.5(c) that would have\npermitted public bodies to withhold from the Public Access Counselor records asserted to be\nexempt under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA, the General Assembly would have done so expressly. \nThe District's refusal to provide copies of the contested records undermines the Public Access\nCounselor's ability to conduct the type of comprehensive review that the General Assembly\ndeemed to be crucial when it enacted Public Act 96-542. This refusal violates section 9.5(c) of\nFOIA (see Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 12-007, issued April 2, 2012). Nevertheless, this\noffice will consider whether the District's written response to this office demonstrates that the\nrecord at issue is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). Section 3(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(a) (West 2022)) further provides: \n\nrecords, except as otherwise provided in Sections 7 and 8.5 of this Act.\" The exemptions from\ndisclosure contained in section 7 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7 (West 2023 Supp.)) are to be narrowly\nconstrued. See Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407\n1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney\nrepresenting the public body that would not be subject to\n\ndiscovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body[.] \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m). See People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1997). A party\nasserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney- client privilege must\nshow that: \"(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was\nmade to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices; and (3) it remained confidential.\" Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228\n2006). Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only to the communications of a client to his\nattorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his client.\" In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. \nApp. 3d 363, 374 (1990); see also People v. Radojcic, 2013 IL 114197, ¶ 40 (\"[ T]he modern\nview is that the privilege is a two-way street, protecting both the client's communications to the\nattorney and the attorney's advice to the client.\"). A public body that withholds records under\nsection 7(1)(m) \" can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption\nis applicable under the circumstances.\" (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Education Ass'n v. \nIllinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003). \n\nAn investigative report prepared by a law firm to advise a public body in\nconnection with allegations of misconduct may be exempt from disclosure under section\n7(1)(m). See Sandra T.E. v. South Berwyn School District 100, 600 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. \n2010) (\" Because the [ public body's] lawyers were hired in their capacity as lawyers to provide\nlegal services— including a factual investigation— the attorney- client privilege applies to the\ncommunications made and documents generated during that investigation.\"); see also Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 81704, issued September 30, 2024 (library properly withheld\n\nThe affidavit the District submitted with its answer to this office stated that the\n\nonly records withheld were a February 13, 2024, investigative report and executive summary of\nthe same report. The affidavit stated that the District's Board of Education (Board) retained the\nlaw firm Petrarca, Gleason, Boyle & Izzo, LLC to investigate allegations of sexual harassment. \nAt the conclusion of its investigation, the law firm provided the Board with the investigation\nreport and summary. The affidavit stated that the records contained confidential\nimpressions, conclusions, and opinions of the Board's attorneys. \nmental\n\nlegal advice, \n\nBased on the available information, the investigation report was prepared by the\n\nBoard's attorneys to provide the Board with confidential\nlegal advice. Such investigation reports\nare protected by the attorney- client privilege because the information they contain, including any\nfactual information, was developed and prepared by legal counsel while providing legal services\nto the public body. See Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 620. This office has not received information\nsuggesting that the District has waived the attorney- client privilege in this instance, such as by\nvoluntarily disclosing the investigation report to an uninvolved third party. Under these\ncircumstances, the District demonstrated that it did not improperly withhold the responsive\nrecord; therefore, its response to\nviolate FOIA. \n\nApril 22, 2024, FOIA request did not\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nlaura. harter@ilag. gov. This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81203 f 71m proper 95c improper sd"}
{"id":1057,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81205"],"title":"Chicago Park District properly withheld performance evaluations under Personnel Record Review Act","filename":"81205, issued May 8, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":473,"summary":"A requester sought their own seasonal performance evaluations from the Chicago Park District, which the District denied citing FOIA exemptions. The PAC determined that the Personnel Record Review Act explicitly prohibits the disclosure of performance evaluations via FOIA, and therefore closed the file.","plain_summary":"A former employee asked the Chicago Park District for copies of their past performance evaluations. The PAC explained that while employees have a right to see their own personnel files under a different law, FOIA specifically forbids public bodies from releasing performance evaluations. Because the law prohibits these records from being released through a FOIA request, the PAC closed the case.","holding":"The Chicago Park District properly withheld the requested performance evaluations because they are exempt from disclosure under FOIA pursuant to the Personnel Record Review Act.","legal_question":"Whether performance evaluations are exempt from disclosure under FOIA pursuant to section 11 of the Personnel Record Review Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(q)","820 ILCS 40/11"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(q)","7.5(q)"],"public_body":"Chicago Park District","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed - no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The requester sought access to their own seasonal performance evaluations and interview scoring records.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":99,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_q/81205%2C%20issued%20May%208%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["personnel records","performance evaluations","employee rights","Personnel Record Review Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"May 8, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81205\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024).  For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted. \n\nOn March 28, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Park District\nDistrict)  seeking copies of your seasonal evaluations for seven specified forestry seasons and\nyour interview scoring for the junior tree surgeon position.  On April 25, 2024, the District\nto sections 7(1)( b), 7(1)( q),  and 7.5(q) \ngranted,  in part,  and denied,  in part,  the request pursuant\nof FOIA.1, 2 On May 1, 2024, this office received your complete Request for Review contesting\nthe withholding of your seasonal evaluations.   You questioned why the evaluations were\nwithheld when you have previously received copies of them. \n\nSection 7.5(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"information prohibited from\n\nbeing disclosed by the Personnel Record Review Act.\"   Section 11 of the Personnel Record\nReview Act (820 ILCS 40/11 (West 2022)) provides:  \" This Act shall not be construed to\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), 7(1)(q) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, \n\n2023;  103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103-462, effective August 4, 2023;  103-446, effective August 4, 2023; \n103-540, effective January 1, 2024;  103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(q) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103-142, effective January 1, 2024; 103-372, effective January 1, 2024; 103-508, \neffective July 1, 2023; 103-580, effective December 8, 2023. \n\n\fMay 8, 2024\nPage 2\n\ndiminish a right of access to records already otherwise provided by law,  provided that disclosure\nof performance evaluations under the Freedom of Information Act shall be prohibited.\"  \nEmphasis added.)   This provision expressly exempts performance evaluations,  such as seasonal\nevaluations, from disclosure pursuant to a FOIA request.  \n\nBecause section 11 of the Personnel Record Review Act prohibits disclosure of\n\nperformance evaluations in response to a FOIA request,  the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter.  You may wish to follow up with\nyour Human Resources Department about obtaining or reviewing evaluations outside of FOIA, \nas you stated you have received them in the past.  See 820 ILCS 40/2 (West 2022), as amended\nby Public Act 103- 201,  effective January 1, 2024 ( requiring public bodies to permit employees to\ninspect certain personnel records).  \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81205 f no fi war pkd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Seasonal performance evaluations and interview scoring records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81205/","full_text":"May 8, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81205\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted. \n\nOn March 28, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Park District\nDistrict) seeking copies of your seasonal evaluations for seven specified forestry seasons and\nyour interview scoring for the junior tree surgeon position. On April 25, 2024, the District\nto sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(q), and 7.5(q) \ngranted, in part, and denied, in part, the request pursuant\nof FOIA.1, 2 On May 1, 2024, this office received your complete Request for Review contesting\nthe withholding of your seasonal evaluations. You questioned why the evaluations were\nwithheld when you have previously received copies of them. \n\nSection 7.5(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"information prohibited from\n\nbeing disclosed by the Personnel Record Review Act.\" Section 11 of the Personnel Record\nReview Act (820 ILCS 40/11 (West 2022)) provides: \" This Act shall not be construed to\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), 7(1)(q) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, \n\n2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; \n103-540, effective January 1, 2024; 103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(q) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103-142, effective January 1, 2024; 103-372, effective January 1, 2024; 103-508, \n\ndiminish a right of access to records already otherwise provided by law, provided that disclosure\nof performance evaluations under the Freedom of Information Act shall be prohibited.\" \nEmphasis added.) This provision expressly exempts performance evaluations, such as seasonal\nevaluations, from disclosure pursuant to a FOIA request. \n\nBecause section 11 of the Personnel Record Review Act prohibits disclosure of\n\nperformance evaluations in response to a FOIA request, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. You may wish to follow up with\nyour Human Resources Department about obtaining or reviewing evaluations outside of FOIA, \nas you stated you have received them in the past. See 820 ILCS 40/2 (West 2022), as amended\nby Public Act 103- 201, effective January 1, 2024 (requiring public bodies to permit employees to\ninspect certain personnel records). \n\nThis file is closed. If you have questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81205 f no fi war pkd"}
{"id":1058,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81235"],"title":"Chicago Public Schools did not violate FOIA by withholding OIG laptop inventory data under 7.5(h)","filename":"81235, issued June 13, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2366,"summary":"The requester sought school-by-school inventory records of lost or stolen laptop devices referenced in a CPS Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, which CPS withheld citing an exemption for OIG investigatory records. The PAC determined that because the records were obtained and used by the OIG for an investigation, they are exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(h) of FOIA.","plain_summary":"The requester sought a school-by-school breakdown of the roughly 77,505 lost or stolen technology devices cited in a CPS Inspector General report, and the district's IT department provided a different, non-matching current dataset instead. The PAC determined that dataset was not responsive, and that the actual responsive records - the raw asset-management data CPS provided to and the OIG analyzed for its report - were properly exempt as inspector-general investigatory records. The district's ultimate withholding of the responsive data did not violate FOIA, though its search should have identified the correct dataset.","holding":"The PAC found that the data CPS provided was not responsive to the request and that the responsive raw data held by the OIG is exempt under section 7.5(h) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether records obtained and used by an Office of Inspector General for an investigation are exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(h) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(h)"],"public_body":"Chicago Public Schools","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7.5(h)","subject_description":"The request sought detailed inventory records of lost or stolen electronic devices that were utilized in an OIG investigation.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_h/81235%2C%20issued%20June%2013%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["OIG records","investigatory records","CPS","laptop inventory","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"June 13, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs.  Annie Righi\nFOIA Officer\nChicago Public Schools\n42 West Madison Street, 3rd Floor\nChicago,  Illinois 60602\narighi@cps. edu\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81235; N014712 -012224\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Righi: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn January 22, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to Chicago\n\nPublic Schools ( CPS)  seeking,  in relevant part,  copies of \"[ s] chool by school CPS inventory\ndocuments of the 77,505 laptop devices in total that had been reported as lost or stolen and\nmentioned in the [ 2023]  CPS OIG' s Annual Report[,]\" \nincluding the \" total number of laptops\ngiven to each school, number of laptops given out to students and CPS employees, number of\nlaptops returned by both, and the number of laptops reported as lost or stolen by both.\" 1 Upon\n\n1FOIA portal message from Chicago Public Schools to\n\nJanuary 22, 2024 ). \n\n\fMs. Annie Righi\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 2\n\nreceiving\nallowed by section 3(e)  of FOIA  (5 ILCS 140/3(e) ( West 2022)). 2\n\nrequest,  CPS extended its time to respond to by five business days as\n\nOn March 28, 2024, CPS provided\n\nwith a responsive dataset and\n\nthat to \" the extent the OIG maintains a dataset\n\nexplained the \"cited '77,505' figure from the referenced OIG report is a count of  'tech devices,' \ninformation about tech devices,  not just laptops,  has been provided in response to this request. \nDue to the difference in analysis using methodology,  the numbers may not align with the OIG\nreport.\"3 CPS also informed\nreflecting the 77,505 figure ,\" this information would be exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7.5(h) of FOIA .4 On April 25, 2024, \nsubmitted the above -referenced\nRequest for Review complaining that \"CPS failed to provide me with the school-by-school\nbreakdown of the 77,505 lost or stolen laptops  (and tech devices)  that were at the center of a CPS\nOIG investigation .\"5\ndocuments that must have been accessed by CPS Inspector General [OIG] in its investigation.  \nHe contended :  \"CPS OIG had to go through CPS inventory records to declare 77,505 laptops\nand tech devices) were lost or stolen as the CPS OIG doesn't maintain those CPS inventory\nrecords,  especially as CPS and the CPS OIG are separate entities from each other.\" 6\n\nalleged that CPS failed to provide him with inventory\n\nOn May 15 , 2024 , this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to CPS\nallegation that CPS did not\n\nand asked it to provide a written answer responding to\nprovide him with all records responsive to his request as well as a detailed description of its\nsearch process.   On May 17 , 2024,  this office received CPS'  written response.   On May 28 , 2024,    \nthis office forwarded a copy of CPS' response to\n\nhe replied on June 24, 2024. \n\nOn May 1, 2025,  an Assistant Attorney General ( AAG)  in the Public Access\n\nBureau e- mailed CPS'  FOIA officer,  Annie Righi,  and asked if CPS could provide copies of any\nrecords withheld pursuant to section 7.5(h).  On that same date, Ms. Righi informed the AA G\nthat CPS' FOIA Office does not possess any such records because the OIG \"generally does not\n\nsubmitted a preceding Request for Review, 2024 PAC 80659, a lleging that the CPS\nhad not responded to his FOIA request.  That complaint was closed on April 24, 2024 , when this office received\nnotification that CPS responded to the request . \n\n3FOIA portal message from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public\n\nSchools,  to [\n\nMarch 28, 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 7.5(h) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103 -142, effective January 1, 2024;  103 -372, effective January 1, 2024; 103 -508, \neffective July 1, 2023;  103 -580,  effective December 8, 2023. \n\n5E-mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( April 25, 2024). \n\n6E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( April 25, 202 4 ). \n\n\fMs. Annie Righi\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 3\n\nshare records like this with CPS due to confidentiality concerns.\" 7 Because the CPS Office of\ncited found that 77,505 technology\nthe Inspector General's (OIG) annual report that\ndevices had been reported as lost or stolen during the 2021 -2022 academic year based on data\nprovided to the OIG by CPS Asset Management,8 on May 23, 2025, the AAG asked Ms. Righi if\nCPS maintained a copy of the Asset Management data that was provided to the OIG and whether\nit was willing to provide the data to\ndata would be exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nMs.  Righi responded that such\n\nto section 7.5( h)  of FOIA. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022).   When presented with a FOIA\nrequest, a public body is required to conduct a \"reasonable search tailored to the nature of [that] \nparticular request.\"   Campbell v. U.S.  Dep't of Justice , 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  \nAlthough a public body is not required to perform an exhaustive search of every possible\nlocation, the body must construe FOIA requests liberally and search those places that are\nreasonably likely to contain responsive records.'\"   Better Government Ass' n v. City of Chicago , \n2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S.  Dep't of Justice , 373 F. \nSupp. 3d 120, 126 (D.D.C. 2019)).  \"[ T]he adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined\nnot by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the\nsearch.\"   Iturralde v.  Comptroller of Currency ,  315 F.3d 311,  315 ( D.C. Cir.  2003).   A public\nbody is obligated to devise appropriate search parameters.   See Oglesby v.  U.S.  Department of\nthe Army , 920 F.2d 57,  68 ( D.C.  Cir. 1990).   \n\nIn its response to this office, CPS reiterated that it sent\n\na copy of the\n\nrequested datasets in its possession.   CPS explained that this dataset was obtained by its\nInformation and Technology Service Department ( IT Department),  and it reflects \" the requested\ntotal number of devices ' given to each school, []  given out to students and CPS employees, [] \nreturned by both, and []  reported as lost or stolen by both .'\"9 Further, CPS addressed the\nallegations set forth in\n\nRequest for Review by stating the following: \n\nAs reflected on page 26 of the report \" as indicated in PAU- Table 1, \nCPS schools reported 77,505 tech devices ... as lost or stolen\n\nLucente- McCullough ( May 1, 2025). \n\n7E-mail from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools,  to AAG\n\nat https:// cpsoig. org/ uploads/ 3/5/ 5/ 6/ 35562484/ fy_2023_ annual_ report_ press_ release. pdf . \n\n8CPS Inspector General Releases FY 2023 Annual Report , CPS OIG (January 9, 2024),  available\n\n9Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools,  to\n\nChristina Lucente-McCullough , Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, \nState of Illinois (May 17, 2024), at [1]. \n\n\fMs. Annie Righi\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 4\n\nduring their 2021 -22 asset inventories.\"  While the report may read\nto be indicating that the 77,505 count is a result of prior CPS asset\ninventory process, the sources cited for the referenced PAU -Table\n1 * * *  provides that the source of the referenced data is \" OIG\nAnalysis of SY 2021 -22 Data Provided 9/2/22 by Asset\nManagement.   Based on the Expected Location;  Excludes 25\nNoncompliant Schools,  Charter Schools,  and Central/ Satellite\nOffice Assets.\"  Accordingly, to the extent any one record is\nmaintained that reflects \"[ s] chool by school CPS inventory\ndocuments of the 77,505 laptop devices in total that had been\nreported as lost or stolen and mentioned in the [ 2023]  CPS OIG's\nAnnual Report\",  it would be the result of unique analysis of CPS\ndata conducted by the OIG, and which includes certain filters\n\nAny such records would be maintained by CPS OIG, and\n\nas such, is exempt pursuant to section 7.5(h) of FOIA. [10] \nEmphasis in original).  \n\nasserted that CPS must possess responsive inventory records \" detailing\n\nIn his reply, \nthe $23M (77,505) in lost or missing laptops (and tech devices) from each school in the 3rd\nlargest school district in the nation [.]\"11 He alleged that it is unlikely that the withheld\ninformation came directly from the OIG' s \" unique analysis\"  and not from existing CPS inventory\nrecords.   \n\nOn May 9, 2025, the AAG spoke with Ms. Righi and discussed the origins of\n\nthese datasets.  According to Ms. Righi, CPS pulled the dataset that was provided to\nfrom the only database that houses this type of information.   This is the same type of dataset that\nCPS Asset Management provided to the OIG.   Although the information in the dataset might not\nreflect the 77, 505 total listed in the OIG Annual Report,  Ms.  Righ i explained that CPS'  dataset\nwas current as of the date it was pulled in response to\nrequest.  Ms. Righi reiterated\nthat the 77,505 total included CPS' raw data plus any OIG investigation notes/analysis. \n\nAs an initial matter,  CPS explained that its efforts to loc ate non- exempt\n\nresponsive school inventory data consisted of searching for and compiling data documenting lost\nor missing devices at the time the data was pulled to respond to\nFOIA request.  \nBased on this office's review, the data reflects only a small fraction of the number of lost or\n\n10Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools,  to\n\nChristina Lucente- McCullough , Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, \nState of Illinois ( May 17, 2024),  at [1]. \n\n11E- mail from\n\nto Christina Lucente -McCullough,  Assistant Attorney General, \n\nPublic Access Bureau ( June 24, 2024).  \n\n\fMs. Annie Righi\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 5\n\nmissing devices that the Inspector General found to be lost or missing for the 2021 -22 school\nyear.  Because the data CPS provided to\nrequest for inventory records upon which the OIG based its findings in the 2023 annual report, \nthis office concludes that it is not responsive to\nrequest and was not generated as a\nresult of a search that was reasonably calculated to locate records responsive to the parameters of\nthe request.   \n\nwas outdated and irrelevant to\n\nThe data that is responsive is referenced in the 2023 annual report, which states\n\nthat the OIG's findings were based on its analysis of data the OIG received from CPS Asset\nManagement on September 2, 2022.  The raw data CPS Asset Management that was provided to\nthe OIG and analyzed by the OIG is therefore responsive to\nrequest for \"school by\nschool inventory documents of the 77, 505 laptop devices in total that had been reported as lost or\nstolen [.]\"  Section 7.5(h) of FOIA exempts \"[ i]nformation the disclosure of which is exempted\nunder the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act [SOEEA],  and records of any lawfully\ncreated State or local inspector general's office that would be exempt if created or obtained by an\nExecutive Inspector General's office under that Act.\"  Sections 20 -95(b) and (d) of the SOEEA12\nprovide: \n\nb)  Any allegations and related documents submitted to\n\nan Executive Inspector General and any pleadings and related\ndocuments brought before the Executive Ethics Commission are\nexempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act\nso long as the Executive Ethics Commission does not make a\nfinding of a violation of this Act. * * * \n\nd) Unless otherwise provided in this Act, all investigatory\n\nfiles and reports of the Office of an Executive Inspector\nGeneral,  other than monthly reports required under Section 20 -85, \nare confidential and privileged, are exempt from disclosure\nunder the Freedom of Information Act , and shall not be\ndivulged to any person or agency, except as necessary ( i) to a law\nenforcement authority, (ii) to the ultimate jurisdictional authority, \niii) to the Executive Ethics Commission, ( iv) to another Inspector\nGeneral appointed pursuant to thi s Act, or ( v) to an Inspector\nGeneral appointed or employed by a Regional Transit Board in\naccordance with Section 75 -10.  (Emphasis added.) \n\n125 ILCS 430/ 20 -95(b), (d) (West 2022).  \n\n\fMs. Annie Righi\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 6\n\nThus,  any records that are submitted to a lawfully -created local inspector general' s office,  such as\nthe CPS OIG, for an investigation are exempt from disclosure under FOIA .  The Public Access\nBureau has previously determined that copies of records that public bodies independently\nmaintain are exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(h) of FOIA if copies of the same records\nare included in OIG investigatory files.  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 72654, issued\nNovember 4,  2022,  at 5 ( records in the posse ssion of park district' s risk management office\nexempt from disclosure because the records had been provided to the park district' s inspector\ngeneral and used for an investigation);  Ill Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 57727, issued June 4, \n2019, at 4 (transcript of interview maintained by inspector general exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7.5(h) when requested under FOIA from city's law department). \n\nThe inventory records responsive to\n\nrequest were obtained by the\n\nOIG from CPS Asset Management and used in an OIG investigation .  Even if CPS Asset\nManagement still maintains a copy of the same data it furnished to OIG , those records are OIG\ninvestigatory records.  Accordingly, this office concludes that those records are exempt from\ndisclosure pursuant to section 7.5(h) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  If you have any questions, you may contact me by\nmail at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter or by e -mail at\nc.lucentemccullough@ilag. gov.   This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81235 f 3a search improper 75h proper sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A requester asked Chicago Public Schools (CPS) for school-by-school inventory records of 77,505 lost or stolen laptop devices mentioned in a CPS Inspector General (OIG) annual report. CPS provided a dataset of current device counts but argued that any single record reflecting the 77,505 total would be the result of OIG analysis and that the raw data CPS Asset Management provided to the OIG was exempt under section 7.5(h) of FOIA as OIG investigatory records. The Public Access Counselor (PAC) found that the data CPS provided was not responsive to the request and that the responsive raw data held by the OIG is exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(h).","card_headline":"Inventory records of lost or stolen electronic devices","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81235/","full_text":"June 13, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Annie Righi\nFOIA Officer\nChicago Public Schools\n42 West Madison Street, 3rd Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60602\narighi@cps. edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81235; N014712 -012224\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Righi: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn January 22, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to Chicago\n\nPublic Schools (CPS) seeking, in relevant part, copies of \"[ s] chool by school CPS inventory\ndocuments of the 77,505 laptop devices in total that had been reported as lost or stolen and\nmentioned in the [ 2023] CPS OIG's Annual Report[,]\" \nincluding the \" total number of laptops\ngiven to each school, number of laptops given out to students and CPS employees, number of\nlaptops returned by both, and the number of laptops reported as lost or stolen by both.\" 1 Upon\n\nreceiving\nallowed by section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(e) (West 2022)). 2\n\nrequest, CPS extended its time to respond to by five business days as\n\nOn March 28, 2024, CPS provided\n\nwith a responsive dataset and\n\nthat to \" the extent the OIG maintains a dataset\n\nexplained the \"cited '77,505' figure from the referenced OIG report is a count of 'tech devices,' \ninformation about tech devices, not just laptops, has been provided in response to this request. \nDue to the difference in analysis using methodology, the numbers may not align with the OIG\nreport.\"3 CPS also informed\nreflecting the 77,505 figure,\" this information would be exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7.5(h) of FOIA.4 On April 25, 2024, \nsubmitted the above -referenced\nRequest for Review complaining that \"CPS failed to provide me with the school-by-school\nbreakdown of the 77,505 lost or stolen laptops (and tech devices) that were at the center of a CPS\nOIG investigation.\"5\ndocuments that must have been accessed by CPS Inspector General [OIG] in its investigation. \nHe contended: \"CPS OIG had to go through CPS inventory records to declare 77,505 laptops\nand tech devices) were lost or stolen as the CPS OIG doesn't maintain those CPS inventory\nrecords, especially as CPS and the CPS OIG are separate entities from each other.\" 6\n\nalleged that CPS failed to provide him with inventory\n\nOn May 15, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to CPS\nallegation that CPS did not\n\nand asked it to provide a written answer responding to\nprovide him with all records responsive to his request as well as a detailed description of its\nsearch process. On May 17, 2024, this office received CPS' written response. On May 28, 2024, \nthis office forwarded a copy of CPS' response to\n\nhe replied on June 24, 2024. \n\nOn May 1, 2025, an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in the Public Access\n\nBureau e- mailed CPS' FOIA officer, Annie Righi, and asked if CPS could provide copies of any\nrecords withheld pursuant to section 7.5(h). On that same date, Ms. Righi informed the AA G\nthat CPS' FOIA Office does not possess any such records because the OIG \"generally does not\n\nsubmitted a preceding Request for Review, 2024 PAC 80659, a lleging that the CPS\nhad not responded to his FOIA request. That complaint was closed on April 24, 2024, when this office received\nnotification that CPS responded to the request. \n\n3FOIA portal message from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public\n\nSchools, to [\n\nMarch 28, 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 7.5(h) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; 103-\n034, effective June 9, 2023; 103 -142, effective January 1, 2024; 103 -372, effective January 1, 2024; 103 -508, \n\nshare records like this with CPS due to confidentiality concerns.\" 7 Because the CPS Office of\ncited found that 77,505 technology\nthe Inspector General's (OIG) annual report that\ndevices had been reported as lost or stolen during the 2021 -2022 academic year based on data\nprovided to the OIG by CPS Asset Management,8 on May 23, 2025, the AAG asked Ms. Righi if\nCPS maintained a copy of the Asset Management data that was provided to the OIG and whether\nit was willing to provide the data to\ndata would be exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nMs. Righi responded that such\n\nto section 7.5(h) of FOIA. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). When presented with a FOIA\nrequest, a public body is required to conduct a \"reasonable search tailored to the nature of [that] \nparticular request.\" Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). \nAlthough a public body is not required to perform an exhaustive search of every possible\nlocation, the body must construe FOIA requests liberally and search those places that are\nreasonably likely to contain responsive records.'\" Better Government Ass' n v. City of Chicago, \n2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 373 F. \nSupp. 3d 120, 126 (D.D.C. 2019)). \"[ T]he adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined\nnot by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the\nsearch.\" Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003). A public\nbody is obligated to devise appropriate search parameters. See Oglesby v. U.S. Department of\nthe Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). \n\nIn its response to this office, CPS reiterated that it sent\n\na copy of the\n\nrequested datasets in its possession. CPS explained that this dataset was obtained by its\nInformation and Technology Service Department (IT Department), and it reflects \" the requested\ntotal number of devices ' given to each school, [] given out to students and CPS employees, [] \nreturned by both, and [] reported as lost or stolen by both.'\"9 Further, CPS addressed the\nallegations set forth in\n\nRequest for Review by stating the following: \n\nAs reflected on page 26 of the report \" as indicated in PAU- Table 1, \nCPS schools reported 77,505 tech devices... as lost or stolen\n\nLucente- McCullough (May 1, 2025). \n\n7E-mail from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to AAG\n\nat https:// cpsoig. org/ uploads/ 3/5/ 5/ 6/ 35562484/ fy_2023_ annual_ report_ press_ release. pdf. \n\n8CPS Inspector General Releases FY 2023 Annual Report, CPS OIG (January 9, 2024), available\n\n9 Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to\n\nChristina Lucente-McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, \n\nduring their 2021 -22 asset inventories.\" While the report may read\nto be indicating that the 77,505 count is a result of prior CPS asset\ninventory process, the sources cited for the referenced PAU -Table\n1 * * * provides that the source of the referenced data is \" OIG\nAnalysis of SY 2021 -22 Data Provided 9/2/22 by Asset\nManagement. Based on the Expected Location; Excludes 25\nNoncompliant Schools, Charter Schools, and Central/ Satellite\nOffice Assets.\" Accordingly, to the extent any one record is\nmaintained that reflects \"[ s] chool by school CPS inventory\ndocuments of the 77,505 laptop devices in total that had been\nreported as lost or stolen and mentioned in the [ 2023] CPS OIG's\nAnnual Report\", it would be the result of unique analysis of CPS\ndata conducted by the OIG, and which includes certain filters\n\nAny such records would be maintained by CPS OIG, and\n\nas such, is exempt pursuant to section 7.5(h) of FOIA. [10] \nEmphasis in original). \n\nasserted that CPS must possess responsive inventory records \" detailing\n\nIn his reply, \nthe $23M (77,505) in lost or missing laptops (and tech devices) from each school in the 3rd\nlargest school district in the nation [.]\"11 He alleged that it is unlikely that the withheld\ninformation came directly from the OIG's \" unique analysis\" and not from existing CPS inventory\nrecords. \n\nOn May 9, 2025, the AAG spoke with Ms. Righi and discussed the origins of\n\nthese datasets. According to Ms. Righi, CPS pulled the dataset that was provided to\nfrom the only database that houses this type of information. This is the same type of dataset that\nCPS Asset Management provided to the OIG. Although the information in the dataset might not\nreflect the 77, 505 total listed in the OIG Annual Report, Ms. Righ i explained that CPS' dataset\nwas current as of the date it was pulled in response to\nrequest. Ms. Righi reiterated\nthat the 77,505 total included CPS' raw data plus any OIG investigation notes/analysis. \n\nAs an initial matter, CPS explained that its efforts to loc ate non- exempt\n\nresponsive school inventory data consisted of searching for and compiling data documenting lost\nor missing devices at the time the data was pulled to respond to\nFOIA request. \nBased on this office's review, the data reflects only a small fraction of the number of lost or\n\n10 Letter from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to\n\nChristina Lucente- McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, \n\nmissing devices that the Inspector General found to be lost or missing for the 2021 -22 school\nyear. Because the data CPS provided to\nrequest for inventory records upon which the OIG based its findings in the 2023 annual report, \nthis office concludes that it is not responsive to\nrequest and was not generated as a\nresult of a search that was reasonably calculated to locate records responsive to the parameters of\nthe request. \n\nwas outdated and irrelevant to\n\nThe data that is responsive is referenced in the 2023 annual report, which states\n\nthat the OIG's findings were based on its analysis of data the OIG received from CPS Asset\nManagement on September 2, 2022. The raw data CPS Asset Management that was provided to\nthe OIG and analyzed by the OIG is therefore responsive to\nrequest for \"school by\nschool inventory documents of the 77, 505 laptop devices in total that had been reported as lost or\nstolen [.]\" Section 7.5(h) of FOIA exempts \"[ i]nformation the disclosure of which is exempted\nunder the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act [SOEEA], and records of any lawfully\ncreated State or local inspector general's office that would be exempt if created or obtained by an\nExecutive Inspector General's office under that Act.\" Sections 20 -95(b) and (d) of the SOEEA12\nprovide: \n\nb) Any allegations and related documents submitted to\n\nan Executive Inspector General and any pleadings and related\ndocuments brought before the Executive Ethics Commission are\nexempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act\nso long as the Executive Ethics Commission does not make a\nfinding of a violation of this Act. * * * \n\nd) Unless otherwise provided in this Act, all investigatory\n\nfiles and reports of the Office of an Executive Inspector\nGeneral, other than monthly reports required under Section 20 -85, \nare confidential and privileged, are exempt from disclosure\nunder the Freedom of Information Act, and shall not be\ndivulged to any person or agency, except as necessary (i) to a law\nenforcement authority, (ii) to the ultimate jurisdictional authority, \n\nThus, any records that are submitted to a lawfully -created local inspector general's office, such as\nthe CPS OIG, for an investigation are exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The Public Access\nBureau has previously determined that copies of records that public bodies independently\nmaintain are exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(h) of FOIA if copies of the same records\nare included in OIG investigatory files. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 72654, issued\nNovember 4, 2022, at 5 (records in the posse ssion of park district's risk management office\nexempt from disclosure because the records had been provided to the park district's inspector\ngeneral and used for an investigation); Ill Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 57727, issued June 4, \n2019, at 4 (transcript of interview maintained by inspector general exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7.5(h) when requested under FOIA from city's law department). \n\nThe inventory records responsive to\n\nrequest were obtained by the\n\nOIG from CPS Asset Management and used in an OIG investigation. Even if CPS Asset\nManagement still maintains a copy of the same data it furnished to OIG, those records are OIG\ninvestigatory records. Accordingly, this office concludes that those records are exempt from\ndisclosure pursuant to section 7.5(h) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, you may contact me by\nmail at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter or by e -mail at\nc.lucentemccullough@ilag. gov. This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81235 f 3a search improper 75h proper sd"}
{"id":1059,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81259"],"title":"Illinois Human Rights Commission may refuse to answer interrogatory-style FOIA requests","filename":"81259, issued July 1, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1025,"summary":"The requester submitted a FOIA request consisting of twenty-six questions seeking clarification and legal advice from the Illinois Human Rights Commission, which the Commission denied as not being a request for public records. The PAC determined that no further inquiry is warranted because FOIA is intended for the production of existing records, not for answering interrogatories.","plain_summary":"The question was whether a FOIA request consisting of twenty-six questions posed to the Illinois Human Rights Commission constituted a valid request for 'public records' under 5 ILCS 140/2(c). The Public Access Bureau held that no further inquiry was warranted because a request asking a public body to answer questions, rather than to produce existing records, does not reasonably identify a public record under FOIA. The reasoning is that FOIA does not obligate a public body to answer questions, generate new records, conduct legal research, or manually search and compile scattered information to respond to a request, even if the requester believes the public body possesses records containing the answers. The Illinois Human Rights Commission's denial of the request was therefore upheld, and the Public Access Bureau closed the file without further action.","holding":"A FOIA request that asks a public body to answer questions rather than identifying existing public records does not reasonably describe a record and is not enforceable under FOIA.","legal_question":"Does the Freedom of Information Act require a public body to answer interrogatories or provide legal clarification in response to a request for information?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Illinois Human Rights Commission","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOIA scope","subject_description":"The requester sought answers to twenty-six questions regarding the Commission's internal procedures and legal definitions rather than requesting specific public records.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Doesnt-Identify/81259%2C%20issued%20July%201%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA request","public records","interrogatories","information request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"July 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81259\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024).  For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further inquiry is warranted as to this matter.  \n\nOn April 24, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Human Rights\n\nCommission (Commission) informing the Commission that \"[ m]y Freedom of Information Act\nRequest for information and clarification of the IHRC Request for Review requirements begins\nimmediately below. The questions that need answers appear in bold print.\"1  ( Emphasis in\noriginal.)   You then proceed to ask the Commission twenty- six questions --  for example you\nasked the Commission:   \n\nExactly how many copies of the 45-page limit Request for\n\nReview am I required to send to the IHRC?  \n\nDo I need to verify my husband' s disabilities as a\nrequirement for the IDHR accepting my Request for Review or\nwill the IHRC dismiss my Request for Review without this\nverification? \n\n2024).   \n\n1E- mailed letter from\n\nto Illinois Human Rights Commission at 2 (April 24, \n\n\fJune 21, 2024\nPage 2\n\nWhat sections of my Charge Investigation File did the\n\nIDHR send to the IHRC? \n\nWhat does the term ' under similar circumstances'  mean and\n\nhow does this differ from the term 'similarly situated[']? \n\nAm I required to provide full patient names or, in order to\n\nprotect the privacy of each patient,  is it allowable for me to provide\nonly partial patient names, for example, \"John S.\"  as long as the\npatient is verifiable,  if necessary?[ 2] \n\nOn May 1, 2024,  the Commission denied your request \" because it asks a series of questions\nrather than asking for copies of records in the custody or possession of the Commission.\" 3 On\nMay 1, 2024,  you submitted a Request for Review to this office contesting the Commission' s\nresponse.  In your Request for Review, you first complain that the Commission did \"not respond\nto my questions[,]\"  and then assert that your questions are actually for documents because the\nanswers to your questions \" must appear on documents in possession of the [Commission,]\"  and\nthat the Commission \" knows exactly the documents to which I refer.\" 4\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \" public records,\"  which are existing records\n\nhaving been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession\nof, or under the control of any public body.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) ( West 2022),  as amended by\nPublic Act 103-554, effective January 1, 2024.  A public body is not required to answer\nquestions or generate new records in response to a FOIA request.   Kenyon v. Garrels,  184 Ill. \nApp. 3d 28, 32 (1989).  Nor does FOIA compel a public body to search, collect, extract, and\ncompile information manually scattered throughout records to answer questions.   See Martinez v. \nCook County State's Attorney's Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 163153, ¶ 25 (request that would have\nrequired public body to manually review its files and compile each \" instance\"  in which it \"used\" \nspecific information did not reasonably describe a record but instead was a general request for\n\n2024).   \n\n2E- mailed letter from\n\nto Illinois Human Rights Commission at 2 -3 (April 24, \n\nCommission (May 1, 2024). \n\n3E- mailed letter from Adrian Atwater, Assistant General Counsel, Illinois Human Rights\n\n4E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor (May 2, 2024). \n\n\fJune 21, 2024\nPage 3\n\ndata that was \" scattered throughout [ the public body' s]  records\").   Instead,  a FOIA request \" must\nreasonably identify a public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\" Chicago\nTribune Co.  v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation,  2014 IL App ( 4th) \n130427, ¶ 33.  \n\nAlthough your Request for Review asserts that the questions you asked the\n\nCommission to answer are requests for records because the Commission must have records that\ncontain answers to the questions, FOIA does not require a public body to answer a variety of\nquestions by searching for and compiling information from various unspecified records that it\nmay maintain.  Further, while you assert that the Commission knows what documents you are\nlooking for, public bodies are not required to search beyond the four corners of a FOIA request, \nnor are they required to divine the requester's intent.  Manna v. U.S. Department of Justice, 106\nF. Supp.  3d 16, 19 ( D.D.C. 2015).   A public body is also not required to conduct\norder to respond to a FOIA request, such as researching and providing the legal definition of\nwords in a statute or administrative rule.   See Lamb v. I.R.S.,  871 F. Supp.  301,  304 ( E.D. Mich. \n1994).  Because your request did not reasonably describe records, FOIA did not require the\nCommission to answer your questions or provide records that may contain the answers you are\nseeking.  Accordingly, this office will take no further action in this matter.   \n\nlegal research in\n\nThe Public Access Counselor also is charged with providing advice and education\n\nto public bodies and members of the public.   15 ILCS 205/ 7(a), ( c) ( West 2022).   To that end, \nthis office notes that you may wish to submit a new FOIA request to the Commission seeking\ncopies of records,  such as procedures,  protocols,  directives,  definitions,  or rules pertaining to its\nreview procedures, its patient privacy protections during its review process, or for records the\nCommission received from the Illinois Department of Human Rights pertaining to the review at\nissue.    \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at 312-814-5201,  \n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov,  or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81259 f no fi war sa\n\n\fJune 21, 2024\nPage 4\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrian Atwater\nAssistant General Counsel\nState of Illinois Human Rights Commission\n160 North LaSalle Street,  Suite N-1000\nChicago, Illinois 60601\nHRC. FOIA@illinois. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Questions about internal procedures and legal definitions","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81259/","full_text":"July 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81259\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further inquiry is warranted as to this matter. \n\nOn April 24, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Human Rights\n\nCommission (Commission) informing the Commission that \"[ m]y Freedom of Information Act\nRequest for information and clarification of the IHRC Request for Review requirements begins\nimmediately below. The questions that need answers appear in bold print.\"1 (Emphasis in\noriginal.) You then proceed to ask the Commission twenty- six questions -- for example you\nasked the Commission: \n\nExactly how many copies of the 45-page limit Request for\n\nReview am I required to send to the IHRC? \n\nDo I need to verify my husband's disabilities as a\n\nWhat sections of my Charge Investigation File did the\n\nIDHR send to the IHRC? \n\nWhat does the term ' under similar circumstances' mean and\n\nhow does this differ from the term 'similarly situated[']? \n\nAm I required to provide full patient names or, in order to\n\nprotect the privacy of each patient, is it allowable for me to provide\nonly partial patient names, for example, \"John S.\" as long as the\npatient is verifiable, if necessary?[ 2] \n\nOn May 1, 2024, the Commission denied your request \" because it asks a series of questions\nrather than asking for copies of records in the custody or possession of the Commission.\" 3 On\nMay 1, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review to this office contesting the Commission's\nresponse. In your Request for Review, you first complain that the Commission did \"not respond\nto my questions[,]\" and then assert that your questions are actually for documents because the\nanswers to your questions \" must appear on documents in possession of the [Commission,]\" and\nthat the Commission \" knows exactly the documents to which I refer.\" 4\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \" public records,\" which are existing records\n\nhaving been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession\nof, or under the control of any public body.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) (West 2022), as amended by\nPublic Act 103-554, effective January 1, 2024. A public body is not required to answer\nquestions or generate new records in response to a FOIA request. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. \nApp. 3d 28, 32 (1989). Nor does FOIA compel a public body to search, collect, extract, and\ncompile information manually scattered throughout records to answer questions. See Martinez v. \nCook County State's Attorney's Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 163153, ¶ 25 (request that would have\nrequired public body to manually review its files and compile each \" instance\" in which it \"used\" \nspecific information did not reasonably describe a record but instead was a general request for\n\n2024). \n\ndata that was \" scattered throughout [ the public body's] records\"). Instead, a FOIA request \" must\nreasonably identify a public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\" Chicago\nTribune Co. v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, ¶ 33. \n\nAlthough your Request for Review asserts that the questions you asked the\n\nCommission to answer are requests for records because the Commission must have records that\ncontain answers to the questions, FOIA does not require a public body to answer a variety of\nquestions by searching for and compiling information from various unspecified records that it\nmay maintain. Further, while you assert that the Commission knows what documents you are\nlooking for, public bodies are not required to search beyond the four corners of a FOIA request, \nnor are they required to divine the requester's intent. Manna v. U.S. Department of Justice, 106\nF. Supp. 3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2015). A public body is also not required to conduct\norder to respond to a FOIA request, such as researching and providing the legal definition of\nwords in a statute or administrative rule. See Lamb v. I.R.S., 871 F. Supp. 301, 304 (E.D. Mich. \n1994). Because your request did not reasonably describe records, FOIA did not require the\nCommission to answer your questions or provide records that may contain the answers you are\nseeking. Accordingly, this office will take no further action in this matter. \n\nlegal research in\n\nThe Public Access Counselor also is charged with providing advice and education\n\nto public bodies and members of the public. 15 ILCS 205/ 7(a), (c) (West 2022). To that end, \nthis office notes that you may wish to submit a new FOIA request to the Commission seeking\ncopies of records, such as procedures, protocols, directives, definitions, or rules pertaining to its\nreview procedures, its patient privacy protections during its review process, or for records the\nCommission received from the Illinois Department of Human Rights pertaining to the review at\nissue. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at 312-814-5201, \n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrian Atwater\nAssistant General Counsel\nState of Illinois Human Rights Commission\n160 North LaSalle Street, Suite N-1000\nChicago, Illinois 60601\nHRC. FOIA@illinois. gov"}
{"id":1060,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-09-19","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81283","81300"],"title":"Summit Hill SD 161 properly designated requests as voluminous under FOIA section 3.6","filename":"81283 81300, issued September 19, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3212,"summary":"The requester challenged Summit Hill School District 161's designation of their FOIA requests as voluminous, but the PAC determined that the District's handling of the requests did not warrant a binding opinion and closed the file.","plain_summary":"Two requesters asked Summit Hill School District 161 for emails between the Board President and Superintendent during specific time periods. The District designated them as recurrent requesters and their requests as voluminous, then denied the requests as unduly burdensome. The Illinois Attorney General's office issued a formal determination under FOIA section 9.5(f), concluding that the District properly designated the requests as voluminous because the 32 requests submitted by a group of individuals over five days constituted a combination of requests for more than five different categories of records within 20 business days. The office also found that the requesters met the definition of recurrent requesters, as they submitted 32 requests within a five-day period.","holding":"The Attorney General's office determined that the District properly designated the requests as voluminous and the requesters as recurrent requesters, and that the District's denials based on undue burden were not challenged on that basis.","legal_question":"Did the District properly designate the requests as voluminous and comply with the procedural requirements of section 3.6 of FOIA?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3.6"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Summit Hill School District 161","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"voluminous request","subject_description":"The requester sought emails between the Board President and the District Superintendent over specific date ranges.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_h/81283%2081300%2C%20issued%20September%2019%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["voluminous request","FOIA","school district","email records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nSTATE OF ILLINOIS \n\nSeptember  19, 2025 \n\nKWAMERAOUL \nA HORNEY GENERAL \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nVia electronic mail \nMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nKlein, Thorpe & Jenkins \n120 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1710 \nChicago, Illinois 60606 \nmamilluzzi@ktjlaw.com \n\nRE:  FOIA Requests for Review:  2024 PAC 81283; 2024 PAC 81300 \n\nDear \n\n, and Ms. Milluzzi: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of \n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to Summit Hill \nSchool District 161 (District) seeking copies of \"emails between Board President Jim Martin and \n\nOn March 14, 2024, \n\n15 ILCS  140/9.S(f) (West 2024). \n\n500 South 2nd Street \nSpringfield, Illinois 62701 \n(217) 782-1090 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n\n115 South LaSalle Street \nChicago, Illinois 60603 \n(312) 814-3000 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C \nCarbondale, Illinois 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-6416 \n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service. \n\nWW\\v.IllinoisAttomeyGeneral.gov \n\n\fMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nSeptember 19, 2025 \nPage 2 \n\n[District Superintendent] Dr. Paul McDermott from 12/25/23 - 12/31/23. \" 2  Also on that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking copies of \"emails between \n\nBoard President Jim Martin and Dr. Paul McDermott from 2.5 .24 - 2.11.24. \" 3  On March 21, \n2024, the District sent individual letters to \ninforming them that \nthe District had designated them as recurrent requesters and that their requests were voluminous \nin nature.  The District asserted that 32 individuals, including \nworked together to submit 32 individual FOIA requests between March 14, 2024, and March 18, \nopportunities to amend their requests \n2024.  The District offered \nin such a way that the District would no longer treat the requests as voluminous. \n\nand \n\nand \n\nand \n\nIn response to that message, on March 22, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a request \n\nto the District for the list of documents or categories of records that are to be immediately \ndisclosed upon request pursuant to section 3.5(a) ofFOIA.4  Later that day, he e-mailed the \nDistrict to narrow his request to only e-mails between Mr. Martin and Dr. McDermott from \nDecember 25, 2023, through December 31, 2023, concerning the closing of Arbury Hills School \nand Frankfort Square School. \n\nOn March 21, 2024, \n\nresponded to the District's recurrent requester \n\nand voluminous notification by asking how much data his request would require and offering his \nown thumb drive to save the District costs.  The District referred him to its March 21, 2024, \nletter, which listed the fee schedule for voluminous requests. \n\nOn April 24, 2024, the District issued individual final denials to \nIn response to \n\n, the District stated that his \"responses in collection \n\nand \n\nwith the other 31 FOIA requests remains voluminous in nature and therefore the District \nconsiders your request as unduly burdensome on a public body.\"5  In response to \nthe District stated that it did not receive a narrowed FOIA request from him and therefore, it \nconsidered the request to be unduly burdensome.  On May 2, 2024, and May 3, 2024, this office \nreceived \n\n's 7 Requests for Review.  They did not dispute that \n\n's6 and \n\n2E-mail from- to Julie Sterns [sic] (March  14, 2023).\n\n3E-mail from\n\nto Julie Sterns [sic] (March  14, 2023). \n\n45 ILCS 140/3.S(a) (West 2024) (\"Freedom oflnformation officers shall develop a list of \n\ndocuments or categories of records that the public body shall immediately disclose upon request.\"). \n\n5Letter from Julie Steams, Summit Hill School District 161 FOIA Officer, to-(April \n\n24, 2024). \n\n62024 PAC 81283. \n\n72024 PAC 81300. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\fMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nSeptember 19, 2025 \nPage 3 \n\nbecause they worked in concert with other requesters they can be considered recurrent \nrequesters, but they objected to the District's denials of their requests as unduly burdensome. \n8\nThey also allege that the District's final responses were untimely. \n\nOn May 16, 2024, this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to the \n\nDistrict and asked it to provide a detailed explanation for its designation o�s and \n\ns requests as voluminous.  This office also requested a detailed written explanation \n\nof the factual and legal bases for the assertion that fulfilling \nindividual requests would cause an undue burden on the District's operations.  On June 4, 2024, \nthis office received the District's response.  On June  12, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the \nreplied and \nDistrict's response to \non June 18, 2024, \n\n; on June 13, 2024, \n\n's and \n\nand \n\n's \n\nDETERMINATION \n\nIn its response to this office, the District explained that prior to the FOIA requests \n\nat issue, on January 17, 2024, \nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking e­\nmails between the District superintendent and any member of the Board from October 1, 2023, \nthrough January 17, 2024.  The District denied the request as unduly burdensome because it \nresulted in more than  1,000 responsive e-mails. \nrequests asking for the same information but broken into smaller time increments.  The District \nagain informed-that his FOIA requests were voluminous.  Beginning on March 14, \n2024,_ and 31 other individuals worked together to submit individual FOIA \nrequests, each seeking e-mails between the District superintendent and Board president for \nincrements of approximately one to two weeks beginning in April 2023 through March 2024. \nTwo of those FOIA requests are at issue in this Request for Review. \n\nthen submitted 28 separate \n\n8The response timeframe for responding to requests by recurrent requesters is solely governed by \n\nsection 3.2 ofFOIA.  The time frame for responding to requests in section 3 ofFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2024)) \ndoes not apply to recurrent requesters: \n\nThe time periods for compliance or denial of a request to inspect or \n\ncopy records set out in this Section shall not apply to requests for records made \nfor a commercial purpose, requests by a recurrent requester, or voluminous \nrequests. Such requests shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 3.1, 3.2, \nand 3.6 of this Act, as applicable.  5 ILCS 140/3(i) (West 2024). \n\nUnlike requests governed by section 3, section 3.2 ofFOIA does not preclude a body from denying a request as \nunduly burdensome or imposing copying fees if a response is late. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\fMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nSeptember 19, 2025 \nPage 4 \n\nThe District designated the group of individuals who submitted the requests as \nrecurrent requesters.  Section 2(g) of FOIA9  defines a \"recurrent requester\" as a \"person\" who, \n\"in the  12 months immediately preceding the request, has submitted to the same public body (i) a \nminimum of 50 requests for records, (ii) a minimum of 15 requests for records within a 30-day \nperiod, or (iii) a minimum of 7 requests for records within a 7-day period.\"  Section 2(b) of \nFOIA 10 defines \"person\" as \"any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, organization or \nassociation, acting individually or as a group.\" \nthat they meet the definition of \"recurrent requester,\" as they, along with 30 other individuals, \nsubmitted a total of 32 individual FOIA requests to the District over a five-day period between \nMarch  14, 2024, and March  18, 2024. \n\ndo not dispute \n\nand \n\nThe District also designated \n\nvoluminous pursuant to section 3.6 ofFOIA.11\nrequest,\" in relevant part, as: \n\n's and \n\n's requests as \n\nSection 2(h) of FOIA 12 defines \"voluminous \n\na request that: (i) includes more than 5 individual requests for more \nthan 5 different categories of records or a combination of \nindividual requests that total requests for more than 5 different \ncategories of records in a period of 20 business days; or (ii) \nrequires the compilation of more than 500 letter or legal-sized \npages of public records unless a single requested record exceeds \n500 pages. \"Single requested record\" may include, but is not \nlimited to, one report, form, e-mail, letter, memorandum, book, \nmap, microfilm, tape, or recording.  (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn its response to this office, the District argued that \n\ns and-\n\n-•s FOIA requests were voluminous because those requests, in addition to the other 30 \nFOIA requests submitted between March 14, 2024, and March  18, 2024, constituted \"a \ncombination of individual requests that total requests for more than 5 different categories of \nrecords in a period of20 business days[.]\" 13  The District asserted that the requests can be \n\n95 ILCS  140/2(g) (West 2024).\n\n105 ILCS  140/2(b) (West 2024).\n\n11 5 ILCS  140/3.6 (West 2024).\n\n125 ILCS  140/2(h) (West 2024).\n\n13Letter from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Assistant School District Attorney, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, \n\nLtd., to Laura Harter, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (June 3, 2024), at 2. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\fMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nSeptember 19, 2025 \nPage 5 \n\nconsidered together for purposes of section 2(h) of FOIA because they were submitted by the \nsame \"person,\" as defined in section 2(b) of FOIA. \n\nSection 2(h) does not specify that the request or requests that provide the basis or \n\nbases for a \"voluminous\" designation must be submitted by the same \"person,\" as defined in \nsection 2(b) of FOIA, but to conclude otherwise would lead to absurd results. For example, if \nthe requests did not need to be submitted by the same \"person,\" a public body could combine any \nfive unrelated requests submitted within 20 business days and designate them all as \n\"voluminous.\"  Generally, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing \nbody \"may not depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, \nor conditions that the legislature did not express.\"  Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & \nProfessional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ,i 16.  However, a reviewing body \"has a duty to avoid \na construction of the statute that would defeat the statute's purpose or yield an absurd or unjust \nresult.\"  People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998).  Courts \"are not bound by the literal \nlanguage of a statute if that language produces absurd or unjust results not contemplated by the \nlegislature.\"  In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006).  This interpretation is consistent \nwith language in section 3.6 ofFOIA referencing a \"person\" making a voluminous request and a \n\"person\" required to pay for a voluminous request.  5 ILCS 140/3.6(b), (c), (d) (West 2024). \nAccordingly, this office concludes that the definition of voluminous request in section 2(h) \nextends to requests submitted by the same \"person,\" as defined in section 2(b) of FOIA. \n\nIn his reply, \n\nasserted that the individual requests did not cover more \n\nthan 5 different categories of records, as they each asked for only one category:  all e-mails \nbetween two individuals for short time increments.  The District contended that each of the 32 \nFOIA requests constituted a separate category of records. FOIA does not define \"categories of \nrecords,\" but Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines \"category\" as \"a class, group, \nor classification of any kind[.]\"  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 352 (1993). \nBecause each FOIA request sought a specific timeframe, this office concludes that the FOIA \nrequests are each a category of their own. \n\nAfter designating the FOIA requests as voluminous pursuant to section 3.6(a) of \n\nFOIA, the District gave the requesters an opportunity to amend their FOIA requests in such a \nnarrowed the scope of his request \nway that they would no longer be voluminous. \nto e-mails only between the Board president and the District superintendent from December 25, \n2023, through December 31, 2023, concerning the closing of Arbury Hills School and Frankfort \nSquare School. \n\ndid not amend his request. \n\nThe District then stated that the requests remained voluminous and denied the \n\nFOIA requests as unduly burdensome pursuant to section 3.6(c) ofFOIA, 14  which states: \n\n145 ILCS  140/3.6(c) (West 2024). \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\fMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nSeptember  19, 2025 \nPage 6 \n\nIf a request continues to be a voluminous request following \nthe requester's response under subsection (b) of this Section or the \nrequester fails to respond, the public body shall respond within the \nearlier of 5 business days after it receives the response from the \nrequester or 5 business days after the final day for the requester to \nrespond to the public body's notification under this subsection. The \nresponse shall: (i) provide an estimate of the fees to be charged, \nwhich the public body may require the person to pay in full before \ncopying the requested documents; (ii) deny the request pursuant to \none or more of the exemptions set out in this Act; (iii) notify the \nrequester that the request is unduly burdensome and extend an \nopportunity to the requester to attempt to reduce the request \nto manageable proportions; or (iv) provide the records requested. \n(Emphasis added.) \n\nThe District argued that to accurately assess the burden of these requests, they \n\nmust be considered in connection with the \"collective burden\" imposed by the 32 FOIA requests \nsubmitted by the individuals who worked together between March  14, 2024, and March  18, \n2024. 15  The District asserted that because the 32 FOIA requests were submitted by the same \n\"person,\" their impact should be considered together. \n\nThis office has previously concluded that when considering whether a voluminous \n\nrequest is unduly burdensome under section 3.6 ofFOIA, the public body may combine the \nseparately-submitted requests that constituted the voluminous request.  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 87457, issued June 26, 2025, at 2 (contrasting section 3.6 ofFOIA with section 3(g) of \nFOIA (5 ILCS  140/3(g) (West 2024)), which does not authorize a public body to combine \nseparately-submitted requests into one request for purposes of measuring the burden of \ncompliance). \n\nIn general, a request for all e-mails sent or received by a public employee over a \n\nperiod of several weeks or months, which would require a public body to gather and review a \nlarge quantity ofresponsive records, is unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA in the \nabsence of an identified public interest in disclosure of all the records that outweighs the burden \nof compliance with the request.  See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 70860, \nissued May  10, 2022, at 8-9 (a request that would have required the public body to copy, review, \nand redact more than 700 potentially responsive e-mails would be unduly burdensome in the \nabsence of an identifiable public interest that outweighed the burden of compliance); Ill. Att'y \n\nLtd., to Laura Harter, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (June 3, 2024), at 4. \n\n15Letter from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Assistant School District Attorney, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\fMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nSeptember 19, 2025 \nPage 7 \n\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47671, issued August 10, 2017, at 4 (\"There is no question that the \npublic interest in collective bargaining generally and unionization at Noble is high, but there is \nno indication that [the requester's] request for all e-mails sent or received by the three individuals \nat issue over that 17-day period containing the broad term 'union' could not be appropriately \nnarrowed to more specifically target records responsive to the purpose of her request.\").  See also\nNational Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v.  Chicago Police Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, \n17 (2010) (\"A request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate, review, redact \nand arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material that is largely unnecessary to the \n[requester's] purpose constitutes an undue burden.\"). \n\nThe voluminous request sought all e-mails from April 2023 through March 2024 \n\nbetween the District superintendent and Board president.  The District asserted that the total \nvolume of potentially responsive records was more than 1,000 e-mails.  Although \namended the scope of his request to only e-mails concerning certain school closings, the \nnarrowed request did not materiall�verall volume of records the District would have \nto review.  The District stated that�'s amended request for e-mails concerning two \nschool closings was \"too vague a term to search within the emails to actually capture responsive \nrecords, so the 218 emails (which was over 700 pages of emails, without attachments) was all \nemails between\" the named individuals, which would still have to be reviewed for \nresponsiveness. 16  Although it is not apparent why the District could not devise search terms \nreasonably tailored to the topic of the closings of two specific schools, 17  there is no indication \nthat the other requesters substantially narrowed the scope of their requests.  The cumulative \nburden of compliance with all 32 individual FOIA requests that comprise the voluminous request \nat issue in this matter must be weighed against the public interest in disclosure to determine \nwhether that voluminous request was unduly burdensome. \n\nThis office acknowledges that there is a compelling public interest in the \n\n's request, however, the wording of the requests were not targeted to the topic \n\ndisclosure of information that sheds light on a public body's decision to close a school.  Other \nthan \nof school closings.  Even when the subject matter of a FOIA request is of significant public \ninterest, the scope of the request must be appropriately targeted to advance that public interest. \nSee Shriver Center, 2018 IL App (1st) 171846, at ,r,r 39-41 (determining that although the topic \nof the school-to-prison pipeline is of significant public interest, the year-long scope of the FOIA \nrequest was indicative of a fishing expedition rather than an appropriately targeted request, such \nas a request limited to suspected misconduct within a specific school or of a specific officer, or \nschools with the highest student arrest rates). \n\n16E-mail from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Klen, Thorpe & Jenkins to [Laura] Harter (June  10, 2024).\n\nStates Department of Education, 630 F. Supp. 3d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2022). \n\n17FOIA imposes a \"duty to craft reasonable search terms[.]\"  Bader Family Foundation v.  United \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\fMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nSeptember 19, 2025 \nPage 8 \n\nUnder these circumstances, this office is unable to conclude that the public \n\ninterest in disclosure of all the information requested outweighs the burden of compliance on the \nDistrict in responding to the voluminous request.  The requesters have not established that the \ndisclosure of all e-mails between the Board president and the District superintendent for an  11-\nmonth period is necessary to serve the public interest in the school closings. \n\nThis office observed that the District did not strictly comply with the requirements \n\nof section 3.6(c)(iii), as its April 24, 2024, denial letters did not \"extend an opportunity to the \nrequester to attempt to reduce the request to manageable proportions.\"  The District asserted that \nit offered the requesters opportunities to narrow their requests when it notified them that their \nrequests were voluminous.  The obligation in section 3.6(a)(iii) of FOIA to offer a requester an \nopportunity to amend their request to no longer be voluminous is separate from the obligation in \nsection 3.6(c)(iii) ofFOIA to offer a requester an opportunity to reduce the request to \nmanageable proportions.  However, the requesters did not object to this omission and it appears \nunlikely that they would have narrowed their requests at the time.  This office suggests that the \nrequesters consider submitting a new FOIA request for e-mails between the Board president and \nDistrict superintendent containing the terms \"Arbury Hills\" or \"Franklin\" for approximately a \nthree-month time period. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does \nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  If you have any questions, please contact me at \nlaura.harter@ilag.gov.  This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER \nBureau Chief \nPublic Access Bureau, Springfield \n\n81283 81300 f 36 vol req proper sd \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Emails between a school board president and superintendent","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81283/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nSTATE OF ILLINOIS \n\nSeptember 19, 2025 \n\nKWAMERAOUL \nA HORNEY GENERAL \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nVia electronic mail \nMs. Mallory Milluzzi \nKlein, Thorpe & Jenkins \n120 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1710 \nChicago, Illinois 60606 \nmamilluzzi@ktjlaw.com \n\nRE: FOIA Requests for Review: 2024 PAC 81283; 2024 PAC 81300 \n\nDear \n\n, and Ms. Milluzzi: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of \n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to Summit Hill \nSchool District 161 (District) seeking copies of \"emails between Board President Jim Martin and \n\nOn March 14, 2024, \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.S(f) (West 2024). \n\n500 South 2nd Street \nSpringfield, Illinois 62701 \n(217) 782-1090 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n\n115 South LaSalle Street \nChicago, Illinois 60603 \n(312) 814-3000 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C \nCarbondale, Illinois 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-6416 \n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service. \n\n[District Superintendent] Dr. Paul McDermott from 12/25/23 - 12/31/23. \" 2 Also on that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking copies of \"emails between \n\nBoard President Jim Martin and Dr. Paul McDermott from 2.5.24 - 2.11.24. \" 3 On March 21, \n2024, the District sent individual letters to \ninforming them that \nthe District had designated them as recurrent requesters and that their requests were voluminous \nin nature. The District asserted that 32 individuals, including \nworked together to submit 32 individual FOIA requests between March 14, 2024, and March 18, \nopportunities to amend their requests \n2024. The District offered \nin such a way that the District would no longer treat the requests as voluminous. \n\nand \n\nand \n\nand \n\nIn response to that message, on March 22, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a request \n\nto the District for the list of documents or categories of records that are to be immediately \ndisclosed upon request pursuant to section 3.5(a) ofFOIA.4 Later that day, he e-mailed the \nDistrict to narrow his request to only e-mails between Mr. Martin and Dr. McDermott from \nDecember 25, 2023, through December 31, 2023, concerning the closing of Arbury Hills School \nand Frankfort Square School. \n\nOn March 21, 2024, \n\nresponded to the District's recurrent requester \n\nand voluminous notification by asking how much data his request would require and offering his \nown thumb drive to save the District costs. The District referred him to its March 21, 2024, \nletter, which listed the fee schedule for voluminous requests. \n\nOn April 24, 2024, the District issued individual final denials to \nIn response to \n\n, the District stated that his \"responses in collection \n\nand \n\nwith the other 31 FOIA requests remains voluminous in nature and therefore the District \nconsiders your request as unduly burdensome on a public body.\"5 In response to \nthe District stated that it did not receive a narrowed FOIA request from him and therefore, it \nconsidered the request to be unduly burdensome. On May 2, 2024, and May 3, 2024, this office \nreceived \n\n's 7 Requests for Review. They did not dispute that \n\n's6 and \n\n2E-mail from- to Julie Sterns [sic] (March 14, 2023).\n\n3E-mail from\n\nto Julie Sterns [sic] (March 14, 2023). \n\n45 ILCS 140/3.S(a) (West 2024) (\"Freedom oflnformation officers shall develop a list of \n\ndocuments or categories of records that the public body shall immediately disclose upon request.\"). \n\nbecause they worked in concert with other requesters they can be considered recurrent \nrequesters, but they objected to the District's denials of their requests as unduly burdensome. \n8\nThey also allege that the District's final responses were untimely. \n\nOn May 16, 2024, this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to the \n\nDistrict and asked it to provide a detailed explanation for its designation o�s and \n\ns requests as voluminous. This office also requested a detailed written explanation \n\nof the factual and legal bases for the assertion that fulfilling \nindividual requests would cause an undue burden on the District's operations. On June 4, 2024, \nthis office received the District's response. On June 12, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the \nreplied and \nDistrict's response to \non June 18, 2024, \n\n; on June 13, 2024, \n\n's and \n\nand \n\n's \n\nDETERMINATION \n\nIn its response to this office, the District explained that prior to the FOIA requests \n\nat issue, on January 17, 2024, \nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking e­\nmails between the District superintendent and any member of the Board from October 1, 2023, \nthrough January 17, 2024. The District denied the request as unduly burdensome because it \nresulted in more than 1,000 responsive e-mails. \nrequests asking for the same information but broken into smaller time increments. The District \nagain informed-that his FOIA requests were voluminous. Beginning on March 14, \n2024,_ and 31 other individuals worked together to submit individual FOIA \nrequests, each seeking e-mails between the District superintendent and Board president for \nincrements of approximately one to two weeks beginning in April 2023 through March 2024. \nTwo of those FOIA requests are at issue in this Request for Review. \n\nthen submitted 28 separate \n\n8 The response timeframe for responding to requests by recurrent requesters is solely governed by \n\nsection 3.2 ofFOIA. The time frame for responding to requests in section 3 ofFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2024)) \ndoes not apply to recurrent requesters: \n\nThe time periods for compliance or denial of a request to inspect or \n\ncopy records set out in this Section shall not apply to requests for records made \nfor a commercial purpose, requests by a recurrent requester, or voluminous \nrequests. Such requests shall be subject to the provisions of Sections 3.1, 3.2, \nand 3.6 of this Act, as applicable. 5 ILCS 140/3(i) (West 2024). \n\nUnlike requests governed by section 3, section 3.2 ofFOIA does not preclude a body from denying a request as \n\nThe District designated the group of individuals who submitted the requests as \nrecurrent requesters. Section 2(g) of FOIA9 defines a \"recurrent requester\" as a \"person\" who, \n\"in the 12 months immediately preceding the request, has submitted to the same public body (i) a \nminimum of 50 requests for records, (ii) a minimum of 15 requests for records within a 30-day \nperiod, or (iii) a minimum of 7 requests for records within a 7-day period.\" Section 2(b) of \nFOIA 10 defines \"person\" as \"any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, organization or \nassociation, acting individually or as a group.\" \nthat they meet the definition of \"recurrent requester,\" as they, along with 30 other individuals, \nsubmitted a total of 32 individual FOIA requests to the District over a five-day period between \nMarch 14, 2024, and March 18, 2024. \n\ndo not dispute \n\nand \n\nThe District also designated \n\nvoluminous pursuant to section 3.6 ofFOIA.11\nrequest,\" in relevant part, as: \n\n's and \n\n's requests as \n\nSection 2(h) of FOIA 12 defines \"voluminous \n\na request that: (i) includes more than 5 individual requests for more \nthan 5 different categories of records or a combination of \nindividual requests that total requests for more than 5 different \ncategories of records in a period of 20 business days; or (ii) \nrequires the compilation of more than 500 letter or legal-sized \npages of public records unless a single requested record exceeds \n500 pages. \"Single requested record\" may include, but is not \nlimited to, one report, form, e-mail, letter, memorandum, book, \nmap, microfilm, tape, or recording. (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn its response to this office, the District argued that \n\ns and-\n\n-•s FOIA requests were voluminous because those requests, in addition to the other 30 \nFOIA requests submitted between March 14, 2024, and March 18, 2024, constituted \"a \ncombination of individual requests that total requests for more than 5 different categories of \nrecords in a period of20 business days[.]\" 13 The District asserted that the requests can be \n\n95 ILCS 140/2(g) (West 2024).\n\n105 ILCS 140/2(b) (West 2024).\n\n11 5 ILCS 140/3.6 (West 2024).\n\n125 ILCS 140/2(h) (West 2024).\n\n13 Letter from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Assistant School District Attorney, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, \n\nLtd., to Laura Harter, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (June 3, 2024), at 2. \n\nconsidered together for purposes of section 2(h) of FOIA because they were submitted by the \nsame \"person,\" as defined in section 2(b) of FOIA. \n\nSection 2(h) does not specify that the request or requests that provide the basis or \n\nbases for a \"voluminous\" designation must be submitted by the same \"person,\" as defined in \nsection 2(b) of FOIA, but to conclude otherwise would lead to absurd results. For example, if \nthe requests did not need to be submitted by the same \"person,\" a public body could combine any \nfive unrelated requests submitted within 20 business days and designate them all as \n\"voluminous.\" Generally, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing \nbody \"may not depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, \nor conditions that the legislature did not express.\" Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & \nProfessional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023,,i 16. However, a reviewing body \"has a duty to avoid \na construction of the statute that would defeat the statute's purpose or yield an absurd or unjust \nresult.\" People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269 (1998). Courts \"are not bound by the literal \nlanguage of a statute if that language produces absurd or unjust results not contemplated by the \nlegislature.\" In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006). This interpretation is consistent \nwith language in section 3.6 ofFOIA referencing a \"person\" making a voluminous request and a \n\"person\" required to pay for a voluminous request. 5 ILCS 140/3.6(b), (c), (d) (West 2024). \nAccordingly, this office concludes that the definition of voluminous request in section 2(h) \nextends to requests submitted by the same \"person,\" as defined in section 2(b) of FOIA. \n\nIn his reply, \n\nasserted that the individual requests did not cover more \n\nthan 5 different categories of records, as they each asked for only one category: all e-mails \nbetween two individuals for short time increments. The District contended that each of the 32 \nFOIA requests constituted a separate category of records. FOIA does not define \"categories of \nrecords,\" but Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines \"category\" as \"a class, group, \nor classification of any kind[.]\" Webster's Third New International Dictionary 352 (1993). \nBecause each FOIA request sought a specific timeframe, this office concludes that the FOIA \nrequests are each a category of their own. \n\nAfter designating the FOIA requests as voluminous pursuant to section 3.6(a) of \n\nFOIA, the District gave the requesters an opportunity to amend their FOIA requests in such a \nnarrowed the scope of his request \nway that they would no longer be voluminous. \nto e-mails only between the Board president and the District superintendent from December 25, \n2023, through December 31, 2023, concerning the closing of Arbury Hills School and Frankfort \nSquare School. \n\nIf a request continues to be a voluminous request following \nthe requester's response under subsection (b) of this Section or the \nrequester fails to respond, the public body shall respond within the \nearlier of 5 business days after it receives the response from the \nrequester or 5 business days after the final day for the requester to \nrespond to the public body's notification under this subsection. The \nresponse shall: (i) provide an estimate of the fees to be charged, \nwhich the public body may require the person to pay in full before \ncopying the requested documents; (ii) deny the request pursuant to \none or more of the exemptions set out in this Act; (iii) notify the \nrequester that the request is unduly burdensome and extend an \nopportunity to the requester to attempt to reduce the request \nto manageable proportions; or (iv) provide the records requested. \n(Emphasis added.) \n\nThe District argued that to accurately assess the burden of these requests, they \n\nmust be considered in connection with the \"collective burden\" imposed by the 32 FOIA requests \nsubmitted by the individuals who worked together between March 14, 2024, and March 18, \n2024. 15 The District asserted that because the 32 FOIA requests were submitted by the same \n\"person,\" their impact should be considered together. \n\nThis office has previously concluded that when considering whether a voluminous \n\nrequest is unduly burdensome under section 3.6 ofFOIA, the public body may combine the \nseparately-submitted requests that constituted the voluminous request. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 87457, issued June 26, 2025, at 2 (contrasting section 3.6 ofFOIA with section 3(g) of \nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2024)), which does not authorize a public body to combine \nseparately-submitted requests into one request for purposes of measuring the burden of \ncompliance). \n\nIn general, a request for all e-mails sent or received by a public employee over a \n\nperiod of several weeks or months, which would require a public body to gather and review a \nlarge quantity ofresponsive records, is unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA in the \nabsence of an identified public interest in disclosure of all the records that outweighs the burden \nof compliance with the request. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 70860, \nissued May 10, 2022, at 8-9 (a request that would have required the public body to copy, review, \nand redact more than 700 potentially responsive e-mails would be unduly burdensome in the \nabsence of an identifiable public interest that outweighed the burden of compliance); Ill. Att'y \n\nLtd., to Laura Harter, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (June 3, 2024), at 4. \n\n15 Letter from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Assistant School District Attorney, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, \n\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47671, issued August 10, 2017, at 4 (\"There is no question that the \npublic interest in collective bargaining generally and unionization at Noble is high, but there is \nno indication that [the requester's] request for all e-mails sent or received by the three individuals \nat issue over that 17-day period containing the broad term 'union' could not be appropriately \nnarrowed to more specifically target records responsive to the purpose of her request.\"). See also\nNational Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, \n17 (2010) (\"A request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate, review, redact \nand arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material that is largely unnecessary to the \n[requester's] purpose constitutes an undue burden.\"). \n\nThe voluminous request sought all e-mails from April 2023 through March 2024 \n\nbetween the District superintendent and Board president. The District asserted that the total \nvolume of potentially responsive records was more than 1,000 e-mails. Although \namended the scope of his request to only e-mails concerning certain school closings, the \nnarrowed request did not materiall�verall volume of records the District would have \nto review. The District stated that�'s amended request for e-mails concerning two \nschool closings was \"too vague a term to search within the emails to actually capture responsive \nrecords, so the 218 emails (which was over 700 pages of emails, without attachments) was all \nemails between\" the named individuals, which would still have to be reviewed for \nresponsiveness. 16 Although it is not apparent why the District could not devise search terms \nreasonably tailored to the topic of the closings of two specific schools, 17 there is no indication \nthat the other requesters substantially narrowed the scope of their requests. The cumulative \nburden of compliance with all 32 individual FOIA requests that comprise the voluminous request \nat issue in this matter must be weighed against the public interest in disclosure to determine \nwhether that voluminous request was unduly burdensome. \n\nThis office acknowledges that there is a compelling public interest in the \n\n's request, however, the wording of the requests were not targeted to the topic \n\ndisclosure of information that sheds light on a public body's decision to close a school. Other \nthan \nof school closings. Even when the subject matter of a FOIA request is of significant public \ninterest, the scope of the request must be appropriately targeted to advance that public interest. \nSee Shriver Center, 2018 IL App (1st) 171846, at,r,r 39-41 (determining that although the topic \nof the school-to-prison pipeline is of significant public interest, the year-long scope of the FOIA \nrequest was indicative of a fishing expedition rather than an appropriately targeted request, such \nas a request limited to suspected misconduct within a specific school or of a specific officer, or \nschools with the highest student arrest rates). \n\n16E-mail from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Klen, Thorpe & Jenkins to [Laura] Harter (June 10, 2024).\n\nStates Department of Education, 630 F. Supp. 3d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2022). \n\n17FOIA imposes a \"duty to craft reasonable search terms[.]\" Bader Family Foundation v. United \n\nUnder these circumstances, this office is unable to conclude that the public \n\ninterest in disclosure of all the information requested outweighs the burden of compliance on the \nDistrict in responding to the voluminous request. The requesters have not established that the \ndisclosure of all e-mails between the Board president and the District superintendent for an 11-\nmonth period is necessary to serve the public interest in the school closings. \n\nThis office observed that the District did not strictly comply with the requirements \n\nof section 3.6(c)(iii), as its April 24, 2024, denial letters did not \"extend an opportunity to the \nrequester to attempt to reduce the request to manageable proportions.\" The District asserted that \nit offered the requesters opportunities to narrow their requests when it notified them that their \nrequests were voluminous. The obligation in section 3.6(a)(iii) of FOIA to offer a requester an \nopportunity to amend their request to no longer be voluminous is separate from the obligation in \nsection 3.6(c)(iii) ofFOIA to offer a requester an opportunity to reduce the request to \nmanageable proportions. However, the requesters did not object to this omission and it appears \nunlikely that they would have narrowed their requests at the time. This office suggests that the \nrequesters consider submitting a new FOIA request for e-mails between the Board president and \nDistrict superintendent containing the terms \"Arbury Hills\" or \"Franklin\" for approximately a \nthree-month time period. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does \nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at \nlaura.harter@ilag.gov. This letter serves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER \nBureau Chief \nPublic Access Bureau, Springfield \n\n81283 81300 f 36 vol req proper sd \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1061,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81399"],"title":"Downers Grove Public Library properly withheld closed session minutes and recordings under OMA and FOIA","filename":"81399, issued May 20, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1073,"summary":"The requester sought records of a closed session regarding an investigation of themselves, which the Downers Grove Public Library denied. The PAC determined that the Library properly withheld the verbatim recording and minutes under OMA and FOIA, and closed the file.","plain_summary":"A library patron requested records from a closed-door meeting regarding an investigation into their own conduct. The library refused to release the meeting minutes and audio recording, citing laws that keep such records confidential. The Attorney General's office agreed with the library, noting that these records are protected and no further action will be taken.","holding":"The Downers Grove Public Library properly withheld the requested closed session verbatim recording and minutes because they are exempt from disclosure under OMA and FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether a public body properly denied a FOIA request for closed session minutes and verbatim recordings pursuant to section 2.06(e) of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a)","5 ILCS 140/7(1)(l)","5 ILCS 120/2.06(e)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7(1)(l)"],"public_body":"Downers Grove Public Library","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The requester sought access to closed session minutes and verbatim recordings concerning an investigation into their own conduct.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_l/81399%2C%20issued%20May%2020%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","verbatim recording","meeting minutes","library records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"May 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81399\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn April 12, 2024,  after business hours,  in an unsigned e-mail, you submitted a\nFOIA request to the Downers Grove Public Library ( Library)  seeking \" records of the Executive\nClosed Session regarding the investigation of\" you. 2 On April 22, 2024,  the Library denied your\nrequest pursuant to section 7(1)(a)  of FOIA 3 in connection with section 2.06(e)  of the Open\nMeetings Act (OMA), 4 as well as section 7(1)(l) of FOIA. 5 Thus,  the Library construed your\nrequest as seeking the materials generated by the closed session— the closed session verbatim\nrecording and closed session minutes— and not records referenced during the closed session.   On\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n2E- mail from [\n\nto Julie Milavec ( April 12, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023;  \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462, effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446, effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n45 ILCS 120/2.06(e) ( West 2022). \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(l) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023;  \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446,  effective August 4, 2023;  103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024;  103- 554, effective January 1, 2024.  \n\n\fMay 20, 2024\nPage 2\n\nMay 14, 2024,  you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the Library' s\nresponse.   You indicated that you had requested an investigation from the Library and stated that\nyou were requesting all documentation on that investigation. \n\nAs a threshold matter,  a FOIA request must reasonably identify the public records\n\nthe requester seeks.   Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial &  Professional\nRegulation,  2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶  33.  Public bodies are not required to search beyond the\nfour corners of a FOIA request,  nor are they required to divine the requester' s intent.   American\nChemistry Council, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health &  Human Services,  922 F. Supp.  2d 56, 62\nD.D.C. 2013).   Therefore, \"[ a]  public body does not violate FOIA by failing to produce\ndocuments in its possession that do not fit within the parameters of the documents specified in\nthe FOIA request.\"   Kraft v. City of Kankakee,  2022 IL App (3d) 210270- U, ¶ 25 (citing\nHarwood v. McDonough,  334 Ill. App. 3d 242, 249-50 (2003)).   In this instance,  although your\nRequest for Review indicates that you seek investigatory materials that may have been discussed\nor referenced during the Library Board' s closed session discussion pertaining to you, your\nrequest for \" records of the Executive Closed Session regarding the investigation\"  did not\nreasonably identify any such investigatory records;  the language \" of the\"  in your request\nindicated that you were seeking the records documenting the closed session itself, rather than\nunderlying records of the investigation that related to or were mentioned during the closed\nsession.   Accordingly,  investigatory records are outside the scope of this matter,  and the\nremainder of this determination letter addresses why the records documenting the closed session\nare exempt from disclosure.   \n\nSection 7(1)(l) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ m] inutes of meetings of public\n\nbodies closed to the public as provided in [OMA]  until the public body makes the minutes\navailable to the public under Section 2.06 of [OMA].\"   In addition,  section 2.06(f) of OMA 6\nprovides that the \"[ m] inutes of meetings closed to the public shall be available only after the\npublic body determines that it is no longer necessary to protect the public interest or the privacy\nof an individual by keeping them confidential[.]\"   The Public Access Bureau has consistently\ndetermined that closed session minutes are exempt from disclosure under the plain language of\nsection 7(1)(l) of FOIA,  as long as there is no indication that the public body has voted to make\nthem available to the public under section 2.06(f) of OMA.  See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC\nReq.  Rev. Ltr. 23562,  issued March 2, 2015,  at 2; Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 49629, \nissued September 19, 2017,  at 2.  Given that the Library denied your FOIA request pursuant to\nthe 7(1)( l) exemption,  and you have provided no evidence to the contrary,  there is no indication\nthat the Library has voted to make the minutes from the meeting that is the subject of your\nrequest available to the public. \n\nSection 7(1)(a)  of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\"   Section 2.06(e)  of OMA provides: \n\n65 ILCS 120/2.06(f) (West 2022). \n\n\fMay 20, 2024\nPage 3\n\nUnless the public body has made a determination that the\n\nverbatim recording no longer requires confidential\notherwise consents to disclosure,  the verbatim record of a meeting\nclosed to the public shall not be open for public inspection or\nsubject to discovery in any administrative or judicial proceeding\nother than one brought to enforce this Act. \n\ntreatment or\n\nThus,  section 2.06(e) of OMA specifically prohibits disclosure of closed session verbatim\nrecordings unless the public body has made a determination that the recordings no longer require\ntreatment.   The Library denied your request pursuant to section 2.06(e),  reflecting\nconfidential\nthat it has not determined that the closed session verbatim recording at issue no longer requires\nconfidential\n\ntreatment.   \n\nBecause the closed session minutes and verbatim recording you requested are\nexempt from disclosure,  this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter.   You may wish to submit a new FOIA request to the Library in which you expressly ask\nfor documentation from the investigation you mentioned in your correspondence to this office if\nyou still seek such records. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81399 f no fi war lib\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie Milavec\nLibrary Director\nDowners Grove Public Library\n1050 Curtiss Street\nDowners Grove,  Illinois 60515\njmilavec@dglibrary. org\nfoia@dglibrary. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Closed-session minutes and recordings of an investigation","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81399/","full_text":"May 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81399\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn April 12, 2024, after business hours, in an unsigned e-mail, you submitted a\nFOIA request to the Downers Grove Public Library (Library) seeking \" records of the Executive\nClosed Session regarding the investigation of\" you. 2 On April 22, 2024, the Library denied your\nrequest pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA 3 in connection with section 2.06(e) of the Open\nMeetings Act (OMA), 4 as well as section 7(1)(l) of FOIA. 5 Thus, the Library construed your\nrequest as seeking the materials generated by the closed session— the closed session verbatim\nrecording and closed session minutes— and not records referenced during the closed session. On\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n2E- mail from [\n\nto Julie Milavec (April 12, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \neffective January 1, 2024; 103- 554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n45 ILCS 120/2.06(e) (West 2022). \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(l) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, 2023; \n\n103- 423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 540, \n\nMay 14, 2024, you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the Library's\nresponse. You indicated that you had requested an investigation from the Library and stated that\nyou were requesting all documentation on that investigation. \n\nAs a threshold matter, a FOIA request must reasonably identify the public records\n\nthe requester seeks. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional\nRegulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33. Public bodies are not required to search beyond the\nfour corners of a FOIA request, nor are they required to divine the requester's intent. American\nChemistry Council, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 922 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62\nD.D.C. 2013). Therefore, \"[ a] public body does not violate FOIA by failing to produce\ndocuments in its possession that do not fit within the parameters of the documents specified in\nthe FOIA request.\" Kraft v. City of Kankakee, 2022 IL App (3d) 210270- U, ¶ 25 (citing\nHarwood v. McDonough, 334 Ill. App. 3d 242, 249-50 (2003)). In this instance, although your\nRequest for Review indicates that you seek investigatory materials that may have been discussed\nor referenced during the Library Board's closed session discussion pertaining to you, your\nrequest for \" records of the Executive Closed Session regarding the investigation\" did not\nreasonably identify any such investigatory records; the language \" of the\" in your request\nindicated that you were seeking the records documenting the closed session itself, rather than\nunderlying records of the investigation that related to or were mentioned during the closed\nsession. Accordingly, investigatory records are outside the scope of this matter, and the\nremainder of this determination letter addresses why the records documenting the closed session\nare exempt from disclosure. \n\nSection 7(1)(l) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ m] inutes of meetings of public\n\nbodies closed to the public as provided in [OMA] until the public body makes the minutes\navailable to the public under Section 2.06 of [OMA].\" In addition, section 2.06(f) of OMA 6\nprovides that the \"[ m] inutes of meetings closed to the public shall be available only after the\npublic body determines that it is no longer necessary to protect the public interest or the privacy\nof an individual by keeping them confidential[.]\" The Public Access Bureau has consistently\ndetermined that closed session minutes are exempt from disclosure under the plain language of\nsection 7(1)(l) of FOIA, as long as there is no indication that the public body has voted to make\nthem available to the public under section 2.06(f) of OMA. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 23562, issued March 2, 2015, at 2; Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 49629, \nissued September 19, 2017, at 2. Given that the Library denied your FOIA request pursuant to\nthe 7(1)(l) exemption, and you have provided no evidence to the contrary, there is no indication\nthat the Library has voted to make the minutes from the meeting that is the subject of your\nrequest available to the public. \n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\n\nUnless the public body has made a determination that the\n\nverbatim recording no longer requires confidential\notherwise consents to disclosure, the verbatim record of a meeting\nclosed to the public shall not be open for public inspection or\nsubject to discovery in any administrative or judicial proceeding\nother than one brought to enforce this Act. \n\ntreatment or\n\nThus, section 2.06(e) of OMA specifically prohibits disclosure of closed session verbatim\nrecordings unless the public body has made a determination that the recordings no longer require\ntreatment. The Library denied your request pursuant to section 2.06(e), reflecting\nconfidential\nthat it has not determined that the closed session verbatim recording at issue no longer requires\nconfidential\n\ntreatment. \n\nBecause the closed session minutes and verbatim recording you requested are\nexempt from disclosure, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter. You may wish to submit a new FOIA request to the Library in which you expressly ask\nfor documentation from the investigation you mentioned in your correspondence to this office if\nyou still seek such records. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81399 f no fi war lib\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie Milavec\nLibrary Director\nDowners Grove Public Library\n1050 Curtiss Street\nDowners Grove, Illinois 60515\njmilavec@dglibrary. org\nfoia@dglibrary. org"}
{"id":1062,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-05-31","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81544"],"title":"Personal email FOIA request to Village of South Roxana trustee was procedurally improper","filename":"81544, issued May 31, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":969,"summary":"The requester sought records from a Village Trustee's personal email account, and the PAC determined that no further action was warranted because FOIA requests must be directed to the public body as a whole, not to individual members.","plain_summary":"A citizen sent a FOIA request to a Village Trustee's personal email address asking for records. The Attorney General's office explained that FOIA requests must be sent to the public body itself, not to individual officials, and therefore closed the case without further action.","holding":"The PAC determined that the request was procedurally improper because it was directed to an individual trustee rather than the public body.","legal_question":"Whether a FOIA request directed to an individual public official's personal email address constitutes a valid request to the public body under 5 ILCS 140/3.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of South Roxana","requesting_party":"Mr. Bob Coles","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOIA procedure","subject_description":"The requester sought records from a Village Trustee regarding a community Facebook page.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_a/Non-profit-federal-alderman/81544%2C%20issued%20May%2031%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA request","public body","individual official","procedural error"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"May 31,  2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   OMA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81544\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5( c) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1,  2024 ).  For these reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn April 24,  2024 , you e -mailed a FOIA request to Village of South Roxana\n\nVillage)  Trustee Anna Broadfoot on a gmail. com account,  asking her for records from a\nFacebook page relating to the community .   Trustee Broadfoot\nVillage's administration and noted:  \" Individually, I am not a public body under FOIA.\" 1 The\nVillage's administration indicated to Trustee Broadfoot that it was her responsibility to respond.  \nOn May 23, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review alleging that you had received no\nresponse after that correspondence between Trustee Broadfoot and the Village' s administration.  \nOn May 30, 2024, you confirmed to this office that \"[ t]he FOIA was directed to Trustee\nBroadfoot, individually.\" 2\n\nforwarded the request to the\n\nSection 3(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2022)) provides that \"[ e] ach public\nbody shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records,  except as\notherwise provided in Sections 7 and 8.5 of this Act.\"  (Emphasis added.)  Because FOIA applies\nto public bodies as a whole, the Act requires that \"[ r]equests for inspection or copies shall be\n\n1Message from Anna [ Broadfoot]  to Bob [ Coles] ( April 25, 2024). \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto [Joshua]  Jones (May 30, 2024). \n\n\fMay 31, 2024\nPage 2\n\nmade in writing and directed to the public body .\"  (Emphasis added.)  Section 2(a)  of FOIA (5\nILCS 140/ 2( a) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103 -311, effective July 28, 2023)  defines\na \" public body\" as: \n\nA]ll legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of\nthe State, state universities and colleges, counties, townships, \ncities,  villages,  incorporated towns,  school districts and all other\nmunicipal corporations,  boards,  bureaus,  committees,  or\ncommissions of this State, any subsidiary bodies of any of the\nforegoing including but not limited to committees and\nsubcommittees thereof, and a School Finance Authority created\nunder Article 1E of the School Code. \" Public body\" does not\ninclude a child death review team or the Illinois Child Death\nReview Teams Executive Council established under the Child\nDeath Review Team Act. \n\nIn Quinn v. Stone , 211 Ill. App. 3d 809 (1991), the Illinois Appellate Court\n\nconcluded that individual officers of a public body do not fall within the definition of a \" public\nbody\" under FOIA.  Quinn , 211 Ill. App. 3d at 812.  In that case, the court upheld the dismissal\nof a complaint for injunctive relief against a City of Chicago alderman for failing to respond to a\nFOIA request made of him individually because the alderman was \"not the proper recipient\" of a\nFOIA request.   Quinn,  211 Ill. App.  3d at 812.   Based on that precedent,  the Public Access\nBureau has consistently determined that public officials are not required to respond to FOIA\nrequests directed to them individually.   See,  for example ,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. \n70274, issued March 14, 2022 (request for records concerning proposed legislation was\nimproperly directed to individual senator's office, rather than the Illinois Senate ). \n\nBecause individual public officials are not public bodies,  Trustee Broadfoot did\nnot violate FOIA by not respond ing to the request you directed to her individually .  To the extent\nyou seek public records of the Village, you may wish to submit a new request for those records\nto the Village rather than any trustee individually.  This office notes that FOIA defines \"public\nrecords\" as: \n\nA]ll records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, \npapers, maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, \nelectronic data processing records, electronic communications, \nrecorded information and all other documentary materials\npertaining to the transaction of public business,  regardless of\nphysical form or characteristics, having been prepared by or for, \nor having been or being used by,  received by,  in the possession\nof, or under the control of any public body .  (Emphasis added.) \n\n\fMay 31, 2024\nPage 3\n\nIn your Request for Review, you also asked this office to, among other things, \n\nd] etermine whether the official' s use of a private Facebook account for public business\n\ncomplies with the Local Records Act and the State Records Act .\"3 The Public Access\nCounselor's authority to resolve disputes , however, is limited to alleged violations of FOIA and\nthe Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq . (West 2022)).  See 15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West\n2022).  FOIA governs the disclosure of existing public records; unlike the Local Records Act (50\nILCS 205/ 1 et seq . (West 2022))  and State Records Act ( 5 ILCS 160/ 1 et seq . (West 2022)),  it\ndoes not govern the retention of records that are not subject to a pending request,  nor does it\ndictate how public bodies are to dispose of records.  Accordingly, this office is not authorized to\nreview a public body's compliance with the Local Records Act or State Records Act.   \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\njoshua. jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81544 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Bob Coles\nChief of Police/ City Administrator\nVillage of South Roxana\n211 Sinclair Avenue\nSouth Roxana, Illinois 62087\nbcoles@southroxana.org\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Anna Broadfoot\nTrustee, Village of South Roxana\nmagones2021@gmail.com\n\n3Letter from\n\nto Office of the Attorney General, Public Access Counselor\n\ntransmitted May 23, 2024), at [3 ]. \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A village trustee's records of a community Facebook page","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81544/","full_text":"May 31, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81544\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For these reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn April 24, 2024, you e -mailed a FOIA request to Village of South Roxana\n\nVillage) Trustee Anna Broadfoot on a gmail. com account, asking her for records from a\nFacebook page relating to the community. Trustee Broadfoot\nVillage's administration and noted: \" Individually, I am not a public body under FOIA.\" 1 The\nVillage's administration indicated to Trustee Broadfoot that it was her responsibility to respond. \nOn May 23, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review alleging that you had received no\nresponse after that correspondence between Trustee Broadfoot and the Village's administration. \nOn May 30, 2024, you confirmed to this office that \"[ t]he FOIA was directed to Trustee\nBroadfoot, individually.\" 2\n\nforwarded the request to the\n\nSection 3(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2022)) provides that \"[ e] ach public\nbody shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records, except as\notherwise provided in Sections 7 and 8.5 of this Act.\" (Emphasis added.) Because FOIA applies\nto public bodies as a whole, the Act requires that \"[ r]equests for inspection or copies shall be\n\nmade in writing and directed to the public body.\" (Emphasis added.) Section 2(a) of FOIA (5\nILCS 140/ 2(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -311, effective July 28, 2023) defines\na \" public body\" as: \n\nA]ll legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of\nthe State, state universities and colleges, counties, townships, \ncities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other\nmunicipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees, or\ncommissions of this State, any subsidiary bodies of any of the\nforegoing including but not limited to committees and\nsubcommittees thereof, and a School Finance Authority created\nunder Article 1E of the School Code. \" Public body\" does not\ninclude a child death review team or the Illinois Child Death\nReview Teams Executive Council established under the Child\nDeath Review Team Act. \n\nIn Quinn v. Stone, 211 Ill. App. 3d 809 (1991), the Illinois Appellate Court\n\nconcluded that individual officers of a public body do not fall within the definition of a \" public\nbody\" under FOIA. Quinn, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 812. In that case, the court upheld the dismissal\nof a complaint for injunctive relief against a City of Chicago alderman for failing to respond to a\nFOIA request made of him individually because the alderman was \"not the proper recipient\" of a\nFOIA request. Quinn, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 812. Based on that precedent, the Public Access\nBureau has consistently determined that public officials are not required to respond to FOIA\nrequests directed to them individually. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n70274, issued March 14, 2022 (request for records concerning proposed legislation was\nimproperly directed to individual senator's office, rather than the Illinois Senate). \n\nBecause individual public officials are not public bodies, Trustee Broadfoot did\nnot violate FOIA by not respond ing to the request you directed to her individually. To the extent\nyou seek public records of the Village, you may wish to submit a new request for those records\nto the Village rather than any trustee individually. This office notes that FOIA defines \"public\nrecords\" as: \n\nA]ll records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, \npapers, maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, \n\nIn your Request for Review, you also asked this office to, among other things, \n\nd] etermine whether the official's use of a private Facebook account for public business\n\ncomplies with the Local Records Act and the State Records Act.\"3 The Public Access\nCounselor's authority to resolve disputes, however, is limited to alleged violations of FOIA and\nthe Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2022)). See 15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West\n2022). FOIA governs the disclosure of existing public records; unlike the Local Records Act (50\nILCS 205/ 1 et seq. (West 2022)) and State Records Act (5 ILCS 160/ 1 et seq. (West 2022)), it\ndoes not govern the retention of records that are not subject to a pending request, nor does it\ndictate how public bodies are to dispose of records. Accordingly, this office is not authorized to\nreview a public body's compliance with the Local Records Act or State Records Act. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\njoshua. jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81544 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Bob Coles\nChief of Police/ City Administrator\nVillage of South Roxana\n211 Sinclair Avenue\nSouth Roxana, Illinois 62087\nbcoles@southroxana.org\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Anna Broadfoot\nTrustee, Village of South Roxana\nmagones2021@gmail.com\n\n3 Letter from\n\nto Office of the Attorney General, Public Access Counselor\n\ntransmitted May 23, 2024), at [3 ]."}
{"id":1063,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81643"],"title":"Hinsdale Twp HS District 86 properly withheld threat assessment procedures under 7(1)(ll)","filename":"81643, issued June 24, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1027,"summary":"The requester challenged Hinsdale Township High School District 86's denial of records regarding 'Tip Line' policies and security procedures. The PAC determined that the District properly withheld the security-related records under section 7(1)(ll) of FOIA.","plain_summary":"A requester asked a school district for documents about their 'Tip Line' policies and security procedures. The school district withheld some documents, claiming they contained sensitive security information. The Attorney General's office reviewed the documents and agreed that the school district was allowed to keep them private to protect security protocols.","holding":"The District did not improperly withhold the requested records concerning threat assessment procedures pursuant to section 7(1)(ll) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the District properly withheld records concerning threat assessment procedures under FOIA section 7(1)(ll).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(v)","7(1)(ll)"],"public_body":"Hinsdale Township High School District 86","requesting_party":"Ms. Deborah F. Weiss","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(ll)","subject_description":"The request sought policies and procedures regarding the implementation of a school district 'Tip Line' and associated security protocols.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_ll/81643%2C%20issued%20June%2024%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["school records","security procedures","FOIA exemption","tip line"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"June 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Deborah F. Weiss\nWhitted Takiff, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndweiss@whittedtakifflaw. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Debra Kedrowski\nFOIA Officer\nHinsdale Township High School District 86\n5500 South Grant Street\nHinsdale Illinois 60521\ndkedrows@hinsdale86.org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81643\n\nDear Ms. Weiss and Ms. Kedrowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)).   \n\nOn May 22,  2024,  Ms. Deborah Weiss submitted a FOIA request to the Hinsdale\n\nTownship High School District 86 (District) seeking copies of the District's \" policies and\nprocedures regarding implementation of the District' s ' Tip Line'.  This should include,  but not be\nlimited to, those regarding privacy and the release of records of the 'tips' made to the 'Tip Line.'\"1\nOn May 30, 2024,  the District directed Ms. Weiss to the District' s Student Handbook posted\nonline and asserted that sections of the handbook pertaining to student records may apply to the\nextent that a tip may constitute a student record.   The District withheld one \" record describing\n\n2024). \n\n1Portal message from Deborah Weiss to Hinsdale Township High School District 86 (May 22, \n\n\fMs. Deborah F. Weiss\nMs. Debra Kedrowski\nJune 24, 2025\nPage 2\n\ncertain security procedures\" 2 pursuant to sections 7(1)(v) and 7(1)(ll) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 7(1)( v), (1)( ll) (West 2024)).   On May 31,  2024,  Ms. Weiss submitted a Request for Review\nchallenging the partial denial. \n\nOn June 5, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nDistrict and asked it to provide a copy of the withheld records,  together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions.  On\nJune 14, 2024,  this office received the requested materials,  which included both a complete\nversion of its written response for this office's confidential review and a redacted version for this\noffice to forward to Ms. Weiss. 3 On June 20,  2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the redacted\nresponse to Ms. Weiss; she replied on June 24, 2024.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2024);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024).  The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)(ll) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:  \" Records concerning the work\nteam of a school district,  including,  but not limited to, any threat\n\nof the threat assessment\nassessment procedure under the School Safety Drill Act and any information contained in the\nprocedure.\" \n\nIn its response to this office,  the District asserted it properly withheld certain\n\nrecords pursuant to section 7(1)(ll) because they were prepared by its District-level and building-\nlevel threat assessment\nprocedure.  In particular, the District asserted that the withheld records were response plans\ndeveloped by members of these threat assessment\n\nteams and contained information concerning its threat assessment\n\nteams and limited stakeholders with\n\n86, to Deborah Weiss (May 30, 2024). \n\n2Portal message from Debra Kedrowski, FOIA Officer, Hinsdale Township High School District\n\n3See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2024) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the\n\nanswer to the person submitting the request for review, with any alleged confidential information to which the\nrequest pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\n\fs. Deborah F. Weiss\nMs. Debra Kedrowski\nJune 24, 2025\nPage 3\n\noperational insight to help inform the plans.  The plans reflect the threat assessment team\nmembers'  knowledge of relevant procedures and their expertise in risk assessment.\" 4\n\nIn reply to that answer,  Ms. Weiss stated that she did \" not object to the\n\nwithholding of public records that address threat assessment procedure or a response plan for\nattacks on Hinsdale or its facilities.\" 5 She nonetheless explained that her request was prompted\nby the District's handling of a tip concerning a student.  She stated that the student's parent was\nasked by the District whether she wanted a copy of the tip, but that \"[ w] hen the parent accepted\nthe offer of a copy of the tip, she was provided with written paperwork to complete to obtain it, \nstating that it would be a school student record under the Illinois School Student Records'  Act.\" 6\nMs. Weiss asserted that the parent was informed by the District that it was school policy to seek\nreview from its counsel before releasing copies of tips. \n\nThis office' s review of the withheld records confirmed that the records contain\n\ninformation regarding the District's threat assessment procedure.  The records pertain, in part, to\nthe District' s tip line,  because they include a process for identifying and assessing tips involving\npotential security threats.  Because the records reflect the work of the District's threat assessment\nteams and concern threat assessment procedures,  the District did not improperly withhold the\nrecords pursuant to section 7(1)(ll).7\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81643 f 71ll proper sd\n\nAccess Bureau (June 14, 2024), at 3. \n\n4Letter from Matthew M. Swift, Robbins Schwartz, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\nAccess Bureau (June 24, 2024). \n\n5Letter from Deborah Weiss, Whitted Takiff, LLC, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\nAccess Bureau (June 24, 2024). \n\n6Letter from Deborah Weiss, Whitted Takiff, LLC, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\npursuant to section 7(1)(ll), we decline to address the applicability of section 7(1)(v). \n\n7Because this determination concludes that the records at issue are exempt from disclosure\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school district's tip-line policies and security protocols","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81643/","full_text":"June 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Deborah F. Weiss\nWhitted Takiff, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndweiss@whittedtakifflaw. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Debra Kedrowski\nFOIA Officer\nHinsdale Township High School District 86\n5500 South Grant Street\nHinsdale Illinois 60521\ndkedrows@hinsdale86.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81643\n\nDear Ms. Weiss and Ms. Kedrowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)). \n\nOn May 22, 2024, Ms. Deborah Weiss submitted a FOIA request to the Hinsdale\n\nTownship High School District 86 (District) seeking copies of the District's \" policies and\nprocedures regarding implementation of the District's ' Tip Line'. This should include, but not be\nlimited to, those regarding privacy and the release of records of the 'tips' made to the 'Tip Line.'\"1\nOn May 30, 2024, the District directed Ms. Weiss to the District's Student Handbook posted\nonline and asserted that sections of the handbook pertaining to student records may apply to the\nextent that a tip may constitute a student record. The District withheld one \" record describing\n\ncertain security procedures\" 2 pursuant to sections 7(1)(v) and 7(1)(ll) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 7(1)(v), (1)(ll) (West 2024)). On May 31, 2024, Ms. Weiss submitted a Request for Review\nchallenging the partial denial. \n\nOn June 5, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nDistrict and asked it to provide a copy of the withheld records, together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions. On\nJune 14, 2024, this office received the requested materials, which included both a complete\nversion of its written response for this office's confidential review and a redacted version for this\noffice to forward to Ms. Weiss. 3 On June 20, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the redacted\nresponse to Ms. Weiss; she replied on June 24, 2024. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(ll) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \" Records concerning the work\nteam of a school district, including, but not limited to, any threat\n\nof the threat assessment\nassessment procedure under the School Safety Drill Act and any information contained in the\nprocedure.\" \n\nIn its response to this office, the District asserted it properly withheld certain\n\nrecords pursuant to section 7(1)(ll) because they were prepared by its District-level and building-\nlevel threat assessment\nprocedure. In particular, the District asserted that the withheld records were response plans\ndeveloped by members of these threat assessment\n\nteams and contained information concerning its threat assessment\n\nteams and limited stakeholders with\n\n86, to Deborah Weiss (May 30, 2024). \n\n2 Portal message from Debra Kedrowski, FOIA Officer, Hinsdale Township High School District\n\n3 See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2024) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the\n\nanswer to the person submitting the request for review, with any alleged confidential information to which the\n\noperational insight to help inform the plans. The plans reflect the threat assessment team\nmembers' knowledge of relevant procedures and their expertise in risk assessment.\" 4\n\nIn reply to that answer, Ms. Weiss stated that she did \" not object to the\n\nwithholding of public records that address threat assessment procedure or a response plan for\nattacks on Hinsdale or its facilities.\" 5 She nonetheless explained that her request was prompted\nby the District's handling of a tip concerning a student. She stated that the student's parent was\nasked by the District whether she wanted a copy of the tip, but that \"[ w] hen the parent accepted\nthe offer of a copy of the tip, she was provided with written paperwork to complete to obtain it, \nstating that it would be a school student record under the Illinois School Student Records' Act.\" 6\nMs. Weiss asserted that the parent was informed by the District that it was school policy to seek\nreview from its counsel before releasing copies of tips. \n\nThis office's review of the withheld records confirmed that the records contain\n\ninformation regarding the District's threat assessment procedure. The records pertain, in part, to\nthe District's tip line, because they include a process for identifying and assessing tips involving\npotential security threats. Because the records reflect the work of the District's threat assessment\nteams and concern threat assessment procedures, the District did not improperly withhold the\nrecords pursuant to section 7(1)(ll).7\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81643 f 71ll proper sd\n\nAccess Bureau (June 14, 2024), at 3. \n\n4 Letter from Matthew M. Swift, Robbins Schwartz, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\nAccess Bureau (June 24, 2024). \n\n5 Letter from Deborah Weiss, Whitted Takiff, LLC, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\nAccess Bureau (June 24, 2024). \n\n6 Letter from Deborah Weiss, Whitted Takiff, LLC, to Teresa Lim, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\npursuant to section 7(1)(ll), we decline to address the applicability of section 7(1)(v). \n\n7 Because this determination concludes that the records at issue are exempt from disclosure"}
{"id":1064,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-06-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81723"],"title":"PAC closes case because U.S. Department of the Interior is not a public body under Illinois FOIA","filename":"81723, issued June 13, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":371,"summary":"The requester challenged the U.S. Department of the Interior's refusal to accept a FOIA request via email, but the PAC determined it lacked jurisdiction because the agency is a federal entity.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Illinois Attorney General to intervene after the U.S. Department of the Interior refused to accept a FOIA request. The Attorney General's office explained that Illinois FOIA laws only apply to Illinois state and local government agencies, not federal agencies. Because the federal government is not subject to Illinois FOIA, the PAC closed the case without taking further action.","holding":"The PAC determined that it has no authority to review the matter because the U.S. Department of the Interior is not a 'public body' as defined by the Illinois Freedom of Information Act.","legal_question":"Whether the U.S. Department of the Interior constitutes a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"U.S. Department of the Interior","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed - No further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"jurisdiction","subject_description":"The PAC determined it lacked jurisdiction over a federal agency regarding an Illinois FOIA request.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_a/Non-profit-federal-alderman/81723%2C%20issued%20June%2013%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["federal agency","jurisdiction","public body","FOIA request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"June 13, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRe:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81723\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  this office has determined that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn June 5, 2024,  you e-mailed a FOIA request to the U.S. Department of Interior\n\nDepartment).   On June 6, 2024,  the Department\nrequests via e-mail.  Later that day, this office received your Request for Review contesting the\nDepartment' s refusal to accept your e-mailed FOIA request. \n\ninformed you that it could not accept FOIA\n\nPlease note that the Public Access Counselor' s authority is limited to reviewing\n\npublic bodies'  denials of requests for information under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act. 2\nSection 2(a)  of Illinois FOIA 3 defines a \" public body\"  as: \n\nA]ll legislative,  executive,  administrative,  or advisory bodies of\nthe State,  state universities and colleges,  counties,  townships, \ncities,  villages,  incorporated towns,  school districts and all other\nmunicipal corporations,  boards,  bureaus,  committees,  or\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/1 et seq. ( West 2022);  5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act\n\n35 ILCS 140/2(a) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fJune 13, 2024\nPage 2\n\ncommissions of this State,  any subsidiary bodies of any of the\nforegoing[.]  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nThe plain language of this definition limits the application of Illinois FOIA to\nState and local governmental entities of the State of Illinois.  The Department\nis a part of the\nfederal government rather than a government entity of the State of Illinois.  The Department\ntherefore not a \" public body\"  subject to the requirements of Illinois FOIA.  Accordingly,  we are\nunable to assist you in this matter and will take no further action.  \n\nis\n\nThis file is closed.   Please contact the Public Access Bureau at the Springfield\n\naddress on the first page of this letter if you have questions.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81723 f no fi war not a pb\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A federal agency's response to an Illinois FOIA request","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81723/","full_text":"June 13, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRe: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81723\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, this office has determined that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn June 5, 2024, you e-mailed a FOIA request to the U.S. Department of Interior\n\nDepartment). On June 6, 2024, the Department\nrequests via e-mail. Later that day, this office received your Request for Review contesting the\nDepartment's refusal to accept your e-mailed FOIA request. \n\ninformed you that it could not accept FOIA\n\nPlease note that the Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to reviewing\n\npublic bodies' denials of requests for information under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act. 2\nSection 2(a) of Illinois FOIA 3 defines a \" public body\" as: \n\nA]ll legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of\nthe State, state universities and colleges, counties, townships, \ncities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other\nmunicipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees, or\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2022); 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act\n\n35 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\ncommissions of this State, any subsidiary bodies of any of the\nforegoing[.] (Emphasis added.) \n\nThe plain language of this definition limits the application of Illinois FOIA to\nState and local governmental entities of the State of Illinois. The Department\nis a part of the\nfederal government rather than a government entity of the State of Illinois. The Department\ntherefore not a \" public body\" subject to the requirements of Illinois FOIA. Accordingly, we are\nunable to assist you in this matter and will take no further action. \n\nis\n\nThis file is closed. Please contact the Public Access Bureau at the Springfield\n\naddress on the first page of this letter if you have questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81723 f no fi war not a pb"}
{"id":1065,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81798","81970"],"title":"PAC takes no further action on journalist's challenge to recurrent requester status at IDHS and IDVA","filename":"81798 81970, issued July 3, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1300,"summary":"The requester challenged the classification of their FOIA requests as 'recurrent requester' status, arguing they should be exempt due to their status as a journalist. The PAC determined that no further action was warranted, effectively upholding the agencies' handling of the requests.","plain_summary":"A journalist requested records from two state agencies and challenged the agencies' decision to label them a 'recurrent requester,' which allows agencies more time to respond. The journalist argued that their professional status should exempt them from this classification. The Attorney General's office reviewed the matter and decided not to take any further action, meaning the agencies' original handling of the requests stands.","holding":"The Public Access Counselor determined that no further action is warranted regarding the agencies' classification of the requester as a recurrent requester.","legal_question":"Whether a requester's status as a journalist exempts them from the 'recurrent requester' provisions under section 3.2 of FOIA.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3.2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Human Services and Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs","requesting_party":"Suzanna R. Waters","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"recurrent requester","subject_description":"The requester sought to overturn the agencies' designation of their FOIA requests as those of a 'recurrent requester' based on their professional status as a journalist.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_f/81798%2081970%2C%20issued%20July%203%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["recurrent requester","FOIA response time","journalist","public records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Requester Status","full_text_pre_clean":"July 3,  2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  OMA Requests for Review – 2024 PAC 81798 and 81970\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024 ).  For these reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in these matters. \n\nOn June 7,  2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nHuman Services seeking copies of communications with a named Senior Immigration Fellow .  \nThe request stated:  \" As a journalist that writes for Toresays.com I will make this request and all\ncorrespondence public for the purpose of transparency .\"  (Emphasis in original.)1 On June 13, \n2024,  the Department of Human Services notified you that it was treating your request as a\nrequest from a recurrent requester under section 3.2 of FOIA2 because you became a recurrent\nrequester on March 15, 2024 , and the status lasts for a year; the Department of Human Services\nstated that it would respond to the request by July 10, 2024.  On June 18, 2024, you submitted a\nRequest for Review alleging that the Department of Human Services improperly treated your\nrequest as a personal request because \"[ t] his is a journalist request and should be treated as\nsuch.\" 3\n\n1E-mail from\n\nto FOIA officer (June 7, 2024). \n\n25 ILCS 140/ 3.2 (West 2022).    \n\n3E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau] ( June 13, 2024).  \n\n\fMs.  Suzanna R Waters\nJuly 3, 2024\nPage 2\n\nOn June 24, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Department of Veterans' \nAffairs seeking copies of its communications with the same Senior Immigration Fellow named in\nyour FOIA request to the Department of Human Services .  That request also stated you are\njournalist for Toresays.com.  On June 26, 2024, the Department of Veterans' Affairs designated\nyou as a recurrent requester based on the number of FOIA requests that you previously\nsubmitted.  On the same day, you objected to that designation and the Department of Veterans' \nAffairs replied by reiterating that it would treat you r request as a request submitted by a recurrent\nrequester.   On June 27, 202 4, you submitted a Request for Review asserting that you qualify as\nnews media and, therefore, the Department improperly treated your request as a request by a\nrecurrent requester. \n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA4 specifies that requests made by news media and non -profit, \n\nscientific,  or academic organizations do not count towards the recurrent requester designation\nwhen the principal purpose of the requests is (i) to access and disseminate information\nconcerning news and current or passing events, (ii) for articles of opinion or features of interest\nto the public, or (iii) for the purpose of academic, scientific, or public research or education.\"  \nSection 2(f) of FOIA5 defines \"news media\" as: \n\nA] newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals\nwhether in print or electronic format, a news service whether in\nprint or electronic format, a radio station, a television station, a\ntelevision network,  a community antenna television service,  or a\nperson or corporation engaged in making news reels or other\nmotion picture news for public showing. \n\nYour June 7, 2024, and June 24, 2024, FOIA requests did not illustrate how you\nmeet the definition of \" news media.\"   You stated that you are a journalist and that you write for\nToresays. com,  but you provided no information about any journalism you have performed or\nwhat Toresays. com consists of.   Thus,  even if you had not previously triggered the recurrent\nrequester designation , your June 2024 requests did not set forth sufficient facts to suggest that the\nDepartments needed to treat you as a member of the news media excluded from the recurrent\nrequester provisions of FOIA . \n\nAdditionally, a brief Google search revealed a Washington Post article that\n\nidentified a person named Terpsichore Maras -Lindeman , \"who goes by Tore,\" as making \"a blog\n\n45 ILCS 140/ 2(g) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -554, effective January 1, 2024.  \n\n55 ILCS 140/ 2(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n\fJuly 3, 2024\nPage 3\n\npost\" on Toresays.com and running the podcast \"Tore Says.\" 6 This office visited Toresays.com\nand used the search function to search for your name (\" Suzanna\"  and \" Waters\"  separately), \nwhich returned zero posts.  In clicking through some of the posts on the homepage , none appear\nto have attribution to any named writer —just \"Tore Says\"— and only five are from 2024 (two in\nFebruary, two in June , and one in July ).7 The \"Contact Us\" webpage contains merely an Ohio\nmailing address.8 There is also a \" Tip Me\" webpage with various payment links,9 a \" World\nNews\"  webpage most recently updated February 8, 2023, 10 and a \" TORE SAYS SHOW ( LIVE\nACCESS)\"  webpage with 1,161 episodes that was last updated October 23,  2023 .11\n\nBased on this office's review of a sample of the material posted on the\n\nToresays.com website , it does not reflect the usage of recognized journalistic standards and\ntherefore does not have the essential components of a \" newspaper,\" \" other periodical issued at\nregular intervals,\"  or \"news service\"  included in FOIA' s definition of \"news media.\"   The articles\ndo not appear to be based primarily on journalistic methods of newsgathering such as interviews, \ninformation derived from public records, or data analysis.  See, for example , Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 71808, issued May 23, 2022, at 3 (concluding that even though requester's website\ncontained \"information and opinions about certain topics of public interest ,\" the requester did not\nqualify as \" news media\"  because \" the posts are not compiled by journalists using recognized\njournalistic standards\"  such as editorial oversight).  The timing of the posts to the website are\nsporadic rather than in regular intervals .  Although you indicate that you are a freelancer for\nToresays.com, there is no indication that the website has a staff that gathers and edits news or an\neditorial oversight process comparable to that of a news media entity .  Accordingly,  there is no\nbasis for this office to conclude that the Department of Human Services or Department of\nVeterans'  Affairs improperly treated your requests as requests submitted by a recurrent requester. \n\n6Jon Swaine, Sidney Powell 's secret intelligence contractor witness is a pro -Trump podcaster, \nWashington Post (December 24, 2020, 4:03 p.m. EST),  https:// www.washingtonpost. com/ investigations/ sidney -\npowells- secret- intelligence - contractor- witness- is -a-pro-trump- podcaster/ 2020/ 12/ 24/ d5a1ab9e -4403- 11eb -a277 -\n49a6d1f9dff1_ story. html.  \n\nJune 26, 2024). \n\n7Home,  The Organization Regarding Everything (T.O.R.E.), https:// toresays. com/ ( last visited\n\n8Contact Us, The Organization Regarding Everything ( T.O.R.E.), https:// toresays. com/contact -us/ \n\nlast visited June 26, 2024).  \n\nvisited June 26, 2024). \n\n9Tip Me, The Organization Regarding Everything ( T.O.R.E.), https:// toresays. com/ tip -me/ ( last\n\n10World News,  The Organization Regarding Everything ( T.O.R.E.), \n\nhttps:// toresays. com/ category/ world -news/ ( last visited June 26, 2024). \n\n11TORE SAYS SHOW (LIVE ACCESS), The Organization Regarding Everything ( T.O.R.E.), \n\nhttps:// toresays.com/ tore -says-show/ (last visited June 26, 2024). \n\n\fJuly 3, 2024\nPage 4\n\nFor all of the above reasons, this office has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in these matters.   Th ese files are closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me\nat joshua.jones@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81798 81970 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas Mulcrone\nAssociate General Counsel\nIllinois Department of Human Services\nDHS.FOIAOfficer@illinois.gov\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ma tt Eddington\nDeputy General Counsel\nEthics Officer\nIllinois Department of Veterans ' Affairs\nMatt.Eddington@illinois.gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A journalist's recurrent requester designation","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81798/","full_text":"July 3, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Requests for Review – 2024 PAC 81798 and 81970\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For these reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in these matters. \n\nOn June 7, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nHuman Services seeking copies of communications with a named Senior Immigration Fellow. \nThe request stated: \" As a journalist that writes for Toresays.com I will make this request and all\ncorrespondence public for the purpose of transparency.\" (Emphasis in original.)1 On June 13, \n2024, the Department of Human Services notified you that it was treating your request as a\nrequest from a recurrent requester under section 3.2 of FOIA2 because you became a recurrent\nrequester on March 15, 2024, and the status lasts for a year; the Department of Human Services\nstated that it would respond to the request by July 10, 2024. On June 18, 2024, you submitted a\nRequest for Review alleging that the Department of Human Services improperly treated your\nrequest as a personal request because \"[ t] his is a journalist request and should be treated as\nsuch.\" 3\n\nOn June 24, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Department of Veterans' \nAffairs seeking copies of its communications with the same Senior Immigration Fellow named in\nyour FOIA request to the Department of Human Services. That request also stated you are\njournalist for Toresays.com. On June 26, 2024, the Department of Veterans' Affairs designated\nyou as a recurrent requester based on the number of FOIA requests that you previously\nsubmitted. On the same day, you objected to that designation and the Department of Veterans' \nAffairs replied by reiterating that it would treat you r request as a request submitted by a recurrent\nrequester. On June 27, 202 4, you submitted a Request for Review asserting that you qualify as\nnews media and, therefore, the Department improperly treated your request as a request by a\nrecurrent requester. \n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA4 specifies that requests made by news media and non -profit, \n\nscientific, or academic organizations do not count towards the recurrent requester designation\nwhen the principal purpose of the requests is (i) to access and disseminate information\nconcerning news and current or passing events, (ii) for articles of opinion or features of interest\nto the public, or (iii) for the purpose of academic, scientific, or public research or education.\" \nSection 2(f) of FOIA5 defines \"news media\" as: \n\nA] newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals\nwhether in print or electronic format, a news service whether in\nprint or electronic format, a radio station, a television station, a\ntelevision network, a community antenna television service, or a\nperson or corporation engaged in making news reels or other\nmotion picture news for public showing. \n\nYour June 7, 2024, and June 24, 2024, FOIA requests did not illustrate how you\nmeet the definition of \" news media.\" You stated that you are a journalist and that you write for\nToresays. com, but you provided no information about any journalism you have performed or\nwhat Toresays. com consists of. Thus, even if you had not previously triggered the recurrent\nrequester designation, your June 2024 requests did not set forth sufficient facts to suggest that the\nDepartments needed to treat you as a member of the news media excluded from the recurrent\nrequester provisions of FOIA. \n\nAdditionally, a brief Google search revealed a Washington Post article that\n\nidentified a person named Terpsichore Maras -Lindeman, \"who goes by Tore,\" as making \"a blog\n\n45 ILCS 140/ 2(g) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n55 ILCS 140/ 2(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -554, effective January 1, 2024. \n\npost\" on Toresays.com and running the podcast \"Tore Says.\" 6 This office visited Toresays.com\nand used the search function to search for your name (\" Suzanna\" and \" Waters\" separately), \nwhich returned zero posts. In clicking through some of the posts on the homepage, none appear\nto have attribution to any named writer —just \"Tore Says\"— and only five are from 2024 (two in\nFebruary, two in June, and one in July).7 The \"Contact Us\" webpage contains merely an Ohio\nmailing address.8 There is also a \" Tip Me\" webpage with various payment links,9 a \" World\nNews\" webpage most recently updated February 8, 2023, 10 and a \" TORE SAYS SHOW (LIVE\nACCESS)\" webpage with 1,161 episodes that was last updated October 23, 2023.11\n\nBased on this office's review of a sample of the material posted on the\n\nToresays.com website, it does not reflect the usage of recognized journalistic standards and\ntherefore does not have the essential components of a \" newspaper,\" \" other periodical issued at\nregular intervals,\" or \"news service\" included in FOIA's definition of \"news media.\" The articles\ndo not appear to be based primarily on journalistic methods of newsgathering such as interviews, \ninformation derived from public records, or data analysis. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 71808, issued May 23, 2022, at 3 (concluding that even though requester's website\ncontained \"information and opinions about certain topics of public interest,\" the requester did not\nqualify as \" news media\" because \" the posts are not compiled by journalists using recognized\njournalistic standards\" such as editorial oversight). The timing of the posts to the website are\nsporadic rather than in regular intervals. Although you indicate that you are a freelancer for\nToresays.com, there is no indication that the website has a staff that gathers and edits news or an\neditorial oversight process comparable to that of a news media entity. Accordingly, there is no\nbasis for this office to conclude that the Department of Human Services or Department of\nVeterans' Affairs improperly treated your requests as requests submitted by a recurrent requester. \n\n6 Jon Swaine, Sidney Powell 's secret intelligence contractor witness is a pro -Trump podcaster, \nWashington Post (December 24, 2020, 4:03 p.m. EST), https:// www.washingtonpost. com/ investigations/ sidney -\npowells- secret- intelligence - contractor- witness- is -a-pro-trump- podcaster/ 2020/ 12/ 24/ d5a1ab9e -4403- 11eb -a277 -\n49a6d1f9dff1_ story. html. \n\nJune 26, 2024). \n\n7 Home, The Organization Regarding Everything (T.O.R.E.), https:// toresays. com/ (last visited\n\n8 Contact Us, The Organization Regarding Everything (T.O.R.E.), https:// toresays. com/contact -us/ \n\nlast visited June 26, 2024). \n\nvisited June 26, 2024). \n\n9 Tip Me, The Organization Regarding Everything (T.O.R.E.), https:// toresays. com/ tip -me/ (last\n\nFor all of the above reasons, this office has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in these matters. Th ese files are closed. If you have any questions, please contact me\nat joshua.jones@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81798 81970 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas Mulcrone\nAssociate General Counsel\nIllinois Department of Human Services\nDHS.FOIAOfficer@illinois.gov\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ma tt Eddington\nDeputy General Counsel\nEthics Officer\nIllinois Department of Veterans ' Affairs\nMatt.Eddington@illinois.gov"}
{"id":1066,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81858"],"title":"PAC closes case: Chicago Public Schools teacher evaluation records exempt from disclosure","filename":"81858, issued July 9, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":875,"summary":"The requester sought teacher evaluation performance task results from Chicago Public Schools, which the district denied citing confidentiality requirements under the School Code and Personnel Record Review Act. The PAC determined that because the requested records are legally required to be kept confidential in their entirety, no further inquiry is warranted.","plain_summary":"A requester asked Chicago Public Schools for teacher evaluation data, hoping that removing personal names would make the records public. The Attorney General's office agreed with the school district that these specific evaluation records are protected by law and cannot be released, even if names are removed. Consequently, the PAC closed the case without requiring the district to provide the documents.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau concluded that no further action is warranted because the requested teacher evaluation records are exempt from disclosure under the School Code and the Personnel Record Review Act.","legal_question":"Whether teacher evaluation performance task results are exempt from disclosure under FOIA sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(j)(ii), and 7.5(r) due to confidentiality mandates in the School Code and Personnel Record Review Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7(1)(j)(ii)","7.5(r)"],"public_body":"Chicago Public Schools","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action warranted","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought REACH teacher evaluation performance task results from 2019 to the present.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_q/81858%2C%20issued%20July%209%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["teacher evaluation","personnel records","school records","confidentiality"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"July 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81858;  CPS no. N015125- 040424\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024).   For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further inquiry is warranted. \n\nOn April 4, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to Chicago Public Schools ( CPS)  \nseeking Recognizing Educators Advancing Chicago' s Students ( REACH)  test results from school\nyear 2019 through present.   In your request,  you described REACH as \" the district' s enhanced, \ncomprehensive system for teacher evaluating and support,\"  and REACH Performance Tasks as\nperformance- based,  formative assessments.\" 1 You argued that \"[ t]hese records should be\nreleased so the records provided will allow for the results of each student to be matched without\nrevealing private personally identifiable information.\" 2 On April 19, 2024,  CPS denied your\nrequest in its entirety pursuant to sections 7(1)(a),  7(1)(j)(ii), and 7.5(r) of FOIA. 3 In connection\n\n2024).  \n\n2024). \n\n1FOIA portal message from Chicago Public Schools FOIA Center to\n\nApril 4, \n\n2FOIA portal message from Chicago Public Schools FOIA Center to\n\nApril 4,  \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), ( 1)(j)(ii) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30,  \n\n2023;  103-423, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462, effective August 4, 2023;  103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; \n103- 540, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 554,  effective January 1, 2024;  5 ILCS 140/ 7.5(r) (West 2022),  as amended\nby Public Acts 103- 008,  effective June 7, 2023;  103- 034,  effective June 9, 2023;  103- 142, effective January 1, 2024; \n103- 372, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 508,  effective July 1, 2023;  103- 580,  effective December 8, 2023. \n\n\fJuly 9, 2024\nPage 2\n\nwith section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, CPS cited a provision of the School Code 4 and a provision of the\nPersonnel Record Review Act. 5 CPS stated that \" the sole use of REACH assessments and\nrelated assessment data is to inform a teacher' s performance review by the district.\" 6\n\nOn June 18, 2024,  you completed the submission of the above- referenced\n\nRequest for Review.   You contended that \"[ t]his request does not ask for any records that could\nidentify a student or a specific teacher if unidentified,  and withholding such records is a violation\nof the Illinois FOIA.\" 7\n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\"  The School Code provision CPS cited is a State law that provides:  \" Except as\notherwise provided under this Act, disclosure of public school teacher,  principal,  and\nsuperintendent performance evaluations is prohibited.\"   Similarly,  the Personnel Record Review\nAct provision CPS cited states:  \" This Act shall not be construed to diminish a right of access to\nrecords already otherwise provided by law, provided that disclosure of performance evaluations\nunder the Freedom of Information Act shall be prohibited.\"  ( Emphasis added.) 8 These\nprovisions expressly exempt teacher performance evaluations from disclosure pursuant to FOIA.   \n\nYou noted in your FOIA request to CPS that the test results you seek are\n\ngenerated for evaluating teachers'  performance.   CPS confirmed in its response to your request\nthat the records are solely used to evaluate teachers'  performance.   Among other things,  these\nevaluations can be used in personnel decisions,  such as tenure attainment,  identification of\nteacher leaders,  or removal of persistently low-performing teachers who are not meeting district\nexpectations.\" 9\n\nUnder these circumstances,  the records you requested plainly constitute\n\n4105 ILCS 5/24A-7.1 (West 2022).  \n\n5820 ILCS 40/11 (West 2022).  \n\n6E- mail from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer,  Chicago Public Schools,  to\n\nApril 19, 2024).   \n\n7E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( June 17, 2024). \n\n8Although CPS did not expressly cite section 7.5(q) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7.5(q) (West 2022),  as\n\namended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023;  103- 034, effective June 9, 2023;  103- 142, effective\nJanuary 1, 2024;  103- 372, effective January 1, 2024;  103- 508, effective July 1, 2023;  103-580, effective December\n8, 2023),  the exemption pertains to \" information prohibited from being disclosed by the Personnel Record Review\nAct.\" \n\nCPS:  Perceptions of REACH Implementation,  Five Years In (2020),  at 10.   \n\n9University of Chicago Consortium on School Research,  Research Brief, Teacher Evaluation in\n\n\fJuly 9, 2024\nPage 3\n\nperformance evaluations which are required to be kept confidential pursuant to the School Code\nand Personnel Record Review Act.  While you stated that you did not seek personally\nidentifiable information,  the Personnel Record Review Act and School Code require the\nwithholding of performance evaluations in full; redacting teachers'  identifying information is not\nan option.   Accordingly,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81858 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Annie Righi\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nChicago Public Schools\n42 West Madison Street,  3rd Floor\nChicago,  Illinois 60602\narighi@cpsd. edu\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Teacher evaluation performance task results","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81858/","full_text":"July 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81858; CPS no. N015125- 040424\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further inquiry is warranted. \n\nOn April 4, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to Chicago Public Schools (CPS) \nseeking Recognizing Educators Advancing Chicago's Students (REACH) test results from school\nyear 2019 through present. In your request, you described REACH as \" the district's enhanced, \ncomprehensive system for teacher evaluating and support,\" and REACH Performance Tasks as\nperformance- based, formative assessments.\" 1 You argued that \"[ t]hese records should be\nreleased so the records provided will allow for the results of each student to be matched without\nrevealing private personally identifiable information.\" 2 On April 19, 2024, CPS denied your\nrequest in its entirety pursuant to sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(j)(ii), and 7.5(r) of FOIA. 3 In connection\n\n2024). \n\n2024). \n\n1FOIA portal message from Chicago Public Schools FOIA Center to\n\nApril 4, \n\n2FOIA portal message from Chicago Public Schools FOIA Center to\n\nApril 4, \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (1)(j)(ii) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103-154, effective June 30, \n\n2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective August 4, 2023; 103- 446, effective August 4, 2023; \n103- 540, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 554, effective January 1, 2024; 5 ILCS 140/ 7.5(r) (West 2022), as amended\nby Public Acts 103- 008, effective June 7, 2023; 103- 034, effective June 9, 2023; 103- 142, effective January 1, 2024; \n103- 372, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 508, effective July 1, 2023; 103- 580, effective December 8, 2023. \n\nwith section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, CPS cited a provision of the School Code 4 and a provision of the\nPersonnel Record Review Act. 5 CPS stated that \" the sole use of REACH assessments and\nrelated assessment data is to inform a teacher's performance review by the district.\" 6\n\nOn June 18, 2024, you completed the submission of the above- referenced\n\nRequest for Review. You contended that \"[ t]his request does not ask for any records that could\nidentify a student or a specific teacher if unidentified, and withholding such records is a violation\nof the Illinois FOIA.\" 7\n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\" The School Code provision CPS cited is a State law that provides: \" Except as\notherwise provided under this Act, disclosure of public school teacher, principal, and\nsuperintendent performance evaluations is prohibited.\" Similarly, the Personnel Record Review\nAct provision CPS cited states: \" This Act shall not be construed to diminish a right of access to\nrecords already otherwise provided by law, provided that disclosure of performance evaluations\nunder the Freedom of Information Act shall be prohibited.\" (Emphasis added.) 8 These\nprovisions expressly exempt teacher performance evaluations from disclosure pursuant to FOIA. \n\nYou noted in your FOIA request to CPS that the test results you seek are\n\ngenerated for evaluating teachers' performance. CPS confirmed in its response to your request\nthat the records are solely used to evaluate teachers' performance. Among other things, these\nevaluations can be used in personnel decisions, such as tenure attainment, identification of\nteacher leaders, or removal of persistently low-performing teachers who are not meeting district\nexpectations.\" 9\n\nUnder these circumstances, the records you requested plainly constitute\n\n4105 ILCS 5/24A-7.1 (West 2022). \n\n5820 ILCS 40/11 (West 2022). \n\n6E- mail from Annie Righi, Freedom of Information Act Officer, Chicago Public Schools, to\n\nApril 19, 2024). \n\n7E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor (June 17, 2024). \n\n8 Although CPS did not expressly cite section 7.5(q) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7.5(q) (West 2022), as\n\namended by Public Acts 103-008, effective June 7, 2023; 103- 034, effective June 9, 2023; 103- 142, effective\nJanuary 1, 2024; 103- 372, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 508, effective July 1, 2023; 103-580, effective December\n8, 2023), the exemption pertains to \" information prohibited from being disclosed by the Personnel Record Review\nAct.\" \n\nCPS: Perceptions of REACH Implementation, Five Years In (2020), at 10. \n\n9 University of Chicago Consortium on School Research, Research Brief, Teacher Evaluation in\n\nperformance evaluations which are required to be kept confidential pursuant to the School Code\nand Personnel Record Review Act. While you stated that you did not seek personally\nidentifiable information, the Personnel Record Review Act and School Code require the\nwithholding of performance evaluations in full; redacting teachers' identifying information is not\nan option. Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81858 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Annie Righi\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nChicago Public Schools\n42 West Madison Street, 3rd Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60602\narighi@cpsd. edu"}
{"id":1067,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81880"],"title":"Chief Procurement Office for General Services commercial purpose FOIA denial not reviewable by PAC","filename":"81880, issued July 1, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":707,"summary":"AHEAD requested emails regarding a cancelled bid, which the Chief Procurement Office denied; the PAC determined it lacked authority to review the matter because the request was made for a commercial purpose.","plain_summary":"A company requested emails from a state office regarding a cancelled bid, but the office denied the request. When the company asked the Attorney General's office to review the denial, the PAC determined it could not help because the request was for a commercial purpose. Under Illinois law, the PAC does not have the authority to resolve disputes over commercial FOIA requests.","holding":"The Public Access Counselor has no authority to review a denial of a FOIA request made for a commercial purpose.","legal_question":"Does the Public Access Counselor have the authority to review a denial of a FOIA request submitted for a commercial purpose?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/9.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(f)","7(1)(h)","7(1)(m)"],"public_body":"Chief Procurement Office for General Services","requesting_party":"Mr. Sean Dailey (AHEAD)","pac_outcome":"Closed - No further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"commercial purpose","subject_description":"The requester sought emails related to the cancellation of a bid for which they had filed a protest.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_c-10/81880%2C%20issued%20July%201%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["commercial purpose","bid protest","procurement","PAC authority"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"July 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81880\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024 ).  For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau has no\nauthority to take further action in this matter. \n\nOn June 10, 2024, Mr. Sean Dailey , Senior Client Director at AHEAD, submitted\na FOIA request to the Chief Procurement Office for General Services  (Office ) seeking copies of\ne-mails related to the decision to cancel a bid that AHEAD was awarded .  On June 17 , 2024, the\nOffice denied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)( f), 7( 1)(h),  and 7( 1)( m) of FOIA, 1 and cited\nsection 8.5 for materials posted on its website.2 On June 20 , 2024 , this office received your\nRequest for Review contesting the Office' s denial on behalf of AHEAD.   When this office asked\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(f), (1)( h), (1)(m) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -154, effective\n\nJune 30, 2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, \n2023;  103 -540,  effective January 1, 2024;  103 -554,  effective January 1, 2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/ 8.5 (West 2022). \n\n\fJuly 1, 2024\nPage 2\n\nyou about the purpose of the request, you stated:  \" It's related to a bid cancellation, to which we\nhave filed a protest.\" 3\n\nSection 9.5(a) of FOIA4 allows a person whose FOIA request has been denied to\nseek review of that denial with the Public Access Counselor.  However, section 9.5(b) of FOIA 5\ncreates an exception, providing that a \"person whose request to inspect or copy a public record is\nmade for a commercial purpose as defined in subsection ( c -10) of Section 2 of this Act may not\nfile a request for review with the Public Access Counselor.\" 6 Under the plain language of this\nprovision, the Public Access Counselor's review process is not available to a person whose\nrequest was made for a commercial purpose. \n\nAlthough it does not appear that Mr. Dailey marked the FOIA request to the\n\nOffice as hav ing a commercial purpose,  the request was submitted on behalf of AHEAD,  which\nprovides commercial services in Illinois .7 Your confirmation that the request is for a bid protest\ndemonstrates the commercial nature of the request.  The Public Access Bureau has determined\nthat a request for the purpose of a potential bid protest is a commercial request.   See, for\nexample, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47083, issued April 4, 2017, at 2 (\" A request that\nseeks records for use in efforts to obtain a business contract has a commercial purpose.\"). \nAccordingly, section 9.5(b) of FOIA precludes this office from reviewing the substance of the\nOffice's denial.  Please note that you have the option of filing suit against the Office for\ninjunctive or declaratory relief pursuant to section 11 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/11 (West 202 2 )). \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  If you have questions,  please contact me at\n\njoshua .jones@ilag. gov or ( 773)  590 -7951.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n3E-mail from\n\nVice President,  Legal, AHEAD, to [Joshua ] Jones ( July 1 , 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n55 ILCS 140/ 9.5(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n6Section 2(c -10) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-10) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -554, \neffective January 1, 2024) defines \" commercial purpose\"  as \" the use of any part of a public record or records,  or\ninformation derived from public records, in any form for sale, resale,  or solicitation or advertisement\nfor sales or\nservices.\" \n\n7AHEAD,  https:// www.ahead. com/ ( last visited July 1, 2024 ). \n\n\fJuly 1, 2024\nPage 3\n\n81880 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Jennifer A. Winking\nAssistant General Counsel\nChief Procurement Office for General Services\n300 We st Jefferson Street,  Suite 128\nSpringfield ,  Illinois 62702\njennifer.winking@illinois.gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Emails about cancellation of a protested bid","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81880/","full_text":"July 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81880\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau has no\nauthority to take further action in this matter. \n\nOn June 10, 2024, Mr. Sean Dailey, Senior Client Director at AHEAD, submitted\na FOIA request to the Chief Procurement Office for General Services (Office) seeking copies of\ne-mails related to the decision to cancel a bid that AHEAD was awarded. On June 17, 2024, the\nOffice denied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)(f), 7(1)(h), and 7(1)(m) of FOIA, 1 and cited\nsection 8.5 for materials posted on its website.2 On June 20, 2024, this office received your\nRequest for Review contesting the Office's denial on behalf of AHEAD. When this office asked\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(f), (1)(h), (1)(m) (West 2022), as amended by Public Acts 103 -154, effective\n\nJune 30, 2023; 103-423, effective January 1, 2024; 103-462, effective August 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, \n\nyou about the purpose of the request, you stated: \" It's related to a bid cancellation, to which we\nhave filed a protest.\" 3\n\nSection 9.5(a) of FOIA4 allows a person whose FOIA request has been denied to\nseek review of that denial with the Public Access Counselor. However, section 9.5(b) of FOIA 5\ncreates an exception, providing that a \"person whose request to inspect or copy a public record is\nmade for a commercial purpose as defined in subsection (c -10) of Section 2 of this Act may not\nfile a request for review with the Public Access Counselor.\" 6 Under the plain language of this\nprovision, the Public Access Counselor's review process is not available to a person whose\nrequest was made for a commercial purpose. \n\nAlthough it does not appear that Mr. Dailey marked the FOIA request to the\n\nOffice as hav ing a commercial purpose, the request was submitted on behalf of AHEAD, which\nprovides commercial services in Illinois.7 Your confirmation that the request is for a bid protest\ndemonstrates the commercial nature of the request. The Public Access Bureau has determined\nthat a request for the purpose of a potential bid protest is a commercial request. See, for\nexample, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47083, issued April 4, 2017, at 2 (\" A request that\nseeks records for use in efforts to obtain a business contract has a commercial purpose.\"). \nAccordingly, section 9.5(b) of FOIA precludes this office from reviewing the substance of the\nOffice's denial. Please note that you have the option of filing suit against the Office for\ninjunctive or declaratory relief pursuant to section 11 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/11 (West 202 2)). \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. If you have questions, please contact me at\n\njoshua.jones@ilag. gov or (773) 590 -7951. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n3E-mail from\n\nVice President, Legal, AHEAD, to [Joshua ] Jones (July 1, 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103-069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n55 ILCS 140/ 9.5(b) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n6 Section 2(c -10) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-10) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -554, \neffective January 1, 2024) defines \" commercial purpose\" as \" the use of any part of a public record or records, or\ninformation derived from public records, in any form for sale, resale, or solicitation or advertisement\n\n81880 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Jennifer A. Winking\nAssistant General Counsel\nChief Procurement Office for General Services\n300 We st Jefferson Street, Suite 128\nSpringfield, Illinois 62702\njennifer.winking@illinois.gov"}
{"id":1069,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81922"],"title":"University of Illinois properly charged voluminous-request fee for electronic PDF file","filename":"81922, issued July 15, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1036,"summary":"The requester challenged the University of Illinois's classification of their request as 'voluminous' and the subsequent assessment of fees. The PAC determined that the University acted in accordance with FOIA in designating the request as voluminous and charging the associated fees.","plain_summary":"This determination addresses whether a public body properly charged fees under FOIA's voluminous-request provisions. The Public Access Bureau held that the University of Illinois properly designated the request as voluminous under 5 ILCS 140/2(h) and 3.6(a), because the requester had submitted more than five categories of records requests within twenty business days, and that the $20 fee charged under 5 ILCS 140/6(a-5) for the resulting electronic file was proper. The reasoning establishes that once a request qualifies as voluminous, a public body may charge the statutory fee for the data size of the responsive electronic file regardless of whether it is produced in PDF or another format, since the fee schedule applies similarly to both. The Bureau found the Request for Review unfounded and closed the matter without ordering any relief.","holding":"A public body may lawfully charge the fee authorized under 5 ILCS 140/6(a-5) for a properly designated voluminous request, regardless of whether the responsive electronic file is provided in PDF or another format, because the statute permits comparable fees for both.","legal_question":"Whether the University of Illinois properly designated a FOIA request as 'voluminous' and assessed fees pursuant to 5 ILCS 140/3.6.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3.6","5 ILCS 140/6"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"University of Illinois","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"fees","subject_description":"The requester sought writer reviews from the UIUC Writers Workshop and disputed the University's voluminous request designation and fee assessment.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":98.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/6/6_a-5/81922%2C%20issued%20July%2015%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["voluminous request","FOIA fees","University of Illinois","records request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"July 15, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81922;  FOIA 24-811\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  this office has determined that your\nRequest for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn May 15, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the University of Illinois\nfor the spring 2024 semester at\n\nUniversity)  seeking \" all writer reviews of\nUIUC Writers Workshop[.]\" 2 On May 22, 2024,  the University informed you that it designated\nyour request as \" voluminous\"  pursuant to section 3.6 of FOIA. 3 The University notified you that\nyou had ten business days to amend your request such that it would no longer be a voluminous\nrequest.   It also stated: \n\nIf you do not respond by this date,  or if you do respond but your\nrequest continues to be a voluminous request,  the University will\nproceed in processing this request and will impose any fees\nallowable pursuant to Section 6 of the Act (5 ILCS 140/ 6). Even if\nyou fail to accept or collect the responsive records,  the University\nmay still charge you for the response pursuant to Section 6 of the\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto [ University of Illinois FOIA] ( May 15, 2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/3.6 (West 2022). \n\n\fJuly 15, 2024\nPage 2\n\nAct and your failure to pay will be considered a debt due and\nowing to the University and may be collected in accordance with\napplicable law.[ 4] \n\nOn June 23, 2024,  the University informed you that it had located information responsive to your\nrequest and that the fees,  pursuant to section 6(a-5) of FOIA, 5 totaled $ 20.00.  On June 25, 2024, \nthis office received your Request for Review challenging the fees. \n\nSection 3.6(a)  of FOIA governs \" voluminous requests.\" 6 Section 2(h) of FOIA 7\n\ndefines \" voluminous request\"  as a request that: \n\ni) includes more than 5 individual requests for more than 5\n\ndifferent categories of records or a combination of individual\nrequests that total requests for more than 5 different categories\nof records in a period of 20 business days;  or\n\nii) requires the compilation of more than 500 letter or\n\nlegal- sized pages of public records unless a single requested record\nexceeds 500 pages. \" Single requested record\"  may include,  but is\nnot limited to, one report,  form, e-mail, letter,  memorandum,  book, \nmap,  microfilm,  tape, or recording.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nUpon this office' s request,  the University provided the Public Access Bureau with\n\ntracking the 60 FOIA requests you made between April 22, 2024,  and\n\na copy of a spreadsheet\nMay 15, 2024.   This office' s review of the spreadsheet confirmed that you have submitted\nrequests for more than 5 different categories of records in a period of less than 20 business days.  \nBecause your request is voluminous,  the University may charge fees pursuant to section 6(a-5) of\nFOIA,  which states: \n\nIf a voluminous request is for electronic records and\nformat ( PDF), \n\nthose records are not in a portable document\nthe public body may charge up to $20 for not more than 2\nmegabytes of data,  up to $40 for more than 2 but not more\nthan 4 megabytes of data, and up to $100 for more than 4\nmegabytes of data.   If a voluminous request is for electronic\n\nRecords Officer,  to\n\nMay 22, 2024),  at [ 1]. \n\n4Letter from Adrienne Nazon,  Vice President,  External Relations and Communications and Chief\n\n55 ILCS 140/6(a-5) (West 2022). \n\n65 ILCS 140/3.6(a) ( West 2022). \n\n75 ILCS 140/2(h) (West 2022). \n\n\fJuly 15, 2024\nPage 3\n\nrecords and those records are in a portable document format,  the\npublic body may charge up to $20 for not more than 80 megabytes\nof data, up to $40 for more than 80 megabytes but not more than\n160 megabytes of data, and up to $100 for more than 160\nmegabytes of data.  If the responsive electronic records are in both\na portable document format and not in a portable document format, \nthe public body may separate the fees and charge the requester\nunder both fee scales. \n\nIf a public body imposes a fee pursuant to this subsection\n\na-5), it must provide the requester with an accounting of all fees, \ncosts,  and personnel hours in connection with the request for\npublic records. ( Emphasis added.) \n\nThe University informed this office that the CSV file responsive to your request is\n\n12 kilobytes,  or 0.012 megabytes.   Accordingly,  because the file is not a PDF and is less than 2\nmegabytes,  the University may charge you $20.00.  You appear to assert that the University\ncannot charge fees for the CSV file because the information also exists in PDF.  To the contrary, \nas quoted above,  the University may also charge fees for PDFs pursuant to section 6(a-5), up to\n20.00 for a PDF not larger than 80 megabytes.   In other words,  the cost would be the same\nwhether the University provided the file in CSV or PDF.  Accordingly,  the Public Access Bureau\nhas determined that the University' s fees are proper and that your Request for Review is\nunfounded.   Please note that section 3.6(e)  of FOIA states: \n\nIf a requester does not pay a fee charged pursuant to Section 6 of\nthis Act for a voluminous request,  the debt shall be considered a\ndebt due and owing to the public body and may be collected in\naccordance with applicable law. This fee may be charged by the\npublic body even if the requester fails to accept or collect records\nthe public body has prepared in response to a voluminous request.  \n5 ILCS 140/ 3.6(e) ( West 2022). \n\nThis matter is closed.   Please contact me at laura. harter@ilag. gov if you have any\n\nquestions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81922 f unf univ\n\n\fJuly 15, 2024\nPage 4\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nVice President,  External Relations and Communications\nand Chief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n108 Henry Administration Building,  MC370\n506 South Wright Street\nUrbana,  Illinois 61801\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Writer reviews from a university","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81922/","full_text":"July 15, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81922; FOIA 24-811\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, this office has determined that your\nRequest for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn May 15, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the University of Illinois\nfor the spring 2024 semester at\n\nUniversity) seeking \" all writer reviews of\nUIUC Writers Workshop[.]\" 2 On May 22, 2024, the University informed you that it designated\nyour request as \" voluminous\" pursuant to section 3.6 of FOIA. 3 The University notified you that\nyou had ten business days to amend your request such that it would no longer be a voluminous\nrequest. It also stated: \n\nIf you do not respond by this date, or if you do respond but your\nrequest continues to be a voluminous request, the University will\nproceed in processing this request and will impose any fees\nallowable pursuant to Section 6 of the Act (5 ILCS 140/ 6). Even if\nyou fail to accept or collect the responsive records, the University\nmay still charge you for the response pursuant to Section 6 of the\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\nAct and your failure to pay will be considered a debt due and\nowing to the University and may be collected in accordance with\napplicable law.[ 4] \n\nOn June 23, 2024, the University informed you that it had located information responsive to your\nrequest and that the fees, pursuant to section 6(a-5) of FOIA, 5 totaled $ 20.00. On June 25, 2024, \nthis office received your Request for Review challenging the fees. \n\nSection 3.6(a) of FOIA governs \" voluminous requests.\" 6 Section 2(h) of FOIA 7\n\ndefines \" voluminous request\" as a request that: \n\ni) includes more than 5 individual requests for more than 5\n\ndifferent categories of records or a combination of individual\nrequests that total requests for more than 5 different categories\nof records in a period of 20 business days; or\n\nii) requires the compilation of more than 500 letter or\n\nlegal- sized pages of public records unless a single requested record\nexceeds 500 pages. \" Single requested record\" may include, but is\nnot limited to, one report, form, e-mail, letter, memorandum, book, \nmap, microfilm, tape, or recording. (Emphasis added.) \n\nUpon this office's request, the University provided the Public Access Bureau with\n\ntracking the 60 FOIA requests you made between April 22, 2024, and\n\na copy of a spreadsheet\nMay 15, 2024. This office's review of the spreadsheet confirmed that you have submitted\nrequests for more than 5 different categories of records in a period of less than 20 business days. \nBecause your request is voluminous, the University may charge fees pursuant to section 6(a-5) of\nFOIA, which states: \n\nIf a voluminous request is for electronic records and\nformat (PDF), \n\nthose records are not in a portable document\nthe public body may charge up to $20 for not more than 2\nmegabytes of data, up to $40 for more than 2 but not more\nthan 4 megabytes of data, and up to $100 for more than 4\nmegabytes of data. If a voluminous request is for electronic\n\nRecords Officer, to\n\nMay 22, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n4 Letter from Adrienne Nazon, Vice President, External Relations and Communications and Chief\n\nrecords and those records are in a portable document format, the\npublic body may charge up to $20 for not more than 80 megabytes\nof data, up to $40 for more than 80 megabytes but not more than\n160 megabytes of data, and up to $100 for more than 160\nmegabytes of data. If the responsive electronic records are in both\na portable document format and not in a portable document format, \nthe public body may separate the fees and charge the requester\nunder both fee scales. \n\nIf a public body imposes a fee pursuant to this subsection\n\na-5), it must provide the requester with an accounting of all fees, \ncosts, and personnel hours in connection with the request for\npublic records. (Emphasis added.) \n\nThe University informed this office that the CSV file responsive to your request is\n\n12 kilobytes, or 0.012 megabytes. Accordingly, because the file is not a PDF and is less than 2\nmegabytes, the University may charge you $20.00. You appear to assert that the University\ncannot charge fees for the CSV file because the information also exists in PDF. To the contrary, \nas quoted above, the University may also charge fees for PDFs pursuant to section 6(a-5), up to\n20.00 for a PDF not larger than 80 megabytes. In other words, the cost would be the same\nwhether the University provided the file in CSV or PDF. Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau\nhas determined that the University's fees are proper and that your Request for Review is\nunfounded. Please note that section 3.6(e) of FOIA states: \n\nIf a requester does not pay a fee charged pursuant to Section 6 of\nthis Act for a voluminous request, the debt shall be considered a\ndebt due and owing to the public body and may be collected in\naccordance with applicable law. This fee may be charged by the\npublic body even if the requester fails to accept or collect records\nthe public body has prepared in response to a voluminous request. \n5 ILCS 140/ 3.6(e) (West 2022). \n\nThis matter is closed. Please contact me at laura. harter@ilag. gov if you have any\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nVice President, External Relations and Communications\nand Chief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n108 Henry Administration Building, MC370\n506 South Wright Street\nUrbana, Illinois 61801\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu"}
{"id":1070,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81942"],"title":"University of Illinois not required to create records to explain staffing limits","filename":"81942, issued July 1, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":836,"summary":"The requester sought records from the University of Illinois regarding its FOIA staffing and resource capacity, but the PAC determined that the request sought calculations and explanations rather than existing records.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the University of Illinois for data and calculations to prove their claim that they lacked the resources to fulfill a previous FOIA request. The Attorney General's office closed the case, explaining that FOIA only requires agencies to provide existing documents, not to create new reports, perform calculations, or explain their internal staffing decisions.","holding":"The PAC determined that no further action is warranted because the request sought information that does not exist in the form of public records.","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required under FOIA to create new records or perform calculations to explain its internal resource limitations.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"University of Illinois","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action warranted","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOIA compliance","subject_description":"The requester sought records quantifying the University's FOIA personnel and resources to challenge a previous denial based on undue burden.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Doesnt-Identify/81942%2C%20issued%20July%201%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA request","undue burden","records creation","University of Illinois"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nJuly 1,  2024\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81942;  University no.  24 -962\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1,  2024 ).  For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter . \n\nOn June 18 , 2024 , you submitted a FOIA request to the University of Illinois\n\nUniversity ) asking: \n\nThe University]  discontinued a public records search in\nresponding to a FOIA 24 -889 request. [ The University]  stated, \nDue to workloads affiliated with the primary duties of University\nstaff and limited FOIA personnel and resources, the amount of\ntime that would be required to complete this request would\nsubstantially interfere with the normal conduct of public business.\" \n\nI respectfully request electronic copies of the following University\nof Illinois (UI) records: \n\n1.  Records that quantify and corroborate what UI\ncharacterized as limited FOIA personnel; \n2.  Records that quantify and corroborate what UI\ncharacterized as limited FOIA resources; \n\n3.  Names and titles of UI personnel who are tasked with\n\npresent- day FOIA- related duties;  and\n\n500 South Second Street,  Springfield,  Illinois 62701 • ( 217)  782-1090 •  TTY: (877) 844-5461 •  Fax: ( 217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street,  Chicago,  Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814 -3000 •  TTY: (800) 964-3013 •  Fax: ( 312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave.,  Carbondale,  Illinois 62901 • ( 618)  529 -6400 •  TTY: ( 877)  675- 9339 •  Fax: ( 618)  529-6416\n\n\fJuly 1,  2024\nPage 2\n\n4.  Hours devoted, respectively, by UI personnel tasked with\n\npresent- day FOIA- related duties.[ 1] \n\nOn June 23, 2024,  University responded by listing its FOIA personnel and\n\nproviding copies of certain job description and appointment records pertaining to them.  The\nUniversity stated that it located no records responsive to parts one, two, and four of your request.   \n\nIn your Request for Review,  submitted June 25 , 2024,  you explain that because\nyou question whether the University is allocating appropriate resources to FOIA,  you want the\nUniversity to  \"disclose present-day records that quantify times and monies allocated to\nrespective [University ] personnel dedicated to the fulfillment of [ the University's]  obligation to\naccommodate public records requests.\" 2\n\nFOIA applies to requests for existing public records.   5 ILCS 140/ 3( a) ( West\n\n2022 ) (\"Each public body shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public\nrecords, except as otherwise provided in Sections 7 and 8.5 of this Act.\").  FOIA defines \"public\nrecords\" as \"all records  * * *  having been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, \nreceived by,  in the possession of,  or under the control of any public body.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 2( c) \nWest 202 2),  as amended by Public Act 103 -554,  effective January 1,  2024 .  A FOIA request\nmust reasonably identify a public record and not general data,  information,  or statistics.\"  \nChicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation , 2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, ¶ 33.  Moreover, a public body is not required to answer questions or generate new\nrecords in response to a FOIA request.  Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989).   \n\nHere,  in asking the University to \" quantify and corroborate\"  particular\n\ncharacterizations about staffing and resources, you sought explanations rather than copies of\nexisting public records.  Thus, although you couched the first two parts of your request as\nseeking records, the rest of those two parts asked the University to set forth evidence and\njustification s.   Granting such a request would require the University to do more than what FOIA\ndemands, which is simply to provide copies of the public records in its possession that are\nreasonably described in a FOIA request.  Similarly, your request for hours devoted to FOIA -\nrelated duties by each staff member who has FOIA responsibilities does not reasonably identify\npublic records, as it instead seeks calculations, explanations, and /or sums that do not appear to be\nset f orth in any existing public rec ords in the University ' s possession .   Accordingly,  the Public\nAccess Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\n1E- mail from njs to FOIA professional ( June 18, 2024). \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Illinois Attorney General, Public Access Counselor ( PAC) \n\nJune 25 , 2024). \n\n\fJuly 1,  2024\nPage 3\n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\njoshua .jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81942 f no fi war univ\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs.  Adrienne Nazon\nVice President, External Relations and Communications\n\nand Chief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n108 Henry Administration Building,  MC370\n506 South Wright Street\nUrbana, Illinois 61801\nc/o sullard@uillinois.edu\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A university's FOIA personnel and resource records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81942/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nJuly 1, 2024\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81942; University no. 24 -962\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn June 18, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the University of Illinois\n\nUniversity) asking: \n\nThe University] discontinued a public records search in\nresponding to a FOIA 24 -889 request. [ The University] stated, \nDue to workloads affiliated with the primary duties of University\nstaff and limited FOIA personnel and resources, the amount of\ntime that would be required to complete this request would\nsubstantially interfere with the normal conduct of public business.\" \n\nI respectfully request electronic copies of the following University\nof Illinois (UI) records: \n\n1. Records that quantify and corroborate what UI\ncharacterized as limited FOIA personnel; \n2. Records that quantify and corroborate what UI\ncharacterized as limited FOIA resources; \n\n3. Names and titles of UI personnel who are tasked with\n\npresent- day FOIA- related duties; and\n\n4. Hours devoted, respectively, by UI personnel tasked with\n\npresent- day FOIA- related duties.[ 1] \n\nOn June 23, 2024, University responded by listing its FOIA personnel and\n\nproviding copies of certain job description and appointment records pertaining to them. The\nUniversity stated that it located no records responsive to parts one, two, and four of your request. \n\nIn your Request for Review, submitted June 25, 2024, you explain that because\nyou question whether the University is allocating appropriate resources to FOIA, you want the\nUniversity to \"disclose present-day records that quantify times and monies allocated to\nrespective [University ] personnel dedicated to the fulfillment of [ the University's] obligation to\naccommodate public records requests.\" 2\n\nFOIA applies to requests for existing public records. 5 ILCS 140/ 3(a) (West\n\n2022) (\"Each public body shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public\nrecords, except as otherwise provided in Sections 7 and 8.5 of this Act.\"). FOIA defines \"public\nrecords\" as \"all records * * * having been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, \nreceived by, in the possession of, or under the control of any public body.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) \nWest 202 2), as amended by Public Act 103 -554, effective January 1, 2024. A FOIA request\nmust reasonably identify a public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\" \nChicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) \n130427, ¶ 33. Moreover, a public body is not required to answer questions or generate new\nrecords in response to a FOIA request. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\nHere, in asking the University to \" quantify and corroborate\" particular\n\ncharacterizations about staffing and resources, you sought explanations rather than copies of\nexisting public records. Thus, although you couched the first two parts of your request as\nseeking records, the rest of those two parts asked the University to set forth evidence and\njustification s. Granting such a request would require the University to do more than what FOIA\ndemands, which is simply to provide copies of the public records in its possession that are\nreasonably described in a FOIA request. Similarly, your request for hours devoted to FOIA -\nrelated duties by each staff member who has FOIA responsibilities does not reasonably identify\npublic records, as it instead seeks calculations, explanations, and /or sums that do not appear to be\nset f orth in any existing public rec ords in the University ' s possession. Accordingly, the Public\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\njoshua.jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81942 f no fi war univ\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\nVice President, External Relations and Communications\n\nand Chief Records Officer\nUniversity of Illinois System\n108 Henry Administration Building, MC370\n506 South Wright Street\nUrbana, Illinois 61801\nc/o sullard@uillinois.edu"}
{"id":1071,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-08-02","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["81969"],"title":"City of Chicago Mayor’s Office properly withheld deliberative emails under 7(1)(f)","filename":"81969, issued August 2, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1296,"summary":"Mr. Mick Dumke of Block Club Chicago challenged the City of Chicago's redactions of emails regarding a property development project, and the PAC determined the City properly withheld the records under the deliberative process exemption.","plain_summary":"This determination addresses whether the City of the requester Office of the Mayor properly withheld portions of e-mails under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f)) as predecisional, deliberative material. The Public Access Bureau held that the Mayor's Office did not improperly deny the request, because its confidential review confirmed the withheld draft presentation and meeting notes concerning a redevelopment project were predecisional and deliberative when created. The Bureau explained that, unlike section 7(1)(r), section 7(1)(f) contains no time limit tied to whether a project or policy is later adopted, completed, or abandoned, so the exemption can continue to apply despite the passage of time or changed circumstances. The Bureau concluded no binding opinion was required and closed the file.","holding":"Records that were predecisional and deliberative when prepared remain exempt under 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) regardless of whether the underlying policy or project is later adopted, completed, or terminated, because unlike section 7(1)(r), section 7(1)(f) contains no such time limitation.","legal_question":"Whether the City of Chicago properly applied the deliberative process exemption (Section 7(1)(f)) to withhold internal emails and notes regarding a property development project.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)","7(1)(f)","7(1)(kk)"],"public_body":"City of Chicago Office of the Mayor","requesting_party":"Mr. Mick Dumke, Block Club Chicago","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(f)","subject_description":"The records concern internal communications, presentations, and notes regarding a property development project at 39th and State in Chicago.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/81969%2C%20issued%20August%202%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["deliberative process","email redaction","predecisional","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"August 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Mick Dumke\nInvestigative Editor\nBlock Club Chicago\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmick@blockclubchi.org\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Hibo Aden\nFOIA Officer\nOffice of the Mayor\nCity of Chicago\n21 North LaSalle Street,  4th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60602\nhibo. aden@cityofchicago. org\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 81969\n\nDear Mr. Dumke and Ms. Aden: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).  For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the City of Chicago Office of the Mayor ( Mayor' s\nOffice) did not improperly deny Mr. Mick Dumke's June 24, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Mr. Dumke, on behalf of Block Club Chicago, submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest to the Mayor' s Office seeking copies of certain e- mails specified in a log of e-mails\nattached to Mr. Dumke's request.  On June 27, 2024, the Mayor's Office provided Mr. Dumke\nwith responsive records with redactions pursuant to sections 7(1)( b),  7(1)( c),  7(1)( f), and\n7(1)(kk) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(f), (1)(kk) (West 2022), as amended by Public\n\n\fMr. Mick Dumke\nMs. Hibo Aden\nAugust 2, 2024\nPage 2\n\nActs 103- 154,  effective June 30, 2023;  103- 423,  effective January 1, 2024;  103- 462,  effective\nAugust 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, effective January 1, 2024; 103-554, \neffective January 1, 2024).   On July 1, 2024,  this office received Mr. Dumke' s complete Request\nfor Review contesting the redactions.  In particular, he challenged the redactions in an e-mail\nsent on February 27, 2023,  by Samir Mayekar,  a then- city official,  concerning a property at 39th\nand State in Chicago and related materials. Those records were redacted pursuant to section\n7(1)( f) of FOIA. \n\nOn July 11, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Mayor' s\n\nOffice and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for our confidential\nreview,  together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for its denial.   On July\n24, 2024, this office received the Mayor's Office's response.  One July 25, 2024, this office\nforwarded a copy of the response to Mr. Dumke;  he replied on that same date. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA,  all public records in the possession or custody of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body\nhas the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts,  notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\"  The\nsection 7(1)( f) exemption applies to \" inter-  and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\"  Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003).  The exemption is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\"   Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248. \n\nIn its response to this office, the Mayor's Office stated that the withheld material\nconsists of a draft presentation for the INVEST South West Bronzeville project,  as well as notes\nfrom a meeting regarding that project.  The Mayor's Office stated that these materials were\nshared only with officials and employees within the City of Chicago and Chicago Housing\nAuthority.  The Mayor's Office argued: \n\nThese records are preliminary and frank discussions in which\nopinions are expressed and policies and actions are formulated. \nThey are part of the process by which governmental decisions and\n\n\fMr. Mick Dumke\nMs. Hibo Aden\nAugust 2, 2024\nPage 3\n\npolicies are formulated.  The redacted materials are thus exempt\nfrom production under Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA and the relevant\ncase law.  Additionally,  because the redactions contain frank\ndiscussions of policy matters, it is necessary to redact the records\nto encourage City employees to feel free to express their honest\nopinions.[1] \n\nIn his reply, Mr. Dumke argued:  \" Even if some of these records once met the\ndefinition of 'deliberative'  or 'pre- decisional,'  it doesn' t mean they should be exempt forever.\" 2\nMr. Dumke cited an alderman's statement that portions of the project at issue did not bear fruit\nand argued \" Section 7 of the FOIA exempts ' The records,  documents,  and information relating to\nreal estate purchase negotiations until those negotiations have been completed or otherwise\nterminated.'\" 3  ( Emphasis in original.) \n\nThe language cited by Mr. Dumke appears in section 7(1)( r) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS\n140/7(1)(r) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024), \nwhich exempts from disclosure \"[ t]he records,  documents,  and information relating to real estate\npurchase negotiations until those negotiations have been completed or otherwise terminated.\"   \n\nWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing body \"may\n\nnot depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions,  limitations,  or\nconditions that the legislature did not express.\"   Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial and\nProfessional Regulation,  2014 IL 116023.   Unlike the 7(1)( r) exemption,  section 7(1)( f) contains\nno limitation relating to the completion or termination of the issue or project underlying the\nexempted records.   \n\nAccordingly,  this office has previously determined that the section 7(1)( f) \nexemption continues to apply even when a policy proposal contained within records is not\nadopted.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 75506,  issued July 20, 2023,  at 4 (\"[ C] onstruing\nthe scope of section 7(1)(f) as excluding recommendations that are not adopted as agency policy\nwould discourage the type of candid predecisional communications that the exemption is\nintended to protect.\").   See also Dumke v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 121668, ¶ 15 (\" The\ndeliberative process privilege exemption of the federal statute requires disclosure of\n\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau (July 24, 2024), at [3]. \n\n1Letter from Hibo Aden, FOIA Officer, Office of the Mayor, to Ben Silver, Assistant Attorney\n\n2E- mail from Mick Dumke, Investigative Editor, Block Club Chicago, to Benjamin Silver, \n\nAssistant Attorney General], [ Public Access Bureau] ( July 25, 2024). \n\n3E- mail from Mick Dumke, Investigative Editor, Block Club Chicago,  to Benjamin Silver, \n\nAssistant Attorney General], [ Public Access Bureau] ( July 25, 2024). \n\n\fr. Mick Dumke\nMs. Hibo Aden\nAugust 2, 2024\nPage 4\n\npredecisional material once it has been adopted or incorporated by an agency.   Illinois has no\nsuch limitation dealing with whether the communication was incorporated in the final\ndecision.\"). \n\nThis office' s confidential review of the contested records confirmed that they are\n\npredecisional and deliberative in nature.  The withheld presentation and notes reflect the\ndecision- making processes of the Mayor' s Office and other City of Chicago departments and\nshow the agencies formulating action on the project.  Because the records were predecisional at\nthe time they were prepared,  they constitute predecisional deliberative material despite the\npassage of time and changing circumstances.  Accordingly, the Mayor's Office did not\nimproperly withhold these records pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( f) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or ( 773)  590- 7878.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81969 f 71f proper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Internal communications on a property development project","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-81969/","full_text":"August 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Mick Dumke\nInvestigative Editor\nBlock Club Chicago\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmick@blockclubchi.org\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Hibo Aden\nFOIA Officer\nOffice of the Mayor\nCity of Chicago\n21 North LaSalle Street, 4th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60602\nhibo. aden@cityofchicago. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 81969\n\nDear Mr. Dumke and Ms. Aden: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the City of Chicago Office of the Mayor (Mayor's\nOffice) did not improperly deny Mr. Mick Dumke's June 24, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Mr. Dumke, on behalf of Block Club Chicago, submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest to the Mayor's Office seeking copies of certain e- mails specified in a log of e-mails\nattached to Mr. Dumke's request. On June 27, 2024, the Mayor's Office provided Mr. Dumke\nwith responsive records with redactions pursuant to sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), 7(1)(f), and\n7(1)(kk) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(f), (1)(kk) (West 2022), as amended by Public\n\nActs 103- 154, effective June 30, 2023; 103- 423, effective January 1, 2024; 103- 462, effective\nAugust 4, 2023; 103-446, effective August 4, 2023; 103-540, effective January 1, 2024; 103-554, \neffective January 1, 2024). On July 1, 2024, this office received Mr. Dumke's complete Request\nfor Review contesting the redactions. In particular, he challenged the redactions in an e-mail\nsent on February 27, 2023, by Samir Mayekar, a then- city official, concerning a property at 39th\nand State in Chicago and related materials. Those records were redacted pursuant to section\n7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nOn July 11, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Mayor's\n\nOffice and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for our confidential\nreview, together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for its denial. On July\n24, 2024, this office received the Mayor's Office's response. One July 25, 2024, this office\nforwarded a copy of the response to Mr. Dumke; he replied on that same date. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder FOIA, all public records in the possession or custody of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body\nhas the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts, notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" The\nsection 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003). The exemption is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248. \n\nIn its response to this office, the Mayor's Office stated that the withheld material\nconsists of a draft presentation for the INVEST South West Bronzeville project, as well as notes\nfrom a meeting regarding that project. The Mayor's Office stated that these materials were\nshared only with officials and employees within the City of Chicago and Chicago Housing\n\npolicies are formulated. The redacted materials are thus exempt\nfrom production under Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA and the relevant\ncase law. Additionally, because the redactions contain frank\ndiscussions of policy matters, it is necessary to redact the records\nto encourage City employees to feel free to express their honest\nopinions.[1] \n\nIn his reply, Mr. Dumke argued: \" Even if some of these records once met the\ndefinition of 'deliberative' or 'pre- decisional,' it doesn' t mean they should be exempt forever.\" 2\nMr. Dumke cited an alderman's statement that portions of the project at issue did not bear fruit\nand argued \" Section 7 of the FOIA exempts ' The records, documents, and information relating to\nreal estate purchase negotiations until those negotiations have been completed or otherwise\nterminated.'\" 3 (Emphasis in original.) \n\nThe language cited by Mr. Dumke appears in section 7(1)(r) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/7(1)(r) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024), \nwhich exempts from disclosure \"[ t]he records, documents, and information relating to real estate\npurchase negotiations until those negotiations have been completed or otherwise terminated.\" \n\nWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing body \"may\n\nnot depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or\nconditions that the legislature did not express.\" Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial and\nProfessional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023. Unlike the 7(1)(r) exemption, section 7(1)(f) contains\nno limitation relating to the completion or termination of the issue or project underlying the\nexempted records. \n\nAccordingly, this office has previously determined that the section 7(1)(f) \nexemption continues to apply even when a policy proposal contained within records is not\nadopted. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 75506, issued July 20, 2023, at 4 (\"[ C] onstruing\nthe scope of section 7(1)(f) as excluding recommendations that are not adopted as agency policy\nwould discourage the type of candid predecisional communications that the exemption is\nintended to protect.\"). See also Dumke v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 121668, ¶ 15 (\" The\ndeliberative process privilege exemption of the federal statute requires disclosure of\n\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau (July 24, 2024), at [3]. \n\n1 Letter from Hibo Aden, FOIA Officer, Office of the Mayor, to Ben Silver, Assistant Attorney\n\npredecisional material once it has been adopted or incorporated by an agency. Illinois has no\nsuch limitation dealing with whether the communication was incorporated in the final\ndecision.\"). \n\nThis office's confidential review of the contested records confirmed that they are\n\npredecisional and deliberative in nature. The withheld presentation and notes reflect the\ndecision- making processes of the Mayor's Office and other City of Chicago departments and\nshow the agencies formulating action on the project. Because the records were predecisional at\nthe time they were prepared, they constitute predecisional deliberative material despite the\npassage of time and changing circumstances. Accordingly, the Mayor's Office did not\nimproperly withhold these records pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773) 590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n81969 f 71f proper mun"}
{"id":1072,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-11","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82064"],"title":"Peoria Police Department did not violate FOIA for nonexistent records","filename":"82064, issued July 11, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":598,"summary":"The requester sought data regarding the number of police officers using body cameras on a specific date, and the PAC determined that the Peoria Police Department properly responded that it did not possess responsive records.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked the Peoria Police Department for a specific count of officers using body cameras on a date two years ago. The Department stated it had no such records, and the PAC agreed, noting that FOIA does not require a public body to create new data or perform calculations to answer a request. Consequently, the PAC closed the file with no further action required.","holding":"The Peoria Police Department did not violate FOIA because it does not possess the specific records requested and is not required to create new records or perform calculations to satisfy a request.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates FOIA by failing to provide records that do not exist or by refusing to create new records to satisfy a request.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Peoria Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No further action warranted","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records existence","subject_description":"The requester sought statistical data regarding the daily usage of body cameras by police officers on a specific historical date.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Doesnt-Identify/82064%2C%20issued%20July%2011%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","records creation","non-existent records","police data"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"July 11, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82064;  City no. 2024- 2886\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024).   For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn July 1, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Peoria Police Department\n\nDepartment)  via the City of Peoria' s FOIA portal seeking \" the records that reflect the number of\nofficer [ sic]  that were using body camera on 7/1/2022 please include graph and all data that exist\non this matter please include all patrol officers[.]\" 1 On July 8, 2024,  the Department responded\nthat it \"does not possess any documents or records responsive to your request.\" 2 That same day, \nyou submitted the above- referenced Request for Review.   In correspondence to the Department, \nyou argued:  \" This does not satisfy my request every police department' s [ sic]  has some type of\nstats that reflect the department use of body camera your own general directive order state\nthis[.]\" 3\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to requests for \"public records,\"  which are\n\nrecords \" having been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the\n\n1FOIA portal message from [\n\nto Peoria [ Polic Department] ( July 1, 2024).  \n\n2E- mail from Rebecca Boland,  Records Administrator,  Peoria Police Department,  to\n\nJuly 8, 2024).   \n\n3E- mail from\n\nto [Rebecca Boland] ( July 8, 2024).  \n\n\fJuly 11, 2024\nPage 2\n\npossession of, or under the control of any public body.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) (West 2022).  \" A\nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \ninformation,  or statistics.\"   Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial &  Professional\nRegulation,  2014 IL App ( 4th) 130427, ¶  33 (concluding that an agency was not required to\ncalculate the number of claims against certain physicians in response to a request for the number\nof claims).   Thus,  a public body is not required to answer questions or generate new records in\nresponse to a FOIA request.   Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\nRather than reasonably describing records,  your request sought general data about\n\nthe number of officers using body cameras on a specific date two years ago.   The Department\nstated that it does not possess records reflecting that number,  and your Request for Review does\nnot indicate why it would;  the available information does not suggest that the Department would\npossess a daily count of officers with body cameras as of July 1, 2022.   FOIA does not require\nto calculate that number,  nor generate a graph and/ or data with respect to that\nthe Department\nnumber.   Although the Department may possess some statistics concerning its use of body\ncameras,  there is no indication that it possesses the specific statistics you requested,  and the\nDepartment was not required to provide statistics you did not request.   Accordingly,  this office\nhas determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82064 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rebecca Boland\nRecords Administrator\nPeoria Police Department\n600 SW Adams Street\nPeoria,  Illinois 61602\nrboland@peoriacounty. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police daily body-camera usage statistics for a specific date","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82064/","full_text":"July 11, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82064; City no. 2024- 2886\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn July 1, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Peoria Police Department\n\nDepartment) via the City of Peoria's FOIA portal seeking \" the records that reflect the number of\nofficer [ sic] that were using body camera on 7/1/2022 please include graph and all data that exist\non this matter please include all patrol officers[.]\" 1 On July 8, 2024, the Department responded\nthat it \"does not possess any documents or records responsive to your request.\" 2 That same day, \nyou submitted the above- referenced Request for Review. In correspondence to the Department, \nyou argued: \" This does not satisfy my request every police department's [ sic] has some type of\nstats that reflect the department use of body camera your own general directive order state\nthis[.]\" 3\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to requests for \"public records,\" which are\n\nrecords \" having been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the\n\npossession of, or under the control of any public body.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) (West 2022). \" A\nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \ninformation, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional\nRegulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33 (concluding that an agency was not required to\ncalculate the number of claims against certain physicians in response to a request for the number\nof claims). Thus, a public body is not required to answer questions or generate new records in\nresponse to a FOIA request. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\nRather than reasonably describing records, your request sought general data about\n\nthe number of officers using body cameras on a specific date two years ago. The Department\nstated that it does not possess records reflecting that number, and your Request for Review does\nnot indicate why it would; the available information does not suggest that the Department would\npossess a daily count of officers with body cameras as of July 1, 2022. FOIA does not require\nto calculate that number, nor generate a graph and/ or data with respect to that\nthe Department\nnumber. Although the Department may possess some statistics concerning its use of body\ncameras, there is no indication that it possesses the specific statistics you requested, and the\nDepartment was not required to provide statistics you did not request. Accordingly, this office\nhas determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82064 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rebecca Boland\nRecords Administrator\nPeoria Police Department\n600 SW Adams Street\nPeoria, Illinois 61602\nrboland@peoriacounty. org"}
{"id":1073,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-07-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82071"],"title":"PAC declines to decide Aurora Downtown's public body status due to pending litigation","filename":"82071, issued July 15, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":626,"summary":"The requester asked the PAC to determine if Aurora Downtown is a public body subject to FOIA and OMA, but the PAC declined to act because the issue is currently being litigated in court.","plain_summary":"A former board member asked the Illinois Attorney General's office to decide if the organization 'Aurora Downtown' must follow state transparency laws. The Attorney General's office declined to intervene because the same question is already being decided in a pending lawsuit. As a result, the office closed the file without making a formal determination.","holding":null,"legal_question":"Whether the Public Access Counselor should issue a determination regarding the status of an entity as a 'public body' while that issue is the subject of active litigation.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/9.5","5 ILCS 120/3.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Aurora Downtown","requesting_party":"Ms. Gina Salamone","pac_outcome":"Closed - no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body status","subject_description":"The requester sought a determination on whether Aurora Downtown qualifies as a public body subject to FOIA and OMA requirements.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/9.5/9.5_f/82071%2C%20issued%20July%2015%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","litigation","jurisdiction","transparency laws"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"July 15, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Gina Salamone\nAttorney at Law\nHuck Bouma\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ngsalamone@huckbouma.com\n\nRE:   OMA and FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82071\n\nDear Ms.  Salamone : \n\nThis letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e)  of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) \n5 ILCS 120/ 3.5( e) ( West 2022))  and section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5\nILCS 140/ 9.5( f) (West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103 -069,  effective January 1,  2024 ).  \nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau will take no further action with\nrespect to the above -referenced Request for Review. \n\nOn July 8, 2024 , you submitted this Request for Review to the Public Access\n\nBureau alleging that Aurora Downtown is out of compliance with FOIA and OMA .  You noted\nthat you are a former member of Aurora Downtown's Board of Directors, for which you took\nOMA training and responded to FOIA requests directed to the organization.  You further noted\nthat because of your activity on behalf of Aurora Downtown, you are a party to a lawsuit\nalleging, among other things, that Aurora Downtown is a public body subject to FOIA.1 In River\nBreeze,  LLC v.  Granholm ,  2022 IL App ( 2d)  210704 , ¶¶  40- 41, the Illinois Appellate Court\nvacated the lower court's dismissal of a complaint that Aurora Downtown must abide by FOIA as\n\n1The Illinois Supreme Court has declared:  \" The definition of public body is substantially identical\nin both of those statutes.   We find no reason to distinguish between the determination of a public body for purposes\nof the Open Meetings Act and the FOIA.\"  Better Government Ass' n v. Illinois High School Ass' n, 2017 IL 121124, ¶ \n25.  \n\n\fs. Gina Salamone\nJuly 15, 2024\nPage 2\n\na public body , remanding the case for a factual analysis of whether Aurora Downtown indeed\nqualifies as a public body.   You advised that the litigation remains pending on remand. \n\nBoth FOIA2 and OMA3 provide that when the requester files suit with respect to\nthe same alleged violation that is the subject of a pending Request for Review, the Public Access\nCounselor shall take no further action on the matter.  Although you did not file the lawsuit in\nquestion , your Request for Review calls upon the Public Access Bureau to perform precisely the\nsame factual analysis that the courts are currently performing in River Breeze,  LLC v. Granholm .  \nAs an exercise of discretion in deference to the court proceeding, the Public Access Bureau will\ntake no further action in this matter.4\n\nAccordingly, this letter serves to close this file.  If you have questions, please\n\ncontact me at joshua. jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82071 f and o dsc mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Brian Failing\nBoard Chair\nAurora Downtown\n43 West Galena Boulevard\nAurora,  Illinois 60506\ninfo@auroradowntown.org\n\n25 ILCS 140/ 9.5(g) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, effective January 1, 2024 . \n\n35 ILCS 120/ 3.5(f) (West 2022). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, effective January 1, 2024\nIn responding to any request under this Section 9.5, the Attorney General may exercise his or her discretion and\nchoose to resolve a request for review by mediation or by a means other than the issuance of a binding opinion .\");  5\nILCS 120/ 3.5(e) (West 2022) (\"In responding to any written request under this Section 3.5, the Attorney General\nmay exercise his or her discretion and choose to resolve a request for review by mediation or by a means other than\nthe issuance of a binding opinion.\").   \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Entity's status as a public body under FOIA and OMA","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82071/","full_text":"July 15, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Gina Salamone\nAttorney at Law\nHuck Bouma\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ngsalamone@huckbouma.com\n\nRE: OMA and FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82071\n\nDear Ms. Salamone: \n\nThis letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) \n5 ILCS 120/ 3.5(e) (West 2022)) and section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5\nILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, effective January 1, 2024). \nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau will take no further action with\nrespect to the above -referenced Request for Review. \n\nOn July 8, 2024, you submitted this Request for Review to the Public Access\n\nBureau alleging that Aurora Downtown is out of compliance with FOIA and OMA. You noted\nthat you are a former member of Aurora Downtown's Board of Directors, for which you took\nOMA training and responded to FOIA requests directed to the organization. You further noted\nthat because of your activity on behalf of Aurora Downtown, you are a party to a lawsuit\nalleging, among other things, that Aurora Downtown is a public body subject to FOIA.1 In River\nBreeze, LLC v. Granholm, 2022 IL App (2d) 210704, ¶¶ 40- 41, the Illinois Appellate Court\nvacated the lower court's dismissal of a complaint that Aurora Downtown must abide by FOIA as\n\n1 The Illinois Supreme Court has declared: \" The definition of public body is substantially identical\nin both of those statutes. We find no reason to distinguish between the determination of a public body for purposes\nof the Open Meetings Act and the FOIA.\" Better Government Ass' n v. Illinois High School Ass' n, 2017 IL 121124, ¶ \n\na public body, remanding the case for a factual analysis of whether Aurora Downtown indeed\nqualifies as a public body. You advised that the litigation remains pending on remand. \n\nBoth FOIA2 and OMA3 provide that when the requester files suit with respect to\nthe same alleged violation that is the subject of a pending Request for Review, the Public Access\nCounselor shall take no further action on the matter. Although you did not file the lawsuit in\nquestion, your Request for Review calls upon the Public Access Bureau to perform precisely the\nsame factual analysis that the courts are currently performing in River Breeze, LLC v. Granholm. \nAs an exercise of discretion in deference to the court proceeding, the Public Access Bureau will\ntake no further action in this matter.4\n\nAccordingly, this letter serves to close this file. If you have questions, please\n\ncontact me at joshua. jones@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82071 f and o dsc mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Brian Failing\nBoard Chair\nAurora Downtown\n43 West Galena Boulevard\nAurora, Illinois 60506\ninfo@auroradowntown.org\n\n25 ILCS 140/ 9.5(g) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, effective January 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 120/ 3.5(f) (West 2022). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103 -069, effective January 1, 2024\nIn responding to any request under this Section 9.5, the Attorney General may exercise his or her discretion and\nchoose to resolve a request for review by mediation or by a means other than the issuance of a binding opinion.\"); 5\nILCS 120/ 3.5(e) (West 2022) (\"In responding to any written request under this Section 3.5, the Attorney General\nmay exercise his or her discretion and choose to resolve a request for review by mediation or by a means other than\nthe issuance of a binding opinion.\")."}
{"id":1074,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-09-05","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82157"],"title":"Alton Police Department properly withheld case report under 7(1)(d)(i), must offer narrowing for remaining records","filename":"82157 , issued 090524.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2009,"summary":"The requester sought various police records related to a shooting incident, which the Alton Police Department denied in full under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(d)(iii) and (iv). The PAC determined the Department failed to properly address the request and instructed them to engage in the mandatory process for claiming an 'unduly burdensome' exemption.","plain_summary":"A requester sought police records about a shooting. The PAC found that the police department properly withheld the main case report because disclosure would interfere with an ongoing investigation, but determined that the department had not established a basis to withhold the remaining records in their entirety. The department was directed to issue a revised response explaining any undue burden and offering the requester an opportunity to narrow the request.","holding":"The Alton Police Department properly withheld the case report under section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. For other responsive records, the Department may rely on the undue burden exemption under section 3(g) after issuing a revised response that offers the requester an opportunity to narrow the request.","legal_question":"Whether the Alton Police Department properly denied a FOIA request in its entirety without first attempting to narrow the request or providing clear and convincing evidence of an undue burden.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(iii)","7(1)(d)(iv)"],"public_body":"Alton Police Department","requesting_party":"Mr. Alan Pirtle","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought various records, including police reports, body camera footage, and 911 recordings, related to a specific shooting incident.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_i/82157%20%2C%20issued%20090524.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","unduly burdensome","FOIA denial","records request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"September 5, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Alan Pirtle\nAttorney\nBrown &  Crouppen Law Firm\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nalanp@getbc. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nLieutenant Michael O'Neill\nSupport Services Commander\nAlton Police Department\n1700 East Broadway\nAlton, Illinois 62002\nmoneill@cityofaltonil. gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82157\n\nDear Mr. Pirtle and Lieutenant O'Neill: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   \n\nOn June 25, 2024,  Mr. Alan Pirtle submitted a seven- part FOIA request to the\n\nAlton Police Department ( Department)  seeking copies of records related to an incident in which\nhis client was shot: \n\nAll police reports and reconstruction reports, \nAny photographs,  depictions or videos, \nCruiser/ dash camera/ body cam videos, \nComputer Aided Dispatch ( CAD) reports, \n\n\fMr. Alan Pirtle\nLieutenant Michael O'Neill\nSeptember 5, 2024\nPage 2\n\nAny and all 911 recordings, \nWritten or otherwise recorded statements made by any\nwitnesses and/or parties or summaries of witness\nstatements made by anyone\nAny press releases issued by the Alton PD or on their\nbehalf related to the above- referenced incident.[ 1] \n\nOn July 2, 2024,  the Department denied the request in its entirety pursuant to sections 7(1)(d)(iii) \nand 7(1)(d)( iv) of FOIA. 2 On July 11, 2024,  Mr. Pirtle submitted the above- referenced Request\nfor Review contesting the Department' s denial of his request.   Mr. Pirtle asserted:  \" Alton PD did\nnot even attempt to redact the requested information but instead issued a full denial in contrary to\nthe FOIA statute.\" 3\n\nOn July 15, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nDepartment and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the requested records for this office's\nconfidential review,  along with a written explanation of the factual and legal bases for\nwithholding the records.   On July 18, 2024,  this office received a copy of the case report from\nthe Department,  as well as the Department' s confidential written response and a non-confidential\nredacted version for this office to forward to Mr. Pirtle. 4 In the Department' s non-confidential\nresponse,  the Department asserted that it also properly withheld the responsive records pursuant\nto sections 7(1)(d)( i) and 7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA. 5 Additionally,  the Department clarified that there\nwere no body camera videos from the incident.   On July 23, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy\nof the Department' s non- confidential response to Mr. Pirtle and notified him of his right to reply; \nhe did not reply.   \n\nMeanwhile,  this office followed up with the Department about obtaining copies of\n\nthe remaining responsive records for this office' s confidential review,  but the Department\nexplained that it had technical difficulties in transmitting the records because of their sheer\n\n1Letter from Alan Pirtle, Brown &  Crouppen,  P.C., to Alton Police Department,  Attn: Records\n\nJune 25, 2024). \n\neffective July 1, 2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii), (1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605,  \n\n3FOIA –  Request for Review by Public Access Counselor ( PAC)  form submitted by Alan Pirtle\n\nJuly 11, 2024).  \n\n4See 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a\n\ncopy of the answer to the person submitting the request for review, with any alleged confidential\nwhich the request pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\ninformation to\n\neffective July 1, 2024. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i), (1)(d)(vi) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605,  \n\n\fMr. Alan Pirtle\nLieutenant Michael O'Neill\nSeptember 5, 2024\nPage 3\n\nvolume.   The Department stated that the responsive digital media items comprise 214 gigabytes, \n102,717 files, and 489 folders,  which include photographs of the scene and evidence recovery, \ndash camera videos,  surveillance videos from residences and business,  911 call recordings,  press\nreleases,  photos and videos from a suspect' s phone,  and video interviews of the victim, \nwitnesses,  and suspect.   The Department asserted that if its denial of Mr. Pirtle's request was\ndetermined to be improper,  compliance with Mr. Pirtle's complete FOIA request would be\nunduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) (West 2022)). \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body \" has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed.   Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 ( 1997). \n\nSection 7(1)( d)(i) of FOIA\n\nIn its response to this office, the Department asserted that it properly withheld the\n\nresponsive records pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA.  Section 7(1)(d)( i) of FOIA exempts\nfrom disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would:  \n\ni)  interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request[.] \n\nThe classification of information as ' law enforcement'  or 'investigatory'  does not necessarily\nforeclose access unless it can be shown,  in a particular case,  that disclosure would interfere with\nlaw enforcement and would,  therefore,  not be in the public interest.\"   Baudin v. City of Crystal\nLake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 ( 1989).   Conclusory statements that the disclosure of records\nwould obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are insufficient to support the assertion of the\npending law enforcement proceeding exemption.   See Day v. City of Chicago,  388 Ill. App. 3d\n70, 74-77 (2009).   Rather,  a public body must demonstrate how disclosure of records would\ninterfere with or obstruct an investigation in order to properly withhold records pursuant to\n\n\fMr. Alan Pirtle\nLieutenant Michael O'Neill\nSeptember 5, 2024\nPage 4\n\nsection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA.  See Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 17-001, issued March 14, 2017\npolice department did not sustain its burden to withhold records under section 7(1)(d)(i) because\nit failed to provide a factual basis for its denial).   \n\nIn its non- confidential response,  in support of the applicability of section\n\n7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA to the records,  the Department asserted:  \"[ T]his investigation is still active * \nEven after charges were filed against Pearson in January 2023,  it is clear through the reports\n\nthat the investigation has not concluded.   There has been consistent activity since the filing of\ncharges,  with the last documented activity being March 2024,  with no finality.\" 6 The\nDepartment provided more information in its confidential response about that law enforcement\nactivity,  then concluded in its non- confidential response that \"[ t]he disclosure of the information\nto the public would likely jeopardize that part of the continued investigation.\" 7\n\nThis office has reviewed the confidential records and explanation the Department\n\nprovided.   Because the Department submitted a portion of its explanation confidentially,  this\noffice is prohibited from commenting on its confidential reasoning in this determination letter\nsee 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.)),  other than to note that it establishes with clear and\nconvincing evidence that disclosure of the case report at this time would interfere with pending\nlaw enforcement proceedings.   Accordingly,  the Department did not improperly withhold the\ncase report pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. \n\nEven if the denial of the case report was improper,  however,  section 3(g) of FOIA\n\nprovides,  in relevant part:   \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information.   Before invoking\nthis exemption,  the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions.   If any public body\nresponds to a categorical request by stating that compliance would\nunduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are\nmet, it shall do so in writing,  specifying the reasons why it would\nbe unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\n\nGeneral Katie Goldsmith ( July 18, 2024),  at [ 1].  \n\n6Letter from Lieutenant Mike O'Neill, Alton Police Department,  to Illinois Assistant Attorney\n\nGeneral Katie Goldsmith ( July 18, 2024),  at [ 1].   \n\n7Letter from Lieutenant Mike O'Neill, Alton Police Department,  to Illinois Assistant Attorney\n\n\fMr. Alan Pirtle\nLieutenant Michael O'Neill\nSeptember 5, 2024\nPage 5\n\nburden the operations of the public body.  Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information.   \n\nWhile the plain language of section 3(g) requires a public body that wishes to rely\n\non the exemption to respond to the request by explaining why compliance would be unduly\nburdensome and offering the requester an opportunity to narrow the request,  the Illinois\nAppellate Court has ruled that a public body' s failure to do so in its initial response does not\nnecessarily waive the ability to assert section 3(g).  Kelly v. Village of Kenilworth,  2019 IL App\n1st)  170780, ¶¶  42-49.  In Kelly, the Illinois Appellate Court examined whether a public body\nthat did not sustain its burden of proving that records were exempt from disclosure in their\nentireties pursuant to exemptions enumerated in section 7(1)(d) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(d) \nWest 2016))  could rely on section 3(g) of FOIA as an alternative basis to deny the request even\nthough it had not raised the section 3(g) exemption in its response to the request.   Kelly, 2019 IL\nApp (1st)  170780, ¶¶  42-49.  The court concluded that the public body could assert section 3(g) \nafter the court struck down the public body' s original rationale for denying the request as long as\nthe public body still afforded the requester the opportunity to confer about narrowing the request.  \nKelly, 2019 IL App (1st)  170780, ¶  49. \n\nTo the extent that responsive records other than the case report were not properly\n\nwithheld pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA or the other exemptions asserted by the\nDepartment,  it is evident that Mr. Pirtle's request is unduly burdensome.   In order for the\nDepartment to review each of the records,  including 102,717 files, and determine appropriate\nredactions,  it would take an unidentified but clearly excessive amount of time to review.   It is to\nbe expected that the records in this file would warrant a significant amount of redactions,  such as\ninformation that would unavoidably identify witnesses under section 7(1)( d)(iv).  Given the\nbroad scope of Mr. Pirtle' s request,  the Department appears to have a rational basis for asserting\nthat it would be unduly burdensome to review and redact the responsive records.   Therefore,  in\naccordance with Kelly, the Department should issue a revised response to Mr. Pirtle in which it\narticulates why the request is unduly burdensome as written and offers him the opportunity to\nnarrow his request to manageable proportions. 8 If the parties are then unable to reach an\nagreement on what constitutes a manageable request for the information at issue,  the Department\nmay deny the request as unduly burdensome only if it can prove by clear and convincing\nevidence that the burden of compliance with the request outweighs the public interest in\ndisclosure. \n\namenable to receiving and reviewing a narrowed request from Mr. Pirtle.   \n\n8This office notes that in e-mail correspondence from Lieutenant O'Neill, he appeared to be\n\n\fr. Alan Pirtle\nLieutenant Michael O'Neill\nSeptember 5, 2024\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This file is closed.   If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82157 f 71di proper 3g proper pd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports, body camera footage, and 911 recordings of a shooting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":"violation_found","plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":"A lawyer requested police records about a shooting, and the Alton Police Department denied the request entirely. The Attorney General's office found that the Department properly withheld the main case report because its release would interfere with an ongoing investigation. For the remaining records, the Department may claim the request is unduly burdensome, but it must first send a revised response to the requester offering a chance to narrow the request.","human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82157/","full_text":"September 5, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Alan Pirtle\nAttorney\nBrown & Crouppen Law Firm\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nalanp@getbc. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nLieutenant Michael O'Neill\nSupport Services Commander\nAlton Police Department\n1700 East Broadway\nAlton, Illinois 62002\nmoneill@cityofaltonil. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82157\n\nDear Mr. Pirtle and Lieutenant O'Neill: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn June 25, 2024, Mr. Alan Pirtle submitted a seven- part FOIA request to the\n\nAlton Police Department (Department) seeking copies of records related to an incident in which\nhis client was shot: \n\nAny and all 911 recordings, \nWritten or otherwise recorded statements made by any\nwitnesses and/or parties or summaries of witness\nstatements made by anyone\nAny press releases issued by the Alton PD or on their\nbehalf related to the above- referenced incident.[ 1] \n\nOn July 2, 2024, the Department denied the request in its entirety pursuant to sections 7(1)(d)(iii) \nand 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA. 2 On July 11, 2024, Mr. Pirtle submitted the above- referenced Request\nfor Review contesting the Department's denial of his request. Mr. Pirtle asserted: \" Alton PD did\nnot even attempt to redact the requested information but instead issued a full denial in contrary to\nthe FOIA statute.\" 3\n\nOn July 15, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nDepartment and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the requested records for this office's\nconfidential review, along with a written explanation of the factual and legal bases for\nwithholding the records. On July 18, 2024, this office received a copy of the case report from\nthe Department, as well as the Department's confidential written response and a non-confidential\nredacted version for this office to forward to Mr. Pirtle. 4 In the Department's non-confidential\nresponse, the Department asserted that it also properly withheld the responsive records pursuant\nto sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA. 5 Additionally, the Department clarified that there\nwere no body camera videos from the incident. On July 23, 2024, this office forwarded a copy\nof the Department's non- confidential response to Mr. Pirtle and notified him of his right to reply; \nhe did not reply. \n\nMeanwhile, this office followed up with the Department about obtaining copies of\n\nthe remaining responsive records for this office's confidential review, but the Department\nexplained that it had technical difficulties in transmitting the records because of their sheer\n\n1 Letter from Alan Pirtle, Brown & Crouppen, P.C., to Alton Police Department, Attn: Records\n\nJune 25, 2024). \n\neffective July 1, 2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iii), (1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, \n\n3FOIA – Request for Review by Public Access Counselor (PAC) form submitted by Alan Pirtle\n\nJuly 11, 2024). \n\n4 See 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a\n\ncopy of the answer to the person submitting the request for review, with any alleged confidential\n\nvolume. The Department stated that the responsive digital media items comprise 214 gigabytes, \n102,717 files, and 489 folders, which include photographs of the scene and evidence recovery, \ndash camera videos, surveillance videos from residences and business, 911 call recordings, press\nreleases, photos and videos from a suspect's phone, and video interviews of the victim, \nwitnesses, and suspect. The Department asserted that if its denial of Mr. Pirtle's request was\ndetermined to be improper, compliance with Mr. Pirtle's complete FOIA request would be\nunduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) (West 2022)). \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \" has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA\n\nIn its response to this office, the Department asserted that it properly withheld the\n\nresponsive records pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. Section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA exempts\nfrom disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request[.] \n\nThe classification of information as ' law enforcement' or 'investigatory' does not necessarily\nforeclose access unless it can be shown, in a particular case, that disclosure would interfere with\nlaw enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public interest.\" Baudin v. City of Crystal\nLake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989). Conclusory statements that the disclosure of records\nwould obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are insufficient to support the assertion of the\npending law enforcement proceeding exemption. See Day v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d\n70, 74-77 (2009). Rather, a public body must demonstrate how disclosure of records would\ninterfere with or obstruct an investigation in order to properly withhold records pursuant to\n\nsection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 17-001, issued March 14, 2017\npolice department did not sustain its burden to withhold records under section 7(1)(d)(i) because\nit failed to provide a factual basis for its denial). \n\nIn its non- confidential response, in support of the applicability of section\n\n7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA to the records, the Department asserted: \"[ T]his investigation is still active * \nEven after charges were filed against Pearson in January 2023, it is clear through the reports\n\nthat the investigation has not concluded. There has been consistent activity since the filing of\ncharges, with the last documented activity being March 2024, with no finality.\" 6 The\nDepartment provided more information in its confidential response about that law enforcement\nactivity, then concluded in its non- confidential response that \"[ t]he disclosure of the information\nto the public would likely jeopardize that part of the continued investigation.\" 7\n\nThis office has reviewed the confidential records and explanation the Department\n\nprovided. Because the Department submitted a portion of its explanation confidentially, this\noffice is prohibited from commenting on its confidential reasoning in this determination letter\nsee 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.)), other than to note that it establishes with clear and\nconvincing evidence that disclosure of the case report at this time would interfere with pending\nlaw enforcement proceedings. Accordingly, the Department did not improperly withhold the\ncase report pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. \n\nEven if the denial of the case report was improper, however, section 3(g) of FOIA\n\nprovides, in relevant part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information. Before invoking\nthis exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions. If any public body\nresponds to a categorical request by stating that compliance would\nunduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are\nmet, it shall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would\nbe unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\n\nGeneral Katie Goldsmith (July 18, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n6 Letter from Lieutenant Mike O'Neill, Alton Police Department, to Illinois Assistant Attorney\n\nGeneral Katie Goldsmith (July 18, 2024), at [ 1]. \n\n7 Letter from Lieutenant Mike O'Neill, Alton Police Department, to Illinois Assistant Attorney\n\nburden the operations of the public body. Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information. \n\nWhile the plain language of section 3(g) requires a public body that wishes to rely\n\non the exemption to respond to the request by explaining why compliance would be unduly\nburdensome and offering the requester an opportunity to narrow the request, the Illinois\nAppellate Court has ruled that a public body's failure to do so in its initial response does not\nnecessarily waive the ability to assert section 3(g). Kelly v. Village of Kenilworth, 2019 IL App\n1st) 170780, ¶¶ 42-49. In Kelly, the Illinois Appellate Court examined whether a public body\nthat did not sustain its burden of proving that records were exempt from disclosure in their\nentireties pursuant to exemptions enumerated in section 7(1)(d) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(d) \nWest 2016)) could rely on section 3(g) of FOIA as an alternative basis to deny the request even\nthough it had not raised the section 3(g) exemption in its response to the request. Kelly, 2019 IL\nApp (1st) 170780, ¶¶ 42-49. The court concluded that the public body could assert section 3(g) \nafter the court struck down the public body's original rationale for denying the request as long as\nthe public body still afforded the requester the opportunity to confer about narrowing the request. \nKelly, 2019 IL App (1st) 170780, ¶ 49. \n\nTo the extent that responsive records other than the case report were not properly\n\nwithheld pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA or the other exemptions asserted by the\nDepartment, it is evident that Mr. Pirtle's request is unduly burdensome. In order for the\nDepartment to review each of the records, including 102,717 files, and determine appropriate\nredactions, it would take an unidentified but clearly excessive amount of time to review. It is to\nbe expected that the records in this file would warrant a significant amount of redactions, such as\ninformation that would unavoidably identify witnesses under section 7(1)(d)(iv). Given the\nbroad scope of Mr. Pirtle's request, the Department appears to have a rational basis for asserting\nthat it would be unduly burdensome to review and redact the responsive records. Therefore, in\naccordance with Kelly, the Department should issue a revised response to Mr. Pirtle in which it\narticulates why the request is unduly burdensome as written and offers him the opportunity to\nnarrow his request to manageable proportions. 8 If the parties are then unable to reach an\nagreement on what constitutes a manageable request for the information at issue, the Department\nmay deny the request as unduly burdensome only if it can prove by clear and convincing\nevidence that the burden of compliance with the request outweighs the public interest in\ndisclosure. \n\namenable to receiving and reviewing a narrowed request from Mr. Pirtle. \n\n8 This office notes that in e-mail correspondence from Lieutenant O'Neill, he appeared to be\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82157 f 71di proper 3g proper pd"}
{"id":1075,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-02-14","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82252"],"title":"Palatine Park District properly withheld risk management report under 7(1)(m), 7(1)(s), and 7(1)(v)","filename":"82252, issued February 14, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1329,"summary":"The requester challenged the Palatine Park District's denial of a risk management report regarding stable buildings, and the PAC determined the record was properly withheld under FOIA exemption 7(1)(s).","plain_summary":"A citizen requested a risk assessment report regarding stable buildings from the Palatine Park District, but the District refused to release it. The Attorney General's office reviewed the document and agreed that it is exempt from disclosure under state law. Consequently, the District was not required to provide the record.","holding":"The Palatine Park District did not improperly withhold the requested risk management report.","legal_question":"Whether the Palatine Park District properly withheld a risk management report under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(m), 7(1)(s), and 7(1)(v).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(m)","7(1)(s)","7(1)(v)"],"public_body":"Palatine Park District","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(s)","subject_description":"The request sought a risk management agency report concerning the safety of stable buildings.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_s/82252%2C%20issued%20February%2014%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["risk management","stable buildings","FOIA exemption","park district"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"February 14, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Andrew S. Paine\nTressler LLP\n233 South Wacker Drive, 61st Floor\nChicago,  Illinois 60606\nAPaine@tresslerllp. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82252\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Paine: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the Palatine Park District ( Park District)  did not improperly withhold a record responsive to\n\nJuly 11, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a six-part FOIA request to the Park District\n\nseeking copies of various records,  including the \" Risk Management Agency ( PDRMA) [ Park\nDistrict Risk Management Agency]  report received by the park district regarding the risk, if any, \nthat the stable buildings present to the citizens/ users of said property\" 2 On July 18, 2024,  the\nPark District withheld the document responsive to this portion of\n\nrequest pursuant\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.).  \n\n2E-mail from\n\nto FOIA Officer,  Palatine Park District ( July 11, 2024). \n\n\fMr. Andrew S. Paine\nFebruary 14, 2025\nPage 2\n\nto sections 7(1)(m), 7(1)(s),  and 7(1)(v) of FOIA. 3 On July 26, 2024,  this office received the\ndocuments necessary to complete\npartial denial of his request.  \n\nRequest for Review disputing the Park District' s\n\nOn August 2, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nPark District and asked it to provide a copy of the withheld record for this office' s confidential\nreview,  together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of\nthe asserted exemptions.   On August 12, 2024,  this office received the requested materials.   This\noffice forwarded the Park District' s written answer to\nAugust 16, 2024. \n\nwho submitted a reply on\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)(s)  of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying: \n\nAny and all proprietary information and records related to\nrisk management association\n\nthe operation of an intergovernmental\nor self- insurance pool or jointly self- administered health and\naccident cooperative or pool.  Insurance or self insurance\nincluding any intergovernmental\nself insurance pool)  claims,  loss or risk management\ninformation,  records,  data,  advice or communications.  \nEmphasis added.) \n\nrisk management association or\n\nThe Attorney General has issued a binding opinion analyzing the scope of section\n7(1)( s)  which concluded that \" management\"  is the operative word in section 7(1)(s),  and that the\nexemption is limited to \" information regarding the policies,  procedures,  and practices that an\nintergovernmental\n\nrisk management association or self- insurance pool adopts to manage its\n\neffective July 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(m), (1)( s), ( 1)(v) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, \n\n\fMr. Andrew S. Paine\nFebruary 14, 2025\nPage 3\n\nclaims,  loss,  and risk exposure.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 11-004, issued April 15, 2011, \nat 5-6.   \n\nFurther,  this office has previously determined that a public body can withhold\n\ncommunications between itself and a claim representative from its insurance company regarding\nthe management of a claim.   See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 56329,  issued\nMay 13, 2019 ( notes and communications by a claims representative employed by transit\nauthority concerning management of a claim against the transit authority fell within the scope of\nthe section 7(1)(s) exemption).   However,  the section 7(1)(s) exemption \" does not exempt from\ndisclosure all records that in some way relate to insurance.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. \n28619,  issued November 27, 2019,  at 2.  Records that do not discuss \" sensitive business\ninformation about how to handle the claim,\"  and for which disclosure would not \" reveal sensitive\nbusiness policies or provide an unfair advantage to persons\"  dealing with a public body or its\ninsurance provider,  do not fall within the scope of section 7(1)( s)  of FOIA.  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC\nReq.  Rev. Ltr. 65021,  issued November 17, 2021,  at 3-4.  Therefore,  to fall within the scope of\nthis provision,  a record must reflect claims management,  loss management,  or risk management\ninformation,  the disclosure of which would reveal sensitive information concerning any policies, \nprocedures,  or practices that a public body may use to manage claims,  loss,  or risk exposure or\nprovide an unfair advantage to persons dealing with a public body or its insurance provider.  \n\nThe Park District' s answer to this office explained that PDRMA \" is an\n\nintergovernmental\njoint self- insurance pool\"  that offers \" legal advice,  risk management advice, \npooled self- insurance coverage,  crisis management,  and training services to its members.\" 4 The\nPark District argued that the withheld record at issue \" clearly consists of risk management advice\nand communications.\" 5 Specifically,  the Park District contended:  \n\nT]he plain language of [section 7(1)(s) of FOIA]  makes it clear\nthat the exemption applies to a variety of documents,  specifically\nincluding all risk management related communications and advice. \nIn this case,  all records at issue are,  at a minimum, \ncommunications and advice with the Park District' s risk\nmanagement agency,  which brings those records clearly within the\ns] ection 7(1)(s) exemption.[ 6] \n\nGeneral,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( August 12, 2024),  at 2. \n\n4Letter from Andrew S. Paine,  Tressler LLP, to Shannon Barnaby,  Senior Assistant Attorney\n\nGeneral,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( August 12, 2024),  at 4.  \n\n5Letter from Andrew S. Paine,  Tressler LLP, to Shannon Barnaby,  Senior Assistant Attorney\n\nGeneral,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( August 12, 2024),  at 4.  \n\n6Letter from Andrew S. Paine,  Tressler LLP, to Shannon Barnaby,  Senior Assistant Attorney\n\n\fMr. Andrew S. Paine\nFebruary 14, 2025\nPage 4\n\nIn his Request for Review and reply, \n\ncontended that the record is not\n\nexempt from disclosure under any of the cited exemptions and argued that the \" only reason for\nthis denial is [because]  the report does not concur with the [ Park] [ D]istrict['] s published\nnarrative of a dangerous facility.\" 7\n\nBased on this office' s review,  the withheld letter constitutes communications and\n\nadvice between the Park District and PDRMA regarding loss or risk management.   The\ndisclosure of this letter would reveal sensitive business information that may be used by the Park\nDistrict or PDRMA to formulate risk management policies and procedures.   Accordingly,  this\noffice has determined that the record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(s). 8\n\nLastly,  the Public Access Counselor' s authority is limited to resolving disputes\nconcerning FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (OMA). 9 See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c) ( West 2022).  \nTherefore,  the Public Access Counselor does not have the authority to review any alleged\nviolations raised in\nunderlying decisions concerning the stables.     \n\ncorrespondence to this office related to the Park District' s\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This file is closed.   If you have any FOIA\nquestions,  my e-mail address is Shannon. Barnaby@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82252 f 71s proper pkd\n\n7E-mail from\n\nto Attorney General ( July 19, 2024).    \n\n8Because this office has determined that the record at issue is exempt from disclosure under\n\nsection 7(1)( s)  of FOIA,  it is not necessary to address the applicability of the other exemptions raised in the Park\nDistrict' s response.   \n\n95 ILCS 120/1 et seq. ( West 2022).   \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A risk management report on building safety","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82252/","full_text":"February 14, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Andrew S. Paine\nTressler LLP\n233 South Wacker Drive, 61st Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60606\nAPaine@tresslerllp. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82252\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Paine: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the Palatine Park District (Park District) did not improperly withhold a record responsive to\n\nJuly 11, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a six-part FOIA request to the Park District\n\nseeking copies of various records, including the \" Risk Management Agency (PDRMA) [ Park\nDistrict Risk Management Agency] report received by the park district regarding the risk, if any, \nthat the stable buildings present to the citizens/ users of said property\" 2 On July 18, 2024, the\n\nto sections 7(1)(m), 7(1)(s), and 7(1)(v) of FOIA. 3 On July 26, 2024, this office received the\ndocuments necessary to complete\npartial denial of his request. \n\nRequest for Review disputing the Park District's\n\nOn August 2, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nPark District and asked it to provide a copy of the withheld record for this office's confidential\nreview, together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of\nthe asserted exemptions. On August 12, 2024, this office received the requested materials. This\noffice forwarded the Park District's written answer to\nAugust 16, 2024. \n\nwho submitted a reply on\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(s) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying: \n\nAny and all proprietary information and records related to\nrisk management association\n\nthe operation of an intergovernmental\nor self- insurance pool or jointly self- administered health and\naccident cooperative or pool. Insurance or self insurance\nincluding any intergovernmental\nself insurance pool) claims, loss or risk management\ninformation, records, data, advice or communications. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nrisk management association or\n\nThe Attorney General has issued a binding opinion analyzing the scope of section\n7(1)(s) which concluded that \" management\" is the operative word in section 7(1)(s), and that the\nexemption is limited to \" information regarding the policies, procedures, and practices that an\nintergovernmental\n\nrisk management association or self- insurance pool adopts to manage its\n\neffective July 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(m), (1)(s), (1)(v) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, \n\nclaims, loss, and risk exposure.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 11-004, issued April 15, 2011, \nat 5-6. \n\nFurther, this office has previously determined that a public body can withhold\n\ncommunications between itself and a claim representative from its insurance company regarding\nthe management of a claim. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 56329, issued\nMay 13, 2019 (notes and communications by a claims representative employed by transit\nauthority concerning management of a claim against the transit authority fell within the scope of\nthe section 7(1)(s) exemption). However, the section 7(1)(s) exemption \" does not exempt from\ndisclosure all records that in some way relate to insurance.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n28619, issued November 27, 2019, at 2. Records that do not discuss \" sensitive business\ninformation about how to handle the claim,\" and for which disclosure would not \" reveal sensitive\nbusiness policies or provide an unfair advantage to persons\" dealing with a public body or its\ninsurance provider, do not fall within the scope of section 7(1)(s) of FOIA. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 65021, issued November 17, 2021, at 3-4. Therefore, to fall within the scope of\nthis provision, a record must reflect claims management, loss management, or risk management\ninformation, the disclosure of which would reveal sensitive information concerning any policies, \nprocedures, or practices that a public body may use to manage claims, loss, or risk exposure or\nprovide an unfair advantage to persons dealing with a public body or its insurance provider. \n\nThe Park District's answer to this office explained that PDRMA \" is an\n\nintergovernmental\njoint self- insurance pool\" that offers \" legal advice, risk management advice, \npooled self- insurance coverage, crisis management, and training services to its members.\" 4 The\nPark District argued that the withheld record at issue \" clearly consists of risk management advice\nand communications.\" 5 Specifically, the Park District contended: \n\nT]he plain language of [section 7(1)(s) of FOIA] makes it clear\nthat the exemption applies to a variety of documents, specifically\nincluding all risk management related communications and advice. \nIn this case, all records at issue are, at a minimum, \ncommunications and advice with the Park District's risk\nmanagement agency, which brings those records clearly within the\ns] ection 7(1)(s) exemption.[ 6] \n\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (August 12, 2024), at 2. \n\n4 Letter from Andrew S. Paine, Tressler LLP, to Shannon Barnaby, Senior Assistant Attorney\n\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (August 12, 2024), at 4. \n\n5 Letter from Andrew S. Paine, Tressler LLP, to Shannon Barnaby, Senior Assistant Attorney\n\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (August 12, 2024), at 4. \n\nIn his Request for Review and reply, \n\ncontended that the record is not\n\nexempt from disclosure under any of the cited exemptions and argued that the \" only reason for\nthis denial is [because] the report does not concur with the [ Park] [ D]istrict['] s published\nnarrative of a dangerous facility.\" 7\n\nBased on this office's review, the withheld letter constitutes communications and\n\nadvice between the Park District and PDRMA regarding loss or risk management. The\ndisclosure of this letter would reveal sensitive business information that may be used by the Park\nDistrict or PDRMA to formulate risk management policies and procedures. Accordingly, this\noffice has determined that the record is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(s). 8\n\nLastly, the Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to resolving disputes\nconcerning FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (OMA). 9 See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c) (West 2022). \nTherefore, the Public Access Counselor does not have the authority to review any alleged\nviolations raised in\nunderlying decisions concerning the stables. \n\ncorrespondence to this office related to the Park District's\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any FOIA\nquestions, my e-mail address is Shannon. Barnaby@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82252 f 71s proper pkd\n\n7E-mail from\n\nto Attorney General (July 19, 2024). \n\n8 Because this office has determined that the record at issue is exempt from disclosure under\n\nsection 7(1)(s) of FOIA, it is not necessary to address the applicability of the other exemptions raised in the Park\nDistrict's response. \n\n95 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2022)."}
{"id":1076,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-05-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82313"],"title":"Village of Orland Park failed to conduct reasonable search for audit emails","filename":"82313, issued May 8, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1868,"summary":"The requester sought communications regarding incomplete fiscal audits for 2022 and 2023, but the Village claimed it possessed no responsive records. The PAC determined the Village failed to conduct an adequate search for the requested documents.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked the Village of Orland Park for emails and documents related to incomplete financial audits, but the Village claimed it had no such records. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and found that the Village did not search thoroughly enough. The Village must now conduct a proper search and provide a new response to the requester.","holding":"The Village of Orland Park violated FOIA by failing to perform a reasonable search for records responsive to the request.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Orland Park conducted an adequate search for records responsive to a FOIA request as required by section 3 of FOIA.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Orland Park","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"reasonable search","subject_description":"The requester sought communications and correspondence regarding the Village's incomplete fiscal audits for 2022 and 2023.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":90.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Completeness-of-Search/82313%2C%20issued%20May%208%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["reasonable search","financial audits","FOIA request","Village of Orland Park"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"May 8, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nVillage of Orland Park\n14700 Ravinia Avenue\nOrland Park,  Illinois 60462\nasnodsmith@orlandpark. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82313; Reference No. N017942 - \n071024\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Snodsmith : \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn July 10, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village of\nOrland Park (Village) seeking copies of \"all records related to the incomplete audits for fiscal\nyears 2022 and 2023 \", including the following: \n\n1.  Communications and e -mails between the financial\n\ndepartment, the village manager George Koczwara, and Keith\nPeaku,  \n\n2.  Correspondence with the State of Illinois' Comptroller's Office\nregarding the incomplete audits for fiscal years 2022 and 2023, \n\n\fMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nMay 8, 2025\nPage 2\n\n3.  Communications and emails from Village of Orland Park\n\nTrustees regarding the incomplete audits for fiscal years 2022\nand 2023, [ and] \n\n4.  If the Village of Orland Park uses a specific accountant or law\nfirm for independent audits,  please include any communication\nand emails regarding the incomplete audits for fiscal years\n2022 and 2023 .[1] \n\nOn July 18, 2024,  the Village extended its time to respond to\nbusiness days as allowed by section 3( e)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3( e) ( West 2022)).  \n\nFOIA request by five\n\nOn July 24, 2024, the Village responded that it does not possess records\n\nrequest.  On that same date, this office received\n\nresponsive to\nRequest for Review disputing the Village' s response.   In particular, \nasserted that the\nVillage should possess these records because he received copies of correspondence exchanged\nbetween the Village and the State of Illinois Comptroller's Office (Comptroller's Office) after he\nsubmitted a nearly identical FOIA request to the Comptroller's Office on July 10, 2024.  \n\nprovided this office with the Comptroller's Office 's response to his request.  \n\nOn July 30, 2024 , this office sent a copy of this Request for Review to the Village\nand asked it to provide a detailed description of its search for responsive records.   Specifically, \nthis office asked the Village if it possessed copies of the e -mails between its employees and the\nComptroller's Office that were included in the materials submitted by\nOn August\n2 , 2024 , the Village provided this office with its written response.   On August 9 , 2024,  this office\nforwarded a copy of this response to\n\nhe replied on August 11,  2024.  \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health , 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  The adequacy of a public body's\nsearch for responsive records is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends upon the\nparticular facts of the case.  Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago , 2020 IL 190038, ¶ 31.  \nAlthough a public body is not required to perform an exhaustive search of every possible\nlocation,  the body must construe FOIA requests liberally and search those places that are\nreasonably likely to contain responsive records.'\"   Better Government Ass'n , 2020 IL 190038, \n31 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S.  Dep't of Justice , 373 F. Supp. 3d 120, 126 (D.D.C. \n2019)).  Further, a public body must use search terms that are reasonably calculated to locate all\nresponsive records.  Hall v. C.I.A., 668 F. Supp. 2d 172, 183-84 (D.D.C. 2009).  \"At all times the\n\n1Freedom of Information Act request submitted by\n\nto Freedom of Information Act\n\nOfficer, Village of Orland Park  (July 10, 2024). \n\n\fMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nMay 8, 2025\nPage 3\n\nburden is on the [public body] to establish the adequacy of its search.\"   Rugiero v. U.S.  Dep't of\nJustice, 257 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2001).  \n\nIn its response to this office, the Village described its search for responsive\n\nrecords as follows: \n\nPursuant to this request, the Village conducted an internal\n\ndocument search in the places that were requested by\nand that are reasonably likely to contain any responsive records\nincluding an e- mail search for the term \" incomplete audit\"  in the e-\nmail accounts of [a list of named individuals].  Per\nrequest, the time period searched for was 2022 to the present.  The\nVillage's IT Department responded that there were no results for\nthe requested term and time frame. \n\nAfter receiving the results from the electronic search, the\n\nVillage's FOIA officer individually requested information\nregarding any additional potentially responsive documents from\ncurrent Village Director of Finance Chris Frankenfield.   After he\nreviewed the request, it was determined that documents responsive\nto the request would not exist because the Village does not have\nany \"incomplete audits.\"[2]   \n\nFurther,  the Village argued that the wording used in this FOIA request was misleading and\ndifferent from\nasked\nthe Comptroller's Office for all records related to the Village's \" audits\"  whereas he asked the\nVillage, for all records related to its \"incomplete audits.\"  The Village asserted it \"is not required\nto have clairvoyant capabilities to discover the requester 's needs or to advise him on what public\nrecords he should seek.\" 3\n\nFOIA request to the Comptroller' s Office in that\n\nIn his reply, \n\nresponded that his FOIA request \"was very clearly and\nplainly worded\" and \" sought all documents and correspondence with the Comptroller's Office\nrelating to the Village's fiscal year 2022 and 2023 audits, which are incomplete.\" 4\n\nMcCullough,  Assistant Public Access Counselor,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( August 2, 2024),  at 1 -2. \n\n2Letter from Dennis G. Walsh, Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, LTD., to Christina Lucente -\n\n3Letter from Dennis G. Walsh,  Klein,  Thorpe and Jenkins,  LTD., to Christina Lucente -\n\nMcCullough,  Assistant Public Access Counselor,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( August 2, 2024),  at 3. \n\n4Letter from\n\nto Christina M. Lucente -McCullough,  Assistant Attorney General\n\nAugust 12, 2024), at 1. \n\n\fMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nMay 8, 2025\nPage 4\n\nalso argued that the Village improperly fixated on the phrase \"incomplete audit\" and ignored the\nknown context, including the local media coverage, surrounding its past audits. \n\nrequest.  The Village acknowledged that it limited its search to records that\n\nHaving reviewed the information submitted by the parties , this office concludes\nthat the Village did not demonstrate that it conducted a reasonable search for records responsive\nto\ncontained the phrase \" incomplete audit.\"  Although this phrase was included in\nFOIA request,  the Village did not show that searching only for records containing that specific\nprovide d copies of\nphrase was reasonable under the circumstances.   In this matter, \nthe records he received from the Comptroller' s Office .  Th ose records reflect that the Village\nreceived a notice of delinquency regarding its FY 2022 audit, and that the Village had responded\nto the Comptroller's Office that it was working \"to get the 2022 audit done as quickly as possible.  \nIn addition, we have added a financial incentive for the audit firm to complete the 2022 audit\nwithin the 4 months in order to get our financial reporting back on track .\" 5 In subsequent\ncommunications, \n\nthe Village' s Finance Director,  Chris Frankfenfield,  advised:   \n\nI understand the Village is delinquent with submitting our\n\n2022 and now the 2023 audited financials. We are actively\nengaged in our audit with Sikich to finalize our ACFR for 2022. \nThis was delayed due to an abundance of staff turnover and\nretirements,  in addition to a new ERP implementation.  We have\nalready made significant progress, and depending on the audit\nfirm, I hope to have the Final draft by the end of August 2024.[6] \n\nThe plain and ordinary meaning of \" incomplete\"  is:  \" not complete :  UNFINISHED:  such as\na: lacking a usually necessary part, element, or step[.]\" 7 It is clear that the Village had not\ncompleted or finished its audits for FY 2022 and FY 2023 on time and was working to complete\nthem.  The Village did not explain why it had not considered communications related to audits\nthat were still unfinished to be responsive to the request for records concerning \"incomplete\naudits.\"   Further,  this office' s own research located multiple news articles surrounding the\nVillage's failure to file its financial audits with the Comptroller's Office .8 Given this media\n\n5E-mail from Kevin Wachtel, Financial Director, Village of Orland Park, to June [ Canello , Illinois\n\nState Comptroller] ( October 19, 2023). \n\n6E- mail from Chris Frankenfield ,  CPA, Finance Director,  Village of Orland Park,  to June\n\nCanello,  Illinois State Comptroller] ( July 1, 2024). \n\n7Merriam -Webster Online Dictionary,  https:// www.merriam- webster. com/ dictionary/ incomplete . \n\n8See e.g., Ben Bradley, Orland Park latest suburb to fail to file audits, WGN Investigates ( Oct. 14, \n\n2024, 6: 10 p.m.), https:// wgntv. com/ news/ wgn -investigates/ orland -park -latest -suburb -to-fail-to-file-audits.  \n\n\fMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nMay 8, 2025\nPage 5\n\nattention, the available information suggests that the Village was also reasonably aware of the\ncircumstances in which\n\nsubmitted his request. \n\nEven if the Village disputes that the audits its finance director acknowledged to be\n\ndelinquent were \" incomplete\",  FOIA required the Village to construe\nFOIA\nrequest liberally and conduct a search that was reasonably tailored to find any responsive\nrecords.  The Village's argument that it needed \" clairvoyant capabilities\"  to ascertain Mr. \n\nneeds is unavailing because\n\nrequest provided enough context as to the\nsubject matter and types of records requested.   See Government Accountability Project v.  U.S. \nDep' t of Homeland Sec ., 335 F. Supp.  3d 7, 11 -12 (D.D.C. 2018) ( ruling that \" FOIA requests are\nnot a game of Battleship\"  and that the government fails its FOIA obligations when it ignores\nlogical variations,\" \" synonyms,\" and \" proxies\" \" calculated to turn up all responsive\ndocuments\").   It is apparent from the wording of the request that\nrecords concerning the fiscal year 2022 and 2023 audits regardless of whether they were most\nproperly characterized as incomplete ,  delinquent,  or otherwise deficient or untimely.  \nAccordingly , the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Village failed to perform a reasonable\nsearch for responsive records. \n\nwas seeking\n\nTo remedy this violation,  this office asks the Village to conduct a search of the\napplicable recordkeeping systems for responsive records concerning its FY 2022 and 2023 audits\nand issue a supplemental\nthat fully complies with section 9 of FOIA ( 5\nILCS 140/9 (West 2022)).  If no records are located, the Village should provide\nwith a detailed description of the measures that were taken to search f or records. \n\nresponse to\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of th ese matters does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This letter shall serve to close these matters.  If\nyou have any questions, please contact me at c.lucentemccullough@ilag.gov or the Chicago\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82313 f 3a search improper mun\n\n\fMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nMay 8, 2025\nPage 6\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Dennis G. Walsh\nPartner,  Klein,  Thorpe &  Jenkins\n15010 South Ravinia Avenue, Suite 10\nOrland Park,  Illinois 60462\nDGWalsh@ktjlaw.com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Communications about incomplete fiscal audits","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82313/","full_text":"May 8, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nVillage of Orland Park\n14700 Ravinia Avenue\nOrland Park, Illinois 60462\nasnodsmith@orlandpark. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82313; Reference No. N017942 - \n071024\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Snodsmith: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn July 10, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village of\nOrland Park (Village) seeking copies of \"all records related to the incomplete audits for fiscal\nyears 2022 and 2023 \", including the following: \n\n3. Communications and emails from Village of Orland Park\n\nTrustees regarding the incomplete audits for fiscal years 2022\nand 2023, [ and] \n\n4. If the Village of Orland Park uses a specific accountant or law\nfirm for independent audits, please include any communication\nand emails regarding the incomplete audits for fiscal years\n2022 and 2023.[1] \n\nOn July 18, 2024, the Village extended its time to respond to\nbusiness days as allowed by section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(e) (West 2022)). \n\nFOIA request by five\n\nOn July 24, 2024, the Village responded that it does not possess records\n\nrequest. On that same date, this office received\n\nresponsive to\nRequest for Review disputing the Village's response. In particular, \nasserted that the\nVillage should possess these records because he received copies of correspondence exchanged\nbetween the Village and the State of Illinois Comptroller's Office (Comptroller's Office) after he\nsubmitted a nearly identical FOIA request to the Comptroller's Office on July 10, 2024. \n\nprovided this office with the Comptroller's Office 's response to his request. \n\nOn July 30, 2024, this office sent a copy of this Request for Review to the Village\nand asked it to provide a detailed description of its search for responsive records. Specifically, \nthis office asked the Village if it possessed copies of the e -mails between its employees and the\nComptroller's Office that were included in the materials submitted by\nOn August\n2, 2024, the Village provided this office with its written response. On August 9, 2024, this office\nforwarded a copy of this response to\n\nhe replied on August 11, 2024. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). The adequacy of a public body's\nsearch for responsive records is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends upon the\nparticular facts of the case. Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL 190038, ¶ 31. \nAlthough a public body is not required to perform an exhaustive search of every possible\nlocation, the body must construe FOIA requests liberally and search those places that are\nreasonably likely to contain responsive records.'\" Better Government Ass'n, 2020 IL 190038, \n31 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 373 F. Supp. 3d 120, 126 (D.D.C. \n2019)). Further, a public body must use search terms that are reasonably calculated to locate all\nresponsive records. Hall v. C.I.A., 668 F. Supp. 2d 172, 183-84 (D.D.C. 2009). \"At all times the\n\nburden is on the [public body] to establish the adequacy of its search.\" Rugiero v. U.S. Dep't of\nJustice, 257 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2001). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Village described its search for responsive\n\nrecords as follows: \n\nPursuant to this request, the Village conducted an internal\n\ndocument search in the places that were requested by\nand that are reasonably likely to contain any responsive records\nincluding an e- mail search for the term \" incomplete audit\" in the e-\nmail accounts of [a list of named individuals]. Per\nrequest, the time period searched for was 2022 to the present. The\nVillage's IT Department responded that there were no results for\nthe requested term and time frame. \n\nAfter receiving the results from the electronic search, the\n\nVillage's FOIA officer individually requested information\nregarding any additional potentially responsive documents from\ncurrent Village Director of Finance Chris Frankenfield. After he\nreviewed the request, it was determined that documents responsive\nto the request would not exist because the Village does not have\nany \"incomplete audits.\"[2] \n\nFurther, the Village argued that the wording used in this FOIA request was misleading and\ndifferent from\nasked\nthe Comptroller's Office for all records related to the Village's \" audits\" whereas he asked the\nVillage, for all records related to its \"incomplete audits.\" The Village asserted it \"is not required\nto have clairvoyant capabilities to discover the requester 's needs or to advise him on what public\nrecords he should seek.\" 3\n\nFOIA request to the Comptroller's Office in that\n\nIn his reply, \n\nresponded that his FOIA request \"was very clearly and\nplainly worded\" and \" sought all documents and correspondence with the Comptroller's Office\nrelating to the Village's fiscal year 2022 and 2023 audits, which are incomplete.\" 4\n\nMcCullough, Assistant Public Access Counselor, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (August 2, 2024), at 1 -2. \n\n2 Letter from Dennis G. Walsh, Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, LTD., to Christina Lucente -\n\n3 Letter from Dennis G. Walsh, Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, LTD., to Christina Lucente -\n\nMcCullough, Assistant Public Access Counselor, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (August 2, 2024), at 3. \n\nalso argued that the Village improperly fixated on the phrase \"incomplete audit\" and ignored the\nknown context, including the local media coverage, surrounding its past audits. \n\nrequest. The Village acknowledged that it limited its search to records that\n\nHaving reviewed the information submitted by the parties, this office concludes\nthat the Village did not demonstrate that it conducted a reasonable search for records responsive\nto\ncontained the phrase \" incomplete audit.\" Although this phrase was included in\nFOIA request, the Village did not show that searching only for records containing that specific\nprovide d copies of\nphrase was reasonable under the circumstances. In this matter, \nthe records he received from the Comptroller's Office. Th ose records reflect that the Village\nreceived a notice of delinquency regarding its FY 2022 audit, and that the Village had responded\nto the Comptroller's Office that it was working \"to get the 2022 audit done as quickly as possible. \nIn addition, we have added a financial incentive for the audit firm to complete the 2022 audit\nwithin the 4 months in order to get our financial reporting back on track.\" 5 In subsequent\ncommunications, \n\nthe Village's Finance Director, Chris Frankfenfield, advised: \n\nI understand the Village is delinquent with submitting our\n\n2022 and now the 2023 audited financials. We are actively\nengaged in our audit with Sikich to finalize our ACFR for 2022. \nThis was delayed due to an abundance of staff turnover and\nretirements, in addition to a new ERP implementation. We have\nalready made significant progress, and depending on the audit\nfirm, I hope to have the Final draft by the end of August 2024.[6] \n\nThe plain and ordinary meaning of \" incomplete\" is: \" not complete: UNFINISHED: such as\na: lacking a usually necessary part, element, or step[.]\" 7 It is clear that the Village had not\ncompleted or finished its audits for FY 2022 and FY 2023 on time and was working to complete\nthem. The Village did not explain why it had not considered communications related to audits\nthat were still unfinished to be responsive to the request for records concerning \"incomplete\naudits.\" Further, this office's own research located multiple news articles surrounding the\nVillage's failure to file its financial audits with the Comptroller's Office.8 Given this media\n\n5E-mail from Kevin Wachtel, Financial Director, Village of Orland Park, to June [ Canello, Illinois\n\nState Comptroller] (October 19, 2023). \n\n6E- mail from Chris Frankenfield, CPA, Finance Director, Village of Orland Park, to June\n\nCanello, Illinois State Comptroller] (July 1, 2024). \n\n7 Merriam -Webster Online Dictionary, https:// www.merriam- webster. com/ dictionary/ incomplete. \n\n8 See e.g., Ben Bradley, Orland Park latest suburb to fail to file audits, WGN Investigates (Oct. 14, \n\n2024, 6: 10 p.m.), https:// wgntv. com/ news/ wgn -investigates/ orland -park -latest -suburb -to-fail-to-file-audits. \n\nattention, the available information suggests that the Village was also reasonably aware of the\ncircumstances in which\n\nsubmitted his request. \n\nEven if the Village disputes that the audits its finance director acknowledged to be\n\ndelinquent were \" incomplete\", FOIA required the Village to construe\nFOIA\nrequest liberally and conduct a search that was reasonably tailored to find any responsive\nrecords. The Village's argument that it needed \" clairvoyant capabilities\" to ascertain Mr. \n\nneeds is unavailing because\n\nrequest provided enough context as to the\nsubject matter and types of records requested. See Government Accountability Project v. U.S. \nDep' t of Homeland Sec., 335 F. Supp. 3d 7, 11 -12 (D.D.C. 2018) (ruling that \" FOIA requests are\nnot a game of Battleship\" and that the government fails its FOIA obligations when it ignores\nlogical variations,\" \" synonyms,\" and \" proxies\" \" calculated to turn up all responsive\ndocuments\"). It is apparent from the wording of the request that\nrecords concerning the fiscal year 2022 and 2023 audits regardless of whether they were most\nproperly characterized as incomplete, delinquent, or otherwise deficient or untimely. \nAccordingly, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Village failed to perform a reasonable\nsearch for responsive records. \n\nwas seeking\n\nTo remedy this violation, this office asks the Village to conduct a search of the\napplicable recordkeeping systems for responsive records concerning its FY 2022 and 2023 audits\nand issue a supplemental\nthat fully complies with section 9 of FOIA (5\nILCS 140/9 (West 2022)). If no records are located, the Village should provide\nwith a detailed description of the measures that were taken to search f or records. \n\nresponse to\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of th ese matters does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close these matters. If\nyou have any questions, please contact me at c.lucentemccullough@ilag.gov or the Chicago\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Dennis G. Walsh\nPartner, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins\n15010 South Ravinia Avenue, Suite 10\nOrland Park, Illinois 60462\nDGWalsh@ktjlaw.com"}
{"id":1077,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-08-12","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82350"],"title":"Illinois Department on Aging properly denied APSA records under confidentiality provisions","filename":"82350, issued August 12, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":941,"summary":"A requester sought records from the Illinois Department on Aging regarding allegations of isolation of their mother, which the Department denied citing confidentiality provisions in the Adult Protective Services Act. The PAC determined that the Department properly withheld the records because they are exempt from disclosure under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested records from the Illinois Department on Aging concerning allegations of elder abuse or isolation. The Department refused to release the documents, stating they are confidential by law. The Attorney General's office agreed with the Department, concluding that the records are legally protected and cannot be released without specific authorization.","holding":"The Illinois Department on Aging did not improperly deny the request because the records are protected by confidentiality requirements under the Adult Protective Services Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois Department on Aging properly denied a FOIA request for records protected by the confidentiality provisions of the Adult Protective Services Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7","5 ILCS 140/7.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7.5(y)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department on Aging","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought records related to allegations of isolating an individual from relatives and medical care.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":98.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_y/82350%2C%20issued%20August%2012%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["Adult Protective Services Act","confidentiality","elder abuse","Department on Aging"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"August 12, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82350\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted.  \n\nOn June 14, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department on\n\nAging ( Department).   You requested \" any records that claim that I\nmother from relatives and from receiving medical Care[.]\" 1 On July 5, 2024,  the Department\ndenied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)(a) 2 and 7.5(y) of FOIA, 3 citing section 7.5(a-5) of\nthe Adult Protective Services Act 4 and sections 270.275( b) and ( c) of the Illinois Administrative\nCode. 5\n\nisolated my\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Aging.FOIA (June 14, 2024). \n\n2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1,  \n\n2024;  103-605, effective July 1, 2024;  103- 636, effective July 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7.5(y) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7,  \n\n4320 ILCS 20/7.5(a-5) (West 2022).  \n\n2018).  \n\n589 Ill. Admin.  Code §  270.275(b), (c) (2024),  as amended at 42 Ill. Reg. 9226, effective July 1, \n\n\fAugust 12, 2024\nPage 2\n\nIn its denial letter, the Department\n\nindicated that records regarding alleged abuse\nare exempt from disclosure and that release requires a written authorization from the subject of\nthe records or their authorized agent for the release of the requested information.   On August 1, \n2024,  this office received your completed Request for Review contesting the Department' s\ndenial.   \n\nSection 7.5(y) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nConfidential\n\ninformation under the Adult Protective\n\nServices Act and its predecessor enabling statute,  the Elder Abuse\nand Neglect Act, including information about the identity and\nadministrative finding against any caregiver of a verified and\nsubstantiated decision of abuse,  neglect,  or financial exploitation of\nan eligible adult maintained in the Registry established under\nSection 7.5 of the Adult Protective Services Act.  (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nSection 8 of the Adult Protective Services Act (320 ILCS 20/8 (West 2023\n\nSupp.))  states that \"[ a] ll records concerning reports of abuse,  abandonment,  neglect,  financial\nexploitation,  or self-neglect and all records generated as a result of such reports shall be\nconfidential and shall not be disclosed except as specifically authorized by this Act or other\napplicable law.\"   Section 8 lists the categories of individuals or entities permitted access to those\nrecords.   Among the individuals eligible to receive copies of the records is \"[ a] n eligible adult\nreported to be abused,  abandoned,  neglected,  financially exploited,  or self-neglected,  or such\nadult' s authorized guardian or agent,  unless such guardian or agent is the abuser or the alleged\nabuser[.]\"   320 ILCS 20/8(4) (West 2023 Supp.).   \n\nThe administrative rules implementing section 8 of the Adult Protective Services\n\nAct, which the Department cited,  further specify that the records may be released to a legal\nguardian or agent \" who has current authority to act on behalf of the eligible adult when access to\nthose records is relevant to representing the interests of the eligible adult,  and a complete\nauthorization for release of records is submitted,  unless the guardian or agent is\nthe substantiated abuser or is the alleged abuser in an open case[.]\"   89 Ill. Admin.  Code § \n270.275(d)(6) (2024),  as amended at 42 Ill. Reg.  9226,  effective July 1, 2018.  ( Italics removed.)  \nThe rules further explain: \n\nAn authorization for release of records by the Department\n\nor the APS provider agencies must be legally sufficient and\ninclude: \n\n\fAugust 12, 2024\nPage 3\n\n1)         supporting documentation of the agency or guardianship\nevidencing current authority and the extent of the authority to act\non behalf of the eligible adult or his or her estate;  and\n\n2)         a sworn statement as to the purpose of the request and its\nrelevance to representing the interests of the eligible adult or his or\nher estate.[ 6] \n\nThe Department has indicated that your FOIA request concerns records relating to\n\nalleged abuse.   Under section 8 of the Adult Protective Services Act, all records related to abuse\nare confidential,  and therefore exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(y) of FOIA.  \nAdditionally,  your FOIA request to the Department did not include the required written\nauthorization certifying that you are your mother' s legal guardian or agent,  the extent of your\nauthority to act on her behalf,  and a sworn statement describing the purpose of your request and\nits relevance to the interests of your mother.   Please note,  however,  that even with a signed\nauthorization,  the Department\nis the substantiated abuser or is the alleged abuser in an open case.\" 7 Because the rules\nimplementing the Adult Protective Services Act prohibit disclosure of the responsive records\nwithout the required written authorization,  this office concludes that the Department did not\nimproperly deny your request.   \n\nis prohibited from disclosing records where the \" guardian or agent\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82350 f no fi war sa\n\n689 Ill. Admin.  Code §  270.275( e) ( 2024),  as amended at 42 Ill. Reg. 9226,  effective July 1, 2018. \n\n789 Ill. Admin.  Code §  270.275( d)(6) (2024),  as amended at 42 Ill. Reg. 9226, effective July 1, \n\n2018. \n\n\fAugust 12, 2024\nPage 4\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Priscilla Chapman\nFOIA Officer and Deputy General Counsel\nIllinois Department on Aging\n555 West Monroe Street,  Suite 1500S\nChicago,  Illinois 60661\naging. foia@illinois. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Records of isolation allegations and medical care","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82350/","full_text":"August 12, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82350\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted. \n\nOn June 14, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department on\n\nAging (Department). You requested \" any records that claim that I\nmother from relatives and from receiving medical Care[.]\" 1 On July 5, 2024, the Department\ndenied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)(a) 2 and 7.5(y) of FOIA, 3 citing section 7.5(a-5) of\nthe Adult Protective Services Act 4 and sections 270.275(b) and (c) of the Illinois Administrative\nCode. 5\n\nisolated my\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Aging.FOIA (June 14, 2024). \n\n2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 636, effective July 1, 2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7.5(y) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n4320 ILCS 20/7.5(a-5) (West 2022). \n\n2018). \n\n589 Ill. Admin. Code § 270.275(b), (c) (2024), as amended at 42 Ill. Reg. 9226, effective July 1, \n\nIn its denial letter, the Department\n\nindicated that records regarding alleged abuse\nare exempt from disclosure and that release requires a written authorization from the subject of\nthe records or their authorized agent for the release of the requested information. On August 1, \n2024, this office received your completed Request for Review contesting the Department's\ndenial. \n\nSection 7.5(y) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nConfidential\n\ninformation under the Adult Protective\n\nServices Act and its predecessor enabling statute, the Elder Abuse\nand Neglect Act, including information about the identity and\nadministrative finding against any caregiver of a verified and\nsubstantiated decision of abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of\nan eligible adult maintained in the Registry established under\nSection 7.5 of the Adult Protective Services Act. (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nSection 8 of the Adult Protective Services Act (320 ILCS 20/8 (West 2023\n\nSupp.)) states that \"[ a] ll records concerning reports of abuse, abandonment, neglect, financial\nexploitation, or self-neglect and all records generated as a result of such reports shall be\nconfidential and shall not be disclosed except as specifically authorized by this Act or other\napplicable law.\" Section 8 lists the categories of individuals or entities permitted access to those\nrecords. Among the individuals eligible to receive copies of the records is \"[ a] n eligible adult\nreported to be abused, abandoned, neglected, financially exploited, or self-neglected, or such\nadult's authorized guardian or agent, unless such guardian or agent is the abuser or the alleged\nabuser[.]\" 320 ILCS 20/8(4) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\nThe administrative rules implementing section 8 of the Adult Protective Services\n\nAct, which the Department cited, further specify that the records may be released to a legal\nguardian or agent \" who has current authority to act on behalf of the eligible adult when access to\nthose records is relevant to representing the interests of the eligible adult, and a complete\nauthorization for release of records is submitted, unless the guardian or agent is\nthe substantiated abuser or is the alleged abuser in an open case[.]\" 89 Ill. Admin. Code § \n270.275(d)(6) (2024), as amended at 42 Ill. Reg. 9226, effective July 1, 2018. (Italics removed.) \n\n1) supporting documentation of the agency or guardianship\nevidencing current authority and the extent of the authority to act\non behalf of the eligible adult or his or her estate; and\n\n2) a sworn statement as to the purpose of the request and its\nrelevance to representing the interests of the eligible adult or his or\nher estate.[ 6] \n\nThe Department has indicated that your FOIA request concerns records relating to\n\nalleged abuse. Under section 8 of the Adult Protective Services Act, all records related to abuse\nare confidential, and therefore exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7.5(y) of FOIA. \nAdditionally, your FOIA request to the Department did not include the required written\nauthorization certifying that you are your mother's legal guardian or agent, the extent of your\nauthority to act on her behalf, and a sworn statement describing the purpose of your request and\nits relevance to the interests of your mother. Please note, however, that even with a signed\nauthorization, the Department\nis the substantiated abuser or is the alleged abuser in an open case.\" 7 Because the rules\nimplementing the Adult Protective Services Act prohibit disclosure of the responsive records\nwithout the required written authorization, this office concludes that the Department did not\nimproperly deny your request. \n\nis prohibited from disclosing records where the \" guardian or agent\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82350 f no fi war sa\n\n689 Ill. Admin. Code § 270.275(e) (2024), as amended at 42 Ill. Reg. 9226, effective July 1, 2018. \n\n789 Ill. Admin. Code § 270.275(d)(6) (2024), as amended at 42 Ill. Reg. 9226, effective July 1, \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Priscilla Chapman\nFOIA Officer and Deputy General Counsel\nIllinois Department on Aging\n555 West Monroe Street, Suite 1500S\nChicago, Illinois 60661\naging. foia@illinois. gov"}
{"id":1078,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-09-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82465"],"title":"Chicago Park District improperly withheld police activity logs under 7(1)(v)","filename":"82465, issued September 24, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1437,"summary":"The requester sought police logs for Touhy Park, which the Chicago Park District partially redacted citing various FOIA exemptions. The PAC determined the District failed to justify the redactions and improperly withheld the information.","plain_summary":"This determination addresses whether the Chicago Park District properly withheld portions of a daily police log under FOIA exemption 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(v), which protects vulnerability assessments and security measures from disclosure. The Public Access Bureau held that the Park District failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the redacted 'Exterior Premise Check' and 'Interior Premise Check' entries qualified for the exemption, because the log reflected only routine law enforcement activity rather than specialized security measures or plans designed to prevent or respond to attacks. The Bureau reasoned that section 7(1)(v) must be narrowly construed and requires a showing that disclosure could reasonably jeopardize the effectiveness of specific security measures or personnel/public safety, which the Park District did not demonstrate. The Park District, a park district public body, was found to have improperly denied the requested police log information.","holding":"A public body invoking the section 7(1)(v) exemption must show by clear and convincing evidence that the withheld material constitutes vulnerability assessments, security measures, or response plans whose disclosure could reasonably jeopardize their effectiveness or personnel/public safety; routine police activity logs do not meet this standard.","legal_question":"Whether the Chicago Park District properly applied FOIA exemptions 7(1)(b), 7(1)(d)(v), and 7(1)(v) to redact information from police activity logs.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(d)(v)","7(1)(v)"],"public_body":"Chicago Park District","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request concerned police activity logs for Touhy Park, specifically regarding premise checks and personnel contact information.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_v/82465%2C%20issued%20September%2024%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","redaction","security exemption","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"September 24, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Karen Choudhury\nFreedom of Information Counsel\nChicago Park District\n4830 South Western Avenue\nChicago,  Illinois 60609\nfoia@chicagoparkdistrict.com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82465\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Choudhury: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Chicago Park District (Park District) improperly\ndenied information responsive to\n\nJuly 11, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Park District seeking\n\npolice logs for Touhy Park for the week of March 11, 2024, through March 18, 2024.  On July\n19, 2024,  the Park District provided the requested police log with the entries for Beat #,  Star #, \nExterior Premise Check, Comment, Interior Premise Check, and Park Personnel Contacted\nredacted pursuant to sections 7(1)( b),  7(1)( d)( v), and 7(1)( v) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)( b), \n1)(d)(v), (1)(v) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024).  \nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the\nOn August 5, 2024, \npartial denial. \n\n\fMs. Karen Choudhury\nSeptember 24, 2024\nPage 2\n\nOn August 13, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Park District and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the contested record for this\noffice's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for\nthe applicability of the asserted exemptions.   On August 20, 2024,  the Park District provided\n\nwith a copy of the police log with only the entries for Exterior Premise Check and Interior\n\nto section 7(1)( v).  On August 21,  2024, \n\nresponse.   Accordingly,  on August 25, 2024,  this office asked the Park\n\nPremise Check redacted pursuant\nan e-mail to this office that she still wished to contest the remaining redactions in the Park\nDistrict' s supplemental\nDistrict to provide a written response addressing the applicability of the section 7(1)(v) \nexemption,  along with an unredacted copy of the police log.   On September 3, 2024,  this office\nreceived the requested materials, which included both a complete version of the Park District's\nwritten response for this office' s confidential\nforward to\nconfidential\n\nreview and a redacted version for this office to\n1 On September 16, 2024, this office forwarded the Park District's non-\n\nshe replied on September 17, 2024. \n\nresponse to\n\nconfirmed in\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)( v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nVulnerability assessments,  security measures,  and response\npolicies or plans that are designed to identify, prevent, or respond\nto potential attacks upon a community' s population or systems, \nfacilities, or installations, the destruction or contamination of\nwhich would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or\nsafety of the community, but only to the extent that disclosure\ncould reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the\nmeasures or the safety of the personnel who implement them or the\npublic.   Information exempt under this item may include such\nthings as details pertaining to the mobilization or deployment of\n\n1See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of\n\nthe answer to the person submitting the request for review, with any alleged confidential information to which the\nrequest pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\n\fMs. Karen Choudhury\nSeptember 24, 2024\nPage 3\n\npersonnel or equipment, to the operation of communication\nsystems or protocols,  or to tactical operations. \n\nBy its plain language,  section 7(1)( v) applies to records involved in identifying,  preventing,  or\nresponding to potential attacks.  The legislative history behind the exemption further confirms\nthat the exemption is largely intended to exempt records involved in homeland security and\nemergency preparations.  See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48212, issued November 2, \n2017,  at 7 (House Sponsor James H. Meyer explained that the bill \" exempts documents prepared\nfor emergency and security procedures from being disclosed from homeland security where that\nwould be compromised.\"). \n\nIn its non- confidential\n\nresponse to this office,  the Park District argued: \n\nThe vulnerability exemption was appropriately applied to the\nFOIA 5676 Daily Police Log information that reveals the planning\nand procedures on ' how'  to keep a park safe.  First, ' Exterior\nPremise Check' and 'Interior Premise Check' fall within\nvulnerability assessments,  security measures,  and response policies\nor plans. Second, the FOIA 5676 Daily Police Log itself is a\nstandard document created for the purpose of identifying, \npreventing, or responding to potential security concerns for a\ncommunity or its infrastructure.  Third,  in this case,  the disclosure\nof the redacted information would expose current security\ninitiatives at Touhy Park and for its community,  which,  if revealed, \ncould expose a security vulnerability or jeopardize the\neffectiveness of the measures,  policies,  or plans,  or the safety of\nthe personnel who implement them and/or the public. \n\nIn Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, \nthe Illinois Appellate Court analyzed the applicability of section 7(1)( v) to rail platform camera\nrecordings maintained by the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA).  In Chicago Sun-Times, the\nCTA argued that it properly withheld surveillance camera video recordings from its rail\nplatforms pursuant to section 7(1)(v) because the surveillance cameras were installed after the\nSeptember 11, 2001,  terrorist attacks,  with funds from a U.S. Department of Homeland Security\nprogram designed to protect the public and critical infrastructure.  Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL\nApp ( 1st)  192028, ¶  48.   In concluding that \"[ t]he CTA sufficiently demonstrated that disclosure\nof its surveillance camera footage from the rail platform could reasonably be expected to\njeopardize the effectiveness of its security measures[,]\" \nhomeland security expert averred that the requested platform footage \"revealed the quality, \nresolution,  field of view,  and blind spots of the CTA' s surveillance cameras,  and that information\ncould enable individuals to evade these security devices when targeting passengers, planning\n\nthe court cited an affidavit in which a\n\n\fMs. Karen Choudhury\nSeptember 24, 2024\nPage 4\n\nattacks, or evading capture by law enforcement.\"   Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL App (1st) \n192028, ¶  49. \n\nUnlike the evidence the CTA set forth in Chicago Sun- Times concerning how\n\nexposure of the views from the platform cameras would jeopardize the CTA's counterterrorism\nmeasures,  the Park District has not demonstrated that the redacted columns in the Touhy Park\npolice long are vulnerability assessments, security measures, or response policies or plans that\nare designed to identify,  prevent,  or respond to potential attacks upon a community' s population\nor systems, facilities, or installations, as is necessary to qualify for the exemption.  See Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 71393,  issued June 27,  2022,  at 5 (explaining the homeland security\npurpose of the exemption).  In contrast to the type of specialized security measures the section\n7(1)( v) exemption is designed to protect,  the daily police log reflects merely routine law\nenforcement activity.  Further, it is not apparent to this office how the redacted information\nwould expose the Park District' s current security initiatives;  the columns simply document dates, \ntimes, and general reasons that particular employees conducted surveillance.  They do not reveal\ndetails of any security measures that could be exploited to jeopardize their effectiveness or the\n\nsafety of personnel or members of the public.   Because FOIA exemptions must be read narrowly\nand because the Park District' s response does not show that the particular language of section\n7(1)(v) applies to daily police activity logs, this office concludes that the Park District did not\nsustain its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any portions of the log are\nexempt.  This office asks the Park District to provide\nwith an unredacted copy of the\nrecord. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or ( 773)  590- 7878.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82465 f 71v improper pkd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police activity logs for a park","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82465/","full_text":"September 24, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Karen Choudhury\nFreedom of Information Counsel\nChicago Park District\n4830 South Western Avenue\nChicago, Illinois 60609\nfoia@chicagoparkdistrict.com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82465\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Choudhury: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Chicago Park District (Park District) improperly\ndenied information responsive to\n\nJuly 11, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Park District seeking\n\npolice logs for Touhy Park for the week of March 11, 2024, through March 18, 2024. On July\n19, 2024, the Park District provided the requested police log with the entries for Beat #, Star #, \nExterior Premise Check, Comment, Interior Premise Check, and Park Personnel Contacted\nredacted pursuant to sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(d)(v), and 7(1)(v) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(b), \n1)(d)(v), (1)(v) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024). \n\nOn August 13, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Park District and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the contested record for this\noffice's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for\nthe applicability of the asserted exemptions. On August 20, 2024, the Park District provided\n\nwith a copy of the police log with only the entries for Exterior Premise Check and Interior\n\nto section 7(1)(v). On August 21, 2024, \n\nresponse. Accordingly, on August 25, 2024, this office asked the Park\n\nPremise Check redacted pursuant\nan e-mail to this office that she still wished to contest the remaining redactions in the Park\nDistrict's supplemental\nDistrict to provide a written response addressing the applicability of the section 7(1)(v) \nexemption, along with an unredacted copy of the police log. On September 3, 2024, this office\nreceived the requested materials, which included both a complete version of the Park District's\nwritten response for this office's confidential\nforward to\nconfidential\n\nreview and a redacted version for this office to\n1 On September 16, 2024, this office forwarded the Park District's non-\n\nshe replied on September 17, 2024. \n\nresponse to\n\nconfirmed in\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nVulnerability assessments, security measures, and response\npolicies or plans that are designed to identify, prevent, or respond\nto potential attacks upon a community's population or systems, \nfacilities, or installations, the destruction or contamination of\nwhich would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or\nsafety of the community, but only to the extent that disclosure\ncould reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the\nmeasures or the safety of the personnel who implement them or the\npublic. Information exempt under this item may include such\nthings as details pertaining to the mobilization or deployment of\n\n1 See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of\n\nthe answer to the person submitting the request for review, with any alleged confidential information to which the\n\npersonnel or equipment, to the operation of communication\nsystems or protocols, or to tactical operations. \n\nBy its plain language, section 7(1)(v) applies to records involved in identifying, preventing, or\nresponding to potential attacks. The legislative history behind the exemption further confirms\nthat the exemption is largely intended to exempt records involved in homeland security and\nemergency preparations. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48212, issued November 2, \n2017, at 7 (House Sponsor James H. Meyer explained that the bill \" exempts documents prepared\nfor emergency and security procedures from being disclosed from homeland security where that\nwould be compromised.\"). \n\nIn its non- confidential\n\nresponse to this office, the Park District argued: \n\nThe vulnerability exemption was appropriately applied to the\nFOIA 5676 Daily Police Log information that reveals the planning\nand procedures on ' how' to keep a park safe. First, ' Exterior\nPremise Check' and 'Interior Premise Check' fall within\nvulnerability assessments, security measures, and response policies\nor plans. Second, the FOIA 5676 Daily Police Log itself is a\nstandard document created for the purpose of identifying, \npreventing, or responding to potential security concerns for a\ncommunity or its infrastructure. Third, in this case, the disclosure\nof the redacted information would expose current security\ninitiatives at Touhy Park and for its community, which, if revealed, \ncould expose a security vulnerability or jeopardize the\neffectiveness of the measures, policies, or plans, or the safety of\nthe personnel who implement them and/or the public. \n\nIn Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, \nthe Illinois Appellate Court analyzed the applicability of section 7(1)(v) to rail platform camera\nrecordings maintained by the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). In Chicago Sun-Times, the\nCTA argued that it properly withheld surveillance camera video recordings from its rail\nplatforms pursuant to section 7(1)(v) because the surveillance cameras were installed after the\nSeptember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, with funds from a U.S. Department of Homeland Security\nprogram designed to protect the public and critical infrastructure. Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL\nApp (1st) 192028, ¶ 48. In concluding that \"[ t]he CTA sufficiently demonstrated that disclosure\nof its surveillance camera footage from the rail platform could reasonably be expected to\njeopardize the effectiveness of its security measures[,]\" \nhomeland security expert averred that the requested platform footage \"revealed the quality, \nresolution, field of view, and blind spots of the CTA's surveillance cameras, and that information\ncould enable individuals to evade these security devices when targeting passengers, planning\n\nattacks, or evading capture by law enforcement.\" Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL App (1st) \n192028, ¶ 49. \n\nUnlike the evidence the CTA set forth in Chicago Sun- Times concerning how\n\nexposure of the views from the platform cameras would jeopardize the CTA's counterterrorism\nmeasures, the Park District has not demonstrated that the redacted columns in the Touhy Park\npolice long are vulnerability assessments, security measures, or response policies or plans that\nare designed to identify, prevent, or respond to potential attacks upon a community's population\nor systems, facilities, or installations, as is necessary to qualify for the exemption. See Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 71393, issued June 27, 2022, at 5 (explaining the homeland security\npurpose of the exemption). In contrast to the type of specialized security measures the section\n7(1)(v) exemption is designed to protect, the daily police log reflects merely routine law\nenforcement activity. Further, it is not apparent to this office how the redacted information\nwould expose the Park District's current security initiatives; the columns simply document dates, \ntimes, and general reasons that particular employees conducted surveillance. They do not reveal\ndetails of any security measures that could be exploited to jeopardize their effectiveness or the\n\nsafety of personnel or members of the public. Because FOIA exemptions must be read narrowly\nand because the Park District's response does not show that the particular language of section\n7(1)(v) applies to daily police activity logs, this office concludes that the Park District did not\nsustain its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any portions of the log are\nexempt. This office asks the Park District to provide\nwith an unredacted copy of the\nrecord. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773) 590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82465 f 71v improper pkd"}
{"id":1079,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-04","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82484"],"title":"Village of Orland Park improperly withheld audit records under section 7(1)(m)","filename":"82484, issued December 4, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1479,"summary":"The requester sought emails, records provided to auditors, and agreements with auditors from the Village of Orland Park, which the Village partially denied under section 7(1)(m). The PAC determined the Village failed to meet its burden of proof to justify the exemption and requested the Village provide the records.","plain_summary":"A resident requested financial records and audit-related documents from the Village of Orland Park. The Village denied access to some of these records, claiming they were exempt under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA, which covers communications with auditors and internal audits. The Attorney General's office found that the Village did not provide enough evidence to prove the records were actually exempt and instructed them to provide the requested information.","holding":"The Village of Orland Park improperly withheld records by failing to demonstrate that the requested documents were exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(m).","legal_question":"Did the Village of Orland Park meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that records provided to auditors were exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(m)"],"public_body":"Village of Orland Park","requesting_party":"Christopher Frankenfield","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"financial records","subject_description":"The request concerned records provided to and from the Village's auditors for the years 2022 and 2023.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_m/Internal-audits/82484%2C%20issued%20December%204%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["audit records","attorney-client privilege","FOIA denial","burden of proof"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Legal & Financial Records","full_text_pre_clean":"December 4, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Anne Skrodzki\nKlein, Thorpe and Jenkins\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nAmskrodzki@ktjlaw. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82484\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Skrodzki: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Village of Orland Park ( Village)  improperly responded\nto\n\nJuly 20, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a three- point FOIA request to the Village\n\nseeking ( 1) all e-mails to and from the auditors for 2022 and 2023, ( 2) all of the records given to\nthe auditors and ( 3) copies of the agreements with the auditors.   On August 6, 2024,  the Village\nresponded and provided\nrequest and informed him that the first part was voluminous under section 2(h) (5 ILCS 140/ 2(h) \nWest 2023 Supp.)).  The Village denied the records responsive to the second part of the request\npursuant to section 7(1)(m) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by\nPublic Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024).   On that same date, \nreferenced Request for Review asserting that the Village had not filed audits required by State\n\nwith the agreements responsive to the third part of the\n\nsubmitted the above-\n\n\fMs. Anne M. Skrodzki\nDecember 4, 2024\nPage 2\n\nlaw and that \"[ t]he taxpayers have a right to all records given to the auditor[.]\" 1\n\nOn August 23, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Village and requested unredacted copies of the records responsive to the second part of the\nrequest,  together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the applicability of\nthe section 7(1)(m) exemption. 2 On August 30, 2024 the Village responded and provided this\noffice with a representative sample of the withheld documents and a written response. 3 On\nSeptember 3, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy the Village' s response to\non that same date by narrowing his request to certain records such as copies of contracts for\nservices by vendors that were provided to auditors and various records related to the provision\nand costs of legal services.  \n\nhe replied\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep' t of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)( m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:  \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney or auditor\nrepresenting the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, \nand materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a\ncriminal,  civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney\n\n2024).  \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau,  Office of the Attorney General] ( August 6,  \n\n2Because the Village treated the first part of the request as voluminous rather than denying it and\ndid not dispute that the request qualified as a voluminous request under section 2(h) of FOIA, \n\nbecause\nthis office did not review that part of Village' s response.   See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) ( West 2023 Supp.) ( authorizing the\nPublic Access Counselor to review denials of FOIA requests;  5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(b-5) (West 2023 Supp.) ( authorizing\nPublic Access Counselor to review whether request is voluminous).  \n\n3In its response,  the Village notes that over 10,000 pages of responsive records were transferred to\n\nthe auditor for the 2022 and 2023 audits.   The representative sample furnished to this office consist of external\ndocuments such as balance sheets,  trial balance accounts and bank statements.  \n\n\fMs. Anne M. Skrodzki\nDecember 4, 2024\nPage 3\n\nadvising the public body,  and materials prepared or compiled with respect to\ninternal audits of public bodies. \n\nIn its response to this office, the Village states that the records at issue are\n\ninternal materials provided to the auditors in order to produce the delayed 2022 and 2023 audits\nneither of which have been completed)\"  which \" are definitionally included in the 7(1)(m) \nexemption[.]\" 4 This response also notes that its documents were received by the Village' s\nauditor,  Sikich,  LLP.   In a supplemental response sent to this office on September 11, 2024,  the\nVillage asserted that the records concern \" an internal,  Village conducted and controlled audit.\" 5\n\nThe primary objective when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain\nand give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.   DeLuna v. Burciaga,  223 Ill. 2d 49, 59\n2006).  \" The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language,  given its plain\nand ordinary meaning.\"   Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of Orland Fire Protection District,  2012\nIL 110012, ¶  56.  Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,  a reviewing body\nmay not depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions,  limitations,  or\nconditions that the legislature did not express.\"   Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & \nProfessional Regulation,  2014 IL 116023, ¶  16.  \n\nBlack' s Law Dictionary defines an \" internal audit\"  is defined as \"[ a] n audit\n\nperformed by an organization' s personnel to ensure that internal procedures,  operations,  and\naccounting practices are in proper order.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Black' s Law Dictionary ( 10th ed. \n2014),  available at Westlaw BLACKS.   Based on the plain language of that term, the Public\nAccess Bureau has previously determined that audits prepared by external entities do not\nconstitute \" materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies\" \nwithin the meaning of section 7(1)(m).  See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 44377, \nissued February 1, 2017,  at 10 (audit report created by private accounting firm for public body\nnot exempt under section 7(1)(m)); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 17844, issued April 11, \n2012,  at 3 (\" Although th[e]  portion of the audit report [ at issue]  may pertain to 'internal control,' \nthat does not mean that it is an internal audit.\");  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 14434,  issued\nSeptember 6, 2011,  at 2 (distinguishing an internal audit as one prepared by a public body' s\npersonnel from an independent audit,  which is prepared by an outside source).  \n\nDespite the Village' s assertion that the records in question relate to internal audits, \n\nthe Village hired an external auditor.   The recently- completed Annual Comprehensive Financial\nReport for 2022 posted on the State Comptroller' s website includes a letter from the Village' s\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General ( August 30, 2024). \n\n4Letter from Anne M. Skrodzki,  Village Attorney to Mr. Matthew Rogina,  Public Access Bureau, \n\n2024).  \n\n5E- mail from Anne M. Skrodzki,  Klein, Thorpe &  Jenkins,  to Matthew Rogina ( September 11,  \n\n\fMs. Anne M. Skrodzki\nDecember 4, 2024\nPage 4\n\nFinance Director stating that \" Sikich CPA LLC, a firm of independent certified public\naccountants[ ]\"  performed an \" independent audit[.]\" 6 The \" Independent Auditor' s Report\" \nprepared by the external auditor notes that \"[ w]e are required to be independent of the Village\nand to meet our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with the relevant ethical requirements\nrelating to our audit.\" 7 Such an audit is not an \" internal audit\"  under the plain language of the\ndefinition of that term.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the Village has not sustained its\nburden of demonstrating that the records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(m) \nof FOIA.  \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed above,  this office requests that the\n\nwith the specific records that he identified in his reply.   If any\n\nVillage provide\ndiscrete information is redacted,  the Village should provide a partial notice of denial in\naccordance with section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 9 (West 2022)).   The Public Access Counselor\nhas determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion.  \nThis letter serves to close this matter.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\nMatthew. Rogina@ilag. gov or (312)  814- 3180.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82484 f 71m improper mun\n\nPekau,  Members of the Village Board,  and Citizens of the Village of Orland Park,  Illinois ( November 4, 2024),  at i.  \n\n6Letter from Christopher Frankenfield,  Finance Director,  Orland Park,  to the Honorable Keith\n\nMembers of the Board of Trustees ( November 4, 2024),  at 1. \n\n7Independent Auditor' s Report submitted by Sikich CPA LLC, to The Honorbale President and\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Records provided to a village's auditors","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82484/","full_text":"December 4, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Anne Skrodzki\nKlein, Thorpe and Jenkins\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nAmskrodzki@ktjlaw. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82484\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Skrodzki: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Village of Orland Park (Village) improperly responded\nto\n\nJuly 20, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a three- point FOIA request to the Village\n\nseeking (1) all e-mails to and from the auditors for 2022 and 2023, (2) all of the records given to\nthe auditors and (3) copies of the agreements with the auditors. On August 6, 2024, the Village\nresponded and provided\nrequest and informed him that the first part was voluminous under section 2(h) (5 ILCS 140/ 2(h) \nWest 2023 Supp.)). The Village denied the records responsive to the second part of the request\npursuant to section 7(1)(m) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by\nPublic Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024). On that same date, \nreferenced Request for Review asserting that the Village had not filed audits required by State\n\nlaw and that \"[ t]he taxpayers have a right to all records given to the auditor[.]\" 1\n\nOn August 23, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Village and requested unredacted copies of the records responsive to the second part of the\nrequest, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the applicability of\nthe section 7(1)(m) exemption. 2 On August 30, 2024 the Village responded and provided this\noffice with a representative sample of the withheld documents and a written response. 3 On\nSeptember 3, 2024, this office forwarded a copy the Village's response to\non that same date by narrowing his request to certain records such as copies of contracts for\nservices by vendors that were provided to auditors and various records related to the provision\nand costs of legal services. \n\nhe replied\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep' t of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney or auditor\nrepresenting the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, \nand materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a\ncriminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney\n\n2024). \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Attorney General] (August 6, \n\n2 Because the Village treated the first part of the request as voluminous rather than denying it and\ndid not dispute that the request qualified as a voluminous request under section 2(h) of FOIA, \n\nbecause\nthis office did not review that part of Village's response. See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) (West 2023 Supp.) (authorizing the\nPublic Access Counselor to review denials of FOIA requests; 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(b-5) (West 2023 Supp.) (authorizing\nPublic Access Counselor to review whether request is voluminous). \n\n3 In its response, the Village notes that over 10,000 pages of responsive records were transferred to\n\nthe auditor for the 2022 and 2023 audits. The representative sample furnished to this office consist of external\n\nadvising the public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect to\ninternal audits of public bodies. \n\nIn its response to this office, the Village states that the records at issue are\n\ninternal materials provided to the auditors in order to produce the delayed 2022 and 2023 audits\nneither of which have been completed)\" which \" are definitionally included in the 7(1)(m) \nexemption[.]\" 4 This response also notes that its documents were received by the Village's\nauditor, Sikich, LLP. In a supplemental response sent to this office on September 11, 2024, the\nVillage asserted that the records concern \" an internal, Village conducted and controlled audit.\" 5\n\nThe primary objective when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain\nand give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59\n2006). \" The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain\nand ordinary meaning.\" Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of Orland Fire Protection District, 2012\nIL 110012, ¶ 56. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing body\nmay not depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or\nconditions that the legislature did not express.\" Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & \nProfessional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 16. \n\nBlack's Law Dictionary defines an \" internal audit\" is defined as \"[ a] n audit\n\nperformed by an organization's personnel to ensure that internal procedures, operations, and\naccounting practices are in proper order.\" (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. \n2014), available at Westlaw BLACKS. Based on the plain language of that term, the Public\nAccess Bureau has previously determined that audits prepared by external entities do not\nconstitute \" materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies\" \nwithin the meaning of section 7(1)(m). See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 44377, \nissued February 1, 2017, at 10 (audit report created by private accounting firm for public body\nnot exempt under section 7(1)(m)); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 17844, issued April 11, \n2012, at 3 (\" Although th[e] portion of the audit report [ at issue] may pertain to 'internal control,' \nthat does not mean that it is an internal audit.\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 14434, issued\nSeptember 6, 2011, at 2 (distinguishing an internal audit as one prepared by a public body's\npersonnel from an independent audit, which is prepared by an outside source). \n\nDespite the Village's assertion that the records in question relate to internal audits, \n\nthe Village hired an external auditor. The recently- completed Annual Comprehensive Financial\nReport for 2022 posted on the State Comptroller's website includes a letter from the Village's\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General (August 30, 2024). \n\n4 Letter from Anne M. Skrodzki, Village Attorney to Mr. Matthew Rogina, Public Access Bureau, \n\nFinance Director stating that \" Sikich CPA LLC, a firm of independent certified public\naccountants[ ]\" performed an \" independent audit[.]\" 6 The \" Independent Auditor's Report\" \nprepared by the external auditor notes that \"[ w]e are required to be independent of the Village\nand to meet our other ethical responsibilities in accordance with the relevant ethical requirements\nrelating to our audit.\" 7 Such an audit is not an \" internal audit\" under the plain language of the\ndefinition of that term. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Village has not sustained its\nburden of demonstrating that the records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(m) \nof FOIA. \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed above, this office requests that the\n\nwith the specific records that he identified in his reply. If any\n\nVillage provide\ndiscrete information is redacted, the Village should provide a partial notice of denial in\naccordance with section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 9 (West 2022)). The Public Access Counselor\nhas determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion. \nThis letter serves to close this matter. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nMatthew. Rogina@ilag. gov or (312) 814- 3180. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82484 f 71m improper mun\n\nPekau, Members of the Village Board, and Citizens of the Village of Orland Park, Illinois (November 4, 2024), at i. \n\n6 Letter from Christopher Frankenfield, Finance Director, Orland Park, to the Honorable Keith\n\nMembers of the Board of Trustees (November 4, 2024), at 1. \n\n7 Independent Auditor's Report submitted by Sikich CPA LLC, to The Honorbale President and"}
{"id":1080,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-21","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82571"],"title":"Village of Bartlett properly redacted witness-identifying info from police report under 7(1)(d)(iv)","filename":"82571, issued October 21, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":938,"summary":"The requester challenged the Village of Bartlett's redaction of a police report, specifically seeking the name of an individual and a redacted sentence. The PAC determined that the Village properly withheld the information under FOIA section 7(1)(d)(iv).","plain_summary":"A citizen requested a police report from the Village of Bartlett, but the Village redacted certain information. The citizen asked the Attorney General's office to review the redactions. The PAC concluded that the Village acted legally because the redacted information could identify witnesses or confidential sources, which is protected under state law.","holding":"The Village of Bartlett did not violate FOIA by redacting the name of an individual and a sentence from a police report, as the information was exempt under section 7(1)(d)(iv).","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Bartlett properly redacted the name of an individual and a sentence from a police report pursuant to FOIA section 7(1)(d)(iv).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(iv)"],"public_body":"Village of Bartlett","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought the identity of an individual and a specific sentence redacted from a police report.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_iv/82571%2C%20issued%20October%2021%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","redaction","witness identity","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kelly A. Coyle\nClark Baird Smith Law\n6133 North River Road, Suite 1120\nRosemont,  Illinois 60018\nkcoyle@cbslawyers. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82571;  W011628- 080724\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Coyle: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe response by the Village of Bartlett ( Village)  to\nAugust 7, \n2024,  FOIA request did not violate the requirements of FOIA. \n\nOn August 7, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village\n\nseeking a specified police report.   On August 9, 2024,  the Village partially denied\n\nrequest pursuant to multiple sections of FOIA.  On August 15, 2024,  this office\n\nreceived\nSpecifically, \nthat was covered up in this report.\" 2\n\nRequest for Review challenging the Village' s denial.  \n\nstated she is \" just requesting the name and whatever sentence\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Public Access ( August 12, 2024).  \n\n\fMs. Kelly A. Coyle\nOctober 21, 2024\nPage 2\n\nOn August 20, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office's\nconfidential review,  together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nFOIA exemptions it asserted.   On August 28, 2024,  the Village provided the requested records.  \nOn August 30, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Village' s response to\n\nwith an opportunity to reply;  she did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).   \n\nSection 7(1)( d)( iv) of FOIA 3 exempts from disclosure: \n\nRecords in the possession of any public body created in the\n\nd) \ncourse of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would:  \n\nunavoidably disclose the identity of a confidential\n\niv) \nsource,  confidential\nconfidential source,  or persons who file complaints with or\nprovide information to administrative,  investigative,  law\nenforcement,  or penal agencies[.]  ( Emphasis added.) \n\ninformation furnished only by the\n\nThis provision allows police departments to protect the anonymity of both confidential\ninformants and other persons who provide them with information.   See,  e.g., Chicago Alliance\nfor Neighborhood Safety v. Town of Chicago,  348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 200-01 ( 2004) ( names and\naddresses of beat meeting participants properly redacted because they provided information to\npolice department).   A witness statement may be withheld in its entirety only if disclosure of its\ncontents \" would necessarily result in the disclosure of the identity of that source\"  of information\n\n2024.  \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n\fMs. Kelly A. Coyle\nOctober 21, 2024\nPage 3\n\nand,  therefore, \" redaction of the [ statement]  cannot be meaningfully accomplished.\"   Copley\nPress, Inc. v. City of Springfield,  266 Ill. App. 3d 421, 426 ( 1994).   \n\nThis office has also previously determined that where there are a limited number\nindividuals who could have made the statement,  the statement can be withheld in its\n\nof potential\nentirety if the contents of the statement would unavoidably disclose the source.   Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 68998,  issued April 13, 2022,  at 5-6 (determining that descriptions from the\nsmall number of individuals involved in an incident could be withheld from a requester who was\nalso involved in the incident,  but a statement from a witness the requester did not interact with\nduring the incident was not exempt from disclosure).   See also Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. \n51832,  issued July 25, 2018,  at 5 (determining that a public body did not improperly withhold\nthe statements of multiple witnesses who worked in the same \" small department\"  as the\nrequester);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 75565,  issued September 28, 2023,  at 4\ndetermining that \" information from which inferences could be drawn to limit the number of\npossible complainants to certain potentially identifiable individuals\"  was properly withheld).  \n\nBased on the plain language of section 7(1)(d)( iv), the Village did not improperly\n\nredact the name of the individual who provided information to the Village Police Department.  \nAdditionally,  this office's review of the unredacted record confirms that the release of the\nredacted sentence would limit the number of possible witnesses to certain potentially identifiable\nindividuals.   Accordingly,  the Village has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the name of\nthe individual and the single sentence of the report are exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA.  Because the information was properly withheld under section\n7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA, this office will not address the other exemptions asserted by the Village. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov.  Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82571 f 71div proper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Redacted name and sentence in a police report","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82571/","full_text":"October 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kelly A. Coyle\nClark Baird Smith Law\n6133 North River Road, Suite 1120\nRosemont, Illinois 60018\nkcoyle@cbslawyers. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82571; W011628- 080724\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Coyle: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe response by the Village of Bartlett (Village) to\nAugust 7, \n2024, FOIA request did not violate the requirements of FOIA. \n\nOn August 7, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village\n\nseeking a specified police report. On August 9, 2024, the Village partially denied\n\nrequest pursuant to multiple sections of FOIA. On August 15, 2024, this office\n\nreceived\nSpecifically, \nthat was covered up in this report.\" 2\n\nOn August 20, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office's\nconfidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nFOIA exemptions it asserted. On August 28, 2024, the Village provided the requested records. \nOn August 30, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's response to\n\nwith an opportunity to reply; she did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dep't of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA 3 exempts from disclosure: \n\nRecords in the possession of any public body created in the\n\nd) \ncourse of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\nunavoidably disclose the identity of a confidential\n\niv) \nsource, confidential\nconfidential source, or persons who file complaints with or\nprovide information to administrative, investigative, law\nenforcement, or penal agencies[.] (Emphasis added.) \n\ninformation furnished only by the\n\nThis provision allows police departments to protect the anonymity of both confidential\ninformants and other persons who provide them with information. See, e.g., Chicago Alliance\nfor Neighborhood Safety v. Town of Chicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 200-01 (2004) (names and\naddresses of beat meeting participants properly redacted because they provided information to\npolice department). A witness statement may be withheld in its entirety only if disclosure of its\ncontents \" would necessarily result in the disclosure of the identity of that source\" of information\n\n2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\nand, therefore, \" redaction of the [ statement] cannot be meaningfully accomplished.\" Copley\nPress, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 266 Ill. App. 3d 421, 426 (1994). \n\nThis office has also previously determined that where there are a limited number\nindividuals who could have made the statement, the statement can be withheld in its\n\nof potential\nentirety if the contents of the statement would unavoidably disclose the source. Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 68998, issued April 13, 2022, at 5-6 (determining that descriptions from the\nsmall number of individuals involved in an incident could be withheld from a requester who was\nalso involved in the incident, but a statement from a witness the requester did not interact with\nduring the incident was not exempt from disclosure). See also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n51832, issued July 25, 2018, at 5 (determining that a public body did not improperly withhold\nthe statements of multiple witnesses who worked in the same \" small department\" as the\nrequester); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 75565, issued September 28, 2023, at 4\ndetermining that \" information from which inferences could be drawn to limit the number of\npossible complainants to certain potentially identifiable individuals\" was properly withheld). \n\nBased on the plain language of section 7(1)(d)(iv), the Village did not improperly\n\nredact the name of the individual who provided information to the Village Police Department. \nAdditionally, this office's review of the unredacted record confirms that the release of the\nredacted sentence would limit the number of possible witnesses to certain potentially identifiable\nindividuals. Accordingly, the Village has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the name of\nthe individual and the single sentence of the report are exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA. Because the information was properly withheld under section\n7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA, this office will not address the other exemptions asserted by the Village. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82571 f 71div proper mun"}
{"id":1081,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-31","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82640"],"title":"Lake County Forest Preserve District improperly denied I-Pass records under multiple FOIA exemptions","filename":"82640, issued December 31, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3610,"summary":"The requester sought I-Pass transponder information for a specific individual, which the Lake County Forest Preserve District denied as an undue burden and exempt under various FOIA provisions. The PAC determined the District failed to demonstrate that the burden of compliance outweighed the public interest in the disclosure of records involving public funds.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for I-Pass records related to a specific person, but the Lake County Forest Preserve District refused, claiming the records were exempt under several FOIA exemptions. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and concluded that the District did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the records were exempt under sections 7(1)(c), 7.5(w), 7(1)(d)(i), or 7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA. The determination found that the District improperly denied the request.","holding":"The Lake County Forest Preserve District improperly denied the FOIA request because it failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the requested records were exempt under sections 7(1)(c), 7.5(w), 7(1)(d)(i), or 7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Did the public body meet its burden of proof to deny a request as unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)","7(1)(d)(i)","7(1)(d)(vi)","7.5(w)"],"public_body":"Lake County Forest Preserve District","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"undue burden","subject_description":"The request sought I-Pass transponder information and associated license plate data for a specific individual.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_w/82640%2C%20issued%20December%2031%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["undue burden","I-Pass records","public funds","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"December 31, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Betsy Gates- Alford\nAttorney for the Lake County Forest Preserve District\nPartner\nBurke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C. \n330 North Wabash Avenue,  21st Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60611\nBGatesAlford@BurkeLaw. com\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82640\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Gates- Alford: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).  For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Lake County Forest Preserve District ( District) \nimproperly denied\n\nJuly 18, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking I-Pass\n\ninformation for Ron Davis and his associated license plate for January 1, 2024, \n\ntransponder\nthrough July 18, 2024.  On July 25, 2024, the District responded that the request as written posed\nan undue burden under section 3(g) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) ( West 2022))  and offered\n\nthe opportunity to narrow it.  On that same date, \n\nconferred with the District and\n\nattempted to narrow his request.   On August 1, 2024,  the District responded that the narrowed\nrequest still posed an undue burden under section 3(g) and offered\nfurther narrow it.  On August 8, 2024,  the District denied\nburdensome under section 3(g), and also stated that the records were exempt under sections\n\nrequest as unduly\n\nthe opportunity to\n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 2\n\n7(1)(c), 7(1)(d)(i), 7(1)(d)(vi), and 7.5(w) of FOIA.1 On August 17, 2024, \nthe above- referenced Request for Review contesting the District' s response. \n\nsubmitted\n\nOn August 28, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe District and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the contested records for this office's\nreview,  together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for its\nconfidential\ndenial.  On September 9, 2024, this office received the requested materials.  On September 16, \n2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the District' s written response to\nSeptember 23, 2024. \n\nHe replied on\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).  The exemptions from disclosure contained in\nsection 7 of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7 (West 2023 Supp.))  are to be narrowly construed.   Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nFurthermore, section 2.5 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2.5 (West 2022)) provides that\n\na] ll records relating to the obligation,  receipt,  and use of public funds of the State,  units of local\n\ngovernment, and school districts are public records subject to inspection and copying by the\npublic,\"  and article VIII, section 1(c) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that \" records\nof the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the State, units of local government and\nschool districts are public records available for inspection by the public according to law.\" \n\nSections 7(1)( c) and 7.5(w) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"  Section 7(1)(c) defines \"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas: \n\nT] he disclosure of information that is highly personal or\nobjectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(c), (1)(d)(i), (1)(d)(vi) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, \n\neffective July 1, 2024; 5 ILCS 140/7.5(w) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n2024;  103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024;  103-786, effective August 7, 2024;  103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024;  103-1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 3\n\nright to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in\nobtaining the information.   The disclosure of information that\nbears on the public duties of public employees and officials\nshall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.  \nEmphasis added.) \n\nThe General Assembly's use of the language \" clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy\"  evinces the \" strict standard\"  that a public body must meet to claim the section 7(1)( c) \nexemption.  (Emphasis in original.)  Schessler v. Department of Conservation, 256 Ill. App. 3d\n198,  202 ( 1994). \n\nSection 7.5(w) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonally identifiable\n\ninformation which is exempted from disclosure under subsection (g) of Section 19.1 of the Toll\nHighway Act.\"   Section 19.1(g) of the Toll Highway Act ( 605 ILCS 10/ 19.1(g) ( West 2022)) \nprovides, in pertinent part: \n\nPersonally identifiable information generated through the\n\nAuthority' s toll collection process that reveals the date,  time, \nlocation or direction of travel by an electronic toll collection\nsystem user shall be exempt from release under the Illinois\nFreedom of Information Act. The exemption in this subsection\nshall not apply to information that concerns ( i) the public\nduties of public employees and officials[.]  (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn its response to this office, the District argued that, although both section 7(1)(c) \n\nand section 7.5(w) do not apply to records bearing on or concerning the public duties of public\nemployees, both exemptions are applicable to portions of the records of Mr. Davis's toll use.  The\nDistrict argued: \n\nin question are made\n\nAlthough the vehicle and transponder\navailable to Chief Davis in connection with his employment, not\nall use of the vehicle concerns his public duties.  A full review of\nthe Responsive Records would be required to determine the extent\nto which transponder\ninformation is subject to this exemption but, \nat a minimum, travel data related to permissible off-duty vehicle\nuse,  such as commuting to and from work,  is exempt from public\ndisclosure.2\n\nBureau ( September 9, 2024),  at 4. \n\n2Letter from Betsy Gates- Alford to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access\n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 4\n\nExamining the \"public duties\" provision in section 7(1)(c), this office previously\n\ndetermined that records revealing the identity of a 9-1-1 caller were exempt from disclosure, \neven though the caller was an off-duty police officer because the officer was acting as a member\nof the general public at the time.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 64579,  issued January 8, \n2021, at 3 (\"It is clear from the recording that the caller did not attempt to execute a traffic stop\nor otherwise respond to the incident in an official capacity.  Instead,  the caller provided\ninformation to enable on-duty police officers to respond, as a member of the public would\nhave.\"). \n\nOn the other hand,  by its plain language,  the limitation in section 7(1)( c) applies\n\nnot only to an employee's on-duty conduct, but to any \"information that bears on the public\nduties of public employees.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Section 19.1(g)  of the Toll Highway Act\nsimilarly does not apply to \"information that concerns the public duties of public employees.\"  \nEmphasis added.)   Thus,  this office has previously determined that some off-duty conduct may\nnonetheless bear on public duties where there is a nexus to the individual's employment.  See, \ne.g., Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 56428,  issued February 6, 2023,  at 3 (concluding records\nconcerning the off-duty conduct of firefighter were not exempt from disclosure where conduct\nnonetheless led to employment- related discipline);  Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 78194,  issued\nDecember 5, 2023, at 6-7 (concluding records concerning police officer's off-duty involvement\nin K-9 officer' s death were not exempt where officer was responsible for K-9 officer even while\noff-duty). \n\nOn November 18, 2024, this office asked the District to provide additional\n\ninformation regarding employees'  use of District- issued toll passes,  including whether portions\nof travel are repaid by employees.  On December 10, 2024, the District provided this office with\na copy of its policies regarding vehicle use and confirmed that,  consistent with its policies,  toll\ncharges are paid by the District.  The District further stated that the District allows use of the\ntransponder\n\nfor commuting to and from work,  but not for personal travel. \n\nMr. Davis has been provided with a benefit in connection with his employment, \n\nthe use of which obligates the District to expend public funds.  The contents of the withheld\nrecords document\nthe use of those public funds and thus are subject to the specific provisions of\nsection 2.5 of FOIA and article VIII, section 1(c) of the State constitution.  Further, the records\ndo not contain highly personal details about Mr. Davis,  such as his home address.   Instead,  the\nrecords show general information about toll sites he has passed while using District equipment.  \nPursuant to District policy,  the records should only reflect the date,  time,  location,  and direction\nof travel used for commuting to and from work.  The District has not established that any of the\nentries in the records concern personal travel unrelated to Mr. Davis'  employment.   Even if the\ntransponder was used for personal travel in violation of District policy, it is unclear how\ndisclosure of records reflecting a public employee' s improper use of a transponder would\nconstitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.  Like the section 7(1)(c) exemption, the\n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 5\n\nexemption for \"personally identifiable information\" under the Toll Highway Act expressly\nexcludes information that concerns the public duties of public employees.   The use of the I-Pass\ntransponder issued to Mr. Davis as a publicly-funded benefit of his employment to travel to and\nfrom work both bear on and concern his public duties.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that\nthe District has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the information in the\ncontested records is exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( c) or 7.5(w) of FOIA. \n\nSections 7(1)( d)(i) and 7(1(d)(vi) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( d)( i) and ( 1)( d)( vi) of FOIA exempt from disclosure: \n\nd)  Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ni)  interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request; \n\nvi) endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\nenforcement personnel or any other person[.] \n\nrecords are exempt from\n\nto demonstrate that law enforcement\n\nConclusory statements that the disclosure of requested records would obstruct a law enforcement\nproceeding are insufficient\ndisclosure under FOIA.  See Day v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74-77 (2009).  In Day, \nthe court explained:  \" Simply saying there is an ' ongoing criminal\ninvestigation because the case\nhas not been cleared,' with little additional explanation, is not 'objective indicia' sufficient to\nshow the ongoing investigation exemption applies.\"   Day,  388 Ill. App.  3d at 76;  see also Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 17-011, issued August 14, 2017, at 7-8 (public body improperly\nwithheld record under section 7(1)( d)( vii) because it failed to demonstrate that disclosure would\ninterfere with law enforcement).  Rather, a public body must demonstrate how disclosure of the\nrecords would interfere with or obstruct an investigation.   See Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, \n192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989) (\" The classification of information as 'law enforcement' or\ninvestigatory'  does not necessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown,  in a particular case, \nthat disclosure would interfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public\ninterest.\"). \n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 6\n\nTo demonstrate that records are exempt under the provision of Federal FOIA that\n\ncorresponds with section 7(1)( d)( vi),3 \"[ a] n agency must identify and explain the reasonable\nthreat of harm imposed on the individuals identified in the records the agency is seeking to\nexempt.\"   King v. United States Department of Justice,  245 F. Supp.  3d 153,  162 ( D.D.C. 2017); \nsee also Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice, 331 F.3d\n918,  948 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) ( records not exempt because agency did not identify reasons that\ndisclosure of information would pose a threat).4 This office has previously determined that\nsection 7(1)( d)( vi) may be applied to highly specific information,  the disclosure of which would\nprovide the public with information that could be exploited to cause identifiable harm to certain\nindividuals.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 39298,  39299,  issued December 6, 2017,  at\n4-5 (noting that this office has consistently determined that information that could be used to\nidentify undercover officers is exempt from disclosure).   By contrast,  this office has found that\npublic bodies failed to meet their burden under section 7(1)(d)(vi) when their assertions were\nconclusory and they did not explain,  nor was it apparent,  how disclosure would endanger any\nindividual.  See e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 38173, issued February 13, 2018, at 3\ndetermining that a city had failed to demonstrate how disclosure of a use of force report would\nendanger any individual's safety). \n\nIn its response to this office, the District stated that the data would reveal patterns\n\nregarding Mr. Davis' s travel and argued that this is \" information related to criminal\ninvestigations and other law enforcement proceedings.\" 5 The District also argued in general\nterms that this \" could be used to maliciously target an individual and,  particularly given the\nnature of Chief Davis’ s duties, this is a meaningful concern that outweighs any minimal public\ninterest in tracking his travel.\"  6 However,  the section 7(1)( d)( i) and 7(1)( d)( vi) exemptions do\nnot weigh the public interest in disclosure against law enforcement's interest in withholding the\nrecords.   Rather,  the exemptions place a burden on the public body to prove by clear and\nconvincing how disclosure of the records would interfere with or obstruct an investigation under\nsection 7(1)( d)( i) or \" identify and explain the reasonable threat of harm imposed on the\nindividuals identified in the records the agency is seeking to exempt\" under section 7(1)(d)(vi).  \nThe District' s response is conclusory and does not explain how release of information reflecting\n\nrecords that \" could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.\"  \n\n3Exemption 7(F) of Federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012)) exempts from disclosure\n\n4Because Illinois' FOIA statute is based on the federal FOIA statute, decisions construing the\n\nlatter, while not controlling, may provide helpful and relevant precedents in construing the state Act.  Margolis v. \nDirector, Ill. Department of Revenue, 180 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1087 (1989). \n\nBureau (September 9, 2024), at 5. \n\n5Letter from Betsy Gates-Alford to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nBureau ( September 9, 2024),  at 4. \n\n6Letter from Betsy Gates- Alford to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access\n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 7\n\nthat Mr. Davis previously passed through certain toll sites would interfere with any pending or\ncontemplated law enforcement proceeding,  nor does it establish a reasonable threat of harm\nagainst any individual.  Accordingly, the District has not met its burden of demonstrating that\nany portion of the records is exempt under section 7(1)( d)( i) or 7(1)( d)( vi) of FOIA. \n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA\n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides,  in pertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information.   Before invoking\nthis exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions. If any public body responds\nto a categorical\nburden its operation and the conditions described above are met, it\nshall do so in writing,  specifying the reasons why it would be\nunduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body.  Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information. \n\nrequest by stating that compliance would unduly\n\nA request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate, review, \nredact and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material that is largely unnecessary to the\nrequester's]  purpose constitutes an undue burden.\"  National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers\nv. Chicago Police Department,  399 Ill. App.  3d 1, 17 ( 2010).  \"[ A] public body asserting a\nsection 3(g) exemption must make a clear and convincing showing that the burden of compliance\noutweighs public interest in the disclosure of the requested records.\"   Sargent Shriver National\nCenter on Poverty Law, Inc. v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) \n171846, ¶  38.   Thus,  section 3(g) necessarily involves a case- by- case analysis in which the public\nbody must demonstrate the extent of the burden of compliance on its operations and show that\nthe burden outweighs the public interest in disclosure.   Sargent Shriver,  2018 IL App ( 1st) \n171846, ¶ 38 (\"What constitutes a clear and convincing showing of undue burden will likely vary\nfrom case to case,  depending on the broadness of the request,  the level of detail provided in the\npublic body's response, and the nature of the parties' exchange.\"). \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that a request seeking all\nrecords in a category over an extended period,  which would require a public body to review a\nlarge quantity of responsive records, is unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA in the\n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 8\n\nabsence of an identified public interest in disclosure of all the records that outweighs the burden\nof compliance with the request.   See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 54377, \nissued May 18, 2021, at 4 (request for all e-mails in a principal's account, totaling more than 500\ne-mails,  was unduly burdensome because although a matter of public interest occurred during the\ntime period, the request was not limited to that subject matter, and compliance would impose a\nsignificant burden on the school district' s operations);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 37598, \nissued October 27, 2015, at 2-3 (request for two-months' worth of e-mail, requiring a school\ndistrict to de- duplicate,  review,  and redact over 2,000 e- mails,  was unduly burdensome). \n\nHowever,  a request for a substantial volume of records is not unduly burdensome\n\nwhen there is a compelling public interest in disclosure that outweighs the public body's burden.  \nNational Ass' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers,  399 Ill. App.  3d at 17.   See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 80244, issued July 15, 2024, at 6 (village improperly denied as unduly\nburdensome a request for a set of police policies and procedures,  totaling 420 pages,  because\nthere was a compelling public interest in the information); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n74214,  issued March 8, 2023,  at 6 ( police department\nrequest for e-mails, totaling more than 500 pages, pertaining to traffic stops because there was a\ncompelling public interest in the topic,  and the request was reasonably tailored to that topic). \n\nimproperly denied as unduly burdensome a\n\nThe District asserts that this request is unduly burdensome because it would\n\nrequire Mr. Davis to compare approximately 600 lines in thirteen pages of toll data against his\npersonal schedule to determine if the record of travel was potentially subject to a FOIA\nexemption.  As discussed above, that comparison is not necessary, as the data in question is not\nexempt from disclosure under FOIA.   Even if it were,  the District has not established how\ncomparing the toll data to Mr. Davis's work schedule would unduly burden its operations.  The\nDistrict estimates that this would take two full work days by Mr. Davis but does not provide any\nbasis for that estimate, and it's not clear to this office why review of thirteen pages would require\ndays of work. 7 On the other hand,  there is a legitimate public interest in information that sheds\nlight on Mr. Davis's publicly-funded work-related travel.  Under these circumstances, this office\nconcludes that the District did not demonstrate that the burden of compliance with\nrequest outweighs the public interest in disclosure of the requested records related to the use of\npublic funds. \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter,  this office requests\n\nwith unredacted copies of the requested records.  The Public\nthat the District provide\nAccess Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a\n\n7See,  e.g., Greer v. Board of Education, 2021 IL App (1st) 200429, ¶ 12 (rejecting as \" unrealistic\" \n\nthe public body's estimate that every three pages of the estimated 28,000 pages of records would require five\nminutes to review for privileged material,  as \"[ a]  glance at the head of each document should quickly determine\nwhether the exemption applied.\"). \n\n\fMs. Betsy Gates-Alford\nDecember 31,  2024\nPage 9\n\nbinding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at\nbenjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773)  590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82640 f 71c 71di 71dvi 75w improper 3g improper spd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"I-Pass transponder and license plate data for an individual","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82640/","full_text":"December 31, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Betsy Gates- Alford\nAttorney for the Lake County Forest Preserve District\nPartner\nBurke, Warren, MacKay & Serritella, P.C. \n330 North Wabash Avenue, 21st Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60611\nBGatesAlford@BurkeLaw. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82640\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Gates- Alford: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Lake County Forest Preserve District (District) \nimproperly denied\n\nJuly 18, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking I-Pass\n\ninformation for Ron Davis and his associated license plate for January 1, 2024, \n\ntransponder\nthrough July 18, 2024. On July 25, 2024, the District responded that the request as written posed\nan undue burden under section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) (West 2022)) and offered\n\nthe opportunity to narrow it. On that same date, \n\nconferred with the District and\n\nattempted to narrow his request. On August 1, 2024, the District responded that the narrowed\n\n7(1)(c), 7(1)(d)(i), 7(1)(d)(vi), and 7.5(w) of FOIA.1 On August 17, 2024, \nthe above- referenced Request for Review contesting the District's response. \n\nsubmitted\n\nOn August 28, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe District and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the contested records for this office's\nreview, together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for its\nconfidential\ndenial. On September 9, 2024, this office received the requested materials. On September 16, \n2024, this office forwarded a copy of the District's written response to\nSeptember 23, 2024. \n\nHe replied on\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure contained in\nsection 7 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7 (West 2023 Supp.)) are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nFurthermore, section 2.5 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2.5 (West 2022)) provides that\n\na] ll records relating to the obligation, receipt, and use of public funds of the State, units of local\n\ngovernment, and school districts are public records subject to inspection and copying by the\npublic,\" and article VIII, section 1(c) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that \" records\nof the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the State, units of local government and\nschool districts are public records available for inspection by the public according to law.\" \n\nSections 7(1)(c) and 7.5(w) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\" Section 7(1)(c) defines \"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas: \n\nT] he disclosure of information that is highly personal or\nobjectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's\n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(c), (1)(d)(i), (1)(d)(vi) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, \n\neffective July 1, 2024; 5 ILCS 140/7.5(w) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103-1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\nright to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in\nobtaining the information. The disclosure of information that\nbears on the public duties of public employees and officials\nshall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nThe General Assembly's use of the language \" clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy\" evinces the \" strict standard\" that a public body must meet to claim the section 7(1)(c) \nexemption. (Emphasis in original.) Schessler v. Department of Conservation, 256 Ill. App. 3d\n198, 202 (1994). \n\nSection 7.5(w) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonally identifiable\n\ninformation which is exempted from disclosure under subsection (g) of Section 19.1 of the Toll\nHighway Act.\" Section 19.1(g) of the Toll Highway Act (605 ILCS 10/ 19.1(g) (West 2022)) \nprovides, in pertinent part: \n\nPersonally identifiable information generated through the\n\nAuthority's toll collection process that reveals the date, time, \nlocation or direction of travel by an electronic toll collection\nsystem user shall be exempt from release under the Illinois\nFreedom of Information Act. The exemption in this subsection\nshall not apply to information that concerns (i) the public\nduties of public employees and officials[.] (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn its response to this office, the District argued that, although both section 7(1)(c) \n\nand section 7.5(w) do not apply to records bearing on or concerning the public duties of public\nemployees, both exemptions are applicable to portions of the records of Mr. Davis's toll use. The\nDistrict argued: \n\nin question are made\n\nAlthough the vehicle and transponder\navailable to Chief Davis in connection with his employment, not\nall use of the vehicle concerns his public duties. A full review of\nthe Responsive Records would be required to determine the extent\nto which transponder\ninformation is subject to this exemption but, \nat a minimum, travel data related to permissible off-duty vehicle\nuse, such as commuting to and from work, is exempt from public\ndisclosure.2\n\nBureau (September 9, 2024), at 4. \n\n2 Letter from Betsy Gates- Alford to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nExamining the \"public duties\" provision in section 7(1)(c), this office previously\n\ndetermined that records revealing the identity of a 9-1-1 caller were exempt from disclosure, \neven though the caller was an off-duty police officer because the officer was acting as a member\nof the general public at the time. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 64579, issued January 8, \n2021, at 3 (\"It is clear from the recording that the caller did not attempt to execute a traffic stop\nor otherwise respond to the incident in an official capacity. Instead, the caller provided\ninformation to enable on-duty police officers to respond, as a member of the public would\nhave.\"). \n\nOn the other hand, by its plain language, the limitation in section 7(1)(c) applies\n\nnot only to an employee's on-duty conduct, but to any \"information that bears on the public\nduties of public employees.\" (Emphasis added.) Section 19.1(g) of the Toll Highway Act\nsimilarly does not apply to \"information that concerns the public duties of public employees.\" \nEmphasis added.) Thus, this office has previously determined that some off-duty conduct may\nnonetheless bear on public duties where there is a nexus to the individual's employment. See, \ne.g., Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 56428, issued February 6, 2023, at 3 (concluding records\nconcerning the off-duty conduct of firefighter were not exempt from disclosure where conduct\nnonetheless led to employment- related discipline); Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 78194, issued\nDecember 5, 2023, at 6-7 (concluding records concerning police officer's off-duty involvement\nin K-9 officer's death were not exempt where officer was responsible for K-9 officer even while\noff-duty). \n\nOn November 18, 2024, this office asked the District to provide additional\n\ninformation regarding employees' use of District- issued toll passes, including whether portions\nof travel are repaid by employees. On December 10, 2024, the District provided this office with\na copy of its policies regarding vehicle use and confirmed that, consistent with its policies, toll\ncharges are paid by the District. The District further stated that the District allows use of the\ntransponder\n\nfor commuting to and from work, but not for personal travel. \n\nMr. Davis has been provided with a benefit in connection with his employment, \n\nthe use of which obligates the District to expend public funds. The contents of the withheld\nrecords document\nthe use of those public funds and thus are subject to the specific provisions of\nsection 2.5 of FOIA and article VIII, section 1(c) of the State constitution. Further, the records\ndo not contain highly personal details about Mr. Davis, such as his home address. Instead, the\nrecords show general information about toll sites he has passed while using District equipment. \nPursuant to District policy, the records should only reflect the date, time, location, and direction\nof travel used for commuting to and from work. The District has not established that any of the\nentries in the records concern personal travel unrelated to Mr. Davis' employment. Even if the\ntransponder was used for personal travel in violation of District policy, it is unclear how\ndisclosure of records reflecting a public employee's improper use of a transponder would\nconstitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Like the section 7(1)(c) exemption, the\n\nexemption for \"personally identifiable information\" under the Toll Highway Act expressly\nexcludes information that concerns the public duties of public employees. The use of the I-Pass\ntransponder issued to Mr. Davis as a publicly-funded benefit of his employment to travel to and\nfrom work both bear on and concern his public duties. Accordingly, this office concludes that\nthe District has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the information in the\ncontested records is exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(c) or 7.5(w) of FOIA. \n\nSections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1(d)(vi) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(d)(i) and (1)(d)(vi) of FOIA exempt from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request; \n\nvi) endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\nenforcement personnel or any other person[.] \n\nrecords are exempt from\n\nto demonstrate that law enforcement\n\nConclusory statements that the disclosure of requested records would obstruct a law enforcement\nproceeding are insufficient\ndisclosure under FOIA. See Day v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74-77 (2009). In Day, \nthe court explained: \" Simply saying there is an ' ongoing criminal\ninvestigation because the case\nhas not been cleared,' with little additional explanation, is not 'objective indicia' sufficient to\nshow the ongoing investigation exemption applies.\" Day, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 76; see also Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 17-011, issued August 14, 2017, at 7-8 (public body improperly\nwithheld record under section 7(1)(d)(vii) because it failed to demonstrate that disclosure would\ninterfere with law enforcement). Rather, a public body must demonstrate how disclosure of the\nrecords would interfere with or obstruct an investigation. See Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, \n192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989) (\" The classification of information as 'law enforcement' or\ninvestigatory' does not necessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown, in a particular case, \nthat disclosure would interfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public\n\nTo demonstrate that records are exempt under the provision of Federal FOIA that\n\ncorresponds with section 7(1)(d)(vi),3 \"[ a] n agency must identify and explain the reasonable\nthreat of harm imposed on the individuals identified in the records the agency is seeking to\nexempt.\" King v. United States Department of Justice, 245 F. Supp. 3d 153, 162 (D.D.C. 2017); \nsee also Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice, 331 F.3d\n918, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (records not exempt because agency did not identify reasons that\ndisclosure of information would pose a threat).4 This office has previously determined that\nsection 7(1)(d)(vi) may be applied to highly specific information, the disclosure of which would\nprovide the public with information that could be exploited to cause identifiable harm to certain\nindividuals. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 39298, 39299, issued December 6, 2017, at\n4-5 (noting that this office has consistently determined that information that could be used to\nidentify undercover officers is exempt from disclosure). By contrast, this office has found that\npublic bodies failed to meet their burden under section 7(1)(d)(vi) when their assertions were\nconclusory and they did not explain, nor was it apparent, how disclosure would endanger any\nindividual. See e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 38173, issued February 13, 2018, at 3\ndetermining that a city had failed to demonstrate how disclosure of a use of force report would\nendanger any individual's safety). \n\nIn its response to this office, the District stated that the data would reveal patterns\n\nregarding Mr. Davis's travel and argued that this is \" information related to criminal\ninvestigations and other law enforcement proceedings.\" 5 The District also argued in general\nterms that this \" could be used to maliciously target an individual and, particularly given the\nnature of Chief Davis’ s duties, this is a meaningful concern that outweighs any minimal public\ninterest in tracking his travel.\" 6 However, the section 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(vi) exemptions do\nnot weigh the public interest in disclosure against law enforcement's interest in withholding the\nrecords. Rather, the exemptions place a burden on the public body to prove by clear and\nconvincing how disclosure of the records would interfere with or obstruct an investigation under\nsection 7(1)(d)(i) or \" identify and explain the reasonable threat of harm imposed on the\nindividuals identified in the records the agency is seeking to exempt\" under section 7(1)(d)(vi). \nThe District's response is conclusory and does not explain how release of information reflecting\n\nrecords that \" could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.\" \n\n3 Exemption 7(F) of Federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012)) exempts from disclosure\n\n4 Because Illinois' FOIA statute is based on the federal FOIA statute, decisions construing the\n\nlatter, while not controlling, may provide helpful and relevant precedents in construing the state Act. Margolis v. \nDirector, Ill. Department of Revenue, 180 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1087 (1989). \n\nBureau (September 9, 2024), at 5. \n\n5 Letter from Betsy Gates-Alford to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nBureau (September 9, 2024), at 4. \n\n6 Letter from Betsy Gates- Alford to Benjamin J. Silver, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nthat Mr. Davis previously passed through certain toll sites would interfere with any pending or\ncontemplated law enforcement proceeding, nor does it establish a reasonable threat of harm\nagainst any individual. Accordingly, the District has not met its burden of demonstrating that\nany portion of the records is exempt under section 7(1)(d)(i) or 7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA. \n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA\n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides, in pertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information. Before invoking\nthis exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions. If any public body responds\nto a categorical\nburden its operation and the conditions described above are met, it\nshall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would be\nunduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body. Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information. \n\nrequest by stating that compliance would unduly\n\nA request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate, review, \nredact and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material that is largely unnecessary to the\nrequester's] purpose constitutes an undue burden.\" National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers\nv. Chicago Police Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2010). \"[ A] public body asserting a\nsection 3(g) exemption must make a clear and convincing showing that the burden of compliance\noutweighs public interest in the disclosure of the requested records.\" Sargent Shriver National\nCenter on Poverty Law, Inc. v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) \n171846, ¶ 38. Thus, section 3(g) necessarily involves a case- by- case analysis in which the public\nbody must demonstrate the extent of the burden of compliance on its operations and show that\nthe burden outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Sargent Shriver, 2018 IL App (1st) \n171846, ¶ 38 (\"What constitutes a clear and convincing showing of undue burden will likely vary\nfrom case to case, depending on the broadness of the request, the level of detail provided in the\npublic body's response, and the nature of the parties' exchange.\"). \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that a request seeking all\nrecords in a category over an extended period, which would require a public body to review a\nlarge quantity of responsive records, is unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA in the\n\nabsence of an identified public interest in disclosure of all the records that outweighs the burden\nof compliance with the request. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 54377, \nissued May 18, 2021, at 4 (request for all e-mails in a principal's account, totaling more than 500\ne-mails, was unduly burdensome because although a matter of public interest occurred during the\ntime period, the request was not limited to that subject matter, and compliance would impose a\nsignificant burden on the school district's operations); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37598, \nissued October 27, 2015, at 2-3 (request for two-months' worth of e-mail, requiring a school\ndistrict to de- duplicate, review, and redact over 2,000 e- mails, was unduly burdensome). \n\nHowever, a request for a substantial volume of records is not unduly burdensome\n\nwhen there is a compelling public interest in disclosure that outweighs the public body's burden. \nNational Ass' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 17. See, for example, Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 80244, issued July 15, 2024, at 6 (village improperly denied as unduly\nburdensome a request for a set of police policies and procedures, totaling 420 pages, because\nthere was a compelling public interest in the information); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n74214, issued March 8, 2023, at 6 (police department\nrequest for e-mails, totaling more than 500 pages, pertaining to traffic stops because there was a\ncompelling public interest in the topic, and the request was reasonably tailored to that topic). \n\nimproperly denied as unduly burdensome a\n\nThe District asserts that this request is unduly burdensome because it would\n\nrequire Mr. Davis to compare approximately 600 lines in thirteen pages of toll data against his\npersonal schedule to determine if the record of travel was potentially subject to a FOIA\nexemption. As discussed above, that comparison is not necessary, as the data in question is not\nexempt from disclosure under FOIA. Even if it were, the District has not established how\ncomparing the toll data to Mr. Davis's work schedule would unduly burden its operations. The\nDistrict estimates that this would take two full work days by Mr. Davis but does not provide any\nbasis for that estimate, and it's not clear to this office why review of thirteen pages would require\ndays of work. 7 On the other hand, there is a legitimate public interest in information that sheds\nlight on Mr. Davis's publicly-funded work-related travel. Under these circumstances, this office\nconcludes that the District did not demonstrate that the burden of compliance with\nrequest outweighs the public interest in disclosure of the requested records related to the use of\npublic funds. \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter, this office requests\n\nwith unredacted copies of the requested records. The Public\nthat the District provide\nAccess Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a\n\n7 See, e.g., Greer v. Board of Education, 2021 IL App (1st) 200429, ¶ 12 (rejecting as \" unrealistic\" \n\nthe public body's estimate that every three pages of the estimated 28,000 pages of records would require five\nminutes to review for privileged material, as \"[ a] glance at the head of each document should quickly determine\n\nbinding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nbenjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773) 590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82640 f 71c 71di 71dvi 75w improper 3g improper spd"}
{"id":1082,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82657"],"title":"Peoria County Sheriff's Office complied with flash drive format request","filename":"82657, issued October 9, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":533,"summary":"The requester sought a video recording on a flash drive after previously receiving it on a CD, and the PAC closed the matter after the Peoria County Sheriff's Office provided the requested flash drive.","plain_summary":"This determination letter addresses whether a county sheriff's office violated FOIA's electronic-format requirement under 5 ILCS 140/6(a) by failing to provide a video recording on a flash drive as requested. The Public Access Bureau held that the Request for Review was unfounded because the sheriff's office had already converted and provided the video on a flash drive, satisfying the requester's specified format. The reasoning clarifies that while FOIA requires production in a requester-specified electronic format where feasible, a request for a particular storage medium (like a flash drive) is not itself an 'electronic format' under the statute, but here the public body complied regardless. The Peoria County Sheriff's Office was the public body reviewed, and the records at issue were video footage of an incident.","holding":"A public body satisfies FOIA's format requirements when it provides the requested recording in the medium sought by the requester, even though a storage medium like a flash drive is not itself an 'electronic format' under 5 ILCS 140/6(a).","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required to provide records in a specific physical medium (flash drive) under FOIA.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/6"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Peoria County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Complied after PAC involvement","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records format","subject_description":"The requester sought a video recording of a mental health incident in a specific physical format (flash drive) rather than a CD.","ocr_status":"reocr_tesseract","ocr_quality":92.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/6/6_a/82657%2C%20issued%20October%209%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["video records","electronic format","records request","flash drive"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"October 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82657\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.).    For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn July 16, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Peoria County Sheriff' s\n\nOffice ( Sheriff' s Office)  seeking: \n\nT]he prior video that u guys release to me of my mental\nbreakdown in the law library I gave the copies u gave me to the\nfederal Judge in my case I need 3 original copies uploaded via\nflash drive a/ease upload the original video the last video had\ntechnical difficulties please check and make sure there is no still\nshots please do not be indifferent to me the ag officer provide these\ntype of material cd usb I do not need these copies in a cd format it\nhad to usb.[ 1] \n\nOn August 19, 2024,  the Sheriff' s Office responded and denied your request, \n\ninforming you that the video was provided to you \" in multiple formats on a previous date.\" 2 You\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review stating that the Sheriff' s Office previously\n\n1FOIA portal message from Peoria County Sheriff confirming receipt of request ( July 16,, 2024). \n\n2E- mail from Carol Lotz, PeoriaCounty@request.\n\njustfoia. com to\n\nAugust 19, 2024).   \n\n\fOctober 9, 2024\nPage 2\n\nprovided a compact disc that you were unable to play on your laptop computer,  so you are\nseeking the recording on a flash drive. \n\nOn September 30, 2024,  the Sheriff' s Office sent an e-mail informing you that it\nhad converted the video onto a flash drive and that it was available for pick- up.  On October 3, \n2024,  you confirmed to this office that you received the flash drive.   \n\nFOIA provides that a public body must provide copies of records in the electronic\n\nformat specified by the requester,  such as a spreadsheet or Portable Document Format,  if it\nfeasible to do so.   5 ILCS 140/ 6(a) ( West 2023 Supp.).   Your request for a flash drive identifies a\nrecording medium rather than an electronic format.   Regardless,  the Sheriff' s Office provided\nyou with footage of the video on a flash drive as you expressly requested.   Accordingly,  this\noffice will take no further action in this matter.   If you are unable to download the recording,  you\nmay wish to seek technical assistance. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at (312)  814-\n\n3180 or Matthew. Rogina@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82657 f unf co\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Carol Lotz\nRecords Manager\nPeoria County Sheriff' s Office\n301 North Maxwell Road\nPeoria,  Illinois 61604\nclotz@peoriacounty. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":"October 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82657\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn July 16, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Peoria County Sheriff's\n\nOffice (Sheriff's Office) seeking: \n\nT]he prior video that u guys release to me of my mental\nbreakdown in the law library I gave the copies u gave me to the\nfederal Judge in my case I need 3 original copies uploaded via\nflash drive a/ease upload the original video the last video had\ntechnical difficulties please check and make sure there is no still\nshots please do not be indifferent to me the ag officer provide these\ntype of material cd usb I do not need these copies in a cd format it\nhad to usb.[ 1] \n\nOn August 19, 2024, the Sheriff's Office responded and denied your request, \n\ninforming you that the video was provided to you \" in multiple formats on a previous date.\" 2 You\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review stating that the Sheriff's Office previously\n\n1FOIA portal message from Peoria County Sheriff confirming receipt of request (July 16,, 2024). \n\nprovided a compact disc that you were unable to play on your laptop computer, so you are\nseeking the recording on a flash drive. \n\nOn September 30, 2024, the Sheriff's Office sent an e-mail informing you that it\nhad converted the video onto a flash drive and that it was available for pick- up. On October 3, \n2024, you confirmed to this office that you received the flash drive. \n\nFOIA provides that a public body must provide copies of records in the electronic\n\nformat specified by the requester, such as a spreadsheet or Portable Document Format, if it\nfeasible to do so. 5 ILCS 140/ 6(a) (West 2023 Supp.). Your request for a flash drive identifies a\nrecording medium rather than an electronic format. Regardless, the Sheriff's Office provided\nyou with footage of the video on a flash drive as you expressly requested. Accordingly, this\noffice will take no further action in this matter. If you are unable to download the recording, you\nmay wish to seek technical assistance. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (312) 814-\n\n3180 or Matthew. Rogina@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82657 f unf co\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Carol Lotz\nRecords Manager\nPeoria County Sheriff's Office\n301 North Maxwell Road\nPeoria, Illinois 61604\nclotz@peoriacounty. org","plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A sheriff's office video recording on a flash drive","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82657/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nOctober 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2024 PAC 82657\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). For the reasons stated below,\nthe Public Access Bureau has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded.\n\nOn July 16, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Peoria County Sheriff's\nOffice (Sheriff's Office) seeking:\n\n[T]he prior video that u guys release to me of my mental\nbreakdown in the law library I gave the copies u gave me to the\nfederal Judge in my case I need 3 original copies uploaded via\nflash drive a/ease upload the original video the last video had\ntechnical difficulties please check and make sure there is no still\nshots please do not be indifferent to me the ag officer provide these\ntype of material cd usb I do not need these copies in a cd format it\nhad to usb.\"\n\nOn August 19, 2024, the Sheriff's Office responded and denied your request,\ninforming you that the video was provided to you \"in multiple formats on a previous date.\" You\nsubmitted the above-referenced Request for Review stating that the Sheriff's Office previously\n\n'ROIA portal message from Peoria County Sheriff confirming receipt of request (July 16,, 2024).\n\n?E-mail from Carol Lotz, PeoriaCounty@request.justfoia.com to [MY (August 19, 2024).\n\n500 South 2nd Street 115 South LaSalle Street 1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Carbondale, Illinois 62903\n(217) 782-1090 * Fax: (217) 782-7046 (312) 814-3000 « Fax: (312) 814-3806 (618) 529-6400 * Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service.\n\nwww IllinoisAttomeyGeneral.gov\n\nOctober 9, 2024\nPage 2\n\nprovided a compact disc that you were unable to play on your laptop computer, so you are\nseeking the recording on a flash drive.\n\nOn September 30, 2024, the Sheriff's Office sent an e-mail informing you that it\nhad converted the video onto a flash drive and that it was available for pick-up. On October 3,\n2024, you confirmed to this office that you received the flash drive.\n\nFOIA provides that a public body must provide copies of records in the electronic\nformat specified by the requester, such as a spreadsheet or Portable Document Format, if it\nfeasible to do so. 5 ILCS 140/6(a) (West 2023 Supp.). Your request for a flash drive identifies a\nrecording medium rather than an electronic format. Regardless, the Sheriff's Office provided\nyou with footage of the video on a flash drive as you expressly requested. Accordingly, this\noffice will take no further action in this matter. If you are unable to download the recording, you\nmay wish to seek technical assistance.\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (312) 814-\n3180 or Matthew.Rogina@ilag.gov.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82657 f unf co\n\nCe Via electronic mail\nMs. Carol Lotz\nRecords Manager\nPeoria County Sheriff's Office\n301 North Maxwell Road\nPeoria, Illinois 61604\nclotz@peoriacounty.org\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1083,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-21","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82674"],"title":"Kankakee School District 111 properly denied FOIA request as unduly burdensome under 3(g)","filename":"82674, issued October 21, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":924,"summary":"The requester sought extensive communications and financial records from Kankakee School District 111, which the District denied as unduly burdensome. The PAC determined that the District complied with FOIA's procedural requirements for asserting an undue burden claim and that the burden of compliance outweighed the public interest.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for a large volume of emails and financial documents from a school district. The district claimed the request was too broad and burdensome to fulfill, and the Attorney General's office agreed, noting that the district followed the correct legal steps to ask the requester to narrow the scope of the request.","holding":"The District properly denied the request as unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the public body properly denied a FOIA request as unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Kankakee School District 111","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"unduly burdensome","subject_description":"The request sought extensive communications and financial records related to grants, youth programs, and district staffing.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_g/Categorical-requests/82674%2C%20issued%20October%2021%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["unduly burdensome","FOIA request","school district","records request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"October 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82674\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons stated below,  the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted as to this matter. \n\nOn August 12, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to Kankakee School District\n\n111 ( District)  seeking: \n\nAll communication between ICJIA and all KSD111 staff\nand board members\ncommunication about the budget managers around the R3\ngrant from ICJIA\nAll communication that includes:  R3, Community\npartnerships,  ICJIA, YEP ( Youth Empowerment Program)  \ncommunication between the current and previous\nsuperintendent and any staff member or board member\nconcerning YEP.  \nCommunication with the mayor and the states attorney\nconcerning the R3 grant and YEP\nThe amount spent on youth employment during the past ten\nyears\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fOctober 21, 2024\nPage 2\n\nAll communication concerning the community center and\nYEP\nAll reimbursement\namounts requested.  \nMinutes from the previous finance Meeting\nCommunication around summer employment,  youth\nworkers and/ or student job fairs prior to COVID.[ 2] \n\nrequests for the R3 grant and the total\n\nIn a follow- up e-mail later that evening,  you also requested:  \" W4 of all student workers with\nidentifying information redacted for calendar year 23, 22 and 19, 18 and 17.\" 3 On August 19, \n2024,  the District informed you that it found your request to be unduly burdensome under section\n3(g) of FOIA 4 and offered you the opportunity to narrow your request.   It appears that you did\nnot do so, and instead submitted this Request for Review.   \n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides,  in pertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information.   Before invoking\nthis exemption,  the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions.   If any public body\nresponds to a categorical request by stating that compliance would\nunduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are\nmet, it shall do so in writing,  specifying the reasons why it would\nbe unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body.  Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information.   \n\nThis office has previously determined that a request for all communications sent or received by a\npublic official or employee over a period of several weeks or months,  which would require a\npublic body to gather and review a large quantity of potentially responsive records,  is unduly\nburdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA in the absence of an identified public interest in\ndisclosure of all of the records that outweighs the burden of compliance with the request.   See, \n\n2E- mail from\n\n3E- mail from\n\nto [ Kankakee School District 111] ( August 12, 2024,  at 8:25 PM). \n\nto [ Kankakee School District 111] ( August 12, 2024,  at 9:13 PM).  \n\n45 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022).  \n\n\fOctober 21, 2024\nPage 3\n\nfor example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 48444,  issued August 10, 2017,  at 5 (a request\nfor more than a month of an employee' s e-mails,  which would require review of 1,126 e-mails, \nwas unduly burdensome,  as the request was not limited by subject matter or keywords and thus\nthe public interest in disclosure of every record did not outweigh the public body' s burden);  see\nalso National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department,  399 Ill. App. \n3d 1, 17 (2010) (\" A request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate,  review, \nredact and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material that is largely unnecessary to the\nrequester' s]  purpose constitutes an undue burden.\"). \n\nYour request is categorical and vast in scope.   The District asserted that there are\nover 680,000 e-mails potentially responsive to seven portions of your request,  not counting the\nrecords responsive to the other four portions of your request. 5 To collect and review such a large\nvolume of responsive material would impose a significant burden on the District' s operations.  \nAlthough there is a general public interest in information concerning the District,  you have not\nspecified a particular public interest that necessitates the release of all of the requested records.  \nFurther,  the District met the procedural requirements of section 3(g) by issuing a timely response\nand offering you the opportunity to confer about narrowing your request to manageable\nproportions.   Under these circumstances,  the burden of compliance with your request outweighs\nthe public interest in the records you are seeking.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the\nDistrict did not improperly deny your request as unduly burdensome,  and that no further action is\nwarranted as to this matter. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\n\nvictoria. frazier@ilag. gov.  Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82674 f no fi war sd\n\n5Letter from Rachel Thornton,  Freedom of Information Officer,  Kankakee School District 111 to\nAugust 19, 2024) \n\n\fOctober 21, 2024\nPage 4\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rachel Thornton\nFOIA Officer\nKankakee School District 111\n240 Warren Avenue\nKankakee,  Illinois 60901\nrachel- thornton@ksd111. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Grants, youth programs, and staffing records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82674/","full_text":"October 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82674\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons stated below, the Public Access Bureau has\ndetermined that no further action is warranted as to this matter. \n\nOn August 12, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to Kankakee School District\n\n111 (District) seeking: \n\nAll communication between ICJIA and all KSD111 staff\nand board members\ncommunication about the budget managers around the R3\ngrant from ICJIA\nAll communication that includes: R3, Community\npartnerships, ICJIA, YEP (Youth Empowerment Program) \ncommunication between the current and previous\nsuperintendent and any staff member or board member\n\nAll communication concerning the community center and\nYEP\nAll reimbursement\namounts requested. \nMinutes from the previous finance Meeting\nCommunication around summer employment, youth\nworkers and/ or student job fairs prior to COVID.[ 2] \n\nrequests for the R3 grant and the total\n\nIn a follow- up e-mail later that evening, you also requested: \" W4 of all student workers with\nidentifying information redacted for calendar year 23, 22 and 19, 18 and 17.\" 3 On August 19, \n2024, the District informed you that it found your request to be unduly burdensome under section\n3(g) of FOIA 4 and offered you the opportunity to narrow your request. It appears that you did\nnot do so, and instead submitted this Request for Review. \n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides, in pertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information. Before invoking\nthis exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions. If any public body\nresponds to a categorical request by stating that compliance would\nunduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are\nmet, it shall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would\nbe unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body. Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information. \n\nThis office has previously determined that a request for all communications sent or received by a\npublic official or employee over a period of several weeks or months, which would require a\npublic body to gather and review a large quantity of potentially responsive records, is unduly\nburdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA in the absence of an identified public interest in\ndisclosure of all of the records that outweighs the burden of compliance with the request. See, \n\nfor example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48444, issued August 10, 2017, at 5 (a request\nfor more than a month of an employee's e-mails, which would require review of 1,126 e-mails, \nwas unduly burdensome, as the request was not limited by subject matter or keywords and thus\nthe public interest in disclosure of every record did not outweigh the public body's burden); see\nalso National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department, 399 Ill. App. \n3d 1, 17 (2010) (\" A request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate, review, \nredact and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material that is largely unnecessary to the\nrequester's] purpose constitutes an undue burden.\"). \n\nYour request is categorical and vast in scope. The District asserted that there are\nover 680,000 e-mails potentially responsive to seven portions of your request, not counting the\nrecords responsive to the other four portions of your request. 5 To collect and review such a large\nvolume of responsive material would impose a significant burden on the District's operations. \nAlthough there is a general public interest in information concerning the District, you have not\nspecified a particular public interest that necessitates the release of all of the requested records. \nFurther, the District met the procedural requirements of section 3(g) by issuing a timely response\nand offering you the opportunity to confer about narrowing your request to manageable\nproportions. Under these circumstances, the burden of compliance with your request outweighs\nthe public interest in the records you are seeking. Accordingly, this office concludes that the\nDistrict did not improperly deny your request as unduly burdensome, and that no further action is\nwarranted as to this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nvictoria. frazier@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82674 f no fi war sd\n\n5 Letter from Rachel Thornton, Freedom of Information Officer, Kankakee School District 111 to\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rachel Thornton\nFOIA Officer\nKankakee School District 111\n240 Warren Avenue\nKankakee, Illinois 60901\nrachel- thornton@ksd111. org"}
{"id":1084,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82717"],"title":"Lee County Sheriff's Office improperly withheld incident report under 7(1)(d)(i) for swan decoy case","filename":"82717, issued October 9, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1511,"summary":"The requester sought an incident report regarding missing swan decoys, which the Lee County Sheriff's Office denied citing the pending litigation exemption. The PAC determined the Sheriff's Office failed to demonstrate that disclosure would interfere with pending or reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested a police incident report about missing swan decoys, but the Sheriff's Office refused to release it, claiming it would interfere with an ongoing court case. The Attorney General's Public Access Counselor reviewed the request and found that the Sheriff's Office did not provide enough evidence to justify keeping the report secret. Consequently, the Sheriff's Office was told they must release the records.","holding":"The Lee County Sheriff's Office improperly denied the FOIA request because it failed to provide a detailed factual basis for how the disclosure of the incident report would interfere with pending legal proceedings.","legal_question":"Whether the Lee County Sheriff's Office properly invoked the FOIA exemption for records that would interfere with pending or reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings under section 7(1)(d)(i).","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(i)"],"public_body":"Lee County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":"Requester (name redacted in source document)","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought an incident report concerning a complaint of missing swan decoys.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_i/82717%2C%20issued%20October%209%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","incident report","pending litigation","law enforcement records","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Stephanie Sasscer\nAssistant State's Attorney\nLee County State's Attorney' s Office\n309 South Galena Avenue\nDixon,  Illinois 61021\nssasscer@countyoflee. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82717\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Sasscer: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the Lee County ( County)  Sheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  improperly denied\n\nAugust 13, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff' s Office\n\nseeking a copy of an incident report about a complaint of missing swan decoys.   On August 21, \nrequest pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. 2\n2024,  the Sheriff' s Office denied\nIn its denial letter, the Sheriff' s Office stated:  \" Given that the above- mentioned case is open and\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2024.  \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1,  \n\n\fMs. Stephanie Sasscer\nOctober 9, 2024\nPage 2\n\npending in court,  any disclosure of documents associated with the case prior to the closing of the\ncase would interfere with the pending case[.]\" 3 That same day, \nabove- referenced Request for Review contesting the Sheriff' s Office' s denial of her request.  \nstated that the report concerns charges against her and that her first appearance was\n\nsubmitted the\n\nupcoming on September 4, 2024. \n\nOn August 29, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Sheriff' s Office and requested a copy of the withheld report for this office' s confidential\nreview as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the\nasserted exemption.   The Sheriff' s Office did not respond.   Accordingly,  on September 12, 2024, \nthis office sent another letter to the Sheriff' s Office seeking the same materials.   \n\nOn September 15, 2024,  this office received the County State's Attorney' s Office' s\n\nwritten response on behalf of the Sheriff' s Office,  as well as a copy of the withheld report.   On\nSeptember 16, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the State's Attorney' s Office' s written\nresponse to\n\nand notified her of her right to reply;  she did not reply.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body \" has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed.   Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 ( 1997).   \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would:  \n\ni)  interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request[.] \n\nCounty Sheriff' s Office,  to\n\nAugust 21, 2024). \n\n3Letter from Devon D. Gugerty,  Officer Manager/ Freedom of Information Act Officer,  Lee\n\n\fMs. Stephanie Sasscer\nOctober 9, 2024\nPage 3\n\nThe classification of information as ' law enforcement'  or 'investigatory'  does not\n\nnecessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown,  in a particular case,  that disclosure would\ninterfere with law enforcement and would,  therefore,  not be in the public interest.\"   Baudin v. \nCity of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 ( 1989).   Conclusory statements that the disclosure\nof records would obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are insufficient to support the assertion\nof the pending law enforcement proceeding exemption.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 24-\n006, issued April 1, 2024,  at 8-9 (explaining that a law enforcement agency must demonstrate\nwith a detailed factual basis,  rather than conclusory statements,  how disclosure of all information\nin a police report would interfere with law enforcement proceedings to sustain its burden of\nproving the report is exempt from disclosure in its entirety pursuant to the section 7(1)(d)( i) \nexemption).   \n\nIn its response to this office, the State' s Attorney' s Office noted the context of the\n\ncase,  including the case number,  the date of\n2024,  and the next action in the case:  a pretrial conference,  which is set for October 24, 2024.  \nThe State' s Attorney' s Office argued:  \" Disclosure of the subject report would interfere with the\nlaw enforcement proceedings in that an information based on the report had been filed into Lee\nCounty Case Number 2024 CM 75, which subjects the report to rules of discovery.\" 4\n\nfirst appearance on September 4, \n\nThe State' s Attorney' s Office' s response to this office merely states that there is an\n\nongoing proceeding and that the report has been filed in the proceeding.   The response does not\nset forth facts as to how or why disclosure of the responsive report would interfere with the\nproceeding.   Because the State' s Attorney' s Office has not set forth facts in this matter\ndemonstrating how or why the disclosure of the withheld report would interfere with the\nproceeding,  this office concludes that the State's Attorney' s Office has not met its burden of\ndemonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the requested report is exempt from\ndisclosure in its entirety under section 7(1)( d)( i) of FOIA. 5\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter,  this office requests\n\nState' s Attorney,  to Katie Goldsmith,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( September 15, 2024). \n\n4Letter from Charles A. Boonstra,  Lee County State's Attorney,  by Stephanie Sasscer,  Assistant\n\n5This conclusion is based on the response presented by the State's Attorney' s Office, as well as the\n\ncriminal charge.   In Turner v. Joliet Police Department,  2019 IL App (3d) \n\nmisdemeanor nature of\n170819, ¶¶  15-16, the Illinois Appellate Court advised that a defendant charged with a felony could not receive the\nrecords pertaining to his arrest,  including the police report,  through FOIA, because Illinois Supreme Court Rule\n415( c) prohibited a criminal defendant represented by counsel from possessing discovery documents.   Notably, \nIllinois Supreme Court Rule 415( c) does not apply to misdemeanors.   See People v. Moore, 2024 IL App (1st) \n231537- U, ¶ 13 (\" We note,  however,  that Illinois Supreme Court Rules 411 through 417 —  which provide for\ndiscovery in criminal cases —  only apply in cases wherein the accused is charged with a felony.\")   Accordingly,  an\nanalysis of the applicability of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415( c) in this matter is not necessary. \n\n\fMs. Stephanie Sasscer\nOctober 9, 2024\nPage 4\n\nthat the Sheriff' s Office provide\nwith a copy of the requested report.   The Sheriff' s\nOffice may properly make certain redactions to the report,  such as the home addresses,  home or\npersonal phone numbers,  and driver' s license numbers pursuant to section 7(1)( b) of FOIA, 6\npersonal\ninformation for which disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of\npersonal privacy for persons other than\nnamely any birth dates and the names of any uninvolved third parties), 7 and the identifying\ninformation and statements of any witnesses who provided information to law enforcement\npursuant to section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA. 8 If the Sheriff' s Office does elect to redact any\ninformation,  it shall provide\nrequirements of section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 9 (West 2022)).   \n\nwith a notice of partial denial that meets the\n\npursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82717 f 71di improper co\n\n6Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(b) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-\n605, effective July 1, 2024)  exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information,  unless disclosure is required by another\nprovision of this Act, a State or federal\n\nlaw or a court order.\"  \" Private information\"  is defined to mean: \n\ninformation,  passwords or other access codes,  medical records,  home\n\nU] nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number,  driver' s license\nnumber,  employee identification number,  biometric identifiers,  personal\nfinancial\nor personal\ninformation also includes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to\nany person.   5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\ntelephone numbers,  and personal email addresses.  Private\n\nlicense plates,  except as\n\n2024. \n\n2024.  \n\n75 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1,  \n\n85 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1,  \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"An incident report about missing swan decoys","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82717/","full_text":"October 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Stephanie Sasscer\nAssistant State's Attorney\nLee County State's Attorney's Office\n309 South Galena Avenue\nDixon, Illinois 61021\nssasscer@countyoflee. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82717\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Sasscer: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the Lee County (County) Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) improperly denied\n\nAugust 13, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff's Office\n\nseeking a copy of an incident report about a complaint of missing swan decoys. On August 21, \nrequest pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. 2\n2024, the Sheriff's Office denied\nIn its denial letter, the Sheriff's Office stated: \" Given that the above- mentioned case is open and\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\npending in court, any disclosure of documents associated with the case prior to the closing of the\ncase would interfere with the pending case[.]\" 3 That same day, \nabove- referenced Request for Review contesting the Sheriff's Office's denial of her request. \nstated that the report concerns charges against her and that her first appearance was\n\nsubmitted the\n\nupcoming on September 4, 2024. \n\nOn August 29, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Sheriff's Office and requested a copy of the withheld report for this office's confidential\nreview as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the\nasserted exemption. The Sheriff's Office did not respond. Accordingly, on September 12, 2024, \nthis office sent another letter to the Sheriff's Office seeking the same materials. \n\nOn September 15, 2024, this office received the County State's Attorney's Office's\n\nwritten response on behalf of the Sheriff's Office, as well as a copy of the withheld report. On\nSeptember 16, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the State's Attorney's Office's written\nresponse to\n\nand notified her of her right to reply; she did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \" has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\n\nThe classification of information as ' law enforcement' or 'investigatory' does not\n\nnecessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown, in a particular case, that disclosure would\ninterfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public interest.\" Baudin v. \nCity of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989). Conclusory statements that the disclosure\nof records would obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are insufficient to support the assertion\nof the pending law enforcement proceeding exemption. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 24-\n006, issued April 1, 2024, at 8-9 (explaining that a law enforcement agency must demonstrate\nwith a detailed factual basis, rather than conclusory statements, how disclosure of all information\nin a police report would interfere with law enforcement proceedings to sustain its burden of\nproving the report is exempt from disclosure in its entirety pursuant to the section 7(1)(d)(i) \nexemption). \n\nIn its response to this office, the State's Attorney's Office noted the context of the\n\ncase, including the case number, the date of\n2024, and the next action in the case: a pretrial conference, which is set for October 24, 2024. \nThe State's Attorney's Office argued: \" Disclosure of the subject report would interfere with the\nlaw enforcement proceedings in that an information based on the report had been filed into Lee\nCounty Case Number 2024 CM 75, which subjects the report to rules of discovery.\" 4\n\nfirst appearance on September 4, \n\nThe State's Attorney's Office's response to this office merely states that there is an\n\nongoing proceeding and that the report has been filed in the proceeding. The response does not\nset forth facts as to how or why disclosure of the responsive report would interfere with the\nproceeding. Because the State's Attorney's Office has not set forth facts in this matter\ndemonstrating how or why the disclosure of the withheld report would interfere with the\nproceeding, this office concludes that the State's Attorney's Office has not met its burden of\ndemonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the requested report is exempt from\ndisclosure in its entirety under section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. 5\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter, this office requests\n\nState's Attorney, to Katie Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (September 15, 2024). \n\n4 Letter from Charles A. Boonstra, Lee County State's Attorney, by Stephanie Sasscer, Assistant\n\n5 This conclusion is based on the response presented by the State's Attorney's Office, as well as the\n\ncriminal charge. In Turner v. Joliet Police Department, 2019 IL App (3d) \n\nmisdemeanor nature of\n170819, ¶¶ 15-16, the Illinois Appellate Court advised that a defendant charged with a felony could not receive the\nrecords pertaining to his arrest, including the police report, through FOIA, because Illinois Supreme Court Rule\n415(c) prohibited a criminal defendant represented by counsel from possessing discovery documents. Notably, \nIllinois Supreme Court Rule 415(c) does not apply to misdemeanors. See People v. Moore, 2024 IL App (1st) \n231537- U, ¶ 13 (\" We note, however, that Illinois Supreme Court Rules 411 through 417 — which provide for\ndiscovery in criminal cases — only apply in cases wherein the accused is charged with a felony.\") Accordingly, an\nanalysis of the applicability of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415(c) in this matter is not necessary. \n\nthat the Sheriff's Office provide\nwith a copy of the requested report. The Sheriff's\nOffice may properly make certain redactions to the report, such as the home addresses, home or\npersonal phone numbers, and driver's license numbers pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA, 6\npersonal\ninformation for which disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of\npersonal privacy for persons other than\nnamely any birth dates and the names of any uninvolved third parties), 7 and the identifying\ninformation and statements of any witnesses who provided information to law enforcement\npursuant to section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA. 8 If the Sheriff's Office does elect to redact any\ninformation, it shall provide\nrequirements of section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 9 (West 2022)). \n\nwith a notice of partial denial that meets the\n\npursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82717 f 71di improper co\n\n6 Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(b) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-\n605, effective July 1, 2024) exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information, unless disclosure is required by another\nprovision of this Act, a State or federal\n\nlaw or a court order.\" \" Private information\" is defined to mean: \n\ninformation, passwords or other access codes, medical records, home\n\nU] nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, driver's license\nnumber, employee identification number, biometric identifiers, personal\nfinancial\nor personal\ninformation also includes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to\nany person. 5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\ntelephone numbers, and personal email addresses. Private\n\nlicense plates, except as\n\n2024. \n\n2024. \n\n75 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\n85 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1,"}
{"id":1085,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-11-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82918"],"title":"Shelby County State's Attorney's Office: PAC ceases review after requester files section 11 lawsuit","filename":"82918, issued November 6, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":330,"summary":"The requester filed a Request for Review regarding a partial FOIA denial by the Shelby County State's Attorney's Office, but subsequently notified the PAC that he had initiated a lawsuit regarding the same records.","plain_summary":"This letter addresses when the Public Access Counselor must cease review under FOIA section 9.5(g). The Public Access Bureau held that because the requester filed a lawsuit under section 11 of FOIA challenging the same denial that was the subject of a pending Request for Review, section 9.5(g) required the Bureau to take no further action on the review and to close the file. The rule: once a requester sues under section 11 over the same denial at issue in a pending PAC review, the Public Access Counselor is statutorily barred from continuing its administrative review of that matter. The public body involved was a county state's attorney's office, and the underlying dispute concerned a partial denial of a FOIA request for records.","holding":"Under 5 ILCS 140/9.5(g), if a requester files a section 11 lawsuit over the same denial that is the subject of a pending Request for Review, the Public Access Counselor must take no further action on that review and must notify the public body.","legal_question":"Does the filing of a FOIA lawsuit by a requester regarding the same denial require the Public Access Counselor to cease its administrative review?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/9.5(g)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Shelby County State's Attorney's Office","requesting_party":"Mr. Kirk Allen (Edgar County Watchdogs)","pac_outcome":"Closed due to pending litigation","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"litigation","subject_description":"The requester sought records from the Shelby County State's Attorney's Office, which were partially denied.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":90.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/9.5/9.5_g/82918%2C%20issued%20November%206%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["lawsuit","pending litigation","FOIA denial","PAC review"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Legal & Financial Records","full_text_pre_clean":"November 6, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kirk Allen\nEdgar County Watchdogs\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nKirk@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Ruth A. Woolery\nShelby County State' s Attorney\nShelby County State' s Attorney' s Office\n301 East Main Street\nShelbyville,  Illinois 62565\nstatesattorney@shelbycounty-\n\nil.gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82918\n\nDear Mr. Allen and Ms. Woolery: \n\nThis letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(g) of the Freedom of Information Act\nFOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau will take no further action\nwith respect to the above- referenced Request for Review. \n\nOn September 5, 2024,  Mr. Kirk Allen, on behalf of Edgar County Watchdogs, \nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the partial denial by the Shelby\nCounty State' s Attorney' s Office ( State' s Attorney' s Office)  to his FOIA request submitted on\nJuly 10, 2024.   On November 5, 2024,  Mr. Allen informed the Public Access Bureau that he had\nfiled a FOIA lawsuit challenging the State' s Attorney' s Office' s response to the same request. \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(g) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fr. Kirk Allen\nThe Honorable Ruth A. Woolery\nNovember 6, 2024\nPage 2\n\nSection 9.5(g) of FOIA provides: \n\nIf the requester files suit under Section 11 with respect to\n\nthe same denial that is the subject of a pending request for review, \nthe requester shall notify the Public Access Counselor,  and the\nPublic Access Counselor shall take no further action with respect\nto the request for review and shall so notify the public body. \n\nBecause Mr. Allen has filed suit under section 11 of FOIA, 2 section 9.5(g) of\nFOIA precludes the Public Access Counselor from taking further action with respect to this\nmatter. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  Please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov if you have questions.     \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82918 f ls sao\n\n25 ILCS 140/11 (West 2022). \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Records denied by a state's attorney's office","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82918/","full_text":"November 6, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kirk Allen\nEdgar County Watchdogs\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nKirk@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Ruth A. Woolery\nShelby County State's Attorney\nShelby County State's Attorney's Office\n301 East Main Street\nShelbyville, Illinois 62565\nstatesattorney@shelbycounty-\n\nil.gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82918\n\nDear Mr. Allen and Ms. Woolery: \n\nThis letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(g) of the Freedom of Information Act\nFOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau will take no further action\nwith respect to the above- referenced Request for Review. \n\nOn September 5, 2024, Mr. Kirk Allen, on behalf of Edgar County Watchdogs, \nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the partial denial by the Shelby\nCounty State's Attorney's Office (State's Attorney's Office) to his FOIA request submitted on\nJuly 10, 2024. On November 5, 2024, Mr. Allen informed the Public Access Bureau that he had\nfiled a FOIA lawsuit challenging the State's Attorney's Office's response to the same request. \n\nSection 9.5(g) of FOIA provides: \n\nIf the requester files suit under Section 11 with respect to\n\nthe same denial that is the subject of a pending request for review, \nthe requester shall notify the Public Access Counselor, and the\nPublic Access Counselor shall take no further action with respect\nto the request for review and shall so notify the public body. \n\nBecause Mr. Allen has filed suit under section 11 of FOIA, 2 section 9.5(g) of\nFOIA precludes the Public Access Counselor from taking further action with respect to this\nmatter. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. Please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov if you have questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82918 f ls sao\n\n25 ILCS 140/11 (West 2022)."}
{"id":1086,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-23","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82943"],"title":"DeKalb District 428 properly classified FOIA request as voluminous","filename":"82943, issued October 23, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1541,"summary":"The requester sought various records regarding school busing issues, and the PAC determined that the school district properly classified the request as a 'voluminous request' under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A requester asked a school district for a wide range of documents related to busing problems. The school district classified the request as 'voluminous' because it covered many different categories of records, and the Attorney General's office agreed that the district followed the law in doing so. This means the district is allowed to follow the specific, more restrictive procedures that apply to voluminous FOIA requests.","holding":"The District acted within its authority under FOIA to treat the request as a voluminous request, and no further action is warranted.","legal_question":"Whether the school district properly classified a FOIA request as a 'voluminous request' under section 2(h) of FOIA.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"DeKalb Community Unit School District 428","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"voluminous request","subject_description":"The request sought extensive records regarding school busing errors, delays, and student transportation incidents.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_h/82943%2C%20issued%20October%2023%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["voluminous request","school district","busing records","FOIA procedure"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"October 23, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82943\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted. \n\nOn August 22, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to DeKalb Community Unit\n\nSchool District 428 ( District)  seeking copies of the following: \n\nA] ll records,  communications,  reports,  and other documents\nrelated to bussing issues that have occurred since the beginning of\nthe 2024-  2025 school year within DeKalb Community Unit\nSchool District 428. This request includes incidents involving any\nstudents who may have experienced bussing errors,  delays,  or\nmisidentifications.  \n\nSpecifically, I am requesting: \n\n1.  All internal and external communications (including emails, \n\nmemos,  and phone call records)  between school staff, \ntransportation staff, and any third parties related to bussing\nissues since the start of the 2024-  2025 school year. \n\n2.  Records from Skyward or any other student information\n\nsystem reflecting the transportation schedules and any updates\n\n\fOctober 23, 2024\nPage 2\n\nor changes for students,  including any instances where\nschedules were not properly reflected or communicated. \n3.  All records pertaining to bus rides where students were\nmisidentified, incorrectly transported, or where there were\nsignificant delays or errors,  including bus logs,  GPS data,  and\ndriver and aide reports. \nIncident reports,  if any,  filed by school staff or\ntransportation staff regarding bussing errors, student\nmisidentification,  or transportation to incorrect\n\nlocations. \n\n4. \n\n5.  Any notes or records from meetings or communications\nbetween school officials and parents related to these bussing\nissues. \n\n6.  All communications and records between school staff and\nlaw enforcement officers regarding the response to any\nmissing child reports or transportation issues since the start of\nthe 2024- 2025 school year. \n\n7.  All documents and communications sent by the\n\nSuperintendent or any other district official in response to\ncomplaints or reports regarding bussing issues. ( Emphasis in\noriginal.)[1] \n\nOn April 29, 2024, the District notified you that your FOIA request was voluminous because\nyour request sought at least five categories of records.   The District advised that you had ten\nbusiness days to amend your request such that it would no longer be a voluminous request, and\nthat if it did not receive an amended request,  it would respond to your request and may assess\npermissible fees.   \n\nOn August 30, 2024, you provided the District with an amended FOIA request, \nwhich removed the portion of your request seeking records regarding delays.   On September 9, \n2024, the District notified you that your amended FOIA request continued to be voluminous\nbecause your request sought at least five categories of records and an initial search for e- mail\nrecords yielded thousands of records.  On September 12, 2024, you submitted a completed\nRequest for Review which appears to contest the District' s notification that your request is\nvoluminous.2\n\n2024). \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto [DeKalb Community Unit School District 428] ( August 22, \n\n2On September 18, 2024, you sent this office additional correspondence pertaining to video\n\nfootage from a school bus that the District informed you that it does not possess or maintain.  Your correspondence\ndid not ask this office to review the District's response, did not provide a signed Request for Review, and did not\nprovide a copy of the FOIA request; therefore, this office treated that correspondence as information for the above -\nreferenced Request for Review.  We note, however, that \"[ a] requester is entitled only to records that an agency has\nin fact chosen to create and retain.\"   Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. \n\n\fOctober 23, 2024\nPage 3\n\nFirst,  your Request for Review appears to contest the timeliness of the District' s\n\ndesignation of your amened request as voluminous.  Section 3.6(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3.6(a) \nWest 2022))  provides,  in pertinent part,  that if an amended request continues to be voluminous, \nthe public body shall respond within the earlier of 5 business days after it receives the response\nfrom the requester or 5 business days after the final day for the requester to respond to the public\nbody's notification [that the request was voluminous].\"   You submitted your amended FOIA\nrequest to the District on August 30,  2024.   Five business days after August 30,  2024,  is\nSeptember 9, 2024, the date the District responded by notifying you that your amended request\nwas voluminous. 3 Therefore,  the District' s voluminous designation was timely.   \n\nSecond,  you appear to contest the District' s ability to charge fees for records.  \n\nSection 3.6(c) of FOIA provides four options for a public body's response, including providing\nthe requester with an estimate of the fees to be charged;  FOIA does not require a public body to\nwaive copying fees for voluminous requests even if disclosure of the records would further a\npublic interest.  Regardless,  the District' s September 9, 2024,  response did not provide an\nestimate of fees, but rather notified you that your amended FOIA request was unduly\nburdensome pursuant to section 3(g) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) ( West 2022))  and offered you an\nopportunity to confer with it to help you reduce the scope of your request.  This office notes that\nin your amended FOIA request you mentioned that you were especially interested in the two\nincidents reported at the School Board meeting.  Accordingly, you may wish to submit a new\nFOIA request to the District seeking records pertaining to the two incidents,  describing the two\nincidents with as much detail available to you, and providing a specific time frame for the\nsearch. 4\n\nThird,  you appear to contest the District' s designation of your amended FOIA\n\nrequest as voluminous because it seems unlikely that there are thousands of records over a two-\nto-three- week period.   Section 2(h) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(h) ( West 2023 Supp.))  defines\nvoluminous request\"  as a request that: \n\ni) includes more than 5 individual requests for more than 5\n\ndifferent categories of records or a combination of individual\n\n1982); see also Workmann v. Illinois State Board of Education, 229 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463-64 (1992) (a public body\ndoes not violate FOIA when it does not disclose a record that it does not possess). \n\n2, 2024. \n\n3Business days exclude weekends and certain holidays, such as labor day, which fell on September\n\n4This office notes that parts of your August 22, 2024, FOIA request and parts of your August 30, \n\n2024, amended FOIA request ask for records with a time frame and other parts do not include a time frame for the\nrecords requested.  In the future you may wish to be more specific.  See Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 106 F. Supp. \n3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2015) ( public bodies are not required to search beyond the four corners of a FOIA request, nor are\nthey required to divine the requester's intent).   \n\n\fOctober 23, 2024\nPage 4\n\nrequests that total requests for more than 5 different categories\nof records in a period of 20 business days; or\n\nii) requires the compilation of more than 500 letter or\n\nlegal- sized pages of public records unless a single requested record\nexceeds 500 pages. \" Single requested record\" may include, but is\nnot limited to, one report,  form,  e- mail,  letter,  memorandum,  book, \nmap, microfilm, tape, or recording.  (Emphasis added.) \n\nAlthough your Request for Review appears to contest the District's designation of your Request\nfor Review as voluminous because you do not think that there could be thousands of records,  a\npublic body may designate a request as voluminous when a request seeks more than five\ndifferent categories of records. 5 Your amended request seeks at least six different categories of\nrecords, including, but not limited to: (1) internal and external communications regarding busing\nissues; ( 2) records from Skyward or any other student information system; ( 3) records pertaining\nto bus rides; (4) incident reports; (5) notes or records from meetings; and (6) communications\nbetween school staff and law enforcement officers.   Thus,  regardless of whether your amended\nrequest requires the compilation of more than 500 pages of records, it qualifies as a \" voluminous\nrequest\"  under the definition of that term in section 2(h) of FOIA because of the number of\ncategories of records it seeks.  Because your request seeks at least six different categories of\nrecords,  FOIA authorized the District to treat your request as a voluminous request,  and the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at 312-814-5201, \n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov,  or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82943 f no fi war sd\n\nclassification of any kind[.]\"   Webster's Third New International Dictionary 352 (1993).   \n\n5Webster' s Third New International Dictionary defines \" category\"  as \" a class, group, or\n\n\fOctober 23, 2024\nPage 5\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Shawna M. Krenz\nParalegal and FOIA Officer\nDeKalb Community Unit School District 428\n901 South 4th Street\nDeKalb, Illinois 60115\nshawna. krenz@d428. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Records of school busing errors and transportation incidents","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82943/","full_text":"October 23, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82943\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted. \n\nOn August 22, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to DeKalb Community Unit\n\nSchool District 428 (District) seeking copies of the following: \n\nA] ll records, communications, reports, and other documents\nrelated to bussing issues that have occurred since the beginning of\nthe 2024- 2025 school year within DeKalb Community Unit\nSchool District 428. This request includes incidents involving any\nstudents who may have experienced bussing errors, delays, or\nmisidentifications. \n\nSpecifically, I am requesting: \n\nor changes for students, including any instances where\nschedules were not properly reflected or communicated. \n3. All records pertaining to bus rides where students were\nmisidentified, incorrectly transported, or where there were\nsignificant delays or errors, including bus logs, GPS data, and\ndriver and aide reports. \nIncident reports, if any, filed by school staff or\ntransportation staff regarding bussing errors, student\nmisidentification, or transportation to incorrect\n\nlocations. \n\n4. \n\n5. Any notes or records from meetings or communications\nbetween school officials and parents related to these bussing\nissues. \n\n6. All communications and records between school staff and\nlaw enforcement officers regarding the response to any\nmissing child reports or transportation issues since the start of\nthe 2024- 2025 school year. \n\n7. All documents and communications sent by the\n\nSuperintendent or any other district official in response to\ncomplaints or reports regarding bussing issues. (Emphasis in\noriginal.)[1] \n\nOn April 29, 2024, the District notified you that your FOIA request was voluminous because\nyour request sought at least five categories of records. The District advised that you had ten\nbusiness days to amend your request such that it would no longer be a voluminous request, and\nthat if it did not receive an amended request, it would respond to your request and may assess\npermissible fees. \n\nOn August 30, 2024, you provided the District with an amended FOIA request, \nwhich removed the portion of your request seeking records regarding delays. On September 9, \n2024, the District notified you that your amended FOIA request continued to be voluminous\nbecause your request sought at least five categories of records and an initial search for e- mail\nrecords yielded thousands of records. On September 12, 2024, you submitted a completed\nRequest for Review which appears to contest the District's notification that your request is\nvoluminous.2\n\n2024). \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto [DeKalb Community Unit School District 428] (August 22, \n\n2 On September 18, 2024, you sent this office additional correspondence pertaining to video\n\nfootage from a school bus that the District informed you that it does not possess or maintain. Your correspondence\ndid not ask this office to review the District's response, did not provide a signed Request for Review, and did not\nprovide a copy of the FOIA request; therefore, this office treated that correspondence as information for the above -\nreferenced Request for Review. We note, however, that \"[ a] requester is entitled only to records that an agency has\nin fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. \n\nFirst, your Request for Review appears to contest the timeliness of the District's\n\ndesignation of your amened request as voluminous. Section 3.6(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3.6(a) \nWest 2022)) provides, in pertinent part, that if an amended request continues to be voluminous, \nthe public body shall respond within the earlier of 5 business days after it receives the response\nfrom the requester or 5 business days after the final day for the requester to respond to the public\nbody's notification [that the request was voluminous].\" You submitted your amended FOIA\nrequest to the District on August 30, 2024. Five business days after August 30, 2024, is\nSeptember 9, 2024, the date the District responded by notifying you that your amended request\nwas voluminous. 3 Therefore, the District's voluminous designation was timely. \n\nSecond, you appear to contest the District's ability to charge fees for records. \n\nSection 3.6(c) of FOIA provides four options for a public body's response, including providing\nthe requester with an estimate of the fees to be charged; FOIA does not require a public body to\nwaive copying fees for voluminous requests even if disclosure of the records would further a\npublic interest. Regardless, the District's September 9, 2024, response did not provide an\nestimate of fees, but rather notified you that your amended FOIA request was unduly\nburdensome pursuant to section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) (West 2022)) and offered you an\nopportunity to confer with it to help you reduce the scope of your request. This office notes that\nin your amended FOIA request you mentioned that you were especially interested in the two\nincidents reported at the School Board meeting. Accordingly, you may wish to submit a new\nFOIA request to the District seeking records pertaining to the two incidents, describing the two\nincidents with as much detail available to you, and providing a specific time frame for the\nsearch. 4\n\nThird, you appear to contest the District's designation of your amended FOIA\n\nrequest as voluminous because it seems unlikely that there are thousands of records over a two-\nto-three- week period. Section 2(h) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(h) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines\nvoluminous request\" as a request that: \n\ni) includes more than 5 individual requests for more than 5\n\ndifferent categories of records or a combination of individual\n\n1982); see also Workmann v. Illinois State Board of Education, 229 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463-64 (1992) (a public body\ndoes not violate FOIA when it does not disclose a record that it does not possess). \n\n2, 2024. \n\n3 Business days exclude weekends and certain holidays, such as labor day, which fell on September\n\n4 This office notes that parts of your August 22, 2024, FOIA request and parts of your August 30, \n\n2024, amended FOIA request ask for records with a time frame and other parts do not include a time frame for the\nrecords requested. In the future you may wish to be more specific. See Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 106 F. Supp. \n3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2015) (public bodies are not required to search beyond the four corners of a FOIA request, nor are\n\nrequests that total requests for more than 5 different categories\nof records in a period of 20 business days; or\n\nii) requires the compilation of more than 500 letter or\n\nlegal- sized pages of public records unless a single requested record\nexceeds 500 pages. \" Single requested record\" may include, but is\nnot limited to, one report, form, e- mail, letter, memorandum, book, \nmap, microfilm, tape, or recording. (Emphasis added.) \n\nAlthough your Request for Review appears to contest the District's designation of your Request\nfor Review as voluminous because you do not think that there could be thousands of records, a\npublic body may designate a request as voluminous when a request seeks more than five\ndifferent categories of records. 5 Your amended request seeks at least six different categories of\nrecords, including, but not limited to: (1) internal and external communications regarding busing\nissues; (2) records from Skyward or any other student information system; (3) records pertaining\nto bus rides; (4) incident reports; (5) notes or records from meetings; and (6) communications\nbetween school staff and law enforcement officers. Thus, regardless of whether your amended\nrequest requires the compilation of more than 500 pages of records, it qualifies as a \" voluminous\nrequest\" under the definition of that term in section 2(h) of FOIA because of the number of\ncategories of records it seeks. Because your request seeks at least six different categories of\nrecords, FOIA authorized the District to treat your request as a voluminous request, and the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at 312-814-5201, \n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Shawna M. Krenz\nParalegal and FOIA Officer\nDeKalb Community Unit School District 428\n901 South 4th Street\nDeKalb, Illinois 60115\nshawna. krenz@d428. org"}
{"id":1087,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-02","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82977"],"title":"Chicago Police Department conducted reasonable search for daily activity forms (no violation)","filename":"82977, issued December 2, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":864,"summary":"The requester sought copies of '21.953' forms from the Chicago Police Department, but the Department stated it could not locate any responsive records. The PAC concluded that the Department conducted a reasonable search for the requested records.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Chicago Police Department for specific daily activity forms, but the Department claimed no such records existed. The Attorney General's office reviewed the Department's search process and determined that they had looked thoroughly enough to satisfy the law. Consequently, the case is closed with no further action required.","holding":"The Chicago Police Department conducted a reasonable search for records responsive to the FOIA request.","legal_question":"Whether the Chicago Police Department conducted a reasonable search for records responsive to a FOIA request as required by section 3 of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Chicago Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"reasonable search","subject_description":"The requester sought police activity forms (21.953) for a specific park over a defined time period.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Completeness-of-Search/82977%2C%20issued%20December%202%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["reasonable search","police records","FOIA request","record production"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"December 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Scott D. Spears\nActing General Counsel\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan\nChicago,  Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice.org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82977; CPD FOIA No. P979412\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Spears: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA).  5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.).   For the reasons that follow,  the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Chicago Police Department (CPD) conducted a\nreasonable search for records responsive to\nrequest. \n\nSeptember 10, 2024,  FOIA\n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to CPD seeking copies of all\n21.953 forms completed by the 24th Police District from August 1, 2024,  through the date of the\nrequest.  After extending the date of its response under section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(e) \nWest 2022)),  on September 24, 2024,  CPD responded,  asserting that it was unable to locate\nresponsive records.  On October 1, 2024, \ncomplete this Request for Review.   In an initial September 10, 2024,  correspondence to this\noffice in connection with her Request for Review, \n\nsubmitted the materials necessary to\n\nalleged that she \" received a\n\n\fMr. Scott D. Spears\nDecember 2, 2024\nPage 2\n\nparallel form that the Chicago Park District maintains on CPD, demonstrating that there were\npolice patrols in Touhy ( Patrick)  Park.\" 1\n\nThe Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to CPD\nand asked that it provide this office with a written response to the allegations, together with a\ndescription of the searches conducted by CPD for responsive records,  including those individuals\nwith whom CPD consulted and any other information concerning the maintenance of the CPD\nform in question.   On November 8, 2024,  CPD provided a written answer.   On November 12, \nShe did not submit a reply. \n2024, this office forwarded a copy of that answer to\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 1.2 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022)) provides that \"[ a]ll records in\n\nthe custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"  \nWhen presented with a FOIA request, a public body is required to conduct a \" reasonable search\ntailored to the nature of [ that]  particular request.\"  Campbell v. U.S.  Dep' t of Justice,  164 F. 3d\n20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  \"Although a public body is not required to perform an exhaustive\nsearch of every possible location,  the body must * * *  search those places that are ' reasonably\nlikely to contain responsive records.'\"   Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App\n1st)  190038, ¶ 31 ( quoting Judicial Watch,  Inc. v. U.S.  Dep' t of Justice,  373 F. Supp.  3d 120,  126\nD.D.C. 2019)).  A public body must use search terms that are reasonably calculated to locate\nresponsive records.   Hall v. C.I.A., 668 F. Supp.  2d 172,  183- 84 ( D.D.C. 2009).   \n\nIn its response to this office,  CPD provided a detailed description of the searches\n\nconducted for responsive records: \n\nAfter FOIA Request P979412 was received, the FOIA officer\nassigned to the request emailed the appropriate department within\nthe CPD that maintains daily activity reports for police officers at\nthe park districts,  the Bureau of Patrol.  The Bureau of Patrol\nsubsequently communicated with the commander for the 24th\nPolice District.  It was confirmed that there were no responsive\nrecords because the 24th Police District did not have a working\nvehicle for officers to patrol the park( s)  during the requested\ntimeframe. Accordingly, since no officers patrolled the park(s) in\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Counselor] ( September 10, 2024). \n\n\fMr. Scott D. Spears\nDecember 2, 2024\nPage 3\n\nthe 24th Police District during the requested timeframe, there are\nno daily activity records for the park( s).[ 2] \n\nThe information provided to this indicates that CPD took measures that were\n\nrequest.  CPD explained that, \n\nreasonably calculated to locate records responsive to\nbecause the police district responsible for patrolling the park in question had no working patrol\nvehicles during the requested time frame, CPD did not possess any responsive daily activity\nreports as requested.   Further,  this office has reviewed a copy of the Chicago Park District' s daily\nprovided to this office in the initial stages of her Request for\npolice report that\nReview.   Although this correspondence predates CPD' s September 24,  2024,  denial of her\nrequest, that report nonetheless documents no CPD police activity in Touhy Park from August 1, \n2024,  through September 10, 2024.   Accordingly,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that the\nCPD conducted a reasonable search for records responsive to\n10, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nSeptember\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have FOIA questions, \nyou may contact me at the Springfield address on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82977 f 3a search proper pd\n\n2Letter from Legal Affairs Division – Unit 114, Chicago Police Department, to Christopher R. \n\nBoggs, Deputy Public Access Counselor, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (November\n8, 2024). \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police activity forms for a park","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82977/","full_text":"December 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Scott D. Spears\nActing General Counsel\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan\nChicago, Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82977; CPD FOIA No. P979412\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Spears: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Chicago Police Department (CPD) conducted a\nreasonable search for records responsive to\nrequest. \n\nSeptember 10, 2024, FOIA\n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to CPD seeking copies of all\n21.953 forms completed by the 24th Police District from August 1, 2024, through the date of the\nrequest. After extending the date of its response under section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(e) \nWest 2022)), on September 24, 2024, CPD responded, asserting that it was unable to locate\n\nparallel form that the Chicago Park District maintains on CPD, demonstrating that there were\npolice patrols in Touhy (Patrick) Park.\" 1\n\nThe Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to CPD\nand asked that it provide this office with a written response to the allegations, together with a\ndescription of the searches conducted by CPD for responsive records, including those individuals\nwith whom CPD consulted and any other information concerning the maintenance of the CPD\nform in question. On November 8, 2024, CPD provided a written answer. On November 12, \nShe did not submit a reply. \n2024, this office forwarded a copy of that answer to\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 1.2 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022)) provides that \"[ a]ll records in\n\nthe custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" \nWhen presented with a FOIA request, a public body is required to conduct a \" reasonable search\ntailored to the nature of [ that] particular request.\" Campbell v. U.S. Dep' t of Justice, 164 F. 3d\n20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). \"Although a public body is not required to perform an exhaustive\nsearch of every possible location, the body must * * * search those places that are ' reasonably\nlikely to contain responsive records.'\" Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App\n1st) 190038, ¶ 31 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep' t of Justice, 373 F. Supp. 3d 120, 126\nD.D.C. 2019)). A public body must use search terms that are reasonably calculated to locate\nresponsive records. Hall v. C.I.A., 668 F. Supp. 2d 172, 183- 84 (D.D.C. 2009). \n\nIn its response to this office, CPD provided a detailed description of the searches\n\nconducted for responsive records: \n\nAfter FOIA Request P979412 was received, the FOIA officer\nassigned to the request emailed the appropriate department within\nthe CPD that maintains daily activity reports for police officers at\nthe park districts, the Bureau of Patrol. The Bureau of Patrol\nsubsequently communicated with the commander for the 24th\nPolice District. It was confirmed that there were no responsive\n\nthe 24th Police District during the requested timeframe, there are\nno daily activity records for the park(s).[ 2] \n\nThe information provided to this indicates that CPD took measures that were\n\nrequest. CPD explained that, \n\nreasonably calculated to locate records responsive to\nbecause the police district responsible for patrolling the park in question had no working patrol\nvehicles during the requested time frame, CPD did not possess any responsive daily activity\nreports as requested. Further, this office has reviewed a copy of the Chicago Park District's daily\nprovided to this office in the initial stages of her Request for\npolice report that\nReview. Although this correspondence predates CPD's September 24, 2024, denial of her\nrequest, that report nonetheless documents no CPD police activity in Touhy Park from August 1, \n2024, through September 10, 2024. Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the\nCPD conducted a reasonable search for records responsive to\n10, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nSeptember\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have FOIA questions, \nyou may contact me at the Springfield address on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82977 f 3a search proper pd\n\n2 Letter from Legal Affairs Division – Unit 114, Chicago Police Department, to Christopher R. \n\nBoggs, Deputy Public Access Counselor, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (November\n8, 2024)."}
{"id":1088,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-09-25","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["82990"],"title":"Village of Elmwood Park properly redacted home address and phone number as private information","filename":"82990, issued September 25, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":499,"summary":"The requester sought an unredacted incident report from the Village of Elmwood Park to obtain another dog owner's contact information, but the PAC determined the redactions were proper under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A resident requested an unredacted police incident report to get the contact information of another dog owner involved in an incident. The Village redacted the owner's home address and phone number, and the PAC agreed that this information is legally protected as 'private information.' Because the law exempts this data from disclosure, the PAC closed the case without requiring the Village to release it.","holding":"The Village of Elmwood Park properly redacted home addresses and personal telephone numbers from an incident report as 'private information' under section 7(1)(b) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Does the definition of 'private information' under 5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) and the exemption in 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) allow a public body to redact a private citizen's home address and phone number from an incident report?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Village of Elmwood Park","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought unredacted contact information for a private citizen involved in a dog bite incident report.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_c-5/82990%2C%20issued%20September%2025%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["private information","police report","redaction","home address"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"September 25, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 82990\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.   \n\nOn August 26, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Elmwood\n\nPark ( Village)  seeking a copy of an incident report by stating the report number.   On September\n10, 2024,  the Village provided you with a copy of the incident report and animal bite report\ncorresponding to that report number,  but redacted certain discrete information pursuant to\nsections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 In particular,  the Village' s response stated that it redacted\nhome or personal telephone numbers and home addressees under section 7(1)(b).  In your\nRequest for Review,  which you finished submitting on September 20, 2024,  you disputed the\nredaction of the other dog owner' s home address and home or personal telephone number.   You\nexplained that your dog was the victim of the incident and that you are seeking the other dog\nowner' s contact information to pursue reimbursement. \n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information,  unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\"  \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2.5 (West 2023 Supp.))  defines \" private information\"  to\ninclude: \n\n1, 2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July\n\n\fSeptember 25, 2024\nPage 2\n\nU]nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number, \ndriver' s license number,  employee identification number,  biometric\nidentifiers,  personal financial\naccess codes,  medical records,  home or personal telephone\nnumbers,  and personal email addresses.  Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  ( Emphasis added.)  \n\ninformation,  passwords or other\n\nlicense plates,  except as\n\nThe information that you seek in unredacted form— a home or personal telephone\nnumber and a home address— meets the plain language of the definition of \"private information.\" \nTherefore,  those pieces of information are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b).  \nAlthough you explained that you need these pieces of information to seek reimbursement\nthe other dog owner,  the Public Access Bureau is unable to conclude that a public body must\ndisclose information that falls within the scope of a FOIA exemption.   Under these\ncircumstances,  this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.  \n\nfrom\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82990 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Gina Pesko\nVillage Clerk/ FOIA Officer\nVillage of Elmwood Park\n11 Conti Parkway\nElmwood Park,  Illinois 60707\ngpesko@elmwoodpark. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A private citizen's contact details in a dog bite incident report","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-82990/","full_text":"September 25, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 82990\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn August 26, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Elmwood\n\nPark (Village) seeking a copy of an incident report by stating the report number. On September\n10, 2024, the Village provided you with a copy of the incident report and animal bite report\ncorresponding to that report number, but redacted certain discrete information pursuant to\nsections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 In particular, the Village's response stated that it redacted\nhome or personal telephone numbers and home addressees under section 7(1)(b). In your\nRequest for Review, which you finished submitting on September 20, 2024, you disputed the\nredaction of the other dog owner's home address and home or personal telephone number. You\nexplained that your dog was the victim of the incident and that you are seeking the other dog\nowner's contact information to pursue reimbursement. \n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information, unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\" \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2.5 (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \" private information\" to\ninclude: \n\n1, 2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July\n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, biometric\nidentifiers, personal financial\naccess codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person. (Emphasis added.) \n\ninformation, passwords or other\n\nlicense plates, except as\n\nThe information that you seek in unredacted form— a home or personal telephone\nnumber and a home address— meets the plain language of the definition of \"private information.\" \nTherefore, those pieces of information are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b). \nAlthough you explained that you need these pieces of information to seek reimbursement\nthe other dog owner, the Public Access Bureau is unable to conclude that a public body must\ndisclose information that falls within the scope of a FOIA exemption. Under these\ncircumstances, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nfrom\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nkatherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n82990 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Gina Pesko\nVillage Clerk/ FOIA Officer\nVillage of Elmwood Park\n11 Conti Parkway\nElmwood Park, Illinois 60707\ngpesko@elmwoodpark. org"}
{"id":1089,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83088"],"title":"Libertyville School District No. 70 properly withheld student incident reports under ISSRA and FOIA 7.5(r)","filename":"83088, issued October 1, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":954,"summary":"A requester sought incident reports regarding student physical altercations at a middle school, which the District denied citing student privacy laws; the PAC determined no further action was warranted because the records are protected from disclosure.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked a school district for reports on student fights and disciplinary actions. The school district refused to provide them, arguing that even if names were removed, the details would still allow people to identify the students involved. The Attorney General's office agreed that the records are protected by privacy laws and closed the case.","holding":"The District properly denied the request because the records constitute protected student records under ISSRA and FOIA section 7.5(r).","legal_question":"Whether the District properly withheld incident reports involving students under the Illinois School Student Records Act (ISSRA) and FOIA section 7.5(r).","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/7.5(r)","105 ILCS 10/6"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7.5(r)"],"public_body":"Libertyville School District No. 70","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"student records","subject_description":"The request sought incident reports and disciplinary records related to student physical altercations at a middle school.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_r/Own-children-individual-student-incidents/83088%2C%20issued%20October%201%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["student records","school district","privacy","ISSRA","incident reports"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83088\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn September 3, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to Libertyville School\n\nDistrict No. 70 ( District)  seeking \" incident reports related to physical altercations at Highland\nMiddle School for the period from Jan 2023 to August 2024. Specifically, I am interested in\nreports documenting incidents where students were involved in physical fights or assaults, \nincluding any records of disciplinary actions taken.\" 1 On September 17, 2024, the District\ndenied your request in its entirety pursuant to section 6 of the Illinois School Student Records\nAct (ISSRA)2 and sections 7(1)(a)3 and 7.5(r)4 of FOIA.  The District stated that \" redacting the\n\n1FOIA Request from\n\nto [Libertyville School District No. 70] (September 3, 2024). \n\n2105 ILCS 10/6 (West 2022). \n\n2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n45 ILCS 140/7.5(r) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024;  103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024;  103-786, effective August 7, 2024;  103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024;  103-1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\n\fOctober 1, 2024\nPage 2\n\ninformation would not sufficiently de- identify the student( s)  involved.\" 5 On September 26, \n2024, this office received your complete Request for Review contesting the District's response.  \nIn your Request for Review,  you contend that the District should disclose the records with names\nand other identifying information redacted if necessary. \n\nSection 7.5(r) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation prohibited from\n\nbeing disclosed by the [ ISSRA].\"   Section 6(a)  of ISSRA provides that \"[ n] o school student\nrecords or information contained therein may be released, transferred, disclosed or otherwise\ndisseminated,  except\"  to certain authorized parties who are irrelevant here.   Section 2(d) of\nISSRA6 defines \"school student record\" as \" any writing or other recorded information\nconcerning a student and by which a student may be individually identified,  maintained by a\nschool or at its direction or by an employee of a school, regardless of how or where the\ninformation is stored.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   \n\nIn Bowie v. Evanston Community Consolidated School District No.  65,  128 Ill.  \n2d 373, 375 (1989), parents of students requested student test scores and the race of each student\ntested for a five- year period.   The Illinois Supreme Court held that a \" masked record,  which\ndeletes individual identifying information, does not fall within the definition of a school student\nrecord,  and is not prohibited from disclosure under the Act.\"   Bowie,  128 Ill. 2d at 379.   In Board\nof Education of City of Chicago v. Illinois Education Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL App (1st) \n122447, ¶  19 ( 2013),  the Illinois Appellate Court distinguished student disciplinary records from\nmasked test scores, stating that \"[ a] ' masked' record is one where any information identifying a\nstudent has been deleted and the record is released for the purpose of research,  statistical\nreporting, or planning.\"  The court held that ISSRA prohibited disclosure of two students' \ndisciplinary records because \" the mere redaction of the students'  surnames or reference to the\nstudents by their initials does not render the records 'masked.\"   Illinois Education Labor\nRelations Board,  2013 IL App ( 1st)  122447, ¶  21.   In accordance with those cases,  this office has\npreviously determined that records documenting student behavior, rather than test scores, could\nnot be sufficiently redacted to prevent the identification of students and that ISSRA prohibits the\ndisclosure of such records.  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 61177, issued January 3, 2020, at\n2-3 (\"[ P] arents,  students,  or other members of the public familiar with the teachers'  classrooms\ncould ascertain the identities of students based on the specific circumstances described in the\nnotes or reports.\"). \n\nYour FOIA request sought records documenting incidents where \" students were\n\ninvolved in physical fights or assaults, including any records of disciplinary actions taken.\" 7\n\nSchool District 70, to\n\nSeptember 17, 2024), at [1]. \n\n5Letter from Robin Smith Kollman, Director of Communications, FOIA Officer, Libertyville\n\n6105 ILCS 10/2(d) (West 2022). \n\n7FOIA Request from\n\nto [ Libertyville School District No. 70] ( September 3, 2024). \n\n\fOctober 1, 2024\nPage 3\n\nUnlike the test score data of a large group of students at issue in Bowie,  which could be readily\nmasked by redacting the students' names and scrambling the scores, your request sought\ninformation regarding specific events and the conduct of individual students.   Redacting the\nnames alone would not suffice to prevent the students from being identified because parents, \nstudents,  or other members of the public familiar with the incidents or classrooms could ascertain\nthe identities of students based on the specific circumstances described in the records.  Because\nISSRA specifically prohibits disclosure of records from which individual students could be\nidentified, the District did not improperly deny your request pursuant to section 7.5(r) of FOIA.  \nTherefore,  no further action is necessary in this matter. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This letter serves to close this matter.  If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at ( 773)  590- 7878 or benjamin. silver@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83088 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Robin Smith Kollman\nDirector of Communications,  FOIA Officer\nLibertyville School District 70\n1381 Lake Street\nLibertyville, Illinois 60048\nrkollman@d70schools. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Incident reports and disciplinary records of student altercations","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83088/","full_text":"October 1, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83088\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn September 3, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to Libertyville School\n\nDistrict No. 70 (District) seeking \" incident reports related to physical altercations at Highland\nMiddle School for the period from Jan 2023 to August 2024. Specifically, I am interested in\nreports documenting incidents where students were involved in physical fights or assaults, \nincluding any records of disciplinary actions taken.\" 1 On September 17, 2024, the District\ndenied your request in its entirety pursuant to section 6 of the Illinois School Student Records\nAct (ISSRA)2 and sections 7(1)(a)3 and 7.5(r)4 of FOIA. The District stated that \" redacting the\n\n1FOIA Request from\n\nto [Libertyville School District No. 70] (September 3, 2024). \n\n2105 ILCS 10/6 (West 2022). \n\n2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n45 ILCS 140/7.5(r) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103-1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\ninformation would not sufficiently de- identify the student(s) involved.\" 5 On September 26, \n2024, this office received your complete Request for Review contesting the District's response. \nIn your Request for Review, you contend that the District should disclose the records with names\nand other identifying information redacted if necessary. \n\nSection 7.5(r) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation prohibited from\n\nbeing disclosed by the [ ISSRA].\" Section 6(a) of ISSRA provides that \"[ n] o school student\nrecords or information contained therein may be released, transferred, disclosed or otherwise\ndisseminated, except\" to certain authorized parties who are irrelevant here. Section 2(d) of\nISSRA6 defines \"school student record\" as \" any writing or other recorded information\nconcerning a student and by which a student may be individually identified, maintained by a\nschool or at its direction or by an employee of a school, regardless of how or where the\ninformation is stored.\" (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn Bowie v. Evanston Community Consolidated School District No. 65, 128 Ill. \n2d 373, 375 (1989), parents of students requested student test scores and the race of each student\ntested for a five- year period. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a \" masked record, which\ndeletes individual identifying information, does not fall within the definition of a school student\nrecord, and is not prohibited from disclosure under the Act.\" Bowie, 128 Ill. 2d at 379. In Board\nof Education of City of Chicago v. Illinois Education Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL App (1st) \n122447, ¶ 19 (2013), the Illinois Appellate Court distinguished student disciplinary records from\nmasked test scores, stating that \"[ a] ' masked' record is one where any information identifying a\nstudent has been deleted and the record is released for the purpose of research, statistical\nreporting, or planning.\" The court held that ISSRA prohibited disclosure of two students' \ndisciplinary records because \" the mere redaction of the students' surnames or reference to the\nstudents by their initials does not render the records 'masked.\" Illinois Education Labor\nRelations Board, 2013 IL App (1st) 122447, ¶ 21. In accordance with those cases, this office has\npreviously determined that records documenting student behavior, rather than test scores, could\nnot be sufficiently redacted to prevent the identification of students and that ISSRA prohibits the\ndisclosure of such records. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 61177, issued January 3, 2020, at\n2-3 (\"[ P] arents, students, or other members of the public familiar with the teachers' classrooms\ncould ascertain the identities of students based on the specific circumstances described in the\nnotes or reports.\"). \n\nYour FOIA request sought records documenting incidents where \" students were\n\ninvolved in physical fights or assaults, including any records of disciplinary actions taken.\" 7\n\nUnlike the test score data of a large group of students at issue in Bowie, which could be readily\nmasked by redacting the students' names and scrambling the scores, your request sought\ninformation regarding specific events and the conduct of individual students. Redacting the\nnames alone would not suffice to prevent the students from being identified because parents, \nstudents, or other members of the public familiar with the incidents or classrooms could ascertain\nthe identities of students based on the specific circumstances described in the records. Because\nISSRA specifically prohibits disclosure of records from which individual students could be\nidentified, the District did not improperly deny your request pursuant to section 7.5(r) of FOIA. \nTherefore, no further action is necessary in this matter. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (773) 590- 7878 or benjamin. silver@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83088 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Robin Smith Kollman\nDirector of Communications, FOIA Officer\nLibertyville School District 70\n1381 Lake Street\nLibertyville, Illinois 60048\nrkollman@d70schools. org"}
{"id":1090,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-11-19","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83108"],"title":"Will County Division of Transportation improperly redacted email under 7(1)(f) deliberative process exemption","filename":"83108, issued November 19, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1120,"summary":"The requester challenged the Will County Division of Transportation's redaction of an email under FOIA section 7(1)(f), and the PAC determined the exemption was improperly applied.","plain_summary":"The requester sought e-mails between the county transportation division and its roadwork contractor, one of which the division redacted as deliberative material. The PAC determined the e-mail reflected negotiation between the division and a contractor protecting its own interests, not an internal deliberation, so the deliberative-process exemption did not apply. The division was directed to provide the requester with an unredacted copy of the e-mail.","holding":"The Will County Division of Transportation improperly redacted an email under section 7(1)(f) because the communication between the Division and a private contractor did not constitute an inter- or intra-agency deliberative process.","legal_question":"Whether communications between a public body and a private contractor regarding project coordination qualify for the deliberative process exemption under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(f)"],"public_body":"Will County Division of Transportation","requesting_party":"Requester (name redacted in source document)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(f)","subject_description":"The request concerned communications between the Division and a contractor regarding the scheduling and coordination of curb and gutter removal and replacement.","ocr_status":"llm_reocr","ocr_quality":89.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/Communications-with-third-parties/Self-interested-parties/83108%2C%20issued%20November%2019%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["deliberative process","contractor communications","redaction","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"November 19, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kyle J. Catalano\nFOIA Officer\nDivision of Transportation\nWill County\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nWCDOTFOIA@willcountyillinois. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83108\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Catalano: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe response by the Will County Division of Transportation ( Division)  to\n\nAugust 14, 2024,  FOIA request violated the requirements of FOIA. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Division seeking,  in\nrelevant part, \"[ a] ll correspondences/ communications/ emails between [ the Division] &  K-Five\nthat resulted in the scheduling and coordination of curb/ gutter removal &  replacement\nspecified address].\" 2 On August 20, 2024,  the Division partially denied\n\nin front of\nrequest\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Kyle Catalano ( August 14, 2024).  \n\n\fMr. Kyle Catalano\nNovember 19, 2024\nPage 2\n\npursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. 3 On September 25, 2024,  this office received\ncompleted Request for Review challenging the Division' s denial.   Specifically, \nalleges that one e-mail was improperly redacted.  \n\nOn October 1, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nDivision and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office' s\nconfidential review,  together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nFOIA exemptions it asserted.   On October 3, 2024,  the Division provided a response and the\nwithheld record.   On October 8, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Division' s response to\n\nwith an opportunity to reply;  she replied later the same day.  \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.   Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\"   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts, \nnotes,  recommendations,  memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed,  or\npolicies or actions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record\nshall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public\nbody.\"   Section 7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank\nand open discussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\"   Harwood v. \nMcDonough,  344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248 ( 2003).  \" The government\ndocuments that reflect the agency' s give- and- take leading up to its final decisions.\"   Chicago\nTribune Co. v. Cook County Assessor' s Office, 2018 IL App (1st)  170455, ¶  29. \n\nis entitled to withhold\n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA also extends to communications between a public body\n\nand a third- party consultant when the third party' s \" analyses and recommendations ' played\nessentially the same part in an agency' s process of deliberation as documents prepared by agency\npersonnel might have done.'\"  Fisher v. Office of the Illinois Attorney General,  2021 IL App ( 1st) \n200225, ¶  20 (quoting Harwood,  344 Ill. App. 3d at 248).   In determining whether third-party\ncommunications fall within the scope of the deliberative process exemption,  courts look \" to\nwhether the third party ' functioned ' enough like' [the agency' s]  own personnel'; ' worked side- by-\nside' with the agency to address the same ' fundamental concern';  or were ' on the same team.'\" \nNew York Times Co. v. United States DOJ, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20776,  at * 51 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. \n3, 2021) ( quoting Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Department of Treasury,  739 F. Supp.  2d 515, \n540 ( S.D.N.Y. 2010) ( quoting DOI v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 12\n2001))).   For communications with a third party to qualify under the 7(1)(f) exemption,  the\nthird- party \" may not represent independent\n\ninterests of its own apart from those of the agency.\" \n\n2024.  \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\n\fMr. Kyle Catalano\nNovember 19, 2024\nPage 3\n\nFisher, 2021 IL App (1st)  200225, ¶  20 (citing Harwood,  344 Ill. App. 3d at 248),  see also Ill. \nAtt'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 26456,  issued December 31, 2013,  at 3 (general contractor' s\nproposal to a municipality outlining certain options for a parking deck was not exempt from\ndisclosure under section 7(1)(f) because the contractor had its own financial\ninterests in the\nmultimillion- dollar project). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Division explained that an employee from K-Five\n\nConstruction Company sent the withheld e-mail to a Division employee.   The Division argued\nthat the K-Five employee' s e-mail is exempt because the individual \" expressed his opinion about\nongoing construction activities.\" 4 In her reply, \ngovernment worker— he is a construction project manager for K-five construction.\" 5\n\nstated the individual \" is not a\n\nfurther noted that the construction company \" was awarded ( and completed) [ a contract\n\nwith the Division]  for the construction work noted in the email.\" 6\n\nreflect that the Division asked K-Five to consider\n\ndriveway to perform additional roadwork to improve\n\nThis office' s review of the disclosed and redacted e-mails indicates that in the\ncontext of the relevant e-mails,  the interests of the Division and K-Five are not aligned.   The\nunredacted e-mails disclosed to\nreturning to the area of\ndrainage concerns.   K-Five stated that \" once scheduled,  we will perform removals and\nreplacements as directed by the County ( Steve).  We will require a sign off from the County,  that\nsubsequent to these revisions,  K5 will have no more liability and or responsibility to perform any\nadditional work in and around this property.   It is with this understanding,  that we will proceed.\" 7\nRather than a deliberation between a public body and its consultant as to the public body' s next\nsteps,  the e-mail chain reflects the back and forth between a contractor and the Division trying to\ncome to a mutual agreement,  with both entities seeking to protect their own interests.   Because\nthe construction company' s interests do not represent the interests of the Division in this instance, \nthe section 7(1)(f) exemption does not apply.   Accordingly,  the Division' s response to\n\nAugust 14, 2024,  FOIA request violated FOIA.  This office requests the Division\n\nprovide\n\nwith an unredacted version of the responsive record.  \n\n4E- mail from\n\n5E- mail from\n\n6E- mail from\n\nto Victoria Frazier ( October 8, 2024).  \n\nto [Victoria Frazier] ( October 8, 2024). \n\nto [Victoria Frazier] ( October 8, 2024). \n\n7E- mail from Bill [Jennings]  to Brian [ Gieseke] ( August 5, 2024). \n\n\fMr. Kyle Catalano\nNovember 19, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov.  Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83108 f 71f improper co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":"November 19, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kyle J. Catalano\nFOIA Officer\nDivision of Transportation\nWill County\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nWCDOTFOIA@willcountyillinois. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83108\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Catalano: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe response by the Will County Division of Transportation (Division) to\n\nAugust 14, 2024, FOIA request violated the requirements of FOIA. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Division seeking, in\nrelevant part, \"[ a] ll correspondences/ communications/ emails between [ the Division] & K-Five\nthat resulted in the scheduling and coordination of curb/ gutter removal & replacement\nspecified address].\" 2 On August 20, 2024, the Division partially denied\n\npursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. 3 On September 25, 2024, this office received\ncompleted Request for Review challenging the Division's denial. Specifically, \nalleges that one e-mail was improperly redacted. \n\nOn October 1, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nDivision and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office's\nconfidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nFOIA exemptions it asserted. On October 3, 2024, the Division provided a response and the\nwithheld record. On October 8, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Division's response to\n\nwith an opportunity to reply; she replied later the same day. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts, \nnotes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or\npolicies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record\nshall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public\nbody.\" Section 7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank\nand open discussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood v. \nMcDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248 (2003). \" The government\ndocuments that reflect the agency's give- and- take leading up to its final decisions.\" Chicago\nTribune Co. v. Cook County Assessor's Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455, ¶ 29. \n\nis entitled to withhold\n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA also extends to communications between a public body\n\nand a third- party consultant when the third party's \" analyses and recommendations ' played\nessentially the same part in an agency's process of deliberation as documents prepared by agency\npersonnel might have done.'\" Fisher v. Office of the Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (1st) \n200225, ¶ 20 (quoting Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248). In determining whether third-party\ncommunications fall within the scope of the deliberative process exemption, courts look \" to\nwhether the third party ' functioned ' enough like' [the agency's] own personnel'; ' worked side- by-\nside' with the agency to address the same ' fundamental concern'; or were ' on the same team.'\" \nNew York Times Co. v. United States DOJ, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20776, at * 51 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. \n3, 2021) (quoting Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, \n540 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting DOI v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 12\n2001))). For communications with a third party to qualify under the 7(1)(f) exemption, the\nthird- party \" may not represent independent\n\ninterests of its own apart from those of the agency.\" \n\n2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\nFisher, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (citing Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248), see also Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26456, issued December 31, 2013, at 3 (general contractor's\nproposal to a municipality outlining certain options for a parking deck was not exempt from\ndisclosure under section 7(1)(f) because the contractor had its own financial\ninterests in the\nmultimillion- dollar project). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Division explained that an employee from K-Five\n\nConstruction Company sent the withheld e-mail to a Division employee. The Division argued\nthat the K-Five employee's e-mail is exempt because the individual \" expressed his opinion about\nongoing construction activities.\" 4 In her reply, \ngovernment worker— he is a construction project manager for K-five construction.\" 5\n\nstated the individual \" is not a\n\nfurther noted that the construction company \" was awarded (and completed) [ a contract\n\nwith the Division] for the construction work noted in the email.\" 6\n\nreflect that the Division asked K-Five to consider\n\ndriveway to perform additional roadwork to improve\n\nThis office's review of the disclosed and redacted e-mails indicates that in the\ncontext of the relevant e-mails, the interests of the Division and K-Five are not aligned. The\nunredacted e-mails disclosed to\nreturning to the area of\ndrainage concerns. K-Five stated that \" once scheduled, we will perform removals and\nreplacements as directed by the County (Steve). We will require a sign off from the County, that\nsubsequent to these revisions, K5 will have no more liability and or responsibility to perform any\nadditional work in and around this property. It is with this understanding, that we will proceed.\" 7\nRather than a deliberation between a public body and its consultant as to the public body's next\nsteps, the e-mail chain reflects the back and forth between a contractor and the Division trying to\ncome to a mutual agreement, with both entities seeking to protect their own interests. Because\nthe construction company's interests do not represent the interests of the Division in this instance, \nthe section 7(1)(f) exemption does not apply. Accordingly, the Division's response to\n\nAugust 14, 2024, FOIA request violated FOIA. This office requests the Division\n\nprovide\n\nwith an unredacted version of the responsive record. \n\n4E- mail from\n\n5E- mail from\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83108 f 71f improper co","plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A resident requested emails between the Will County Division of Transportation and a private contractor regarding construction work. The Division redacted parts of an email claiming it was part of a private internal deliberation, but the Attorney General's office found that communications with an outside contractor do not qualify for this exemption. The Division must now provide the requester with an unredacted copy of the email.","card_headline":"Emails with a contractor about curb and gutter work","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83108/","full_text":"November 19, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n[REDACTED]\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kyle J. Catalano\nFOIA Officer\nDivision of Transportation\nWill County\n16841 West Laraway Road\nJoliet, Illinois 60433\nWCDOTFOIA@willcountyillinois.com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83108\n\nDear [REDACTED] and Mr. Catalano:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the response by the Will County Division of Transportation (Division) to [REDACTED] August 14, 2024, FOIA request violated the requirements of FOIA.\n\nOn that date, [REDACTED] submitted a FOIA request to the Division seeking, in relevant part, \"[a]ll correspondences/communications/emails between [the Division] & K-Five that resulted in the scheduling and coordination of curb/gutter removal & replacement in front of [specified address].\"2 On August 20, 2024, the Division partially denied [REDACTED] request\n\n1 5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.).\n\n2 E-mail from [REDACTED] to Kyle Catalano (August 14, 2024).\n\npursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.3 On September 25, 2024, this office received [REDACTED] completed Request for Review challenging the Division's denial. Specifically, [REDACTED] alleges that one e-mail was improperly redacted.\n\nOn October 1, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Division and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for this office's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the FOIA exemptions it asserted. On October 3, 2024, the Division provided a response and the withheld record. On October 8, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Division's response to [REDACTED] with an opportunity to reply; she replied later the same day.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\n\"All records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[p]reliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" Section 7(1)(f) is \"intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248 (2003). \"The government is entitled to withhold documents that reflect the agency's give-and-take leading up to its final decisions.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Cook County Assessor's Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 170455, ¶ 29.\n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA also extends to communications between a public body and a third-party consultant when the third party's \"analyses and recommendations 'played essentially the same part in an agency's process of deliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done.'\" Fisher v. Office of the Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (quoting Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248). In determining whether third-party communications fall within the scope of the deliberative process exemption, courts look \"to whether the third party 'functioned 'enough like' [the agency's] own personnel'; 'worked side-by-side' with the agency to address the same 'fundamental concern'; or were 'on the same team.'\" New York Times Co. v. United States DOJ, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20776, at *51 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2021) (quoting Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 739 F. Supp. 2d 515, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting DOI v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 12 (2001))). For communications with a third party to qualify under the 7(1)(f) exemption, the third-party \"may not represent independent interests of its own apart from those of the agency.\"\n\n3 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024.\n\nFisher, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 20 (citing Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248), see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26456, issued December 31, 2013, at 3 (general contractor's proposal to a municipality outlining certain options for a parking deck was not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f) because the contractor had its own financial interests in the multimillion-dollar project).\n\nIn its response to this office, the Division explained that an employee from K-Five Construction Company sent the withheld e-mail to a Division employee. The Division argued that the K-Five employee's e-mail is exempt because the individual \"expressed his opinion about ongoing construction activities.\"4 In her reply, [REDACTED] stated the individual \"is not a government worker—he is a construction project manager for K-five construction.\"5 [REDACTED] further noted that the construction company \"was awarded (and completed) [a contract with the Division] for the construction work noted in the email.\"6\n\nThis office's review of the disclosed and redacted e-mails indicates that in the context of the relevant e-mails, the interests of the Division and K-Five are not aligned. The unredacted e-mails disclosed to [REDACTED] reflect that the Division asked K-Five to consider returning to the area of [REDACTED] driveway to perform additional roadwork to improve drainage concerns. K-Five stated that \"once scheduled, we will perform removals and replacements as directed by the County (Steve). We will require a sign off from the County, that subsequent to these revisions, K5 will have no more liability and or responsibility to perform any additional work in and around this property. It is with this understanding, that we will proceed.\"7 Rather than a deliberation between a public body and its consultant as to the public body's next steps, the e-mail chain reflects the back and forth between a contractor and the Division trying to come to a mutual agreement, with both entities seeking to protect their own interests. Because the construction company's interests do not represent the interests of the Division in this instance, the section 7(1)(f) exemption does not apply. Accordingly, the Division's response to [REDACTED] August 14, 2024, FOIA request violated FOIA. This office requests the Division provide [REDACTED] with an unredacted version of the responsive record.\n\n4E-mail from [REDACTED] to Victoria Frazier (October 8, 2024).\n\n5E-mail from [REDACTED] to [Victoria Frazier] (October 8, 2024).\n\n6E-mail from [REDACTED] to [Victoria Frazier] (October 8, 2024).\n\n7E-mail from Bill [Jennings] to Brian [Gieseke] (August 5, 2024).\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have any questions, please contact me at victoria.frazier@ilag.gov. Thank you.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\n[REDACTED]\n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83108 f 71f improper co"}
{"id":1091,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83177"],"title":"Village of Skokie properly withheld body camera footage under 7.5(cc)","filename":"83177, issued October 3, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":713,"summary":"The requester sought body camera footage of a meeting between two police officers, which the Village of Skokie withheld. The PAC determined that the Village properly withheld the footage because the requester did not meet the disclosure requirements under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested body camera footage of a meeting between two police officers from the Village of Skokie. The Village denied the request, and the Public Access Counselor agreed, finding that state law restricts access to such footage unless the requester is a subject of the encounter or meets specific legal criteria. Because the requester did not meet these criteria, the Village was legally permitted to withhold the video.","holding":"The Village of Skokie did not improperly withhold the requested body camera footage because the requester is not authorized to receive it under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Skokie properly withheld body camera footage under section 7.5(cc) of FOIA and the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(cc)","50 ILCS 706/10-20(b)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(cc)"],"public_body":"Village of Skokie","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought body-worn camera footage of a private meeting between two police officers.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/not-flagged-not-subject/83177%2C%20issued%20October%203%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","FOIA exemption","video footage"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 3, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83177\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn September 5, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Skokie\n\nVillage)  seeking body camera footage and other records relating to an August 16, 2024,  meeting\nbetween two police officers.   On September 17, 2024,  the Village provided you with records\nwith redactions under sections 7(1)( b) and ( c) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(b), ( 1)(c) ( West 2023\nSupp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024);  the Village' s response did not\nspecifically address body camera footage.   On September 23, 2024 you submitted the above-\nreferenced Request for Review contesting the withholding of body worn camera footage of the\nface to face meeting between the two officers.  \n\nWhile not raised in the Village' s response,  section 7.5(cc) of FOIA 1 exempts from\n\ndisclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, \nexcept to the extent authorized under that Act.\"  Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act 2\nprovides,  in relevant part: \n\n15 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n2024;  103-605, effective July 1, 2024;  103- 636, effective July 1, 2024;  103- 786, effective August 7, 2024;  103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024;  103- 991,  effective August 9, 2024;  103- 1049,  effective August 9, 2024. \n\n250 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2022).  \n\n\fOctober 3, 2024\nPage 2\n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy,  at the time of the recording,  any\nrecording which is flagged,  due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm,  use of force,  arrest or detention,  or\nresulting death or bodily harm,  shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness;  and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject' s\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph ( 1) of this\n\nsubsection ( b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint,  discharge of a firearm,  use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request,  the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose,  in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter captured\non the recording or to the subject' s attorney,  or the officer\nor his or her legal representative.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nThus,  the Body Camera Act prohibits the disclosure of body camera footage\n\npursuant to a FOIA request,  unless one of the three above- described exceptions apply.  \n\nOn September 26, 2024,  a Senior Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access\nBureau contacted the Village' s FOIA Officer regarding the body camera footage you requested.  \nThe FOIA Officer explained that the Village withheld the footage because you are not the\nsubject of the encounter it depicts and because the footage was not flagged for any of the reasons\nin section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act.   \n\n\fOctober 3, 2024\nPage 3\n\nBecause you are not authorized to obtain the requested body camera footage\n\nunder any of the exceptions that permit disclosure in section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act, \nthe Village did not improperly withhold the footage pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA.  \nAccordingly,  this office has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  If you have questions,  please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83177 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Rolando Ithier\nFOIA Officer\nVillage of Skokie\nRolando. Ithier@skokie. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police body-camera footage of a private meeting between officers","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83177/","full_text":"October 3, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83177\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn September 5, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Skokie\n\nVillage) seeking body camera footage and other records relating to an August 16, 2024, meeting\nbetween two police officers. On September 17, 2024, the Village provided you with records\nwith redactions under sections 7(1)(b) and (c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2023\nSupp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024); the Village's response did not\nspecifically address body camera footage. On September 23, 2024 you submitted the above-\nreferenced Request for Review contesting the withholding of body worn camera footage of the\nface to face meeting between the two officers. \n\nWhile not raised in the Village's response, section 7.5(cc) of FOIA 1 exempts from\n\ndisclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, \nexcept to the extent authorized under that Act.\" Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act 2\nprovides, in relevant part: \n\n15 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 636, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103- 991, effective August 9, 2024; 103- 1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request, the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter captured\non the recording or to the subject's attorney, or the officer\nor his or her legal representative. (Emphasis added.) \n\nThus, the Body Camera Act prohibits the disclosure of body camera footage\n\npursuant to a FOIA request, unless one of the three above- described exceptions apply. \n\nOn September 26, 2024, a Senior Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access\nBureau contacted the Village's FOIA Officer regarding the body camera footage you requested. \nThe FOIA Officer explained that the Village withheld the footage because you are not the\nsubject of the encounter it depicts and because the footage was not flagged for any of the reasons\n\nBecause you are not authorized to obtain the requested body camera footage\n\nunder any of the exceptions that permit disclosure in section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act, \nthe Village did not improperly withhold the footage pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA. \nAccordingly, this office has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. If you have questions, please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83177 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Rolando Ithier\nFOIA Officer\nVillage of Skokie\nRolando. Ithier@skokie. org"}
{"id":1092,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-02","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83212"],"title":"Village of Libertyville properly withheld police reports under section 7(1)(c) personal privacy exemption","filename":"83212, issued October 2, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":786,"summary":"The requester sought police reports concerning two specific individuals at a residential address, which the Village of Libertyville denied citing personal privacy exemptions. The PAC determined the Village's denial was proper under FOIA section 7(1)(c).","plain_summary":"This determination addressed whether the Village of Libertyville properly withheld police reports under section 7(1)(c) of FOIA's personal privacy exemption. The Public Access Bureau held that the Village did not improperly withhold the reports, finding the request unfounded. The reports concerned a private incident at a private residence involving named individuals, no arrests or charges resulted, and because the request itself identified the subjects by name and address, redaction would not have protected their identities. The reasoning follows prior guidance that a report may be withheld in full under section 7(1)(c) where it contains highly personal information, no arrests were made, the matter is closed, and meaningful redaction cannot protect the subjects' identities.","holding":"A public body may withhold police reports in full under section 7(1)(c) of FOIA where the reports contain highly personal information about individuals who were not arrested or charged, the case is closed, and redaction cannot meaningfully protect the subjects' identities, particularly where the request itself identifies the subjects by name and address.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Libertyville properly invoked section 7(1)(c) of FOIA to withhold police reports containing personal information about private individuals.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)","7(1)(d)(iv)"],"public_body":"Village of Libertyville","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought police reports regarding specific individuals residing at a private address.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_c/Highly-personal-information/83212%2C%20issued%20October%202%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","privacy","exemption 7(1)(c)","personal information"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83212\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained\nbelow,  this office has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nYou submitted an undated FOIA request to the Village of Libertyville ( Village) \n\nseeking all police reports concerning two individuals who resided at a specific residential\naddress.   On September 9, 2024,  the Village denied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)(a), \n7(1)(b), 7(1)( c) and 7(1)( d)(iv) of FOIA, 1 asserting that disclosure of the withheld reports would\nconstitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.   On September 25, 2024,  this office\nreceived your Request for Review contesting the Village' s response.       \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"   Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject' s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining\n\n605,  effective July 1, 2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)( a), ( 1)( b), (1)(c), (1)( d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-\n\n\fOctober 2, 2024\nPage 2\n\nthe information.   The disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public\nemployees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.\" \n\nWhen balancing the right to privacy against the public interest in disclosure,  \n\ncourts have \" repeatedly expressed particular concern for protecting those who have been\ninvestigated,  but not charged,  in connection with a crime from the public embarrassment and\ndamage to their reputations which a disclosure of the investigative interest would cause.\"  \nDunaway v. Webster,  519 F. Supp.  1059,  1078 ( N.D. Cal. 1981).   The right to privacy \" is\nstrongest where the individuals in question ' have been investigated but never publicly charged.'\"  \nCitizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. United States Dep't of Justice, 846 F. \nSupp.  2d 63, 71 (D.D.C., 2012),  quoting American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Dep't\nof Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   The Public Access Bureau has previously determined\nthat in appropriate circumstances,  a report can be withheld in its entirety if the report' s narrative\ncontains highly personal\nclosed at the time of the request.   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 32478,  issued October 4, \n2016,  at 3 (report of domestic disturbance involving a police officer properly withheld where no\narrests were made and the case was closed);  see also Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, \n266 Ill. App. 3d 421, 426 ( 1994) ( finding an investigative file may be withheld in full under\nsection 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA 2 where \" redaction of the file cannot be meaningfully\naccomplished[ ]\" \n\ninformation about an individual,  no arrests were made,  and the matter is\n\nto protect the identities of witnesses).   \n\nOn October 1, 2024,  the Village furnished this office with unredacted copies of\n\nthe two reports.   Based on this office' s review,  the reports contain highly personal\nconcerning a private incident that occurred at a private residence,  and there is no indication that\nthe incident resulted in any arrests or criminal charges.   Because your request identified the\nsubjects by name and address,  redaction of those individuals'  names and identifying information\nfrom the responsive records would not protect their identities.   Further,  the specific nature of the\nconduct and circumstances described in the report could potentially reveal the identities of the\nrecords'  subjects even if the FOIA request did not identify them by name.  \n\ninformation\n\n2Section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA exempts from disclosure information that would \" unavoidably\n\ndisclose the identity of a confidential source,  confidential\ninformation furnished only by the confidential source,  or\npersons who file complaints with or provide information to administrative,  investigative,  law enforcement,  or penal\nagencies[.]\" \n\n\fOctober 2, 2024\nPage 3\n\nAccordingly,  this office concludes that the Village did not improperly withhold\nthe reports pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and that this matter is unfounded. 3 This file is\nclosed.   If you have any questions,  my e-mail address is Matthew. Rogina@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83212 f unf mun\n\ncc:  \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Benjamin Schuster\nElrod Friedman LLP\n325 North LaSalle Street,  Suite 450\nChicago,   Illinois 60654\nBenjamin. Schuster@ElrodFriedman. com\n\nexemptions. \n\n3Because of the applicability of section 7(1)(c), this office declines to discuss any additional\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports on named private individuals","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83212/","full_text":"October 2, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83212\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nYou submitted an undated FOIA request to the Village of Libertyville (Village) \n\nseeking all police reports concerning two individuals who resided at a specific residential\naddress. On September 9, 2024, the Village denied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)(a), \n7(1)(b), 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA, 1 asserting that disclosure of the withheld reports would\nconstitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. On September 25, 2024, this office\nreceived your Request for Review contesting the Village's response. \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\" Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining\n\n605, effective July 1, 2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-\n\nthe information. The disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public\nemployees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.\" \n\nWhen balancing the right to privacy against the public interest in disclosure, \n\ncourts have \" repeatedly expressed particular concern for protecting those who have been\ninvestigated, but not charged, in connection with a crime from the public embarrassment and\ndamage to their reputations which a disclosure of the investigative interest would cause.\" \nDunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The right to privacy \" is\nstrongest where the individuals in question ' have been investigated but never publicly charged.'\" \nCitizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. United States Dep't of Justice, 846 F. \nSupp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C., 2012), quoting American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Dep't\nof Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Public Access Bureau has previously determined\nthat in appropriate circumstances, a report can be withheld in its entirety if the report's narrative\ncontains highly personal\nclosed at the time of the request. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 32478, issued October 4, \n2016, at 3 (report of domestic disturbance involving a police officer properly withheld where no\narrests were made and the case was closed); see also Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, \n266 Ill. App. 3d 421, 426 (1994) (finding an investigative file may be withheld in full under\nsection 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA 2 where \" redaction of the file cannot be meaningfully\naccomplished[ ]\" \n\ninformation about an individual, no arrests were made, and the matter is\n\nto protect the identities of witnesses). \n\nOn October 1, 2024, the Village furnished this office with unredacted copies of\n\nthe two reports. Based on this office's review, the reports contain highly personal\nconcerning a private incident that occurred at a private residence, and there is no indication that\nthe incident resulted in any arrests or criminal charges. Because your request identified the\nsubjects by name and address, redaction of those individuals' names and identifying information\nfrom the responsive records would not protect their identities. Further, the specific nature of the\nconduct and circumstances described in the report could potentially reveal the identities of the\nrecords' subjects even if the FOIA request did not identify them by name. \n\ninformation\n\n2 Section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA exempts from disclosure information that would \" unavoidably\n\ndisclose the identity of a confidential source, confidential\ninformation furnished only by the confidential source, or\npersons who file complaints with or provide information to administrative, investigative, law enforcement, or penal\n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that the Village did not improperly withhold\nthe reports pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and that this matter is unfounded. 3 This file is\nclosed. If you have any questions, my e-mail address is Matthew. Rogina@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83212 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Benjamin Schuster\nElrod Friedman LLP\n325 North LaSalle Street, Suite 450\nChicago, Illinois 60654\nBenjamin. Schuster@ElrodFriedman. com\n\nexemptions. \n\n3 Because of the applicability of section 7(1)(c), this office declines to discuss any additional"}
{"id":1093,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-16","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83222"],"title":"PAC closes complaint against Central School District 301 over board discussion of FOIA fees","filename":"83222, issued October 16, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":886,"summary":"A requester alleged that a school board violated FOIA by discussing the potential imposition of unauthorized fees and publicly identifying frequent FOIA requesters during a meeting. The PAC determined that these actions did not constitute a denial of a FOIA request under the Act's jurisdiction.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained to the Attorney General's office that a school board discussed charging illegal fees for FOIA requests and publicly named people who file many requests. The PAC explained that it only has the authority to review actual denials of records requests, not general board discussions or policies that haven't resulted in a specific denial. Consequently, the PAC closed the matter without finding a violation.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the allegations regarding board discussions about potential future fees and the identification of requesters do not constitute a denial of a FOIA request subject to PAC review.","legal_question":"Does a public body's discussion of potential future FOIA fee policies or the identification of requesters during a meeting constitute a denial of access to public records under FOIA?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/9.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Central School District 301","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed - no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"fees","subject_description":"The board discussed potential future FOIA fee policies and identified frequent requesters during a public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/6/6_f/83222%2C%20issued%20October%2016%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA fees","public body policy","requester privacy","PAC jurisdiction"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"ctober 16, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Graydon Engle\nFOIA Officer\nCentral School District 301\ngraydon. engle@central301. net\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jeff Gorman\nPresident,  Board of Education\nCentral School District 301\njeff.gorman@central301. net\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83222\n\nDear\n\nMr. Engle,  and Mr. Gorman: \n\nOn September 26, 2024, \n\nalleged to the Public Access\n\nCounselor that Central School District 301 (District)  violated the Freedom of Information Act\nFOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2022))  during the September 23, 2024,  meeting of its Board\nof Education ( Board).   More specifically, \ndiscussed the possibility of charging requesters for FOIA requests; \nthan reproduction costs and other costs allowed by statute,  FOIA forbids public bodies from\ncharging requesters.  \nidentified an individual by name as having \"' the win for most FOIA's for the month[.]'\" 1\n\nalso expressed concern that Board President Jeff Gorman\n\nalleged that at that meeting,  the Board\n\nasserted that other\n\n1E- mail from\n\nAIA, NCARB,  LEED AP COO/ Managing Principal,  Williams\n\nArchitects ( September 26, 2024).  \n\n\fMr. Graydon Engle\nMr. Jeff Gorman\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 2\n\nAs an initial matter,  we note that the Office of the Public Access Counselor has\n\nthe authority to review a public body' s denial of a FOIA request.   5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) ( West\n2022)).   Section 6(d) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 6(d) (West 2022))  states that the imposition of a fee\nthat is not authorized by FOIA constitutes a denial of access to public records.   However, \n\ndoes not allege that the District denied his FOIA request by imposing an excessive fee.  \nIdentifying individuals who submitted FOIA requests by name also does not constitute a denial\nof a FOIA request or violate any other provision of FOIA.  Accordingly,  this office will take no\nfurther action on\n2024,  meeting.   \n\nallegation that the District violated FOIA during its September 23, \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has the authority to educate public bodies and the\npublic on the responsibilities of public bodies under FOIA.  15 ILCS 205/ 7 (West 2022).   This\noffice has reviewed a video recording of the meeting and observed the Board' s conversation\nabout updating its policy on charging requesters.   In its advisory capacity,  this office notes that\nsection 6 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6 (West 2022))  outlines the permissible fees a public body may\ncharge in response to most FOIA requests.   Section 6(b) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 6(b) (West 2022)) \nprovides: \n\nExcept when a fee is otherwise fixed by statute,  each public\nbody may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual\ncost for reproducing and certifying public records and for the use, \nby any person,  of the equipment of the public body to copy\nrecords.  No fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of black and\nwhite,  letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester.  The fee\nfor black and white, letter or legal sized copies shall not exceed 15\ncents per page. * * *  \nIn calculating its actual cost for reproducing\nrecords or for the use of the equipment of the public body to\nreproduce records,  a public body shall not include the costs of\nany search for and review of the records or other personnel\ncosts associated with reproducing the records,  except for\ncommercial requests as provided in subsection ( f) of this Section. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nAdditionally,  section 6(a)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 6(a) ( West 2022))  states that \" statutory fees\napplicable to copies of public records when furnished in a paper format shall not be applicable to\nthose records when furnished in an electronic format.\"   \n\nThere are limited exceptions to these provisions.   First, if the public body has\n\ndetermined that a requester has submitted a \" voluminous request\"  as defined in section 2(h) of\n\n\fMr. Graydon Engle\nMr. Jeff Gorman\nOctober 16, 2024\nPage 3\n\nFOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(h) (West 2022))  and the public body has complied with the notice\nrequirements to voluminous requesters outlined in section 3.6 of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3.6 (West\n2022)),  a public body may be able to charge fees for records furnished in an electronic format as\noutlined in section 6(a-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(a-5) (West 2022)).   \n\nSecond,  if a public body has received a request that has a \" commercial purpose\" \nas defined in section 2(c-10) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-10) ( West 2022)),  the public body may\ncharge up to $10 for each hour spent by personnel\nin searching for and retrieving a requested\nrecord or examining the record for necessary redactions,  except that the public body may not\ncharge for the first 8 hours.   5 ILCS 140/ 6(f) (West 2022).   However,  section 6(f) of FOIA states\nthat those fees apply \" only to commercial requests.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   5 ILCS 140/ 6(f) \nWest 2022).   \n\nTo the extent that the Board is considering updating its policy relating to access to\n\nthe District' s public records,  we remind the District that it may not impose fees that exceed the\nfees outlined in sections 6(a) and 6(b) of FOIA.   \n\nYou may contact me at leah. bartelt@ilag. gov or (773)  590-6995 if you have\n\nquestions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83222 f no fi war sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school board's discussion of FOIA fee policies and requesters","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83222/","full_text":"ctober 16, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Graydon Engle\nFOIA Officer\nCentral School District 301\ngraydon. engle@central301. net\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jeff Gorman\nPresident, Board of Education\nCentral School District 301\njeff.gorman@central301. net\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83222\n\nDear\n\nMr. Engle, and Mr. Gorman: \n\nOn September 26, 2024, \n\nalleged to the Public Access\n\nCounselor that Central School District 301 (District) violated the Freedom of Information Act\nFOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2022)) during the September 23, 2024, meeting of its Board\nof Education (Board). More specifically, \ndiscussed the possibility of charging requesters for FOIA requests; \nthan reproduction costs and other costs allowed by statute, FOIA forbids public bodies from\ncharging requesters. \nidentified an individual by name as having \"' the win for most FOIA's for the month[.]'\" 1\n\nalso expressed concern that Board President Jeff Gorman\n\nalleged that at that meeting, the Board\n\nAs an initial matter, we note that the Office of the Public Access Counselor has\n\nthe authority to review a public body's denial of a FOIA request. 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) (West\n2022)). Section 6(d) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(d) (West 2022)) states that the imposition of a fee\nthat is not authorized by FOIA constitutes a denial of access to public records. However, \n\ndoes not allege that the District denied his FOIA request by imposing an excessive fee. \nIdentifying individuals who submitted FOIA requests by name also does not constitute a denial\nof a FOIA request or violate any other provision of FOIA. Accordingly, this office will take no\nfurther action on\n2024, meeting. \n\nallegation that the District violated FOIA during its September 23, \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has the authority to educate public bodies and the\npublic on the responsibilities of public bodies under FOIA. 15 ILCS 205/ 7 (West 2022). This\noffice has reviewed a video recording of the meeting and observed the Board's conversation\nabout updating its policy on charging requesters. In its advisory capacity, this office notes that\nsection 6 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6 (West 2022)) outlines the permissible fees a public body may\ncharge in response to most FOIA requests. Section 6(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(b) (West 2022)) \nprovides: \n\nExcept when a fee is otherwise fixed by statute, each public\nbody may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual\ncost for reproducing and certifying public records and for the use, \nby any person, of the equipment of the public body to copy\nrecords. No fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of black and\nwhite, letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester. The fee\nfor black and white, letter or legal sized copies shall not exceed 15\ncents per page. * * * \nIn calculating its actual cost for reproducing\nrecords or for the use of the equipment of the public body to\nreproduce records, a public body shall not include the costs of\nany search for and review of the records or other personnel\ncosts associated with reproducing the records, except for\ncommercial requests as provided in subsection (f) of this Section. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nAdditionally, section 6(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(a) (West 2022)) states that \" statutory fees\napplicable to copies of public records when furnished in a paper format shall not be applicable to\nthose records when furnished in an electronic format.\" \n\nThere are limited exceptions to these provisions. First, if the public body has\n\ndetermined that a requester has submitted a \" voluminous request\" as defined in section 2(h) of\n\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(h) (West 2022)) and the public body has complied with the notice\nrequirements to voluminous requesters outlined in section 3.6 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.6 (West\n2022)), a public body may be able to charge fees for records furnished in an electronic format as\noutlined in section 6(a-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(a-5) (West 2022)). \n\nSecond, if a public body has received a request that has a \" commercial purpose\" \nas defined in section 2(c-10) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-10) (West 2022)), the public body may\ncharge up to $10 for each hour spent by personnel\nin searching for and retrieving a requested\nrecord or examining the record for necessary redactions, except that the public body may not\ncharge for the first 8 hours. 5 ILCS 140/ 6(f) (West 2022). However, section 6(f) of FOIA states\nthat those fees apply \" only to commercial requests.\" (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 140/ 6(f) \nWest 2022). \n\nTo the extent that the Board is considering updating its policy relating to access to\n\nthe District's public records, we remind the District that it may not impose fees that exceed the\nfees outlined in sections 6(a) and 6(b) of FOIA. \n\nYou may contact me at leah. bartelt@ilag. gov or (773) 590-6995 if you have\n\nquestions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83222 f no fi war sd"}
{"id":1094,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-10","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83276"],"title":"Sangamon County Sheriff's Office FOIA lawsuit ends PAC administrative review","filename":"83276, issued October 10, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":313,"summary":"The requester filed a Request for Review regarding a FOIA denial by the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office, but subsequently notified the PAC that she had filed a lawsuit regarding the same denial.","plain_summary":"A reporter's FOIA request for review was pending before the PAC when the reporter filed suit in court over the same denial. Because FOIA requires the Public Access Counselor to take no further action on a request for review once the requester sues over the same denial, the PAC closed the file without reaching the merits.","holding":"The PAC is statutorily required to take no further action because the requester initiated litigation regarding the same FOIA denial.","legal_question":"Does the filing of a lawsuit regarding a FOIA denial require the Public Access Counselor to cease its administrative review of the same matter?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/9.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Sangamon County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":"Ms. Beth Hundsdorfer (Capitol News Illinois)","pac_outcome":"Closed due to pending litigation","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"litigation","subject_description":"The requester sought records from the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office and subsequently filed a lawsuit to challenge the denial.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/9.5/9.5_g/83276%2C%20issued%20October%2010%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["litigation","FOIA lawsuit","PAC jurisdiction","denial of records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Legal & Financial Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 10, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Beth Hundsdorfer\nReporter\nCapitol News Illinois\nbhundsdorfer@capitolnewsillinois. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Abby Hamelin\nFOIA Officer\nSangamon County Sheriff' s Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nAbby. Hamelin@sangamonil. gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83276\n\nDear Ms. Hundsdorfer and Ms. Hamelin: \n\nThis letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act\nFOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau will take no further action\nwith respect to the above- referenced Request for Review. \n\nOn September 30, 2024,  Ms. Beth Hundsdorfer,  on behalf of Capitol News\n\nIllinois submitted the above- referenced Request for Review,  contesting the denial by the\nSangamon County Sheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  to her FOIA request submitted on\nSeptember 29, 2024.   On October 8, 2024,  Ms. Hundsdorfer informed the Public Access Bureau\nthat the same denial of this FOIA request would be pursued in court. \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fs. Beth Hundsdorfer\nMs. Abby Hamelin\nOctober 10, 2024\nPage 2\n\nSection 9.5(g) of FOIA 2 provides: \n\nIf the requester files suit under Section 11 with respect to\n\nthe same denial that is the subject of a pending request for review, \nthe requester shall notify the Public Access Counselor,  and the\nPublic Access Counselor shall take no further action with respect\nto the request for review and shall so notify the public body. \n\nBecause Ms. Hundsdorfer has filed suit under section 11 of FOIA, 3 section 9.5(g) \n\nof FOIA precludes the Public Access Counselor from taking further action with respect to this\nmatter. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  Please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov\n\nif you have questions.     \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83276 f ls co\n\n25 ILCS 140/9.5(g) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n35 ILCS 140/11 (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A reporter requested records from the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office and asked the Attorney General's office to review the denial. Before the review was completed, the reporter filed a lawsuit in court over the same records. Because the law prohibits the Attorney General from reviewing a case that is already being handled by a court, the PAC closed the file.","card_headline":"A sheriff's office's denial of FOIA records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83276/","full_text":"October 10, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Beth Hundsdorfer\nReporter\nCapitol News Illinois\nbhundsdorfer@capitolnewsillinois. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Abby Hamelin\nFOIA Officer\nSangamon County Sheriff's Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nAbby. Hamelin@sangamonil. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83276\n\nDear Ms. Hundsdorfer and Ms. Hamelin: \n\nThis letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act\nFOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau will take no further action\nwith respect to the above- referenced Request for Review. \n\nOn September 30, 2024, Ms. Beth Hundsdorfer, on behalf of Capitol News\n\nIllinois submitted the above- referenced Request for Review, contesting the denial by the\n\nSection 9.5(g) of FOIA 2 provides: \n\nIf the requester files suit under Section 11 with respect to\n\nthe same denial that is the subject of a pending request for review, \nthe requester shall notify the Public Access Counselor, and the\nPublic Access Counselor shall take no further action with respect\nto the request for review and shall so notify the public body. \n\nBecause Ms. Hundsdorfer has filed suit under section 11 of FOIA, 3 section 9.5(g) \n\nof FOIA precludes the Public Access Counselor from taking further action with respect to this\nmatter. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. Please contact me at victoria. frazier@ilag. gov\n\nif you have questions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nVICTORIA FRAZIER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83276 f ls co\n\n25 ILCS 140/9.5(g) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n35 ILCS 140/11 (West 2023 Supp.)."}
{"id":1095,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83280"],"title":"Illinois State Police properly withheld ALPR data under 7(1)(d-7)","filename":"83280, issued October 9, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":551,"summary":"The requester sought automated license plate reader (ALPR) data for their own vehicle from the Illinois State Police, which the agency denied under section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA. The PAC determined that the agency properly withheld the records because the statute provides no exception for individuals to access ALPR data regarding their own vehicles.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Illinois State Police for data showing when and where their vehicle was tracked by automated license plate readers. The police denied the request, citing a state law that keeps this data confidential. The Attorney General's office agreed with the police, confirming that the law does not allow individuals to obtain this specific tracking data, even for their own vehicles.","holding":"The Illinois State Police properly withheld the requested ALPR data pursuant to section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA exempts from disclosure automated license plate reader (ALPR) data, even when requested by the owner of the vehicle tracked.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d-7)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d-7)"],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":"Mr. Matthew Patterson","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought data generated by automated license plate readers (ALPR) regarding the movements of a specific vehicle.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d-7/83280%2C%20issued%20October%209%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["ALPR","license plate reader","police records","privacy","vehicle tracking"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Matthew Patterson\nBeam Legal Team,  LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmpatterson@beamlegalteam. com\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83280;  ISP no. 06261320\n\nDear Mr. Patterson: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted. \n\nOn August 15, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois State Police\n\nISP)  seeking \" any and all license plate reading device( s)  hits for License Plate No: \nmy 2015 Jeep Wrangler),  from 3:30 p.m. (15:50 hours)  on July 25, 2024 to 6:15 p.m. (18:15\nhours)  on July 29, 2024 from Evanston,  Skokie,  Niles, Des Plaines,  Morton Grove,  Chicago,  and\nany Illinois State Highway,  Tollway,  or other Expressway.\" 1 On August 28, 2024,  ISP denied\nyour request pursuant to section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(d-7) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as\namended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024).   ISP's response stated that under this\nexemption \"[ i]nformation gathered by an\"  automated license plate reader ( ALPR) \" or created\nfrom the analysis of data generated by an ALPR is exempt from disclosure.\" 2 You submitted\nthis Request for Review on September 27, 2024,  alleging that the \" requested information does\nnot fall under any recognized FOIA exemptions concerning personal privacy,  law enforcement\n\n1Letter from Matthew M. Patterson to ISP.FOIA.Officer@illinois. gov (August 15, 2024). \n\nacarulli@beamlegalteam. com ( August 28, 2024). \n\n2E- mail from Sarah Wheeler,  Illinois State Police,  Freedom of Information Office, to\n\n\fr. Matthew Patterson\nOctober 9, 2024\nPage 2\n\nproceedings,  or other protected interests,  since I am only requesting records for my own\nvehicle.\" 3\n\nSection 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation gathered or\n\nrecords created from the use of automatic license plate readers in connection with Section 2-130\nof the Illinois Vehicle Code.\"   Correspondingly,  section 2-130(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code\n625 ILCS 5/2-130(d) (West 2023 Supp.))  states that \" ALPR information shall be held\nconfidentially to the fullest extent of the law.\"  Neither that provision nor the section 7(1)(d-7) of\nFOIA contains an exception that permits individuals to obtain ALPR information about their\nown vehicles. \n\nThe ALPR hits you requested constitute information gathered or records created\nfrom the use of ALPRs.   Because such information must be kept confidential under section 2-\n130( d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code,  and because that statute provides no exception that would\nallow an individual to obtain ALPR information for their own vehicle pursuant to FOIA, the\nrequested material\noffice has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nis exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)( d-7) of FOIA.  Accordingly,  this\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\n\nMatthew. Rogina@ilag. gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83280 f no fi war sa\n\ncc:   \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nFOIA Appeals Manager\nIllinois State Police\n801 South 7th Street,  Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov\n\n3E- mail from Aurelia Carulli, Law Clerk, Beam Legal Team LLC, To Whom It May Concern\n\nSeptember 27, 2024).  \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Automated license plate reader data on a specific vehicle","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83280/","full_text":"October 9, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Matthew Patterson\nBeam Legal Team, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmpatterson@beamlegalteam. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83280; ISP no. 06261320\n\nDear Mr. Patterson: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted. \n\nOn August 15, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois State Police\n\nISP) seeking \" any and all license plate reading device(s) hits for License Plate No: \nmy 2015 Jeep Wrangler), from 3:30 p.m. (15:50 hours) on July 25, 2024 to 6:15 p.m. (18:15\nhours) on July 29, 2024 from Evanston, Skokie, Niles, Des Plaines, Morton Grove, Chicago, and\nany Illinois State Highway, Tollway, or other Expressway.\" 1 On August 28, 2024, ISP denied\nyour request pursuant to section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(d-7) (West 2023 Supp.), as\namended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024). ISP's response stated that under this\nexemption \"[ i]nformation gathered by an\" automated license plate reader (ALPR) \" or created\nfrom the analysis of data generated by an ALPR is exempt from disclosure.\" 2 You submitted\nthis Request for Review on September 27, 2024, alleging that the \" requested information does\n\nproceedings, or other protected interests, since I am only requesting records for my own\nvehicle.\" 3\n\nSection 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation gathered or\n\nrecords created from the use of automatic license plate readers in connection with Section 2-130\nof the Illinois Vehicle Code.\" Correspondingly, section 2-130(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code\n625 ILCS 5/2-130(d) (West 2023 Supp.)) states that \" ALPR information shall be held\nconfidentially to the fullest extent of the law.\" Neither that provision nor the section 7(1)(d-7) of\nFOIA contains an exception that permits individuals to obtain ALPR information about their\nown vehicles. \n\nThe ALPR hits you requested constitute information gathered or records created\nfrom the use of ALPRs. Because such information must be kept confidential under section 2-\n130(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and because that statute provides no exception that would\nallow an individual to obtain ALPR information for their own vehicle pursuant to FOIA, the\nrequested material\noffice has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nis exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA. Accordingly, this\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nMatthew. Rogina@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83280 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nFOIA Appeals Manager\nIllinois State Police\n801 South 7th Street, Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov\n\n3E- mail from Aurelia Carulli, Law Clerk, Beam Legal Team LLC, To Whom It May Concern\n\nSeptember 27, 2024)."}
{"id":1096,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83308"],"title":"Village of Oak Brook improperly redacted body camera footage under 7(1)(d)","filename":"83308, issued March 20, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2790,"summary":"The requester sought body camera footage of a traffic stop and arrest, which the Village of Oak Brook partially redacted. The PAC determined the Village failed to prove that the redacted portions were exempt under FOIA section 7(1)(d).","plain_summary":"A citizen requested police body camera footage of a specific traffic stop and arrest. The Village of Oak Brook provided the video but redacted parts of it, claiming it would interfere with legal proceedings. The Attorney General's office reviewed the footage and decided the Village did not provide enough evidence to justify the redactions, ordering them to release the unredacted video.","holding":"The Village of Oak Brook improperly redacted the requested body camera footage.","legal_question":"Did the Village of Oak Brook meet its burden of proving that the redacted portions of body camera footage were exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(d) of FOIA?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)"],"public_body":"Village of Oak Brook","requesting_party":"Mr. [Name Redacted]","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought unredacted body camera footage of a police officer performing a traffic stop and arrest involving a stop stick device.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_vii/83308%2C%20issued%20March%2020%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police records","body camera","redaction","FOIA","law enforcement"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"March 20, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nOttosen DiNolfo Hasenbalg &  Castaldo,  Ltd. \n1804 North Naper Boulevard,  Suite 350\nNaperville,  Illinois 60563\nmcastaldo3@ottosenlaw. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83308;  Village W010313- 082524\n\nDear Mr. \n\nand Mr. Castaldo: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Village of Oak Brook ( Village)  improperly redacted the body camera footage responsive to\nMr. \n\ns August 25, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Mr. \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village via its FOIA\nportal seeking the body camera and dash camera footage of the officer who pulled over a named\nperson and placed a stop stick device on his vehicle before arresting him.  Mr. \nidentified\nthe date,  time, and location of the incident and specified the footage he sought:   \n\nThe officer that pulled him over placed a \" stop stick\"  device on the\nvehicle,  anticipating that the driver would flee (which he did). * * \n\nI'm requesting 2 records that will show the totality of the incident\nand arrest from the First Responder' s perspective:  Body Camera\nand Dash Camera of the Officer that pulled him over.  We're\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fMr. \nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nMarch 20, 2025\nPage 2\n\nhoping for both records to begin about 1-2 minutes before the\nOfficer first spots him to pull him over, and ends about 1-2\nminutes after he's placed in the back of a squad car.[ 2]  ( Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nOn August 29, 2024,  the Village responded to Mr. \n\ns FOIA request.   The\nVillage noted that there was no dash camera footage from the incident and stated:  \" Your request\nis denied as to the following records or redacted information contained in those records:  private\ninformation[.]\" 3 The Village further stated that \"[ t]he records are private\nor personal\ninformation. §  2(c-5), §7(1)(b).\" 4,  5\n\nOn October 8, 2024,  Mr. \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for\n\nReview contesting the withholding of body camera footage.   Mr. \nprovided a few brief clips and questioned how \" leading police on a chase on public roadways\nconstitutes ' private information[.]'\" 6 On October 11, 2024,  this office sent a copy of the Request\nfor Review to the Village and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive body\ncamera recordings for this office's confidential review,  together with a detailed explanation of the\nfactual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions,  including section 7.5(cc) \nof FOIA. 7 This office also requested that the Village clarify how it construed Mr. \nFOIA request.   \n\ncontended he was only\n\ns\n\nOn October 24, 2024,  the Village provided this office with its response dated\nOctober 22, 2024.   On October 25, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Village' s written\nand notified him of his right to reply;  he did not reply.   The Village\nresponse to Mr. \nseparately provided this office with copies of the body camera recordings for this office's\nconfidential review.   \n\n2FOIA portal submission from\n\nto Village of Oak Brook ( August 25, 2024).  \n\n3E- mail from Shana Galto,  Deputy FOIA Officer, Village of Oak Brook,  to\n\nAugust\n\n4E- mail from Shana Galto,  Deputy FOIA Officer, Village of Oak Brook,  to\n\nAugust\n\n29, 2024).  \n\n29, 2024).   \n\nPublic Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024. \n\n55 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.);  5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by\n\n6E- mail from\n\nto Attorney General' s Office ( October 1, 2024). \n\n2024;  103- 605,  effective July 1, 2024;  103- 636, effective July 1, 2024.  \n\n75 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7,  \n\n\fMr. \nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nMarch 20, 2025\nPage 3\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.   Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\"   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure contained in section 7 of FOIA 8 are to be\nnarrowly construed.   See Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d\n401, 407 ( 1997).   \n\nScope of FOIA Request\n\nIn order to properly construe a request,  the public body must look to the full scope\n\nand precise language of the FOIA request when determining what records are responsive.   See\nJudicial Watch,  Inc. v. U.S.  Department of Energy,  310 F. Supp.  2d 271, 306 ( D.D.C. 2004), \naff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,  412 F.3d 125 ( D.C. Cir. 2005) ( holding an agency\nsearch to be unreasonable because it did not encompass the full scope or precise language of the\nplaintiff' s request).   Public bodies are not required to search beyond the four corners of a FOIA\nrequest,  nor are they required to divine the requester' s intent.   American Chemistry Council,  Inc. \nv. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,  922 F. Supp.  2d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2013).   \n\nThis office has reviewed the precise language of Mr. \n\ns FOIA request,  as\n\nwell as the Village' s response to this office' s inquiry letter.   In its response to this office, the\nVillage explained: \n\nThe Village interpreted the request to include the dash\n\ncamera footage and body camera footage of the responding officer\nthat initially pulled Craig Singleton over and placed a 'stop stick' \ndevice under the vehicle.   The responsive records pertaining to this\ninterpretation of the request were provided to Mr. \nHowever,  because of Mr. Singleton' s attempt to flee from the\ninitial scene triggering the stop stick device,  many additional\nofficers and vehicles were engaging to respond.   The initial\nresponding officer to deploy the stop stick device was not the same\nofficer to \" pull over\"  the fleeing vehicle at the final location on I-\n88, nor was the initial responding officer the same officer to place\nMr. Singleton in 'the back of a squad car.'   As stated in the\nVillage' s initial response,  some of the requested recordings,  or\n\n85 ILCS 140/7 (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024. \n\n\fMr. \nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nMarch 20, 2025\nPage 4\n\nportions thereof,  do not exist.[ 9] \n\nThis office concludes that the Village reasonably interpreted Mr. \n\ns FOIA\n\nrequest for recordings \" from the First Responder' s perspective\"  as seeking only the initially\nresponding officers'  footage.   Although the request expressed hope that the first responder' s\nrecordings would begin a minute or two before the vehicle was pulled over and end a minute or\ntwo after the suspect was placed in the back of a squad car, the Village has explained why they\nwere not that comprehensive.   If Mr. \nwas seeking all body camera footage from all\nofficers involved in the incident,  that was not clear from the precise language he used in his\nrequest for footage from \"[ t]he officer that pulled him over [ and]  placed a 'stop stick' device on\nthe vehicle[.]\" 10 This determination will proceed by analyzing whether the Village improperly\nwithheld portions of the footage from that officer. \n\nSection 7.5(cc)  of FOIA and Body Camera Videos\n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\"  Section 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act (Body Camera\nAct) 11 specifies when body camera recordings are subject to disclosure pursuant to FOIA, in\nrelevant part: \n\nb) Recordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\n\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n2) * * *  any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint,  discharge of a firearm,  use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act[.]   \n\n9Letter from Michael Castaldo,  III, Ottosen DiNolfo Hassenbalg &  Castaldo,  Ltd., to Katie\n\nGoldsmith,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Illinois Attorney General' s Office ( October 22, \n2024),  at 1. \n\n10FOIA portal submission from\n\nto Village of Oak Brook ( August 25, 2024).   \n\n1150 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2022). \n\n\fMr. \nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nMarch 20, 2025\nPage 5\n\nNothing in this subsection ( b) shall require the\n\ndisclosure of any recording or portion of any recording\nwhich would be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom\nof Information Act.   \n\nIn its response to this office, the Village restated some of the language of the\n\nBody Camera Act but did not address whether the recordings are flagged.   Based on the scope of\nMr. \ns FOIA request,  for body camera footage from an arrest from a traffic incident,  it is\napparent that the recordings are flagged under section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act due\nto the arrest,  and thus the Body Camera Act does not prohibit disclosure.   Accordingly,  the\nremainder of this letter will analyze whether the Village demonstrated that the withheld footage\nis exempt from disclosure pursuant to the set of exemptions cited by the Village in its response to\nthis office's inquiry letter:   the law enforcement exemptions of section 7(1)(d) of FOIA. 12\n\nSection 7(1)(d) of FOIA\n\nIn totality,  section 7(1)( d) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would:  \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and reasonably\n\ncontemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by\nany law enforcement or correctional agency that is the\nrecipient of the request;  \n\nii) interfere with active administrative enforcement\n\nproceedings conducted by the public body that is the\nrecipient of the request; \n\niii) create a substantial\n\nlikelihood that a person will\n\nbe deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing; \n\niv)  unavoidably disclose the identity of a\n\nconfidential source,  confidential\nby the confidential source,  or persons who file complaints\nwith or provide information to administrative,  investigative, \n\ninformation furnished only\n\n2024.  \n\n125 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(d) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1,  \n\n\fMr. \nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nMarch 20, 2025\nPage 6\n\nlaw enforcement,  or penal agencies;  except that the\nidentities of witnesses to traffic crashes,  traffic crash\nreports,  and rescue reports shall be provided by agencies of\nlocal government,  except when disclosure would interfere\nwith an active criminal\nagency that is the recipient of the request; \n\ninvestigation conducted by the\n\nv) disclose unique or specialized investigative\n\ntechniques other than those generally used and known or\ndisclose internal documents of correctional agencies related\nto detection,  observation or investigation of incidents of\ncrime or misconduct,  and disclosure would result in\ndemonstrable harm to the agency or public body that is the\nrecipient of the request; \n\nvi) endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\nenforcement personnel or any other person;  or\n\nvii) obstruct an ongoing criminal\n\ninvestigation by\n\nthe agency that is the recipient of the request. \n\nBare assertions without a detailed rationale do not satisfy a public body' s burden\n\nof explaining how exemptions are applicable.   See Rockford Police Benevolent &  Protective\nAss'n v. Morrissey,  398 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151 ( 2010) ( citing Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois\nState Board of Education,  204 Ill. 2d 456, 464 ( 2003)).   Rather, \"[ t]o meet its burden * * *, \nthe\npublic body must provide a detailed justification for its claim of exemption,  addressing the\nrequested records specifically and in a manner allowing for adequate adversarial testing.\" \nRockford Police Benevolent &  Protective Ass'n, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 150.  The Illinois Supreme\nCourt has determined that \"[ t]he appropriate time to measure whether a public record may be\nwithheld is when the public body asserts the exemption and denies the request.\"   Green v. \nChicago Police Department,  2022 IL 127229, ¶  72 (holding that where an injunction prohibited\ndisclosure of records at the time of the public body' s denial,  the public body was not required to\ndisclose the records once the injunction was lifted absent submission of a new FOIA request).   \n\nIn support of the applicability of section 7(1)(d), the Village asserted:   \n\nWith the understanding that the judicial proceedings ( People Of\nThe State Of Illinois – Vs- Craig V Singelton;  Case No. \n2023CF001109)  relating to the traffic incident was,  and still is\npending,  as of the date of this correspondence ( See Case Summary\nDetails noting the Defendant must appear at the next court date on\n\n\fMr. Neil\nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nMarch 20, 2025\nPage 7\n\nNovember 7, 2024),  the Village withheld or redacted certain\nrecords in accordance with 5 ILCS 140/ 7(d) not knowing the\nimpact or level of interference such release to an unrelated third-\nparty would have on the still active judicial proceedings. \nEmphasis added.)[ 13]  \n\nThis office has reviewed the responsive body camera recordings and the Village' s\n\nresponse,  which argues that most portions of the footage are exempt solely because the Village\ndoes not know what impact disclosure might have.   With respect to sections 7(1)(d)(i) and\n7(1)(d)( vii), the Village did not illustrate with any facts how or why disclosure of the body worn\ncamera recordings would interfere with or obstruct an ongoing investigation or law enforcement\nproceeding;  the mere speculation that there could be some untold type of harm is insufficient to\nprove that an exemption applies.   For section 7(1)( d)(ii), the Village has not suggested the\nexistence of active administrative enforcement proceedings;  even if such proceedings did exist,  it\nis apparent that the recordings were pre- existing rather than \" created in the course of\nadministrative enforcement proceedings[.]\"   For section 7(1)(d)(iii), the Village has not\ndemonstrated that release of the recordings would create a substantial\nwould be deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing. 14 Notably,  based on information\navailable on the DuPage County Circuit Clerk' s website,  at the time of the denial of Mr. \n\nlikelihood that a defendant\n\ns FOIA request,  the most recent action concerning the court case related to the records\noccurred that same day when the court granted a continuance by the defendant and the speedy\ntrial demand was tolled. 15 Thus,  it does not appear that a trial or adjudication of the matter was\npending or truly imminent at the time the Village denied the request,  but even if it was,  the\nVillage did not articulate how the disclosure of the footage under the circumstances would be\nmore likely than not to interfere with the fairness of any prospective trial.  For section\n7(1)(d)( iv), the only interactions captured on the responsive body camera recording occur\nbetween law enforcement and the arrestee and therefore there is no witness information that is\nsubject to redaction under this exemption.   For section 7(1)(d)(v), the Village did not show that\nrelease of the responsive recordings would reveal unique or specialized investigative techniques.  \nFurthermore,  for section 7(1)(d)( vi), the Village did not establish that releasing the recordings\nwould endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel,  or any other person.    \n\n13Letter from Michael Castaldo,  III, Ottosen DiNolfo Hassenbalg &  Castaldo,  Ltd., to Katie\n\nGoldsmith,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Illinois Attorney General' s Office ( October 22, \n2024),  at 2.  \n\n14Federal courts have held that a public body withholding records pursuant to the \" fair trial\" \nexemption,  must establish:  \"( 1) that a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent;  and ( 2) that it is more\nprobable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those\nproceedings.\"   Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice,  863 F.2d 96, 102 ( D.C. Cir. 1988). \n\n15See Case Summary Details for 2023CF001109,  18th Judicial Circuit Court Clerk, DuPage\nCounty,  Illinois,  https:// epay. 18thjudicial. org/Clerk/ caseNumberSearch. do ( last accessed March 12, 2025).  \n\n\fr. \nMr. Michael Castaldo,  III\nMarch 20, 2025\nPage 8\n\nIn sum,  the Village did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the\n\nredacted portions of the recordings are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(d) of\nFOIA.  Accordingly,  this office requests that the Village provide Mr. \ncopies of the responsive recordings.   \n\nwith unredacted\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.        \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83308 f 71di improper 71dii improper 71diii improper 71div improper 71dv improper 71dvi\nimproper 71dvii improper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police body-camera footage of a traffic stop arrest","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83308/","full_text":"March 20, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael Castaldo, III\nOttosen DiNolfo Hasenbalg & Castaldo, Ltd. \n1804 North Naper Boulevard, Suite 350\nNaperville, Illinois 60563\nmcastaldo3@ottosenlaw. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83308; Village W010313- 082524\n\nDear Mr. \n\nand Mr. Castaldo: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Village of Oak Brook (Village) improperly redacted the body camera footage responsive to\nMr. \n\ns August 25, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Mr. \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Village via its FOIA\nportal seeking the body camera and dash camera footage of the officer who pulled over a named\nperson and placed a stop stick device on his vehicle before arresting him. Mr. \nidentified\nthe date, time, and location of the incident and specified the footage he sought: \n\nThe officer that pulled him over placed a \" stop stick\" device on the\nvehicle, anticipating that the driver would flee (which he did). * * \n\nhoping for both records to begin about 1-2 minutes before the\nOfficer first spots him to pull him over, and ends about 1-2\nminutes after he's placed in the back of a squad car.[ 2] (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nOn August 29, 2024, the Village responded to Mr. \n\ns FOIA request. The\nVillage noted that there was no dash camera footage from the incident and stated: \" Your request\nis denied as to the following records or redacted information contained in those records: private\ninformation[.]\" 3 The Village further stated that \"[ t]he records are private\nor personal\ninformation. § 2(c-5), §7(1)(b).\" 4, 5\n\nOn October 8, 2024, Mr. \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for\n\nReview contesting the withholding of body camera footage. Mr. \nprovided a few brief clips and questioned how \" leading police on a chase on public roadways\nconstitutes ' private information[.]'\" 6 On October 11, 2024, this office sent a copy of the Request\nfor Review to the Village and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive body\ncamera recordings for this office's confidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the\nfactual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions, including section 7.5(cc) \nof FOIA. 7 This office also requested that the Village clarify how it construed Mr. \nFOIA request. \n\ncontended he was only\n\ns\n\nOn October 24, 2024, the Village provided this office with its response dated\nOctober 22, 2024. On October 25, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's written\nand notified him of his right to reply; he did not reply. The Village\nresponse to Mr. \nseparately provided this office with copies of the body camera recordings for this office's\nconfidential review. \n\n2FOIA portal submission from\n\nto Village of Oak Brook (August 25, 2024). \n\n3E- mail from Shana Galto, Deputy FOIA Officer, Village of Oak Brook, to\n\nAugust\n\n4E- mail from Shana Galto, Deputy FOIA Officer, Village of Oak Brook, to\n\nAugust\n\n29, 2024). \n\n29, 2024). \n\nPublic Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024. \n\n55 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.); 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by\n\n6E- mail from\n\nto Attorney General's Office (October 1, 2024). \n\n2024; 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 636, effective July 1, 2024. \n\n75 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure contained in section 7 of FOIA 8 are to be\nnarrowly construed. See Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d\n401, 407 (1997). \n\nScope of FOIA Request\n\nIn order to properly construe a request, the public body must look to the full scope\n\nand precise language of the FOIA request when determining what records are responsive. See\nJudicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Energy, 310 F. Supp. 2d 271, 306 (D.D.C. 2004), \naff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 412 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding an agency\nsearch to be unreasonable because it did not encompass the full scope or precise language of the\nplaintiff's request). Public bodies are not required to search beyond the four corners of a FOIA\nrequest, nor are they required to divine the requester's intent. American Chemistry Council, Inc. \nv. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 922 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2013). \n\nThis office has reviewed the precise language of Mr. \n\ns FOIA request, as\n\nwell as the Village's response to this office's inquiry letter. In its response to this office, the\nVillage explained: \n\nThe Village interpreted the request to include the dash\n\ncamera footage and body camera footage of the responding officer\nthat initially pulled Craig Singleton over and placed a 'stop stick' \ndevice under the vehicle. The responsive records pertaining to this\ninterpretation of the request were provided to Mr. \nHowever, because of Mr. Singleton's attempt to flee from the\ninitial scene triggering the stop stick device, many additional\nofficers and vehicles were engaging to respond. The initial\nresponding officer to deploy the stop stick device was not the same\nofficer to \" pull over\" the fleeing vehicle at the final location on I-\n88, nor was the initial responding officer the same officer to place\nMr. Singleton in 'the back of a squad car.' As stated in the\nVillage's initial response, some of the requested recordings, or\n\n85 ILCS 140/7 (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024. \n\nportions thereof, do not exist.[ 9] \n\nThis office concludes that the Village reasonably interpreted Mr. \n\ns FOIA\n\nrequest for recordings \" from the First Responder's perspective\" as seeking only the initially\nresponding officers' footage. Although the request expressed hope that the first responder's\nrecordings would begin a minute or two before the vehicle was pulled over and end a minute or\ntwo after the suspect was placed in the back of a squad car, the Village has explained why they\nwere not that comprehensive. If Mr. \nwas seeking all body camera footage from all\nofficers involved in the incident, that was not clear from the precise language he used in his\nrequest for footage from \"[ t]he officer that pulled him over [ and] placed a 'stop stick' device on\nthe vehicle[.]\" 10 This determination will proceed by analyzing whether the Village improperly\nwithheld portions of the footage from that officer. \n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA and Body Camera Videos\n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\" Section 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act (Body Camera\nAct) 11 specifies when body camera recordings are subject to disclosure pursuant to FOIA, in\nrelevant part: \n\nb) Recordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\n\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n2) * * * any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act[.] \n\n9 Letter from Michael Castaldo, III, Ottosen DiNolfo Hassenbalg & Castaldo, Ltd., to Katie\n\nGoldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney General's Office (October 22, \n\nNothing in this subsection (b) shall require the\n\ndisclosure of any recording or portion of any recording\nwhich would be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom\nof Information Act. \n\nIn its response to this office, the Village restated some of the language of the\n\nBody Camera Act but did not address whether the recordings are flagged. Based on the scope of\nMr. \ns FOIA request, for body camera footage from an arrest from a traffic incident, it is\napparent that the recordings are flagged under section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act due\nto the arrest, and thus the Body Camera Act does not prohibit disclosure. Accordingly, the\nremainder of this letter will analyze whether the Village demonstrated that the withheld footage\nis exempt from disclosure pursuant to the set of exemptions cited by the Village in its response to\nthis office's inquiry letter: the law enforcement exemptions of section 7(1)(d) of FOIA. 12\n\nSection 7(1)(d) of FOIA\n\nIn totality, section 7(1)(d) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and reasonably\n\ncontemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by\nany law enforcement or correctional agency that is the\nrecipient of the request; \n\nii) interfere with active administrative enforcement\n\nproceedings conducted by the public body that is the\nrecipient of the request; \n\niii) create a substantial\n\nlikelihood that a person will\n\nbe deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing; \n\niv) unavoidably disclose the identity of a\n\nconfidential source, confidential\nby the confidential source, or persons who file complaints\nwith or provide information to administrative, investigative, \n\ninformation furnished only\n\n2024. \n\n125 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(d) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\nlaw enforcement, or penal agencies; except that the\nidentities of witnesses to traffic crashes, traffic crash\nreports, and rescue reports shall be provided by agencies of\nlocal government, except when disclosure would interfere\nwith an active criminal\nagency that is the recipient of the request; \n\ninvestigation conducted by the\n\nv) disclose unique or specialized investigative\n\ntechniques other than those generally used and known or\ndisclose internal documents of correctional agencies related\nto detection, observation or investigation of incidents of\ncrime or misconduct, and disclosure would result in\ndemonstrable harm to the agency or public body that is the\nrecipient of the request; \n\nvi) endanger the life or physical safety of law\n\nenforcement personnel or any other person; or\n\nvii) obstruct an ongoing criminal\n\ninvestigation by\n\nthe agency that is the recipient of the request. \n\nBare assertions without a detailed rationale do not satisfy a public body's burden\n\nof explaining how exemptions are applicable. See Rockford Police Benevolent & Protective\nAss'n v. Morrissey, 398 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151 (2010) (citing Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois\nState Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 464 (2003)). Rather, \"[ t]o meet its burden * * *, \nthe\npublic body must provide a detailed justification for its claim of exemption, addressing the\nrequested records specifically and in a manner allowing for adequate adversarial testing.\" \nRockford Police Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 150. The Illinois Supreme\nCourt has determined that \"[ t]he appropriate time to measure whether a public record may be\nwithheld is when the public body asserts the exemption and denies the request.\" Green v. \nChicago Police Department, 2022 IL 127229, ¶ 72 (holding that where an injunction prohibited\ndisclosure of records at the time of the public body's denial, the public body was not required to\ndisclose the records once the injunction was lifted absent submission of a new FOIA request). \n\nIn support of the applicability of section 7(1)(d), the Village asserted: \n\nWith the understanding that the judicial proceedings (People Of\n\nNovember 7, 2024), the Village withheld or redacted certain\nrecords in accordance with 5 ILCS 140/ 7(d) not knowing the\nimpact or level of interference such release to an unrelated third-\nparty would have on the still active judicial proceedings. \nEmphasis added.)[ 13] \n\nThis office has reviewed the responsive body camera recordings and the Village's\n\nresponse, which argues that most portions of the footage are exempt solely because the Village\ndoes not know what impact disclosure might have. With respect to sections 7(1)(d)(i) and\n7(1)(d)(vii), the Village did not illustrate with any facts how or why disclosure of the body worn\ncamera recordings would interfere with or obstruct an ongoing investigation or law enforcement\nproceeding; the mere speculation that there could be some untold type of harm is insufficient to\nprove that an exemption applies. For section 7(1)(d)(ii), the Village has not suggested the\nexistence of active administrative enforcement proceedings; even if such proceedings did exist, it\nis apparent that the recordings were pre- existing rather than \" created in the course of\nadministrative enforcement proceedings[.]\" For section 7(1)(d)(iii), the Village has not\ndemonstrated that release of the recordings would create a substantial\nwould be deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing. 14 Notably, based on information\navailable on the DuPage County Circuit Clerk's website, at the time of the denial of Mr. \n\nlikelihood that a defendant\n\ns FOIA request, the most recent action concerning the court case related to the records\noccurred that same day when the court granted a continuance by the defendant and the speedy\ntrial demand was tolled. 15 Thus, it does not appear that a trial or adjudication of the matter was\npending or truly imminent at the time the Village denied the request, but even if it was, the\nVillage did not articulate how the disclosure of the footage under the circumstances would be\nmore likely than not to interfere with the fairness of any prospective trial. For section\n7(1)(d)(iv), the only interactions captured on the responsive body camera recording occur\nbetween law enforcement and the arrestee and therefore there is no witness information that is\nsubject to redaction under this exemption. For section 7(1)(d)(v), the Village did not show that\nrelease of the responsive recordings would reveal unique or specialized investigative techniques. \nFurthermore, for section 7(1)(d)(vi), the Village did not establish that releasing the recordings\nwould endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel, or any other person. \n\n13 Letter from Michael Castaldo, III, Ottosen DiNolfo Hassenbalg & Castaldo, Ltd., to Katie\n\nGoldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney General's Office (October 22, \n2024), at 2. \n\n14 Federal courts have held that a public body withholding records pursuant to the \" fair trial\" \nexemption, must establish: \"(1) that a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it is more\nprobable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those\nproceedings.\" Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1988). \n\n15 See Case Summary Details for 2023CF001109, 18th Judicial Circuit Court Clerk, DuPage\nCounty, Illinois, https:// epay. 18thjudicial. org/Clerk/ caseNumberSearch. do (last accessed March 12, 2025). \n\nIn sum, the Village did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the\n\nredacted portions of the recordings are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(d) of\nFOIA. Accordingly, this office requests that the Village provide Mr. \ncopies of the responsive recordings. \n\nwith unredacted\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83308 f 71di improper 71dii improper 71diii improper 71div improper 71dv improper 71dvi\nimproper 71dvii improper mun"}
{"id":1097,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-10-21","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83380"],"title":"Village of Bolingbrook properly withheld body camera footage under 7.5(cc)","filename":"83380, issued October 21, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":766,"summary":"The requester sought body camera footage of an incident they reported, which the Village of Bolingbrook denied because the requester was not the subject of the recording. The PAC determined the denial was proper under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act and FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested police body camera footage of an incident they had reported to the Village of Bolingbrook. The Village denied the request, stating that the requester was not the person captured in the video and therefore not entitled to it. The Attorney General's office agreed, noting that state law strictly limits who can access body camera footage and that public interest does not override these specific privacy restrictions.","holding":"The Village of Bolingbrook properly withheld the requested body camera footage because the requester did not meet the statutory requirements for disclosure under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Bolingbrook properly denied a FOIA request for body camera footage under section 7.5(cc) of FOIA and the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(cc)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(cc)"],"public_body":"Village of Bolingbrook","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request concerned access to police officer-worn body camera footage of an incident reported by the requester.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/not-flagged-not-subject/83380%2C%20issued%20October%2021%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","FOIA exemption","privacy"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"October 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83380\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)).  For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn September 26, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of\n\nBolingbrook (Village) seeking a copy of body camera footage of an incident you had reported\nearlier that same day.   On October 7, 2024,  the Village denied your request pursuant\nto the\nIllinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act,1 asserting that the footage was\nwithheld because you are not the subject of the encounter captured on the recording.   On October\n10, 2024, you submitted this complete Request for Review contesting the Village's response.  \nYou generally stated that,  although you are not the subject of the recording,  you reported the\nincident in question and the public interests of transparency and government accountability\nnecessitate the disclosure of the requested footage. \n\nWhile not specifically raised in the Village' s response,  section 7.5(cc)  of FOIA2\n\nexempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body\n\n150 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq. ( West 2022).  \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103 -1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\n\fOctober 21, 2024\nPage 2\n\nCamera Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.\"   Section 10- 20( b) of the Body\nCamera Act3 provides, in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer-worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy,  at the time of the recording,  any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm,  use of force,  arrest or detention,  or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject' s\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection ( b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act;  and\n\n3) upon request,  the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter captured\non the recording or to the subject's attorney, or the officer\nor his or her legal representative.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nThus,  the Body Camera Act prohibits the disclosure of body camera footage\n\npursuant to a FOIA request, unless one of the three above-described exceptions apply.  \n\nOn October 17, 2024, the Deputy Public Access Counselor contacted the Village's\n\nFOIA Officer regarding the body camera footage you requested.   The FOIA Officer explained\nthat the Village withheld the footage because you are not the subject of the encounter it depicts\n\n350 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2022).  \n\n\fOctober 21, 2024\nPage 3\n\nand because the footage was not flagged for any of the reasons in section 10- 20( b)( 2)  of the\nBody Camera Act. \n\nBecause you are not authorized to obtain the requested body camera footage\n\nunder any of the exceptions that permit disclosure in section 10- 20( b) of the Body Camera Act, \nthe Village did not improperly withhold the footage pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA.  Unlike\ncertain other provisions of FOIA,  the public interest in disclosure of body camera footage is not\nrelevant to the applicability of section 7.5(cc) of FOIA.4 Accordingly, this office has determined\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have questions,  please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83380 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nFran Miller\nFOIA Officer\nVillage of Bolingbrook\nfoia@bolingbrook.com\n\n4E. g., 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022) (permitting a public body to deny a request as unduly\nburdensome only if the burden of compliance with the request outweighs the public interest in disclosure).  \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police body-camera footage of a reported incident","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83380/","full_text":"October 21, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83380\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn September 26, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of\n\nBolingbrook (Village) seeking a copy of body camera footage of an incident you had reported\nearlier that same day. On October 7, 2024, the Village denied your request pursuant\nto the\nIllinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act,1 asserting that the footage was\nwithheld because you are not the subject of the encounter captured on the recording. On October\n10, 2024, you submitted this complete Request for Review contesting the Village's response. \nYou generally stated that, although you are not the subject of the recording, you reported the\nincident in question and the public interests of transparency and government accountability\nnecessitate the disclosure of the requested footage. \n\nWhile not specifically raised in the Village's response, section 7.5(cc) of FOIA2\n\nexempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body\n\n150 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq. (West 2022). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103 -1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\nCamera Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.\" Section 10- 20(b) of the Body\nCamera Act3 provides, in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer-worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request, the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter captured\non the recording or to the subject's attorney, or the officer\nor his or her legal representative. (Emphasis added.) \n\nThus, the Body Camera Act prohibits the disclosure of body camera footage\n\npursuant to a FOIA request, unless one of the three above-described exceptions apply. \n\nOn October 17, 2024, the Deputy Public Access Counselor contacted the Village's\n\nFOIA Officer regarding the body camera footage you requested. The FOIA Officer explained\nthat the Village withheld the footage because you are not the subject of the encounter it depicts\n\nand because the footage was not flagged for any of the reasons in section 10- 20(b)(2) of the\nBody Camera Act. \n\nBecause you are not authorized to obtain the requested body camera footage\n\nunder any of the exceptions that permit disclosure in section 10- 20(b) of the Body Camera Act, \nthe Village did not improperly withhold the footage pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA. Unlike\ncertain other provisions of FOIA, the public interest in disclosure of body camera footage is not\nrelevant to the applicability of section 7.5(cc) of FOIA.4 Accordingly, this office has determined\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have questions, please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83380 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nFran Miller\nFOIA Officer\nVillage of Bolingbrook\nfoia@bolingbrook.com\n\n4E. g., 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022) (permitting a public body to deny a request as unduly\nburdensome only if the burden of compliance with the request outweighs the public interest in disclosure)."}
{"id":1098,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83586"],"title":"Village of Lee did not violate FOIA in timesheet request, but FOIA officer training noted","filename":"83586, issued December 17, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1342,"summary":"The requester challenged the Village of Lee's response to a FOIA request for employee records and economic interest statements, alleging missing documents and questioning the FOIA officer's training compliance. The PAC determined the request was unfounded as the Village provided the available records and addressed the inquiries.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested timesheets and expense reports for a Village of Lee employee, but believed the Village withheld documents and failed to provide economic interest statements. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and found that the Village had provided all existing records and that the request was unfounded. The PAC did note that the Village should ensure its FOIA officer completes mandatory annual training.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the Village of Lee did not violate FOIA because it provided the responsive records in its possession and addressed the requester's concerns.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Lee violated FOIA by failing to provide all requested records and whether the FOIA officer complied with mandatory training requirements.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Lee","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The requester sought timesheets, expense reports, and economic interest statements for a specific municipal employee.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3.5/83586%2C%20issued%20December%2017%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["personnel records","FOIA training","missing records","economic interest statement"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"December 17, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83586\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the above-referenced Request for Review is\nunfounded. \n\nOn October 10, 2024,  you submitted a Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA) 1\n\nrequest to the Village of Lee (Village) seeking:  \n\nAll timesheets, expense reports, and reimbursement\n\nrequests,  filed by or on behalf of Village of Lee employee Mike\nWoodbury, between July 1st, 2024, through October 9th, 2024, \ninclusive.   The two most recently filed Illinois Economic Interest\nstatements for Mike Woodbury.[2]  \n\nOn October 14, 2024, the Village responded by providing timesheets and stating\n\nthat there were no expense reports or reimbursement\nrequests.   On October 15, 2024,  you sent an\ne-mail to the Village of Lee Clerk inquiring whether the timesheets that were provided were the\noriginal files submitted by the employee.   According to your Request for Review,  the Village\nClerk responded affirmatively.  On October 22, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review\ncontesting,  among other things,  the Village' s response that there were no expense reports or\n\n15 ILCS 140/1 et seq. ( West 2022).  \n\n2Village of Lee Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request form submitted by\n\nOctober 10, 2024).  \n\n\fDecember 17, 2024\nPage 2\n\nrequests,  and the lack of a response regarding Illinois Economic Interest\n\nreimbursement\nStatements.  You also questioned whether the timesheets that were provided were the original\nrecords submitted by the employee,  and whether the Village Clerk had completed legally\nmandated FOIA training.  \n\nAs a threshold matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to\n\nresolving disputes concerning the Open Meetings Act ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. ( West 2022))  and\nreviewing denials of FOIA requests.  15 ILCS 205/7 (West 2022).  The Public Access Counselor\ndoes not have authority to review allegations concerning conflicts of interests,  violations of\ncriminal statutes, the filing of economic interest statements under the Illinois Governmental\nEthics Act ( 5 ILCS 420/ 1-101 et seq. ( West 2022)),  or the retention and disposal of records, \nwhich is governed by the Local Records Act (50 ILCS 205/1 et seq. (West 2022)) rather than\nFOIA.  \n\nWith respect to FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also\nSouthern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).  \nHowever, \"[ a]  requester is entitled only to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and\nretain.\"   Yeager,  678 F.2d at 321.   Although FOIA generally requires a public body to take\nreasonable measures to search for records, a public body is not required to conduct a search that\nwould be futile.   See American- Arab Anti- Discrimination Committee v. United States Dep' t of\nHomeland Security,  516 F. Supp.  2d 83,  88 ( D.D.C. 2007).  \n\nOn November 12, 2024, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access\n\nBureau spoke with Ms. Dawn Woodbury,  the Village of Lee Clerk,  about her response to your\nFOIA request.  Ms. Woodbury stated that as the Village Clerk, she is knowledgeable regarding\nthe nature of the records you requested.   She stated that there are no expense reports or\nreimbursement requests because the employee you identified in your request, who works in the\npublic works department,  uses a Village debit card for any expenses incurred on behalf of the\nVillage.  She explained that the Village Treasurer then compares the debit card receipts to the\nbank account.   She also stated that only Village officials–– and not Village employees–– are\nrequired to file economic interest statements, and she confirmed that the employee named in\nyour request had not done so.   As noted above,  whether another statute such as the Illinois\nGovernmental Ethics Act requires a particular employee to file an economic interest statement is\nnot subject to review by the Public Access Counselor.    \n\nYou argued in your Request for Review that the response that there were no\nexpense reports or reimbursement requests was inaccurate because, during a Village Board\nmeeting,  the Village Treasurer stated that receipts were being turned in.  You implied that the\nVillage should have interpreted your request for expense reports and reimbursement requests as\nencompassing a request for receipts.   Your FOIA request,  however,  specifically sought expense\nreports and reimbursement requests, which are distinct from receipts for charges to a Village\ndebit card.   The Village was not required to interpret your request for those distinct records as a\nrequest for any and all records related to Village expenses.  Public bodies are not required to\n\n\fDecember 17, 2024\nPage 3\n\nsearch beyond the four corners of a FOIA request,  nor are they required to divine the requester' s\nintent.  Manna v. U.S. Department of Justice, 106 F. Supp. 3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2015).  If you still\nwish to obtain copies of the receipts,  you may wish to submit a new FOIA request specifically\nrequesting those records.  \n\nBecause the Village explained why it did not possess responsive economic\n\nrequests,  it appears that searching for\n\ninterest statements,  expense reports,  and reimbursement\nthose records would be futile.  This office has not received any information to the contrary.  The\nVillage is not required to provide a notice of denial pursuant to section 9(a)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS\n140/9(a) ( West 2022)) when a request seeks records that the Village does not maintain.  See\nKenyon v. Garrels,  184 Ill. App.  3d 28,  32 ( 1989) ( public bodies not obligated to create records). \nAccordingly, the Public Access Bureau has no basis to conclude that the Village violated FOIA\nby failing to provide you with economic interest statements,  expense reports,  and reimbursement\nrequests. \n\nRegarding the authenticity of the timesheets, Ms. Woodbury explained in an e-\n\nmail to the Public Access Bureau that the employee had submitted his hours to the treasurer via\ne-mail, and that Ms. Woodbury had copied and pasted the information from those e-mails onto\nthe documents that were provided to you.   On December 3, 2024,  Ms. Woodbury sent you a\nsupplemental FOIA response providing you with copies of the original time-keeping e-mails\nsubmitted by the employee.   That supplemental\nhad not provided the original records.  \n\nresponse resolves your complaint\n\nthat the Village\n\nLastly,  you questioned whether the Village Clerk has completed statutorily-\n\nrequired training for FOIA officers.  Section 9.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) ( West 2023\nSupp.))  authorizes the Public Access Bureau to review denials of FOIA requests;  it does not\nauthorize this office to review whether public bodies' FOIA officers have complied with training\nrequirements.   This office,  however,  is also charged with providing advice and education to\npublic bodies and members of the public.  15 ILCS 205/7(a), ( c) (West 2022).  In that capacity, \nthis office notes that section 3.5(b) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3.5(b) ( West 2022))  provides: \n\nAll Freedom of Information officers shall,  within 6 months\nafter the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General\nAssembly,  successfully complete an electronic training curriculum\nto be developed by the Public Access Counselor and thereafter\nsuccessfully complete an annual training program.  Thereafter, \nwhenever a new Freedom of Information officer is designated by a\npublic body,  that person shall successfully complete the electronic\ntraining curriculum within 30 days after assuming the position. \nSuccessful completion of the required training curriculum within\nthe periods provided shall be a prerequisite to continue serving as a\nFreedom of Information officer. \n\n\fDecember 17, 2024\nPage 4\n\nThe Village should ensure that its designated FOIA officer complies with these training\nrequirements.  The 2025 version of the Public Access Counselor's annual training program will\nbe available early in the year. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have questions,  you may contact me at\n\nmichael.knight@ilag.gov.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT\nAssistantAttorneyGeneral\nPublicAccessBureau\n\n83586 f unf mun\n\ncc:  \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Dawn Woodbury\nVillage Clerk\nVillage of Lee\nvillageofleeclerk@gmail. com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A village employee's timesheets, expense reports, and economic interest statements","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83586/","full_text":"December 17, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83586\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the above-referenced Request for Review is\nunfounded. \n\nOn October 10, 2024, you submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1\n\nrequest to the Village of Lee (Village) seeking: \n\nAll timesheets, expense reports, and reimbursement\n\nrequests, filed by or on behalf of Village of Lee employee Mike\nWoodbury, between July 1st, 2024, through October 9th, 2024, \ninclusive. The two most recently filed Illinois Economic Interest\nstatements for Mike Woodbury.[2] \n\nOn October 14, 2024, the Village responded by providing timesheets and stating\n\nthat there were no expense reports or reimbursement\nrequests. On October 15, 2024, you sent an\ne-mail to the Village of Lee Clerk inquiring whether the timesheets that were provided were the\noriginal files submitted by the employee. According to your Request for Review, the Village\nClerk responded affirmatively. On October 22, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review\ncontesting, among other things, the Village's response that there were no expense reports or\n\nrequests, and the lack of a response regarding Illinois Economic Interest\n\nreimbursement\nStatements. You also questioned whether the timesheets that were provided were the original\nrecords submitted by the employee, and whether the Village Clerk had completed legally\nmandated FOIA training. \n\nAs a threshold matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to\n\nresolving disputes concerning the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. (West 2022)) and\nreviewing denials of FOIA requests. 15 ILCS 205/7 (West 2022). The Public Access Counselor\ndoes not have authority to review allegations concerning conflicts of interests, violations of\ncriminal statutes, the filing of economic interest statements under the Illinois Governmental\nEthics Act (5 ILCS 420/ 1-101 et seq. (West 2022)), or the retention and disposal of records, \nwhich is governed by the Local Records Act (50 ILCS 205/1 et seq. (West 2022)) rather than\nFOIA. \n\nWith respect to FOIA, \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also\nSouthern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). \nHowever, \"[ a] requester is entitled only to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and\nretain.\" Yeager, 678 F.2d at 321. Although FOIA generally requires a public body to take\nreasonable measures to search for records, a public body is not required to conduct a search that\nwould be futile. See American- Arab Anti- Discrimination Committee v. United States Dep' t of\nHomeland Security, 516 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2007). \n\nOn November 12, 2024, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access\n\nBureau spoke with Ms. Dawn Woodbury, the Village of Lee Clerk, about her response to your\nFOIA request. Ms. Woodbury stated that as the Village Clerk, she is knowledgeable regarding\nthe nature of the records you requested. She stated that there are no expense reports or\nreimbursement requests because the employee you identified in your request, who works in the\npublic works department, uses a Village debit card for any expenses incurred on behalf of the\nVillage. She explained that the Village Treasurer then compares the debit card receipts to the\nbank account. She also stated that only Village officials–– and not Village employees–– are\nrequired to file economic interest statements, and she confirmed that the employee named in\nyour request had not done so. As noted above, whether another statute such as the Illinois\nGovernmental Ethics Act requires a particular employee to file an economic interest statement is\nnot subject to review by the Public Access Counselor. \n\nYou argued in your Request for Review that the response that there were no\nexpense reports or reimbursement requests was inaccurate because, during a Village Board\nmeeting, the Village Treasurer stated that receipts were being turned in. You implied that the\nVillage should have interpreted your request for expense reports and reimbursement requests as\nencompassing a request for receipts. Your FOIA request, however, specifically sought expense\nreports and reimbursement requests, which are distinct from receipts for charges to a Village\ndebit card. The Village was not required to interpret your request for those distinct records as a\nrequest for any and all records related to Village expenses. Public bodies are not required to\n\nsearch beyond the four corners of a FOIA request, nor are they required to divine the requester's\nintent. Manna v. U.S. Department of Justice, 106 F. Supp. 3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2015). If you still\nwish to obtain copies of the receipts, you may wish to submit a new FOIA request specifically\nrequesting those records. \n\nBecause the Village explained why it did not possess responsive economic\n\nrequests, it appears that searching for\n\ninterest statements, expense reports, and reimbursement\nthose records would be futile. This office has not received any information to the contrary. The\nVillage is not required to provide a notice of denial pursuant to section 9(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/9(a) (West 2022)) when a request seeks records that the Village does not maintain. See\nKenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) (public bodies not obligated to create records). \nAccordingly, the Public Access Bureau has no basis to conclude that the Village violated FOIA\nby failing to provide you with economic interest statements, expense reports, and reimbursement\nrequests. \n\nRegarding the authenticity of the timesheets, Ms. Woodbury explained in an e-\n\nmail to the Public Access Bureau that the employee had submitted his hours to the treasurer via\ne-mail, and that Ms. Woodbury had copied and pasted the information from those e-mails onto\nthe documents that were provided to you. On December 3, 2024, Ms. Woodbury sent you a\nsupplemental FOIA response providing you with copies of the original time-keeping e-mails\nsubmitted by the employee. That supplemental\nhad not provided the original records. \n\nresponse resolves your complaint\n\nthat the Village\n\nLastly, you questioned whether the Village Clerk has completed statutorily-\n\nrequired training for FOIA officers. Section 9.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) (West 2023\nSupp.)) authorizes the Public Access Bureau to review denials of FOIA requests; it does not\nauthorize this office to review whether public bodies' FOIA officers have complied with training\nrequirements. This office, however, is also charged with providing advice and education to\npublic bodies and members of the public. 15 ILCS 205/7(a), (c) (West 2022). In that capacity, \nthis office notes that section 3.5(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.5(b) (West 2022)) provides: \n\nAll Freedom of Information officers shall, within 6 months\nafter the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General\nAssembly, successfully complete an electronic training curriculum\nto be developed by the Public Access Counselor and thereafter\nsuccessfully complete an annual training program. Thereafter, \n\nThe Village should ensure that its designated FOIA officer complies with these training\nrequirements. The 2025 version of the Public Access Counselor's annual training program will\nbe available early in the year. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have questions, you may contact me at\n\nmichael.knight@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT\nAssistantAttorneyGeneral\nPublicAccessBureau\n\n83586 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Dawn Woodbury\nVillage Clerk\nVillage of Lee\nvillageofleeclerk@gmail. com"}
{"id":1099,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-11-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83592"],"title":"PAC closes case after Village of Hillside provided body camera footage","filename":"83592, issued November 6, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":598,"summary":"A requester challenged the Village of Hillside's extension of time to respond to a FOIA request for body camera footage. The PAC determined that while the Village failed to cite a specific statutory reason for the extension, the matter is moot because the Village subsequently provided the requested records.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested body camera footage from the Village of Hillside, and the Village extended its response deadline without citing a specific legal reason required by FOIA. The Attorney General's office noted the Village's procedural error but closed the case because the Village eventually provided the requested footage.","holding":"The PAC took no further action because the Village provided the requested records, rendering the dispute moot.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Hillside properly extended its time to respond to a FOIA request under 5 ILCS 140/3(e).","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Hillside","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOIA response timeline","subject_description":"The requester sought body camera footage and challenged the Village's procedural handling of a response deadline extension.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_e/Statutory-right-to-extend-time-for-response/83592%2C%20issued%20November%206%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera footage","FOIA response time","extension of time","procedural compliance"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"November 6, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Joe Beckwith\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nVillage of Hillside\n425 Hillside Avenue\nHillside,  Illinois 60162\njbeckwith@hillside- il.org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83592\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Beckwith: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   \n\nOn October 15, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nVillage of Hillside ( Village)  seeking body camera footage.   On October 22, 2024,  the Village\ninformed\n\nthat his \" request requires an extension of time until\"  October 30, 2024. 1\nsubmitted this Request for Review contesting the extension taken by the Village. \n\nUnder section 9.5(a)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) ( West 2023 Supp.)), \"[ a]  person\n\nwhose request to inspect or copy a public record is denied by a public body * * *  may file a\nrequest for review with the Public Access Counselor * * *  not later than 60 days after the date of\nthe final denial.\"   Section 3(d) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3(d) (West 2022))  provides that \"[ e] ach\npublic body shall,  promptly,  either comply with or deny a request for public records within 5\nbusiness days after its receipt of the request,  unless the time for response is properly extended\n\n1E- mail from FOIA Officer,  Village of Hillside to\n\nOctober 22, 2024)  \n\n\fMr. Joe Beckwith\nNovember 6, 2024\nPage 2\n\nunder subsection ( e) of this Section.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Section 3(e)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS\n140/ 3(e) ( West 2022))  provides seven enumerated reasons for extending the time to respond to a\nrequest,  and states:  \" When additional time is required for any of the above reasons,  the public\nbody shall,  within 5 business days after receipt of the request,  notify the person making the\nrequest of the reasons for the extension and the date by which the response will be\nforthcoming.\"  ( Emphasis added.)  \"[ T]he plain language of FOIA gives a public body in receipt\nof a records request the unilateral ability to extend its own response deadline by five days.\"  \nSargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, Inc. v. The Board of Education of the City of\nChicago,  2018 IL App (1st)  171846, ¶  25. \n\nThe information provided to this office indicates that the Village extended its time\nrequest on October 22, 2024,  which was within five business days\n\nto respond to\nafter its receipt of the request.   Although the Village was authorized to unilaterally take that\nextension,  the Village did not cite any of the enumerated reasons in the statute in its\ncorrespondence notifying\nof the extension as required by the plain language of\nsection 3(e)  of FOIA.  The Village should be mindful of its obligation to do so if it extends the\ntime for responding to FOIA requests in the future.   Because this office has received\nconfirmation that on October 28, 2024,  the Village substantively responded to the request and\nprovided responsive body camera footage to\nmatter.   See Duncan Publishing,  Inc. v. City of Chicago,  304 Ill. App. 3d 778, 782 ( 1999) \ndisclosure of records responsive to a FOIA request renders moot the claim that a public body\nfailed to provide records)   \n\nwe will take no further action in this\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\n83592 f no fi war mun\n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Body-camera footage and response deadline extension","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83592/","full_text":"November 6, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Joe Beckwith\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nVillage of Hillside\n425 Hillside Avenue\nHillside, Illinois 60162\njbeckwith@hillside- il.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83592\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Beckwith: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn October 15, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nVillage of Hillside (Village) seeking body camera footage. On October 22, 2024, the Village\ninformed\n\nthat his \" request requires an extension of time until\" October 30, 2024. 1\nsubmitted this Request for Review contesting the extension taken by the Village. \n\nUnder section 9.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(a) (West 2023 Supp.)), \"[ a] person\n\nwhose request to inspect or copy a public record is denied by a public body * * * may file a\nrequest for review with the Public Access Counselor * * * not later than 60 days after the date of\nthe final denial.\" Section 3(d) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(d) (West 2022)) provides that \"[ e] ach\npublic body shall, promptly, either comply with or deny a request for public records within 5\nbusiness days after its receipt of the request, unless the time for response is properly extended\n\nunder subsection (e) of this Section.\" (Emphasis added.) Section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 3(e) (West 2022)) provides seven enumerated reasons for extending the time to respond to a\nrequest, and states: \" When additional time is required for any of the above reasons, the public\nbody shall, within 5 business days after receipt of the request, notify the person making the\nrequest of the reasons for the extension and the date by which the response will be\nforthcoming.\" (Emphasis added.) \"[ T]he plain language of FOIA gives a public body in receipt\nof a records request the unilateral ability to extend its own response deadline by five days.\" \nSargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, Inc. v. The Board of Education of the City of\nChicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 171846, ¶ 25. \n\nThe information provided to this office indicates that the Village extended its time\nrequest on October 22, 2024, which was within five business days\n\nto respond to\nafter its receipt of the request. Although the Village was authorized to unilaterally take that\nextension, the Village did not cite any of the enumerated reasons in the statute in its\ncorrespondence notifying\nof the extension as required by the plain language of\nsection 3(e) of FOIA. The Village should be mindful of its obligation to do so if it extends the\ntime for responding to FOIA requests in the future. Because this office has received\nconfirmation that on October 28, 2024, the Village substantively responded to the request and\nprovided responsive body camera footage to\nmatter. See Duncan Publishing, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 3d 778, 782 (1999) \ndisclosure of records responsive to a FOIA request renders moot the claim that a public body\nfailed to provide records) \n\nwe will take no further action in this\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\n83592 f no fi war mun\n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau"}
{"id":1100,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-23","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83737"],"title":"Champaign County Executive's Office properly withheld draft ads under 7(1)(f)","filename":"83737, issued December 23, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1353,"summary":"The requester challenged the Champaign County Executive's Office's denial of draft advertisements regarding a public safety sales tax. The PAC determined that the County properly withheld the draft versions under the deliberative process exemption.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for communications and copies of advertisements related to a public safety sales tax. The County provided some records but withheld draft versions of advertisements, claiming they were preliminary and part of the decision-making process. The Attorney General's office agreed that these drafts were exempt from disclosure because they reflect the County's internal deliberative process.","holding":"The Champaign County Executive's Office did not improperly withhold the requested draft advertisements under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether draft versions of advertisements constitute exempt preliminary drafts or recommendations under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(f)"],"public_body":"Champaign County Executive's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(f)","subject_description":"The requester sought draft versions of advertisements produced by the County regarding a public safety sales tax.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/83737%2C%20issued%20December%2023%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["drafts","deliberative process","exemption 7(1)(f)","public safety sales tax"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"December 23, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Michelle Jett\nDirector of Administration\nOffice of Champaign County Executive\n1776 Wast Washington Street\nUrbana,  Illinois 61802\nmjett@co. champaign. il.us\n\nRE:  Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83737\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Jett: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Champaign County Executive' s Office ( County)  did not\nimproperly deny draft versions of advertisements in response to\nrequest. \n\nFOIA\n\nOn October 4, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the County\n\nseeking copies of \"[ a[ ll emails,  memorandum,  texts or other communication from Steve Summers\nor Michelle Jett or their subordinates from 1/1/2024 to current with any vendors involved with\ncampaign ads over the public safety sales tax[ ]\"  and \"[ c] opies of all advertisements,  billboard, \nprint, radio or otherwise the county has produced or has had produced by third- parties in regards\n\n\fMs. Michelle Jett\nDecember 23, 2024\nPage 2\n\nto the public safety sales tax.\" 1 On October 21, 2024,  the County provided\ncertain records and informed him that it was waiting on to hear from another department\nregarding additional records.   On October 25, 2024,  the County sent\nresponse denying the remaining records under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)( f)  \nWest 2023 Supp),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024).   On October 30, \n2024, \nwithholding of what he claims are fully produced videos and challenged the completeness of the\nCounty' s response. 2\n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the\n\na final\n\nwith\n\nOn November 7, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe County and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of the requested records\ntogether with a detailed explanation for the applicability of the section 7(1)( f) exemption.   On\nNovember 19, 2024,  the County provided this office with copies of the responsive materials, \nincluding the records provided to\na written response,  and three withheld videos\nof television advertisements concerning a sales tax.   The County informed this office that after\n\nalleged that the first production was incomplete,  it undertook an additional\n\nreview and identified two responsive spreadsheets that were furnished to\nNovember 19, 2024.   On that same date, \nOn November 20, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the County' s redacted response to\n\nnoted receipt of the two spreadsheets. 3\n\non\n\nhe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept. of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that a record is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\n1E- mail from\n2Some of the e-mails provided to\n\nMahomet Leaks,  to County Executive ( October 4, 2024) \n\nwere also redacted pursuant to section 7(1)(f).  \n\ndoes not challenge these redactions in his Request for Review.   \n\n3In his Request for Review, \n\nstated that the e-mails that were provided did not\n\ninclude outbound e-mails.  This office's review of the e-mails that were furnished,  however,  confirmed that they\ninclude chains in which the County received as well as responded to e-mails.  \nwere missing zip code and address data.   The County performed an additional search and furnished the attachments\nwith this data.  Given that\nthis office will take no further action on the issue of whether the County' s response was complete. \n\nnoted receipt and did not further contest the production of the attachments, \n\nalso alleged that e-mails\n\n\fMs. Michelle Jett\nDecember 23, 2024\nPage 3\n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying \"[ p]reliminary\n\ndrafts,  notes,  recommendations,  memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, \nor policies or actions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record\nshall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public\nbody.\"   The section 7(1)( f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative material.\"   Harwood v. McDonough,  344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 ( 2003).   Section\n7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open\ndiscussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\"   Harwood,  344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248. \n\nRequest for Review alleges that the County improperly withheld\ntelevision advertisements that \" were fully produced and as far as I can tell, paid for. They are no\nlonger preliminary drafts,  it's a finished product.\" 4 In its response to this office, the County\ncharacterized the withheld advertisements as drafts that were not finalized and never used even\nthough the producer was paid for its services.   In an e-mail to this office on December 5, 2024, \nthe County further stated that \"[ i]f the County decided tomorrow to use them as their intended\npurpose,  they would have to be edited further before doing so.\" 5\n\nIn United States Fish and Wildlife Service vs. Sierra Club, 592 U.S 261 ( 2021), \n\nthe United States Supreme Court addressed whether written opinions regarding a proposed\nfederal agency action were drafts within the scope of the exemption in Federal FOIA that\ncorresponds to section 7(1)(f).6 The opinions,  which concluded that a proposed rule was likely\nto adversely affect endangered species,  were not approved or submitted to the Environmental\nProtection Agency ( EPA).   Sierra Club, 592 U.S at 265.   Instead,  the decisionmakers who\nreviewed the drafts concluded \" that ' more work needed to be done,'\"  and \" shelved the draft\nopinions and agreed with the EPA to extend the period of consultation.\"   Sierra Club, 592 U.S at\n265.   The Court rejected the argument that the opinions constituted a final decision because they\nwere not followed by another version that was adopted,  holding that the opinions were \" both\npredecisional and deliberative.\"   Sierra Club, 592 U.S at 272-73.  The Court emphasized that\nthe determinative fact is not their level of polish— it is that the decisionmakers at the Services\nneither approved the drafts nor sent them to the EPA.\"   Sierra Club, 592 U.S at 271-72; see also\nHeffernan vs. Azar, 417 F Supp.  3d 1, 17 (D.D.C 2018) ( draft of press release that was not issued\n\n4E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General]  \n\nOctober 30, 2024). \n\n5E- mail from Michelle Jett to Matthew Rogina ( December 5, 2024). \n\n65 U. S. C. § 552( b)(5) ( 2018) ( exempting from disclosure \" inter- agency or intra- agency\n\nmemorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the\nagency.\"). \n\n\fMs. Michelle Jett\nDecember 23, 2024\nPage 4\n\nproperly withheld under the deliberative process exemption because it was \" never adopted\nformally or used by the agency in its dealings with the public, * * *  and it relates to the\ndefendant' s policy consideration of whether to issue a press release\"). \n\nLikewise,  the versions of advertisements at issue were not among the versions\nthat were approved for release and if they were, the final product would have been different, \naccording to the County.   Even though completed versions of the videos were submitted and no\nadditional editing was done,  the unadopted versions of the advertisements are preliminary drafts\nthat provide insight into the County' s predecisional deliberative process of formulating\nadvertisements.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the County did not improperly withhold\nthe videos under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at the Chicago address on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83737 f 71f proper co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Draft advertisements for a public safety sales tax","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83737/","full_text":"December 23, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Michelle Jett\nDirector of Administration\nOffice of Champaign County Executive\n1776 Wast Washington Street\nUrbana, Illinois 61802\nmjett@co. champaign. il.us\n\nRE: Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83737\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Jett: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Champaign County Executive's Office (County) did not\nimproperly deny draft versions of advertisements in response to\nrequest. \n\nFOIA\n\nOn October 4, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the County\n\nseeking copies of \"[ a[ ll emails, memorandum, texts or other communication from Steve Summers\nor Michelle Jett or their subordinates from 1/1/2024 to current with any vendors involved with\ncampaign ads over the public safety sales tax[ ]\" and \"[ c] opies of all advertisements, billboard, \nprint, radio or otherwise the county has produced or has had produced by third- parties in regards\n\nto the public safety sales tax.\" 1 On October 21, 2024, the County provided\ncertain records and informed him that it was waiting on to hear from another department\nregarding additional records. On October 25, 2024, the County sent\nresponse denying the remaining records under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(f) \nWest 2023 Supp), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024). On October 30, \n2024, \nwithholding of what he claims are fully produced videos and challenged the completeness of the\nCounty's response. 2\n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the\n\na final\n\nwith\n\nOn November 7, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe County and asked it to provide this office with unredacted copies of the requested records\ntogether with a detailed explanation for the applicability of the section 7(1)(f) exemption. On\nNovember 19, 2024, the County provided this office with copies of the responsive materials, \nincluding the records provided to\na written response, and three withheld videos\nof television advertisements concerning a sales tax. The County informed this office that after\n\nalleged that the first production was incomplete, it undertook an additional\n\nreview and identified two responsive spreadsheets that were furnished to\nNovember 19, 2024. On that same date, \nOn November 20, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the County's redacted response to\n\nnoted receipt of the two spreadsheets. 3\n\non\n\nhe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept. of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \" has the burden of\nproving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\n1E- mail from\n2 Some of the e-mails provided to\n\nMahomet Leaks, to County Executive (October 4, 2024) \n\nwere also redacted pursuant to section 7(1)(f). \n\ndoes not challenge these redactions in his Request for Review. \n\n3 In his Request for Review, \n\nstated that the e-mails that were provided did not\n\ninclude outbound e-mails. This office's review of the e-mails that were furnished, however, confirmed that they\ninclude chains in which the County received as well as responded to e-mails. \nwere missing zip code and address data. The County performed an additional search and furnished the attachments\nwith this data. Given that\nthis office will take no further action on the issue of whether the County's response was complete. \n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying \"[ p]reliminary\n\ndrafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, \nor policies or actions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record\nshall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public\nbody.\" The section 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and\ndeliberative material.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003). Section\n7(1)(f) is \" intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open\ndiscussion among agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood, 344 Ill. App. \n3d at 248. \n\nRequest for Review alleges that the County improperly withheld\ntelevision advertisements that \" were fully produced and as far as I can tell, paid for. They are no\nlonger preliminary drafts, it's a finished product.\" 4 In its response to this office, the County\ncharacterized the withheld advertisements as drafts that were not finalized and never used even\nthough the producer was paid for its services. In an e-mail to this office on December 5, 2024, \nthe County further stated that \"[ i]f the County decided tomorrow to use them as their intended\npurpose, they would have to be edited further before doing so.\" 5\n\nIn United States Fish and Wildlife Service vs. Sierra Club, 592 U.S 261 (2021), \n\nthe United States Supreme Court addressed whether written opinions regarding a proposed\nfederal agency action were drafts within the scope of the exemption in Federal FOIA that\ncorresponds to section 7(1)(f).6 The opinions, which concluded that a proposed rule was likely\nto adversely affect endangered species, were not approved or submitted to the Environmental\nProtection Agency (EPA). Sierra Club, 592 U.S at 265. Instead, the decisionmakers who\nreviewed the drafts concluded \" that ' more work needed to be done,'\" and \" shelved the draft\nopinions and agreed with the EPA to extend the period of consultation.\" Sierra Club, 592 U.S at\n265. The Court rejected the argument that the opinions constituted a final decision because they\nwere not followed by another version that was adopted, holding that the opinions were \" both\npredecisional and deliberative.\" Sierra Club, 592 U.S at 272-73. The Court emphasized that\nthe determinative fact is not their level of polish— it is that the decisionmakers at the Services\nneither approved the drafts nor sent them to the EPA.\" Sierra Club, 592 U.S at 271-72; see also\nHeffernan vs. Azar, 417 F Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C 2018) (draft of press release that was not issued\n\n4E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General] \n\nOctober 30, 2024). \n\n5E- mail from Michelle Jett to Matthew Rogina (December 5, 2024). \n\n65 U. S. C. § 552(b)(5) (2018) (exempting from disclosure \" inter- agency or intra- agency\n\nmemorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the\n\nproperly withheld under the deliberative process exemption because it was \" never adopted\nformally or used by the agency in its dealings with the public, * * * and it relates to the\ndefendant's policy consideration of whether to issue a press release\"). \n\nLikewise, the versions of advertisements at issue were not among the versions\nthat were approved for release and if they were, the final product would have been different, \naccording to the County. Even though completed versions of the videos were submitted and no\nadditional editing was done, the unadopted versions of the advertisements are preliminary drafts\nthat provide insight into the County's predecisional deliberative process of formulating\nadvertisements. Accordingly, this office concludes that the County did not improperly withhold\nthe videos under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at the Chicago address on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83737 f 71f proper co"}
{"id":1101,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83830"],"title":"Illinois State Police improperly denied incident report as unduly burdensome","filename":"83830, issued January 24, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1116,"summary":"The Illinois State Police (ISP) denied a FOIA request for a specific incident report by claiming it was unduly burdensome, but the PAC determined the ISP failed to provide sufficient evidence to support that claim.","plain_summary":"A law firm requested a specific police report from the Illinois State Police, but the agency refused to provide it, claiming the request was too burdensome to fulfill. The Public Access Counselor reviewed the case and found that the police did not provide enough proof to justify that claim. Consequently, the agency must now process the request.","holding":"The Illinois State Police improperly denied the request as unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois State Police properly invoked the 'unduly burdensome' exemption under section 3(g) of FOIA to deny a request for a specific incident report.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":"Mr. Daniel T. Ryan","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought records related to a specific Illinois State Police incident report.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_g/Categorical-requests/83830%2C%20issued%20January%2024%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","unduly burdensome","FOIA request","denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"January 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Daniel T. Ryan\nOf Counsel\nHolland Injury Law,  LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndan@whollandinjurylaw.com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street,  Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov\nisp.foia.officer@illinois.gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83830\n\nDear Mr. Ryan and Ms. Martynowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois State Police (ISP) improperly denied Mr. \nDaniel T. Ryan' s October 24, 2024,  FOIA request as unduly burdensome under section 3(g)  of\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)). \n\nOn that date, Mr. Ryan's law firm, on behalf of a client, submitted a FOIA request\n\nto ISP seeking records related to ISP report 24- 40681400630.   On October 31, 2024,  ISP\nextended its time to respond by five business days pursuant to section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 3(e) ( West 2022)).   On November 8, 2024,  ISP responded by asserting that the request was\nunduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)) and extending\n\n\fMr. Daniel T. Ryan\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nJanuary 24, 2025\nPage 2\n\nMr. Ryan the opportunity to narrow his request.  On that same date, Mr. Ryan submitted the\nabove- referenced Request for Review contesting ISP' s response. \n\nOn November 18,  2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nISP and asked it to provide a detailed written explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\nassertion that fulfilling the request would unduly burden its operations,  including an estimate of\nthe volume of responsive records and of the time that it would take ISP to provide Mr. Ryan with\nthe responsive records.   Having received no response,  this office sent an additional\non December 4, 2024, enclosing the November 18, 2024, letter and an additional copy of the\nRequest for Review.   As of the date of this determination,  this office has received no response\nfrom ISP in this matter. \n\nletter to ISP\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder section 1.2 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022)), \"[ a] ll records in the\ncustody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   A\npublic body \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is\nexempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   Section 3(g)  of FOIA provides,  in\npertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information.  Before invoking\nthis exemption,  the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions.  If any public body responds\nto a categorical request by stating that compliance would unduly\nburden its operation and the conditions described above are met,  it\nshall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would be\nunduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body. Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information. \n\nSection 3(g) necessarily involves a case- by-case analysis in which it is incumbent upon the\npublic body to demonstrate the extent of the burden that compliance would have upon its\noperations and that the burden outweighs the public interest in disclosure.   Sargent Shriver\nNational Center on Poverty Law, Inc. v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2018 IL App\n1st)  171846, ¶  38 (\" What constitutes a clear and convincing showing of undue burden will\n\n\fMr. Daniel T. Ryan\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nJanuary 24, 2025\nPage 3\n\nlikely vary from case to case, depending on the broadness of the request, the level of detail\nprovided in the public body' s response,  and the nature of the parties'  exchange.\") \n\nIn response to Mr. Ryan' s request,  ISP stated: \n\nISP is unable to provide any records without\n\ndisproportionately burdening our operations. Continuing to search\nfor, compile,  and redact records in response to this request would\nbe unduly burdensome, pursuant to Section 3(g) of FOIA. The time\nrequired for this request would result in delays for other FOIA\nrequests. ISP is extending you the opportunity to narrow the scope\nand reduce your request to manageable proportions.[ 1] \n\nISP provided Mr. Ryan with only a conclusory statement\nthat did not specify the reasons why the\nrequest would be unduly burdensome or explain the extent to which compliance would burden its\noperations.   In particular,  ISP did not provide even an initial estimate of the number of\nresponsive records or describe the types of records it maintained pertaining to the specified case.  \nFurthermore,  ISP failed to provide this office with an explanation for the applicability of section\n3(g).2 Because this office has no basis to conclude that the burden of fulfilling the request\noutweighs the public interest in disclosure of the records,  ISP failed to demonstrate that it\nproperly denied Mr. Ryan's request as unduly burdensome. \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this determination, this office\n\nrequests that ISP promptly provide Mr. Ryan with copies of the requested records,  subject only\nto permissible redactions under section 7 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2023 Supp.), as\namended by Public Act 103- 605,  effective July 1, 2024).   If any information is redacted,  FOIA\nrequires ISP to provide a written notice of denial that includes \"a detailed factual basis for the\napplication of any exemption claimed[.]\"   5 ILCS 140/ 9(a) ( West 2022). \n\n1Letter from Sarah Wheeler, Illinois State Police, Freedom of Information Officer, to Dan Ryan, \n\nHolland Injury Law, LLC] (November 8, 2024). \n\n2Section 9.5(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.))  provides, in pertinent part:  \nWithin 7 business days after receipt of the request for review, the public body shall provide copies of records\nrequested and shall otherwise fully cooperate with the Public Access Counselor.\"  ( Emphasis added.) \n\n\fr. Daniel T. Ryan\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nJanuary 24, 2025\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This file is closed.   If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83830 f 95c improper 3g improper pd sa\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A state police incident report","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83830/","full_text":"January 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Daniel T. Ryan\nOf Counsel\nHolland Injury Law, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndan@whollandinjurylaw.com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street, Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov\nisp.foia.officer@illinois.gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83830\n\nDear Mr. Ryan and Ms. Martynowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons stated below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois State Police (ISP) improperly denied Mr. \nDaniel T. Ryan's October 24, 2024, FOIA request as unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)). \n\nOn that date, Mr. Ryan's law firm, on behalf of a client, submitted a FOIA request\n\nto ISP seeking records related to ISP report 24- 40681400630. On October 31, 2024, ISP\nextended its time to respond by five business days pursuant to section 3(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 3(e) (West 2022)). On November 8, 2024, ISP responded by asserting that the request was\n\nMr. Ryan the opportunity to narrow his request. On that same date, Mr. Ryan submitted the\nabove- referenced Request for Review contesting ISP's response. \n\nOn November 18, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nISP and asked it to provide a detailed written explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\nassertion that fulfilling the request would unduly burden its operations, including an estimate of\nthe volume of responsive records and of the time that it would take ISP to provide Mr. Ryan with\nthe responsive records. Having received no response, this office sent an additional\non December 4, 2024, enclosing the November 18, 2024, letter and an additional copy of the\nRequest for Review. As of the date of this determination, this office has received no response\nfrom ISP in this matter. \n\nletter to ISP\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder section 1.2 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022)), \"[ a] ll records in the\ncustody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" A\npublic body \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is\nexempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). Section 3(g) of FOIA provides, in\npertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest in the information. Before invoking\nthis exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions. If any public body responds\nto a categorical request by stating that compliance would unduly\nburden its operation and the conditions described above are met, it\nshall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would be\nunduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body. Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request for information. \n\nSection 3(g) necessarily involves a case- by-case analysis in which it is incumbent upon the\npublic body to demonstrate the extent of the burden that compliance would have upon its\noperations and that the burden outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Sargent Shriver\n\nlikely vary from case to case, depending on the broadness of the request, the level of detail\nprovided in the public body's response, and the nature of the parties' exchange.\") \n\nIn response to Mr. Ryan's request, ISP stated: \n\nISP is unable to provide any records without\n\ndisproportionately burdening our operations. Continuing to search\nfor, compile, and redact records in response to this request would\nbe unduly burdensome, pursuant to Section 3(g) of FOIA. The time\nrequired for this request would result in delays for other FOIA\nrequests. ISP is extending you the opportunity to narrow the scope\nand reduce your request to manageable proportions.[ 1] \n\nISP provided Mr. Ryan with only a conclusory statement\nthat did not specify the reasons why the\nrequest would be unduly burdensome or explain the extent to which compliance would burden its\noperations. In particular, ISP did not provide even an initial estimate of the number of\nresponsive records or describe the types of records it maintained pertaining to the specified case. \nFurthermore, ISP failed to provide this office with an explanation for the applicability of section\n3(g).2 Because this office has no basis to conclude that the burden of fulfilling the request\noutweighs the public interest in disclosure of the records, ISP failed to demonstrate that it\nproperly denied Mr. Ryan's request as unduly burdensome. \n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this determination, this office\n\nrequests that ISP promptly provide Mr. Ryan with copies of the requested records, subject only\nto permissible redactions under section 7 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2023 Supp.), as\namended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024). If any information is redacted, FOIA\nrequires ISP to provide a written notice of denial that includes \"a detailed factual basis for the\napplication of any exemption claimed[.]\" 5 ILCS 140/ 9(a) (West 2022). \n\n1 Letter from Sarah Wheeler, Illinois State Police, Freedom of Information Officer, to Dan Ryan, \n\nHolland Injury Law, LLC] (November 8, 2024). \n\n2 Section 9.5(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)) provides, in pertinent part: \nWithin 7 business days after receipt of the request for review, the public body shall provide copies of records\nrequested and shall otherwise fully cooperate with the Public Access Counselor.\" (Emphasis added.) \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83830 f 95c improper 3g improper pd sa"}
{"id":1102,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-02-10","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83854"],"title":"Illinois DNR properly redacted waterfowl banding locations as research data under 7(1)(i)","filename":"83854, issued February 10, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2174,"summary":"A requester challenged the Illinois Department of Natural Resources' redaction of waterfowl banding locations and band numbers under FOIA. The PAC determined that the Department properly withheld this information under section 7(1)(i) to prevent the potential exploitation of wildlife.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested records from the Illinois Department of Natural Resources about waterfowl banding activities, including band numbers and locations, citing concerns about the handling of the program. The Department redacted the band numbers and locations under FOIA. The citizen challenged the redactions, but the Attorney General's Public Access Bureau concluded that the Department properly withheld the information because it qualifies as 'research data' under section 7(1)(i) of FOIA, and disclosure could reasonably be expected to produce private gain (e.g., selling replica bands, targeting banded birds) and public loss (e.g., skewed data, shortened hunting seasons).","holding":"The Illinois Department of Natural Resources properly redacted waterfowl banding locations and band numbers pursuant to section 7(1)(i) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois Department of Natural Resources properly invoked section 7(1)(i) of FOIA to redact waterfowl banding locations and identification numbers.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(i)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Natural Resources","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(i)","subject_description":"The request sought records of waterfowl banding activities, including specific locations and identification numbers, which the agency redacted to protect wildlife.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_i/83854%2C%20issued%20February%2010%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["wildlife data","redaction","environmental records","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"February 10, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Nicole Thomas\nLegal Counsel\nIllinois Department of Natural Resources\nOne Natural Resources Way\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62702\nNicole. thomas@illinois. gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 83854;  24-F-08-540\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Thomas: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Illinois Department of Natural Resources (\" Department\"  or \" IDNR\")  did not improperly\nredact portions of research data responsive to\nAugust 7, 2024,  FOIA\nrequest. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Department seeking:  \n\nReport of all waterfowl banding activities ( for example,  but\nnot exclusive,  attaching a unique identifying band to waterfowl)  by\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fMs. Nicole Thomas\nFebruary 10, 2025\nPage 2\n\nIllinois Department of Natural Resource personnel or program\nvolunteers,  within the counties of DuPage,  Cook and Will, for the\nyears 2020 to 2024.  Information should include:  band number, \nspecies,  age,  location,  sex, date of banding,  name of permitted\nbander.  Any format containing this information is acceptable.[ 2]   \n\nOn August 22, 2024,  the Department responded by providing a copy of a\nresponsive report with the band numbers and the locations of where the banding occurred\nredacted pursuant to section 7(1)(i) of FOIA. 3 On November 12, 2024,  this office received\n\nRequest for Review contesting the Department' s redactions of the band numbers and\n\nbanding locations.  \n\nexplained that: \n\nThe reason I am asking for this information is concern over\n\nhandling of the program.  I am a bird rescue volunteer.  I have\nidentified instances where the IDNR has banded birds with visible\ninjuries and then released them.  The injuries should have been\nidentified and proper steps taken to treat through a licensed\nrehabilitation center.  Instead,  they were banded and released. \nWithin 6 weeks both of these birds were debilitated and captured\nby our rescue group in our community public parks.  These birds\nwere ultimately euthanized due to the willful ignorance during the\nbanding process.  Specifically,  I need the band numbers and\nlocation of the IDNR banding to compare with my findings.[ 4]   \n\nOn November 19, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Department and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the report for this office' s\nconfidential review as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\napplicability of section 7(1)(i) to the band numbers and the banding locations.   On November 27, \n2024,  the Department provided this office with those materials.   On December 2, 2024,  this\noffice forwarded a copy of the Department' s written response to\nof his opportunity to reply to that response.  \n\ndid not submit a reply.  \n\nand notified him\n\n7, 2024). \n\n2FOIA portal message from\n\nto Illinois Department of Natural Resources ( August\n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(i) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024.  \n\n4Letter from\nOctober 18, 2024;  received November 12, 2024).  \n\nto Public Access Counselor,  Office of the Attorney General ( dated\n\n\fMs. Nicole Thomas\nFebruary 10, 2025\nPage 3\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body that redacts\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the information is\nexempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)(i) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nValuable formulae,  computer geographic systems,  designs, \n\ndrawings,  and research data obtained or produced by any public\nbody when disclosure could reasonably be expected to produce\nprivate gain or public loss.  The exemption for \" computer\ngeographic systems\"  provided in this paragraph ( i) does not extend\nto requests made by news media as defined in Section 2 of this Act\nwhen the requested information is not otherwise exempt and the\nonly purpose of the request is to access and disseminate\ninformation regarding the health,  safety,  welfare,  or legal rights of\nthe general public.  ( Emphasis added.)  \n\nIn its response to this office' s inquiry letter, the Department asserted that it\n\nproperly redacted the band numbers and banding locations from the report as \" research data\"  by\nexplaining that: \n\nThe Department\n\nis involved in a study that tracks the\n\nsurvival rates of banded waterfowl.  This study is a collaborative\neffort between the federal government and all the states in the\nflyway.  The United States Geological Survey ( USGS)  Bird\nBanding Laboratory ( BBL) manages all banding data in the U.S. \nThe Department retains its banding data, but it is required to\nsubmit all data to the BBL. The BBL provides the bands to the\nDepartment.  When individuals report bird bands,  they must do so\nonline with the USGS Bird Banding Laboratory.  The Department\nthen receives reports from the BBL indicating recent band\nrecoveries. \n\n\fMs. Nicole Thomas\nFebruary 10, 2025\nPage 4\n\nDuring the banding process,  waterfowl\n\nis captured by a\npermit holder who then places a band on the bird with a number\nis then released. \nthat is unique to that bird. The captured waterfowl\nWhen a banded bird is killed or found,  the individual\nin possession\ncan then report the band number.  That individual will then receive\na certificate with the following information:  species,  age at\nbanding,  sex, date of banding,  agency/ individual who banded the\nbird, and location the bird was banded.  \n\nThe Department\n\nthen uses the data it receives from these\n\nreports of banded birds to determine the survival rates of different\nspecies of waterfowl\nin general based on the smaller population of\nbanded birds.  These survival rates help the Department to\ndetermine season lengths and bag limits ( number of birds that a\nhunter can kill) for the different species.[ 5] \n\nResearch data\"  is not defined in FOIA.  Therefore,  this office looks to the\nprinciples of statutory construction.   When construing a statute,  the primary purpose is to\nascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.   Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois\nDepartment of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415, ( 2006).  \" The best evidence of legislative\nintent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain, ordinary and\npopularly understood meaning.\"   Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶  23.  When a term\nis undefined in a statute,  it is entirely appropriate to use a dictionary to help determine its\nmeaning.   Lacey v. Village of Palatine,  232 Ill. 2d 349, 363 ( 2009).   \n\nResearch\"  is defined as:  \" Serious study of a subject with the purpose of\n\nacquiring more knowledge,  discovering new facts,  or testing new ideas[ ]\"  or \"[ t]he activity of\nfinding information that one needs to answer a question or solve a problem.\"   Black' s Law\nDictionary 1563 ( 11th ed.  2021).   The dictionary definition of \"data\"  is \" factual information\nsuch as measurements or statistics)  used as a basis for reasoning,  discussion,  or calculation.\" 6\n\nHere,  the Department explained that it is involved in a collaborative study with\nthe United States Geological Survey ( USGS)  Bird Band Laboratory ( BBL) that seeks to track\nsurvival rates of banded waterfowl.   The Department stated that it utilizes the data it collects, \nincluding the band numbers and banding locations,  to determine survival rates of different\nspecies of waterfowl and thereby set the length of the hunting season and bag limits.  Such an\n\nGoodman,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( November 27, 2024),  at [ 1-2].  \n\n5Letter from Nicole Thomas,  Legal Counsel,  Illinois Department of Natural Resources to Matt\n\n2025). \n\n6Merriam- Webster,  https:// www.merriam- webster. com/dictionary/ data ( last visited January 28, \n\n\fMs. Nicole Thomas\nFebruary 10, 2025\nPage 5\n\nendeavor clearly involves acquiring more knowledge and discovering new facts about survival\nrates.   Similarly,  the band numbers and the band locations are \" data\"  obtained by the Department\nbecause they are factual information the Department relies upon to determine the length of the\nhunting season and the number of birds a hunter can kill in a given hunting season.   Accordingly, \nbased on this office' s review of the record itself and the explanation provided by the Department, \nthe band numbers and banding locations redacted from the report constitute \" research data,\"  as\nthat term is used in section 7(1)(i) of FOIA. \n\nAlthough the Department established that the banding numbers and banding\n\nlocations are \" research data,\"  they are only exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(i) if the\nDepartment demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that \" disclosure could reasonably be\nexpected to produce private gain or public loss.\"   \n\nRegarding \" private gain,\"  the Department stated:  \n\nThe taking of a banded bird and the accompanying\ncertificate has become a point of pride for some waterfowl\nhunters.  This is so much so that there is a market for bands of\nunreported numbers on websites such as ebay.com. It has also led\nto these banded birds being targeted by hunters over non- banded\nbirds.  \n\nIf the unique identifying numbers are released,  individuals\n\ncould then make replica bands and sell them.  Buyers could then\nreport these numbers as a taken and receive a certificate.  This is\none reason the Department believes the band numbers that are\nunique to each bird should not be released.  \n\nSince banded birds are targeted by hunters,  releasing the\n\nlocation where the birds are banded would allow these birds to be\ntargeted even more so.[ 7] \n\nThe Department provided sufficient facts to demonstrate that the disclosure of the\n\nband numbers could reasonably expected to produce private gain.  This office confirmed the\nDepartment' s assertions that bands are sold online on websites such as eBay and that there is a\ncompany selling replica bird bands online. 8 In addition to private gain from replica bands,  a\n\nGoodman,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( November 27, 2024),  at [ 2].  \n\n7Letter from Nicole Thomas,  Legal Counsel,  Illinois Department of Natural Resources to Matt\n\nBands,  https:// www. nationalband. com/ replica- bands- and- custom- bird- bands/ ( last visited January 28, 2025).  \n\n8National Band &  Tag Company International Identification Inc., Replica Bands and Custom Bird\n\n\fMs. Nicole Thomas\nFebruary 10, 2025\nPage 6\n\nhunter who obtains the banding locations once they have been released to anyone pursuant to\nFOIA could reasonably be expected to obtain private gains from targeting hotspots of banded\nbirds.   \n\nAlthough the Department has established the resulting \" private gain\"  from\n\ndisclosure of the redacted band numbers and locations,  the Department also established the\npublic loss\"  element by explaining:  \n\nIf the band numbers are released to the public,  an individual could\nfalsely report the take of banded birds.  This would skew the results\nof the data collection.  It could result in the incorrect determination\nthat the survival rates for specific species is smaller than what it\ntruly is. Therefore,  hunting seasons could be unnecessarily\nshortened and bag limits could be reduced.  This would create less\nopportunities for waterfowl hunters in general. \n\nReleasing the location of the banding would also allow\n\nindividuals to continue to target the banded birds,  again resulting\nin incorrect survival rates.[ 9] \n\nThe Department has illustrated that the disclosure of the redacted information\n\ncould reasonably be expected to interfere with data collection for public research,  the length and\nscope of the hunting season,  and bird survival rates.   As such,  the Department demonstrated that\nrelease of the redacted data could reasonably be expected to produce \" public loss.\" \n\nhas explained that he is seeking the records in connection with\n\nrescue activities,  and there is no indication that he is seeking to profit or otherwise reap a private\ngain or that he would seek to use the information in a manner that would generate a public loss.  \nNevertheless,  if the information is disclosed the Department would be unable to prevent it from\nbeing disseminated and potentially accessed for the profit and hunting related activities described\nin the Department' s response even if\nin that manner.   Accordingly,  under these circumstances,  the Department has sustained its burden\nof demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the band numbers and banding locations\nare exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(i) of FOIA.   \n\ndid not intend for the information to be used\n\nGoodman,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau ( November 27, 2024),  at [ 2].  \n\n9Letter from Nicole Thomas,  Legal Counsel,  Illinois Department of Natural Resources to Matt\n\n\fMs. Nicole Thomas\nFebruary 10, 2025\nPage 7\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions,  please contact me at matthew. goodman@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATT GOODMAN\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83854 71i proper sa\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Waterfowl banding locations and identification numbers","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83854/","full_text":"February 10, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Nicole Thomas\nLegal Counsel\nIllinois Department of Natural Resources\nOne Natural Resources Way\nSpringfield, Illinois 62702\nNicole. thomas@illinois. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83854; 24-F-08-540\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Thomas: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nthe Illinois Department of Natural Resources (\" Department\" or \" IDNR\") did not improperly\nredact portions of research data responsive to\nAugust 7, 2024, FOIA\nrequest. \n\nIllinois Department of Natural Resource personnel or program\nvolunteers, within the counties of DuPage, Cook and Will, for the\nyears 2020 to 2024. Information should include: band number, \nspecies, age, location, sex, date of banding, name of permitted\nbander. Any format containing this information is acceptable.[ 2] \n\nOn August 22, 2024, the Department responded by providing a copy of a\nresponsive report with the band numbers and the locations of where the banding occurred\nredacted pursuant to section 7(1)(i) of FOIA. 3 On November 12, 2024, this office received\n\nRequest for Review contesting the Department's redactions of the band numbers and\n\nbanding locations. \n\nexplained that: \n\nThe reason I am asking for this information is concern over\n\nhandling of the program. I am a bird rescue volunteer. I have\nidentified instances where the IDNR has banded birds with visible\ninjuries and then released them. The injuries should have been\nidentified and proper steps taken to treat through a licensed\nrehabilitation center. Instead, they were banded and released. \nWithin 6 weeks both of these birds were debilitated and captured\nby our rescue group in our community public parks. These birds\nwere ultimately euthanized due to the willful ignorance during the\nbanding process. Specifically, I need the band numbers and\nlocation of the IDNR banding to compare with my findings.[ 4] \n\nOn November 19, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Department and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the report for this office's\nconfidential review as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\napplicability of section 7(1)(i) to the band numbers and the banding locations. On November 27, \n2024, the Department provided this office with those materials. On December 2, 2024, this\noffice forwarded a copy of the Department's written response to\nof his opportunity to reply to that response. \n\ndid not submit a reply. \n\nand notified him\n\n7, 2024). \n\n2FOIA portal message from\n\nto Illinois Department of Natural Resources (August\n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(i) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that redacts\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the information is\nexempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(i) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nValuable formulae, computer geographic systems, designs, \n\ndrawings, and research data obtained or produced by any public\nbody when disclosure could reasonably be expected to produce\nprivate gain or public loss. The exemption for \" computer\ngeographic systems\" provided in this paragraph (i) does not extend\nto requests made by news media as defined in Section 2 of this Act\nwhen the requested information is not otherwise exempt and the\nonly purpose of the request is to access and disseminate\ninformation regarding the health, safety, welfare, or legal rights of\nthe general public. (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn its response to this office's inquiry letter, the Department asserted that it\n\nproperly redacted the band numbers and banding locations from the report as \" research data\" by\nexplaining that: \n\nThe Department\n\nis involved in a study that tracks the\n\nsurvival rates of banded waterfowl. This study is a collaborative\neffort between the federal government and all the states in the\nflyway. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) Bird\nBanding Laboratory (BBL) manages all banding data in the U.S. \nThe Department retains its banding data, but it is required to\n\nDuring the banding process, waterfowl\n\nis captured by a\npermit holder who then places a band on the bird with a number\nis then released. \nthat is unique to that bird. The captured waterfowl\nWhen a banded bird is killed or found, the individual\nin possession\ncan then report the band number. That individual will then receive\na certificate with the following information: species, age at\nbanding, sex, date of banding, agency/ individual who banded the\nbird, and location the bird was banded. \n\nThe Department\n\nthen uses the data it receives from these\n\nreports of banded birds to determine the survival rates of different\nspecies of waterfowl\nin general based on the smaller population of\nbanded birds. These survival rates help the Department to\ndetermine season lengths and bag limits (number of birds that a\nhunter can kill) for the different species.[ 5] \n\nResearch data\" is not defined in FOIA. Therefore, this office looks to the\nprinciples of statutory construction. When construing a statute, the primary purpose is to\nascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois\nDepartment of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415, (2006). \" The best evidence of legislative\nintent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain, ordinary and\npopularly understood meaning.\" Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 23. When a term\nis undefined in a statute, it is entirely appropriate to use a dictionary to help determine its\nmeaning. Lacey v. Village of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 363 (2009). \n\nResearch\" is defined as: \" Serious study of a subject with the purpose of\n\nacquiring more knowledge, discovering new facts, or testing new ideas[ ]\" or \"[ t]he activity of\nfinding information that one needs to answer a question or solve a problem.\" Black's Law\nDictionary 1563 (11th ed. 2021). The dictionary definition of \"data\" is \" factual information\nsuch as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for reasoning, discussion, or calculation.\" 6\n\nHere, the Department explained that it is involved in a collaborative study with\nthe United States Geological Survey (USGS) Bird Band Laboratory (BBL) that seeks to track\nsurvival rates of banded waterfowl. The Department stated that it utilizes the data it collects, \nincluding the band numbers and banding locations, to determine survival rates of different\nspecies of waterfowl and thereby set the length of the hunting season and bag limits. Such an\n\nGoodman, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (November 27, 2024), at [ 1-2]. \n\n5 Letter from Nicole Thomas, Legal Counsel, Illinois Department of Natural Resources to Matt\n\n2025). \n\n6 Merriam- Webster, https:// www.merriam- webster. com/dictionary/ data (last visited January 28, \n\nendeavor clearly involves acquiring more knowledge and discovering new facts about survival\nrates. Similarly, the band numbers and the band locations are \" data\" obtained by the Department\nbecause they are factual information the Department relies upon to determine the length of the\nhunting season and the number of birds a hunter can kill in a given hunting season. Accordingly, \nbased on this office's review of the record itself and the explanation provided by the Department, \nthe band numbers and banding locations redacted from the report constitute \" research data,\" as\nthat term is used in section 7(1)(i) of FOIA. \n\nAlthough the Department established that the banding numbers and banding\n\nlocations are \" research data,\" they are only exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(i) if the\nDepartment demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that \" disclosure could reasonably be\nexpected to produce private gain or public loss.\" \n\nRegarding \" private gain,\" the Department stated: \n\nThe taking of a banded bird and the accompanying\ncertificate has become a point of pride for some waterfowl\nhunters. This is so much so that there is a market for bands of\nunreported numbers on websites such as ebay.com. It has also led\nto these banded birds being targeted by hunters over non- banded\nbirds. \n\nIf the unique identifying numbers are released, individuals\n\ncould then make replica bands and sell them. Buyers could then\nreport these numbers as a taken and receive a certificate. This is\none reason the Department believes the band numbers that are\nunique to each bird should not be released. \n\nSince banded birds are targeted by hunters, releasing the\n\nlocation where the birds are banded would allow these birds to be\ntargeted even more so.[ 7] \n\nThe Department provided sufficient facts to demonstrate that the disclosure of the\n\nband numbers could reasonably expected to produce private gain. This office confirmed the\nDepartment's assertions that bands are sold online on websites such as eBay and that there is a\ncompany selling replica bird bands online. 8 In addition to private gain from replica bands, a\n\nGoodman, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (November 27, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\n7 Letter from Nicole Thomas, Legal Counsel, Illinois Department of Natural Resources to Matt\n\nBands, https:// www. nationalband. com/ replica- bands- and- custom- bird- bands/ (last visited January 28, 2025). \n\n8 National Band & Tag Company International Identification Inc., Replica Bands and Custom Bird\n\nhunter who obtains the banding locations once they have been released to anyone pursuant to\nFOIA could reasonably be expected to obtain private gains from targeting hotspots of banded\nbirds. \n\nAlthough the Department has established the resulting \" private gain\" from\n\ndisclosure of the redacted band numbers and locations, the Department also established the\npublic loss\" element by explaining: \n\nIf the band numbers are released to the public, an individual could\nfalsely report the take of banded birds. This would skew the results\nof the data collection. It could result in the incorrect determination\nthat the survival rates for specific species is smaller than what it\ntruly is. Therefore, hunting seasons could be unnecessarily\nshortened and bag limits could be reduced. This would create less\nopportunities for waterfowl hunters in general. \n\nReleasing the location of the banding would also allow\n\nindividuals to continue to target the banded birds, again resulting\nin incorrect survival rates.[ 9] \n\nThe Department has illustrated that the disclosure of the redacted information\n\ncould reasonably be expected to interfere with data collection for public research, the length and\nscope of the hunting season, and bird survival rates. As such, the Department demonstrated that\nrelease of the redacted data could reasonably be expected to produce \" public loss.\" \n\nhas explained that he is seeking the records in connection with\n\nrescue activities, and there is no indication that he is seeking to profit or otherwise reap a private\ngain or that he would seek to use the information in a manner that would generate a public loss. \nNevertheless, if the information is disclosed the Department would be unable to prevent it from\nbeing disseminated and potentially accessed for the profit and hunting related activities described\nin the Department's response even if\nin that manner. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the Department has sustained its burden\nof demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the band numbers and banding locations\nare exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(i) of FOIA. \n\ndid not intend for the information to be used\n\nGoodman, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (November 27, 2024), at [ 2]. \n\n9 Letter from Nicole Thomas, Legal Counsel, Illinois Department of Natural Resources to Matt\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at matthew. goodman@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATT GOODMAN\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83854 71i proper sa"}
{"id":1103,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-02-11","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83921"],"title":"City of Granite City improperly denied crash report under 7(1)(d)(i)","filename":"83921, issued February 11, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1373,"summary":"The requester sought police reports and videos related to a specific crash report, which the City of Granite City denied under section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. The PAC determined that the City improperly withheld the records and concluded the matter without a binding opinion.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the City of Granite City for crash reports and videos related to a specific accident. The City denied the request under section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA, claiming the records were exempt as part of a pending law enforcement proceeding. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau reviewed the case and found that the City's blanket denial was improper, but that a small portion of witness statements could be withheld because their release would interfere with the accident reconstruction report. The Bureau requested that the City release the remaining records with permissible redactions, and the matter was closed without a binding opinion.","holding":"The City of Granite City improperly denied the FOIA request in its entirety under section 7(1)(d)(i), but properly withheld limited witness statements that would interfere with the accident reconstruction report.","legal_question":"Whether the City of Granite City properly invoked section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA to withhold records and videos related to a motor vehicle crash report.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(d)(i)"],"public_body":"City of Granite City","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request concerned access to police reports and video footage associated with a specific traffic crash incident.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_i/83921%2C%20issued%20February%2011%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","crash report","FOIA denial","video records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"February 11,  2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Ellen Ogden Burford\nAttorney for the City of Granite City\n2000 Edison Avenue\nGranite City,  IL 62040\nfoia@granitecity.illinois.gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83921\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Burford: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5 (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the City of Granite City (City) improperly denied\n\nNovember 12,  2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City seeking reports\n\nand videos related to crash report #2024-22354.  On November 13, 2024, the City denied the\nrequest in its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)( d)( i) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)( d)( i) (West 2023\nSupp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024).  On November 21, 2024, this\noffice received\n\ncomplete Request for Review contesting the denial.   On\n\n\fMs. Ellen Ogden Burford\nFebruary 11, 2025\nPage 2\n\nDecember 3, 2024, \nCity' s denial of reports as well as videos. \n\nconfirmed in an e-mail to this office that he was contesting the\n\nOn December 4, 2024,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe City and requested a copy of the withheld records for this office's confidential review as well\nas a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of section 7(1)( d)( i) \nto the records.  On December 27, 2024, this office received the City's response.  That same day, \nthis office forwarded a copy of the City' s written response to\n\nhe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body \" has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure.  5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed.   Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would:  \n\ni)  interfere with pending or actually and\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request[.] \n\nThe classification of information as 'law enforcement' or 'investigatory' does not\n\nnecessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown,  in a particular case,  that disclosure would\ninterfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public interest.\"  Baudin v. \nCity of Crystal Lake,  192 Ill. App.  3d 530,  536 ( 1989).   Conclusory statements that the disclosure\nof records would obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are insufficient to support the assertion\nof the pending law enforcement proceeding exemption.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No. 24-\n006, issued April 1, 2024, at 8-9 (explaining that a law enforcement agency must demonstrate\nwith a detailed factual basis,  rather than conclusory statements,  how disclosure of all information\nin a police report would interfere with law enforcement proceedings to sustain its burden of\nproving the report is exempt from disclosure in its entirety pursuant\nto the section 7(1)( d)( i) \nexemption). \n\n\fMs. Ellen Ogden Burford\nFebruary 11, 2025\nPage 3\n\nIn its response to this office, the City stated that a detective had advised that the\n\ncrash was still being investigated,  and the accident reconstruction report had still not been\ncompleted and provided to the City.  The City stated that it would present the matter to the\nMadison County State' s Attorney' s Office once that report was complete in order for that office\nto issue charges.  The City argued that disclosure of the contested records \"would likely result in\nthe dissemination of the information,  including witness information[,]\" 1 but did not elaborate as\nto how disclosure of the information would interfere with law enforcement proceedings.  The\nCity further stated:  \" Recently,  investigative material of the Granite City Police Department\nwhich was released pursuant to FOIA was posted to social media. This allowed defense counsel\nto seek a new trial in a new venue with the position the jury pool had been tainted.\" 2\n\nAlthough the City' s response to this office stated that the matter was still under\n\ninvestigation, the response did not set forth facts as to how or why disclosure of the responsive\nrecords would interfere with that investigation.   Rather,  the City provided only conclusory\nstatements.  Based on this office's review of the contested records, it is unclear how disclosure of\nmost portions of the records would interfere with the Police Department' s investigation or State' s\nAttorney's Office's potential prosecution of the matter.  The City did not provide any additional\ndetails regarding the previous case in which it had released some information,  such as the type of\ninformation that was released, who accessed the information, and the nature of the charges that\nwere filed in that case.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the City did not sustain its burden\nof demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the records are exempt from disclosure\nin their entireties pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( d)( i) of FOIA. \n\nHowever,  a portion of the records includes statements from a witness that may be\n\nused in the creation of the accident reconstruction report.  Based on this office's review of the\nrecords,  release of the portions documenting the witness' s impressions of the accident and\nmoments just prior to the accident would interfere with the creation of the accident\nreconstruction report.   Because the report had not been completed at the time of\nFOIA request, the City did not improperly withhold those limited portions of the records\npursuant to section 7(1)( d)( i) of FOIA.  \nrequest for the remaining portions of the records once the report is complete. \n\nmay wish to submit an additional FOIA\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter, this office requests\n\nthat the City provide\npermissible redactions.  This office will provide the City with a copy of the witness interview\nnotes with permissible redactions highlighted.   Additionally,  the City may redact \" private\n\nwith copies of the contested records subject only to\n\nAttorney, Public Access Bureau (December 27, 2024), at [2]. \n\n1Letter from Ellen Ogden Burford, Attorney at Law, to Attorney Benjamin Silver, Supervising\n\nAttorney, Public Access Bureau ( December 27, 2024), at [2]. \n\n2Letter from Ellen Ogden Burford, Attorney at Law, to Attorney Benjamin Silver, Supervising\n\n\fMs. Ellen Ogden Burford\nFebruary 11, 2025\nPage 4\n\ninformation\"3 under section 7(1)(b) of FOIA4 and the dates of birth and races of individuals\nunder section 7(1)( c). 5 If the City redacts any portion of the records,  it should provide an\nexplanation for those redactions to\n140/ 9 ( West 2022)). \n\nin accordance with section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or ( 773)  590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83921 f 71di improper pd\n\ninclude: \n\n3Section 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.))  defines \" private information\"  to\n\nU]nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number,  driver' s\nlicense number, employee identification number,  biometric identifiers,  personal\nfinancial information, passwords or other access codes, medical records, home\nor personal telephone numbers, and personal email addresses. Private\ninformation also includes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to\nany person.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\n2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n45 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n2024;  103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports and video footage of a traffic crash","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83921/","full_text":"February 11, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Ellen Ogden Burford\nAttorney for the City of Granite City\n2000 Edison Avenue\nGranite City, IL 62040\nfoia@granitecity.illinois.gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83921\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Burford: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5 (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons explained below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that the City of Granite City (City) improperly denied\n\nNovember 12, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City seeking reports\n\nand videos related to crash report #2024-22354. On November 13, 2024, the City denied the\nrequest in its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(d)(i) (West 2023\nSupp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024). On November 21, 2024, this\n\nDecember 3, 2024, \nCity's denial of reports as well as videos. \n\nconfirmed in an e-mail to this office that he was contesting the\n\nOn December 4, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe City and requested a copy of the withheld records for this office's confidential review as well\nas a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of section 7(1)(d)(i) \nto the records. On December 27, 2024, this office received the City's response. That same day, \nthis office forwarded a copy of the City's written response to\n\nhe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll public records in the possession or custody of a public body are \" presumed to\nbe open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body \" has the burden\nof proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that a record is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. \nBoard of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request[.] \n\nThe classification of information as 'law enforcement' or 'investigatory' does not\n\nnecessarily foreclose access unless it can be shown, in a particular case, that disclosure would\ninterfere with law enforcement and would, therefore, not be in the public interest.\" Baudin v. \nCity of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536 (1989). Conclusory statements that the disclosure\nof records would obstruct a law enforcement proceeding are insufficient to support the assertion\nof the pending law enforcement proceeding exemption. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 24-\n006, issued April 1, 2024, at 8-9 (explaining that a law enforcement agency must demonstrate\nwith a detailed factual basis, rather than conclusory statements, how disclosure of all information\nin a police report would interfere with law enforcement proceedings to sustain its burden of\n\nIn its response to this office, the City stated that a detective had advised that the\n\ncrash was still being investigated, and the accident reconstruction report had still not been\ncompleted and provided to the City. The City stated that it would present the matter to the\nMadison County State's Attorney's Office once that report was complete in order for that office\nto issue charges. The City argued that disclosure of the contested records \"would likely result in\nthe dissemination of the information, including witness information[,]\" 1 but did not elaborate as\nto how disclosure of the information would interfere with law enforcement proceedings. The\nCity further stated: \" Recently, investigative material of the Granite City Police Department\nwhich was released pursuant to FOIA was posted to social media. This allowed defense counsel\nto seek a new trial in a new venue with the position the jury pool had been tainted.\" 2\n\nAlthough the City's response to this office stated that the matter was still under\n\ninvestigation, the response did not set forth facts as to how or why disclosure of the responsive\nrecords would interfere with that investigation. Rather, the City provided only conclusory\nstatements. Based on this office's review of the contested records, it is unclear how disclosure of\nmost portions of the records would interfere with the Police Department's investigation or State's\nAttorney's Office's potential prosecution of the matter. The City did not provide any additional\ndetails regarding the previous case in which it had released some information, such as the type of\ninformation that was released, who accessed the information, and the nature of the charges that\nwere filed in that case. Accordingly, this office concludes that the City did not sustain its burden\nof demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the records are exempt from disclosure\nin their entireties pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. \n\nHowever, a portion of the records includes statements from a witness that may be\n\nused in the creation of the accident reconstruction report. Based on this office's review of the\nrecords, release of the portions documenting the witness's impressions of the accident and\nmoments just prior to the accident would interfere with the creation of the accident\nreconstruction report. Because the report had not been completed at the time of\nFOIA request, the City did not improperly withhold those limited portions of the records\npursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA. \nrequest for the remaining portions of the records once the report is complete. \n\nmay wish to submit an additional FOIA\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions expressed in this letter, this office requests\n\nthat the City provide\npermissible redactions. This office will provide the City with a copy of the witness interview\nnotes with permissible redactions highlighted. Additionally, the City may redact \" private\n\nwith copies of the contested records subject only to\n\nAttorney, Public Access Bureau (December 27, 2024), at [2]. \n\n1 Letter from Ellen Ogden Burford, Attorney at Law, to Attorney Benjamin Silver, Supervising\n\nAttorney, Public Access Bureau (December 27, 2024), at [2]. \n\n2 Letter from Ellen Ogden Burford, Attorney at Law, to Attorney Benjamin Silver, Supervising\n\ninformation\"3 under section 7(1)(b) of FOIA4 and the dates of birth and races of individuals\nunder section 7(1)(c). 5 If the City redacts any portion of the records, it should provide an\nexplanation for those redactions to\n140/ 9 (West 2022)). \n\nin accordance with section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773) 590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83921 f 71di improper pd\n\ninclude: \n\n3 Section 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \" private information\" to\n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, driver's\nlicense number, employee identification number, biometric identifiers, personal\nfinancial information, passwords or other access codes, medical records, home\nor personal telephone numbers, and personal email addresses. Private\ninformation also includes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to\nany person. (Emphasis added.) \n\n2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n45 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1,"}
{"id":1104,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-16","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["83945"],"title":"Chicago Police Department properly withheld School Absentee Reports under 7.5(bb) and Juvenile Court Act","filename":"83945, issued December 16, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":677,"summary":"The requester sought School Absentee Reports from the Chicago Police Department, which were denied under FOIA section 7.5(bb). The PAC determined that the records are exempt from disclosure because they constitute law enforcement records relating to minors taken into custody under the Juvenile Court Act.","plain_summary":"This determination addresses whether the Chicago Police Department properly denied a FOIA request for School Absentee Reports under 5 ILCS 140/7.5(bb), which exempts records whose disclosure is prohibited by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. The Public Access Bureau held that CPD did not improperly deny the request, concluding that School Absentee Reports relate to minors taken into custody or limited custody under the Juvenile Court Act, and that such records are confidential except by court order, so no further action was warranted. The reasoning establishes that a police department may withhold records under section 7.5(bb) where the Juvenile Court Act's confidentiality provisions (705 ILCS 405/5-905(1) and 705 ILCS 405/3-4(g)) apply to the minors described in the records, even if similar records were previously disclosed. The public body involved was the Chicago Police Department, and the records at issue were School Absentee Reports.","holding":"Under 5 ILCS 140/7.5(bb), a public body may withhold records relating to minors taken into custody or limited custody because the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-905(1) and 705 ILCS 405/3-4(g)) prohibits their disclosure except by court order.","legal_question":"Whether School Absentee Reports maintained by the Chicago Police Department are exempt from disclosure under FOIA section 7.5(bb) as records prohibited from disclosure by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(bb)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(bb)"],"public_body":"Chicago Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought access to School Absentee Reports filed by the Chicago Police Department regarding minors.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_bb/83945%2C%20issued%20December%2016%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police records","juvenile records","school absentee reports","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"December 16, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83945\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn October 3, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police\n\nDepartment ( CPD)  seeking School Absentee Reports filed from May 1, 2024,  to September 30, \n2024.  On October 10, 2024, CPD denied your request in its entirety pursuant to section 7.5(bb) \nof FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7.5(bb) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 592,  effective\nJune 7, 2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective\nAugust 7, 2024;  103- 859,  effective August 9, 2024;  103- 991,  effective August 9, 2024;  103-\n1049, effective August 9, 2024).  On November 18, 2024, you submitted the above-referenced\nRequest for Review contesting the denial of your request.   Specifically,  you argued that you are\nonly seeking the portions pertaining to CPD activity and that the records could be redacted to\nremove information identifying minors.   You also noted that CPD has previously provided\nSchool Absentee Reports covering earlier dates. \n\nAlthough CPD previously furnished similar records, section 7.5(bb) of FOIA\n\nexempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation which is or was prohibited from disclosure by the\nJuvenile Court Act of 1987.\"  Section 5-905(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (JCA) (705\nILCS 405/ 5-905( 1) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 1037,  effective August 9, \n2024) provides: \n\n\fDecember 16, 2024\nPage 2\n\nInspection and copying of law enforcement\n\nrecords\n\nmaintained by law enforcement agencies that relate to a minor who\nhas been investigated,  arrested,  or taken into custody before the\nminor's 18th birthday shall be restricted to the following and when\nnecessary for the discharge of their official duties[.] ( Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nFurthermore, section 3-4 of the JCA (705 ILCS 405/3-4(g) (West 2023 Supp.)), which concerns\ncircumstances in which a police officer takes a minor into only limited custody,  provides: \n\nThe taking of a minor into limited custody under this\n\nSection is not an arrest nor does it constitute a police record; and\nthe records of law enforcement officers concerning all minors\ntaken into limited custody under this Section shall be maintained\nseparate from the records of arrest and may not be inspected by\nor disclosed to the public except by order of the court. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nThus,  the JCA unambiguously prohibits disclosure of records concerning minors taken into\ncustody or limited custody by law enforcement officers except when ordered by a court or to\nauthorized individuals,  which do not include FOIA requesters. \n\nCPD Special Order S06- 04- 08 outlines guidelines for officers in dealing with\n\nschool absentees, including the filing of School Absentee Reports.  The order specifies:  \" If there\nis no valid reason for the absence and no crime has been committed,  the member will take the\nschool absentee into custody[.]\" 1 Thus, even when a CPD officer stops a minor in relation to\nabsenteeism without suspicion that the minor is engaged in criminal activity,  the minor is taken\ninto custody or limited custody.  Because the JCA prohibits disclosure of law enforcement\nrecords that relate to a minor taken into custody,  CPD did not improperly deny your request\npursuant to section 7.5(bb) of FOIA.  Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter. \n\nhttps:// directives. chicagopolice. org/#directive/ public/6459 ( last visited November 22, 2024). \n\n1Special Order S06-04-08, Chicago Police Department ( June 7, 2017),  available at\n\n\fDecember 16, 2024\nPage 3\n\nThis letter serves to close this matter.   If you have any questions,  please contact\n\nme at (773) 590-7878 or benjamin.silver@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83945 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Scott D. Spears\nActing General Counsel\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan Avenue, 5th Floor\nChicago,  Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice.org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police school absentee reports on minors","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-83945/","full_text":"December 16, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 83945\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn October 3, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police\n\nDepartment (CPD) seeking School Absentee Reports filed from May 1, 2024, to September 30, \n2024. On October 10, 2024, CPD denied your request in its entirety pursuant to section 7.5(bb) \nof FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7.5(bb) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective\nJune 7, 2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective\nAugust 7, 2024; 103- 859, effective August 9, 2024; 103- 991, effective August 9, 2024; 103-\n1049, effective August 9, 2024). On November 18, 2024, you submitted the above-referenced\nRequest for Review contesting the denial of your request. Specifically, you argued that you are\nonly seeking the portions pertaining to CPD activity and that the records could be redacted to\nremove information identifying minors. You also noted that CPD has previously provided\nSchool Absentee Reports covering earlier dates. \n\nAlthough CPD previously furnished similar records, section 7.5(bb) of FOIA\n\nexempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation which is or was prohibited from disclosure by the\nJuvenile Court Act of 1987.\" Section 5-905(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (JCA) (705\nILCS 405/ 5-905(1) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 1037, effective August 9, \n\nInspection and copying of law enforcement\n\nrecords\n\nmaintained by law enforcement agencies that relate to a minor who\nhas been investigated, arrested, or taken into custody before the\nminor's 18th birthday shall be restricted to the following and when\nnecessary for the discharge of their official duties[.] (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nFurthermore, section 3-4 of the JCA (705 ILCS 405/3-4(g) (West 2023 Supp.)), which concerns\ncircumstances in which a police officer takes a minor into only limited custody, provides: \n\nThe taking of a minor into limited custody under this\n\nSection is not an arrest nor does it constitute a police record; and\nthe records of law enforcement officers concerning all minors\ntaken into limited custody under this Section shall be maintained\nseparate from the records of arrest and may not be inspected by\nor disclosed to the public except by order of the court. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nThus, the JCA unambiguously prohibits disclosure of records concerning minors taken into\ncustody or limited custody by law enforcement officers except when ordered by a court or to\nauthorized individuals, which do not include FOIA requesters. \n\nCPD Special Order S06- 04- 08 outlines guidelines for officers in dealing with\n\nschool absentees, including the filing of School Absentee Reports. The order specifies: \" If there\nis no valid reason for the absence and no crime has been committed, the member will take the\nschool absentee into custody[.]\" 1 Thus, even when a CPD officer stops a minor in relation to\nabsenteeism without suspicion that the minor is engaged in criminal activity, the minor is taken\ninto custody or limited custody. Because the JCA prohibits disclosure of law enforcement\nrecords that relate to a minor taken into custody, CPD did not improperly deny your request\npursuant to section 7.5(bb) of FOIA. Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter. \n\nhttps:// directives. chicagopolice. org/#directive/ public/6459 (last visited November 22, 2024). \n\nThis letter serves to close this matter. If you have any questions, please contact\n\nme at (773) 590-7878 or benjamin.silver@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n83945 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Scott D. Spears\nActing General Counsel\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan Avenue, 5th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice.org"}
{"id":1105,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-07-29","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84026"],"title":"Springfield Police Department failed to justify withholding security camera footage under 7(1)(v)","filename":"84026, issued July 29, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1969,"summary":"The requester sought security camera footage from the Springfield Police Department, which the Department denied under the security exemption of FOIA. The PAC determined the Department failed to prove the footage qualified as a security measure designed to prevent or respond to attacks.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested security camera footage from the Springfield Police Department, but the Department refused to release it, claiming it was exempt as a security measure. The Attorney General's office reviewed the request and determined that the Department did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the camera was a specialized security tool designed to prevent attacks, rather than a general monitoring device. The source document does not state any order or directive to release the footage; it only concludes that the Department failed to meet its burden to justify the exemption.","holding":"The Springfield Police Department did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the camera footage falls within the section 7(1)(v) exemption.","legal_question":"Whether security camera footage of a police department building entrance is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(v) of FOIA as a security measure designed to identify, prevent, or respond to potential attacks.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(v)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(v)"],"public_body":"Springfield Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought video footage from a police department security camera covering the main entrance during a protest.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_v/84026%2C%20issued%20July%2029%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police records","security footage","FOIA denial","video surveillance"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"July 29, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael S. Hampleman\nSenior Assistant Corporation Counsel\nCity of Springfield\n800 East Monroe Street, Room 313\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\nmichael.hampleman@springfield.il.us\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 84026\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Hampleman: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2024)).   \n\nOn November 14, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nSpringfield Police Department ( Department)  seeking a copy of footage from the camera located\non the south side of the main police building covering the main entrance on September 9, 2024, \nbetween 12 p.m. and 4 p.m.  On November 15,  2024,  the Department denied the request pursuant\nto section 7(1)(v) of FOIA1 and cited the court's opinion in Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago\nTransit Authority,  2021 IL App ( 1st)  192028.   On November 21, 2024,  this office received\n\nRequest for Review challenging the denial.   \n\nOn December 10, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Department and asked it to provide a copy of the withheld footage,  together with a detailed\n\n2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(v) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n\fMr. Michael S. Hampleman\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 2\n\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemption.  On\nDecember 19,  2024,  this office received the requested materials.   On December 20,  2024,  this\noffice forwarded a copy of the Department's response to\n\nhe did not reply.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).  The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nVulnerability assessments, security measures, and response\npolicies or plans that are designed to identify,  prevent,  or respond\nto potential attacks upon a community's population or systems, \nfacilities,  or installations,  the destruction or contamination of\nwhich would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or\nsafety of the community,  but only to the extent that disclosure\ncould reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of\nthe measures or the safety of the personnel who implement\nthem or the public.  Information exempt under this item may\ninclude such things as details pertaining to the mobilization or\ndeployment of personnel or equipment, to the operation of\ncommunication systems or protocols,  or to tactical operations.  \nEmphasis added.) \n\nBy its plain language, section 7(1)(v) applies to records that are devised and\n\ncrafted to identify,  prevent,  or respond to potential attacks.   The legislative history behind the\nexemption further confirms that the exemption concerns records involved in homeland security\nand emergency preparations rather than routine monitoring.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. \nLtr. 48212, issued November 2, 2017, at 7 (quoting House Sponsor James H. Meyer explaining\nthat the bill \" exempts documents prepared for emergency and security procedures from being\ndisclosed from homeland security where that would be compromised.\").   \n\nIn Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, \nthe Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the Chicago Transit Authority ( CTA)  met its burden\nof demonstrating that video recordings of a train platform from several camera angles fell within\n\n\fMr. Michael S. Hampleman\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 3\n\nthe scope of the section 7(1)(v) exemption.  The CTA showed that surveillance cameras were\ninstalled at its rail stations after the September 11,  2001,  terrorist attacks with funds from a U.S. \nDepartment of Homeland Security program designed to protect the public and critical\ninfrastructure.   Chicago Sun- Times,  2021 IL App ( 1st)  192028, ¶¶  48- 51. The CTA also\npresented an affidavit from a homeland security expert averring that the requested recordings\nrevealed the quality,  resolution,  field of view,  and blind spots of the CTA' s surveillance\ncameras, and that information could enable individuals to evade these security devices when\ntargeting passengers,  planning attacks,  or evading capture by law enforcement.\"   Chicago Sun-\nTimes, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, ¶ 49.  In concluding that the footage was exempt from\ndisclosure,  the court further observed that section 7(1)( v) \"is worded broadly and requires a\ngovernment agency to demonstrate that release of a document 'could reasonably be expected to' \njeopardize the effectiveness of its security measures— not that it would jeopardize them.\"  \nEmphasis in original.)  Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, ¶¶ 43-45. \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that a public body could\n\nproperly withhold records listing the locations of all of its cameras and other details about them\npursuant to section 7(1)(v) because \"[ d]isclosure of these locations would allow the entire\nnetwork of cameras to be pieced together,  undermining the effectiveness of the system by\nrevealing areas where surveillance cameras are highly concentrated and exposing areas that are\nnot covered by surveillance cameras.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 62247,  issued April 20, \n2020, at 2-3 (noting that the cameras were funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security\nto reduce crime and protect critical\n65558, issued September 30, 2022, at 4 (determining that office of emergency management had\nestablished that disclosure of all surveillance footage of looting incidents that occurred on a\ncertain date at 20 specified times and block locations in downtown Chicago could jeopardize\noverall effectiveness of its security network).   \n\ninfrastructure);  see also Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. \n\nBy contrast,  this office has previously concluded that routine surveillance footage\nand other videos that are not used for homeland security purposes or emergency preparations do\nnot fall within the scope of section 7(1)( v).  See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. \n72032, issued October 20, 2022, at 4 (dispatch center did not establish that interior security\ncameras were intended for a homeland security purpose and thus camera footage did not fall\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(v)); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 70528, issued November\n29, 2021,  at 8 (footage of room improperly withheld pursuant to section 7(1)( v) because village\nfailed to show that \"the camera was installed for the purpose of identifying, preventing, or\nresponding to potential attacks,  rather than for the purpose of video recording meetings held in\nthat room.\"). \n\nIn its denial letter to\n\nthe Department stated that the camera at issue \" is\n\na security camera for Municipal Center East which houses the Springfield Police Department, \n\n\fMr. Michael S. Hampleman\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 4\n\nseveral other City departments, and City employees.\" 2 The Department asserted that the footage\nshows \" the quality,  resolution,  field of view and blind spots of the City’ s surveillance camera, \nand such information could enable individuals to evade the security device in the event of\ntargeting City employees,  a planned attacked on the building,  or evading capture by law\nenforcement.\" 3 In his Request for Review, \nreveal\ncamera, Axis, is a commonly used camera brand, and that information about the technical\nfeatures of the Axis camera are already publicly available on the Axis website, \" including the\ncommonly used 110 degree field of view for fixed lens cameras and up to roughly 60 foot IR\ncapabilities.\" 4\n\ncontended that the footage would not\ninformation that was not already known to the public.   He argued that the brand of the\n\nThe Department' s answer to this office argued that the footage is comparable to\n\nthe platform footage at issue in Chicago Sun-Times.  The Department reiterated that the \"footage\nrequested covers the main entrance of a municipal building that houses critical City functions, \nincluding the police department, city officials, and city employees.\" 5 The Department contended\nthat,  like the platform footage in Chicago Sun- Times,  the footage of the entrance \" would expose\nthe cameras' positioning, fields of view, and blind spots, allowing bad actors to exploit these\nvulnerabilities.\" 6 The Department\nfurther contended that the footage captured an active protest\nagainst the police department and City officials, which could be exploited or \"facilitate targeted\nthus jeopardizing the safety of protesters and City personnel. 7 Additionally,  the\ncriminal acts[,]\" \nDepartment argued that the \"camera system is part of a broader effort to ensure public safety, \nfunded and designed for security purposes.\" 8\n\nHaving reviewed the footage and the Department' s response,  the Department did\nnot provide sufficient evidence to establish that the camera is used as a security measure that is\n\n2Letter from Ava Cox, FOIA Officer, Police, City of Springfield, to\n\nNovember\n\n15, 2024). \n\n15, 2024). \n\n3Letter from Ava Cox, FOIA Officer, Police, City of Springfield, to\n\nNovember\n\n4E- mail from\n\nto [ Public Access Bureau] ( November 21, 2024). \n\nSpringfield, to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (December 19, 2024), at [3]. \n\n5Letter from Michael Hampleman, Senior Asst. Corporation Counsel/Police Advisor, City of\n\nSpringfield, to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (December 19, 2024), at [3]. \n\n6Letter from Michael Hampleman, Senior Asst. Corporation Counsel/Police Advisor, City of\n\nSpringfield, to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (December 19, 2024), at [3]. \n\n7Letter from Michael Hampleman, Senior Asst. Corporation Counsel/Police Advisor, City of\n\nSpringfield,  to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General' s Office, Public Access Bureau ( December 19, 2024),  at [ 3]. \n\n8Letter from Michael Hampleman,  Senior Asst. Corporation Counsel/ Police Advisor, City of\n\n\fMr. Michael S. Hampleman\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 5\n\ndesigned to prevent the types of harm that the section 7(1)(v) exemption is intended to prevent.  \nThe City' s response to this office focused on how disclosure of the recording could reasonably be\nexpected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the surveillance camera but failed to establish that the\ncamera is the type of security measure discussed in that exemption.   In contrast to how the CTA\ndemonstrated the homeland security purpose and role of the surveillance camera system at the\nrail platforms in Chicago Sun- Times,  the Department did not explain specifically how the camera\nwas a component of a broader security network aimed to prevent potential terrorist attacks, \ndisasters,  or emergencies;  instead,  the Department simply asserted that the camera was part of a\nbroader effort to ensure public safety.  The footage captures the outside area around the\nbuilding' s entrance,  which is generally viewable to the public.   The footage shows a crowd of\npeople and officers.  Although the building houses several city departments, the Department did\nnot show with detail how its camera is designed to address potential attacks on the City' s\npopulation or systems.  The fact that the specific footage\nagainst the City' s police department and civil unrest does not transform a security camera that\nappears to be generally used for routine monitoring into a \" security measure\"  that is \"designed to\nidentify,  prevent,  or respond to potential attacks upon a community' s population or systems[.]\"  \nUnder these circumstances, this office concludes that the Department did not demonstrate by\nclear and convincing evidence that the requested footage is exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(v).  This office requests that the Department provide\nwith a copy of the\nfootage.   \n\nsought depicts a protest\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This letter shall serve to close this matter.  If you\nhave any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84026 f 71v improper pd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police security camera footage of a building entrance during a protest","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84026/","full_text":"July 29, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael S. Hampleman\nSenior Assistant Corporation Counsel\nCity of Springfield\n800 East Monroe Street, Room 313\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\nmichael.hampleman@springfield.il.us\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84026\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Hampleman: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2024)). \n\nOn November 14, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\n\nSpringfield Police Department (Department) seeking a copy of footage from the camera located\non the south side of the main police building covering the main entrance on September 9, 2024, \nbetween 12 p.m. and 4 p.m. On November 15, 2024, the Department denied the request pursuant\nto section 7(1)(v) of FOIA1 and cited the court's opinion in Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago\nTransit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028. On November 21, 2024, this office received\n\nRequest for Review challenging the denial. \n\nOn December 10, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Department and asked it to provide a copy of the withheld footage, together with a detailed\n\n2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(v) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemption. On\nDecember 19, 2024, this office received the requested materials. On December 20, 2024, this\noffice forwarded a copy of the Department's response to\n\nhe did not reply. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nVulnerability assessments, security measures, and response\npolicies or plans that are designed to identify, prevent, or respond\nto potential attacks upon a community's population or systems, \nfacilities, or installations, the destruction or contamination of\nwhich would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or\nsafety of the community, but only to the extent that disclosure\ncould reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of\nthe measures or the safety of the personnel who implement\nthem or the public. Information exempt under this item may\ninclude such things as details pertaining to the mobilization or\ndeployment of personnel or equipment, to the operation of\ncommunication systems or protocols, or to tactical operations. \nEmphasis added.) \n\nBy its plain language, section 7(1)(v) applies to records that are devised and\n\ncrafted to identify, prevent, or respond to potential attacks. The legislative history behind the\nexemption further confirms that the exemption concerns records involved in homeland security\nand emergency preparations rather than routine monitoring. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. \nLtr. 48212, issued November 2, 2017, at 7 (quoting House Sponsor James H. Meyer explaining\nthat the bill \" exempts documents prepared for emergency and security procedures from being\ndisclosed from homeland security where that would be compromised.\"). \n\nIn Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, \nthe Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) met its burden\nof demonstrating that video recordings of a train platform from several camera angles fell within\n\nthe scope of the section 7(1)(v) exemption. The CTA showed that surveillance cameras were\ninstalled at its rail stations after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with funds from a U.S. \nDepartment of Homeland Security program designed to protect the public and critical\ninfrastructure. Chicago Sun- Times, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, ¶¶ 48- 51. The CTA also\npresented an affidavit from a homeland security expert averring that the requested recordings\nrevealed the quality, resolution, field of view, and blind spots of the CTA's surveillance\ncameras, and that information could enable individuals to evade these security devices when\ntargeting passengers, planning attacks, or evading capture by law enforcement.\" Chicago Sun-\nTimes, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, ¶ 49. In concluding that the footage was exempt from\ndisclosure, the court further observed that section 7(1)(v) \"is worded broadly and requires a\ngovernment agency to demonstrate that release of a document 'could reasonably be expected to' \njeopardize the effectiveness of its security measures— not that it would jeopardize them.\" \nEmphasis in original.) Chicago Sun-Times, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, ¶¶ 43-45. \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that a public body could\n\nproperly withhold records listing the locations of all of its cameras and other details about them\npursuant to section 7(1)(v) because \"[ d]isclosure of these locations would allow the entire\nnetwork of cameras to be pieced together, undermining the effectiveness of the system by\nrevealing areas where surveillance cameras are highly concentrated and exposing areas that are\nnot covered by surveillance cameras.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 62247, issued April 20, \n2020, at 2-3 (noting that the cameras were funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security\nto reduce crime and protect critical\n65558, issued September 30, 2022, at 4 (determining that office of emergency management had\nestablished that disclosure of all surveillance footage of looting incidents that occurred on a\ncertain date at 20 specified times and block locations in downtown Chicago could jeopardize\noverall effectiveness of its security network). \n\ninfrastructure); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n\nBy contrast, this office has previously concluded that routine surveillance footage\nand other videos that are not used for homeland security purposes or emergency preparations do\nnot fall within the scope of section 7(1)(v). See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n72032, issued October 20, 2022, at 4 (dispatch center did not establish that interior security\ncameras were intended for a homeland security purpose and thus camera footage did not fall\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(v)); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 70528, issued November\n29, 2021, at 8 (footage of room improperly withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(v) because village\nfailed to show that \"the camera was installed for the purpose of identifying, preventing, or\nresponding to potential attacks, rather than for the purpose of video recording meetings held in\nthat room.\"). \n\nIn its denial letter to\n\nthe Department stated that the camera at issue \" is\n\na security camera for Municipal Center East which houses the Springfield Police Department, \n\nseveral other City departments, and City employees.\" 2 The Department asserted that the footage\nshows \" the quality, resolution, field of view and blind spots of the City’ s surveillance camera, \nand such information could enable individuals to evade the security device in the event of\ntargeting City employees, a planned attacked on the building, or evading capture by law\nenforcement.\" 3 In his Request for Review, \nreveal\ncamera, Axis, is a commonly used camera brand, and that information about the technical\nfeatures of the Axis camera are already publicly available on the Axis website, \" including the\ncommonly used 110 degree field of view for fixed lens cameras and up to roughly 60 foot IR\ncapabilities.\" 4\n\ncontended that the footage would not\ninformation that was not already known to the public. He argued that the brand of the\n\nThe Department's answer to this office argued that the footage is comparable to\n\nthe platform footage at issue in Chicago Sun-Times. The Department reiterated that the \"footage\nrequested covers the main entrance of a municipal building that houses critical City functions, \nincluding the police department, city officials, and city employees.\" 5 The Department contended\nthat, like the platform footage in Chicago Sun- Times, the footage of the entrance \" would expose\nthe cameras' positioning, fields of view, and blind spots, allowing bad actors to exploit these\nvulnerabilities.\" 6 The Department\nfurther contended that the footage captured an active protest\nagainst the police department and City officials, which could be exploited or \"facilitate targeted\nthus jeopardizing the safety of protesters and City personnel. 7 Additionally, the\ncriminal acts[,]\" \nDepartment argued that the \"camera system is part of a broader effort to ensure public safety, \nfunded and designed for security purposes.\" 8\n\nHaving reviewed the footage and the Department's response, the Department did\nnot provide sufficient evidence to establish that the camera is used as a security measure that is\n\n2 Letter from Ava Cox, FOIA Officer, Police, City of Springfield, to\n\nNovember\n\n15, 2024). \n\n15, 2024). \n\n3 Letter from Ava Cox, FOIA Officer, Police, City of Springfield, to\n\nNovember\n\n4E- mail from\n\nto [ Public Access Bureau] (November 21, 2024). \n\nSpringfield, to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (December 19, 2024), at [3]. \n\n5 Letter from Michael Hampleman, Senior Asst. Corporation Counsel/Police Advisor, City of\n\nSpringfield, to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (December 19, 2024), at [3]. \n\n6 Letter from Michael Hampleman, Senior Asst. Corporation Counsel/Police Advisor, City of\n\nSpringfield, to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (December 19, 2024), at [3]. \n\n7 Letter from Michael Hampleman, Senior Asst. Corporation Counsel/Police Advisor, City of\n\nSpringfield, to Teresa Lim, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Public Access Bureau (December 19, 2024), at [ 3]. \n\ndesigned to prevent the types of harm that the section 7(1)(v) exemption is intended to prevent. \nThe City's response to this office focused on how disclosure of the recording could reasonably be\nexpected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the surveillance camera but failed to establish that the\ncamera is the type of security measure discussed in that exemption. In contrast to how the CTA\ndemonstrated the homeland security purpose and role of the surveillance camera system at the\nrail platforms in Chicago Sun- Times, the Department did not explain specifically how the camera\nwas a component of a broader security network aimed to prevent potential terrorist attacks, \ndisasters, or emergencies; instead, the Department simply asserted that the camera was part of a\nbroader effort to ensure public safety. The footage captures the outside area around the\nbuilding's entrance, which is generally viewable to the public. The footage shows a crowd of\npeople and officers. Although the building houses several city departments, the Department did\nnot show with detail how its camera is designed to address potential attacks on the City's\npopulation or systems. The fact that the specific footage\nagainst the City's police department and civil unrest does not transform a security camera that\nappears to be generally used for routine monitoring into a \" security measure\" that is \"designed to\nidentify, prevent, or respond to potential attacks upon a community's population or systems[.]\" \nUnder these circumstances, this office concludes that the Department did not demonstrate by\nclear and convincing evidence that the requested footage is exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(v). This office requests that the Department provide\nwith a copy of the\nfootage. \n\nsought depicts a protest\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84026 f 71v improper pd"}
{"id":1106,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-11","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84210"],"title":"City of Chicago Office of the Mayor complied with duty to narrow unduly burdensome FOIA request","filename":"84210, issued March 11, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1246,"summary":"The requester sought text messages from the Mayor's personal cell phone regarding township business, and the PAC determined that no further action was warranted because the City properly offered to confer to narrow the request.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for text messages from the Mayor's personal phone, but the City claimed the request was too broad and burdensome. The Attorney General's office decided not to take further action because the City followed the law by inviting the requester to discuss how to narrow the request to a manageable size. This means the PAC is not forcing the City to produce the records at this time.","holding":"The Public Access Counselor concluded that no further inquiry is warranted because the City complied with its obligation to offer the requester an opportunity to narrow an unduly burdensome request.","legal_question":"Whether the public body complied with 5 ILCS 140/3(g) by offering the requester an opportunity to confer to reduce an unduly burdensome request to manageable proportions.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Chicago Office of the Mayor","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action warranted","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"unduly burdensome","subject_description":"The request sought text messages from the Mayor's personal cell phone regarding township business.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_g/Categorical-requests/84210%2C%20issued%20March%2011%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["unduly burdensome","text messages","FOIA request","narrowing request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"March 11, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84210;  \n\nCity FOIA #  F090337- 112924;  Requester FOIA Request #  35\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). For the reasons set forth below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted as to this matter.  \n\nOn November 29, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the City of Chicago\n\nOffice of the Mayor (Mayor's Office) seeking: \n\nto proceed,  I request the timeframe be reduced to\n\nText messages sent or received by the City Mayor on her personal\ncell phone related to township business during the year 2024.  If the\nyear of 2024 results in the request being unduly burdensome or\nrequires payment\nthe month of November 2024. If the month of November 2024\nresults in the request being unduly burdensome or requires\npayment to proceed, I request the timeframe be reduced to the\nweek of November 17th 2024.  If the week of November 17th 2024\nresults in the request being unduly burdensome or requires\npayment to proceed,  I request the timeframe be reduced to the day\nof November 17th 2024. If the day of November 17th, 2024\nresults in there being no responsive records,  I request the\ntimeframe of search be replaced with November 16th, 2024. If the\nday of November 16th,  2024 results in there being no responsive\nrecords, I request the timeframe of search be replaced with\n\n\fMarch 11, 2025\nPage 2\n\nNovember 18th,  2024.  If the day of November 18th,  2024 results\nin there being no responsive records, I request the timeframe of\nsearch be replaced with November 20th,  2024.  If the day of\nNovember 20th, 2024 results in there being no responsive records, \nI request the timeframe of search be replaced with November 21st, \n2024. If the day of November 21st, 2024 results in there being no\nresponsive records,  I request the timeframe of search be replaced\nwith November 7th, 2024. If the day of November 7th, 2024\nresults in there being no responsive records,  I request the\ntimeframe of search be replaced with November 5th, 2024. If the\nday of November 5th,  2024 results in there being no responsive\nrecords, I request the timeframe of search be replaced with July\n4th,  2024.  If any of the days listed above results in the request\nbeing unduly burdensome or require a payment, reduce the request\nto the first and last text message sent related to city business sent\nby the mayor in the year 2024, regardless of content. Please start at\nthe beginning of the request and only reduce the scope after a\ndetermination of being burdensome or fees being required has been\nreached.[ 1] \n\nOn December 5, 2024,  the Mayor' s Office denied your FOIA request as unduly burdensome\npursuant to section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)) and asked you to reduce your\nrequest to manageable proportions.   That same day,  you submitted a Request for Review to this\noffice contesting the denial.    \n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides, in pertinent part, that \"[ r]equests calling for all\n\nrecords falling within a category shall be complied with unless compliance with the request\nwould be unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is no way to narrow the\nrequest and the burden on the public body outweighs the public interest in the information.\"  \nIllinois courts have determined that a FOIA request must be specifically targeted to advance a\ncompelling public interest to outweigh the burden of compliance on a public body under section\n3(g) of FOIA.  See, e.g., Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, Inc. v. Board of\nEducation of City of Chicago,  2018 IL App ( 1st)  171846,  at ¶¶  39- 41 ( FOIA request was unduly\nburdensome where the scope of the request was indicative of a fishing expedition, rather than an\nappropriately targeted request).   Likewise,  this office has previously determined that a request\nthat is vast in scope and not targeted to any manner of public interest is unduly burdensome\nunder section 3(g) of FOIA in the absence of an identifiable public interest in disclosure of the\nresponsive records that would outweigh the burden of compliance with the request.  See, e.g., Ill. \nAtt'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 84099,  issued January 3, 2025,  at 2 ( taking no further action on a\nrequest for review involving correspondence amongst numerous public officials, employees, and\n\n1FOIA request from\n\nto City of Chicago Office of the Mayor via online request system\n\nNovember 29, 2024). \n\n\fMarch 11, 2025\nPage 3\n\ndepartments pertaining to all public business where the request was not targeted to any particular\nmatter of public interest, such as by using keywords for an e-mail search or limiting the request\nto a particular subject matter).   See also National Ass' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago\nPolice Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2010) (\" A request that is overly broad and requires\nthe public body to locate,  review,  redact and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material\nthat is largely unnecessary to the [requester's]  purpose constitutes an undue burden.\").  \n\nIn its response, the Mayor's Office advised you that your request was unduly\n\nburdensome because in order to comply with your request as written,  it would \" need to identify, \nprocure, and review an unknown quantity of records, many of which are non-City business.\" 2\nWhile the Mayor' s Office did not specifically address each portion of your FOIA request,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has consistently determined that a public body may deny an entire request\nas unduly burdensome if one or more parts of the request is unduly burdensome.   See,  e.g. Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 81020, issued April 24, 2024, at 3 (\"[ T]he burdensomeness of a\nrequest is evaluated as a whole,  such that if one part of a request\nwhole request is.\").  When a request seeks a vast quantity of records that a public body\ndetermines is unduly burdensome,  a public body is not required to consider a series of\nalternatives––such as those listed in your submission––that require it to assess whether each of\nthose requests would also be unduly burdensome and permit the assessment of fees.   Instead,  the\nprocedure in FOIA provides that a \" public body shall extend to the person making the request an\nopportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce the request to manageable proportions.\"   5\nILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022).  The Mayor's Office's response to your request extended you the\nopportunity to modify your request to manageable proportions so you may wish to resubmit a\nnarrowed request or avail yourself of the opportunity to confer with the Mayor's Office.    \n\nis unduly burdensome,  the\n\nAccordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this\n\nmatter.   This file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at 312- 814- 5201,  \nedie.steinberg@ilag.gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84210 f no fi war mun\n\nCity Of Chicago,  to\n\nDecember 5, 2024). \n\n2E- mail from Hibo Aden, FOIA Officer, Office of Mayor Brandon Johnson, \n\n\fMarch 11, 2025\nPage 4\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Hibo Aiden\nFOIA Officer\nCity of Chicago Office of the Mayor\n121 North LaSalle Street,  Suite 500\nChicago, Illinois 60602\nmofoia@cityofchicago. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A mayor's personal cell phone texts about township business","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84210/","full_text":"March 11, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84210; \n\nCity FOIA # F090337- 112924; Requester FOIA Request # 35\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). For the reasons set forth below, \nthe Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted as to this matter. \n\nOn November 29, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the City of Chicago\n\nOffice of the Mayor (Mayor's Office) seeking: \n\nto proceed, I request the timeframe be reduced to\n\nText messages sent or received by the City Mayor on her personal\ncell phone related to township business during the year 2024. If the\nyear of 2024 results in the request being unduly burdensome or\nrequires payment\nthe month of November 2024. If the month of November 2024\nresults in the request being unduly burdensome or requires\npayment to proceed, I request the timeframe be reduced to the\nweek of November 17th 2024. If the week of November 17th 2024\nresults in the request being unduly burdensome or requires\n\nNovember 18th, 2024. If the day of November 18th, 2024 results\nin there being no responsive records, I request the timeframe of\nsearch be replaced with November 20th, 2024. If the day of\nNovember 20th, 2024 results in there being no responsive records, \nI request the timeframe of search be replaced with November 21st, \n2024. If the day of November 21st, 2024 results in there being no\nresponsive records, I request the timeframe of search be replaced\nwith November 7th, 2024. If the day of November 7th, 2024\nresults in there being no responsive records, I request the\ntimeframe of search be replaced with November 5th, 2024. If the\nday of November 5th, 2024 results in there being no responsive\nrecords, I request the timeframe of search be replaced with July\n4th, 2024. If any of the days listed above results in the request\nbeing unduly burdensome or require a payment, reduce the request\nto the first and last text message sent related to city business sent\nby the mayor in the year 2024, regardless of content. Please start at\nthe beginning of the request and only reduce the scope after a\ndetermination of being burdensome or fees being required has been\nreached.[ 1] \n\nOn December 5, 2024, the Mayor's Office denied your FOIA request as unduly burdensome\npursuant to section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022)) and asked you to reduce your\nrequest to manageable proportions. That same day, you submitted a Request for Review to this\noffice contesting the denial. \n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA provides, in pertinent part, that \"[ r]equests calling for all\n\nrecords falling within a category shall be complied with unless compliance with the request\nwould be unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is no way to narrow the\nrequest and the burden on the public body outweighs the public interest in the information.\" \nIllinois courts have determined that a FOIA request must be specifically targeted to advance a\ncompelling public interest to outweigh the burden of compliance on a public body under section\n3(g) of FOIA. See, e.g., Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, Inc. v. Board of\nEducation of City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 171846, at ¶¶ 39- 41 (FOIA request was unduly\nburdensome where the scope of the request was indicative of a fishing expedition, rather than an\nappropriately targeted request). Likewise, this office has previously determined that a request\nthat is vast in scope and not targeted to any manner of public interest is unduly burdensome\nunder section 3(g) of FOIA in the absence of an identifiable public interest in disclosure of the\nresponsive records that would outweigh the burden of compliance with the request. See, e.g., Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 84099, issued January 3, 2025, at 2 (taking no further action on a\nrequest for review involving correspondence amongst numerous public officials, employees, and\n\ndepartments pertaining to all public business where the request was not targeted to any particular\nmatter of public interest, such as by using keywords for an e-mail search or limiting the request\nto a particular subject matter). See also National Ass' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago\nPolice Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2010) (\" A request that is overly broad and requires\nthe public body to locate, review, redact and arrange for inspection a vast quantity of material\nthat is largely unnecessary to the [requester's] purpose constitutes an undue burden.\"). \n\nIn its response, the Mayor's Office advised you that your request was unduly\n\nburdensome because in order to comply with your request as written, it would \" need to identify, \nprocure, and review an unknown quantity of records, many of which are non-City business.\" 2\nWhile the Mayor's Office did not specifically address each portion of your FOIA request, the\nPublic Access Bureau has consistently determined that a public body may deny an entire request\nas unduly burdensome if one or more parts of the request is unduly burdensome. See, e.g. Ill. \nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 81020, issued April 24, 2024, at 3 (\"[ T]he burdensomeness of a\nrequest is evaluated as a whole, such that if one part of a request\nwhole request is.\"). When a request seeks a vast quantity of records that a public body\ndetermines is unduly burdensome, a public body is not required to consider a series of\nalternatives––such as those listed in your submission––that require it to assess whether each of\nthose requests would also be unduly burdensome and permit the assessment of fees. Instead, the\nprocedure in FOIA provides that a \" public body shall extend to the person making the request an\nopportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce the request to manageable proportions.\" 5\nILCS 140/3(g) (West 2022). The Mayor's Office's response to your request extended you the\nopportunity to modify your request to manageable proportions so you may wish to resubmit a\nnarrowed request or avail yourself of the opportunity to confer with the Mayor's Office. \n\nis unduly burdensome, the\n\nAccordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this\n\nmatter. This file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at 312- 814- 5201, \nedie.steinberg@ilag.gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Hibo Aiden\nFOIA Officer\nCity of Chicago Office of the Mayor\n121 North LaSalle Street, Suite 500\nChicago, Illinois 60602\nmofoia@cityofchicago. org"}
{"id":1107,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84296"],"title":"DuPage County Sheriff's Office properly denied body camera footage under Body Camera Act","filename":"84296, issued January 15, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1114,"summary":"The requester sought body-worn camera footage from the DuPage County Sheriff's Office, which denied the request citing FOIA exemptions; the PAC determined the denial was proper under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested body-worn camera footage from the DuPage County Sheriff's Office, which denied the request. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau reviewed the case and found the request unfounded. The Bureau concluded that because the requester was not present during the recording and did not interact with law enforcement, they were not a 'subject of the encounter' under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, and the footage was not flagged for mandatory disclosure. Therefore, the Act prohibits disclosure of the footage to this requester.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau determined that the Request for Review is unfounded because the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act prohibits disclosure of the requested body-worn camera footage to the requester, who was not a subject of the encounter and the footage was not flagged for disclosure.","legal_question":"Whether the DuPage County Sheriff's Office properly denied a FOIA request for body-worn camera footage pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(cc)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"DuPage County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought body-worn camera footage of an incident occurring at a private residence.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/not-flagged-not-subject/84296%2C%20issued%20January%2015%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","privacy","FOIA denial"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"January 15, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84296\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act ( FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn November 21, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the DuPage County\n\nSheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  seeking records,  including body- worn camera footage, \npertaining to an incident that took place at a certain house on October 6, 2024.  That same day, \nthe Sheriff' s Office denied the body- worn camera footage pursuant to section 7(1)( c)  of FOIA. 2\nOn December 10, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review contesting the denial of the body\ncamera footage.   \n\nSection 7.5(cc)  of FOIA3 expressly exempts from inspection and copying\n\nr]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, except to the\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2024.  \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n35 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103-1049, effective August 9, 2024.   \n\n\fJanuary 15, 2025\nPage 2\n\nextent authorized under that Act.\"   Section 10- 20( b) of the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body\nCamera Act (Body Camera Act)4 provides in pertinent part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer-worn body\n\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy,  at the time of the recording,  any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm,  use of force,  arrest or detention,  or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject' s\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection ( b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act;  and\n\n3) upon request,  the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct,  the recording to the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject's attorney, or\nthe officer or his or her legal representative.  ( Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nBased on this law, in instances where there is no expectation of privacy, the\nis required to disclose,  in accordance with FOIA,  recordings from law enforcement\n\nDepartment\nofficer worn body cameras only if the recordings are (1) flagged for any of the reasons specified\nin section 10- 20( b)( 2)  of the Body Camera Act, or ( 2) if they are requested by the subject of the\nencounter captured on the recording or the subject's attorneys.  The Public Access Bureau has\n\n450 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2022).  \n\n\fJanuary 15, 2025\nPage 3\n\nconsistently concluded that the \" subject of the encounter\"  means the person who appeared in the\nrecording and \"interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a law enforcement\nactivity.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 48793,  issued August 31,  2017,  at 4; Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 83729, issued June 26, 2023, at 3.   \n\nOn January 8, 2025, an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in the Public Access\n\nBureau spoke by telephone with an Assistant State' s Attorney ( ASA)  in the DuPage County\nState's Attorney's Office who explained that there is no indication that the Sheriff's Office was\nrequired to flag the footage at issue for any of the reasons set forth in section 10- 20( b)( 2) of the\nBody Camera Act.  Additionally, the ASA informed the AAG that you were not present when\nthe body camera footage was taken.   On January 9, 2025,  the AAG spoke to you by telephone.  \nDuring that conversation, you confirmed that you were not present when the body cam video was\ntaken but asserted that you should be able to obtain the footage based on a belief that the footage\ndepicts a police officer watching a ring doorbell recording of you at the house, and because you\nwere discussed by individuals who are depicted in the footage. \n\nBased on your statement and the statements of the ASA,  it is clear that you were\n\nnot present when the body-camera footage was taken and that you did not interact with law\nenforcement at any time during the recording of the body- camera footage.   Although the\nindividuals interacting with the officer may have shown the officer a recording of you on a ring\ndoorbell and may have discussed you,  it does not make you a subject of the encounter because\nyou had no interaction with law enforcement at any time during the recording.  See, e.g., Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 76600,  issued July 10, 2023,  at 3 (a person discussed in body camera\nfootage was not the subject of the encounter).  Because the footage is not a flagged video and\nbecause you are not the subject of the encounter,  the Body Camera Act prohibits disclosure of\nsuch footage to you.5 Therefore, this office has determined that this Request for Review is\nunfounded. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at 312- 814- 5201, \n\n5We note that section 10-20(b)(1) of the Body Cam Act may also prohibit the disclosure of the\nfootage here because, according to the ASA, most of the footage is taken inside a private home where you do not\nreside, but where the subjects of the video likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy.  In addition, because this\noffice has determined that the Body Cam Act prohibits disclosure of the footage to you, this office declines to\naddress the Sheriff's Office's contention that footage is exempt under section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.   \n\n\fJanuary 15, 2025\nPage 4\n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov,  or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84296 f unf co\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Conor McCarthy\nAssistant State's Attorney\nDuPage County State' s Attorney' s Office\n503 North Country Farm Road\nWheaton,  Illinois 60187\nConor.McCarthy@dupagecounty.gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police body-camera footage of a private-residence incident","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84296/","full_text":"January 15, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84296\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn November 21, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the DuPage County\n\nSheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) seeking records, including body- worn camera footage, \npertaining to an incident that took place at a certain house on October 6, 2024. That same day, \nthe Sheriff's Office denied the body- worn camera footage pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 2\nOn December 10, 2024, you submitted a Request for Review contesting the denial of the body\ncamera footage. \n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA3 expressly exempts from inspection and copying\n\nr]ecordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, except to the\n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2024. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n35 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103-1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\nextent authorized under that Act.\" Section 10- 20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body\nCamera Act (Body Camera Act)4 provides in pertinent part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer-worn body\n\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request, the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject's attorney, or\nthe officer or his or her legal representative. (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nBased on this law, in instances where there is no expectation of privacy, the\nis required to disclose, in accordance with FOIA, recordings from law enforcement\n\nDepartment\nofficer worn body cameras only if the recordings are (1) flagged for any of the reasons specified\nin section 10- 20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act, or (2) if they are requested by the subject of the\nencounter captured on the recording or the subject's attorneys. The Public Access Bureau has\n\nconsistently concluded that the \" subject of the encounter\" means the person who appeared in the\nrecording and \"interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a law enforcement\nactivity.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48793, issued August 31, 2017, at 4; Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 83729, issued June 26, 2023, at 3. \n\nOn January 8, 2025, an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in the Public Access\n\nBureau spoke by telephone with an Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) in the DuPage County\nState's Attorney's Office who explained that there is no indication that the Sheriff's Office was\nrequired to flag the footage at issue for any of the reasons set forth in section 10- 20(b)(2) of the\nBody Camera Act. Additionally, the ASA informed the AAG that you were not present when\nthe body camera footage was taken. On January 9, 2025, the AAG spoke to you by telephone. \nDuring that conversation, you confirmed that you were not present when the body cam video was\ntaken but asserted that you should be able to obtain the footage based on a belief that the footage\ndepicts a police officer watching a ring doorbell recording of you at the house, and because you\nwere discussed by individuals who are depicted in the footage. \n\nBased on your statement and the statements of the ASA, it is clear that you were\n\nnot present when the body-camera footage was taken and that you did not interact with law\nenforcement at any time during the recording of the body- camera footage. Although the\nindividuals interacting with the officer may have shown the officer a recording of you on a ring\ndoorbell and may have discussed you, it does not make you a subject of the encounter because\nyou had no interaction with law enforcement at any time during the recording. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 76600, issued July 10, 2023, at 3 (a person discussed in body camera\nfootage was not the subject of the encounter). Because the footage is not a flagged video and\nbecause you are not the subject of the encounter, the Body Camera Act prohibits disclosure of\nsuch footage to you.5 Therefore, this office has determined that this Request for Review is\nunfounded. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at 312- 814- 5201, \n\n5 We note that section 10-20(b)(1) of the Body Cam Act may also prohibit the disclosure of the\nfootage here because, according to the ASA, most of the footage is taken inside a private home where you do not\nreside, but where the subjects of the video likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In addition, because this\noffice has determined that the Body Cam Act prohibits disclosure of the footage to you, this office declines to\naddress the Sheriff's Office's contention that footage is exempt under section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. \n\nedie. steinberg@ilag. gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this\nletter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84296 f unf co\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Conor McCarthy\nAssistant State's Attorney\nDuPage County State's Attorney's Office\n503 North Country Farm Road\nWheaton, Illinois 60187\nConor.McCarthy@dupagecounty.gov"}
{"id":1108,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84329"],"title":"Marion County Assessor's Office nondisclosure of cost table in copyrighted software under 7(1)(a)/7(1)(o) is no violation","filename":"84329, issued March 3, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1043,"summary":"The requester sought a copy of a Marshall & Swift cost table embedded in the Marion County Assessor's property valuation software, but the PAC determined the request was unfounded because the software is protected by copyright.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked the Marion County Assessor's Office for a copy of a Marshall & Swift cost table embedded in the DEVNET software used to calculate property assessments. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau determined the request was unfounded because the embedded table is exempt from disclosure under FOIA section 7(1)(o) as administrative or technical information associated with automated data processing, and also exempt under section 7(1)(a) because the software is protected by federal copyright law. The Bureau closed the file without ordering disclosure.","holding":"The request for review is unfounded because the requested Marshall & Swift cost table is embedded in software exempt from disclosure under FOIA sections 7(1)(o) and 7(1)(a).","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required to produce information embedded within proprietary, copyright-protected software under FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7(1)(o)"],"public_body":"Marion County Assessor's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(a)","subject_description":"The requester sought access to a proprietary cost table embedded within the county's property assessment software.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_a/84329%2C%20issued%20March%203%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["copyright","software","property assessment","proprietary information"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"March 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84329\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 2 , 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Marion County\nAssessor's Office  (Assessor's Office ) seeking a copy of a Marshall &  Swift cost table .  On\nDecember 9 , 2024 , Mr. Timothy J. Hudspeth, the Marion County States Attorney (State's\nAttorney), responded to your FOIA request on behalf of the Assessor's Office.  In the response, \nthe State's Attorney informed you that the Assessor's Office did not possess or maintain a hard\ncopy of the Marshall &  Swift cost table .  The States Attorney also explained that \" information\ncontained in that table is accessed by making choices/selections in a software program which\nrequires input from the user.  The end result is the software program provides a valuation of a\nsubject property.\" 1 On December 12 , 2024, you submitted your Request for Review contesting\nthe Assessor's Office 's response because you are \" seeking access to a copy of the Marshall & \nSwift cost table embedded in the DEVNET software used by the assessor' s office,\"  which is an\nintegral tool in the assessment process and, therefore, should be accessible under FOIA .2\n\n9, 2024).  \n\n1Letter from Timothy J. Hudspeth,  Marion County States Attorney, to\n\nDecember\n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Counselor] ( December 12, 2025).   \n\n\fMarch 3, 2025\nPage 2\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \"public records,\"  which are existing records\nhaving been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession\nof, or under the control of any public body.\"  5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2023 Supp.).   However, \nsection 7(1)(o) of FOIA3 exempts from disclosure: \n\nAdministrative or technical information associated with\n\nautomated data processing operations,  including but not limited to\nsoftware , operating protocols,  computer program abstracts,  file\nlayouts, source listings, object modules, load modules, user guides, \ndocumentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of\ncomputerized systems, employee manuals, and any other\ninformation that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the\nsystem or its data or the security of materials exempt under this\nSection.  ( Emphasis added.)  \n\nIn Chapman v. Chicago Department of Finance , 2023 IL 128300, the Illinois Supreme Court\nanalyzed the scope of section 7(1)(o) and concluded that file layouts are per se exempt from\ninformation\ndisclosure because they are among the specific forms of administrative or technical\nlisted in the exemption .  Chapman , 2023 IL 128300, ¶ 41.  The listed items also include\nsoftware.   \n\nOn January 15 , 202 5 , an AAG in the Public Access Bureau spoke to you by\n\ntelephone regarding the type of record you were seeking.   You stated that you were seeking a\ncopy of the Marshall &  Swift table that is embedded into the software that the Assessor' s Office\nuses to calculate assessments.  For background you explained that prior to computerization, the\nAssessor's Office would hand calculate an assessment using a hard copy of the Marshall &  Swift\ncost table.   On January 23, 2025,  the AAG spoke to the State' s Attorney who explained that the\nMarshall &  Swift cost table is embedded in the DEVNET software the Assessor' s Office uses to\ncalculate assessments . 4 He explained that asking for the embedded cost table is akin to seeking\nreference material.  Subsequently, the State's Attorney informed this office that the DEVNET\nsoftware in which the table is embedded is copyrighted.  \n\nThe Marshall &  Swift cost table you seek is embedded in the DEVNET software\n\nused by the Assessor's Office.  Because embedded information is included as part of the\nsoftware, it is exempt from disclosure under the plain language of section 7(1)(o) of FOIA .    \n\n2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(o) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective July 1, \n\n4DEVNET is a privately held company providing integrated software and hardware solutions to\nlocal government s, including integrated property tax system s, and includes various partnership s with vendors, \nincluding Marshall &  Swift , whose systems are integrated into DEVNET' s software to ensure seamless workflow for\nusers.  DEVNET, ABOUT, available at https:// www.devnetinc. com/ about/ ( last viewed February 28, 2025).  \n\n\fMarch 3, 2025\nPage 3\n\nIn addition, section 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation\n\nspecifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations\nimplementing federal or State law .\"  Section 106 of the Copyright Act5 gives a copyright holder\nexclusive authority to reproduce the copyrighted work, whereas section 107 of the Copyright\nAct6 provides parameters for \"the fair use of a copyrighted work[,]\"  which \"is not an\ninfringement of copyright.\"  In Garlick v. Naperville Township , 2017 IL App (2d) 170025, the\nlaw prohibited a\nIllinois Appellate Court affirmed a trial court' s ruling that Federal copyright\ntownship from providing a requester with a copy of copyright- protected software in which it\nmaintained the contents of a property record database.  Because the DEVNET software is\nprotected by copyright laws, section 7(1)(a)  of FOIA prohibits the Assessor's Office from\nproviding a copy of the software, including the embedded information, to you.7\n\nBased on the analysis above,  this office has determined that your Request for\n\nReview is unfounded.  Accordingly, this file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact\nme at 312-814-5201, edie.steinberg@ilag.gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter .  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84329 f unf co\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Timothy J.  Hudspeth\nMarion County States Attorney\n100 East Main, Room 107\nSalem, Illinois 62881\nthudspeth@marionco.\n\nillinois. gov\n\n517 U.S.C. § 106 ( 2020). \n\n617 U.S.C. § 107 ( 2020). \n\n7Because the requested records are exempt under sections 7(1)(a) and 7(1)( o) of FOIA, this office\nneed not address the Assessor' s Office contention that the Marshall & Swift cost table embedded in the software is\nreference material, and thus, not a public record.  \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A proprietary cost table in assessment software","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84329/","full_text":"March 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84329\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 2, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Marion County\nAssessor's Office (Assessor's Office) seeking a copy of a Marshall & Swift cost table. On\nDecember 9, 2024, Mr. Timothy J. Hudspeth, the Marion County States Attorney (State's\nAttorney), responded to your FOIA request on behalf of the Assessor's Office. In the response, \nthe State's Attorney informed you that the Assessor's Office did not possess or maintain a hard\ncopy of the Marshall & Swift cost table. The States Attorney also explained that \" information\ncontained in that table is accessed by making choices/selections in a software program which\nrequires input from the user. The end result is the software program provides a valuation of a\nsubject property.\" 1 On December 12, 2024, you submitted your Request for Review contesting\nthe Assessor's Office 's response because you are \" seeking access to a copy of the Marshall & \nSwift cost table embedded in the DEVNET software used by the assessor's office,\" which is an\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \"public records,\" which are existing records\nhaving been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession\nof, or under the control of any public body.\" 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2023 Supp.). However, \nsection 7(1)(o) of FOIA3 exempts from disclosure: \n\nAdministrative or technical information associated with\n\nautomated data processing operations, including but not limited to\nsoftware, operating protocols, computer program abstracts, file\nlayouts, source listings, object modules, load modules, user guides, \ndocumentation pertaining to all logical and physical design of\ncomputerized systems, employee manuals, and any other\ninformation that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security of the\nsystem or its data or the security of materials exempt under this\nSection. (Emphasis added.) \n\nIn Chapman v. Chicago Department of Finance, 2023 IL 128300, the Illinois Supreme Court\nanalyzed the scope of section 7(1)(o) and concluded that file layouts are per se exempt from\ninformation\ndisclosure because they are among the specific forms of administrative or technical\nlisted in the exemption. Chapman, 2023 IL 128300, ¶ 41. The listed items also include\nsoftware. \n\nOn January 15, 202 5, an AAG in the Public Access Bureau spoke to you by\n\ntelephone regarding the type of record you were seeking. You stated that you were seeking a\ncopy of the Marshall & Swift table that is embedded into the software that the Assessor's Office\nuses to calculate assessments. For background you explained that prior to computerization, the\nAssessor's Office would hand calculate an assessment using a hard copy of the Marshall & Swift\ncost table. On January 23, 2025, the AAG spoke to the State's Attorney who explained that the\nMarshall & Swift cost table is embedded in the DEVNET software the Assessor's Office uses to\ncalculate assessments. 4 He explained that asking for the embedded cost table is akin to seeking\nreference material. Subsequently, the State's Attorney informed this office that the DEVNET\nsoftware in which the table is embedded is copyrighted. \n\nThe Marshall & Swift cost table you seek is embedded in the DEVNET software\n\nused by the Assessor's Office. Because embedded information is included as part of the\nsoftware, it is exempt from disclosure under the plain language of section 7(1)(o) of FOIA. \n\n2024. \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(o) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective July 1, \n\n4DEVNET is a privately held company providing integrated software and hardware solutions to\nlocal government s, including integrated property tax system s, and includes various partnership s with vendors, \nincluding Marshall & Swift, whose systems are integrated into DEVNET's software to ensure seamless workflow for\nusers. DEVNET, ABOUT, available at https:// www.devnetinc. com/ about/ (last viewed February 28, 2025). \n\nIn addition, section 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation\n\nspecifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations\nimplementing federal or State law.\" Section 106 of the Copyright Act5 gives a copyright holder\nexclusive authority to reproduce the copyrighted work, whereas section 107 of the Copyright\nAct6 provides parameters for \"the fair use of a copyrighted work[,]\" which \"is not an\ninfringement of copyright.\" In Garlick v. Naperville Township, 2017 IL App (2d) 170025, the\nlaw prohibited a\nIllinois Appellate Court affirmed a trial court's ruling that Federal copyright\ntownship from providing a requester with a copy of copyright- protected software in which it\nmaintained the contents of a property record database. Because the DEVNET software is\nprotected by copyright laws, section 7(1)(a) of FOIA prohibits the Assessor's Office from\nproviding a copy of the software, including the embedded information, to you.7\n\nBased on the analysis above, this office has determined that your Request for\n\nReview is unfounded. Accordingly, this file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact\nme at 312-814-5201, edie.steinberg@ilag.gov, or at the Chicago address listed on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84329 f unf co\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Timothy J. Hudspeth\nMarion County States Attorney\n100 East Main, Room 107\nSalem, Illinois 62881\nthudspeth@marionco.\n\nillinois. gov\n\n517 U.S.C. § 106 (2020). \n\n617 U.S.C. § 107 (2020). \n\n7 Because the requested records are exempt under sections 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(o) of FOIA, this office\nneed not address the Assessor's Office contention that the Marshall & Swift cost table embedded in the software is\nreference material, and thus, not a public record."}
{"id":1109,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2024-12-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84370"],"title":"City of Chicago OEMC properly withheld shooting video under law enforcement proceedings exemption","filename":"84370, issued December 20, 2024.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":628,"summary":"The requester sought video footage of a shooting from the City of Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), which denied the request citing various FOIA exemptions related to ongoing investigations. The PAC determined that no further action was warranted because the records were properly withheld under section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) for video footage of a shooting, but OEMC denied the request, citing that releasing the video could interfere with an active police investigation. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau reviewed the case and determined that no further action was warranted because the footage was exempt from disclosure under FOIA's law enforcement proceedings exemption. This means the request was denied for now, but the requester may be able to ask for the video again once the investigation is closed.","holding":"The PAC determined that OEMC properly withheld the requested video footage because disclosure would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings.","legal_question":"Whether the OEMC properly denied a FOIA request for video footage of a shooting under section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA regarding records created in the course of administrative enforcement proceedings.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7(1)(b)","7(1)(d)(i)","7(1)(d)(ii)","7(1)(d)(iii)"],"public_body":"City of Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC)","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought video footage of a shooting incident currently under investigation.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_i/84370%2C%20issued%20December%2020%2C%202024.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["video footage","ongoing investigation","FOIA denial","law enforcement records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"December 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 84370\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2022),  as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024).   For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn December 2, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the City of Chicago\n\nOffice of Emergency Management and Communications ( OEMC)  seeking video footage of a\nshooting that took place at 2800 West Polk Street.   On December 11, 2024,  OEMC denied your\nrequest under sections 7(1)(a),  7(1)(b), 7(1)(d)(i), 7(1)(d)(ii) and 7(1)( d)(iii) of FOIA, 1 asserting\nin pertinent part that  \" this case is still open and ongoing,  premature release of records at this\ntime could possibly jeopardize the progress of the investigation,  compromise the identities of\nconfidential sources,   prosecutorial strategy,   processing of evidence,   interfere with court\nproceedings,   and ultimately create a substantial\nof a fair trial or an impartial hearing.\" 2\n\nlikelihood that a person will be deprived\n\nOn December 16, 2024,  you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review\n\ncontesting that denial.   \n\nPublic Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024). \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)( a), ( 1)( b), (1)(d)(i), (1)(d)( ii), (1)(d)( iii) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by\n\nManagement and Communications to\n\n2Letter from M. Mason –  OEMC FOIA, Freedom of Information Officer,  Office of Emergency\nDecember 11, 2024). \n\n\fDecember 20, 2024\nPage 2\n\nSection 7(1)(d)( i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would:  \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request[.] \n\nIn a December 18, 2024,  e-mail to this office, an attorney for the City stated that\nthe shooting took place on November 29, 2024,  and that to date,  nobody has been arrested and\nthe Chicago Police Department\nis still investigating the matter.  Given that you submitted your\nrequest only three days after the shooting,  it is apparent that disclosure of footage depicting the\nshooting in such an early stage of an active law enforcement\ninvestigation would jeopardize that\ninvestigation.   Under these circumstances,  this office has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in this matter. 3 Nonetheless,  you may wish to submit a similar request to OEMC at a\nlater date,  as the applicability of the section 7(1)(d)( i) exemption is temporal\ndepends on the specific circumstances at the time of the request.   See Green v. Chicago Police\nDepartment,  2022 IL 127229, ¶  3 (\"[ U]nless the FOIA exemption states otherwise,\"  a denial of\nrecords is reviewed \" under the circumstances as they existed when the public body made its\ndecision. * * * \navail himself of FOIA' s guarantees of prompt government compliance with valid requests.\"). \n\nIf the information becomes releasable later, a requester may refile his request and\n\nin nature and\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84370 f no fi war mun\n\nof the other exemptions asserted by OEMC.  \n\n3Because of the applicability of section 7(1)(d)(i), this office declines to discuss the applicability\n\n\fDecember 20, 2024\nPage 3\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. M. Mason\nFreedom of Information Officer\nOffice of Emergency Management &  Communications\nCity of Chicago\n1411 West Madison\nChicago,  Illinois 60607\nOEMCFOIA@cityofchicago. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Video footage of a shooting under investigation","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84370/","full_text":"December 20, 2024\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84370\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2022), as amended by Public Act 103- 069, \neffective January 1, 2024). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn December 2, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the City of Chicago\n\nOffice of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) seeking video footage of a\nshooting that took place at 2800 West Polk Street. On December 11, 2024, OEMC denied your\nrequest under sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b), 7(1)(d)(i), 7(1)(d)(ii) and 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA, 1 asserting\nin pertinent part that \" this case is still open and ongoing, premature release of records at this\ntime could possibly jeopardize the progress of the investigation, compromise the identities of\nconfidential sources, prosecutorial strategy, processing of evidence, interfere with court\nproceedings, and ultimately create a substantial\nof a fair trial or an impartial hearing.\" 2\n\nlikelihood that a person will be deprived\n\nOn December 16, 2024, you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review\n\ncontesting that denial. \n\nPublic Act 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024). \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d)(i), (1)(d)(ii), (1)(d)(iii) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by\n\nSection 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in\nthe course of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\ni) interfere with pending or actually and\n\nreasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings\nconducted by any law enforcement or correctional agency\nthat is the recipient of the request[.] \n\nIn a December 18, 2024, e-mail to this office, an attorney for the City stated that\nthe shooting took place on November 29, 2024, and that to date, nobody has been arrested and\nthe Chicago Police Department\nis still investigating the matter. Given that you submitted your\nrequest only three days after the shooting, it is apparent that disclosure of footage depicting the\nshooting in such an early stage of an active law enforcement\ninvestigation would jeopardize that\ninvestigation. Under these circumstances, this office has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in this matter. 3 Nonetheless, you may wish to submit a similar request to OEMC at a\nlater date, as the applicability of the section 7(1)(d)(i) exemption is temporal\ndepends on the specific circumstances at the time of the request. See Green v. Chicago Police\nDepartment, 2022 IL 127229, ¶ 3 (\"[ U]nless the FOIA exemption states otherwise,\" a denial of\nrecords is reviewed \" under the circumstances as they existed when the public body made its\ndecision. * * * \navail himself of FOIA's guarantees of prompt government compliance with valid requests.\"). \n\nIf the information becomes releasable later, a requester may refile his request and\n\nin nature and\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84370 f no fi war mun\n\nof the other exemptions asserted by OEMC. \n\n3 Because of the applicability of section 7(1)(d)(i), this office declines to discuss the applicability\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. M. Mason\nFreedom of Information Officer\nOffice of Emergency Management & Communications\nCity of Chicago\n1411 West Madison\nChicago, Illinois 60607\nOEMCFOIA@cityofchicago. org"}
{"id":1110,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84373"],"title":"Wheaton Police Department failed to prove pages 60-68 were sealed by court order","filename":"84373, issued June 6, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":958,"summary":"The requester sought police reports from the Wheaton Police Department, which were denied based on a court order sealing records; the PAC determined that while most records were properly withheld, the Department failed to justify withholding specific pages unrelated to the sealed conviction.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested police records, but the Wheaton Police Department denied the request, claiming the records were sealed by a court order. The Attorney General's office reviewed the documents and found that while most of the records were correctly withheld, some pages did not relate to the sealed case. The PAC concluded the Department must release those specific pages.","holding":"The Department failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that pages 60-68 of the requested records were subject to the court order sealing the conviction.","legal_question":"Whether the Wheaton Police Department properly withheld records under FOIA section 7(1)(a) by citing a court order sealing criminal records.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)"],"public_body":"Wheaton Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request concerned access to police reports related to a 2009 case that the Department claimed were sealed by court order.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_a/protective-orders/84373%2C%20issued%20June%206%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","sealed records","FOIA denial","court order"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"June 6, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Dawn C. Didier\nCity Attorney\nCity of Wheaton –  Legal Department\n303 West Liberty Street\nWheaton,  Illinois 60187\nddidier@wheaton.il.us\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 84373\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Didier: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn December 9, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\nWheaton Police Department ( Department)  seeking copies of the reports for WH 0904284779, \nwhich related to a case dating back to May 27, 2009.  On December 11, 2024, the Department\ndenied the request pursuant\ncopying \"[ i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules\nand regulations implementing federal or State law.\"    In connection with section 7(1)( a),  the\nDepartment cited a provision in the Criminal Identification Act (20 ILCS 2630/13(c) (West\n2022))  related to sealed or impounded records.   On December 13, 2024,  this office received\n\nto section 7(1)( a)  of FOIA, 1 which exempts from inspection and\n\nRequest for Review contesting the withholding of the arrest records.  \n\n2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n\fMs. Dawn C. Didier\nJune 6, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn December 30, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nreview, \n\nthe Department and asked it to provide a copy of the records for this office' s confidential\ntogether with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the\nasserted exemption.   On January 6, 2025,  this office received the requested materials,  including a\ncopy of a court order to seal a conviction.  On January 7, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of\nhe replied that same day,  maintaining that he sought\nthe Department' s response to\narrest records.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).  The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997).  \n\nA public body does not violate FOIA when it withholds records that are\n\nprohibited from disclosure by a court order,  such as a sealing order.   See GTE Sylvania,  Inc. v. \nConsumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 387 (1980) (U.S. Supreme Court held\nthat a Federal agency did not violate the Federal FOIA ( 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. ( 1974))  by\nwithholding several consumer safety reports that were subject to an injunction prohibiting their\ndisclosure);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No. 16- 009,  issued November 7, 2016,  at 22- 23\nconcluding that a public body did not violate FOIA by withholding complaints for search\nwarrants and search warrants that had been impounded by court order);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 62415, issued May 14, 2020 (public body not obligated to disclose a subpoena, which\nwas sealed by the court,  in response to a FOIA request). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Department stated that the incident that was the\n\nsubject of the requested arrest records involved two individuals,  one of whom was\nThe Department asserted that the records are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(a) of\nFOIA because they were sealed pursuant\nto a court order.   Specifically,  the Department argued\nthat records that have been sealed or expunged are exempt from disclosure in accordance with\nsection 5.2(d)( 9)( C) of the Criminal\n\nIdentification Act, which provides,  in relevant part,  that\nu]pon entry of an order to seal records under subsection (c), the arresting agency, any other\nagency as ordered by the court,  the Illinois State Police,  and the court shall seal the records ( as\ndefined in subsection (a)( 1)(K)).\"  20 ILCS 2630/5.2(d)(9)(C) (West 2022)).   \n\nAs noted above, the Department provided a copy of a court order to seal a\n\nconviction.   The court order seals a conviction for another individual and references case #  09\n\n\fMs. Dawn C. Didier\nJune 6, 2025\nPage 3\n\nCF 1282.  This office's review of the withheld records pertaining to WH 0904284779 determined\nrelated to an\nthat most of the records contain information about that individual and\nincident in which they were both involved.  Because the records pertain to the conviction of the\nindividual,  the Department\ncomply with a FOIA request. \n\nis not obligated to disobey a court order sealing those records to\n\nHowever, a portion of the records (pages 60-68) pertain only to the arrest and\n\nThese records reference a different case, # 09 CF 1283,  and do not\n\ncharging of\ndiscuss the other individual.  The Department did not demonstrate how these records are covered\nby the court order at issue,  and its applicability is not apparent\nto this office.   Accordingly,  the\nDepartment did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it properly denied the\nrequest\nprovide\n\nin whole pursuant to section 7(1)( a)  of FOIA.   This office requests that the Department\n\nwith a copy of pages 60-68 of the records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84373 f prot ord proper improper pd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports from a 2009 case","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84373/","full_text":"June 6, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Dawn C. Didier\nCity Attorney\nCity of Wheaton – Legal Department\n303 West Liberty Street\nWheaton, Illinois 60187\nddidier@wheaton.il.us\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84373\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Didier: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn December 9, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the\nWheaton Police Department (Department) seeking copies of the reports for WH 0904284779, \nwhich related to a case dating back to May 27, 2009. On December 11, 2024, the Department\ndenied the request pursuant\ncopying \"[ i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules\nand regulations implementing federal or State law.\" In connection with section 7(1)(a), the\nDepartment cited a provision in the Criminal Identification Act (20 ILCS 2630/13(c) (West\n2022)) related to sealed or impounded records. On December 13, 2024, this office received\n\nto section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, 1 which exempts from inspection and\n\nRequest for Review contesting the withholding of the arrest records. \n\n2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\nOn December 30, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nreview, \n\nthe Department and asked it to provide a copy of the records for this office's confidential\ntogether with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the\nasserted exemption. On January 6, 2025, this office received the requested materials, including a\ncopy of a court order to seal a conviction. On January 7, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of\nhe replied that same day, maintaining that he sought\nthe Department's response to\narrest records. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nA public body does not violate FOIA when it withholds records that are\n\nprohibited from disclosure by a court order, such as a sealing order. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. \nConsumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 387 (1980) (U.S. Supreme Court held\nthat a Federal agency did not violate the Federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1974)) by\nwithholding several consumer safety reports that were subject to an injunction prohibiting their\ndisclosure); Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 009, issued November 7, 2016, at 22- 23\nconcluding that a public body did not violate FOIA by withholding complaints for search\nwarrants and search warrants that had been impounded by court order); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 62415, issued May 14, 2020 (public body not obligated to disclose a subpoena, which\nwas sealed by the court, in response to a FOIA request). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Department stated that the incident that was the\n\nsubject of the requested arrest records involved two individuals, one of whom was\nThe Department asserted that the records are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(a) of\nFOIA because they were sealed pursuant\nto a court order. Specifically, the Department argued\nthat records that have been sealed or expunged are exempt from disclosure in accordance with\nsection 5.2(d)(9)(C) of the Criminal\n\nIdentification Act, which provides, in relevant part, that\nu]pon entry of an order to seal records under subsection (c), the arresting agency, any other\nagency as ordered by the court, the Illinois State Police, and the court shall seal the records (as\ndefined in subsection (a)(1)(K)).\" 20 ILCS 2630/5.2(d)(9)(C) (West 2022)). \n\nAs noted above, the Department provided a copy of a court order to seal a\n\nconviction. The court order seals a conviction for another individual and references case # 09\n\nCF 1282. This office's review of the withheld records pertaining to WH 0904284779 determined\nrelated to an\nthat most of the records contain information about that individual and\nincident in which they were both involved. Because the records pertain to the conviction of the\nindividual, the Department\ncomply with a FOIA request. \n\nis not obligated to disobey a court order sealing those records to\n\nHowever, a portion of the records (pages 60-68) pertain only to the arrest and\n\nThese records reference a different case, # 09 CF 1283, and do not\n\ncharging of\ndiscuss the other individual. The Department did not demonstrate how these records are covered\nby the court order at issue, and its applicability is not apparent\nto this office. Accordingly, the\nDepartment did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it properly denied the\nrequest\nprovide\n\nin whole pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA. This office requests that the Department\n\nwith a copy of pages 60-68 of the records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84373 f prot ord proper improper pd"}
{"id":1111,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-02-28","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84430"],"title":"Joliet Twp HS District 204 not found to have inadequate records search for board member's phone","filename":"84430, issued February 28, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1622,"summary":"The requester sought cell phone communications from a school board member during a public meeting, but the PAC found no evidence that the District failed to conduct an adequate search for responsive records.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested text messages and call logs from a school board member's personal phone during a board meeting. The school district stated the board member claimed no school business was conducted on the phone, and the PAC closed the case because there was no evidence that the district or the board member withheld public records.","holding":"The PAC was unable to conclude that the District failed to take adequate measures to locate records responsive to the FOIA request.","legal_question":"Whether a public body conducted an adequate search for records when a board member used a personal device during a public meeting.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Joliet Township High School District 204","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records search","subject_description":"The requester sought communications from a board member's personal cell phone during a school board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Personal-Accounts/84430%2C%20issued%20February%2028%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["personal device","records search","school board","FOIA request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"February 28, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John E. Fester\nHimes Petrarca &  Fester\n180 North Stetson Avenue,  Suite 3100\nChicago,  Illinois 60601\njfester@edlawyer. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 84430\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Fester: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons discussed below,  this office is unable to conclude that\nJoliet Township High School District 204 ( District)  failed to take adequate measures to locate\nrecords responsive to\n\ns December 2, 2024,  FOIA request.   \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking copies\n\nof: \n\nC]ell phone activity specifically of board member Thomas\nFitzpatrick from the hours of 5:00 pm through the end of the open\nsession on [ November 19, 2024].   This would include calls, texts, \nor any other communication by Mr. Fitzpatrick to or from any\nperson or entity specifically regarding any school board\nbusiness.[ 2]   \n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n2E-mail from\n\nto [Ilandus]  Hampton ( December 2, 2024).  \n\n\fMr. John E. Fester\nFebruary 28, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn December 17, 2024,  the District responded: \n\nThe District asked Mr. Fitzpatrick to produce his personal\n\ncell phone for inspection of text messages and emails that may\nhave been sent or received during the Board meeting.   Mr. \nFitzpatrick did not produce his cell phone for inspection.   Instead, \nMr. Fitzpatrick responded on December 16, 2024, \" I have no\njths204 business per FOIA request.\"    Accordingly,  we have\nsearched as far as we can for responsive records as we have no\nauthority to compel Mr. Fitzpatrick to submit his cell phone for\ninspection by the District FOIA officer.[ 3] \n\nOn December 18, 2024, \ndisputing the District' s response.      \n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau\n\nOn January 8, 2025,  this office forwarded a copy of\n\ns Request for\n\nReview to the District and asked it to provide a detailed explanation of its receipt and handling of\ns FOIA request.   On January 14, 2025, the District provided the requested information.  \n\nOn January 14, 2025,  this office forwarded a copy of the District' s answer to\nreplied on January 16, 2025.       \n\nhe\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \" public records,\"  which section 2(c) of the\n\nAct  (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) (West 2023 Supp.))  defines as \" all records * * *  pertaining to the\ntransaction of public business,  regardless of physical form or characteristics,  having been\nprepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession of, or under\nthe control of any public body.\"   ( Emphasis added.)   A record pertains to the transaction of\npublic business when it concerns \"' business or community interests as opposed to private affairs.'  \nIndeed,  FOIA is not concerned with an individual' s private affairs.\"   City of Champaign v. \nMadigan,  2013 IL App ( 4th) 120662, ¶  31.  FOIA generally requires a public body to conduct a\nreasonable search tailored to the nature of a particular request.\"   Campbell v. United States\nDepartment of Justice,  164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998).   The adequacy of a public body' s search\nfor responsive records is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends upon the particular\nfacts of the case.   Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App ( 1st)  190038, ¶  31.   \n\n3Letter from Dr. Ilandus Hampton,  FOIA Officer, [ Joliet Township High School District 204],  to\n\nDecember 17, 2024).  \n\n\fMr. John E. Fester\nFebruary 28, 2025\nPage 3\n\nIn his Request for Review, \n\nstated that he observed Mr. Fitzpatrick\ncommunicating on his cell phone during [ the]  meeting and appearing to be coached during\nvotes.\" 4 He argued that the court' s decision in City of Champaign referenced above applied to\nthe types of records he requested,  and therefore,  Mr. Fitzpatrick should be compelled to submit\nhis personal device to the District' s FOIA officer for review and any nonexempt material\ndiscovered should be provided to him.   \n\nIn City of Champaign,  a FOIA requester sought electronic communications\n\nrelated to public business that were sent or received by individual city council members on their\npersonal devices during city council meetings.   The City of Champaign asserted that those\ncommunications were not \" public records\"  pursuant to FOIA because the individual city council\nmembers themselves did not constitute public bodies.   City of Champaign,  2013 IL App (4th) \n120662, ¶  33.  The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a trial court' s decision to uphold a binding\nopinion 5 in which the Attorney General concluded that e-mails and text messages sent and\nreceived by city council members during a public meeting were \" public records\"  subject to the\nrequirements of FOIA.  The court held that the records were in the possession of the city council\nbecause they pertained to public business and were sent or received by a city council member\nduring council meetings when a quorum was present and acting collectively as a public body.  \nCity of Champaign,  2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶¶  40, 42-43.    \n\nIn this matter,  however,  the District did not assert that messages pertaining to\n\nDistrict business that Mr. Fitzpatrick may have sent or received on his personal devices during\nthe meeting in question were not \" public records\"  subject to FOIA.  Instead,  the District argued\nthat it made reasonable attempts to search for records responsive to\nDistrict' s answer to this office explained that it e-mailed Mr. Fitzpatrick and asked him to permit\nthe District to inspect his personal cell phone for the requested records.   The District stated that\nMr. Fitzpatrick responded to that request by stating that he did not possess any records\nconcerning the business of the District that would be responsive to the request.   The District\nstressed that it \"does not possess police powers,  search warrant powers,  or any other powers to\ncompel an elected School Board member to produce his cell phone for inspection in response to\na FOIA request.\" 6\n\ns request.   The\n\nThe Attorney General has issued a binding opinion which determined that\ndirecting an official or employee to search for and turn over responsive records from their\npersonal accounts or devices in good faith may fulfill a public body' s obligation to perform a\n\n4E-mail from\n\nto To whom it may concern ( December 18, 2024).  \n\n5Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 11- 006,  issued November 15, 2011.  \n\nAttorney General ( January 14, 2025). \n\n6E-mail from John E. Fester,  Himes Petrarca &  Fester,  to [ Shannon]  Barnaby, [ Senior]  Assistant\n\n\fMr. John E. Fester\nFebruary 28, 2025\nPage 4\n\nreasonable search.   Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 16-006, issued August 9, 2016,  at 10-11\npolice department could perform reasonable search of police officers'  personal e-mail accounts\nfor public records concerning a matter of public business by directing the officers to gather and\nprovide it with any e-mails concerning the matter in good faith);  see also Nissen v. Pierce\nCounty, 183 Wash.  2d 863, 886-87 (Wash.  2015) (\"[ A]gency employees are responsible for\nsearching their files, devices,  and accounts for records responsive to a relevant [ public records] \nrequest. * * *  When done in good faith, this procedure allows an agency to fulfill its\nresponsibility to search for and disclose records without unnecessarily treading on the\nconstitutional rights of its employees.\"). \n\nFurther,  in Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago,  2020 IL App (1st) \n\n190038,  the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the City of Chicago' s argument that it would be\nrequired to search their employees'  personal devices and e-mail accounts for responsive records\nin order to conduct a reasonable search.   Rather,  the court stated that the city \" will merely be\nrequired to ask a limited number of officials whether their personal accounts contain responsive\nrecords.  * * * \nbusiness,  they can so state.\"  2020 IL App ( 1st)  190038, ¶  25. \n\nIf the officials in question have not used their personal accounts to conduct public\n\nIn this instance,  the measures described by the District appear to have been\ns request.   The District has\n\nreasonably calculated to locate records responsive to\ndemonstrated that it contacted Mr. Fitzpatrick to find out whether his personal device contained\nany responsive records and Mr. Fitzpatrick responded that he possessed no records of District\nbusiness responsive to the request.   Although the District itself may have searched Mr. \nFitzpatrick' s personal device if he had agreed to it, the District was not required to do so in order\nto fulfill its obligation to perform a reasonable search.  \nasserted that he witnessed Mr. \nFitzpatrick using his personal phone during the November 19, 2024,  meeting and contended that\nhe appeared to be coached on votes,  but he did not describe any specific observations supporting\nthe claim that Mr. Fitzpatrick used his phone to communicate with other Board members or\notherwise communicate about matters pertaining to public business;  to the extent that Mr. \nFitzpatrick may have used his phone to communicate about private affairs during the meeting, \nrecords of such communications are not subject to the requirements of FOIA.  Because this\noffice has not received any evidence that Mr. Fitzpatrick failed to perform a good faith search of\nhis personal device or to suggest that he, or the District,  withheld any responsive records,  we are\nunable to conclude from the available information that the District improperly responded to\n\ns FOIA request.  \n\n\fMr. John E. Fester\nFebruary 28, 2025\nPage 5\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This file is closed.   If you have FOIA questions, \nmy e-mail is Shannon. Barnaby@ilag. gov.    \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84430 f 3d response complete sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A board member's personal cell phone communications during a meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84430/","full_text":"February 28, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John E. Fester\nHimes Petrarca & Fester\n180 North Stetson Avenue, Suite 3100\nChicago, Illinois 60601\njfester@edlawyer. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84430\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Fester: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons discussed below, this office is unable to conclude that\nJoliet Township High School District 204 (District) failed to take adequate measures to locate\nrecords responsive to\n\ns December 2, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the District seeking copies\n\nof: \n\nC]ell phone activity specifically of board member Thomas\nFitzpatrick from the hours of 5:00 pm through the end of the open\nsession on [ November 19, 2024]. This would include calls, texts, \nor any other communication by Mr. Fitzpatrick to or from any\n\nOn December 17, 2024, the District responded: \n\nThe District asked Mr. Fitzpatrick to produce his personal\n\ncell phone for inspection of text messages and emails that may\nhave been sent or received during the Board meeting. Mr. \nFitzpatrick did not produce his cell phone for inspection. Instead, \nMr. Fitzpatrick responded on December 16, 2024, \" I have no\njths204 business per FOIA request.\" Accordingly, we have\nsearched as far as we can for responsive records as we have no\nauthority to compel Mr. Fitzpatrick to submit his cell phone for\ninspection by the District FOIA officer.[ 3] \n\nOn December 18, 2024, \ndisputing the District's response. \n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau\n\nOn January 8, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of\n\ns Request for\n\nReview to the District and asked it to provide a detailed explanation of its receipt and handling of\ns FOIA request. On January 14, 2025, the District provided the requested information. \n\nOn January 14, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the District's answer to\nreplied on January 16, 2025. \n\nhe\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe requirements of FOIA apply to \" public records,\" which section 2(c) of the\n\nAct (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines as \" all records * * * pertaining to the\ntransaction of public business, regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been\nprepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the possession of, or under\nthe control of any public body.\" (Emphasis added.) A record pertains to the transaction of\npublic business when it concerns \"' business or community interests as opposed to private affairs.' \nIndeed, FOIA is not concerned with an individual's private affairs.\" City of Champaign v. \nMadigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶ 31. FOIA generally requires a public body to conduct a\nreasonable search tailored to the nature of a particular request.\" Campbell v. United States\nDepartment of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The adequacy of a public body's search\nfor responsive records is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends upon the particular\nfacts of the case. Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. \n\n3 Letter from Dr. Ilandus Hampton, FOIA Officer, [ Joliet Township High School District 204], to\n\nIn his Request for Review, \n\nstated that he observed Mr. Fitzpatrick\ncommunicating on his cell phone during [ the] meeting and appearing to be coached during\nvotes.\" 4 He argued that the court's decision in City of Champaign referenced above applied to\nthe types of records he requested, and therefore, Mr. Fitzpatrick should be compelled to submit\nhis personal device to the District's FOIA officer for review and any nonexempt material\ndiscovered should be provided to him. \n\nIn City of Champaign, a FOIA requester sought electronic communications\n\nrelated to public business that were sent or received by individual city council members on their\npersonal devices during city council meetings. The City of Champaign asserted that those\ncommunications were not \" public records\" pursuant to FOIA because the individual city council\nmembers themselves did not constitute public bodies. City of Champaign, 2013 IL App (4th) \n120662, ¶ 33. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a trial court's decision to uphold a binding\nopinion 5 in which the Attorney General concluded that e-mails and text messages sent and\nreceived by city council members during a public meeting were \" public records\" subject to the\nrequirements of FOIA. The court held that the records were in the possession of the city council\nbecause they pertained to public business and were sent or received by a city council member\nduring council meetings when a quorum was present and acting collectively as a public body. \nCity of Champaign, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶¶ 40, 42-43. \n\nIn this matter, however, the District did not assert that messages pertaining to\n\nDistrict business that Mr. Fitzpatrick may have sent or received on his personal devices during\nthe meeting in question were not \" public records\" subject to FOIA. Instead, the District argued\nthat it made reasonable attempts to search for records responsive to\nDistrict's answer to this office explained that it e-mailed Mr. Fitzpatrick and asked him to permit\nthe District to inspect his personal cell phone for the requested records. The District stated that\nMr. Fitzpatrick responded to that request by stating that he did not possess any records\nconcerning the business of the District that would be responsive to the request. The District\nstressed that it \"does not possess police powers, search warrant powers, or any other powers to\ncompel an elected School Board member to produce his cell phone for inspection in response to\na FOIA request.\" 6\n\ns request. The\n\nThe Attorney General has issued a binding opinion which determined that\ndirecting an official or employee to search for and turn over responsive records from their\npersonal accounts or devices in good faith may fulfill a public body's obligation to perform a\n\n4E-mail from\n\nto To whom it may concern (December 18, 2024). \n\n5 Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 11- 006, issued November 15, 2011. \n\nAttorney General (January 14, 2025). \n\n6E-mail from John E. Fester, Himes Petrarca & Fester, to [ Shannon] Barnaby, [ Senior] Assistant\n\nreasonable search. Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16-006, issued August 9, 2016, at 10-11\npolice department could perform reasonable search of police officers' personal e-mail accounts\nfor public records concerning a matter of public business by directing the officers to gather and\nprovide it with any e-mails concerning the matter in good faith); see also Nissen v. Pierce\nCounty, 183 Wash. 2d 863, 886-87 (Wash. 2015) (\"[ A]gency employees are responsible for\nsearching their files, devices, and accounts for records responsive to a relevant [ public records] \nrequest. * * * When done in good faith, this procedure allows an agency to fulfill its\nresponsibility to search for and disclose records without unnecessarily treading on the\nconstitutional rights of its employees.\"). \n\nFurther, in Better Government Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) \n\n190038, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the City of Chicago's argument that it would be\nrequired to search their employees' personal devices and e-mail accounts for responsive records\nin order to conduct a reasonable search. Rather, the court stated that the city \" will merely be\nrequired to ask a limited number of officials whether their personal accounts contain responsive\nrecords. * * * \nbusiness, they can so state.\" 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 25. \n\nIf the officials in question have not used their personal accounts to conduct public\n\nIn this instance, the measures described by the District appear to have been\ns request. The District has\n\nreasonably calculated to locate records responsive to\ndemonstrated that it contacted Mr. Fitzpatrick to find out whether his personal device contained\nany responsive records and Mr. Fitzpatrick responded that he possessed no records of District\nbusiness responsive to the request. Although the District itself may have searched Mr. \nFitzpatrick's personal device if he had agreed to it, the District was not required to do so in order\nto fulfill its obligation to perform a reasonable search. \nasserted that he witnessed Mr. \nFitzpatrick using his personal phone during the November 19, 2024, meeting and contended that\nhe appeared to be coached on votes, but he did not describe any specific observations supporting\nthe claim that Mr. Fitzpatrick used his phone to communicate with other Board members or\notherwise communicate about matters pertaining to public business; to the extent that Mr. \nFitzpatrick may have used his phone to communicate about private affairs during the meeting, \nrecords of such communications are not subject to the requirements of FOIA. Because this\noffice has not received any evidence that Mr. Fitzpatrick failed to perform a good faith search of\nhis personal device or to suggest that he, or the District, withheld any responsive records, we are\nunable to conclude from the available information that the District improperly responded to\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have FOIA questions, \nmy e-mail is Shannon. Barnaby@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84430 f 3d response complete sd"}
{"id":1112,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84503"],"title":"Chicago Police Department may require photo ID before releasing records under 7(1)(c)","filename":"84503, issued June 6, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":827,"summary":"The requester sought a police incident report, which the Chicago Police Department denied because the requester failed to provide photo identification to verify their identity as the victim. The PAC determined that the denial was proper under FOIA because the department could not verify the requester's identity to release private information.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested a police report but was denied because they did not provide a photo ID to prove they were the victim involved in the incident. The Attorney General's office agreed with the police department, stating that the department acted reasonably in withholding the records until the requester's identity could be confirmed. To get the records, the requester must provide the requested identification.","holding":"The Chicago Police Department did not improperly deny the FOIA request by requiring photo identification to verify the requester's identity before releasing private records.","legal_question":"Whether a public body may deny a FOIA request for personal records under section 7(1)(c) when the requester fails to provide identification to verify their status as the subject of the records.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Chicago Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request concerned an incident report involving criminal damage to a motor vehicle.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_c/Highly-personal-information/84503%2C%20issued%20June%206%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","identity verification","privacy","exemption 7(1)(c)"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"June 6, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84503; CPD FOIA No. P005759\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 6, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police\n\nDepartment ( CPD)  seeking records related to a December 2, 2024,  incident involving criminal\ndamage to a motor vehicle.  In its December 23, 2024, response to you, CPD explained that it\nrequired a government- issued photo identification in order to confirm your identity as the victim\nunderlying the requested incident report.  Absent the receipt of a photo ID, CPD denied your\nrequest\nSupp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, 2024).  Later that same day, the\nPublic Access Bureau received your Request for Review contesting CPD' s denial. \n\nin its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)( c)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)( c) ( West 2023\n\nSection 7(1)( c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"  (Emphasis added.)  Section 7(1)(c) defines \"unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy\"  as: \n\nT]he disclosure of information that is highly personal or\nobjectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's\n\n\fJune 6, 2025\nPage 2\n\nright to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in\nobtaining the information.  The disclosure of information that bears\non the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be\nconsidered an invasion of personal privacy.   \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that the disclosure of\ninformation identifying a victim of a criminal offense would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy and therefore that such information may be redacted from a record\npursuant\nto section 7(1)( c).   See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 26904,  issued April 16, \n2014, at 2.  Coleman v. F.B.I., 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 1998) (disclosure of FBI\ndocuments would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy because \" it is evident\nthat release of any portion would reveal the identities of innocent third parties, witnesses or\nvictims.\").   In addition,  section 7(1)( d)( iv) of FOIA1 exempts from disclosure,  in relevant part, \ninformation that would unavoidably disclose the identity of persons who file complaints with or\nprovide information to law enforcement agencies.   The Illinois Appellate Court has concluded\nthat records reflecting information provided by witnesses may be withheld in their entireties if\ndisclosure of the contents \" would necessarily result in the disclosure of the identity of that\nsource\" of the information and, therefore, \"redaction of the [records]  cannot be meaningfully\naccomplished.\"   Copley Press,  Inc. v. City of Springfield,  266 Ill. App.  3d 421,  426 ( 1994). \n\nIn a June 6, 2025,  e- mail to the Deputy Public Access Counselor,  CPD stated: \n\nThe requester named the victim of this criminal offense\n\nto the named victim,  we\n\nwhich was documented in the original case incident report.  Even\nthough the requester' s name is identical\nhave no way to verify this relationship without the requester\nproviding to us some type of identification to verify his identity.  \nTo protect the personal privacy of a named criminal victim, we\ndenied the request in its entirety citing 7(1)( c) which I believe to be\nthe proper course of action.  I can also confirm that there were no\narrests associated with this incident.[ 2] \n\nIt is undisputed that you sought records concerning criminal damage to a named individual' s\nmotor vehicle, which is highly personal in nature.  Although you purport to be the named crime\nvictim underlying the requested report,  CPD has been unable to confirm your identity absent a\nphoto ID.  Under these circumstances, this office concludes that CPD did not improperly deny\nto section 7(1)( c) of FOIA.   Accordingly,  this\nyour December 6, 2024,  FOIA request pursuant\n\n2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, \n\nInformation Act (FOIA) Unit #114, to Christopher Boggs (June 6, 2025). \n\n2E- mail from Michael Onesto #1739, Sergeant, Chicago Police Department, Freedom of\n\n\fJune 6, 2025\nPage 3\n\nRequest for Review is unfounded.   If you still are seeking the records responsive to your request, \nyou may wish to submit your photo ID and written consent to CPD. \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84503 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Vaughn C. Ganiyu\nAssistant General Counsel\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan Avenue, 5th Floor\nChicago,  Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice.org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police incident report of criminal damage to a vehicle","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84503/","full_text":"June 6, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84503; CPD FOIA No. P005759\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 6, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police\n\nDepartment (CPD) seeking records related to a December 2, 2024, incident involving criminal\ndamage to a motor vehicle. In its December 23, 2024, response to you, CPD explained that it\nrequired a government- issued photo identification in order to confirm your identity as the victim\nunderlying the requested incident report. Absent the receipt of a photo ID, CPD denied your\nrequest\nSupp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, 2024). Later that same day, the\nPublic Access Bureau received your Request for Review contesting CPD's denial. \n\nin its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(c) (West 2023\n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\n\nright to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in\nobtaining the information. The disclosure of information that bears\non the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be\nconsidered an invasion of personal privacy. \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that the disclosure of\ninformation identifying a victim of a criminal offense would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy and therefore that such information may be redacted from a record\npursuant\nto section 7(1)(c). See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26904, issued April 16, \n2014, at 2. Coleman v. F.B.I., 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D.D.C. 1998) (disclosure of FBI\ndocuments would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy because \" it is evident\nthat release of any portion would reveal the identities of innocent third parties, witnesses or\nvictims.\"). In addition, section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA1 exempts from disclosure, in relevant part, \ninformation that would unavoidably disclose the identity of persons who file complaints with or\nprovide information to law enforcement agencies. The Illinois Appellate Court has concluded\nthat records reflecting information provided by witnesses may be withheld in their entireties if\ndisclosure of the contents \" would necessarily result in the disclosure of the identity of that\nsource\" of the information and, therefore, \"redaction of the [records] cannot be meaningfully\naccomplished.\" Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 266 Ill. App. 3d 421, 426 (1994). \n\nIn a June 6, 2025, e- mail to the Deputy Public Access Counselor, CPD stated: \n\nThe requester named the victim of this criminal offense\n\nto the named victim, we\n\nwhich was documented in the original case incident report. Even\nthough the requester's name is identical\nhave no way to verify this relationship without the requester\nproviding to us some type of identification to verify his identity. \nTo protect the personal privacy of a named criminal victim, we\ndenied the request in its entirety citing 7(1)(c) which I believe to be\nthe proper course of action. I can also confirm that there were no\narrests associated with this incident.[ 2] \n\nIt is undisputed that you sought records concerning criminal damage to a named individual's\nmotor vehicle, which is highly personal in nature. Although you purport to be the named crime\nvictim underlying the requested report, CPD has been unable to confirm your identity absent a\nphoto ID. Under these circumstances, this office concludes that CPD did not improperly deny\nto section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. Accordingly, this\nyour December 6, 2024, FOIA request pursuant\n\n2024. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, \n\nRequest for Review is unfounded. If you still are seeking the records responsive to your request, \nyou may wish to submit your photo ID and written consent to CPD. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84503 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Vaughn C. Ganiyu\nAssistant General Counsel\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan Avenue, 5th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice.org"}
{"id":1113,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84510"],"title":"City of Harrisburg failed to properly direct FOIA requester to records on website","filename":"84510, issued January 17, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":675,"summary":"The requester sought records of the City of Harrisburg's income sources for 2022-2024, and the PAC investigated whether the City properly directed the requester to its website under section 8.5 of FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked the City of Harrisburg for financial records, and the City told him to look on their website without providing a specific link or instructions. The PAC found that while the City eventually provided the records, they failed to follow the law requiring them to clearly direct the requester to where the documents are located online. The case was closed because the requester ultimately received the information.","holding":"The PAC closed the matter as moot because the City provided the requested information during the review process, though it noted the City failed to properly direct the requester to the specific location of the records online.","legal_question":"Whether a public body satisfies its FOIA obligations by directing a requester to a website without providing specific instructions or a direct link to the requested records as required by 5 ILCS 140/8.5.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/8.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Harrisburg","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed as moot","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"fees","subject_description":"The request concerned the City's sources of income and amounts for the years 2022, 2023, and 2024.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/8.5/8.5_a/84510%2C%20issued%20January%2017%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["website records","FOIA response","financial records","public access"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"January 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable John McPeek\nMayor\nCity of Harrisburg\n110 East Locust Street\nHarrisburg,  Illinois 62946\nmayormcpeek@cityofharrisburgil.com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84510\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. McPeek: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn December 17, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City\nof Harrisburg (City) seeking:  \" a copy of all sources of income and amounts from those sources\nof income to the city in 2022/ 2023/ 2024\" 1 On December 23,  2024,  the City responded by stating\nthat the requested information was available within \"financial statements\"  on the City's website, \nbut that information for 2024 was not yet available.   That same day, \nsubmitted the\nabove-referenced Request for Review contesting the City's response.  Specifically, \n\ncontended that he should not have to search through the City' s records and that the\n\nCity should e-mail him the records. \n\nSection 8.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/8.5(a) ( West 2022)) provides that \"a public\nbody is not required to copy a public record that is published on the public body' s website.   The\n\n1E- mail from\n\nto John McPeek, [ Mayor], [ City of Harrisburg] ( December 17, 2024). \n\n\fThe Honorable John McPeek\nJanuary 17, 2025\nPage 2\n\npublic body shall notify the requester that the public record is available online and direct the\nrequester to the website where the record can be reasonably accessed.\" \n\nOn December 30, 2024,  a Supervising Attorney in the Public Access Bureau\n\nattempted to access records responsive to\nrequest on the City's website, but was\nunable to discern the records to which the City' s response referred.   On January 7, 2025,  the City\nexplained in an e-mail to this office that the information requested by\nfound within the audit reports on its website at https:// www. harrisburgillinois. com/ public-\nnotices.  The City further identified two portions of the reports which would contain the\ninformation:   Statement of Activities,  and Statement of Revenues,  Expenditures,  and Changes in\nFund Balances.  This office's review of the 2022 and 2023 audit reports confirmed that each\ndocument provides information regarding the City' s sources of income and the amount of\na Supervising Attorney in the Public\nrevenue from those sources.  In an e-mail to\nAccess Bureau described the location of the responsive information within the documents on the\nCity's website.  \n\ncould be\n\nBecause FOIA does not require a public body to e-mail copies of records that are\n\nposted online and because\ncontained within the posted records, the allegation that the City failed to provide the requested\ninformation has been resolved.   See Duncan Publishing,  Inc. v. City of Chicago,  304 Ill. App.  3d\n778, 782 (1999) (\" Once an agency produces all records related to a plaintiff's request, the merits\nof a plaintiff' s claim for relief,  in the form of production of information,  becomes moot.\"). \n\nhas been advised of the responsive information\n\nNonetheless,  this office reminds the City that,  by its plain language,  section 8.5 of\n\nFOIA imposes certain obligations for a public body that responds to a request by stating that\nresponsive records,  to the extent that they exist,  are on its website.   Section 8.5(a)  expressly\nrequires that \"[ t]he public body shall notify the requester that the public record is available online\nand direct the requester to the website where the record can be reasonably accessed.\"  \nEmphasis added.)  The City's December 23, 2024, response did not direct\nlocation of the records responsive to his request,  nor did it reasonably identify those records.  \nThe City should be mindful of its obligation to provide the proper location of records available\non its website in response to future FOIA requests. \n\nto the\n\n\fThe Honorable John McPeek\nJanuary 17, 2025\nPage 3\n\nThis letter serves to close this matter.  If you have any questions, please contact\n\nme at ( 773)  590- 7878 or benjamin. silver@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84510 f unf mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A city's income sources and amounts for three years","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84510/","full_text":"January 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable John McPeek\nMayor\nCity of Harrisburg\n110 East Locust Street\nHarrisburg, Illinois 62946\nmayormcpeek@cityofharrisburgil.com\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84510\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. McPeek: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nOn December 17, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City\nof Harrisburg (City) seeking: \" a copy of all sources of income and amounts from those sources\nof income to the city in 2022/ 2023/ 2024\" 1 On December 23, 2024, the City responded by stating\nthat the requested information was available within \"financial statements\" on the City's website, \nbut that information for 2024 was not yet available. That same day, \nsubmitted the\nabove-referenced Request for Review contesting the City's response. Specifically, \n\ncontended that he should not have to search through the City's records and that the\n\nCity should e-mail him the records. \n\nSection 8.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/8.5(a) (West 2022)) provides that \"a public\nbody is not required to copy a public record that is published on the public body's website. The\n\npublic body shall notify the requester that the public record is available online and direct the\nrequester to the website where the record can be reasonably accessed.\" \n\nOn December 30, 2024, a Supervising Attorney in the Public Access Bureau\n\nattempted to access records responsive to\nrequest on the City's website, but was\nunable to discern the records to which the City's response referred. On January 7, 2025, the City\nexplained in an e-mail to this office that the information requested by\nfound within the audit reports on its website at https:// www. harrisburgillinois. com/ public-\nnotices. The City further identified two portions of the reports which would contain the\ninformation: Statement of Activities, and Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in\nFund Balances. This office's review of the 2022 and 2023 audit reports confirmed that each\ndocument provides information regarding the City's sources of income and the amount of\na Supervising Attorney in the Public\nrevenue from those sources. In an e-mail to\nAccess Bureau described the location of the responsive information within the documents on the\nCity's website. \n\ncould be\n\nBecause FOIA does not require a public body to e-mail copies of records that are\n\nposted online and because\ncontained within the posted records, the allegation that the City failed to provide the requested\ninformation has been resolved. See Duncan Publishing, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 3d\n778, 782 (1999) (\" Once an agency produces all records related to a plaintiff's request, the merits\nof a plaintiff's claim for relief, in the form of production of information, becomes moot.\"). \n\nhas been advised of the responsive information\n\nNonetheless, this office reminds the City that, by its plain language, section 8.5 of\n\nFOIA imposes certain obligations for a public body that responds to a request by stating that\nresponsive records, to the extent that they exist, are on its website. Section 8.5(a) expressly\nrequires that \"[ t]he public body shall notify the requester that the public record is available online\nand direct the requester to the website where the record can be reasonably accessed.\" \nEmphasis added.) The City's December 23, 2024, response did not direct\nlocation of the records responsive to his request, nor did it reasonably identify those records. \nThe City should be mindful of its obligation to provide the proper location of records available\n\nThis letter serves to close this matter. If you have any questions, please contact\n\nme at (773) 590- 7878 or benjamin. silver@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84510 f unf mun"}
{"id":1114,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84528"],"title":"Village of Libertyville did not violate FOIA by withholding body camera footage under 7.5(cc) and allowing a non-police official to respond","filename":"84528, issued January 6, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1464,"summary":"The requester challenged the Village of Libertyville's denial of body camera footage, arguing that the Village improperly responded to a request directed to the Police Department and that they were denied footage where they were the subject. The PAC determined the Village's response was proper and that the request was unfounded.","plain_summary":"This non-binding determination addresses whether the Village of Libertyville violated FOIA (5 ILCS 140) by withholding portions of officer body-worn camera footage under 5 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) and the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-20(b)). The Public Access Bureau held that the Village did not violate FOIA, finding no basis to conclude that any footage in which the requester was the subject of the encounter had been improperly withheld. It reasoned that under the Body Camera Act, a person may obtain non-flagged footage only to the extent they are 'the subject of the encounter' -- meaning they personally interacted with an officer in the course of law-enforcement activity -- and that redacted segments showing officers talking among themselves or performing administrative tasks do not meet that standard. The Bureau also concluded that FOIA does not bar a municipality from responding to a request directed to its police department, since Freedom of Information officers or their designees may issue responses on the public body's behalf. The matter, involving the Village of Libertyville Police Department's release of body camera footage, was closed with the Request for Review deemed unfounded.","holding":"A public body does not violate FOIA by withholding body-worn camera footage under 5 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) and the Body Camera Act's 50 ILCS 706/10-20(b) when the withheld portions do not depict the requester interacting with law enforcement as the 'subject of the encounter,' and a municipality may lawfully respond to a FOIA request directed to its police department through another municipal official or designee.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Libertyville violated FOIA by having the Village Administrator respond to a request directed to the Police Department and by withholding body camera footage under section 7.5(cc).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(cc)"],"public_body":"Village of Libertyville","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought body camera recordings of a specific police officer from a specific date.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3.5/Designees/84528%2C%20issued%20January%206%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","FOIA request","Village of Libertyville"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"January 6, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 84528\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 17, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of\n\nLibertyville ( Village)  Police Department ( Police Department)  seeking copies of body camera\nrecordings for Officer Manninen from October 17, 2024.   On December 24, 2024,  the Deputy\nVillage Administrator responded to you that you had already been provided the body camera\nfootage from the officer in which you are the subject,  and that the unflagged footage in which\nyou are not the subject is not allowed to be disclosed to you under the Law Enforcement Officer-\nWorn Body Camera Act (Body Camera Act) 1 pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA. 2 On\nDecember 26, 2024,  you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the\nVillage' s response.   You argued that the Village abused its power because your request was\ndirected to the Police Department,  but the Village responded to your request.   You also argued\nthat you were not provided the body camera footage from when you were the subject of the\nencounter captured on the recording.  \n\n150 ILCS 706/10-20 ( West 2022).  \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n2024;  103- 605,  effective July 1, 2024;  103- 636, effective July 1, 2024;  103- 786,  effective August 7, 2024;  103- 859, \neffective August 9, 2024;  103- 991,  effective August 9, 2024;  103- 1049,  effective August 9, 2024. \n\n\fJanuary 6, 2025\nPage 2\n\nAs an initial matter,  the Police Department\n\nis an entity of the Village,  and FOIA\n\ndoes not prohibit a municipality such as the Village from responding on behalf of its police\ndepartment.   Accordingly,  the fact that the Deputy Village Administrator responded to your\nrequest rather than an employee of the Police Department has no bearing on the validity of that\nresponse.  \n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\"   Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act provides,  in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\n\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy,  at the time of the recording,  any\nrecording which is flagged,  due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm,  use of force,  arrest or detention,  or\nresulting death or bodily harm,  shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness;  and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject' s\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph ( 1) of this\n\nsubsection ( b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint,  discharge of a firearm,  use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request,  the law enforcement agency shall\ndisclose,  in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject' s attorney,  or\nthe officer or his or her legal representative.  ( Emphasis\nadded.) \n\n\fJanuary 6, 2025\nPage 3\n\nUnder these provisions of the Body Camera Act, \" the subject of the encounter\n\ncaptured on the recording\"  may obtain a copy of a non-flagged officer worn body camera\nrecording,  to the extent that the footage is not otherwise exempt from disclosure under a FOIA\nexemption.   Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No 19-001, issued January 9, 2019,  at 10.  The Public\nAccess Bureau has previously determined that \" the subject of the encounter\"  means a person\nwho appeared in the recording and \" interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a\nlaw enforcement activity.\" 3\n\nOn December 30, 2024,  to clarify the context underlying your FOIA request,  the\nAssistant Attorney General ( AAG) in the Public Access Bureau assigned to the matter contacted\nthe Village attorney,  who informed the AAG that you already received all of the body camera\nfootage in which you were the subject of the recording from the date in question.   The Village\nattorney also advised that Officer Manninen has no other flagged footage from that date.   The\nAAG asked the Village attorney for copies of the recordings you received for this office's\nreview;  she provided copies of those recordings that same day.   On January 2, 2025,  the AAG\nasked the Village to provide copies of the correspondence in which it sent you copies of the\nrecordings;  that same day, the Village provided correspondence from four separate,  but related, \nFOIA requests in which you collectively sought,  among other things,  the body camera footage\nfrom your encounters with law enforcement on the specified date in this request.   On January 3, \n2025,  you stated in an e-mail to the AAG that you \" only received a partial recording of the\nOfficer' s Manninen BWC[.]\" 4  ( Emphasis in original.)  \n\nBased on this office's review of the information provided,  you submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest on Village letterhead on October 28, 2024,  seeking the body worn camera footage for the\nofficers ( including Officer Manninen)  associated with a specific police report on October 17, \n2024. 5 You were provided with three links to copies of the responsive footage on October 30, \n2024. 6 This office has reviewed the footage you were provided that day:   it appears that you\nwere provided with all of the footage in which you were interacting with law enforcement.   In\nthe December 30, 2024,  telephone conversation,  the Village attorney noted there were two\ndiscrete portions of the recordings that were redacted because one portion was of officers talking\nto each other and the other portion was where an officer was doing administrative work.  \nHowever,  because neither of those portions depict you interacting with law enforcement officers\nin the course of law-enforcement activities,  you were not the subject of the encounter captured\n\n3ll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48793,  issued August 31, 2017, at 4.  \n\n4E- mail from\n\nto Katherine Goldsmith ( January 3, 2025).  \n\n5Village of Libertyville Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request Form submitted by\n\nOctober 28, 2024).  \n\n6E- mail from Vanessa Wells,  Police Records,  Libertyville Police Department,  to [\n\nOctober 30, 2024).  \n\n\fJanuary 6, 2025\nPage 4\n\non those redacted portions.   Accordingly,  those portions are not subject to disclosure under the\nBody Camera Act. 7\n\nThis office has no basis to conclude that the Village improperly withheld any\n\nbody camera footage in which you were the subject of the encounter from the specified date in\nyour FOIA request.   With respect to your assertion that the Police Department' s records office\nrather than the Village Deputy Administrator should have responded to your request,  FOIA\npermits the Police Department to delegate the responsibility for responding to requests and it is\nnot uncommon for village officials to respond to FOIA requests on behalf of their police\ndepartments.   See 5 ILCS 140/ 3.5(a) ( West 2022) (\" Freedom of Information officers,  or their\ndesignees,  shall receive requests submitted to the public body under this Act, ensure that the\npublic body responds to requests in a timely fashion,  and issue responses under this Act.\"  \nEmphasis added.)).   Therefore,  this office has determined that the Village' s response to your\nrequest did not violate FOIA.   \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  If you have questions,  please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84528 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Debbie Perlini\nPolice Records\nLibertyville Police Department\n200 East Cook Avenue\nLibertyville,  Illinois 60048\ndperlini@libertyville. com\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Courtney P. Willits\n\n7The Body Camera Act defines \" law enforcement- related encounters or activities\"  as any\n\ninstance in which the officer is enforcing the laws of the municipality,  county,  or State. * * * [ but]  does\nnot include when the officer is completing paperwork alone,  is participating in training in a classroom setting,  or is\nonly in the presence of another law enforcement officer.\"   50 ILCS 706/ 10- 10 ( West 2022).   \n\n\fJanuary 6, 2025\nPage 5\n\nElrod Friedman LLP\n325 North LaSalle Street,  Suite 450\nChicago,  Illinois 60654\nCourtney. Willits@ElrodFriedman. com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Body-camera footage of a police officer on a specific date","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84528/","full_text":"January 6, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84528\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 17, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of\n\nLibertyville (Village) Police Department (Police Department) seeking copies of body camera\nrecordings for Officer Manninen from October 17, 2024. On December 24, 2024, the Deputy\nVillage Administrator responded to you that you had already been provided the body camera\nfootage from the officer in which you are the subject, and that the unflagged footage in which\nyou are not the subject is not allowed to be disclosed to you under the Law Enforcement Officer-\nWorn Body Camera Act (Body Camera Act) 1 pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA. 2 On\nDecember 26, 2024, you submitted the above- referenced Request for Review contesting the\nVillage's response. You argued that the Village abused its power because your request was\ndirected to the Police Department, but the Village responded to your request. You also argued\nthat you were not provided the body camera footage from when you were the subject of the\nencounter captured on the recording. \n\n150 ILCS 706/10-20 (West 2022). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 636, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 786, effective August 7, 2024; 103- 859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103- 991, effective August 9, 2024; 103- 1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\nAs an initial matter, the Police Department\n\nis an entity of the Village, and FOIA\n\ndoes not prohibit a municipality such as the Village from responding on behalf of its police\ndepartment. Accordingly, the fact that the Deputy Village Administrator responded to your\nrequest rather than an employee of the Police Department has no bearing on the validity of that\nresponse. \n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\" Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act provides, in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\n\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\nUnder these provisions of the Body Camera Act, \" the subject of the encounter\n\ncaptured on the recording\" may obtain a copy of a non-flagged officer worn body camera\nrecording, to the extent that the footage is not otherwise exempt from disclosure under a FOIA\nexemption. Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No 19-001, issued January 9, 2019, at 10. The Public\nAccess Bureau has previously determined that \" the subject of the encounter\" means a person\nwho appeared in the recording and \" interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a\nlaw enforcement activity.\" 3\n\nOn December 30, 2024, to clarify the context underlying your FOIA request, the\nAssistant Attorney General (AAG) in the Public Access Bureau assigned to the matter contacted\nthe Village attorney, who informed the AAG that you already received all of the body camera\nfootage in which you were the subject of the recording from the date in question. The Village\nattorney also advised that Officer Manninen has no other flagged footage from that date. The\nAAG asked the Village attorney for copies of the recordings you received for this office's\nreview; she provided copies of those recordings that same day. On January 2, 2025, the AAG\nasked the Village to provide copies of the correspondence in which it sent you copies of the\nrecordings; that same day, the Village provided correspondence from four separate, but related, \nFOIA requests in which you collectively sought, among other things, the body camera footage\nfrom your encounters with law enforcement on the specified date in this request. On January 3, \n2025, you stated in an e-mail to the AAG that you \" only received a partial recording of the\nOfficer's Manninen BWC[.]\" 4 (Emphasis in original.) \n\nBased on this office's review of the information provided, you submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest on Village letterhead on October 28, 2024, seeking the body worn camera footage for the\nofficers (including Officer Manninen) associated with a specific police report on October 17, \n2024. 5 You were provided with three links to copies of the responsive footage on October 30, \n2024. 6 This office has reviewed the footage you were provided that day: it appears that you\nwere provided with all of the footage in which you were interacting with law enforcement. In\nthe December 30, 2024, telephone conversation, the Village attorney noted there were two\ndiscrete portions of the recordings that were redacted because one portion was of officers talking\nto each other and the other portion was where an officer was doing administrative work. \nHowever, because neither of those portions depict you interacting with law enforcement officers\nin the course of law-enforcement activities, you were not the subject of the encounter captured\n\n3ll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48793, issued August 31, 2017, at 4. \n\non those redacted portions. Accordingly, those portions are not subject to disclosure under the\nBody Camera Act. 7\n\nThis office has no basis to conclude that the Village improperly withheld any\n\nbody camera footage in which you were the subject of the encounter from the specified date in\nyour FOIA request. With respect to your assertion that the Police Department's records office\nrather than the Village Deputy Administrator should have responded to your request, FOIA\npermits the Police Department to delegate the responsibility for responding to requests and it is\nnot uncommon for village officials to respond to FOIA requests on behalf of their police\ndepartments. See 5 ILCS 140/ 3.5(a) (West 2022) (\" Freedom of Information officers, or their\ndesignees, shall receive requests submitted to the public body under this Act, ensure that the\npublic body responds to requests in a timely fashion, and issue responses under this Act.\" \nEmphasis added.)). Therefore, this office has determined that the Village's response to your\nrequest did not violate FOIA. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. If you have questions, please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84528 f unf mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Debbie Perlini\nPolice Records\nLibertyville Police Department\n200 East Cook Avenue\nLibertyville, Illinois 60048\ndperlini@libertyville. com\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Courtney P. Willits\n\n7 The Body Camera Act defines \" law enforcement- related encounters or activities\" as any\n\ninstance in which the officer is enforcing the laws of the municipality, county, or State. * * * [ but] does\nnot include when the officer is completing paperwork alone, is participating in training in a classroom setting, or is\nonly in the presence of another law enforcement officer.\" 50 ILCS 706/ 10- 10 (West 2022). \n\nElrod Friedman LLP\n325 North LaSalle Street, Suite 450\nChicago, Illinois 60654\nCourtney. Willits@ElrodFriedman. com"}
{"id":1115,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84547"],"title":"Markham Police Department not required to provide destroyed body camera footage","filename":"84547, issued January 24, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":727,"summary":"The requester sought body camera footage from a July 2024 incident, but the Markham Police Department stated no footage existed because it had not been preserved. The PAC determined the Department's response was proper because the footage was not required to be retained under the Body Camera Act and was no longer in the Department's possession.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested police body camera footage from a specific incident, but the police department said they no longer had the video. The Attorney General's office investigated and found that the police were not legally required to keep the video because the incident did not meet the criteria for mandatory preservation under the Body Camera Act. Therefore, the police did not improperly withhold any records.","holding":"The Markham Police Department did not violate FOIA because it did not possess the requested records at the time of the request.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates FOIA by failing to provide records that it no longer possesses and was not legally required to retain.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/1.2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Markham Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought body camera footage from a July 2024 incident that the police department stated was no longer in its possession.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/not-flagged-not-subject/84547%2C%20issued%20January%2024%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","record retention","FOIA request"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"January 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84547\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons that follow,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 4, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Markham Police\nDepartment ( Department)  seeking,  in relevant part,  copies of camera footage from a July 13, \n2024, incident at a specific address.   On December 10, 2024, the Department responded by\ninforming you that no responsive video footage existed.   On December 27,  2024,  this office\nreceived your Request for Review contesting the Department's response. \n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   Under FOIA, \nthe adequacy of a public body's search for responsive records is judged by a standard of\nreasonableness and depends upon the particular facts of the case.   Better Government Ass' n v. \nCity of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31.  However, \"[ a]  requester is entitled only to\nrecords that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\"   Yeager v. Drug Enforcement\nAdministration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982). \n\nOn January 10, 2025, the Deputy Public Access Counselor contacted the\n\nDepartment' s FOIA officer and requested an explanation of its search for responsive footage.   On\nJanuary 21, 2025, Commander Eric. S. Blohm responded, explaining: \n\n\fJanuary 24, 2025\nPage 2\n\nI ran a search in our report management system and found\n\nthe incident cataloged under incident number 24MK18181.  Under\nthis incident,  one police report was generated.  I reviewed the report\nand redacted portions that are excluded pursuant to statute.   \n\nI then conducted a search for \"police cam footage.\"   This\n\nincident occurred at a private residence.   Therefore,  the only\npossible \"police cam footage\" that may exist is body worn camera\nfootage.  I am the records custodian for the police department and\nas part of my duties, I am responsible for the management of body\ncamera footage.   I conducted a search of our body worn camera\nfootage which is stored by Axon at Evidence.com pursuant to our\ncontract with them.   No body worn camera footage was found.  \n\nI again reviewed the report and found that body worn\ncamera was referenced in the report, but no arrest was made in this\nincident.   I reviewed the audit records of the body camera\nrecordings and found that they were not flagged.  Because the\nfootage was not flagged,  they were deleted after the 90- day\nretention period as required by our department's policy.[1] \n\nSections 10-20(7) and 7(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera\n\nAct (Body Camera Act) (50 ILCS 706/10-20(7), 7(B) (West 2022)) provides, in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made on officer- worn cameras must be\n\nretained by the law enforcement agency or by the camera\nvendor used by the agency,  on a recording medium for a\nperiod of 90 days. \n\nB) Following the 90-day storage period, any and\n\nall recordings made with an officer- worn body camera must\nbe destroyed,  unless any encounter captured on the\nrecording has been flagged. \n\nBased on the Department' s explanation to this office and the information\n\nsubmitted with this Request for Review, the incident underlying the requested body camera\nfootage did not result in an arrest or otherwise involve an encounter that required the recording\nto be flagged under the Body Camera Act.  Therefore, the footage was not required to be\npreserved beyond 90 days under that statute.   Because the Department has confirmed that it no\n\n2025). \n\n1E- mail from Eric S. Blohm, Markham Police Department, to Christopher Boggs (January 21, \n\n\fJanuary 24, 2025\nPage 3\n\nlonger possessed the body camera footage you were seeking at the time the Department\nreceived your FOIA request, your allegation that the Department improperly withheld\nresponsive footage is unfounded. \n\nIf you have any questions,  please contact me at the Springfield address on the first\n\npage of this letter.  This letter closes this matter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84547 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nCommander Eric S. Blohm *315\nMarkham Police Department\n16313 Kedzie Parkway\nMarkham,  Illinois 60428\neblohm@CityofMarkham.net\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police body-camera footage of a July 2024 incident","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84547/","full_text":"January 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84547\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 4, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Markham Police\nDepartment (Department) seeking, in relevant part, copies of camera footage from a July 13, \n2024, incident at a specific address. On December 10, 2024, the Department responded by\ninforming you that no responsive video footage existed. On December 27, 2024, this office\nreceived your Request for Review contesting the Department's response. \n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). Under FOIA, \nthe adequacy of a public body's search for responsive records is judged by a standard of\nreasonableness and depends upon the particular facts of the case. Better Government Ass' n v. \nCity of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. However, \"[ a] requester is entitled only to\nrecords that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug Enforcement\nAdministration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982). \n\nOn January 10, 2025, the Deputy Public Access Counselor contacted the\n\nDepartment's FOIA officer and requested an explanation of its search for responsive footage. On\n\nI ran a search in our report management system and found\n\nthe incident cataloged under incident number 24MK18181. Under\nthis incident, one police report was generated. I reviewed the report\nand redacted portions that are excluded pursuant to statute. \n\nI then conducted a search for \"police cam footage.\" This\n\nincident occurred at a private residence. Therefore, the only\npossible \"police cam footage\" that may exist is body worn camera\nfootage. I am the records custodian for the police department and\nas part of my duties, I am responsible for the management of body\ncamera footage. I conducted a search of our body worn camera\nfootage which is stored by Axon at Evidence.com pursuant to our\ncontract with them. No body worn camera footage was found. \n\nI again reviewed the report and found that body worn\ncamera was referenced in the report, but no arrest was made in this\nincident. I reviewed the audit records of the body camera\nrecordings and found that they were not flagged. Because the\nfootage was not flagged, they were deleted after the 90- day\nretention period as required by our department's policy.[1] \n\nSections 10-20(7) and 7(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera\n\nAct (Body Camera Act) (50 ILCS 706/10-20(7), 7(B) (West 2022)) provides, in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made on officer- worn cameras must be\n\nretained by the law enforcement agency or by the camera\nvendor used by the agency, on a recording medium for a\nperiod of 90 days. \n\nB) Following the 90-day storage period, any and\n\nall recordings made with an officer- worn body camera must\nbe destroyed, unless any encounter captured on the\nrecording has been flagged. \n\nBased on the Department's explanation to this office and the information\n\nsubmitted with this Request for Review, the incident underlying the requested body camera\nfootage did not result in an arrest or otherwise involve an encounter that required the recording\nto be flagged under the Body Camera Act. Therefore, the footage was not required to be\npreserved beyond 90 days under that statute. Because the Department has confirmed that it no\n\nlonger possessed the body camera footage you were seeking at the time the Department\nreceived your FOIA request, your allegation that the Department improperly withheld\nresponsive footage is unfounded. \n\nIf you have any questions, please contact me at the Springfield address on the first\n\npage of this letter. This letter closes this matter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84547 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nCommander Eric S. Blohm *315\nMarkham Police Department\n16313 Kedzie Parkway\nMarkham, Illinois 60428\neblohm@CityofMarkham.net"}
{"id":1116,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-27","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84561"],"title":"Illinois State Police properly withheld records about license plate tracking data under 7(1)(c)","filename":"84561, issued January 27, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1301,"summary":"The requester sought various records from the Illinois State Police (ISP) regarding Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and surveillance data, but the PAC determined the ISP conducted an adequate search and that any existing records were exempt from disclosure.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked the Illinois State Police for records related to license plate tracking and surveillance data. The police department stated they could not find any records, and the Attorney General's office agreed that the police performed a proper search and that any records they might have are legally protected from public release. This means the request was denied and the case is now closed.","holding":"The Illinois State Police did not violate FOIA because it conducted a reasonable search for responsive records and properly asserted that any existing data is exempt from disclosure.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois State Police conducted an adequate search for records responsive to a FOIA request and whether the withheld records were properly exempt from disclosure.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":"Requester (name redacted in source document)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought records related to Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), surveillance data, and investigative reports maintained by the Illinois State Police.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d-7/84561%2C%20issued%20January%2027%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police records","ALPR","surveillance","FOIA search","exempt records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"January 27, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 84561\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 15, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois State Police\n\nISP)  seeking: \n\nALPRs\")  that are in\n\nconsidered on the Hot\n\nAny and All Records of\nthe electronic database for the Illinois State Police’ s\nDepartment,  605 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq.  \nAny and All Reports of\nList or Hot Plates,  and a map of my travels recorded by the\nIllinois State Police cameras on the expressway in Cook\nCounty –     I-90/94  ( Dan Ryan),   I-94  ( Bishop Ford),   I-90\nKennedy and Jane Addams tollway),  and I-57. \nAny and All Investigative Reports of\ndiscovered in the Illinois State Police’ s electronic database. \ncurrently under\nAny and All Field Reports of\nthe Illinois State Police’ s Department control. \nAny and All Records of\nrelated to electronic\nsurveillance under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and\n\n\fJanuary 27, 2025\nPage 2\n\nSafe Streets Act of 1968 ( 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510- 2522)[ 1] \nEmphasis in original.) \n\nOn December 27, 2024,  ISP responded and informed you that \"[ a]  reasonable\n\nsearch for the requested records was conducted with the information provided and no responsive\nrecords were located.\" 2 On that same date, you submitted a Request for Review with this office. \n\nOn January 13, 2025 and January 15, 2025,  after being contacted by a Senior\n\nAssistant Attorney General with this office, ISP provided an additional explanation for its\nresponse.   ISP provided further clarification on January 23, 2025. \n\nFor the first part of the request,  ISP stated that any responsive ALPR data would\n\nbe exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA, which applies to \"[ i]nformation\ngathered or records created from the use of automatic license plate readers in connection with\nSection 2-130 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.\" 3 Correspondingly,  section 2-130(d) of the Illinois\nVehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/2-130(d) (West 2023 Supp.))  states that \" ALPR information shall be\nheld confidentially to the fullest extent of the law.\"   Neither that provision nor the exemption in\nsection 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA contains an exception that permits individuals to obtain ALPR\ninformation about their own vehicles.  The ALPR hits you requested constitute information\ngathered or records created from the use of ALPRs.   Because such information must be kept\nconfidential under section 2-130(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code,  and because that statute\nprovides no exception that would allow an individual to obtain ALPR information for their own\nvehicle pursuant to FOIA, any records responsive to the first part of your request would be\nexempt from disclosure under section 7(1)( d-7) of FOIA.   \n\nFor the second part of the request seeking reports of yourself \" considered on the\nHot List or Hot Plates,\"  ISP stated that its \"records management section performed a search of\nthe requester’ s name and dob and no reports were located.  Also, the Division of Patrol advised\nthey've had no interaction with this requester,  and the Division of Criminal Investigation found\nnothing within their search.\" 4 ISP further explained that \" [ n]o reports were located within any\n\n1Letter from\n\nto Illinois State Police ( December 15, 2024).   \n\n2Letter from Sarah Wheeler,  Illinois State Police, Freedom of Information Act Officer to [\n\nDecember 27, 2024).   \n\n2024).  \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(d-7) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\n4E- mail from Rhiann M Martynowski, [ FOIA Appeals Manager,  Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police]  to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of\nthe Attorney General] ( January 23, 2025)  \n\n\fJanuary 27, 2025\nPage 3\n\ncase management systems utilized within the years requested.\" 5 ISP also noted that any\nunderlying data Hot List or Hot plates data that would be included in reports generated in its case\nmanagement system or that could otherwise be considered responsive to the second part of the\nrequest would derive from exempt ALPR information discussed above or the Law Enforcement\nAgency Data System ( LEADS).   Data maintained in LEADS is exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)( a)  of FOIA,  which applies to \"[ i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure\nby federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.\" 6 Section\n1240. 80(d) of title 20 of the Administrative Code ( 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 1240. 80(d) (2022),  last\namended at 42 Ill. Reg.  775, \" effective December 27, 2017)  provides that \" LEADS data shall not\nbe disseminated to any individual or organization that is not legally authorized to have access to\nthe information.\" 7 See also Better Gov't Ass'n v. Zaruba, 2014 IL App (2d) 140071, ¶ 27 (\" The\nregulations make clear that the public is not entitled to view or possess data that is transmitted\nthrough,  received through,  or stored in LEADS.\").   Members of the public,  such as yourself,  are\nnot among the parties authorized to access LEADS data under section 1240.30(c) of title 20 of\nthe Administrative Code ( 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 1240.30(c) (2017),  last amended at 23 Ill. Reg. \n7521,  effective June 18, 1999). \n\nFinally,  for the third, fourth,  and fifth parts of your request,  ISP states that \"[ a] \n\nsearch was performed by ISP’ s Records Management Section,  Division of Criminal Investigation\nand Division of Patrol [ DOP]  with negative results.  No records were located,  and DOP further\ncommented they have no record of ever having contact with the requester.\" 8 ISP further detailed\nits search in a separate January 14, 2025,  e-mail to this office, explaining \" a search was\ncompleted using the requester' s name and date of birth. Further,  a search was conducted in the\nfollowing databases that were/ are used in the years 2018- present:  TraCS,  Indices,  and\nDocuware.\" 9\n\n5E- mail from Rhiann M Martynowski, [ FOIA Appeals Manager,  Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police]  to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of\nthe Attorney General] ( January 23, 2025)  \n\n65 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n2024).  \n\nWest 2022)). \n\n7That provision implements section 7 of the Illinois Criminal Identification Act (20 ILCS 2630/ 7\n\n8E-mail from Rhiann M Martynowski,  FOIA Appeals Manager,  Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of\nthe Attorney General] ( January 13, 2025). \n\n9E- mail from Rhiann M Martynowski,  FOIA Appeals Manager,  Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of\nthe Attorney General] ( January 15, 2025). \n\n\fJanuary 27, 2025\nPage 4\n\nISP's explanations demonstrate that it took measures that were reasonably-\n\ncalculated to locate non- exempt responsive records.   This office has not received any information\nindicating that ISP did not adequately search for records or that it is withholding responsive\nrecords subject to disclosure under FOIA.  If ISP maintains any ALPR information or LEADS\ndata that concerns you, that information is exempt from disclosure for the reasons explained\nabove.    Accordingly,  this office concludes that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter.   Thank you.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84561 f unf sa\n\ncc:     Via electronic mail\n\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nFOIA Appeals Manager\nIllinois State Police\n801 South 7th Street,  Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police records on Automated License Plate Reader data and investigations","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84561/","full_text":"January 27, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84561\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 15, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois State Police\n\nISP) seeking: \n\nALPRs\") that are in\n\nconsidered on the Hot\n\nAny and All Records of\nthe electronic database for the Illinois State Police’ s\nDepartment, 605 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. \nAny and All Reports of\nList or Hot Plates, and a map of my travels recorded by the\nIllinois State Police cameras on the expressway in Cook\nCounty – I-90/94 (Dan Ryan), I-94 (Bishop Ford), I-90\nKennedy and Jane Addams tollway), and I-57. \nAny and All Investigative Reports of\ndiscovered in the Illinois State Police’ s electronic database. \n\nSafe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510- 2522)[ 1] \nEmphasis in original.) \n\nOn December 27, 2024, ISP responded and informed you that \"[ a] reasonable\n\nsearch for the requested records was conducted with the information provided and no responsive\nrecords were located.\" 2 On that same date, you submitted a Request for Review with this office. \n\nOn January 13, 2025 and January 15, 2025, after being contacted by a Senior\n\nAssistant Attorney General with this office, ISP provided an additional explanation for its\nresponse. ISP provided further clarification on January 23, 2025. \n\nFor the first part of the request, ISP stated that any responsive ALPR data would\n\nbe exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA, which applies to \"[ i]nformation\ngathered or records created from the use of automatic license plate readers in connection with\nSection 2-130 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.\" 3 Correspondingly, section 2-130(d) of the Illinois\nVehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2-130(d) (West 2023 Supp.)) states that \" ALPR information shall be\nheld confidentially to the fullest extent of the law.\" Neither that provision nor the exemption in\nsection 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA contains an exception that permits individuals to obtain ALPR\ninformation about their own vehicles. The ALPR hits you requested constitute information\ngathered or records created from the use of ALPRs. Because such information must be kept\nconfidential under section 2-130(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and because that statute\nprovides no exception that would allow an individual to obtain ALPR information for their own\nvehicle pursuant to FOIA, any records responsive to the first part of your request would be\nexempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(d-7) of FOIA. \n\nFor the second part of the request seeking reports of yourself \" considered on the\nHot List or Hot Plates,\" ISP stated that its \"records management section performed a search of\nthe requester’ s name and dob and no reports were located. Also, the Division of Patrol advised\nthey've had no interaction with this requester, and the Division of Criminal Investigation found\nnothing within their search.\" 4 ISP further explained that \" [ n]o reports were located within any\n\n1 Letter from\n\nto Illinois State Police (December 15, 2024). \n\n2 Letter from Sarah Wheeler, Illinois State Police, Freedom of Information Act Officer to [\n\nDecember 27, 2024). \n\n2024). \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(d-7) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\n4E- mail from Rhiann M Martynowski, [ FOIA Appeals Manager, Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police] to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of\n\ncase management systems utilized within the years requested.\" 5 ISP also noted that any\nunderlying data Hot List or Hot plates data that would be included in reports generated in its case\nmanagement system or that could otherwise be considered responsive to the second part of the\nrequest would derive from exempt ALPR information discussed above or the Law Enforcement\nAgency Data System (LEADS). Data maintained in LEADS is exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(a) of FOIA, which applies to \"[ i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure\nby federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.\" 6 Section\n1240. 80(d) of title 20 of the Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code § 1240. 80(d) (2022), last\namended at 42 Ill. Reg. 775, \" effective December 27, 2017) provides that \" LEADS data shall not\nbe disseminated to any individual or organization that is not legally authorized to have access to\nthe information.\" 7 See also Better Gov't Ass'n v. Zaruba, 2014 IL App (2d) 140071, ¶ 27 (\" The\nregulations make clear that the public is not entitled to view or possess data that is transmitted\nthrough, received through, or stored in LEADS.\"). Members of the public, such as yourself, are\nnot among the parties authorized to access LEADS data under section 1240.30(c) of title 20 of\nthe Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code § 1240.30(c) (2017), last amended at 23 Ill. Reg. \n7521, effective June 18, 1999). \n\nFinally, for the third, fourth, and fifth parts of your request, ISP states that \"[ a] \n\nsearch was performed by ISP’ s Records Management Section, Division of Criminal Investigation\nand Division of Patrol [ DOP] with negative results. No records were located, and DOP further\ncommented they have no record of ever having contact with the requester.\" 8 ISP further detailed\nits search in a separate January 14, 2025, e-mail to this office, explaining \" a search was\ncompleted using the requester's name and date of birth. Further, a search was conducted in the\nfollowing databases that were/ are used in the years 2018- present: TraCS, Indices, and\nDocuware.\" 9\n\n5E- mail from Rhiann M Martynowski, [ FOIA Appeals Manager, Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police] to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of\nthe Attorney General] (January 23, 2025) \n\n65 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n2024). \n\nWest 2022)). \n\n7 That provision implements section 7 of the Illinois Criminal Identification Act (20 ILCS 2630/ 7\n\n8E-mail from Rhiann M Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of\nthe Attorney General] (January 13, 2025). \n\n9E- mail from Rhiann M Martynowski, FOIA Appeals Manager, Freedom of Information Act\n\nOffice Illinois State Police to Matthew Rogina [ Senior Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of\n\nISP's explanations demonstrate that it took measures that were reasonably-\n\ncalculated to locate non- exempt responsive records. This office has not received any information\nindicating that ISP did not adequately search for records or that it is withholding responsive\nrecords subject to disclosure under FOIA. If ISP maintains any ALPR information or LEADS\ndata that concerns you, that information is exempt from disclosure for the reasons explained\nabove. Accordingly, this office concludes that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATTHEW C. ROGINA\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84561 f unf sa\n\ncc: Via electronic mail\n\nMs. Rhiann M. Martynowski\nFOIA Appeals Manager\nIllinois State Police\n801 South 7th Street, Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nRhiann. Martynowski@illinois. gov"}
{"id":1117,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84605"],"title":"Chicago Police Department properly withheld juvenile records of deceased person","filename":"84605, issued January 8, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":699,"summary":"The requester sought juvenile criminal history records from the Chicago Police Department for a deceased individual, which the department denied citing the Juvenile Court Act. The PAC determined that the records are confidential under the Juvenile Court Act and that no further action is warranted.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the Chicago Police Department for juvenile criminal records of a deceased person. The police denied the request, stating that juvenile records are confidential by law. The Attorney General's office agreed, confirming that the law protecting juvenile records remains in effect even after the minor is deceased.","holding":"The Chicago Police Department properly withheld the requested juvenile records because they are confidential under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.","legal_question":"Whether juvenile law enforcement records are subject to disclosure under FOIA if the subject of the records is deceased.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(bb)","705 ILCS 405/1-7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7.5(bb)"],"public_body":"Chicago Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action warranted","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought access to juvenile criminal history records for a deceased individual.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_bb/84605%2C%20issued%20January%208%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["juvenile records","police records","deceased minor","confidentiality"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"January 8, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2024 PAC 84605;  FOIA P010798- 122424\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn December 24, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police\n\nDepartment ( CPD)  seeking a copy of the juvenile criminal history report and related records for\na named individual,  who you indicated is deceased.   On December 26, 2024,  CPD denied your\nrequest in its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)( a)  of FOIA. 2 In connection with section 7(1)(a), \nCPD cited section 1-7 of the Juvenile Court Act (JCA), 3 indicating that the records are exempt in\ntheir entireties because they involve a juvenile.   On December 31, 2024,  you submitted the\nabove- referenced Request for Review contesting the denial of your request.   \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n2024. \n\n35 ILCS 405/1-7 (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fJanuary 8, 2025\nPage 2\n\nAlthough CPD cited section 7(1)(a)  in its letter to you, section 7.5(bb) of FOIA is\n\nthe more precise exemption. 4 Section 7.5(bb) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation\nwhich is or was prohibited from disclosure by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.\"   Section 1-7(A) \nof the JCA ( 705 ILCS 405/ 1-7(A) (West 2023 Supp.))  provides:   \n\nAll juvenile records which have not been expunged are\nconfidential and may never be disclosed to the general public\nor otherwise made widely available.  Juvenile law enforcement\nrecords may be obtained only under this Section and Section 1-\n8 and Part 9 of Article V of this Act, when their use is needed\nfor good cause and with an order from the juvenile court,  as\nrequired by those not authorized to retain them.  Inspection, \ncopying,  and disclosure of juvenile law enforcement records\nmaintained by law enforcement agencies or records of municipal\nordinance violations maintained by any State,  local, or municipal\nagency that relate to a minor who has been investigated,  arrested, \nor taken into custody before the minor' s 18th birthday shall be\nrestricted to the following[.]  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nThe classes of persons who are permitted access to records concerning the investigation,  arrest, \nor custodial detention of minors are then enumerated,  and they do not include FOIA requesters; \nrather,  they include official parties such as probation officers,  the Department of Children and\nFamily Services,  and appropriate school officers. 5\n\nYour FOIA request sought juvenile criminal records;  the JCA specifically\nprohibits a police department from disclosing to the general public any portion of records\nconcerning the investigation,  arrest,  or custodial detention of minors,  even if all information\nidentifying the minors is redacted.   Further,  this office has previously concluded that the JCA\napplies to records of minors even after they are deceased.   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. \n50793,  issued March 13, 2018,  at 5 (\" JCA's definition of a 'minor'  does not specifically exclude\ndeceased minors and no other provision of the JCA states that law enforcement records\nconcerning a minor under the age of 18 who was investigated and is now deceased are subject to\npublic release.\").   Accordingly,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in this matter. \n\n45 ILCS 140/7.5(bb) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n2024;  103-605, effective July 1, 2024;  103- 636, effective July 1, 2024;  103- 786, effective August 7, 2024;  103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024;  103- 991,  effective August 9, 2024;  103- 1049,  effective August 9, 2024. \n\n5705 ILCS 405/ 1-7(A)(2), (A)(7), (A)(8) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n\fJanuary 8, 2025\nPage 3\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at (217)  843-\n\n0564 or laura.harter@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84605 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Vaughn C. Ganiyu\nAssistant General Counsel\nLegal Affairs Division -  Unit 114\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan Avenue\nChicago,  Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Juvenile criminal history records of a deceased individual","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84605/","full_text":"January 8, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2024 PAC 84605; FOIA P010798- 122424\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn December 24, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police\n\nDepartment (CPD) seeking a copy of the juvenile criminal history report and related records for\na named individual, who you indicated is deceased. On December 26, 2024, CPD denied your\nrequest in its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA. 2 In connection with section 7(1)(a), \nCPD cited section 1-7 of the Juvenile Court Act (JCA), 3 indicating that the records are exempt in\ntheir entireties because they involve a juvenile. On December 31, 2024, you submitted the\nabove- referenced Request for Review contesting the denial of your request. \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\nAlthough CPD cited section 7(1)(a) in its letter to you, section 7.5(bb) of FOIA is\n\nthe more precise exemption. 4 Section 7.5(bb) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation\nwhich is or was prohibited from disclosure by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.\" Section 1-7(A) \nof the JCA (705 ILCS 405/ 1-7(A) (West 2023 Supp.)) provides: \n\nAll juvenile records which have not been expunged are\nconfidential and may never be disclosed to the general public\nor otherwise made widely available. Juvenile law enforcement\nrecords may be obtained only under this Section and Section 1-\n8 and Part 9 of Article V of this Act, when their use is needed\nfor good cause and with an order from the juvenile court, as\nrequired by those not authorized to retain them. Inspection, \ncopying, and disclosure of juvenile law enforcement records\nmaintained by law enforcement agencies or records of municipal\nordinance violations maintained by any State, local, or municipal\nagency that relate to a minor who has been investigated, arrested, \nor taken into custody before the minor's 18th birthday shall be\nrestricted to the following[.] (Emphasis added.) \n\nThe classes of persons who are permitted access to records concerning the investigation, arrest, \nor custodial detention of minors are then enumerated, and they do not include FOIA requesters; \nrather, they include official parties such as probation officers, the Department of Children and\nFamily Services, and appropriate school officers. 5\n\nYour FOIA request sought juvenile criminal records; the JCA specifically\nprohibits a police department from disclosing to the general public any portion of records\nconcerning the investigation, arrest, or custodial detention of minors, even if all information\nidentifying the minors is redacted. Further, this office has previously concluded that the JCA\napplies to records of minors even after they are deceased. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n50793, issued March 13, 2018, at 5 (\" JCA's definition of a 'minor' does not specifically exclude\ndeceased minors and no other provision of the JCA states that law enforcement records\nconcerning a minor under the age of 18 who was investigated and is now deceased are subject to\npublic release.\"). Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is\nwarranted in this matter. \n\n45 ILCS 140/7.5(bb) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 636, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 786, effective August 7, 2024; 103-859, \neffective August 9, 2024; 103- 991, effective August 9, 2024; 103- 1049, effective August 9, 2024. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (217) 843-\n\n0564 or laura.harter@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84605 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Vaughn C. Ganiyu\nAssistant General Counsel\nLegal Affairs Division - Unit 114\nChicago Police Department\n3510 South Michigan Avenue\nChicago, Illinois 60653\npacola@chicagopolice. org"}
{"id":1118,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-01-28","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84615"],"title":"City of West Frankfort did not violate FOIA for non-existent records","filename":"84615, issued January 28, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1220,"summary":"The requester challenged the City of West Frankfort's denial of a FOIA request for communications with a judge, citing a judge's statement about contact; the PAC determined the request was unfounded because the court clarified no such communications occurred.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested records of communications between the City of West Frankfort and a judge regarding a specific court case. The City stated it had no such records, and the Public Access Bureau (PAC) found the City's search reasonable. The court's docket noted that the judge did not speak with anyone at the City, and the PAC concluded it had no basis to find that the City possesses any responsive communications. The PAC determined the request for review was unfounded and closed the case.","holding":"The City of West Frankfort did not violate FOIA because it conducted a reasonable search and does not possess records responsive to the request.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violated FOIA by failing to produce records of communications that the public body maintains do not exist.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of West Frankfort","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records existence","subject_description":"The requester sought communications between city officials and a judge regarding a specific civil court case.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3.5/Designees/84615%2C%20issued%20January%2028%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["records request","non-existent records","FOIA denial","court communications"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"January 28, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 84615\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)).  For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 12, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the City of West\n\nFrankfort (City) seeking the following: \n\n1. \"  All records of communications between any official, \n\nemployee,  agent,  or representative of the City of West\nFrankfort and Judge Weber, or any representative of the court, \npertaining to Case No. 2024LM54.\" \n\n2. \" Clarification of the nature and content of any discussions, \n\n3. \"\n\nstatements,  or representations made during these\ncommunications.\" \nIdentification of the party who initiated contact,  whether it\nwas a City official, employee, or representative, or if the court\nreached out first.\" 1\n\nOn December 17, 2024,  the City' s attorney responded to your request by stating\n\nthat the City did not possess records responsive to your request.  On January 10, 2025, this office\nreceived your Request for Review contesting the response.   You asserted:  \n\n1E- mail from\n\nto FOIA Officer, City of West Frankfort (December 12, 2024). \n\n\fJanuary 28, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn December 5, 2024,  during a Circuit Court hearing,  Judge Weber stated on the record: ' I have\nbeen in contact with the City of West Frankfort about this case.'\" 2  ( Emphasis in original.)  You\nalso asked this office to review whether there was a potential conflict of interest in the City' s\nattorney assisting the City in responding to your FOIA requests because the attorney is also\nresponsible for representing the City in court[.]\" 3\n\nAs an initial matter,  the Public Access Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes is\n\nlimited to alleged violations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West\n2022)).   See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)( 3) ( West 2022).   FOIA governs the disclosure of existing public\nrecords created and retained by a public body.  To that end, section 3.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 3.5(a) ( West 2022))  requires that public bodies designate one or more officials or employees\nto serve as its FOIA officer(s), and \"[ e]xcept in instances when records are furnished\nimmediately,  Freedom of Information officers,  or their designees,  shall receive requests\nsubmitted to the public body under this Act, ensure that the public body responds to requests in a\ntimely fashion,  and issue responses under this Act.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   FOIA does not contain\nrestrictions on who may act as designees or assist FOIA officers in responding to a request and\ndoes not govern conflict of interest issues.   Accordingly,  this office does not have authority to\nreview your claim that there was a potential conflict of interest involving the City's attorney. \n\nAddressing the City's response to your request, FOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records\nin the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"  \n5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022).  However, \"[ a]  request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify\na public record and not general data,  information,  or statistics.\"   Chicago Tribune Co.  v. \nDepartment of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33.  Further, a\npublic body is not required to answer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA\nrequest.  Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\nBased on this office's review, the second and third parts of your request did not\n\nreasonably describe records.   Instead,  those parts asked the City to explain the nature of any\ncommunications it had with a court pertaining to a specific case and to identify the individuals\nwho were involved in those communications.   Because FOIA does not require a public body to\nanswer questions or compile general information (or pieces of information) into a new record in\nresponse to a request,  the City did not improperly respond to those parts.  \n\nOn January 17, 2025,  this office inquired with the City regarding how it\n\ndetermined that it did not possess records responsive to the first part of your request.  The City's\nCity Clerk and FOIA officer,  Andrea Bolen,  explained that she asked the City' s mayor,  codes\n\n2025). \n\n2025). \n\n2Letter from\n\nto Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (January 1, \n\n3Letter from\n\nto Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (January 1, \n\n\fJanuary 28, 2025\nPage 3\n\nofficer,  and city attorney whether they had any dealings with Judge Weber,  and each responded\nthat they did not.  She further explained that those individuals are the City representatives who\nwould have appeared in court for cases concerning the City.   Ms. Bolen also checked her e-mails\nas she receives communications related to City business in her capacity as City Clerk and did not\nlocate any responsive records.   Additionally,  she clarified that the City was not a party to the\ncase specified in your request, 2024LM54.  \n\nWhen presented with a FOIA request, a public body must perform a reasonable\n\nsearch under the particular circumstances of the matter.   Better Government Ass' n v. City of\nChicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31.  Whether a particular search is reasonable depends on\nthe specific facts and is judged on a case- by- case basis.   Better Gov' t Ass' n v. City of Chicago, \n2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31.   The crucial issue is whether the search was reasonably\ncalculated to discover the requested documents.   Better Government Ass' n v. City of Chicago, \n2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31.  Thus, \"the adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined\nnot by the fruits of the search,  but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the\nsearch.\"   Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  \n\nThe City's search appears reasonably calculated to have located records\n\nresponsive to the first part of your request.   Although you state that Judge Weber made a\ncomment about having been in contact with the City, this office has reviewed the public docket\nfor case no. 2024LM54.   In the the history section of this case' s public docket,  the court noted \" it\nnever said it was going to speak to anyone at the City of West Frankfort\" and that it \"did not\nspeak with anyone at the City of West Frankfort as that would be an ex parte communication.\" 4\nAccordingly, this office has no basis to conclude that the City possesses any responsive\ncommunications,  and this office has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file.  If you have questions,  please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84615 f unf mun\n\navailable at https:// www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_search.jsp?court=IL028015J. \n\n4Rose v. Trone, Docket No. 24-LM-54 (Circuit Court, Franklin County, January 2, 2025), \n\n\fJanuary 28, 2025\nPage 4\n\ncc: \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Andrea Bolen\nCity Clerk\nCity of West Frankfort\n605 West Main\nWest Frankfort, Illinois 62896\nil.gov\ncityclerk@westfrankfort-\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jonathan R. Cantrell\nAttorney for City of West Frankfort\nHart Cantrell &  Thompson LLC\nP.O. Box 937\n602 Public Square\nBenton,  Illinois 62812\njonathanc@hartcantrell.com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Communications between city officials and a judge about a civil case","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84615/","full_text":"January 28, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 84615\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 12, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the City of West\n\nFrankfort (City) seeking the following: \n\n1. \" All records of communications between any official, \n\nemployee, agent, or representative of the City of West\nFrankfort and Judge Weber, or any representative of the court, \npertaining to Case No. 2024LM54.\" \n\n2. \" Clarification of the nature and content of any discussions, \n\n3. \"\n\nstatements, or representations made during these\ncommunications.\" \nIdentification of the party who initiated contact, whether it\nwas a City official, employee, or representative, or if the court\nreached out first.\" 1\n\nOn December 17, 2024, the City's attorney responded to your request by stating\n\nthat the City did not possess records responsive to your request. On January 10, 2025, this office\n\nOn December 5, 2024, during a Circuit Court hearing, Judge Weber stated on the record: ' I have\nbeen in contact with the City of West Frankfort about this case.'\" 2 (Emphasis in original.) You\nalso asked this office to review whether there was a potential conflict of interest in the City's\nattorney assisting the City in responding to your FOIA requests because the attorney is also\nresponsible for representing the City in court[.]\" 3\n\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is\n\nlimited to alleged violations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West\n2022)). See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2022). FOIA governs the disclosure of existing public\nrecords created and retained by a public body. To that end, section 3.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 3.5(a) (West 2022)) requires that public bodies designate one or more officials or employees\nto serve as its FOIA officer(s), and \"[ e]xcept in instances when records are furnished\nimmediately, Freedom of Information officers, or their designees, shall receive requests\nsubmitted to the public body under this Act, ensure that the public body responds to requests in a\ntimely fashion, and issue responses under this Act.\" (Emphasis added.) FOIA does not contain\nrestrictions on who may act as designees or assist FOIA officers in responding to a request and\ndoes not govern conflict of interest issues. Accordingly, this office does not have authority to\nreview your claim that there was a potential conflict of interest involving the City's attorney. \n\nAddressing the City's response to your request, FOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records\nin the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" \n5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). However, \"[ a] request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify\na public record and not general data, information, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. \nDepartment of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33. Further, a\npublic body is not required to answer questions or create new records in response to a FOIA\nrequest. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\nBased on this office's review, the second and third parts of your request did not\n\nreasonably describe records. Instead, those parts asked the City to explain the nature of any\ncommunications it had with a court pertaining to a specific case and to identify the individuals\nwho were involved in those communications. Because FOIA does not require a public body to\nanswer questions or compile general information (or pieces of information) into a new record in\nresponse to a request, the City did not improperly respond to those parts. \n\nOn January 17, 2025, this office inquired with the City regarding how it\n\ndetermined that it did not possess records responsive to the first part of your request. The City's\nCity Clerk and FOIA officer, Andrea Bolen, explained that she asked the City's mayor, codes\n\nofficer, and city attorney whether they had any dealings with Judge Weber, and each responded\nthat they did not. She further explained that those individuals are the City representatives who\nwould have appeared in court for cases concerning the City. Ms. Bolen also checked her e-mails\nas she receives communications related to City business in her capacity as City Clerk and did not\nlocate any responsive records. Additionally, she clarified that the City was not a party to the\ncase specified in your request, 2024LM54. \n\nWhen presented with a FOIA request, a public body must perform a reasonable\n\nsearch under the particular circumstances of the matter. Better Government Ass' n v. City of\nChicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. Whether a particular search is reasonable depends on\nthe specific facts and is judged on a case- by- case basis. Better Gov' t Ass' n v. City of Chicago, \n2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. The crucial issue is whether the search was reasonably\ncalculated to discover the requested documents. Better Government Ass' n v. City of Chicago, \n2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. Thus, \"the adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined\nnot by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the\nsearch.\" Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003). \n\nThe City's search appears reasonably calculated to have located records\n\nresponsive to the first part of your request. Although you state that Judge Weber made a\ncomment about having been in contact with the City, this office has reviewed the public docket\nfor case no. 2024LM54. In the the history section of this case's public docket, the court noted \" it\nnever said it was going to speak to anyone at the City of West Frankfort\" and that it \"did not\nspeak with anyone at the City of West Frankfort as that would be an ex parte communication.\" 4\nAccordingly, this office has no basis to conclude that the City possesses any responsive\ncommunications, and this office has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis letter serves to close this file. If you have questions, please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\ncc: \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Andrea Bolen\nCity Clerk\nCity of West Frankfort\n605 West Main\nWest Frankfort, Illinois 62896\nil.gov\ncityclerk@westfrankfort-\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jonathan R. Cantrell\nAttorney for City of West Frankfort\nHart Cantrell & Thompson LLC\nP.O. Box 937\n602 Public Square\nBenton, Illinois 62812\njonathanc@hartcantrell.com"}
{"id":1119,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-09-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84839"],"title":"Illinois State Police improperly withheld MHDDCA records under 7(1)","filename":"84839, issued September 8, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1671,"summary":"The requester sought police records regarding a 1969 death at a state mental hospital, which the Illinois State Police (ISP) denied as unduly burdensome. The PAC determined that the ISP failed to justify the burden and improperly withheld the records.","plain_summary":"The question was whether the Illinois State Police (ISP) properly withheld records responsive to a 2024 FOIA request for police reports, witness statements, and communications concerning a 1969 death at a state mental health facility, based on the FOIA exemption at 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) for information made confidential by the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (MHDDCA), 740 ILCS 110/3(a). The Public Access Bureau held that ISP improperly withheld the documents in their entirety: only a limited portion qualifying as MHDDCA-protected 'records' or 'communications' (i.e., documents reflecting what a recipient or other person said to a therapist or agency in connection with mental health services) were properly exempt, while the bulk of the material -- law-enforcement investigatory reports, coroner/medical examiner reports, and general agency correspondence -- were not confidential merely because they related to a named recipient of mental health services. The rule established is that MHDDCA confidentiality attaches only to records and communications made or created in the course of providing mental health or developmental disability services, and cannot be stretched to cloak an entire law-enforcement investigative file simply because it references a person who received such services. ISP, a state law-enforcement agency, was found to have misapplied section 7(1)(a)/MHDDCA section 3(a) as a blanket withholding basis for its investigatory file.","holding":"Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA and section 3(a) of the MHDDCA exempt only those specific records and communications made or created in the course of providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient, not an entire law-enforcement investigatory file merely because it references a named recipient of such services.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois State Police properly invoked the 'unduly burdensome' exemption under section 3(g) of FOIA to deny a request for historical records.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)"],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request involved historical police reports and investigative documents related to a 1969 death at the Alton State Mental Hospital.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_a/84839%2C%20issued%20September%208%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","unduly burdensome","FOIA denial","historical records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"September 8, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sarah Wheeler\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street,  Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62703\nisp.foia.officer@illinois. gov\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 84839;  ISP No. 06271461\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Wheeler: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)).   For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois State Police ( ISP)  improperly withheld\ndocuments 1 responsive to\n\nNovember 22, 2024,  FOIA request. \n\nOn November 7, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to ISP seeking\n\ncopies of police reports,  witness statements,  communications,  and reports on telephone\nconversations between a named person and staff of the Alton State Mental Hospital related to the\ndeath of a named person at the Hospital in 1969.   On November 22, 2024,  ISP responded by\n\n1Because this determination letter discusses the meaning of the term \" records\"  in a statute outside\n\nof FOIA,  this office refers to the responsive materials ISP provided to this office as \" documents\"  throughout\nletter.   \n\nthis\n\n\fMs. Sarah Wheeler\nSeptember 8, 2025\nPage 2\n\nthe opportunity to narrow his request.   That same day, \n\nasserting that the request was unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) \nWest 2024))  because it encompassed 502 pages of microfilm that ISP would have to go through.  \nISP extended\nresponded to ISP:  \" I would like to know if I could request the entire file on\n100 pages at a time.\" 2 On December 2, 2024,  ISP acknowledged\n2024,  request and stated that a response would be forthcoming.   On January 16, 2025,  ISP again\nasserted that the request was unduly burdensome because it would have to go through 502 pages\nof microfilm,  which would result in delays for other FOIA requests.   On January 27, 2025, \n\nat\nNovember 22, \n\ncompleted the submission of the above- referenced Request for Review contesting ISP's\n\nresponse to the November 22, 2024,  request. \n\nOn February 10, 2025,  this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to ISP\n\nand asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for asserting that\n\nNovember 22, 2024,  request was unduly burdensome.   Specifically,  this office asked ISP\n\nto address whether it met the requirements of section 3(g), including issuing a timely response\nand offering Mr. Miller an opportunity to confer about narrowing his request to manageable\nproportions.   Additionally,  this office asked ISP to explain the estimated amount of time that\nwould be necessary to review and redact the records and why the burden of complying with Mr. \nMiller's request would outweigh the public interest in disclosure of the information.   ISP did not\nrespond.   Accordingly,  on February 24, 2025,  this office sent another letter to ISP seeking a\nresponse to the February 10, 2025,  inquiry letter.   \n\nOn March 10, 2025,  ISP issued a revised written response to\n\nand\n\ncopied this office.   Instead of section 3(g), ISP relied on section 7(1)( a)  of FOIA 3 in connection\nwith section 3(a) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act\nMHDDCA) ( 740 ILCS 110/ 3(a) ( West 2024))  to deny the request.   ISP separately provided this\noffice with copies of the responsive documents for this office' s confidential review,  as well as a\ncopy of correspondence between another Assistant Attorney General ( AAG) from the Public\nAccess Bureau and ISP regarding ISP's assertion of section 3(a)  of the MHDDCA to withhold a\nseparate set of documents for a different requester.   On March 11, 2025,  the AAG assigned to the\nmatter notified\nnot submit a substantive reply but has since followed up regarding the status of this\ndetermination letter.  \n\nof his opportunity to reply;  he confirmed to the AAG that he would\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.   Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\n\n2E- mail from\n\nto [Illinois State Police FOIA Officer] ( November 22, 2024).  \n\n35 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2024).  \n\n\fMs. Sarah Wheeler\nSeptember 8, 2025\nPage 3\n\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\"   5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2024).  \n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\"   Section 3(a)  of the MHDDCA provides: \n\nAll records and communications shall be confidential and\n\nshall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act.  Unless\notherwise expressly provided for in this Act, records and\ncommunications made or created in the course of providing\nmental health or developmental disabilities services shall be\nprotected from disclosure regardless of whether the records and\ncommunications are made or created in the course of a therapeutic\nrelationship.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nSection 2 of the MHDDCA ( 740 ILCS 110/ 2 (West 2024))  defines the above-\n\nhighlighted terms.   The \" records\"  made confidential under the MHDDCA include \" any record\nkept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental\ndisabilities service to a recipient concerning the recipient and the services provided.\"  ( Emphasis\nadded.)   The \" communications\"  made confidential under the MHDDCA are:  \n\nany communication made by a recipient or other person to a\ntherapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in\nconnection with providing mental health or developmental\ndisability services to a recipient.   Communication includes\ninformation which indicates that a person is a recipient.  \nCommunication\"  does not include information that has been de-\nidentified in accordance with HIPAA,  as specified in 45 CFR\n164.514.  ( Emphasis added.)   \n\nLastly, \" mental health or developmental disabilities services\"  is defined as including,  but not\nlimited to, \" examination,  diagnosis,  evaluation,  treatment,  training,  pharmaceuticals,  aftercare, \nhabilitation,  or rehabilitation.\"  \n\nIn construing a statute,  the primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent\n\nof the General Assembly.   Wisnasky- Bettorf v. Pierce, 2012 IL 111253, ¶  16.  \" We view the\nstatute as a whole,  construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions\nand not in isolation.   Each word, clause,  and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable\nmeaning,  if possible,  and should not be rendered superfluous.\"   People v. Gutman,  2011 IL\n110338, ¶  12. \n\n\fMs. Sarah Wheeler\nSeptember 8, 2025\nPage 4\n\nIn its revised response to\n\nISP recited the language of section 7(1)( a)  of\n\nFOIA and section 3(a)  of the MHDDCA.   ISP asserted that its denial was proper because\n\ni]nformation which indicates that a person is a recipient of mental health or developmental\n\ndisability services is confidential and prohibited from disclosure.\" 4 In the supplemental\nargument ISP submitted for this office' s confidential review,  ISP made additional assertions\nabout the restrictions of the MHDDCA as they relate to named residents of mental health\nfacilities. \n\nISP' s response misconstrues the definition of \"communications\"  in section 2 of\n\nthe MHDDCA to apply to all \"information which indicates that a person is a recipient[]\"  of\nmental health or developmental disability services.   When read in concert with the preceding\nphrase and the MHDDCA as a whole, \" communications\"  protected by the Act are limited to\nthose that occur \" during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental\ndisability services to a recipient.\"   As noted above,  the plain language of MHDDCA' s\nconfidentiality provision prohibits disclosure of \"records and communications made or created in\nthe course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities services[.]\"   740 ILCS\n110/ 3(a) ( West 2024).   The disability services documents within the scope of these provisions\nare fundamentally different from records generated by a law enforcement agency conducting an\ninvestigation.   The relevant language of the MHDDCA cannot be reasonably construed to render\nISP investigatory records confidential\nresident of a mental health facility.   \n\nin their entireties merely because they pertain to a named\n\nBased on this office's careful review of the responsive documents, 5 a limited\n\nportion are exempt because they are \" communications\"  as defined by section 2 of MHDDCA.  \nSpecifically,  these are documents memorializing what a recipient or other person said to a\nmedical professional during or in connection with the provision of mental health services,  such\nas information on pages 43 and 44 of the Part 6 PDF, as well as the note transmitted to a medical\nprofessional on pages 71 through 73 of the Part 6 PDF.  The exempt MHDDCA \" records\"  are\ndocuments kept by a therapist or an agency pertaining to the provision of mental health services, \nsuch as pages 35 through 63 of the Part 6 PDF.  On the other hand,  there are non-exempt records, \nsuch as State agency memorandums and internal correspondence of general applicability ( i.e. \npages two and three of the Part 1 PDF),  coroner and medical examiner reports,  and ISP and other\nagencies'  investigative reports.   Such documents are not the kinds of recipient- level service\ndocuments restricted under section 3(a)  of the MHDDCA. \n\nAccordingly,  this office requests that ISP provide\n\nwith a copy of the\n\n4E- mail from Sarah Wheeler,  Freedom of Information Officer, Illinois State Police,  to [\n\nand [ Katie]  Goldsmith ( March 10, 2025).  \n\n7.  \n\n5The documents were transmitted to this office in seven separate PDFs numbered parts 1 through\n\n\fMs. Sarah Wheeler\nSeptember 8, 2025\nPage 5\n\nresponsive documents,  subject only to permissible redactions under section 7 of FOIA. 6 If ISP\nredacts any portion of the documents,  it should provide an explanation for those redactions to\n\nin accordance with section 9 of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9 (West 2024)).  \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this matter.   If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84839 f 71a proper improper pd sa\n\n65 ILCS 140/7(1) (West 2024). \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports of a 1969 death at a state hospital","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84839/","full_text":"September 8, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sarah Wheeler\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois State Police\n801 South Seventh Street, Suite 1000- S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nisp.foia.officer@illinois. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 84839; ISP No. 06271461\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Wheeler: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois State Police (ISP) improperly withheld\ndocuments 1 responsive to\n\nNovember 22, 2024, FOIA request. \n\nOn November 7, 2024, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to ISP seeking\n\ncopies of police reports, witness statements, communications, and reports on telephone\nconversations between a named person and staff of the Alton State Mental Hospital related to the\ndeath of a named person at the Hospital in 1969. On November 22, 2024, ISP responded by\n\n1 Because this determination letter discusses the meaning of the term \" records\" in a statute outside\n\nof FOIA, this office refers to the responsive materials ISP provided to this office as \" documents\" throughout\n\nthe opportunity to narrow his request. That same day, \n\nasserting that the request was unduly burdensome under section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(g) \nWest 2024)) because it encompassed 502 pages of microfilm that ISP would have to go through. \nISP extended\nresponded to ISP: \" I would like to know if I could request the entire file on\n100 pages at a time.\" 2 On December 2, 2024, ISP acknowledged\n2024, request and stated that a response would be forthcoming. On January 16, 2025, ISP again\nasserted that the request was unduly burdensome because it would have to go through 502 pages\nof microfilm, which would result in delays for other FOIA requests. On January 27, 2025, \n\nat\nNovember 22, \n\ncompleted the submission of the above- referenced Request for Review contesting ISP's\n\nresponse to the November 22, 2024, request. \n\nOn February 10, 2025, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to ISP\n\nand asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for asserting that\n\nNovember 22, 2024, request was unduly burdensome. Specifically, this office asked ISP\n\nto address whether it met the requirements of section 3(g), including issuing a timely response\nand offering Mr. Miller an opportunity to confer about narrowing his request to manageable\nproportions. Additionally, this office asked ISP to explain the estimated amount of time that\nwould be necessary to review and redact the records and why the burden of complying with Mr. \nMiller's request would outweigh the public interest in disclosure of the information. ISP did not\nrespond. Accordingly, on February 24, 2025, this office sent another letter to ISP seeking a\nresponse to the February 10, 2025, inquiry letter. \n\nOn March 10, 2025, ISP issued a revised written response to\n\nand\n\ncopied this office. Instead of section 3(g), ISP relied on section 7(1)(a) of FOIA 3 in connection\nwith section 3(a) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act\nMHDDCA) (740 ILCS 110/ 3(a) (West 2024)) to deny the request. ISP separately provided this\noffice with copies of the responsive documents for this office's confidential review, as well as a\ncopy of correspondence between another Assistant Attorney General (AAG) from the Public\nAccess Bureau and ISP regarding ISP's assertion of section 3(a) of the MHDDCA to withhold a\nseparate set of documents for a different requester. On March 11, 2025, the AAG assigned to the\nmatter notified\nnot submit a substantive reply but has since followed up regarding the status of this\ndetermination letter. \n\nof his opportunity to reply; he confirmed to the AAG that he would\n\nDETERMINATION\n\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt.\" 5 ILCS\n140/ 1.2 (West 2024). \n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\" Section 3(a) of the MHDDCA provides: \n\nAll records and communications shall be confidential and\n\nshall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act. Unless\notherwise expressly provided for in this Act, records and\ncommunications made or created in the course of providing\nmental health or developmental disabilities services shall be\nprotected from disclosure regardless of whether the records and\ncommunications are made or created in the course of a therapeutic\nrelationship. (Emphasis added.) \n\nSection 2 of the MHDDCA (740 ILCS 110/ 2 (West 2024)) defines the above-\n\nhighlighted terms. The \" records\" made confidential under the MHDDCA include \" any record\nkept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental\ndisabilities service to a recipient concerning the recipient and the services provided.\" (Emphasis\nadded.) The \" communications\" made confidential under the MHDDCA are: \n\nany communication made by a recipient or other person to a\ntherapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in\nconnection with providing mental health or developmental\ndisability services to a recipient. Communication includes\ninformation which indicates that a person is a recipient. \nCommunication\" does not include information that has been de-\nidentified in accordance with HIPAA, as specified in 45 CFR\n164.514. (Emphasis added.) \n\nLastly, \" mental health or developmental disabilities services\" is defined as including, but not\nlimited to, \" examination, diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, training, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, \nhabilitation, or rehabilitation.\" \n\nIn construing a statute, the primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent\n\nof the General Assembly. Wisnasky- Bettorf v. Pierce, 2012 IL 111253, ¶ 16. \" We view the\nstatute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions\nand not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable\n\nIn its revised response to\n\nISP recited the language of section 7(1)(a) of\n\nFOIA and section 3(a) of the MHDDCA. ISP asserted that its denial was proper because\n\ni]nformation which indicates that a person is a recipient of mental health or developmental\n\ndisability services is confidential and prohibited from disclosure.\" 4 In the supplemental\nargument ISP submitted for this office's confidential review, ISP made additional assertions\nabout the restrictions of the MHDDCA as they relate to named residents of mental health\nfacilities. \n\nISP's response misconstrues the definition of \"communications\" in section 2 of\n\nthe MHDDCA to apply to all \"information which indicates that a person is a recipient[]\" of\nmental health or developmental disability services. When read in concert with the preceding\nphrase and the MHDDCA as a whole, \" communications\" protected by the Act are limited to\nthose that occur \" during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental\ndisability services to a recipient.\" As noted above, the plain language of MHDDCA's\nconfidentiality provision prohibits disclosure of \"records and communications made or created in\nthe course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities services[.]\" 740 ILCS\n110/ 3(a) (West 2024). The disability services documents within the scope of these provisions\nare fundamentally different from records generated by a law enforcement agency conducting an\ninvestigation. The relevant language of the MHDDCA cannot be reasonably construed to render\nISP investigatory records confidential\nresident of a mental health facility. \n\nin their entireties merely because they pertain to a named\n\nBased on this office's careful review of the responsive documents, 5 a limited\n\nportion are exempt because they are \" communications\" as defined by section 2 of MHDDCA. \nSpecifically, these are documents memorializing what a recipient or other person said to a\nmedical professional during or in connection with the provision of mental health services, such\nas information on pages 43 and 44 of the Part 6 PDF, as well as the note transmitted to a medical\nprofessional on pages 71 through 73 of the Part 6 PDF. The exempt MHDDCA \" records\" are\ndocuments kept by a therapist or an agency pertaining to the provision of mental health services, \nsuch as pages 35 through 63 of the Part 6 PDF. On the other hand, there are non-exempt records, \nsuch as State agency memorandums and internal correspondence of general applicability (i.e. \npages two and three of the Part 1 PDF), coroner and medical examiner reports, and ISP and other\nagencies' investigative reports. Such documents are not the kinds of recipient- level service\ndocuments restricted under section 3(a) of the MHDDCA. \n\nAccordingly, this office requests that ISP provide\n\nwith a copy of the\n\n4E- mail from Sarah Wheeler, Freedom of Information Officer, Illinois State Police, to [\n\nand [ Katie] Goldsmith (March 10, 2025). \n\n7. \n\n5 The documents were transmitted to this office in seven separate PDFs numbered parts 1 through\n\nresponsive documents, subject only to permissible redactions under section 7 of FOIA. 6 If ISP\nredacts any portion of the documents, it should provide an explanation for those redactions to\n\nin accordance with section 9 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 9 (West 2024)). \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84839 f 71a proper improper pd sa\n\n65 ILCS 140/7(1) (West 2024)."}
{"id":1120,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-02-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["84841"],"title":"Marseilles SD 150 student records governed by ISSRA, not FOIA; PAC closed case","filename":"84841, issued February 7, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":742,"summary":"A parent requested communications regarding their child from a school district under FOIA, but the PAC determined that the Illinois School Student Records Act (ISSRA) governs such requests rather than FOIA.","plain_summary":"A parent asked a school district for records about their child, but the district did not provide everything the parent expected. The Attorney General's office decided that these types of school records are handled under a specific student privacy law (ISSRA) instead of the general public records law (FOIA). Because the request falls under a different law, the PAC closed the case without taking further action.","holding":"The PAC concluded that no further action is warranted because the requested records are governed by the Illinois School Student Records Act rather than FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether records concerning a student's school records are subject to disclosure under FOIA or the Illinois School Student Records Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(r)","105 ILCS 10/1"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(r)"],"public_body":"Marseilles Elementary School District 150","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"student records","subject_description":"The requester sought communications from school district staff regarding their child and a complaint about harassment.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_r/Own-children-individual-student-incidents/84841%2C%20issued%20February%207%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["student records","ISSRA","school district","privacy"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"February 7, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 84841\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons that follow,  the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted because the Illinois School\nStudent Records Act ( ISSRA) ( 105 ILCS 10/ 1 et seq. ( West 2022))  rather than FOIA governs a\nparent's request for their child's school student records. \n\nOn December 7, 2024, you submitted a request by e-mail to Marseilles\n\nElementary School District 150 ( District)  seeking all communications between District staff\nregarding you and your son.  On December 13, 2024, the District responded that it had provided\nyou with all responsive records through the date of a previous request and would hand deliver\nany additional records through December 6, 2024.  On February 4, 2025, this office received\nyour complete Request for Review contesting the completeness of the District' s response.  \nSpecifically, you included e-mail correspondence between yourself and a specified employee, \nwhich you allege was not provided to you by the District.   Although it is unclear if the District\nresponded to your request pursuant to FOIA or ISSRA, your request plainly asks for records\nfrom which your son,  a student in the District,  could be individually identified.   You also\nexplained to this office that you sought records related to a complaint you had filed with the\nDistrict concerning the sexual assault and harassment of your son by another student. \n\n\fFebruary 7, 2025\nPage 2\n\nSection 7.5(r) of FOIA1 exempts from inspection and copying \"[ i]nformation\n\nprohibited from being disclosed by [ISSRA].\"   Section 6(a) of ISSRA2 provides that \"[ n]o school\nstudent records or information contained therein may be released,  transferred,  disclosed or\notherwise disseminated, except\" as listed.  Pursuant to section 2(d) of ISSRA,3 a \" school student\nrecord\"  is broadly defined as \" any writing or other recorded information concerning a student\nand by which a student may be individually identified, maintained by a school or at its direction\nor by an employee of a school,  regardless of how or where the information is stored.\"   Under the\nplain language of section 2(d) of ISSRA, records maintained by schools from which students\nmay be individually identified fall within the definition of a \" school student record.\" \n\nHowever,  one of the exceptions in section 6(a)  of ISSRA specifically sets forth\n\nthat school student records be provided \"[ t]o a parent or student or person specifically designated\nas a representative by a parent,  as provided in paragraph ( a)  of Section 5 [ of ISSRA.]\"   Section\n5(a) of ISSRA4 provides, in pertinent part, that \"[ a]  parent * * *  shall have the right to inspect\nand copy all school student permanent and temporary records of that child.\"   That provision then\nsets out a specific procedure for parents to access their children's school student records under\nthat Act that is different from and incompatible with the response procedures of FOIA. \n\nISSRA provides the sole process for parents to access their children' s school\n\nstudent records, and those records are exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(r) of FOIA.  \nBecause the Public Access Counselor does not have the authority5 to enforce any rights you may\nhave with respect to your request to obtain copies of your child's school student records under\nsection 5 of ISSRA,  this office will take no further action with respect to this matter. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7.5(r) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024;  103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024;  103-724, effective January 1, 2025;  103-786, \neffective August 7, 2024; 103-859, effective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103-1049, effective\nAugust 9, 2024. \n\n2105 ILCS 10/6(a) ( West 2022). \n\n3105 ILCS 10/2(d) (West 2022). \n\n4105 ILCS 10/5(a) ( West 2022). \n\nalleged violations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. ( West 2022)). \n\n5See 15 ILCS 205/7 (West 2022) ( Public Access Counselor' s authority is limited to addressing\n\n\fFebruary 7, 2025\nPage 3\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\n\nbenjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84841 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Deb DeGraaf\nDistrict Secretary\n201 Chicago Street\nMarseilles,  Illinois 61341\nddegraaf@mes150.org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school district's communications about a student harassment complaint","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-84841/","full_text":"February 7, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 84841\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted because the Illinois School\nStudent Records Act (ISSRA) (105 ILCS 10/ 1 et seq. (West 2022)) rather than FOIA governs a\nparent's request for their child's school student records. \n\nOn December 7, 2024, you submitted a request by e-mail to Marseilles\n\nElementary School District 150 (District) seeking all communications between District staff\nregarding you and your son. On December 13, 2024, the District responded that it had provided\nyou with all responsive records through the date of a previous request and would hand deliver\nany additional records through December 6, 2024. On February 4, 2025, this office received\nyour complete Request for Review contesting the completeness of the District's response. \nSpecifically, you included e-mail correspondence between yourself and a specified employee, \nwhich you allege was not provided to you by the District. Although it is unclear if the District\nresponded to your request pursuant to FOIA or ISSRA, your request plainly asks for records\nfrom which your son, a student in the District, could be individually identified. You also\nexplained to this office that you sought records related to a complaint you had filed with the\n\nSection 7.5(r) of FOIA1 exempts from inspection and copying \"[ i]nformation\n\nprohibited from being disclosed by [ISSRA].\" Section 6(a) of ISSRA2 provides that \"[ n]o school\nstudent records or information contained therein may be released, transferred, disclosed or\notherwise disseminated, except\" as listed. Pursuant to section 2(d) of ISSRA,3 a \" school student\nrecord\" is broadly defined as \" any writing or other recorded information concerning a student\nand by which a student may be individually identified, maintained by a school or at its direction\nor by an employee of a school, regardless of how or where the information is stored.\" Under the\nplain language of section 2(d) of ISSRA, records maintained by schools from which students\nmay be individually identified fall within the definition of a \" school student record.\" \n\nHowever, one of the exceptions in section 6(a) of ISSRA specifically sets forth\n\nthat school student records be provided \"[ t]o a parent or student or person specifically designated\nas a representative by a parent, as provided in paragraph (a) of Section 5 [ of ISSRA.]\" Section\n5(a) of ISSRA4 provides, in pertinent part, that \"[ a] parent * * * shall have the right to inspect\nand copy all school student permanent and temporary records of that child.\" That provision then\nsets out a specific procedure for parents to access their children's school student records under\nthat Act that is different from and incompatible with the response procedures of FOIA. \n\nISSRA provides the sole process for parents to access their children's school\n\nstudent records, and those records are exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(r) of FOIA. \nBecause the Public Access Counselor does not have the authority5 to enforce any rights you may\nhave with respect to your request to obtain copies of your child's school student records under\nsection 5 of ISSRA, this office will take no further action with respect to this matter. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7.5(r) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-636, effective July 1, 2024; 103-724, effective January 1, 2025; 103-786, \neffective August 7, 2024; 103-859, effective August 9, 2024; 103-991, effective August 9, 2024; 103-1049, effective\nAugust 9, 2024. \n\n2105 ILCS 10/6(a) (West 2022). \n\n3105 ILCS 10/2(d) (West 2022). \n\n4105 ILCS 10/5(a) (West 2022). \n\nalleged violations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2022)). \n\n5 See 15 ILCS 205/7 (West 2022) (Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to addressing\n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nbenjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n84841 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Deb DeGraaf\nDistrict Secretary\n201 Chicago Street\nMarseilles, Illinois 61341\nddegraaf@mes150.org"}
{"id":1121,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-26","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85045","85216"],"title":"City of Chicago Planning Department properly redacted emails under 7(1)(f)","filename":"85045 85216, issued March 26, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2481,"summary":"The requester challenged the City of Chicago's redactions of communications and a legal memo under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(f) and 7(1)(m). The PAC determined that while some redactions were proper, the City failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify the redaction of a specific line in a document under the attorney-client privilege exemption.","plain_summary":"A journalist requested communications and a legal memo from the City of Chicago's Department of Planning and Development. The City provided records but redacted parts under exemptions for internal drafts (section 7(1)(f)) and attorney-client privilege (section 7(1)(m)). The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau reviewed the unredacted records and determined that the redactions under section 7(1)(f) were proper for the specific emails discussed, which concerned pending FOIA requests and Zoning Board of Appeals matters. The provided source text is cut off before reaching any conclusion on the redactions claimed under section 7(1)(m).","holding":"","legal_question":"Did the City of Chicago meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that specific records were exempt from disclosure under FOIA sections 7(1)(f) (preliminary drafts) and 7(1)(m) (attorney-client privilege)?","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(f)","7(1)(m)"],"public_body":"City of Chicago Department of Planning and Development","requesting_party":"Mr. Ronald Roenigk, Inside Publications","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(m)","subject_description":"The requester sought communications and a legal memo from the City of Chicago, which the City partially redacted citing attorney-client privilege and internal draft exemptions.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/Communications-with-third-parties/Inter-agency-communications/85045%2085216%2C%20issued%20March%2026%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA","attorney-client privilege","redactions","legal memo","burden of proof"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"March 26, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ronald Roenigk\nPublisher,  Inside Publications\ninsidepublicationschicago@gmail.com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Peter Strazzabosco\nDeputy Commissioner\nDepartment of Planning and Development\nCity of Chicago\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndpdfoia@cityofchicago. org\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85045;  2025 PAC 85216\n\nDear Mr. Roenigk and Mr. Strazzabosco: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).   \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn January 3, 2025, Mr. Ronald Roenigk submitted a FOIA request to the City of\n\nChicago ( City)  Department of Planning and Development ( Department)  seeking copies of all\ncommunications among four named individuals from December 10, 2024, through January 2, \n2025.   On January 17, 2025,  the Department provided responsive records but redacted some\ninformation pursuant to sections 7(1)(f) and 7(1)(m) of FOIA.1 On January 8, 2025, Mr. \nRoenigk submitted another FOIA request to the Department seeking an unredacted copy of a\nspecific memo from the City's law department that was sent on April 18, 2024.  On January 27, \n\nJuly 1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(f), (1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective\n\n\fMr. Ronald Roenigk\nMr. Peter Strazzabosco\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 2\n\n2025, the Department denied that request pursuant to section 7(1)(m).  On January 31, 2025, Mr. \nRoenigk submitted Requests for Review challenging the redactions in the provided records. \n\nOn February 14, 2025,  this office forwarded copies of the Requests for Review to\nthe Department and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the records, together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions.   On\nFebruary 25, 2025, this office received the requested materials.  On March 3, 2025, this office\nforwarded a copy of the Department' s response to Mr. Roenigk;  he replied on March 5, 2025.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that redacts\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the redacted\ninformation is exempt from disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   The exemptions from\ndisclosure are to be narrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois\nUniversity,  176 Ill. 2d 401,  407 ( 1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts,  notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\"  The\nsection 7(1)( f) exemption applies to \" inter-  and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\"  Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003).  Section 7(1)(f) is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\"   Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248.  \nThe exemption does not exempt from disclosure purely factual material but rather \"[ o] nly those\nportions of a predecisional document that reflect the give and take of the deliberative process\nmay be withheld.\"   Kalven v. City of Chicago,  2014 IL App ( 1st)  121846, ¶  24 ( quoting Public\nCitizen, Inc. v. Office of Management &  Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 876 (2010)).  \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that e-mails in which a\nmayor and alderman conferred to formulate action constituted intra- agency communications\nwithin the scope of the section 7(1)(f).  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 69562, issued March\n23,  2022 ( discussion concerning an already passed ordinance that also included an intertwined\nforward-looking component exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f)); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq.  Rev.  Ltr. 65053,  issued February 17, 2021 ( portions of e- mails between mayor and\nalderman reflecting predecisional formulation of action within scope of section 7(1)(f)). \n\n\fMr. Ronald Roenigk\nMr. Peter Strazzabosco\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 3\n\nIn its response to this office,  the Department contended that portions of the\n\ncontested records are \" deliberative and pre-decisional emails between City staff members\"  that\nare exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)( f).2 Addressing the records provided in response\nto the January 3, 2025, request, the Department asserted that one of the e-mails (page 3), a\ncommunication between Department staff and the director of zoning and infrastructure for the\n2nd Ward,3 fell within the scope of the exemption because the individuals \"discuss[ed]  the\nproper interpretation of rules and procedures for the Zoning Board of Appeals ( ZBA).\" 4 The\nDepartment also stated it redacted some e-mails (pages 23-24, 31, 34, 36-42) between\nDepartment staff and staff members of other city agencies because they involved predecisional\ndiscussions of pending FOIA requests. \n\nIn reply to that answer, Mr. Roenigk questioned whether the e-mail on page 3 of\n\nthe records fell within the scope of section 7(1)( f) as an intra-  or inter- agency deliberative\ncommunication.  He contended, in relevant part:  \n\nNeither the author or the recipients of the email are appointed\nmembers of the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals.  The\nDepartment also cannot identify a decision made by the Chicago\nZoning Board of Appeals that was informed in any way by their\nchatter. They have no reporting relationship, or statutory authority\nto advise the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals.  There is also no\nindication that the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeal requested or\nin any way solicited their opinion on the matter.[ 5] \n\nBased on this office' s review of an unredacted copy of the records,  most of the\n\nredacted information in the e-mails consists of deliberations among Department staff concerning\nhow to respond to FOIA requests.   These e- mails reveal the Department preparing responses and\nconsulting with other city departments, such as the Department of Technology and Innovation, as\nit formulated action.   While the e-mails contain some factual\n\ninformation,  those facts are\n\n2Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [1]. \n\n3The e-mail on page 3 is also reflected on page 6 and other pages of the records. \n\n4Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [1]. \n\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March 6, 2025), at [1]. \n\n5Letter from Ronald Roenigk, Publisher, Inside Publications, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, \n\n\fMr. Ronald Roenigk\nMr. Peter Strazzabosco\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 4\n\ninextricably intertwined with the Department's deliberations.  Accordingly, this office concludes\nthat the e-mails concerning pending FOIA requests constitute predecisional,  deliberative material\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(f). \n\nAs to the remaining e-mails concerning the Zoning Board of Appeals (Board), \nthis office has confirmed that they reveal Department staff deliberating on the proper rules and\nprocedures of the Board.  These communications show staff members expressing opinions and\ngathering input as the Department assessed how to appropriately apply the rules and procedures\nto zoning matters presented to the Board.  This office has confirmed that the e-mail sent from the\ndirector of zoning and infrastructure for the 2nd Ward reveals the Department and alderman' s\noffice conferring on the proper interpretation of the rules.  Although the e-mail does not include\nany members of the Board,  neither the Department nor the alderman' s office was required to\nserve as advisors to the Board for their communications concerning zoning issues to constitute\ninter- agency communications.   The Department and the alderman' s office are within City\ngovernment, and the two entities appeared to share substantially the same interests in the proper\ninterpretation of the zoning matter at issue and deliberated collaboratively.   Because the e- mails\nreveal preliminary deliberations between the two entities, this office concludes that the e-mails\nconstitute inter- agency predecisional communications that are exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(f). \n\nSection of 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney\n\nrepresenting the public body that would not be subject to\n\ndiscovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal,  civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body[.] \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m).  People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1997).  A party\nasserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney- client privilege must\nshow that: \"( 1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was\nmade to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices; and (3) it remained confidential.\"  Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228\n2006).   Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only to the communications of a client to his\nattorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his client.\"  In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. \nApp.  3d 363,  374 ( 1990).   \n\n\fMr. Ronald Roenigk\nMr. Peter Strazzabosco\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 5\n\nHowever, \"[ t]he privilege protects communications, not facts.\"  Specht v. Google, \n\nInc.,  268 F.R.D. 596,  601 ( N.D. Ill. 2010).   Further, \" correspondence that merely notifies\nsomeone of scheduling matters, [ citation], or which updates the recipient\" is not privileged.  \nTowne Place Condominium Ass' n v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co.,  284 F. Supp.  3d 889, \n894 (N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Digital Vending Services International, Inc. v. University of\nPhoenix,  Inc.,  No. 2:09- CV- 555,  2013 WL 1560212,  at * 6 (E.D. Va. 2013) ( e- mails discussing\nstatus of preparation for oral arguments in federal court are \" simply status updates and no legal\nadvice is given by counsel.   Therefore,  these communications are not privileged.\").   \n\nThe Department asserted it properly redacted communications between City\n\nattorneys and staff members from the Department and other city agencies because they\nconcerned matters in which legal advice or guidance was sought or given.   The Department\nstated that a portion of those e-mails (pages 1-2, 4-5, 7, 10, 12) consisted of the Department's\nzoning administrator seeking and receiving \" legal guidance regarding ZBA rules and procedures\" \nand \" legal guidance regarding a planned City Council resolution.\" 6 The remaining e-mails\npages 31- 36,  39- 42)  concerned City employees seeking \" legal guidance regarding a pending\nFOIA request.\" 7\n\nIn reply to that answer, Mr. Roegnik contended that communications that revealed\n\nthe specific communications of legal counsel may fall within the scope of section 7(1)( m),  but\nredacting the entirety of the communication including elements that are not specific non-\ndiscoverable legal guidance is an abuse of the privilege[.]\" 8 He questioned whether legal advice\nwas sought in one of the e-mail chains (pages 2, 5, 7), asserting that the zoning administrator\naddressed his question to the alderman' s assistant and a non- attorney staff member while an\nattorney was merely copied.  He similarly questioned whether legal advice was sought in another\nemail chain ( pages 10- 11):  \" The email is not a request for legal counsel ' When is Fairbanks\nresolution expected?'. It tests any sense of rational thought to see it as a request for legal counsel. \nThe decision had been made nearly 3 months earlier,  and [ the zoning administrator]  had no\nresponsibility for drafting the resolution.\" 9\n\n6Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [1]. \n\n7Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [ 2]. \n\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March 6, 2025),  at [2]. \n\n8Letter from Ronald Roenigk, Publisher, Inside Publications, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, \n\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March 6, 2025),  at [2]. \n\n9Letter from Ronald Roenigk, Publisher, Inside Publications, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, \n\n\fr. Ronald Roenigk\nMr. Peter Strazzabosco\nMarch 26, 2025\nPage 6\n\nThis office's review of the April 18, 2024, e-mail containing the memo responsive\n\nto the January 8, 2025,  request confirmed that the e-mail contains legal guidance from a City\nattorney to the Department concerning a zoning-related issue.  Although the Department noted\nthat it inadvertently disclosed a portion of the e- mail,  there is no indication that the remaining\ncontents have been disclosed to any third parties to waive the attorney-client privilege.  \nAccordingly,  the Department did not improperly redact the e- mail pursuant section 7(1)( m). \n\nAs discussed above,  most of the records provided in response to the January 3, \n2025, request consisted of deliberative discussions of pending FOIA requests and the rules and\nprocedures of the Board.   These e-mails reveal Department staff members seeking the input and\nopinions of other City departments, including the legal guidance of attorneys in the City's law\ndepartment.   For the reasons described above,  these communications ( e.g., pages 2, 5, 7) fall\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(f) because they consist of inter- and intra-agency\ncommunications in which action was formulated.   \n\nHowever,  the Department did not demonstrate that the redacted line in the e- mail\non page 10 reveals the substance of any legal guidance sought or given related to the referenced\nresolution.   Although the e- mail at issue involved a communication from a City attorney,  a\npublic body that withholds records under section 7(1)(m) \"can meet its burden only by providing\nsome objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances.\"  ( Emphasis in\noriginal.)  Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470\n2003).   Because Department did not provide sufficient\ninformation to show that the line reflects\nlegal guidance sought or given, the Department did not show by clear and convincing evidence\nthat the information is exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( m).   \n\nThis office requests that the Department provide an unredacted copy of page 10 of\n\nthe January 3, 2025, records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85045 85216 f consol 71f proper 71m proper improper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Communications and a legal memo from a city planning department","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85045/","full_text":"March 26, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ronald Roenigk\nPublisher, Inside Publications\ninsidepublicationschicago@gmail.com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Peter Strazzabosco\nDeputy Commissioner\nDepartment of Planning and Development\nCity of Chicago\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndpdfoia@cityofchicago. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85045; 2025 PAC 85216\n\nDear Mr. Roenigk and Mr. Strazzabosco: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn January 3, 2025, Mr. Ronald Roenigk submitted a FOIA request to the City of\n\nChicago (City) Department of Planning and Development (Department) seeking copies of all\ncommunications among four named individuals from December 10, 2024, through January 2, \n2025. On January 17, 2025, the Department provided responsive records but redacted some\ninformation pursuant to sections 7(1)(f) and 7(1)(m) of FOIA.1 On January 8, 2025, Mr. \nRoenigk submitted another FOIA request to the Department seeking an unredacted copy of a\nspecific memo from the City's law department that was sent on April 18, 2024. On January 27, \n\nJuly 1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(f), (1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective\n\n2025, the Department denied that request pursuant to section 7(1)(m). On January 31, 2025, Mr. \nRoenigk submitted Requests for Review challenging the redactions in the provided records. \n\nOn February 14, 2025, this office forwarded copies of the Requests for Review to\nthe Department and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the records, together with a detailed\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions. On\nFebruary 25, 2025, this office received the requested materials. On March 3, 2025, this office\nforwarded a copy of the Department's response to Mr. Roenigk; he replied on March 5, 2025. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that redacts\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the redacted\ninformation is exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from\ndisclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois\nUniversity, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] reliminary drafts, notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" The\nsection 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003). Section 7(1)(f) is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\" Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248. \nThe exemption does not exempt from disclosure purely factual material but rather \"[ o] nly those\nportions of a predecisional document that reflect the give and take of the deliberative process\nmay be withheld.\" Kalven v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, ¶ 24 (quoting Public\nCitizen, Inc. v. Office of Management & Budget, 598 F.3d 865, 876 (2010)). \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that e-mails in which a\nmayor and alderman conferred to formulate action constituted intra- agency communications\nwithin the scope of the section 7(1)(f). Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 69562, issued March\n23, 2022 (discussion concerning an already passed ordinance that also included an intertwined\nforward-looking component exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f)); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\n\nIn its response to this office, the Department contended that portions of the\n\ncontested records are \" deliberative and pre-decisional emails between City staff members\" that\nare exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f).2 Addressing the records provided in response\nto the January 3, 2025, request, the Department asserted that one of the e-mails (page 3), a\ncommunication between Department staff and the director of zoning and infrastructure for the\n2nd Ward,3 fell within the scope of the exemption because the individuals \"discuss[ed] the\nproper interpretation of rules and procedures for the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA).\" 4 The\nDepartment also stated it redacted some e-mails (pages 23-24, 31, 34, 36-42) between\nDepartment staff and staff members of other city agencies because they involved predecisional\ndiscussions of pending FOIA requests. \n\nIn reply to that answer, Mr. Roenigk questioned whether the e-mail on page 3 of\n\nthe records fell within the scope of section 7(1)(f) as an intra- or inter- agency deliberative\ncommunication. He contended, in relevant part: \n\nNeither the author or the recipients of the email are appointed\nmembers of the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals. The\nDepartment also cannot identify a decision made by the Chicago\nZoning Board of Appeals that was informed in any way by their\nchatter. They have no reporting relationship, or statutory authority\nto advise the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals. There is also no\nindication that the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeal requested or\nin any way solicited their opinion on the matter.[ 5] \n\nBased on this office's review of an unredacted copy of the records, most of the\n\nredacted information in the e-mails consists of deliberations among Department staff concerning\nhow to respond to FOIA requests. These e- mails reveal the Department preparing responses and\nconsulting with other city departments, such as the Department of Technology and Innovation, as\nit formulated action. While the e-mails contain some factual\n\ninformation, those facts are\n\n2 Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [1]. \n\n3 The e-mail on page 3 is also reflected on page 6 and other pages of the records. \n\n4 Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [1]. \n\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March 6, 2025), at [1]. \n\n5 Letter from Ronald Roenigk, Publisher, Inside Publications, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, \n\ninextricably intertwined with the Department's deliberations. Accordingly, this office concludes\nthat the e-mails concerning pending FOIA requests constitute predecisional, deliberative material\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(f). \n\nAs to the remaining e-mails concerning the Zoning Board of Appeals (Board), \nthis office has confirmed that they reveal Department staff deliberating on the proper rules and\nprocedures of the Board. These communications show staff members expressing opinions and\ngathering input as the Department assessed how to appropriately apply the rules and procedures\nto zoning matters presented to the Board. This office has confirmed that the e-mail sent from the\ndirector of zoning and infrastructure for the 2nd Ward reveals the Department and alderman's\noffice conferring on the proper interpretation of the rules. Although the e-mail does not include\nany members of the Board, neither the Department nor the alderman's office was required to\nserve as advisors to the Board for their communications concerning zoning issues to constitute\ninter- agency communications. The Department and the alderman's office are within City\ngovernment, and the two entities appeared to share substantially the same interests in the proper\ninterpretation of the zoning matter at issue and deliberated collaboratively. Because the e- mails\nreveal preliminary deliberations between the two entities, this office concludes that the e-mails\nconstitute inter- agency predecisional communications that are exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(f). \n\nSection of 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney\n\nrepresenting the public body that would not be subject to\n\ndiscovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body[.] \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m). People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1997). A party\nasserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney- client privilege must\nshow that: \"(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was\nmade to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices; and (3) it remained confidential.\" Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228\n2006). Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only to the communications of a client to his\nattorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his client.\" In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. \n\nHowever, \"[ t]he privilege protects communications, not facts.\" Specht v. Google, \n\nInc., 268 F.R.D. 596, 601 (N.D. Ill. 2010). Further, \" correspondence that merely notifies\nsomeone of scheduling matters, [ citation], or which updates the recipient\" is not privileged. \nTowne Place Condominium Ass' n v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., 284 F. Supp. 3d 889, \n894 (N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Digital Vending Services International, Inc. v. University of\nPhoenix, Inc., No. 2:09- CV- 555, 2013 WL 1560212, at * 6 (E.D. Va. 2013) (e- mails discussing\nstatus of preparation for oral arguments in federal court are \" simply status updates and no legal\nadvice is given by counsel. Therefore, these communications are not privileged.\"). \n\nThe Department asserted it properly redacted communications between City\n\nattorneys and staff members from the Department and other city agencies because they\nconcerned matters in which legal advice or guidance was sought or given. The Department\nstated that a portion of those e-mails (pages 1-2, 4-5, 7, 10, 12) consisted of the Department's\nzoning administrator seeking and receiving \" legal guidance regarding ZBA rules and procedures\" \nand \" legal guidance regarding a planned City Council resolution.\" 6 The remaining e-mails\npages 31- 36, 39- 42) concerned City employees seeking \" legal guidance regarding a pending\nFOIA request.\" 7\n\nIn reply to that answer, Mr. Roegnik contended that communications that revealed\n\nthe specific communications of legal counsel may fall within the scope of section 7(1)(m), but\nredacting the entirety of the communication including elements that are not specific non-\ndiscoverable legal guidance is an abuse of the privilege[.]\" 8 He questioned whether legal advice\nwas sought in one of the e-mail chains (pages 2, 5, 7), asserting that the zoning administrator\naddressed his question to the alderman's assistant and a non- attorney staff member while an\nattorney was merely copied. He similarly questioned whether legal advice was sought in another\nemail chain (pages 10- 11): \" The email is not a request for legal counsel ' When is Fairbanks\nresolution expected?'. It tests any sense of rational thought to see it as a request for legal counsel. \nThe decision had been made nearly 3 months earlier, and [ the zoning administrator] had no\nresponsibility for drafting the resolution.\" 9\n\n6 Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [1]. \n\n7 Letter from Peter Strazzabosco, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Planning and\n\nDevelopment, City of Chicago, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (February 23, 2025), at [ 2]. \n\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March 6, 2025), at [2]. \n\n8 Letter from Ronald Roenigk, Publisher, Inside Publications, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, \n\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March 6, 2025), at [2]. \n\n9 Letter from Ronald Roenigk, Publisher, Inside Publications, to Teresa Lim, Deputy Bureau Chief, \n\nThis office's review of the April 18, 2024, e-mail containing the memo responsive\n\nto the January 8, 2025, request confirmed that the e-mail contains legal guidance from a City\nattorney to the Department concerning a zoning-related issue. Although the Department noted\nthat it inadvertently disclosed a portion of the e- mail, there is no indication that the remaining\ncontents have been disclosed to any third parties to waive the attorney-client privilege. \nAccordingly, the Department did not improperly redact the e- mail pursuant section 7(1)(m). \n\nAs discussed above, most of the records provided in response to the January 3, \n2025, request consisted of deliberative discussions of pending FOIA requests and the rules and\nprocedures of the Board. These e-mails reveal Department staff members seeking the input and\nopinions of other City departments, including the legal guidance of attorneys in the City's law\ndepartment. For the reasons described above, these communications (e.g., pages 2, 5, 7) fall\nwithin the scope of section 7(1)(f) because they consist of inter- and intra-agency\ncommunications in which action was formulated. \n\nHowever, the Department did not demonstrate that the redacted line in the e- mail\non page 10 reveals the substance of any legal guidance sought or given related to the referenced\nresolution. Although the e- mail at issue involved a communication from a City attorney, a\npublic body that withholds records under section 7(1)(m) \"can meet its burden only by providing\nsome objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances.\" (Emphasis in\noriginal.) Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470\n2003). Because Department did not provide sufficient\ninformation to show that the line reflects\nlegal guidance sought or given, the Department did not show by clear and convincing evidence\nthat the information is exempt from disclosure pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(m). \n\nThis office requests that the Department provide an unredacted copy of page 10 of\n\nthe January 3, 2025, records. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85045 85216 f consol 71f proper 71m proper improper mun"}
{"id":1122,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-02-14","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85113"],"title":"Northfield Police Department properly withheld complainant's statement under 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv)","filename":"85113, issued February 14, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":955,"summary":"The requester challenged the Northfield Police Department's redaction of witness statements in a police report. The PAC determined that the redactions were proper because disclosing the statements would unavoidably identify the complainant, violating their privacy under FOIA.","plain_summary":"This determination letter addresses whether the Northfield Police Department properly withheld a complainant's statement to police under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv). The Public Access Bureau held that the Department properly withheld the requested information because disclosure would identify a complainant to law enforcement, constituting an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and unavoidably revealing the identity of a person who provided information to police, even though the requester alleged the complainant made false statements. The reasoning establishes that where a requester already knows a complainant's identity, disclosing that person's statements to police is still exempt because it would attribute the specific content to that individual, and section 7(1)(d)(iv) contains no exception for allegedly false complaints. The public body involved was a municipal police department, and the records at issue were portions of a police report withheld to protect the identity and statements of a named complainant.","holding":"Disclosure of a police complainant's statements is exempt under 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv) where the requester already knows the complainant's identity and disclosure would unavoidably attribute the statements to that person, regardless of allegations that the complaint was false.","legal_question":"Whether a police department may redact witness statements from a police report when the requester alleges the witness provided false information and seeks to identify the source.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)","7(1)(d)(iv)"],"public_body":"Northfield Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought unredacted witness statements from a police report involving themselves and another individual.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_iv/85113%2C%20issued%20February%2014%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","redaction","privacy","witness statements"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"February 14, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85113\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (West 2023 Supp.)).  For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.   \n\nOn January 10, 2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Northfield Police\nDepartment (Department) seeking copies of records related to report number 25-292, which\nconcerned yourself and a named individual.   On January 20, 2025,  the Department provided\nresponsive records pursuant to section 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), and 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 7(1)( b), ( 1)( c), ( 1)( d)( iv) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 605,  effective\nJuly 1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025).  On January 24, 2025, you submitted this\nRequest for Review contesting the extent of the Department' s redactions. \n\nIn a February 10,  2025,  telephone conversation with the Deputy Public Access\n\nCounselor, you stated that you specifically contest redactions of the information the named\nindividual provided to law enforcement because,  you allege,  that individual has filed numerous\nfalse police reports against you and have you have right to know what the individual stated. \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts \"[ p]ersonal information contained within public\n\nrecords,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the\ninformation.   Section 7(1)( c) defines \"[ u] nwarranted invasion of personal privacy\"  as \" the\ndisclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in\n\n\fFebruary 14, 2025\nPage 2\n\nwhich the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the\ninformation.\" \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that disclosure of the\nidentity of a person who complains to the police about an incident constitutes an unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy.  See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 79728, issued\nFebruary 9, 2024 (\" A complainant' s identity is inherently highly personal.\").   Where,  as here, \nyou know the identity of the complainant, providing the information that the complainant\nprovided to the Department would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person;  this is true\neven though you have alleged that false police reports were filed.  See, for example, Gabrielli v. \nU.S.  Dep' t of Justice,  594 F. Supp.  309,  312– 13 ( N.D.N.Y. 1984) ( complainant who submitted\nunfounded complaint retained right to privacy because to conclude otherwise could deter\nmembers of the public \" from providing to law enforcement authorities what may prove to be\nvital information for fear that their names would be released to the parties against whom they\nprovided information if their suspicions ultimately prove groundless.\").   \n\nIn addition,  section 7(1)( d)( iv) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nRecords in the possession of any public body created in the\n\ncourse of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would:  \n\niv) unavoidably disclose the identity of a\n\nconfidential source,  confidential\ninformation furnished only\nby the confidential source, or persons who file complaints\nwith or provide information to administrative, \ninvestigative, law enforcement, or penal agencies[.]  \nEmphasis added.) \n\nThis provision allows law enforcement agencies to protect the anonymity of\npersons who provide them with information.  See, e.g., Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood\nSafety,  348 Ill. App.  3d at 200- 01 ( names and addresses of beat meeting participants properly\nredacted because they provided information to police department).  The plain language of section\n7(1)(d)(iv) permits a law enforcement agency to withhold the identity of a member of the public\nwho provides information to that agency.   Further,  witness statements and investigatory records\nmay be withheld in their entireties if disclosure of the contents \"would necessarily result in the\ndisclosure of the identity of the source\"  of the information and,  therefore, \" redaction * * * \nbe meaningfully accomplished.\"  Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 266 Ill. App 3d 421, \n\ncannot\n\n\fFebruary 14, 2025\nPage 3\n\n426 (1994); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37032, issued October 5, 2015 (where\nidentified the complainant by name,  redacting the complainant' s name from the\nFOIA request\nrecords would not protect his identity and therefore the records were exempt from disclosure in\ntheir entirety);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 17520,  issued January 20, 2012 ( exemption\n7(1)(d)(iv) applied where requester had independent knowledge of a complainant's identity).   \n\nYour FOIA request plainly sought records concerning a named complainant, and\n\nyou have further clarified that you seek the statements that that individual provided to law\nenforcement.  However, disclosure of the requested statements would unavoidably identify that\nperson as having provided information to the Department.   Section 7(1)( d)( iv) does not contain\nan exception that permits disclosure of information that would unavoidably identify a\ncomplainant when the requester alleges that the complainant provided false information. \n\nBecause the requested narrative would be unavoidably attributable to that\nindividual even if the Department redacted the complainant's name and other personally-\nidentifying information,  the requested information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section\n7(1)(c) and section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA.  Accordingly, this office will take no further action in\nthis matter. \n\nIf you have any questions,  you may contact me at the Springfield address listed on\n\nthe first page of this letter.  This letter serves to close the matter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85113 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs.  Dinah Spadoni\nRecords Coordinator\nFOIA Officer\nNorthfield Police Department\n350 Walnut Avenue\nNorthfield, Illinois 60093\ndketzeback@northfieldil. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Witness statements in a police report","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85113/","full_text":"February 14, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85113\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn January 10, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the Northfield Police\nDepartment (Department) seeking copies of records related to report number 25-292, which\nconcerned yourself and a named individual. On January 20, 2025, the Department provided\nresponsive records pursuant to section 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), and 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/ 7(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective\nJuly 1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025). On January 24, 2025, you submitted this\nRequest for Review contesting the extent of the Department's redactions. \n\nIn a February 10, 2025, telephone conversation with the Deputy Public Access\n\nCounselor, you stated that you specifically contest redactions of the information the named\nindividual provided to law enforcement because, you allege, that individual has filed numerous\nfalse police reports against you and have you have right to know what the individual stated. \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts \"[ p]ersonal information contained within public\n\nrecords, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the\ninformation. Section 7(1)(c) defines \"[ u] nwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" as \" the\ndisclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in\n\nwhich the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the\ninformation.\" \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that disclosure of the\nidentity of a person who complains to the police about an incident constitutes an unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 79728, issued\nFebruary 9, 2024 (\" A complainant's identity is inherently highly personal.\"). Where, as here, \nyou know the identity of the complainant, providing the information that the complainant\nprovided to the Department would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person; this is true\neven though you have alleged that false police reports were filed. See, for example, Gabrielli v. \nU.S. Dep' t of Justice, 594 F. Supp. 309, 312– 13 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (complainant who submitted\nunfounded complaint retained right to privacy because to conclude otherwise could deter\nmembers of the public \" from providing to law enforcement authorities what may prove to be\nvital information for fear that their names would be released to the parties against whom they\nprovided information if their suspicions ultimately prove groundless.\"). \n\nIn addition, section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nRecords in the possession of any public body created in the\n\ncourse of administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law\nenforcement or correctional agency for law enforcement purposes, \nbut only to the extent that disclosure would: \n\niv) unavoidably disclose the identity of a\n\nconfidential source, confidential\ninformation furnished only\nby the confidential source, or persons who file complaints\nwith or provide information to administrative, \ninvestigative, law enforcement, or penal agencies[.] \nEmphasis added.) \n\nThis provision allows law enforcement agencies to protect the anonymity of\npersons who provide them with information. See, e.g., Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood\nSafety, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 200- 01 (names and addresses of beat meeting participants properly\nredacted because they provided information to police department). The plain language of section\n7(1)(d)(iv) permits a law enforcement agency to withhold the identity of a member of the public\nwho provides information to that agency. Further, witness statements and investigatory records\nmay be withheld in their entireties if disclosure of the contents \"would necessarily result in the\ndisclosure of the identity of the source\" of the information and, therefore, \" redaction * * * \nbe meaningfully accomplished.\" Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 266 Ill. App 3d 421, \n\n426 (1994); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37032, issued October 5, 2015 (where\nidentified the complainant by name, redacting the complainant's name from the\nFOIA request\nrecords would not protect his identity and therefore the records were exempt from disclosure in\ntheir entirety); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 17520, issued January 20, 2012 (exemption\n7(1)(d)(iv) applied where requester had independent knowledge of a complainant's identity). \n\nYour FOIA request plainly sought records concerning a named complainant, and\n\nyou have further clarified that you seek the statements that that individual provided to law\nenforcement. However, disclosure of the requested statements would unavoidably identify that\nperson as having provided information to the Department. Section 7(1)(d)(iv) does not contain\nan exception that permits disclosure of information that would unavoidably identify a\ncomplainant when the requester alleges that the complainant provided false information. \n\nBecause the requested narrative would be unavoidably attributable to that\nindividual even if the Department redacted the complainant's name and other personally-\nidentifying information, the requested information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section\n7(1)(c) and section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA. Accordingly, this office will take no further action in\nthis matter. \n\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me at the Springfield address listed on\n\nthe first page of this letter. This letter serves to close the matter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85113 f no fi war pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Dinah Spadoni\nRecords Coordinator\nFOIA Officer\nNorthfield Police Department\n350 Walnut Avenue\nNorthfield, Illinois 60093\ndketzeback@northfieldil. org"}
{"id":1123,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-04-10","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85152"],"title":"Columbia Police Department properly withheld body camera footage under 7.5(cc)","filename":"85152, issued April 10, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2212,"summary":"The requester sought various police records, including body camera footage, from the Columbia Police Department. The PAC determined the Department properly withheld portions of the body camera footage under the Body Camera Act and FOIA section 7.5(cc) because the footage contained images of a victim/witness who did not consent to disclosure.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested police records, including an incident report, CAD notes, body camera footage, and 911 audio, from the Columbia Police Department. The Department provided the incident report and CAD notes with redactions for private information, stated no 911 call existed, and granted the body camera footage request in part and denied it in part, citing exemptions under FOIA and the Body Camera Act. The Public Access Bureau concluded the Request for Review was unfounded, finding the Department's responses adequate.","holding":"","legal_question":"Whether the Columbia Police Department properly withheld body camera footage under the Body Camera Act and FOIA section 7.5(cc) due to the presence of a non-consenting victim or witness.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5(cc)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(cc)"],"public_body":"Columbia Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought incident reports, CAD notes, 911 audio, and body camera footage related to a police arrest.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/Flagged-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy/85152%2C%20issued%20April%2010%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","privacy","victim rights"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"April 10, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85152\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 9, 2024,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Columbia Police\n\nDepartment ( Police Department)  seeking copies of an \"[ i]ncident report,  CAD notes,  Full Body\nCamera Footage,  911 original audio file, DCFS notified or not?\" 2 On December 17, 2024,  the\nPolice Department notified you that it was waiting to hear from the Monroe County State' s\nAttorney' s Office regarding the arrest.   On December 19, 2024,  you followed up on the status of\nthe Police Department' s response.   The Police Department responded that it was working on the\nrequest.   You followed up again with the Police Department on December 30, 2024.   On January\n3, 2025,  the Police Department notified you that it would send you a copy of the incident report, \na copy of the CAD notes,  and proof that no 911 call was received.   Additionally,  the Police\nDepartment noted it did not appear that the Department of Children and Family Services ( DCFS) \nwas called and that it was still making redactions to the body camera footage.   On January 7, \n2025,  the Police Department notified you that a DVD of an audio recording was available for\npick up.  On January 9, 2025,  the Police Department notified you that a DVD of the body camera\nfrom the arresting officer was available for pick up.   \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.).    \n\nColumbia Police Department ( December 9, 2024).  \n\n2Written Request for Inspections or Copying of Public Records submitted by\n\nto\n\n\fApril 10, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn January 10, 2025,  you replied to the Police Department:  \" A letter inside along\n\nwith the DVD of the body camera footage states much of the footage was withheld for personal\nprivacy reasons.   Before I appeal the denial,  I have one question.  if personal\nshared then couldn['] t the segment of just the private information be removed and not the whole\nclip be denied?\" 3 The Police Department responded to you that the redactions of the body\ncamera footage were for when \" the reporting Officer went into the house to speak to [ named\nperson].  The Body Cam Act states that if you are not on (subject)  the cam at that time, you are\nnot privy to the footage.\" 4 Thereafter,  you followed up with the Police Department regarding its\nresponses to your request as well as access to other records not included in your initial FOIA\nrequest. \n\ninformation was\n\nOn February 6, 2025,  you asked this office to review the Police Department' s\n\nresponse to your request,  but your submission was incomplete because it did not include a copy\nof the FOIA request you submitted to the Police Department;  you provided a copy of only a one\nresponse letter,  in which the Police Department\nthat asserted that it was withholding portions of\nthe incident report pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 5 Section 9.5(a) of FOIA 6\nspecifies the materials that a requester must submit to the Public Access Bureau to file a Request\nfor Review:  \" The request for review must be in writing,  signed by the requester,  and include ( i) \na copy of the request for access to records and ( ii) any responses from the public body.\"  \nAccordingly,  on February 7, 2025,  the Assistant Attorney General ( AAG) from the Public\nAccess Bureau assigned to the matter e-mailed you to inform you the file was incomplete and\nthat you needed to submit a copy of the FOIA request for this office to proceed.   On February 18, \n2025,  you provided the AAG with a copy of the original FOIA request you submitted to the\nPolice Department. \n\nOn February 24, 2025,  the AAG e-mailed the Police Department' s Records Clerk, \n\nJennifer Woodcock,  and asked her to provide a copy of the responsive report for this office's\nconfidential review;  Ms. Woodcock sent the AAG those records that same day, as well as her\ncorrespondence with you pertaining to this matter.   Based upon the AAG's review of the\ncorrespondence,  you did not provide this office with a copy of all of the Police Department' s\nresponses in this matter;  on February 24, 2025,  the AAG informed you that you must send a\ncopy of all responses from the Police Department for this office to proceed in the matter.   On\nFebruary 25, 2025,  you purported to do so but, again,  did not provide copies of all of the Police\nDepartment' s responses,  because your e-mails with the Police Department referenced a separate\n\n3E- mail from\n\nto Jennifer [ Woodcock] ( January 11, 2025).  \n\n2025).  \n\n4E- mail from Jennifer Woodcock,  Records Clerk, Columbia Police, to\n\nJanuary 13, \n\n1, 2024;  103- 865,  effective January 1, 2025. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July\n\n65 ILCS 140/9.5(a) ( West 2023 Supp.).     \n\n\fApril 10, 2025\nPage 3\n\nPolice Department response regarding the body camera footage.   On March 5, 2025,  the AAG\nagain informed you that the file was incomplete for that reason.   You provided the AAG with a\ncopy of the Police Department' s missing response regarding body camera footage on March 10, \n2025.   The Police Department granted the request for body camera footage in part and denied the\nrequest in part pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA7 as well as sections 7(1)( b) and 7(1)( c) of\nFOIA.   \n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022).   Under FOIA, \nthe adequacy of a public body' s search for responsive records is judged by a standard of\nreasonableness and depends upon the particular facts of the case.   Better Government Ass'n v. \nCity of Chicago,  2020 IL App (1st)  190038, ¶  31.  However, \"[ a]  requester is entitled only to\nrecords that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\"   Yeager v. Drug Enforcement\nAdministration,  678 F.2d 315, 321 ( D.C. Cir. 1982).   Further,  FOIA does not require a public\nbody to answer questions or create new records in response to a request.   Kenyon v. Garrels, 184\nIll. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989).   \n\nAs an initial matter,  the latter part of your request for \"DCFS notified or not?\"  is a\nquestion rather than a request to inspect or copy public records.   FOIA did not require the Police\nDepartment to answer that question,  but the Police Department did answer that question during\nthe course of your correspondence.   As to your request for the 911 audio file, the Police\nDepartment\nthe Police Department.   You responded via e-mail to the Police Department\nthere were no 911 calls. \n\ninformed you that no 911 call was made and provided a screenshot of calls made to\nthat you understood\n\nAs to your request for the report and CAD notes,  the Police Department provided\nyou with copies of those records without redacting the narratives.   The Police Department made\nonly discrete redactions pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)( c) of FOIA.  The Police\nDepartment explained that it redacted addresses,  phone numbers,  and driver' s license numbers\npursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA and dates of birth pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.   \n\nSection 7(1)( b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information,  unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\"  \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.))  defines \" private information\"  to\ninclude: \n\nU]nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number, \ndriver' s license number,  employee identification number, \n\n75 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7,  \n\n2024;  103- 605,  effective July 1, 2024;  103- 636, effective July 1, 2024;  103- 724,  effective January 1, 2025;  103- 786, \neffective August 7, 2024;  103- 859,  effective August 9, 2024;  103- 991, effective August 9, 2024;  103- 1049,  effective\nAugust 9, 2024.  \n\n\fApril 10, 2025\nPage 4\n\nbiometric identifiers,  personal financial\ninformation,  passwords or\nother access codes,  medical records,  home or personal telephone\nnumbers,  and personal email addresses.  Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  ( Emphasis added.)  \n\nlicense plates,  except as\n\nBased on this office' s confidential review of the unredacted report and CAD notes,  the Police\nDepartment properly redacted driver' s license numbers,  personal telephone numbers,  and home\naddresses pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA.   \n\nAdditionally,  section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal\n\ninformation contained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the\nindividual subjects of the information[,]\"  and this office has consistently determined that\ndisclosure of a person' s date of birth would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy.   See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 16-009, issued November 7, 2016,  at 12.  \nAccordingly,  the Police Department properly redacted dates of birth. 8\n\nThe last record that you requested from the Police Department was the body\n\ncamera footage for the incident.   Section 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings\nmade under the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent\nauthorized under that Act.\"   Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act 9 provides,  in relevant\npart: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy,  at the time of the recording,  any\nrecording which is flagged,  due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm,  use of force,  arrest or detention,  or\nresulting death or bodily harm,  shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\n8This office advises the Police Department that driver' s license expiration dates and persons'  ages\nare not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b) or 7(1)(c) of FOIA.  Additionally,  in CAD notes,  nondescript\nnotations such as \" Person Phone changed from\"  or \"Person Address set to\" do not fall within the scope of the\nexemptions,  though the ensuing personal phone numbers and home addresses are exempt from disclosure.   \n\n950 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2022). \n\n\fApril 10, 2025\nPage 5\n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness;  and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject' s\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph ( 1) of this\n\nsubsection ( b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint,  discharge of a firearm,  use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request,  the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose,  in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject' s attorney,  or\nthe officer or his or her legal representative. \n\nAny recording disclosed under the Freedom of\nInformation Act shall be redacted to remove identification\nof any person that appears on the recording and is not the\nofficer,  a subject of the encounter,  or directly involved in\nthe encounter.  Nothing in this subsection ( b) shall require\nthe disclosure of any recording or portion of any recording\nwhich would be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom\nof Information Act.  (Emphasis added.) \n\nBased on the police report,  the footage is flagged for purposes of section 10-20 of\n\nthe Body Camera Act because you were arrested.   However,  the person other than you who is a\nsubject of the footage had a reasonable expectation at the time of the recording,  because it\noccurred inside her residence.   Therefore,  the footage of that individual falls within the first of\nthe three subsections of the Body Camera Act set out above:   section 10-20(b)(1).  Under the\nplain language of that provision,  the footage of the other subject of the recording— who is\ndescribed in the report as a victim and/ or witness— may be disclosed by the Police Department\nonly if that subject provides written consent to disclosure.   There is no indication that this other\nsubject has provided written consent to disclosure.   Because any body camera recording from the\nincident depicting the other subject is not subject to disclosure to you under the Body Camera\nAct, such footage is exempt from disclosure under section 7.5(cc) of FOIA. \n\n\fApril 10, 2025\nPage 6\n\nUnder these circumstances,  this Request for Review is unfounded.   This file is\n\nclosed.   If you have any questions,  you may contact me at the Chicago address on the first page\nof this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85152 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Jennifer Woodcock\nRecords Clerk\nColumbia Police Department\n1020 North Main Street\nColumbia,  Illinois 62236\njwoodcock@columbiail. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police incident reports, CAD notes, 911 audio, and body-camera footage of an arrest","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85152/","full_text":"April 10, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85152\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 9, 2024, you submitted a FOIA request to the Columbia Police\n\nDepartment (Police Department) seeking copies of an \"[ i]ncident report, CAD notes, Full Body\nCamera Footage, 911 original audio file, DCFS notified or not?\" 2 On December 17, 2024, the\nPolice Department notified you that it was waiting to hear from the Monroe County State's\nAttorney's Office regarding the arrest. On December 19, 2024, you followed up on the status of\nthe Police Department's response. The Police Department responded that it was working on the\nrequest. You followed up again with the Police Department on December 30, 2024. On January\n3, 2025, the Police Department notified you that it would send you a copy of the incident report, \na copy of the CAD notes, and proof that no 911 call was received. Additionally, the Police\nDepartment noted it did not appear that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) \nwas called and that it was still making redactions to the body camera footage. On January 7, \n2025, the Police Department notified you that a DVD of an audio recording was available for\npick up. On January 9, 2025, the Police Department notified you that a DVD of the body camera\n\nOn January 10, 2025, you replied to the Police Department: \" A letter inside along\n\nwith the DVD of the body camera footage states much of the footage was withheld for personal\nprivacy reasons. Before I appeal the denial, I have one question. if personal\nshared then couldn['] t the segment of just the private information be removed and not the whole\nclip be denied?\" 3 The Police Department responded to you that the redactions of the body\ncamera footage were for when \" the reporting Officer went into the house to speak to [ named\nperson]. The Body Cam Act states that if you are not on (subject) the cam at that time, you are\nnot privy to the footage.\" 4 Thereafter, you followed up with the Police Department regarding its\nresponses to your request as well as access to other records not included in your initial FOIA\nrequest. \n\ninformation was\n\nOn February 6, 2025, you asked this office to review the Police Department's\n\nresponse to your request, but your submission was incomplete because it did not include a copy\nof the FOIA request you submitted to the Police Department; you provided a copy of only a one\nresponse letter, in which the Police Department\nthat asserted that it was withholding portions of\nthe incident report pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 5 Section 9.5(a) of FOIA 6\nspecifies the materials that a requester must submit to the Public Access Bureau to file a Request\nfor Review: \" The request for review must be in writing, signed by the requester, and include (i) \na copy of the request for access to records and (ii) any responses from the public body.\" \nAccordingly, on February 7, 2025, the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) from the Public\nAccess Bureau assigned to the matter e-mailed you to inform you the file was incomplete and\nthat you needed to submit a copy of the FOIA request for this office to proceed. On February 18, \n2025, you provided the AAG with a copy of the original FOIA request you submitted to the\nPolice Department. \n\nOn February 24, 2025, the AAG e-mailed the Police Department's Records Clerk, \n\nJennifer Woodcock, and asked her to provide a copy of the responsive report for this office's\nconfidential review; Ms. Woodcock sent the AAG those records that same day, as well as her\ncorrespondence with you pertaining to this matter. Based upon the AAG's review of the\ncorrespondence, you did not provide this office with a copy of all of the Police Department's\nresponses in this matter; on February 24, 2025, the AAG informed you that you must send a\ncopy of all responses from the Police Department for this office to proceed in the matter. On\nFebruary 25, 2025, you purported to do so but, again, did not provide copies of all of the Police\nDepartment's responses, because your e-mails with the Police Department referenced a separate\n\n3E- mail from\n\nto Jennifer [ Woodcock] (January 11, 2025). \n\n2025). \n\n4E- mail from Jennifer Woodcock, Records Clerk, Columbia Police, to\n\nJanuary 13, \n\n1, 2024; 103- 865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n55 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July\n\nPolice Department response regarding the body camera footage. On March 5, 2025, the AAG\nagain informed you that the file was incomplete for that reason. You provided the AAG with a\ncopy of the Police Department's missing response regarding body camera footage on March 10, \n2025. The Police Department granted the request for body camera footage in part and denied the\nrequest in part pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA7 as well as sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of\nFOIA. \n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). Under FOIA, \nthe adequacy of a public body's search for responsive records is judged by a standard of\nreasonableness and depends upon the particular facts of the case. Better Government Ass'n v. \nCity of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. However, \"[ a] requester is entitled only to\nrecords that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug Enforcement\nAdministration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Further, FOIA does not require a public\nbody to answer questions or create new records in response to a request. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184\nIll. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). \n\nAs an initial matter, the latter part of your request for \"DCFS notified or not?\" is a\nquestion rather than a request to inspect or copy public records. FOIA did not require the Police\nDepartment to answer that question, but the Police Department did answer that question during\nthe course of your correspondence. As to your request for the 911 audio file, the Police\nDepartment\nthe Police Department. You responded via e-mail to the Police Department\nthere were no 911 calls. \n\ninformed you that no 911 call was made and provided a screenshot of calls made to\nthat you understood\n\nAs to your request for the report and CAD notes, the Police Department provided\nyou with copies of those records without redacting the narratives. The Police Department made\nonly discrete redactions pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. The Police\nDepartment explained that it redacted addresses, phone numbers, and driver's license numbers\npursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA and dates of birth pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. \n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information, unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\" \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \" private information\" to\ninclude: \n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, \n\n75 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 592, effective June 7, \n\n2024; 103- 605, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 636, effective July 1, 2024; 103- 724, effective January 1, 2025; 103- 786, \neffective August 7, 2024; 103- 859, effective August 9, 2024; 103- 991, effective August 9, 2024; 103- 1049, effective\n\nbiometric identifiers, personal financial\ninformation, passwords or\nother access codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person. (Emphasis added.) \n\nlicense plates, except as\n\nBased on this office's confidential review of the unredacted report and CAD notes, the Police\nDepartment properly redacted driver's license numbers, personal telephone numbers, and home\naddresses pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. \n\nAdditionally, section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal\n\ninformation contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the\nindividual subjects of the information[,]\" and this office has consistently determined that\ndisclosure of a person's date of birth would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16-009, issued November 7, 2016, at 12. \nAccordingly, the Police Department properly redacted dates of birth. 8\n\nThe last record that you requested from the Police Department was the body\n\ncamera footage for the incident. Section 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings\nmade under the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent\nauthorized under that Act.\" Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act 9 provides, in relevant\npart: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\n8 This office advises the Police Department that driver's license expiration dates and persons' ages\nare not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b) or 7(1)(c) of FOIA. Additionally, in CAD notes, nondescript\nnotations such as \" Person Phone changed from\" or \"Person Address set to\" do not fall within the scope of the\nexemptions, though the ensuing personal phone numbers and home addresses are exempt from disclosure. \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request, the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject's attorney, or\nthe officer or his or her legal representative. \n\nAny recording disclosed under the Freedom of\nInformation Act shall be redacted to remove identification\nof any person that appears on the recording and is not the\nofficer, a subject of the encounter, or directly involved in\nthe encounter. Nothing in this subsection (b) shall require\nthe disclosure of any recording or portion of any recording\nwhich would be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom\nof Information Act. (Emphasis added.) \n\nBased on the police report, the footage is flagged for purposes of section 10-20 of\n\nthe Body Camera Act because you were arrested. However, the person other than you who is a\nsubject of the footage had a reasonable expectation at the time of the recording, because it\noccurred inside her residence. Therefore, the footage of that individual falls within the first of\nthe three subsections of the Body Camera Act set out above: section 10-20(b)(1). Under the\nplain language of that provision, the footage of the other subject of the recording— who is\ndescribed in the report as a victim and/ or witness— may be disclosed by the Police Department\nonly if that subject provides written consent to disclosure. There is no indication that this other\nsubject has provided written consent to disclosure. Because any body camera recording from the\nincident depicting the other subject is not subject to disclosure to you under the Body Camera\n\nUnder these circumstances, this Request for Review is unfounded. This file is\n\nclosed. If you have any questions, you may contact me at the Chicago address on the first page\nof this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85152 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Jennifer Woodcock\nRecords Clerk\nColumbia Police Department\n1020 North Main Street\nColumbia, Illinois 62236\njwoodcock@columbiail. gov"}
{"id":1125,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85334"],"title":"Region 1 Planning Council properly classified FOIA requests as voluminous","filename":"85334, issued March 3, 2025__1.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1932,"summary":"The requester challenged the Region 1 Planning Council's classification of their FOIA requests as a 'voluminous request' under section 3.6 of FOIA. The PAC determined that the public body acted within its authority and no further action is warranted.","plain_summary":"The requester asked the Attorney General to review whether a government agency correctly labeled their information requests as 'voluminous.' The PAC found that the agency followed the law in how it grouped the requests and handled the process. Consequently, the PAC closed the file and took no further action against the agency.","holding":"The Region 1 Planning Council did not violate FOIA by classifying the requester's submissions as a voluminous request.","legal_question":"Whether the Region 1 Planning Council properly classified multiple FOIA requests as a 'voluminous request' under 5 ILCS 140/3.6.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3.6"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Region 1 Planning Council","requesting_party":"Mr. Henry McDavid","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"voluminous request","subject_description":"The requester disputed the aggregation of multiple FOIA requests into a single voluminous request by the Region 1 Planning Council.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_h/85334%2C%20issued%20March%203%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["voluminous request","FOIA request","request aggregation"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"March 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Henry McDavid\nCo -Founder and Principal\nKIKIFER'S Entrepreneurial Academy\nprincipal@kikifersacademy. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85334\n\nDear Mr. McDavid : \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5( c) ( West 202 3 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter. \n\nOn February 9,  2025,  you submitted three FOIA requests to Region 1 Planning\n\nCouncil (R1) containing eight parts total.  You submitted the requests as Co -Founder and\nPrincipal of KIKIFER'S Entrepreneurial Academy  (KEA).  On that same date, Ms. Keishonda\nWilliamson submitted four FOIA requests to R1 containing 14 parts total.  Ms. Williamson\nsubmitted the requests as Founder and Executive Director of KEA.  On February 14, 2025, R1\nnotified you and Ms.  Williamson that your requests collectively qualified as a voluminous\nrequest under section 3.6 FOIA,1 so you had ten business days within which to amend the request\nin such a way that R1 would no longer treat the request as a voluminous request.  On that same\ndate, you replied to R1 by disputing the aggregation of your requests with Ms. Williamson's and\nby stating that you would not be narrowing the request.  On February 18, 2025, R1 extended its\ntime to respond by ten business days.   On February 27,  2025,  you submitted a Request for\nReview to the Public Access Bureau alleging that R1 improperly treated your requests as a\nvoluminous request. \n\n15 ILCS 140/ 3.6 (West 2022). \n\n\fMr. Henry McDavid\nMarch 3, 2025\nPage 2\n\nAs an initial matter, section 9.5(b -5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9.5(b -5) (West 2023\nSupp.))  provides that \"[ a]  person whose request to inspect or copy a public record was treated by\na public body * * *  as a voluminous request under Section 3.6 of this Act may file a request for\nreview with the Public Access Counselor for the purpose of reviewing whether the public body\nproperly determined that the request was a voluminous request.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Section\n2(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(b) (West 2023 Supp.))  defines \"person\"  as \" any individual, \ncorporation,  partnership,  firm,  organization or ass ociation,  acting individually or as a group.\"  \nThis office has previously determined that individuals who submit requests on behalf of the same\nbusiness constitute the same \"person\" for purposes of FOIA.  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n17798, issued September 21, 2018, at 4 (concluding that \"classifying each individual employee\nwho submits a FOIA request in their employment capacity as a separate ' person ' under section\n2(g) would enable any business with a sufficiently large number of employees to overwhelm a\npublic body with FOIA requests.\"). \n\nIn this instance, R1 had a valid basis to treat the requests submitted under your\nname and the requests submitted under Ms. Williamson's name as requests by the same person\nbecause you both submitted the requests on behalf of KEA and your communications with the\nPublic Access Bureau reflect that you are working together closely on these matters. \n\nSection 2(h) of FOIA2 defines \"voluminous request\" as a request that: \n\ni) includes more than 5 individual requests for more than 5\n\ndifferent categories of records or a combination of individual\nrequests that total requests for more than 5 different categories of\nrecords in a period of 20 business days; or\n\nii) requires the compilation of more than 500 letter or\n\nlegal- sized pages of public records unless a single requested record\nexceeds 500 pages. \" Single requested record\"  may include,  but is\nnot limited to, one report, form, e -mail, letter, memorandum, book, \nmap, microfilm, tape, or recording. \n\nSection 3.6( a)  of FOIA 3 provides that \"[ n] otwithstanding any provision of this\n\nAct to the contrary, a public body shall respond to a voluminous request within 5 business days\nafter receipt.\"  This response shall notify the requester: \n\ni) that the public body is treating the request as a voluminous\nrequest; ( ii) the reasons why the public body is treating the request\nas a voluminous request; (iii) that the requester must respond to the\n\n25 ILCS 140/ 2(h) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 3.6(a) ( West 2022). \n\n\fMr. Henry McDavid\nMarch 3, 2025\nPage 3\n\npublic body within 10 business days after the public body's\nresponse was sent and specify whether the requester would like to\namend the request in such a way that the public body will no\nlonger treat the request as a voluminous request ; (iv) that if the\nrequester does not respond within 10 business days or if the\nrequest continues to be a voluminous request following the\nrequester' s response,  the public body will respond to the request\nand assess any fees the public body charges pursuan t to Section 6\nof this Act; (v) that the public body has 5 business days after\nreceipt of the requester's response or 5 business days from the last\nday for the requester to amend his or her request, whichever is\nsooner, to respond to the request; (vi) that the public body may\nrequest an additional 10 business days to comply with the request; \nvii) of the requester's right to review of the public body's\ndetermination by the Public Access Counselor and provide the\naddress and phone number for the Public Access Counselor; and\nviii) that if the requester fails to accept or collect the responsive\nrecords,  the public body may still charge the requester for its\nresponse pursuant to Section 6 of this Act and the requester's\nfailure to pay will be considered a debt due and owing to the public\nbody and may be collected in accordance with applicable law.   \n\nSection 3.6( c)  of FOIA 4 then specifies what must happen next: \n\nT]he public body shall respond within the earlier of 5 business\ndays after it receives the response from the requester or 5 business\ndays after the final day for the requester to respond to the public\nbody' s notification under this subsection.  The respons e shall: ( i) \nprovide an estimate of the fees to be charged,  which the public\nbody may require the person to pay in full before copying the\nrequested documents; (ii) deny the request pursuant to one or more\nof the exemptions set out in this Act; (iii) notif y the requester that\nthe request is unduly burdensome and extend an opportunity to the\nrequester to attempt to reduce the request to manageable\nproportions; or (iv) provide the records requested. \n\nAdditionally, under section 3.6(d) of FOIA,5 \"[ t]he time for response by the public body under\nsubsection ( c) of this Section may be extended by the public body for not more than 10 business\ndays from the final day for the requester to respond to the public body's notification under\n\n45 ILCS 140/ 3.6(c) (West 2022). \n\n55 ILCS 140/ 3.6(d) (West 202 2 ). \n\n\fMr. Henry McDavid\nMarch 3, 2025\nPage 4\n\nsubsection (c) of this Section for any of the reasons provided in subsection (e)  of Section 3 of\" \nFOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3( e) ( West 202 2 )).   \n\nIn accordance with the provisions set out above, R1 notified you and Ms. \n\nWilliamson within five business days after receipt that your requests qualif ied as a voluminous\nrequest and that you had ten business days within which to narrow the request if you did not wish\nfor it to be treated as voluminous.   After you confirmed that you would not be narrowing the\nrequest,  R1 took a proper extension of ten business days to respond unde r section 3.6( d)  of\nFOIA.  Although you argue that R1 failed to demonstrate an undue burden for purposes of\nsection 3(g) of FOIA,6 your submissions to this office do not suggest that R1 has yet treated your\nrequest as unduly burdensome under that provision.  Rather, R1 explained why your request met\nthe definition of \"voluminous request.\"  Additionally, although you argued that R1 did not justify\nits extension of ten business days,  the plain language of section 3.6( d) of FOIA authorizes a\npublic body to take an additional 10 business days to comply with a request after the requester\nresponds to a notification that the request is voluminous.  Because the request was voluminous, \nthe procedures and timeframe for responding to your request are governed by section 3.6 rather\nthan section 3(d) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140 /3(d) (West 2022)).   \n\nLastly, although you alleged that R1 failed to provide a breakdown of costs for\nfees it might assess, and that electronic documents should be furnished at no cost, section 6(a -5) \nof FOIA7 provides: \n\nIf a voluminous request is for electronic records and those\n\nformat ( PDF),  the public\n\nrecords are not in a portable document\nbody may charge up to $20 for not more than 2 megabytes of data, \nup to $40 for more than 2 but not more than 4 megabytes of data, \nand up to $100 for more than 4 megabytes of data.  If a voluminous\nrequest is for electronic records and those records are in a portable\nformat,  the public body may charge up to $ 20 for not\ndocument\nmore than 80 megabytes of data, up to $40 for more than 80\nmegabytes but not more than 160 megabytes of data, and up to\n100 for more than 160 megabytes of data. If the responsive\n\nelectronic records are in both a portable document\nformat and not\nin a portable document format, the public body may separate the\nfees and charge the requester under both fee scales. \n\nIf a public body imposes a fee pursuant to this subsection\na- 5),  it must provide the requester with an accounting of all fees, \n\n65 ILCS 140/ 3(g) (West 2022). \n\n75 ILCS 140/ 6(a -5) (West 2022). \n\n\fr. Henry McDavid\nMarch 3, 2025\nPage 5\n\ncosts, and personnel hours in connection with the request for\npublic records. \n\nBy its plain language, this provision permits public bodies to assess fees for copies of electronic\nrecords in response to voluminous requests.   Section 3.6(e)  of FOIA8 additionally specifies:   \n\nIf a requester does not pay a fee charged pursuant\nSection 6 of this Act for a voluminous request,  the debt shall be\nconsidered a debt due and owing to the public body and may be\ncollected in accordance with applicable law. This fee may be\ncharged by the public body even if the requester fails to accept or\ncollect records the public body has prepared in response to a\nvoluminous request. \n\nto\n\nIn the event R1 assesses fees for copies of records responsive to your request under section 6(a -\n5) of FOIA, it shall provide you with an accounting of all fees, costs, and personnel hours , but\nR1 is not required to provide that information unless and until it actually imposes fees. \n\nBecause the information you submitted does not indicate that R1 violated FOIA, \nthe Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.   This\nfile is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at joshua.jones @ilag.gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau,  Chicago\n\n85334 f no fi war reg auth\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kayla Gipson\nDirector of Finance\nRegion 1 Planning Council\n127 North Wyman Street, Suite 100\nRockford,  Illinois 61101\nkgipson@r1planning.org\n\n85 ILCS 140/ 3.6(e) (West 2022). \n\n\fMr. Henry McDavid\nMarch 3, 2025\nPage 6\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs.  Keishonda Williamson\nFounder &  Executive Director\nKIKIFER'S Entrepreneurial Academy\ninfo@kikifersacademy.org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Aggregation of multiple FOIA requests as voluminous","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85334/","full_text":"March 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Henry McDavid\nCo -Founder and Principal\nKIKIFER'S Entrepreneurial Academy\nprincipal@kikifersacademy. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85334\n\nDear Mr. McDavid: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 202 3 Supp.)). For the reasons explained\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter. \n\nOn February 9, 2025, you submitted three FOIA requests to Region 1 Planning\n\nCouncil (R1) containing eight parts total. You submitted the requests as Co -Founder and\nPrincipal of KIKIFER'S Entrepreneurial Academy (KEA). On that same date, Ms. Keishonda\nWilliamson submitted four FOIA requests to R1 containing 14 parts total. Ms. Williamson\nsubmitted the requests as Founder and Executive Director of KEA. On February 14, 2025, R1\nnotified you and Ms. Williamson that your requests collectively qualified as a voluminous\nrequest under section 3.6 FOIA,1 so you had ten business days within which to amend the request\nin such a way that R1 would no longer treat the request as a voluminous request. On that same\ndate, you replied to R1 by disputing the aggregation of your requests with Ms. Williamson's and\nby stating that you would not be narrowing the request. On February 18, 2025, R1 extended its\n\nAs an initial matter, section 9.5(b -5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9.5(b -5) (West 2023\nSupp.)) provides that \"[ a] person whose request to inspect or copy a public record was treated by\na public body * * * as a voluminous request under Section 3.6 of this Act may file a request for\nreview with the Public Access Counselor for the purpose of reviewing whether the public body\nproperly determined that the request was a voluminous request.\" (Emphasis added.) Section\n2(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(b) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \"person\" as \" any individual, \ncorporation, partnership, firm, organization or ass ociation, acting individually or as a group.\" \nThis office has previously determined that individuals who submit requests on behalf of the same\nbusiness constitute the same \"person\" for purposes of FOIA. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n17798, issued September 21, 2018, at 4 (concluding that \"classifying each individual employee\nwho submits a FOIA request in their employment capacity as a separate ' person ' under section\n2(g) would enable any business with a sufficiently large number of employees to overwhelm a\npublic body with FOIA requests.\"). \n\nIn this instance, R1 had a valid basis to treat the requests submitted under your\nname and the requests submitted under Ms. Williamson's name as requests by the same person\nbecause you both submitted the requests on behalf of KEA and your communications with the\nPublic Access Bureau reflect that you are working together closely on these matters. \n\nSection 2(h) of FOIA2 defines \"voluminous request\" as a request that: \n\ni) includes more than 5 individual requests for more than 5\n\ndifferent categories of records or a combination of individual\nrequests that total requests for more than 5 different categories of\nrecords in a period of 20 business days; or\n\nii) requires the compilation of more than 500 letter or\n\nlegal- sized pages of public records unless a single requested record\nexceeds 500 pages. \" Single requested record\" may include, but is\nnot limited to, one report, form, e -mail, letter, memorandum, book, \nmap, microfilm, tape, or recording. \n\nSection 3.6(a) of FOIA 3 provides that \"[ n] otwithstanding any provision of this\n\nAct to the contrary, a public body shall respond to a voluminous request within 5 business days\nafter receipt.\" This response shall notify the requester: \n\npublic body within 10 business days after the public body's\nresponse was sent and specify whether the requester would like to\namend the request in such a way that the public body will no\nlonger treat the request as a voluminous request; (iv) that if the\nrequester does not respond within 10 business days or if the\nrequest continues to be a voluminous request following the\nrequester's response, the public body will respond to the request\nand assess any fees the public body charges pursuan t to Section 6\nof this Act; (v) that the public body has 5 business days after\nreceipt of the requester's response or 5 business days from the last\nday for the requester to amend his or her request, whichever is\nsooner, to respond to the request; (vi) that the public body may\nrequest an additional 10 business days to comply with the request; \nvii) of the requester's right to review of the public body's\ndetermination by the Public Access Counselor and provide the\naddress and phone number for the Public Access Counselor; and\nviii) that if the requester fails to accept or collect the responsive\nrecords, the public body may still charge the requester for its\nresponse pursuant to Section 6 of this Act and the requester's\nfailure to pay will be considered a debt due and owing to the public\nbody and may be collected in accordance with applicable law. \n\nSection 3.6(c) of FOIA 4 then specifies what must happen next: \n\nT]he public body shall respond within the earlier of 5 business\ndays after it receives the response from the requester or 5 business\ndays after the final day for the requester to respond to the public\nbody's notification under this subsection. The respons e shall: (i) \nprovide an estimate of the fees to be charged, which the public\nbody may require the person to pay in full before copying the\nrequested documents; (ii) deny the request pursuant to one or more\nof the exemptions set out in this Act; (iii) notif y the requester that\nthe request is unduly burdensome and extend an opportunity to the\nrequester to attempt to reduce the request to manageable\nproportions; or (iv) provide the records requested. \n\nAdditionally, under section 3.6(d) of FOIA,5 \"[ t]he time for response by the public body under\nsubsection (c) of this Section may be extended by the public body for not more than 10 business\ndays from the final day for the requester to respond to the public body's notification under\n\nsubsection (c) of this Section for any of the reasons provided in subsection (e) of Section 3 of\" \nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(e) (West 202 2)). \n\nIn accordance with the provisions set out above, R1 notified you and Ms. \n\nWilliamson within five business days after receipt that your requests qualif ied as a voluminous\nrequest and that you had ten business days within which to narrow the request if you did not wish\nfor it to be treated as voluminous. After you confirmed that you would not be narrowing the\nrequest, R1 took a proper extension of ten business days to respond unde r section 3.6(d) of\nFOIA. Although you argue that R1 failed to demonstrate an undue burden for purposes of\nsection 3(g) of FOIA,6 your submissions to this office do not suggest that R1 has yet treated your\nrequest as unduly burdensome under that provision. Rather, R1 explained why your request met\nthe definition of \"voluminous request.\" Additionally, although you argued that R1 did not justify\nits extension of ten business days, the plain language of section 3.6(d) of FOIA authorizes a\npublic body to take an additional 10 business days to comply with a request after the requester\nresponds to a notification that the request is voluminous. Because the request was voluminous, \nthe procedures and timeframe for responding to your request are governed by section 3.6 rather\nthan section 3(d) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140 /3(d) (West 2022)). \n\nLastly, although you alleged that R1 failed to provide a breakdown of costs for\nfees it might assess, and that electronic documents should be furnished at no cost, section 6(a -5) \nof FOIA7 provides: \n\nIf a voluminous request is for electronic records and those\n\nformat (PDF), the public\n\nrecords are not in a portable document\nbody may charge up to $20 for not more than 2 megabytes of data, \nup to $40 for more than 2 but not more than 4 megabytes of data, \nand up to $100 for more than 4 megabytes of data. If a voluminous\nrequest is for electronic records and those records are in a portable\nformat, the public body may charge up to $ 20 for not\ndocument\nmore than 80 megabytes of data, up to $40 for more than 80\nmegabytes but not more than 160 megabytes of data, and up to\n100 for more than 160 megabytes of data. If the responsive\n\nelectronic records are in both a portable document\nformat and not\nin a portable document format, the public body may separate the\n\ncosts, and personnel hours in connection with the request for\npublic records. \n\nBy its plain language, this provision permits public bodies to assess fees for copies of electronic\nrecords in response to voluminous requests. Section 3.6(e) of FOIA8 additionally specifies: \n\nIf a requester does not pay a fee charged pursuant\nSection 6 of this Act for a voluminous request, the debt shall be\nconsidered a debt due and owing to the public body and may be\ncollected in accordance with applicable law. This fee may be\ncharged by the public body even if the requester fails to accept or\ncollect records the public body has prepared in response to a\nvoluminous request. \n\nto\n\nIn the event R1 assesses fees for copies of records responsive to your request under section 6(a -\n5) of FOIA, it shall provide you with an accounting of all fees, costs, and personnel hours, but\nR1 is not required to provide that information unless and until it actually imposes fees. \n\nBecause the information you submitted does not indicate that R1 violated FOIA, \nthe Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. This\nfile is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at joshua.jones @ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau, Chicago\n\n85334 f no fi war reg auth\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kayla Gipson\nDirector of Finance\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Keishonda Williamson\nFounder & Executive Director\nKIKIFER'S Entrepreneurial Academy\ninfo@kikifersacademy.org"}
{"id":1126,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85440"],"title":"Animal Protective League of Springfield and Sangamon County not a public body under FOIA","filename":"85440, issued March 3, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":610,"summary":"The requester sought records from the Animal Protective League of Springfield and Sangamon County under FOIA, but the PAC determined the organization is a private non-profit and not a public body subject to the Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen filed a FOIA request with the Animal Protective League, arguing that because the organization claims to make documents public in its tax filings, it should be subject to FOIA. The Attorney General's office explained that being a private non-profit does not make an organization a 'public body' under the law. Consequently, the PAC closed the case because the organization is not required to comply with FOIA requests.","holding":"The PAC determined that the Animal Protective League is not a public body as defined by FOIA and therefore is not subject to the Act's requirements.","legal_question":"Whether the Animal Protective League of Springfield and Sangamon County constitutes a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Animal Protective League of Springfield and Sangamon County","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body definition","subject_description":"The requester sought records from a private non-profit organization, which the PAC determined is not a public body.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_a/Non-profit-federal-alderman/85440%2C%20issued%20March%203%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","non-profit","FOIA jurisdiction","private organization"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"March 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85440\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted.  \n\nOn January 28, 2025,  you sent a letter to the Animal Protective League of\n\nSpringfield and Sangamon County ( Animal Protective League)  invoking FOIA and seeking\ncopies of various records.   On February 5, 2025,  the Animal Protective League responded that it\nis a private not-for-profit corporation and not a public body subject to FOIA.  On February 26, \n2025,  this office received this Request for Review disputing the Animal Protective League' s\nresponse to your request.   You alleged that in a form filed with the Internal Revenue Service\nIRS)  and Illinois Attorney General' s Office, the Animal Protective League states that it \"makes\nits governing documents and financial statements available to the public upon request.\" 1\n\nFOIA governs requests for public records maintained by public bodies.   See 5\n\nILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022).   Section 2(a)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(a) ( West 2023 Supp.))  defines a\npublic body\"  as:  \n\n1Letter from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( dated February 23, 2025;  received\n\nFebruary 26, 2025) ( quoting Internal Revenue Service Form 990,  Schedule O [ allegedly submitted in 2023 by the\nAnimal Protective League of Springfield and Sangamon County]).  \n\n\fMarch 3, 2025\nPage 2\n\nA]ll legislative,  executive,  administrative,  or advisory bodies of\nthe State,  state universities and colleges,  counties,  townships, \ncities,  villages,  incorporated towns,  school districts and all other\nmunicipal corporations,  boards,  bureaus,  committees,  or\ncommissions of this State,  any subsidiary bodies of any of the\nforegoing including but not limited to committees and\nsubcommittees thereof,  and a School Finance Authority created\nunder Article 1E of the School Code. \" Public body\"  does not\ninclude a child death review team or the Illinois Child Death\nReview Teams Executive Council established under the Child\nDeath Review Team Act, or a regional youth advisory board or the\nStatewide Youth Advisory Board established under the\nDepartment of Children and Family Services Statewide Youth\nAdvisory Board Act. \n\nThe plain language of this definition limits the application of FOIA to State and local\ngovernmental entities of the State of Illinois.   \n\nThe Animal Protective League is a private not-for-profit corporation registered\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. 2 Your Request for Review does not allege that the Animal\nProtective League is a governmental entity.  Rather,  you challenge its assertion that it is not\nobligated to disclose records in response to your request because it filed a tax form stating that it\nmakes certain records about itself public upon request.   Any statement made by the Animal\nProtective League in a tax form about the availability of certain records upon request does not\ntransform the organization into a public body subject to FOIA.  Because the Animal Protective\nLeague is not required to respond to FOIA requests,  this office has determined that no further\naction is warranted in this matter.   \n\nThis letter closes this file.  If you have any questions about FOIA, you may\n\ncontact the Public Access Bureau at 877- 299- 3642. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85440 f no fi war not a pb\n\nhttps:// apps. ilsos. gov/ businessentitysearch/ (\n\nlast visited February 28, 2025).  \n\n2Office of the Illinois Secretary of State,  Business Entity Search,  available at\n\n\fMarch 3, 2025\nPage 3\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Deana Corbin\nExecutive Director\nAnimal Protective League\n1001 Taintor Road\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62702\nadmin@apl- shelter. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Records from a private non-profit organization","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85440/","full_text":"March 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85440\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted. \n\nOn January 28, 2025, you sent a letter to the Animal Protective League of\n\nSpringfield and Sangamon County (Animal Protective League) invoking FOIA and seeking\ncopies of various records. On February 5, 2025, the Animal Protective League responded that it\nis a private not-for-profit corporation and not a public body subject to FOIA. On February 26, \n2025, this office received this Request for Review disputing the Animal Protective League's\nresponse to your request. You alleged that in a form filed with the Internal Revenue Service\nIRS) and Illinois Attorney General's Office, the Animal Protective League states that it \"makes\nits governing documents and financial statements available to the public upon request.\" 1\n\nFOIA governs requests for public records maintained by public bodies. See 5\n\nILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022). Section 2(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(a) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines a\npublic body\" as: \n\n1 Letter from\n\nto Public Access Counselor (dated February 23, 2025; received\n\nFebruary 26, 2025) (quoting Internal Revenue Service Form 990, Schedule O [ allegedly submitted in 2023 by the\n\nA]ll legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of\nthe State, state universities and colleges, counties, townships, \ncities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other\nmunicipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees, or\ncommissions of this State, any subsidiary bodies of any of the\nforegoing including but not limited to committees and\nsubcommittees thereof, and a School Finance Authority created\nunder Article 1E of the School Code. \" Public body\" does not\ninclude a child death review team or the Illinois Child Death\nReview Teams Executive Council established under the Child\nDeath Review Team Act, or a regional youth advisory board or the\nStatewide Youth Advisory Board established under the\nDepartment of Children and Family Services Statewide Youth\nAdvisory Board Act. \n\nThe plain language of this definition limits the application of FOIA to State and local\ngovernmental entities of the State of Illinois. \n\nThe Animal Protective League is a private not-for-profit corporation registered\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. 2 Your Request for Review does not allege that the Animal\nProtective League is a governmental entity. Rather, you challenge its assertion that it is not\nobligated to disclose records in response to your request because it filed a tax form stating that it\nmakes certain records about itself public upon request. Any statement made by the Animal\nProtective League in a tax form about the availability of certain records upon request does not\ntransform the organization into a public body subject to FOIA. Because the Animal Protective\nLeague is not required to respond to FOIA requests, this office has determined that no further\naction is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis letter closes this file. If you have any questions about FOIA, you may\n\ncontact the Public Access Bureau at 877- 299- 3642. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Deana Corbin\nExecutive Director\nAnimal Protective League\n1001 Taintor Road\nSpringfield, Illinois 62702\nadmin@apl- shelter. org"}
{"id":1127,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85453"],"title":"DCEO improperly withheld tax incentive applications under 7(1)(f)","filename":"85453, issued June 13, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1922,"summary":"The requester sought applications for the Local Journalism Sustainability Tax Incentive Program, which the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO) withheld under the deliberative process exemption. The PAC determined that the records were not exempt and ordered DCEO to disclose them, subject to redactions for confidential commercial or financial information.","plain_summary":"A researcher requested applications for a state tax incentive program, but the DCEO refused to release them, claiming they were still under review and part of a deliberative process. The Attorney General's office disagreed, ruling that the records are public and must be released. The agency is allowed to redact specific private financial or commercial data before providing the documents.","holding":"The DCEO improperly withheld the requested tax incentive program applications under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether applications for a tax incentive program are exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process exemption (Section 7(1)(f)) of FOIA.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(f)","5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(f)","7(1)(a)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO)","requesting_party":"Mr. John Volk","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"tax incentive records","subject_description":"The request concerned applications and attachments for the Local Journalism Sustainability Tax Incentive Program.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_f/Communications-with-third-parties/Self-interested-parties/85453%2C%20issued%20June%2013%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["tax incentive","deliberative process","FOIA request","DCEO","public records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Legal & Financial Records","full_text_pre_clean":"June 13, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Volk\nResearch Associate\nState of Local News Project\nNorthwestern University,  Medill School\njohn.volk@northwestern. edu\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Tom Seymour\nLegal Counsel\nIllinois Department of Commerce and\nEconomic Opportunity\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nCEO.Commerce. FOIA@illinois. gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85453;  DCEO No. 2025- 0027\n\nDear Mr. Volk and Mr. Seymour: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)).   For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic\nOpportunity ( DCEO)  improperly withheld the records responsive to Mr. John Volk's February\n18, 2025,  FOIA request.   \n\nOn that date, Mr. Volk submitted a FOIA request to DCEO seeking copies of\nthe applications for the Local Journalism Sustainability Tax Incentive Program for nine listed\nentities,  including attachments to the applications.   In his request,  Mr. Volk noted that DCEO\nhad denied two previous FOIA requests for the same records because it asserted that the\napplications were not yet approved. \n\n\fMr. John Volk\nMr. Tom Seymour\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn February 25, 2025,  DCEO denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)( f) of\n\nFOIA. 1 DCEO stated that it denied the request \" because the applications submitted are still\nunder review.\" 2 Additionally,  DCEO argued:  \n\nThe records in question are preliminary because they\n\ncontain incomplete information and the impressions and\nrecommendations of the Department and its attorneys.   Disclosure\nof these records,  at this time, would therefore reveal the\nDepartment' s predecisional deliberative process involved in the\ncreation and enforcement of its policies and would undermine the\nability to discuss policy as it is being formed.[ 3]  \n\nOn February 26, 2025,  Mr. Volk submitted the above- referenced Request for\nReview contesting the denial of his request.   Mr. Volk stated:  \" I'm unclear how those private\ndeliberations would be disclosed by sharing documents the Department received from non-\ngovernment organizations.\" 4\n\nOn March 3, 2025,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nDCEO and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the withheld records for this office' s\nconfidential review,  as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\napplicability of section 7(1)(f) of FOIA to the records.  \n\nOn March 11, 2025,  DCEO provided this office with copies of responsive records\n\nas well as its written response.   On March 12, 2025,  this office forwarded a copy of DCEO' s\nwritten response to Mr. Volk and notified him of his opportunity to reply;  he replied on March\n19, 2025. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \n\n2024;  103- 865,  effective January 1, 2025.  \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July 1,  \n\nto John Volk (February 25, 2025),  at [ 1]. \n\n2Letter from Tom Seymour,  Legal Counsel,  Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, \n\nto John Volk (February 25, 2025),  at [ 1]. \n\n3Letter from Tom Seymour,  Legal Counsel,  Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, \n\nUniversity,  Medill School,  to Public Access [ Bureau] ( February 26, 2025).  \n\n4E- mail from John Volk, Research Associate,  State of Local News Project,  Northwestern\n\n\fMr. John Volk\nMr. Tom Seymour\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 3\n\nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).  \n\nSection 7(1)( f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]reliminary drafts,  notes, \n\nrecommendations,  memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed,  or policies or\nactions are formulated,  except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\"   The\nsection 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\"   Harwood v. McDonough,  344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 ( 2003).   Section 7(1)( f) is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Harwood,  344 Ill. \nApp. 3d at 248.  \"[ I]n order to be exempt under this provision,  the responsive materials must be\nboth ( 1) inter or intra agency and ( 2) predecisional and deliberative.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Fisher\nv. Office of the Illinois Attorney General,  2021 IL App (1st)  200225, ¶  19; see also Department\nof Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) ( source of a record\nmust be a Government agency[ ]\"  to be exempt under the Federal FOIA deliberative process\nexemption ( 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) ( 2018)).   The section 7(1)(f) exemption encompasses\ncommunications between government agencies and outside consultants whose analyses and\nrecommendations ' played essentially the same part in an agency' s process of deliberation as\ndocuments prepared by agency personnel might have done.'\"   Harwood,  344 Ill. App. 3d at 248\nquoting Klamath,  532 U.S. at 10 ( exemption extends to third party only when \" the consultant\ndoes not represent an interest of its own, or the interest of any other client,  when it advises the\nagency that hires it.\")).   \n\nIn its response to this office, DCEO argued that Harwood supports its denial\n\nbecause the court determined that a final report the public body relied upon in a decision- making\nprocess was considered preliminary for purposes of section 7(1)( f).  While Harwood does stand\nfor the proposition that a finalized document may be withheld under section 7(1)(f) if it is a\ndeliberative record generated to inform a public body' s decision- making process,  the Harwood\ncourt' s conclusion that the report was exempt hinged on the fact that it was prepared by a\nconsultant which represented the public body' s interests rather than any interests of its own or of\nother clients.   Harwood,  344 Ill. App. 3d at 248.  Here,  in contrast,  the tax credit applicants\nsubmitted applications to advance their own interests,  rather than just to serve the interests of\nDCEO.   \n\nDCEO further argued that section 7(1)(f) of FOIA applies to the withheld records\n\nfor the following reasons:  \n\n\fMr. John Volk\nMr. Tom Seymour\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 4\n\nT]he middle clause of the first sentence of section 7(1)(f)- \"in\nwhich opinions are expressed,  or policies or actions formulated\" \nindicates the legislature intended to protect the competitive process\ninvolved in contracting with public bodies.  Similarly,  this request\nis preliminary because responsive documents contain incomplete\ninformation.  Complete information is required formulate policy\nand take action.  \n\nPart of the inter- and intra- agency deliberative process\n\ninvolves requesting follow up or additional\ninformation in order to\ndetermine whether the Application should be approved or denied.  \nUntil all the Department' s questions are answered,  the decision\ncould tip in either direction toward denial or approval.  Depending\non the Applicant' s response to these deliberative questions,  the\nApplicant' s submitted documents may change from their initial\nsubmission.  Therefore,  the application materials are not final, until\nthe Department has made a decision on whether to approve or deny\nthe Application.  Up until that point, the application is pre-\ndecisional and inter-  and intra- agency deliberative material.[ 5] \n\nDCEO provided several examples of additional follow- up with applicants that may be needed\nand contended that determining the extent to which an application must be supplemented is itself\na deliberative process.   Although DCEO' s review of applications for completeness and other\nissues may be a deliberative process and records it generates and circulates internally during that\nprocess may fall under section 7(1)(f), the issue in this matter is whether the third-party\napplications themselves are inter-  or intra- agency predecisional and deliberative records. \n\nIn reply, Mr. Volk contended that \"[ t]here should be no opinions expressed,  nor\n\npolicies or actions formulated within these standard documents submitted from private entities.\" 6\nHe also argued that \"[ t]he core documents I am requesting are not documents prepared by the\nState of Illinois but are documents prepared by private entities in the possession of the State.\" 7\n\n5Letter from Tom Seymour,  Legal Counsel/ FOIA Officer,  Department of Commerce and\n\nEconomic Opportunity,  to [ Katie]  Goldsmith,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Illinois Attorney\nGeneral' s Office ( March 11, 2025),  at [ 2].  \n\n6Letter from John Volk, Research Associate,  State of Local News Project,  Northwestern\n\nUniversity,  Medill School,  to Katie Goldsmith,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Illinois Attorney\nGeneral' s Office ( March 19, 2025),  at [ 1].   \n\n7Letter from John Volk, Research Associate,  State of Local News Project,  Northwestern\n\nUniversity,  Medill School,  to Katie Goldsmith,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public Access Bureau,  Illinois Attorney\nGeneral' s Office ( March 19, 2025),  at [ 1].   \n\n\fr. John Volk\nMr. Tom Seymour\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 5\n\nThe responsive records are plainly materials submitted to DCEO by a third-party\n\ninterests and stand to benefit from DCEO' s decision on their\n\ncorporation to seek a tax incentive.   While the agency' s review and consideration of the\napplication materials is an intra- agency decision- making process to select awardees,  tax\nincentive applicants do not participate in that joint decision- making process with DCEO because\nthey represent independent\napplication.   See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. Op. No. 21-004, issued May 24, 2021,  at\n6 (binding opinion concluding that communications between a private business owner applying\nfor a zoning variance and a city were not inter-  or intra- agency communications within the scope\nof section 7(1)( f)).  Regardless of whether DCEO has made a final decision on the applications, \nmaterials submitted by applicants do not constitute inter- or intra- agency predecisional\ndeliberative materials.   Accordingly,  DCEO improperly withheld these records pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(f) of FOIA.   \n\nNonetheless,  and although DCEO did not cite this provision,  the program terms\n\nand conditions of the Local Journalism Sustainability Act (35 ILCS 18/40-25 (West 2024)) \nprovide:  \n\nAny documentary materials or data made available or received\nfrom an applicant by any agent or employee of the Department are\nconfidential and are not public records to the extent that the\nmaterials or data consist of commercial or financial\ninformation\nregarding the operation of, or the production of, the applicant or\nrecipient of any tax credit award under this Act. \n\nBecause that provision provides that the \" commercial or financial\noperation of, or the production of, the applicant[ ]\" \nfrom disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(a)  of FOIA. 8 This office requests that DCEO disclose\nthe responsive records with such information redacted. \n\ninformation regarding the\nis confidential,  that information is exempt\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions,  please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.\").  \n\n85 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2024) ( exempting from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\n\fMr. John Volk\nMr. Tom Seymour\nJune 13, 2025\nPage 6\n\n85453 f 71f improper sa\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Tax incentive program applications","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85453/","full_text":"June 13, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Volk\nResearch Associate\nState of Local News Project\nNorthwestern University, Medill School\njohn.volk@northwestern. edu\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Tom Seymour\nLegal Counsel\nIllinois Department of Commerce and\nEconomic Opportunity\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nCEO.Commerce. FOIA@illinois. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85453; DCEO No. 2025- 0027\n\nDear Mr. Volk and Mr. Seymour: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic\nOpportunity (DCEO) improperly withheld the records responsive to Mr. John Volk's February\n18, 2025, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Mr. Volk submitted a FOIA request to DCEO seeking copies of\nthe applications for the Local Journalism Sustainability Tax Incentive Program for nine listed\nentities, including attachments to the applications. In his request, Mr. Volk noted that DCEO\n\nOn February 25, 2025, DCEO denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of\n\nFOIA. 1 DCEO stated that it denied the request \" because the applications submitted are still\nunder review.\" 2 Additionally, DCEO argued: \n\nThe records in question are preliminary because they\n\ncontain incomplete information and the impressions and\nrecommendations of the Department and its attorneys. Disclosure\nof these records, at this time, would therefore reveal the\nDepartment's predecisional deliberative process involved in the\ncreation and enforcement of its policies and would undermine the\nability to discuss policy as it is being formed.[ 3] \n\nOn February 26, 2025, Mr. Volk submitted the above- referenced Request for\nReview contesting the denial of his request. Mr. Volk stated: \" I'm unclear how those private\ndeliberations would be disclosed by sharing documents the Department received from non-\ngovernment organizations.\" 4\n\nOn March 3, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nDCEO and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the withheld records for this office's\nconfidential review, as well as a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the\napplicability of section 7(1)(f) of FOIA to the records. \n\nOn March 11, 2025, DCEO provided this office with copies of responsive records\n\nas well as its written response. On March 12, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of DCEO's\nwritten response to Mr. Volk and notified him of his opportunity to reply; he replied on March\n19, 2025. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \n\n2024; 103- 865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(f) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\nto John Volk (February 25, 2025), at [ 1]. \n\n2 Letter from Tom Seymour, Legal Counsel, Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, \n\nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]reliminary drafts, notes, \n\nrecommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or\nactions are formulated, except that a specific record or relevant portion of a record shall not be\nexempt when the record is publicly cited and identified by the head of the public body.\" The\nsection 7(1)(f) exemption applies to \" inter- and intra- agency predecisional and deliberative\nmaterial.\" Harwood v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 3d 242, 247 (2003). Section 7(1)(f) is\nintended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion\namong agency employees before a final decision is made.\" (Emphasis added.) Harwood, 344 Ill. \nApp. 3d at 248. \"[ I]n order to be exempt under this provision, the responsive materials must be\nboth (1) inter or intra agency and (2) predecisional and deliberative.\" (Emphasis added.) Fisher\nv. Office of the Illinois Attorney General, 2021 IL App (1st) 200225, ¶ 19; see also Department\nof Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (source of a record\nmust be a Government agency[ ]\" to be exempt under the Federal FOIA deliberative process\nexemption (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018)). The section 7(1)(f) exemption encompasses\ncommunications between government agencies and outside consultants whose analyses and\nrecommendations ' played essentially the same part in an agency's process of deliberation as\ndocuments prepared by agency personnel might have done.'\" Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248\nquoting Klamath, 532 U.S. at 10 (exemption extends to third party only when \" the consultant\ndoes not represent an interest of its own, or the interest of any other client, when it advises the\nagency that hires it.\")). \n\nIn its response to this office, DCEO argued that Harwood supports its denial\n\nbecause the court determined that a final report the public body relied upon in a decision- making\nprocess was considered preliminary for purposes of section 7(1)(f). While Harwood does stand\nfor the proposition that a finalized document may be withheld under section 7(1)(f) if it is a\ndeliberative record generated to inform a public body's decision- making process, the Harwood\ncourt's conclusion that the report was exempt hinged on the fact that it was prepared by a\nconsultant which represented the public body's interests rather than any interests of its own or of\nother clients. Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248. Here, in contrast, the tax credit applicants\nsubmitted applications to advance their own interests, rather than just to serve the interests of\n\nT]he middle clause of the first sentence of section 7(1)(f)- \"in\nwhich opinions are expressed, or policies or actions formulated\" \nindicates the legislature intended to protect the competitive process\ninvolved in contracting with public bodies. Similarly, this request\nis preliminary because responsive documents contain incomplete\ninformation. Complete information is required formulate policy\nand take action. \n\nPart of the inter- and intra- agency deliberative process\n\ninvolves requesting follow up or additional\ninformation in order to\ndetermine whether the Application should be approved or denied. \nUntil all the Department's questions are answered, the decision\ncould tip in either direction toward denial or approval. Depending\non the Applicant's response to these deliberative questions, the\nApplicant's submitted documents may change from their initial\nsubmission. Therefore, the application materials are not final, until\nthe Department has made a decision on whether to approve or deny\nthe Application. Up until that point, the application is pre-\ndecisional and inter- and intra- agency deliberative material.[ 5] \n\nDCEO provided several examples of additional follow- up with applicants that may be needed\nand contended that determining the extent to which an application must be supplemented is itself\na deliberative process. Although DCEO's review of applications for completeness and other\nissues may be a deliberative process and records it generates and circulates internally during that\nprocess may fall under section 7(1)(f), the issue in this matter is whether the third-party\napplications themselves are inter- or intra- agency predecisional and deliberative records. \n\nIn reply, Mr. Volk contended that \"[ t]here should be no opinions expressed, nor\n\npolicies or actions formulated within these standard documents submitted from private entities.\" 6\nHe also argued that \"[ t]he core documents I am requesting are not documents prepared by the\nState of Illinois but are documents prepared by private entities in the possession of the State.\" 7\n\n5 Letter from Tom Seymour, Legal Counsel/ FOIA Officer, Department of Commerce and\n\nEconomic Opportunity, to [ Katie] Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (March 11, 2025), at [ 2]. \n\n6 Letter from John Volk, Research Associate, State of Local News Project, Northwestern\n\nUniversity, Medill School, to Katie Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\nGeneral's Office (March 19, 2025), at [ 1]. \n\n7 Letter from John Volk, Research Associate, State of Local News Project, Northwestern\n\nUniversity, Medill School, to Katie Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Illinois Attorney\n\nThe responsive records are plainly materials submitted to DCEO by a third-party\n\ninterests and stand to benefit from DCEO's decision on their\n\ncorporation to seek a tax incentive. While the agency's review and consideration of the\napplication materials is an intra- agency decision- making process to select awardees, tax\nincentive applicants do not participate in that joint decision- making process with DCEO because\nthey represent independent\napplication. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 21-004, issued May 24, 2021, at\n6 (binding opinion concluding that communications between a private business owner applying\nfor a zoning variance and a city were not inter- or intra- agency communications within the scope\nof section 7(1)(f)). Regardless of whether DCEO has made a final decision on the applications, \nmaterials submitted by applicants do not constitute inter- or intra- agency predecisional\ndeliberative materials. Accordingly, DCEO improperly withheld these records pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(f) of FOIA. \n\nNonetheless, and although DCEO did not cite this provision, the program terms\n\nand conditions of the Local Journalism Sustainability Act (35 ILCS 18/40-25 (West 2024)) \nprovide: \n\nAny documentary materials or data made available or received\nfrom an applicant by any agent or employee of the Department are\nconfidential and are not public records to the extent that the\nmaterials or data consist of commercial or financial\ninformation\nregarding the operation of, or the production of, the applicant or\nrecipient of any tax credit award under this Act. \n\nBecause that provision provides that the \" commercial or financial\noperation of, or the production of, the applicant[ ]\" \nfrom disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA. 8 This office requests that DCEO disclose\nthe responsive records with such information redacted. \n\ninformation regarding the\nis confidential, that information is exempt\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at katherine. goldsmith@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.\"). \n\n85453 f 71f improper sa"}
{"id":1128,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-07-29","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85480"],"title":"McHenry County Sheriff's Office properly withheld body camera footage and redacted reports under FOIA privacy exemptions","filename":"85480, issued July 29, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2510,"summary":"The requester challenged the McHenry County Sheriff's Office's redaction of police reports and withholding of body camera footage regarding an incident involving her son. The PAC determined that the Sheriff's Office properly applied FOIA exemptions to protect personal privacy and statutory confidentiality.","plain_summary":"A mother requested police reports and body camera footage related to an incident involving her son. The Sheriff's Office provided redacted reports and withheld the video, citing privacy concerns. The Attorney General's office reviewed the materials and agreed that the Sheriff's Office acted within the law to protect the privacy of the individuals involved.","holding":"The McHenry County Sheriff's Office did not improperly deny the FOIA request.","legal_question":"Whether the Sheriff's Office properly withheld body camera footage and redacted police reports under FOIA exemptions 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), and 7.5(cc).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)","7.5(cc)"],"public_body":"McHenry County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought police reports and body camera footage concerning a specific incident involving a minor.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/not-flagged-not-subject/85480%2C%20issued%20July%2029%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","body camera","privacy","minor","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"July 29, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Michelle Montgomery\nMcHenry County Sheriff' s Office\n2200 North Seminary Avenue\nWoodstock,  Illinois 60098\nmsschroeder@mchenrycountyil. gov\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85480\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Montgomery: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024).   For the reasons that follow, the Public\nAccess Bureau concludes that the McHenry County Sheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  did not\nimproperly deny\n\nFebruary 14, 2025,  FOIA request. \n\nOn February 14, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff' s\n\nOffice seeking,  in relevant part, copies of the body camera footage from each deputy that\nresponded to a November 30, 2024, incident involving her son,  and police reports associated\nwith a separate investigation involving her son.   On February 20, 2025,  the Sheriff' s Office\nprovided responsive police reports with certain information redacted pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) \nand 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 In addition,  the Sheriff' s Office withheld all video footage from the\nNovember 30, 2024,  incident pursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA. 2\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)( b), ( 1)( c) (West 2024). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5(cc) ( West 2024). \n\n\fMs. Michelle Montgomery\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn February 26, 2025, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for\n\nReview disputing the Sheriff' s Office' s redactions of portions of the police report and its\nwithholding of the video footage.   On March 4, 2025,  the Public Access Bureau forwarded a\ncopy of the Request for Review to the Sheriff' s Office and asked it to provide this office with\nunredacted copies of the relevant police reports and the withheld video footage along with an\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the asserted exemptions.   On March 10, 2025,  the\nSheriff' s Office provided this office with a written response and the withheld footage.   In its\nresponse,  the Sheriff' s Office stated that it withheld the footage pursuant to section 10-20(b)(3) \nof the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/ 10-20(b)(3) (West\n2024)) \" because [\nOn March 12, 2025,  this office forwarded the Sheriff' s Office' s response to\nnot provide a written reply.   \n\ndoes not appear in the recording and the footage is not flagged.\" 3\nshe did\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024).   The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.   Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University,  176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 ( 1997).  \n\nPolice Report\n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information,  unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\"  \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) (West 2024))  defines \" private information\"  as: \n\nU]nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number, \ndriver' s license number,  employee identification number,  biometric\nidentifiers,  personal financial\naccess codes,  medical records,  home or personal\nnumbers,  and personal email addresses.   Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\ninformation,  passwords or other\n\nlicense plates,  except as\n\ntelephone\n\nBriscoe,  Assistant Attorney General,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( March 10, 2025),  at [ 2].  \n\n3Letter from Michelle Montgomery,  FOIA Officer,  McHenry County Sheriff' s Office,  to Caleb L.  \n\n\fMs. Michelle Montgomery\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 3\n\nAdditionally,  section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation contained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the\nindividual subjects of the information.\"   An \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\"  is\ndefined in section 7(1)(c) as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or\nobjectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject' s right to privacy outweighs any\nlegitimate public interest in obtaining the information.\" \n\nA public body' s assertion that the release of information would constitute an\n\nis doing,  not\n\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy is evaluated on a case- by-case basis.   Chicago\nJourneymen Plumbers'  Local Union 130 v. Department of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, \n196 ( 2001).  \"[ T]he core purpose of the FOIA is to expose what the government\nwhat its private citizens are up to.'\"  Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety v. City of\nChicago,  348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 211 ( 2004) ( quoting Lakin Law Firm, P.C. v. F.T.C., 352 F.3d\n1122,  1124 ( 7th Cir. 2003)).   The right to privacy \" is strongest where the individuals in question\nhave been investigated but never publicly charged.'\"   Citizens for Responsibility &  Ethics in\nWashington v. United States Department of Justice,  846 F. Supp.  2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2012) \nquoting American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Justice,  655 F.3d 1, 7\nD.C. Cir. 2011)).   Accordingly,  the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that while\nthe public interest generally requires information about the circumstances of arrests to be\ndisclosed,  there is a lesser public interest in the disclosure of information about an incident that\ndid not result in an arrest.   See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 37700,  issued\nJanuary 13, 2016,  at 3 (records of criminal sexual assault investigation exempt where no arrests\nwere made and no criminal charges filed).   \n\nThis office has reviewed the responsive records at issue.   The reports provide a\n\nsummary of an investigation of a criminal sexual assault allegation initiated after statements\nwere made by\nthe investigating officer discussed the progress of the investigation with\nthe officer' s interview of the alleged perpetrator.   The investigation did not result in any arrests or\nthe filing of any criminal charges.   \n\nminor child during a forensic interview.   The report indicates that\nfollowing\n\nThe redacted portions of the report include unique identifiers such as home\n\naddresses,  dates of birth, and driver' s license numbers.   The remaining redacted portions consist\nof a summary of the suspect' s responses to the allegations made by the minor.   As a parent of the\nminor child, \nHowever,  on balance,  given that no arrests were made and the identity of the accused suspect is\nthis office finds disclosure of the records would constitute an unwarranted\nknown to\ninvasion of the suspect' s personal privacy.   Accordingly,  the Sheriff' s Office did not improperly\nwithhold the portions of the responsive records under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA.   \n\ninterest in the contents of the interview.  \n\nhas a strong personal\n\n\fMs. Michelle Montgomery\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 4\n\nBody Camera Footage\n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\"  Section 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act (Body Camera\nAct) 4 provides,  in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy,  at the time of the recording,  any\nrecording which is flagged,  due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm,  use of force, arrest or detention,  or\nresulting death or bodily harm,  shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness;  and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject' s\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph ( 1) of this\n\nsubsection ( b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint,  discharge of a firearm,  use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request,  the law enforcement agency\n\nshall disclose,  in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act, the recording to the subject of the\nencounter captured on the recording or to the subject' s\nattorney,  or the officer or his or her legal representative.  \nEmphasis added.) \n\n450 ILCS 706/ 10-20(b) (West 2024).  \n\n\fMs. Michelle Montgomery\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 5\n\nThus,  the Body Camera Act prohibits the disclosure of body camera footage\n\npursuant to a FOIA request,  unless one of the three exceptions enumerated above applies.   If\nfootage is not flagged due to the filing of a complaint,  discharge of a firearm,  use of force,  arrest\nor detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm,  a subject of the encounter captured on the\nrecording may still obtain a copy of the footage under the third and final exception.   The Public\nAccess Bureau has determined,  however,  that \" the subject of the encounter\"  means a person who\nappeared in the recording and \" interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a law\nenforcement activity.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 48793,  issued August 31, 2017,  at 4. \n\nThough the subject of the encounter may receive copies of the body camera\n\nfootage,  certain limitations remain.   The Public Access Counselor has concluded that section 10-\n20(b)( 3) of the Body Camera Act authorizes the \" subject of the encounter\"  to receive only the\nspecific segments of an unflagged recording in which that subject is \" captured on the recording\" \nand is interacting with an officer.  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 63412 63421,  issued\nSeptember 2, 2020,  at 8 (concluding that requester was entitled to only 30 second clip in which\nhe interacted with officer,  not remaining footage showing interactions between officer and other\nsubjects).   A public body may properly redact portions of an unflagged recording where the\nsubject who submitted the request is no longer present in the footage.   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 74512,  issued February 6, 2023,  at 5 (concluding city did not violate FOIA by blurring\nand muting segments of footage that did not show requester). \n\nThe Sheriff' s Office' s response to this office stated that the withheld recordings\n\ncapture a \" conflict between the dad and juvenile child [ which]  took place at the dad's house and\nmom was not present.\" 5 The Sheriff' s Office asserts that \"\nbody camera]  footage because she does not appear in the recording and the footage is not\nflagged.\" 6\nparent of the minor child who was one of the subjects of the encounter,  and as a parent should be\nable to obtain a copy of the recordings on behalf of her child.  \n\nconcedes that she was not present,  but asserts that she is the custodial\n\nwas denied the\n\nThere is no indication that the footage at issue was flagged for any of the reasons\noutlined in sections 10-20(b)( 1) and ( b)(2) of the Body Camera Act.  Furthermore,  based on this\noffice' s review,  a vast majority of each video involves the police obtaining information from\nindividuals other than the minor who were present within the residence.   Section 10-20(b)(3) of\nthe Body Camera Act plainly prohibits the Sheriff' s Office disclosing the footage of those\n\nAttorney General ( March 10, 2025). \n\n5Letter from Michelle Montgomery to Caleb Briscoe,  Assistant Attorney General,  Office of\n\nAttorney General ( March 10, 2025). \n\n6Letter from Michelle Montgomery to Caleb Briscoe,  Assistant Attorney General,  Office of\n\n\fMs. Michelle Montgomery\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 6\n\nindividual' s interactions with the responding officers to\nwhether\n\nis entitled to obtain footage of the minor. \n\nThe remaining issue is\n\nOne of the most fundamental principles of statutory construction is that a\n\nreviewing body \" may not depart from the plain language [ of a statute]  by reading into the statute\nexceptions,  limitations,  or conditions that the legislature did not express.\"   Hayashi v. Illinois\nDepartment of Financial and Professional Regulation,  2014 IL 116023, ¶  16; see also Brunton v. \nKruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶  67 (\" We will not read in an additional exception to a statute that\ncontains only one express exception,  indicating a legislative intent to limit exceptions to that\nsingle instance.  The creation of such an exception is a matter for the legislature.\").   \n\nBy its plain language,  section 10-20(b)( 3) of the Body Camera Act permits body\nfootage to be disclosed to (1) \" the subject of the encounter captured on the recording,\" ( 2) \" the\nsubject' s attorney,\" ( 3) the officer involved in the encounter,  and ( 4) the officer' s legal\nrepresentative.\"  \nstatutes with broad confidentiality provisions contain exceptions that permit both minors and\ntheir parents to obtain records concerning minors.   See,  e.g., 705 ILCS 405/ 1-7(0.05) ( West\n2024) ( permitting \"[ t]he minor who is the subject of the juvenile law enforcement record,  the\nminor' s parents,  guardian,  and counsel[ ]\"  to obtain records that are generally prohibited from\nbeing disclosed by the Juvenile Court Act).  The Body Camera Act does not contain a\ncomparable exception.   \n\ndoes not fall under any of those categories.   Notably,  certain other\n\nEven if section 10-20(b)(3) of the Body Camera Act may be construed to permit a\n\nparent to stand in the shoes of a minor subject for purposes of obtaining footage depicting the\nminor,  the Act still provides that \"[ n]othing in this subsection ( b) shall require the disclosure of\nany recording or portion of any recording which would be exempt from disclosure under the\nFreedom of Information Act.\"  50 ILCS 706/ 10-20(b) (West 2024).   As discussed above,  courts\nhave recognized that the right to privacy is strongest when a suspect of a crime has not been\narrested or charged.   During the segments of the video recording where the minor alone interacts\nwith an officer,  their interactions concern a matter that is highly personal to the subject who was\nnot arrested or charged with a crime.  \ncamera footage of the minor subject interacting with the officer;  however,  because\naware of the identity of the adult subject,  redacting references to that individual' s name or\npersonally- identifiable information from the footage would not render them anonymous.   Under\nthese circumstances,  the footage of the minor subject is exempt from disclosure under section\n7(1)( c) of FOIA.   \n\nhas a strong personal\n\ninterest in the body\n\nis\n\n\fMs. Michelle Montgomery\nJuly 29, 2025\nPage 7\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter serves to close this file.  If you have\nany questions,  please contact me at (217)  782- 9054 or caleb. briscoe@ilag. gov if you have\nquestions.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCALEB L. BRISCOE\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85480 f 71b proper 71c proper sho\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports and body camera footage of an incident involving a minor","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85480/","full_text":"July 29, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Michelle Montgomery\nMcHenry County Sheriff's Office\n2200 North Seminary Avenue\nWoodstock, Illinois 60098\nmsschroeder@mchenrycountyil. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85480\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Montgomery: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024). For the reasons that follow, the Public\nAccess Bureau concludes that the McHenry County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) did not\nimproperly deny\n\nFebruary 14, 2025, FOIA request. \n\nOn February 14, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff's\n\nOffice seeking, in relevant part, copies of the body camera footage from each deputy that\nresponded to a November 30, 2024, incident involving her son, and police reports associated\nwith a separate investigation involving her son. On February 20, 2025, the Sheriff's Office\nprovided responsive police reports with certain information redacted pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) \nand 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 In addition, the Sheriff's Office withheld all video footage from the\n\nOn February 26, 2025, \n\nsubmitted the above- referenced Request for\n\nReview disputing the Sheriff's Office's redactions of portions of the police report and its\nwithholding of the video footage. On March 4, 2025, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a\ncopy of the Request for Review to the Sheriff's Office and asked it to provide this office with\nunredacted copies of the relevant police reports and the withheld video footage along with an\nexplanation of the factual and legal bases for the asserted exemptions. On March 10, 2025, the\nSheriff's Office provided this office with a written response and the withheld footage. In its\nresponse, the Sheriff's Office stated that it withheld the footage pursuant to section 10-20(b)(3) \nof the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/ 10-20(b)(3) (West\n2024)) \" because [\nOn March 12, 2025, this office forwarded the Sheriff's Office's response to\nnot provide a written reply. \n\ndoes not appear in the recording and the footage is not flagged.\" 3\nshe did\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nPolice Report\n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information, unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\" \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) (West 2024)) defines \" private information\" as: \n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, biometric\nidentifiers, personal financial\naccess codes, medical records, home or personal\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person. (Emphasis added.) \n\ninformation, passwords or other\n\nlicense plates, except as\n\ntelephone\n\nBriscoe, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March 10, 2025), at [ 2]. \n\n3 Letter from Michelle Montgomery, FOIA Officer, McHenry County Sheriff's Office, to Caleb L. \n\nAdditionally, section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the\nindividual subjects of the information.\" An \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" is\ndefined in section 7(1)(c) as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or\nobjectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any\nlegitimate public interest in obtaining the information.\" \n\nA public body's assertion that the release of information would constitute an\n\nis doing, not\n\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy is evaluated on a case- by-case basis. Chicago\nJourneymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 v. Department of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, \n196 (2001). \"[ T]he core purpose of the FOIA is to expose what the government\nwhat its private citizens are up to.'\" Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety v. City of\nChicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 211 (2004) (quoting Lakin Law Firm, P.C. v. F.T.C., 352 F.3d\n1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 2003)). The right to privacy \" is strongest where the individuals in question\nhave been investigated but never publicly charged.'\" Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in\nWashington v. United States Department of Justice, 846 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2012) \nquoting American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 7\nD.C. Cir. 2011)). Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that while\nthe public interest generally requires information about the circumstances of arrests to be\ndisclosed, there is a lesser public interest in the disclosure of information about an incident that\ndid not result in an arrest. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37700, issued\nJanuary 13, 2016, at 3 (records of criminal sexual assault investigation exempt where no arrests\nwere made and no criminal charges filed). \n\nThis office has reviewed the responsive records at issue. The reports provide a\n\nsummary of an investigation of a criminal sexual assault allegation initiated after statements\nwere made by\nthe investigating officer discussed the progress of the investigation with\nthe officer's interview of the alleged perpetrator. The investigation did not result in any arrests or\nthe filing of any criminal charges. \n\nminor child during a forensic interview. The report indicates that\nfollowing\n\nThe redacted portions of the report include unique identifiers such as home\n\naddresses, dates of birth, and driver's license numbers. The remaining redacted portions consist\nof a summary of the suspect's responses to the allegations made by the minor. As a parent of the\nminor child, \nHowever, on balance, given that no arrests were made and the identity of the accused suspect is\nthis office finds disclosure of the records would constitute an unwarranted\nknown to\ninvasion of the suspect's personal privacy. Accordingly, the Sheriff's Office did not improperly\nwithhold the portions of the responsive records under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. \n\nBody Camera Footage\n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\" Section 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act (Body Camera\nAct) 4 provides, in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nsubsection (b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, \narrest or detention, or resulting death or bodily harm shall\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request, the law enforcement agency\n\nshall disclose, in accordance with the Freedom of\n\nThus, the Body Camera Act prohibits the disclosure of body camera footage\n\npursuant to a FOIA request, unless one of the three exceptions enumerated above applies. If\nfootage is not flagged due to the filing of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, arrest\nor detention, or resulting death or bodily harm, a subject of the encounter captured on the\nrecording may still obtain a copy of the footage under the third and final exception. The Public\nAccess Bureau has determined, however, that \" the subject of the encounter\" means a person who\nappeared in the recording and \" interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a law\nenforcement activity.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48793, issued August 31, 2017, at 4. \n\nThough the subject of the encounter may receive copies of the body camera\n\nfootage, certain limitations remain. The Public Access Counselor has concluded that section 10-\n20(b)(3) of the Body Camera Act authorizes the \" subject of the encounter\" to receive only the\nspecific segments of an unflagged recording in which that subject is \" captured on the recording\" \nand is interacting with an officer. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 63412 63421, issued\nSeptember 2, 2020, at 8 (concluding that requester was entitled to only 30 second clip in which\nhe interacted with officer, not remaining footage showing interactions between officer and other\nsubjects). A public body may properly redact portions of an unflagged recording where the\nsubject who submitted the request is no longer present in the footage. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 74512, issued February 6, 2023, at 5 (concluding city did not violate FOIA by blurring\nand muting segments of footage that did not show requester). \n\nThe Sheriff's Office's response to this office stated that the withheld recordings\n\ncapture a \" conflict between the dad and juvenile child [ which] took place at the dad's house and\nmom was not present.\" 5 The Sheriff's Office asserts that \"\nbody camera] footage because she does not appear in the recording and the footage is not\nflagged.\" 6\nparent of the minor child who was one of the subjects of the encounter, and as a parent should be\nable to obtain a copy of the recordings on behalf of her child. \n\nconcedes that she was not present, but asserts that she is the custodial\n\nwas denied the\n\nThere is no indication that the footage at issue was flagged for any of the reasons\noutlined in sections 10-20(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Body Camera Act. Furthermore, based on this\noffice's review, a vast majority of each video involves the police obtaining information from\nindividuals other than the minor who were present within the residence. Section 10-20(b)(3) of\n\nindividual's interactions with the responding officers to\nwhether\n\nis entitled to obtain footage of the minor. \n\nThe remaining issue is\n\nOne of the most fundamental principles of statutory construction is that a\n\nreviewing body \" may not depart from the plain language [ of a statute] by reading into the statute\nexceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.\" Hayashi v. Illinois\nDepartment of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 16; see also Brunton v. \nKruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 67 (\" We will not read in an additional exception to a statute that\ncontains only one express exception, indicating a legislative intent to limit exceptions to that\nsingle instance. The creation of such an exception is a matter for the legislature.\"). \n\nBy its plain language, section 10-20(b)(3) of the Body Camera Act permits body\nfootage to be disclosed to (1) \" the subject of the encounter captured on the recording,\" (2) \" the\nsubject's attorney,\" (3) the officer involved in the encounter, and (4) the officer's legal\nrepresentative.\" \nstatutes with broad confidentiality provisions contain exceptions that permit both minors and\ntheir parents to obtain records concerning minors. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/ 1-7(0.05) (West\n2024) (permitting \"[ t]he minor who is the subject of the juvenile law enforcement record, the\nminor's parents, guardian, and counsel[ ]\" to obtain records that are generally prohibited from\nbeing disclosed by the Juvenile Court Act). The Body Camera Act does not contain a\ncomparable exception. \n\ndoes not fall under any of those categories. Notably, certain other\n\nEven if section 10-20(b)(3) of the Body Camera Act may be construed to permit a\n\nparent to stand in the shoes of a minor subject for purposes of obtaining footage depicting the\nminor, the Act still provides that \"[ n]othing in this subsection (b) shall require the disclosure of\nany recording or portion of any recording which would be exempt from disclosure under the\nFreedom of Information Act.\" 50 ILCS 706/ 10-20(b) (West 2024). As discussed above, courts\nhave recognized that the right to privacy is strongest when a suspect of a crime has not been\narrested or charged. During the segments of the video recording where the minor alone interacts\nwith an officer, their interactions concern a matter that is highly personal to the subject who was\nnot arrested or charged with a crime. \ncamera footage of the minor subject interacting with the officer; however, because\naware of the identity of the adult subject, redacting references to that individual's name or\npersonally- identifiable information from the footage would not render them anonymous. Under\nthese circumstances, the footage of the minor subject is exempt from disclosure under section\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (217) 782- 9054 or caleb. briscoe@ilag. gov if you have\nquestions. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCALEB L. BRISCOE\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85480 f 71b proper 71c proper sho"}
{"id":1129,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-12","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85534"],"title":"Knox County Circuit Clerk not subject to FOIA; PAC closes case","filename":"85534, issued March 12, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":545,"summary":"The requester sought juror names and addresses from Knox County, which the County denied; the PAC determined that the Circuit Clerk's office is part of the judiciary and therefore not subject to FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested juror information from Knox County, but the county denied the request. The Attorney General's office explained that the Circuit Clerk is part of the judicial branch, not the executive branch, and therefore is not required to follow FOIA laws. Because the office is exempt from FOIA, the PAC closed the case without further action.","holding":"The PAC concluded that no further inquiry is warranted because the records of the Circuit Clerk are not subject to FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Knox County Circuit Clerk's office is a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Knox County Circuit Clerk","requesting_party":"Scott Erickson","pac_outcome":"Closed - No further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"judicial records","subject_description":"The request sought the names and addresses of jurors who served in a specific trial.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_a/Exclusion-of-judiciary/85534%2C%20issued%20March%2012%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["juror records","judicial branch","circuit clerk","FOIA applicability"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"March 12, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85534\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted.  \n\nOn February 12, 2025,  you sent an e-mail to Knox County ( County)  requesting\n\nthe names and addresses of all jurors,  including alternates that sat for the above trial.\"   The\nCounty denied your request,  citing \" the Circuit Clerk exemption\"  and referencing \" Copley Press, \nInc. v. Administrative Office of Courts.\" 1 On March 3, 2025,  you submitted a Request for\nReview to this office seeking our review of the denial. \n\nFOIA governs requests for public records maintained by public bodies.   See 5\n\nILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022).   Section 2(a)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(a) ( West 2023 Supp.))  defines a\npublic body\"  as:  \n\nA]ll legislative,  executive,  administrative,  or advisory bodies of\nthe State,  state universities and colleges,  counties,  townships, \ncities,  villages,  incorporated towns,  school districts and all other\nmunicipal corporations,  boards,  bureaus,  committees,  or\ncommissions of this State,  any subsidiary bodies of any of the\nforegoing including but not limited to committees and\nsubcommittees thereof[.] \n\n1E- mail from Scott Erickson to\n\ndated \" Yesterday\"). \n\n\fMarch 12, 2025\nPage 2\n\nBased on that definition,  the Illinois Appellate Court has determined that FOIA is not applicable\nto the judiciary or its agents,  including Circuit Clerk' s Offices.   Newman,  Raiz &  Shelmadine, \nLLC v. Brown, 394 Ill. App. 3d 602, 606 ( 2009) ( the Circuit Clerk' s Office is a component of the\njudicial branch and thus excluded from the definition of \"public body\"  in FOIA).   In Copley\nPress v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 271 Ill. App. 3d 548, 555 ( 1995),  the case the\nCounty listed in its denial e-mail, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that FOIA did not\napply to the courts and related offices.   \n\nAlthough you sent your FOIA request to the County Clerk,  records that would\n\nidentify jurors who sat for a specific case would be in the possession of the Knox County Circuit\nCourt or the Knox County Circuit Clerk,  if the records were created.   See Ill. Att'y Gen.  Req. \nRev. Ltr. 79328,  issued December 19, 2023 ( concluding that e-mails pertaining to the transaction\nof business by the circuit clerk' s office are records of the judiciary and therefore not subject to\nFOIA even if the e-mails are maintained on a shared e-mail server operated by the county).   The\nKnox County Circuit Court and the Knox County Circuit Clerk are judicial offices,  and their\nrecords are not subject to FOIA.  Accordingly,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter.   \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\nleah. bartelt@ilag. gov or the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85534 f no fi war not a pb\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Scott G. Erickson,  CCO\nKnox County Clerk and Recorder\n200 South Cherry Street\nGalesburg,  Illinois 61401\nserickson@knoxcountyil. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Juror names and addresses from a trial","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85534/","full_text":"March 12, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85534\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further inquiry is warranted. \n\nOn February 12, 2025, you sent an e-mail to Knox County (County) requesting\n\nthe names and addresses of all jurors, including alternates that sat for the above trial.\" The\nCounty denied your request, citing \" the Circuit Clerk exemption\" and referencing \" Copley Press, \nInc. v. Administrative Office of Courts.\" 1 On March 3, 2025, you submitted a Request for\nReview to this office seeking our review of the denial. \n\nFOIA governs requests for public records maintained by public bodies. See 5\n\nILCS 140/ 1 (West 2022). Section 2(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(a) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines a\npublic body\" as: \n\nA]ll legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of\nthe State, state universities and colleges, counties, townships, \ncities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other\n\nBased on that definition, the Illinois Appellate Court has determined that FOIA is not applicable\nto the judiciary or its agents, including Circuit Clerk's Offices. Newman, Raiz & Shelmadine, \nLLC v. Brown, 394 Ill. App. 3d 602, 606 (2009) (the Circuit Clerk's Office is a component of the\njudicial branch and thus excluded from the definition of \"public body\" in FOIA). In Copley\nPress v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 271 Ill. App. 3d 548, 555 (1995), the case the\nCounty listed in its denial e-mail, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that FOIA did not\napply to the courts and related offices. \n\nAlthough you sent your FOIA request to the County Clerk, records that would\n\nidentify jurors who sat for a specific case would be in the possession of the Knox County Circuit\nCourt or the Knox County Circuit Clerk, if the records were created. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Req. \nRev. Ltr. 79328, issued December 19, 2023 (concluding that e-mails pertaining to the transaction\nof business by the circuit clerk's office are records of the judiciary and therefore not subject to\nFOIA even if the e-mails are maintained on a shared e-mail server operated by the county). The\nKnox County Circuit Court and the Knox County Circuit Clerk are judicial offices, and their\nrecords are not subject to FOIA. Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no\nfurther action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nleah. bartelt@ilag. gov or the Chicago address listed on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85534 f no fi war not a pb\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Scott G. Erickson, CCO\nKnox County Clerk and Recorder\n200 South Cherry Street\nGalesburg, Illinois 61401\nserickson@knoxcountyil. gov"}
{"id":1130,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85548"],"title":"North Clay School District properly withheld closed session minutes under 7(1)(l)","filename":"85548, issued March 7, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":570,"summary":"The requester sought closed session meeting minutes from the North Clay Community Unit School District No. 25, which the District denied; the PAC determined the records were exempt from disclosure under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A requester asked a school district for several years of closed session meeting minutes. The PAC ruled that the district was allowed to keep these records private because the district had not yet voted to make them public, as required by law. Consequently, the PAC closed the case without requiring the district to release the documents.","holding":"The District properly withheld the requested closed session minutes because they have not been released to the public by the District pursuant to the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether closed session meeting minutes are exempt from disclosure under FOIA when the public body has not yet determined they are available for public release under the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(l)"],"public_body":"North Clay Community Unit School District No. 25","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The requester sought access to school board closed session minutes spanning an eight-year period.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_l/85548%2C%20issued%20March%207%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","meeting minutes","school district","FOIA exemption"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"March 7, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85548\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter. \n\nOn February 14, 2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to the North Clay\n\nCommunity Unit School District No. 25 (District) seeking copies of various District Board\nclosed session meeting minutes from January 2015 through January 2023.   On February 21, \n2025, the District denied your request, asserting that the District had \"taken action to keep all of\nthe closed session minutes as closed for the dates included in your request ( January 2015 to\nJanuary 2023).\" 1 On February 28, 2025, you submitted this Request for Review contesting the\nDistrict' s denial.   Specifically,  you alleged that any possible final action arising from the closed\nsession discussions in question would have either been abandoned or completed by the time of\nyour FOIA request. \n\nAlthough not cited in the District' s denial,  section 7(1)( l) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS\n\n140/7(1)(l) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-\n865,  effective January 1, 2025)  exempts from disclosure \"[ m] inutes of meetings of public bodies\nclosed to the public as provided in [OMA] until the public body makes the minutes available to\n\nto [\n\n1E- mail from Keith A. Price, Superintendent, North Clay Community Unit School District No. 25, \nFebruary 21, 2025). \n\n\fMarch 7, 2025\nPage 2\n\nthe public under Section 2.06 of [ OMA] 2.\"   The Public Access Bureau has consistently\ndetermined that closed session minutes are exempt from disclosure under the plain language of\nsection 7(1)( l) of FOIA,  as long as there is no indication that the public body has voted to make\nthem available to the public under section 2.06(f) of OMA.  See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq.  Rev.  Ltr. 23562,  issued March 2, 2015,  at 2; Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 49629, \nissued September 19, 2017, at 2. \n\nThe District's denial asserted that all of the closed session minutes for the period\n\nin question remain closed at this time,  and this office has received no evidence indicating that the\nDistrict has voted to make the minutes from any of those closed sessions available to the public\nunder section 2.06( f) of OMA.   Accordingly,  because the closed session minutes you requested\nare exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(l) of FOIA, regardless of the status of any final\naction that may have arisen from those closed session discussions,  this office has determined that\nno further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nChristopher. Boggs@ilag. gov.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85548 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Keith A. Price\nSuperintendent\nNorth Clay Community Unit School District No. 25\n953 Kinmundy Road\nLouisville,  Illinois 62858\nkprice@northclayschools.com\n\n2Section 2.06(f) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.06(f) (West 2022))  provides that the \"[ m]inutes of\n\nmeetings closed to the public shall be available only after the public body determines that it is no longer necessary to\nprotect the public interest or the privacy of an individual by keeping them confidential[.]\" \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"School board closed session minutes over eight years","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85548/","full_text":"March 7, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85548\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons explained\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter. \n\nOn February 14, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the North Clay\n\nCommunity Unit School District No. 25 (District) seeking copies of various District Board\nclosed session meeting minutes from January 2015 through January 2023. On February 21, \n2025, the District denied your request, asserting that the District had \"taken action to keep all of\nthe closed session minutes as closed for the dates included in your request (January 2015 to\nJanuary 2023).\" 1 On February 28, 2025, you submitted this Request for Review contesting the\nDistrict's denial. Specifically, you alleged that any possible final action arising from the closed\nsession discussions in question would have either been abandoned or completed by the time of\nyour FOIA request. \n\nAlthough not cited in the District's denial, section 7(1)(l) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n\n140/7(1)(l) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-\n865, effective January 1, 2025) exempts from disclosure \"[ m] inutes of meetings of public bodies\nclosed to the public as provided in [OMA] until the public body makes the minutes available to\n\nto [\n\n1E- mail from Keith A. Price, Superintendent, North Clay Community Unit School District No. 25, \n\nthe public under Section 2.06 of [ OMA] 2.\" The Public Access Bureau has consistently\ndetermined that closed session minutes are exempt from disclosure under the plain language of\nsection 7(1)(l) of FOIA, as long as there is no indication that the public body has voted to make\nthem available to the public under section 2.06(f) of OMA. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 23562, issued March 2, 2015, at 2; Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 49629, \nissued September 19, 2017, at 2. \n\nThe District's denial asserted that all of the closed session minutes for the period\n\nin question remain closed at this time, and this office has received no evidence indicating that the\nDistrict has voted to make the minutes from any of those closed sessions available to the public\nunder section 2.06(f) of OMA. Accordingly, because the closed session minutes you requested\nare exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(l) of FOIA, regardless of the status of any final\naction that may have arisen from those closed session discussions, this office has determined that\nno further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nChristopher. Boggs@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85548 f no fi war sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Keith A. Price\nSuperintendent\nNorth Clay Community Unit School District No. 25\n953 Kinmundy Road\nLouisville, Illinois 62858\nkprice@northclayschools.com\n\n2 Section 2.06(f) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.06(f) (West 2022)) provides that the \"[ m]inutes of\n\nmeetings closed to the public shall be available only after the public body determines that it is no longer necessary to\nprotect the public interest or the privacy of an individual by keeping them confidential[.]\""}
{"id":1131,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85555"],"title":"City of Evanston properly redacted complainant identity and private info from police reports under 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c)","filename":"85555, issued March 17, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":804,"summary":"The requester challenged the City of Evanston's redactions to police reports regarding child custody incidents, but the PAC determined the redactions were appropriate under FOIA exemptions.","plain_summary":"This determination letter addresses whether the City of Evanston properly redacted portions of police reports under FOIA sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c). The Public Access Bureau held that the City did not improperly redact the reports, finding that the redacted material constituted private information (home addresses, personal telephone numbers) and information whose disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, including a caller's statements to police in a domestic incident. The reasoning relied on the established rule that disclosure of a complainant's identity and statements to police is inherently highly personal, and that this is especially true when, as here, the requester already knows the complainant's identity, making disclosure highly objectionable to a reasonable person. No further action was warranted, and the file was closed.","holding":"Disclosure of a known complainant's identity and statements to police constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under section 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and home addresses and phone numbers are exempt private information under section 7(1)(b), so redaction of such material is proper.","legal_question":"Whether the City of Evanston properly applied FOIA exemptions 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) to redact personal information and witness statements from police reports.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"City of Evanston","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought police reports concerning two child custody incidents and the identity of the reporting party.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_c/Highly-personal-information/85555%2C%20issued%20March%2017%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","privacy","redaction","personal information"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"March 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85555; Request #25 -585\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.   \n\nOn February 24 , 2025 , you submitted a FOIA request\n\nto the City of Evanston\n\nCity) seeking copies of the police reports for two separate child custody incidents and identified\nthe individual who called in the incidents.  On February 25, 2025, the City provided responsive\nrecords, subject to redactions made pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 On March\n4, 2025, you submitted this Request for Review contesting the extent of the City's redactions.  \n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 2 Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from\ndisclosure \"[p]rivate information, unless disclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(b), (1)( c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective July\n\n1, 2024;  103 -865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n25 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\n\fMarch 17, 2025\nPage 2\n\nState or federal law or a court order.\"  Section 2(c -5) of FOIA3 (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2022)) \ndefines \" private information\"  as: \n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, biometric\nidentifiers, personal financial information, passwords or other\naccess codes,  medical records,  home or personal\nnumbers,  and personal email addresses.   Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\ntelephone\n\nSection 7( 1)( c)  of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the ind ividual\nsubjects of the information.\"  Section 7(1)(c) defines \"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \"the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject' s right to privacy outweigh s any legitimate public interest in obtaining\nthe information[,]\"  and further provides that \"[ t]he disclosure of information that bears on the\npublic duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal\nprivacy.\" \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that disclosure of the\n\nidentity of a person who complains to the police about an incident constitutes an unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy.  See, for example , Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 79728, issued\nFebruary 9, 2024 (\"A complainant's identity is inherently highly personal.\").   When a requester\nknows the identity of the complainant,  disclosing the information that the complainant provided\nto a police department would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person.   See,  for example , \nGabrielli v. U.S.  Dep' t of Justice , 594 F. Supp.  309,  312– 13 ( N.D.N.Y. 1984 ) (complainant who\nsubmitted unfounded complaint retained right to privacy because to conclude otherwise could\ndeter members of the public \"from providing to law enforcement authorities what may prove to\nbe vital information for fear that their names would be released to the parties against whom they\nprovided information if their suspicions ultimately prove groundless.\"). \n\nBased on a review of the provided redacted reports, it is apparent that the City\nredacted discrete details pertaining to the individuals involved in the incidents.  The information\nincluded their private information (home addresses and personal telephone numbers), as well as\ninformation that, if disclosed,  would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy\nof those individuals under the circumstances of these incidents , which involved a domestic\nmatter.   Additionally,  the City redacted statements that one of the individuals,  the caller, made to\nthe reporting officer.  Because you know the identity of the caller, disclosure of the caller's\n\n35 ILCS 140/ 2(c -5) (West 2022). \n\n\fMarch 17, 2025\nPage 3\n\nstatements to officers would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person for the reasons\ndiscussed above.  Accordingly,  the City did not improperly redact the reports pursuant to sections\n7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and this office will take no further action in this matter. \n\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me by mail at the Chicago address\nlisted on the first page of this letter or by e -mail at c.lucentemccullough@ilag.gov.  This letter\nserves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85555 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs.  Alexandra B. Ruggie\nCorporation Counsel\nCity of Evanston\naruggie@cityofevanston.org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police reports on child custody incidents","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85555/","full_text":"March 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85555; Request #25 -585\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn February 24, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request\n\nto the City of Evanston\n\nCity) seeking copies of the police reports for two separate child custody incidents and identified\nthe individual who called in the incidents. On February 25, 2025, the City provided responsive\nrecords, subject to redactions made pursuant to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 On March\n4, 2025, you submitted this Request for Review contesting the extent of the City's redactions. \n\nFOIA provides that \"[ a] ll records in the custody or possession of a public body\n\nare presumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 2 Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from\ndisclosure \"[p]rivate information, unless disclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective July\n\nState or federal law or a court order.\" Section 2(c -5) of FOIA3 (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2022)) \ndefines \" private information\" as: \n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, biometric\nidentifiers, personal financial information, passwords or other\naccess codes, medical records, home or personal\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person. (Emphasis added.) \n\ntelephone\n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the ind ividual\nsubjects of the information.\" Section 7(1)(c) defines \"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \"the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject's right to privacy outweigh s any legitimate public interest in obtaining\nthe information[,]\" and further provides that \"[ t]he disclosure of information that bears on the\npublic duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal\nprivacy.\" \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that disclosure of the\n\nidentity of a person who complains to the police about an incident constitutes an unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 79728, issued\nFebruary 9, 2024 (\"A complainant's identity is inherently highly personal.\"). When a requester\nknows the identity of the complainant, disclosing the information that the complainant provided\nto a police department would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person. See, for example, \nGabrielli v. U.S. Dep' t of Justice, 594 F. Supp. 309, 312– 13 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (complainant who\nsubmitted unfounded complaint retained right to privacy because to conclude otherwise could\ndeter members of the public \"from providing to law enforcement authorities what may prove to\nbe vital information for fear that their names would be released to the parties against whom they\nprovided information if their suspicions ultimately prove groundless.\"). \n\nBased on a review of the provided redacted reports, it is apparent that the City\nredacted discrete details pertaining to the individuals involved in the incidents. The information\nincluded their private information (home addresses and personal telephone numbers), as well as\ninformation that, if disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy\nof those individuals under the circumstances of these incidents, which involved a domestic\nmatter. Additionally, the City redacted statements that one of the individuals, the caller, made to\nthe reporting officer. Because you know the identity of the caller, disclosure of the caller's\n\nstatements to officers would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person for the reasons\ndiscussed above. Accordingly, the City did not improperly redact the reports pursuant to sections\n7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA, and this office will take no further action in this matter. \n\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me by mail at the Chicago address\nlisted on the first page of this letter or by e -mail at c.lucentemccullough@ilag.gov. This letter\nserves to close this file. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85555 f no fi war mun\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Alexandra B. Ruggie\nCorporation Counsel\nCity of Evanston\naruggie@cityofevanston.org"}
{"id":1132,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-27","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85584","85585"],"title":"Illinois State Police properly redacted personal info from crash report under 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c)","filename":"85584 85585, issued March 27, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":899,"summary":"The requester sought an unredacted traffic crash report from the Illinois State Police, which the agency partially denied by redacting personal identifying information. The PAC determined that the redactions were appropriate under FOIA exemptions and closed the matter.","plain_summary":"A law firm requested an unredacted police crash report to help them serve legal papers to a driver involved in an accident. The Illinois State Police provided the report but redacted private details like the driver's home address and license number. The Attorney General's office agreed with the police, stating these redactions are allowed by law, and suggested the firm use a subpoena to obtain the full information.","holding":"The Illinois State Police properly withheld personal identifying information from the requested traffic crash report under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois State Police properly redacted personal identifying information from a traffic crash report pursuant to FOIA exemptions 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c).","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Illinois State Police","requesting_party":"Mr. Christopher K. Provost / Witherite Law Group","pac_outcome":"No further action warranted","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought an unredacted traffic crash report containing personal identifying information of a driver.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_d/7_1_d_iv/85584%2085585%2C%20issued%20March%2027%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["traffic crash report","personal information","redaction","subpoena","Illinois State Police"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"March 27, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jakub Malinowski\nLitigation Assistant\nWitherite Law Group\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njakub.malinowski@witheritelaw.com\n\nRE:  FOIA Requests for Review – 2025 PAC 85584, 85585\n\nDear Mr. Malinowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in these matters. \n\nlicense plates,  signatures,  and dates of birth.   ISP invited Mr. Provost to submit a\n\nOn February 12, 2025, Mr. Christopher K. Provost, on behalf of Witherite Law\nGroup,  submitted two FOIA requests to the Illinois State Police ( ISP)  seeking,  in relevant part, \nan unredacted copy of a Traffic Crash Report related to case number 03-23-12586.  On February\n28, 2025,  ISP granted the request in part and denied it in part pursuant\nto sections 7(1)( b) and\n7(1)(c) of FOIA.1 ISP stated that it had withheld home addresses, driver's license numbers, \npersonal\nsubpoena for an unredacted copy of the traffic crash report.  On March 5, 2025, you submitted, \non behalf of Witherite Law Group,  the above- referenced Requests for Review contesting ISP' s\nresponse.  In your Requests for Review, you stated that you needed unredacted copies of the\nrecords in order to serve a specified driver mentioned in the crash report.   On March 26, 2025, \nMr. Provost confirmed in a telephone conversation with a Supervising Attorney in the Public\nAccess Bureau that your office is contesting only ISP' s withholding of additional\ninformation for the driver at this time. \n\nidentifying\n\n1, 2024;  103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), ( 1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July\n\n\fMr. Jakub Malinowski\nMarch 27, 2025\nPage 2\n\nSection 7(1)( b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information,  unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\"  \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) ( West 2023 Supp.))  defines \" private information\"  as: \n\nU] nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, \nbiometric identifiers,  personal financial\nother access codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers,  and personal email addresses.   Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  (Emphasis added.) \n\ninformation,  passwords or\n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"   The Attorney General has issued a binding opinion concluding that\nan individual's birth date is highly personal by its very nature and the subject's right to privacy\noutweighs any legitimate public interest in disclosing this information.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc. \nOp. No 16-009, issued November 7, 2016, at 12. \n\nAlthough you stated that you require additional identifying information for the\n\ndriver in order to serve him,  ISP is not required by FOIA to provide the identifying details\ncontained in the crash report beyond the driver's name.  See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 24-\n012,  issued October 22, 2024 ( concluding that,  although section 7(1)( d)( iv) of FOIA2 requires a\npublic body to release \"the identities of witnesses to traffic crashes,\"  a public body is nonetheless\npermitted to redact private information pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)( b) of FOIA).   Identifying\n\nActs 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025) exempts from disclosure: \n\n2Section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public\n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in the course\n\nof administrative enforcement proceedings,  and any law enforcement or\ncorrectional agency for law enforcement purposes,  but only to the extent that\ndisclosure would:   \n\niv) unavoidably disclose the identity of a confidential source, \n\nconfidential information furnished only by the confidential source, or\npersons who file complaints with or provide information to\nadministrative, investigative, law enforcement, or penal agencies; \nexcept that the identities of witnesses to traffic accidents, traffic\naccident reports, and rescue reports shall be provided by agencies\nof local government, except when disclosure would interfere with an\nactive criminal investigation conducted by the agency that is the\nrecipient of the request[.]  ( Emphasis added.) \n\n\fr. Jakub Malinowski\nMarch 27, 2025\nPage 3\n\ninformation such as a home address,  driver' s license number,  or date of birth for the specified\ndriver is exempt from disclosure under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA.  Accordingly, the\nPublic Access Bureau has concluded that no further action is warranted in this matter.   You may\nwish to follow ISP's instructions for submitting a subpoena for an unredacted copy of the crash\nreport. \n\nThis letter serves to close this matter.   If you have any questions,  please contact\n\nme at (773) 590-7878 or benjamin.silver@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85584 85585 f no fi war pd sa\n\ncc: \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sarah Wheeler\nFreedom of Information Officer\nIllinois State Police\n801 South 7th Street, Suite 1000-S\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62703\nISP.FOIA.Officer@Illinois.gov\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Christopher Provost\nAttorney\nWitherite Law Group\n161 North Clark Street, Suite 1875\nChicago,  Illinois 60601\nchristopher.provost@witheritelaw.com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Crash report with driver's personal identifiers","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85584/","full_text":"March 27, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jakub Malinowski\nLitigation Assistant\nWitherite Law Group\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njakub.malinowski@witheritelaw.com\n\nRE: FOIA Requests for Review – 2025 PAC 85584, 85585\n\nDear Mr. Malinowski: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in these matters. \n\nlicense plates, signatures, and dates of birth. ISP invited Mr. Provost to submit a\n\nOn February 12, 2025, Mr. Christopher K. Provost, on behalf of Witherite Law\nGroup, submitted two FOIA requests to the Illinois State Police (ISP) seeking, in relevant part, \nan unredacted copy of a Traffic Crash Report related to case number 03-23-12586. On February\n28, 2025, ISP granted the request in part and denied it in part pursuant\nto sections 7(1)(b) and\n7(1)(c) of FOIA.1 ISP stated that it had withheld home addresses, driver's license numbers, \npersonal\nsubpoena for an unredacted copy of the traffic crash report. On March 5, 2025, you submitted, \non behalf of Witherite Law Group, the above- referenced Requests for Review contesting ISP's\nresponse. In your Requests for Review, you stated that you needed unredacted copies of the\nrecords in order to serve a specified driver mentioned in the crash report. On March 26, 2025, \nMr. Provost confirmed in a telephone conversation with a Supervising Attorney in the Public\nAccess Bureau that your office is contesting only ISP's withholding of additional\ninformation for the driver at this time. \n\nidentifying\n\n1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103-605, effective July\n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information, unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\" \nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \" private information\" as: \n\nU] nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, \nbiometric identifiers, personal financial\nother access codes, medical records, home or personal telephone\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal license plates, except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person. (Emphasis added.) \n\ninformation, passwords or\n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\" The Attorney General has issued a binding opinion concluding that\nan individual's birth date is highly personal by its very nature and the subject's right to privacy\noutweighs any legitimate public interest in disclosing this information.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. \nOp. No 16-009, issued November 7, 2016, at 12. \n\nAlthough you stated that you require additional identifying information for the\n\ndriver in order to serve him, ISP is not required by FOIA to provide the identifying details\ncontained in the crash report beyond the driver's name. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 24-\n012, issued October 22, 2024 (concluding that, although section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA2 requires a\npublic body to release \"the identities of witnesses to traffic crashes,\" a public body is nonetheless\npermitted to redact private information pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(b) of FOIA). Identifying\n\nActs 103-605, effective July 1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025) exempts from disclosure: \n\n2 Section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public\n\nd) Records in the possession of any public body created in the course\n\nof administrative enforcement proceedings, and any law enforcement or\ncorrectional agency for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that\ndisclosure would: \n\niv) unavoidably disclose the identity of a confidential source, \n\nconfidential information furnished only by the confidential source, or\npersons who file complaints with or provide information to\nadministrative, investigative, law enforcement, or penal agencies; \n\ninformation such as a home address, driver's license number, or date of birth for the specified\ndriver is exempt from disclosure under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. Accordingly, the\nPublic Access Bureau has concluded that no further action is warranted in this matter. You may\nwish to follow ISP's instructions for submitting a subpoena for an unredacted copy of the crash\nreport. \n\nThis letter serves to close this matter. If you have any questions, please contact\n\nme at (773) 590-7878 or benjamin.silver@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85584 85585 f no fi war pd sa\n\ncc: \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sarah Wheeler\nFreedom of Information Officer\nIllinois State Police\n801 South 7th Street, Suite 1000-S\nSpringfield, Illinois 62703\nISP.FOIA.Officer@Illinois.gov\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Christopher Provost\nAttorney\nWitherite Law Group\n161 North Clark Street, Suite 1875\nChicago, Illinois 60601\nchristopher.provost@witheritelaw.com"}
{"id":1133,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-03-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85755"],"title":"Illinois DOC properly denied federal investigator access to inmate records under 7(1)(a)","filename":"85755, issued March 17, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":799,"summary":"An investigator for the Federal Public Defender requested an inmate's discharge date from the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), which IDOC denied citing confidentiality laws. The PAC determined that IDOC properly denied the request because the relevant statute does not permit disclosure of master record files even with a signed release.","plain_summary":"A federal investigator asked the Illinois Department of Corrections for an inmate's release date, but the department refused to provide it. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and agreed with the department, explaining that state law strictly limits who can access these specific records and a signed release from the inmate does not override those legal restrictions. Consequently, the case is closed with no further action required.","holding":"The Illinois Department of Corrections did not improperly deny the request for records because the requester is not an authorized party under the Unified Code of Corrections.","legal_question":"Whether the Illinois Department of Corrections properly denied a FOIA request for an inmate's master record file information under section 7(1)(a) of FOIA and section 3-5-1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a)","730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(b)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Corrections","requesting_party":"Ms. Anna Bibulowicz","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought the specific discharge date of an inmate from their Department of Corrections sentence.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_a/85755%2C%20issued%20March%2017%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["inmate records","IDOC","confidentiality","master record file"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"March 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Anna Bibulowicz\nInvestigator\nOffice of the Federal Public Defender\nDistricts of Colorado and Wyoming\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nanna_ bibulowicz@fd. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85755;  IDOC no. 250306079\n\nDear Ms. Bibulowicz: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn March 5, 2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nCorrections ( IDOC)  in which you stated that you are an Investigator with the Office of the\nFederal Public Defender and that the Office is representing a named person who provided an\nauthorization permitting the release of records to your office.  You requested \" records\nconfirming when Mr. \nhis exact date of release from confinement.\" 1 You included a signed release by Mr. \nyour FOIA request to IDOC for confidential\n\nwas discharged from his DOC sentence in case 03CR0673601 and\nwith\n\ninformation and records.  \n\nOn March 13, 2025,  IDOC denied your request pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of\n\nInformation Act Officer,  Illinois Department of Corrections ( March 5, 2025).   \n\n1Letter from Anna Bibulowicz,  Investigator,  Office of the Federal Public Defender,  to Freedom of\n\n\fMs. Anna Bibulowicz\nMarch 17, 2025\nPage 2\n\nFOIA, 2 which exempts from inspection and copying \"[ i]nformation specifically prohibited from\ndisclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.\"  \nIDOC' s response cited section 3-5-1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections ( UCC) ( 730 ILCS\n5/3-5-1(b) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024),  which\nprovides that master record \" files shall be confidential and access shall be limited to authorized\npersonnel of the respective Department or by disclosure in accordance with a court order or\nsubpoena.  Personnel of other correctional,  welfare or law enforcement agencies may have access\nto files under rules and regulations of the respective Department.\"  ( Emphasis added.)  \nAdditionally,  IDOC asserted section 3-5-1(a)( 8) of the UCC ( 730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(a)( 8) (West 2023\nSupp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024)  to withhold the responsive\nrecords;  the provision requires IDOC to maintain in master record files \" the date and\ncircumstances of final discharge[.]\"   \n\nIn your Request for Review,  you argued that IDOC erroneously denied your\n\nrequest because the Federal Public Defender' s Office submitted a release of information from its\nlegal client.   You included e-mail correspondence you sent to IDOC that questioned why your\nrequest was denied and emphasized to IDOC' s FOIA officer that you believe your office is\nauthorized to receive the requested information because of Mr. \n\nsigned release.  \n\nIDOC has confirmed that the information you seek is contained in your client' s\nmaster record file.  Although you assert that you are an \" authorized person\"  who is entitled to\naccess your client' s master record file, section 3-5-1(b) of the UCC identifies the parties who\nmay access master record files, and they do not include an investigator nor an attorney.   As\nemphasized above,  section 3-5-1(b) permits access to master record files for \"authorized\npersonnel\"  of the respective Department,  or pursuant to a court order or subpoena.  \" Department\" \nis defined in section 3-1-2(e)  of the UCC 3 to mean \" both the Department of Corrections and the\nDepartment of Juvenile Justice of this State,  unless the context is specific to either the\nDepartment of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice.\"   Additionally,  to the extent\nyou believe that the release you provided resolved any confidentiality concerns,  section 3-5-1(b) \nof the UCC does not contain an exception permitting disclosure of master record files upon\nIDOC' s receipt of duly executed releases.   Because you are not one of the parties that section 3-\n5-1(b) of the UCC permits to access master record files, IDOC did not improperly deny your\nrequest under section 7(1)( a)  of FOIA.  Accordingly,  the Public Access Bureau has determined\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) ( West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\n2024;  103- 865,  effective January 1, 2025. \n\n3730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(e) ( West 2022).  \n\n\fs. Anna Bibulowicz\nMarch 17, 2025\nPage 3\n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85755 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Anne P. Rayhill\nFreedom of Information Officer\nIllinois Department of Corrections\n1301 Concordia Court\nP.O. Box 19277\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62794\ndoc.foiarequest@illinois. gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"An inmate's discharge date from a corrections sentence","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85755/","full_text":"March 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Anna Bibulowicz\nInvestigator\nOffice of the Federal Public Defender\nDistricts of Colorado and Wyoming\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nanna_ bibulowicz@fd. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85755; IDOC no. 250306079\n\nDear Ms. Bibulowicz: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons below, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn March 5, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nCorrections (IDOC) in which you stated that you are an Investigator with the Office of the\nFederal Public Defender and that the Office is representing a named person who provided an\nauthorization permitting the release of records to your office. You requested \" records\nconfirming when Mr. \nhis exact date of release from confinement.\" 1 You included a signed release by Mr. \nyour FOIA request to IDOC for confidential\n\nwas discharged from his DOC sentence in case 03CR0673601 and\nwith\n\ninformation and records. \n\nOn March 13, 2025, IDOC denied your request pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of\n\nInformation Act Officer, Illinois Department of Corrections (March 5, 2025). \n\n1 Letter from Anna Bibulowicz, Investigator, Office of the Federal Public Defender, to Freedom of\n\nFOIA, 2 which exempts from inspection and copying \"[ i]nformation specifically prohibited from\ndisclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.\" \nIDOC's response cited section 3-5-1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (UCC) (730 ILCS\n5/3-5-1(b) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024), which\nprovides that master record \" files shall be confidential and access shall be limited to authorized\npersonnel of the respective Department or by disclosure in accordance with a court order or\nsubpoena. Personnel of other correctional, welfare or law enforcement agencies may have access\nto files under rules and regulations of the respective Department.\" (Emphasis added.) \nAdditionally, IDOC asserted section 3-5-1(a)(8) of the UCC (730 ILCS 5/3-5-1(a)(8) (West 2023\nSupp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, 2024) to withhold the responsive\nrecords; the provision requires IDOC to maintain in master record files \" the date and\ncircumstances of final discharge[.]\" \n\nIn your Request for Review, you argued that IDOC erroneously denied your\n\nrequest because the Federal Public Defender's Office submitted a release of information from its\nlegal client. You included e-mail correspondence you sent to IDOC that questioned why your\nrequest was denied and emphasized to IDOC's FOIA officer that you believe your office is\nauthorized to receive the requested information because of Mr. \n\nsigned release. \n\nIDOC has confirmed that the information you seek is contained in your client's\nmaster record file. Although you assert that you are an \" authorized person\" who is entitled to\naccess your client's master record file, section 3-5-1(b) of the UCC identifies the parties who\nmay access master record files, and they do not include an investigator nor an attorney. As\nemphasized above, section 3-5-1(b) permits access to master record files for \"authorized\npersonnel\" of the respective Department, or pursuant to a court order or subpoena. \" Department\" \nis defined in section 3-1-2(e) of the UCC 3 to mean \" both the Department of Corrections and the\nDepartment of Juvenile Justice of this State, unless the context is specific to either the\nDepartment of Corrections or the Department of Juvenile Justice.\" Additionally, to the extent\nyou believe that the release you provided resolved any confidentiality concerns, section 3-5-1(b) \nof the UCC does not contain an exception permitting disclosure of master record files upon\nIDOC's receipt of duly executed releases. Because you are not one of the parties that section 3-\n5-1(b) of the UCC permits to access master record files, IDOC did not improperly deny your\nrequest under section 7(1)(a) of FOIA. Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau has determined\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85755 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Anne P. Rayhill\nFreedom of Information Officer\nIllinois Department of Corrections\n1301 Concordia Court\nP.O. Box 19277\nSpringfield, Illinois 62794\ndoc.foiarequest@illinois. gov"}
{"id":1134,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-10-02","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85864"],"title":"University of Illinois properly withheld lecture recording under 7(1)(j)(iv)","filename":"85864, issued October 2, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":967,"summary":"The requester sought a recording of a university lecture, which the University of Illinois denied under the exemption for course materials. The PAC determined that the university properly withheld the recording as it constitutes material prepared for use in teaching.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the University of Illinois for a recording of a specific virtual lecture. The University refused to provide it, arguing that the recording was a teaching material exempt from disclosure. The Attorney General's office agreed with the University, finding that the lecture recording is protected under FOIA as material prepared for teaching purposes.","holding":"The University of Illinois did not improperly deny the FOIA request because the requested lecture recording falls under the exemption for materials prepared for use in teaching.","legal_question":"Whether a recording of a university lecture is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA as material prepared for use in teaching.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(j)(iv)"],"public_body":"University of Illinois","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(j)(iv)","subject_description":"The request concerned a recording of a university lecture used in an urban planning course.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_j/85864%2C%20issued%20October%202%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["university records","course materials","FOIA exemption","lecture recording"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nOctober 2,  2025\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs.  Adrienne Nazon\n\nVice President and Chief Records Officer\n\nUniversity of Illinois\n506 South Wright Street,  MC- 370\n\nUrbana,  Illinois 61801\n\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu\n\nRE:  FOIA Request\n\nfor Review —  2025 PAC 85864\n\nDear\n\nand Ms.  Nazon: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9. 5( f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9. 5( f) (West 2024)).  For the reasons stated below,  the\n\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the University of Illinois ( University)  did not improperly\ndeny\n\nMarch 18,  2025,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nseeking a recording of a specified February 24,  2025,  virtual\nUniversity denied the request\nsame date, \n\nin its entirety pursuant to section 7( 1)(\n\nsubmitted the above - referenced Request for Review\n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the University\nlecture.  On March 20,  2025,  the\nj)( iv) of FOIA. 1 On that\n\ncontesting the University' s response. \n\n2024;  103- 865,  effective January 1,  2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7( 1)(\n\nj)( iv)( West2023 Supp.), asamendedbyPublic Act 103- 605,  effective July 1, \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago,  Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive,  Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217)  782- 1090 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n\n312)  814- 3000 •  Fax: ( 312)  814- 3806\n\n618)  529- 6400 •  Fax: ( 618)  529- 6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities\n\ncan reach us by using the 7- 1- 1 relay service. \n\nwww.\n\nIllinoisAttorneyGeneral.\n\ngov\n\n\fMs.  Adrienne Nazon\n\nOctober 2,  2025\n\nPage 2\n\nOn April 1,  2025,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nUniversity and asked it to provide a copy of the contested record for this office' s confidential\nreview,  together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of\nthe asserted exemption.  On April 10,  2025,  this office received the University' s response, \nincluding both a complete copy of its written response and a redacted copy for forwarding to\n\nOn April 17,  2025,  this office forwarded the redacted copy to\nhe replied on April 28,  2025. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/ 1. 2 ( West 2024);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department ofPublic Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 ( 2006).  A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.  5 ILCS 140/ 1. 2 ( West 2024).  The exemptions from disclosure are to be\n\nnarrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board ofTrustees ofSouthern Illinois University,  176 I11.  2d 401, \n407 ( 1997). \n\nSection 7( 1)(\n\nj)( iv)  of FOIA exempts from disclosure \" course materials or research\nin connection with \" educational matters.\"  FOIA does not\n\nmaterials used by faculty members\" \ndefine \" course materials.\"  However, this office has previously determined that the plain meaning\nof the term \" course materials\"  encompasses materials prepared for use in teaching such as\ncurricula,  lesson plans,  lectures,  and slides that are used in an educational setting.  See Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr.  78019,  issued January 5,  2024,  at 3- 4.  Furthermore, \" course materials\" \ncan include records prepared by a third party outside of the public body that received the FOIA\nrequest.  See,  e. g.,  I11.  Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 78019,  issued January 5,  2024,  at 2. \n\nIn its redacted response to this office, the University stated that the lecture\n\nincluded on the recording was presented by a professor for the UP- 580 course and a visiting\nprofessor at Columbia University.  The University explained that, although the lecture was open\nto additional students in Urban Planning, attendance for students of UP- 580 was required.  In the\nconfidential version of its response,  the University explained in further detail how the lecture\nwas part of the course curriculum.  In his reply, \nargued that the lecture\nwas not exempt under section 7( 1)(\nj)( iv) because it was widely advertised for student attendance, \nwas public -facing, was sponsored by additional campus organizations,  and was independent of\nany courses and thus could not \" be fairly classified as internal course material.\" 2\n\nThe University has explained that the lecture was connected to the UP- 580\n\ncourse, and that attendance was mandatory, rather than optional,  for students in that class unless\n\nBureau] ( Apri128,  2025),  at [ 2]. \n\n2Letter from\n\nto [Benjamin]  Silver, [ Supervising Attorney, Public Access\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Adrienne Nazon\n\nOctober 2,  2025\n\nPage 3\n\nthey had an excused absence.  Although other students who were interested in the topic were\nallowed to listen in on the lecture, it was nonetheless presented as part of the UP- 580 curriculum\nand prepared by professors for use in teaching Urban Planning students.  Nothing in section\n7( 1)(\nj)( iv) limits the application of that exemption to \" internal course materials\"  that are not\nshared beyond a specific course.  Rather,  the exemption applies to materials,  such as a lecture or\nrecording of a lecture,  prepared for use in teaching.  Because the lecture comprises materials\nused in teaching university courses,  the University did not improperly deny\n\nMarch 18,  2025,  FOIA request pursuant\n\nto section 7( 1)(\n\nj)( iv) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or ( 773)  590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85864 f 71jiv proper univ\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A university lecture recording used in a course","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85864/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nOctober 2, 2025\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\n\nVice President and Chief Records Officer\n\nUniversity of Illinois\n506 South Wright Street, MC- 370\n\nUrbana, Illinois 61801\n\nFOIA- OUR@mx. uillinois. edu\n\nRE: FOIA Request\n\nfor Review — 2025 PAC 85864\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Nazon: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9. 5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9. 5(f) (West 2024)). For the reasons stated below, the\n\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the University of Illinois (University) did not improperly\ndeny\n\nMarch 18, 2025, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, \n\nseeking a recording of a specified February 24, 2025, virtual\nUniversity denied the request\nsame date, \n\nin its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)(submitted the above - referenced Request for Review\n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the University\nlecture. On March 20, 2025, the\nj)(iv) of FOIA. 1 On that\n\ncontesting the University's response. \n\n2024; 103- 865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(j)(iv)(West2023 Supp.), asamendedbyPublic Act 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217) 782- 1090 • Fax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 • Fax: (312) 814- 3806\n\n618) 529- 6400 • Fax: (618) 529- 6416\n\nOn April 1, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nUniversity and asked it to provide a copy of the contested record for this office's confidential\nreview, together with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of\nthe asserted exemption. On April 10, 2025, this office received the University's response, \nincluding both a complete copy of its written response and a redacted copy for forwarding to\n\nOn April 17, 2025, this office forwarded the redacted copy to\nhe replied on April 28, 2025. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1. 2 (West 2024); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department ofPublic Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1. 2 (West 2024). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\n\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board ofTrustees ofSouthern Illinois University, 176 I11. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \" course materials or research\nin connection with \" educational matters.\" FOIA does not\n\nmaterials used by faculty members\" \ndefine \" course materials.\" However, this office has previously determined that the plain meaning\nof the term \" course materials\" encompasses materials prepared for use in teaching such as\ncurricula, lesson plans, lectures, and slides that are used in an educational setting. See Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 78019, issued January 5, 2024, at 3- 4. Furthermore, \" course materials\" \ncan include records prepared by a third party outside of the public body that received the FOIA\nrequest. See, e. g., I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 78019, issued January 5, 2024, at 2. \n\nIn its redacted response to this office, the University stated that the lecture\n\nincluded on the recording was presented by a professor for the UP- 580 course and a visiting\nprofessor at Columbia University. The University explained that, although the lecture was open\nto additional students in Urban Planning, attendance for students of UP- 580 was required. In the\nconfidential version of its response, the University explained in further detail how the lecture\nwas part of the course curriculum. In his reply, \nargued that the lecture\nwas not exempt under section 7(1)(j)(iv) because it was widely advertised for student attendance, \nwas public -facing, was sponsored by additional campus organizations, and was independent of\nany courses and thus could not \" be fairly classified as internal course material.\" 2\n\nThe University has explained that the lecture was connected to the UP- 580\n\ncourse, and that attendance was mandatory, rather than optional, for students in that class unless\n\nthey had an excused absence. Although other students who were interested in the topic were\nallowed to listen in on the lecture, it was nonetheless presented as part of the UP- 580 curriculum\nand prepared by professors for use in teaching Urban Planning students. Nothing in section\n7(1)(j)(iv) limits the application of that exemption to \" internal course materials\" that are not\nshared beyond a specific course. Rather, the exemption applies to materials, such as a lecture or\nrecording of a lecture, prepared for use in teaching. Because the lecture comprises materials\nused in teaching university courses, the University did not improperly deny\n\nMarch 18, 2025, FOIA request pursuant\n\nto section 7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, \nplease contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773) 590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85864 f 71jiv proper univ\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1135,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-04-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["85882"],"title":"McLean County School District No. 5 properly withheld teacher interview questions as examination data","filename":"85882, issued April 3, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":516,"summary":"A requester sought interview questions related to DEI from McLean County Unit School District No. 5, which the District denied citing FOIA exemptions. The PAC determined that the District properly withheld the records under the exemption for examination data.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked a school district for their teacher interview questions regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion. The school district refused to release them, and the Attorney General's office agreed, stating that interview questions are considered 'examination data' that can be kept private to ensure a fair hiring process. This means the public does not have a right to access specific interview questions used by public employers.","holding":"The District properly withheld the requested interview questions pursuant to section 7(1)(q) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether interview questions used to evaluate job candidates constitute 'examination data' exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(q) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)","7(1)(q)"],"public_body":"McLean County Unit School District No. 5","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"exemption 7(1)(q)","subject_description":"The request sought disclosure of specific interview questions used by a school district for teacher candidates.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_q/85882%2C%20issued%20April%203%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["interview questions","employment records","examination data","school district"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"General Records Exemptions","full_text_pre_clean":"April 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 85882\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn March 19, 2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to McLean County Unit\n\nSchool District No. 5 (District)  seeking: \n\nA]ny questions used in the interview process for new teacher\ncandidates that contain any references to DEI, diversity,  equity, \ninclusion,  including the understanding of the meaning of equity, \nany requirements to prove the candidate' s past activities that relate\nto supporting equity or DEI.  This would include standard\nquestions used in phone interviews or in-person interviews.[ 2] \n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.).  \n\nby\n\n2McLean County Unit District No. 5 Written Request for District Public Records form completed\nMarch 19, 2025).   \n\n\fApril 3, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn March 21, 2025,  the District denied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)( c) \nand 7(1)(q) of FOIA. 3 Later that day, you submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access\nBureau contesting the District' s denial.    \n\nSection 7(1)(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ t]est questions,  scoring keys, \nand other examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or\nemployment.\" ( Emphasis added.).   The Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that\ninterview questions constitute \" other examination data\"  that are exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(q) because future applicants could exploit such information to gain an advantage\nover other candidates.   See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 71541,  issued\nFebruary 13, 2022,  at 3 (concluding that \" other examination data\"  includes interview questions); \nIll. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 64023,  issued August 4, 2020,  at 2 (interview questions\nexempt under section 7(1)( q)).   \n\nYour request specifically seeks interview questions that would be used by the\n\nDistrict to evaluate candidates'  qualifications for public employment.   This information squarely\nfalls within the scope of the section 7(1)(q) exemption regardless of whether you personally\nintend to use the information to seek employment with the District.   Because section 7(1)( q) \npermits a public body to withhold the information you requested,  there is no basis from which\nthis office could conclude that the District improperly responded to your FOIA request.  \nAccordingly,  the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have FOIA questions,  you may contact me by mail at\n\nthe Chicago address at the bottom of the first page of this letter.   \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85882 f no fi war sd\n\n1, 2024;  103- 865, effective January 1, 2025). \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7(1)( c), (1)( q) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 605,  effective July\n\n\fApril 3, 2025\nPage 3\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. M. Curt Richardson\nAttorney for the District\nMcLean County Unit School District No. 5\n1809 West Hovey Avenue\nNormal,  Illinois 61761- 4339\nrichardmc@unit5. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Interview questions for teacher candidates","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-85882/","full_text":"April 3, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 85882\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn March 19, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to McLean County Unit\n\nSchool District No. 5 (District) seeking: \n\nA]ny questions used in the interview process for new teacher\ncandidates that contain any references to DEI, diversity, equity, \ninclusion, including the understanding of the meaning of equity, \nany requirements to prove the candidate's past activities that relate\nto supporting equity or DEI. This would include standard\nquestions used in phone interviews or in-person interviews.[ 2] \n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.). \n\nby\n\n2 McLean County Unit District No. 5 Written Request for District Public Records form completed\n\nOn March 21, 2025, the District denied your request pursuant to sections 7(1)(c) \nand 7(1)(q) of FOIA. 3 Later that day, you submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access\nBureau contesting the District's denial. \n\nSection 7(1)(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ t]est questions, scoring keys, \nand other examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or\nemployment.\" (Emphasis added.). The Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that\ninterview questions constitute \" other examination data\" that are exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(q) because future applicants could exploit such information to gain an advantage\nover other candidates. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 71541, issued\nFebruary 13, 2022, at 3 (concluding that \" other examination data\" includes interview questions); \nIll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 64023, issued August 4, 2020, at 2 (interview questions\nexempt under section 7(1)(q)). \n\nYour request specifically seeks interview questions that would be used by the\n\nDistrict to evaluate candidates' qualifications for public employment. This information squarely\nfalls within the scope of the section 7(1)(q) exemption regardless of whether you personally\nintend to use the information to seek employment with the District. Because section 7(1)(q) \npermits a public body to withhold the information you requested, there is no basis from which\nthis office could conclude that the District improperly responded to your FOIA request. \nAccordingly, the Public Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this\nmatter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have FOIA questions, you may contact me by mail at\n\nthe Chicago address at the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n85882 f no fi war sd\n\n1, 2024; 103- 865, effective January 1, 2025). \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(c), (1)(q) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. M. Curt Richardson\nAttorney for the District\nMcLean County Unit School District No. 5\n1809 West Hovey Avenue\nNormal, Illinois 61761- 4339\nrichardmc@unit5. org"}
{"id":1136,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-04-21","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["86037"],"title":"Jersey County Sheriff's Office properly withheld police report under 7(1)(c)","filename":"86037, issued April 21, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1398,"summary":"A requester sought a police report from the Jersey County Sheriff's Office, which denied the request citing the personal privacy exemption under FOIA. The PAC determined that the Sheriff's Office properly withheld the records because the privacy interests of the subjects outweighed the public interest in disclosure.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested a specific police report, but the Sheriff's Office refused to release it, arguing that doing so would violate the personal privacy of the people involved. The Attorney General's office reviewed the report and agreed that the privacy rights of the individuals mentioned in the report are more important than the public's right to see it. As a result, the Sheriff's Office is not required to release the document.","holding":"The Jersey County Sheriff's Office properly withheld the requested police report under section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Jersey County Sheriff's Office properly invoked section 7(1)(c) of FOIA to withhold a police report based on the personal privacy of the subjects involved.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Jersey County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought access to a specific police incident report involving a county public official and her spouse.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":90.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_c/Highly-personal-information/86037%2C%20issued%20April%2021%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","privacy exemption","FOIA denial","personal information"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"April 21, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Benjamin L. Goetten\nJersey County State's Attorney\n201 West Pearl Street\nJerseyville, Illinois 62052\nsao@jerseyil. org\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 86037\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Goetten: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)).  For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Jersey County Sheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  did not\nimproperly withhold the report responsive to\nrequest. \n\nMarch 14, 2025, FOIA\n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff' s Office seeking\na copy of police report 2024-6054.  On that same date, the Sheriff's Office denied the request in\nits entirety pursuant to section 7(1)( c) of FOIA. 1 On March 31, 2025, \nsubmitted the\nabove-referenced Request for Review contesting the denial.  He argued that the section 7(1)(c) \nexemption did not apply because the report involved a county public official and her husband. \n\nOn April 10, 2025,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nSheriff's Office and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the withheld report for this office's\n\n2024;  103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\n\fThe Honorable Benjamin L. Goetten\nApril 21, 2025\nPage 2\n\nconfidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nasserted exemption.   On April 14,  2025,  the Jersey County State' s Attorney ( State' s Attorney) \nfurnished those materials to this office on behalf of the Sheriff's Office.  On April 15, 2025, he\n2 On that same\nprovided an amended copy of the written response for forwarding to\ndate, this office forwarded the written response to\n\nOn April 16, 2025, he replied. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2022);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"   An \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\"  is defined in\nsection 7(1)(c) as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a\nreasonable person and in which the subject' s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public\ninterest in obtaining the information.\"  Section 7(1)(c) also provides that \"[ t]he disclosure of\ninformation that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be\nconsidered an invasion of personal privacy.\" \n\nA public body's assertion that the release of information would constitute an\n\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy is evaluated on a case- by- case basis.   Chicago\nJourneymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 v. Department of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, \n196 ( 2001).   Illinois courts consider the following factors in determining whether disclosure of\ninformation would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy: \"(1) the\nplaintiff' s interest in disclosure, ( 2) the public interest in disclosure, ( 3) the degree of invasion of\npersonal privacy, and (4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested\ninformation.\"   National Ass' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department,  399\nIll. App. 3d 1, 13 (2010). \n\nT]he core purpose of the FOIA is to expose what the government is doing, not\n\nwhat its private citizens are up to.'\"   Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety v. City of\nChicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 211 (2004) (quoting Lakin Law Firm, P.C. v. F.T.C., 352 F.3d\n1122,  1124 ( 7th Cir. 2003)).   In contrast to the diminished privacy interests of arrestees,  the right\n\n2See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of\n\nthe answer to the person submitting the request for review, with any alleged confidential\nrequest pertains redacted from the copy.\"). \n\ninformation to which the\n\n\fThe Honorable Benjamin L. Goetten\nApril 21, 2025\nPage 3\n\nto privacy \"is strongest where the individuals in question 'have been investigated but never\npublicly charged.'\"   Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S.   Dep' t of\nJustice, 846 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. \nDep' t of Justice,  655 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011));  see also Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No. 16-\n009, issued November 7, 2016, at 16 (disclosure of information identifying suspect of a crime\nwho had not been arrested or charged would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of\npersonal privacy). \n\nAdditionally, while there is a strong public interest in information reflecting how\npublic officials perform their public duties,  there is generally a lower public interest in domestic\nmatters involving public officials that do not rise to the level of an arrest or the charging of a\ncriminal offense.   See,  for instance,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 32478,  issued October 4, \n2016, at 3-4 (police report concerning domestic matter involving a police officer and his family\non private property where no arrests were made exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)( c)). \n\nIn his response to this office,  the State' s Attorney stated that the incident\n\nunderlying the requested report was a marital dispute in which no arrests were made and did not\ninvolve the public duties of public officials.   He argued that disclosure of the report would\ntherefore be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy for multiple parties in the report. \n\nIn his reply, \n\nargued that there is \"significant public interest in [one of\n\nthe subjects']  actions leading up to her resignation [ from public office],  including the\ncircumstances surrounding her marriage.\" 3 He speculated that a publicly reported investigation\ninto her conduct as a public official could be connected to the circumstances of her marriage.  \n\nfurther argued that there is a public interest in the way public employees or officials\nresponded to the 9-1-1 call and investigated the circumstances surrounding the withheld report.  \nIn response to\nreply, the State's Attorney noted that any cause of action related to\nthis report would have arisen in Madison County,  and that he did not have jurisdiction over this\nincident. \n\nApplying the four-factor balancing test set out above, \n\nhas not\n\ninterest in disclosure other than the general public interest in information\n\ndescribed a personal\nconcerning a public official who is the subject of a publicly reported investigation.  This office's\nconfidential\nreview of the withheld report confirmed that it concerns a highly personal\nthat did not result in any arrests or criminal charges by the Sheriff's Office.  Further, the incident\ndid not involve any actions related to the public duties of any public officials who are the\nsubjects of the report.  There is an acute right to privacy in records concerning such incidents.  \nTo the limited extent that the report reflects the duties of responding officers,  the report cannot\nbe meaningfully redacted.  See Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 266 Ill. App. 3d 421, \n\nincident\n\n3E- mail from\n\nto [Benjamin]  Silver, [ Supervising Attorney,  Public Access Bureau] \n\nApril 16, 2025). \n\n\fThe Honorable Benjamin L. Goetten\nApril 21, 2025\nPage 4\n\n427 (1994) (concluding that public body properly withheld records that could not be\nmeaningfully redacted to avoid the disclosure\"  of exempt information).   Lastly, \nnot appear to have any alternative means to access the report. \n\ndoes\n\nWeighing these factors, the privacy interests of the subjects of the report clearly\noutweigh the public interest in disclosure under these circumstances.   Accordingly,  the Sheriff' s\nOffice sustained its burden of proving that the report is exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7(1)( c). \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This letter shall serve to close this matter.  If you\nhave any questions,  please contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or ( 773)  590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86037 f 71c proper sho\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A police incident report involving a public official and her spouse","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-86037/","full_text":"April 21, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Benjamin L. Goetten\nJersey County State's Attorney\n201 West Pearl Street\nJerseyville, Illinois 62052\nsao@jerseyil. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86037\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Goetten: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Jersey County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) did not\nimproperly withhold the report responsive to\nrequest. \n\nMarch 14, 2025, FOIA\n\nOn that date, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff's Office seeking\na copy of police report 2024-6054. On that same date, the Sheriff's Office denied the request in\nits entirety pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 On March 31, 2025, \nsubmitted the\nabove-referenced Request for Review contesting the denial. He argued that the section 7(1)(c) \nexemption did not apply because the report involved a county public official and her husband. \n\nOn April 10, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nSheriff's Office and asked it to provide an unredacted copy of the withheld report for this office's\n\n2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Act 103-605, effective July 1, \n\nconfidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nasserted exemption. On April 14, 2025, the Jersey County State's Attorney (State's Attorney) \nfurnished those materials to this office on behalf of the Sheriff's Office. On April 15, 2025, he\n2 On that same\nprovided an amended copy of the written response for forwarding to\ndate, this office forwarded the written response to\n\nOn April 16, 2025, he replied. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\" An \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" is defined in\nsection 7(1)(c) as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a\nreasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public\ninterest in obtaining the information.\" Section 7(1)(c) also provides that \"[ t]he disclosure of\ninformation that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be\nconsidered an invasion of personal privacy.\" \n\nA public body's assertion that the release of information would constitute an\n\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy is evaluated on a case- by- case basis. Chicago\nJourneymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 v. Department of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, \n196 (2001). Illinois courts consider the following factors in determining whether disclosure of\ninformation would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy: \"(1) the\nplaintiff's interest in disclosure, (2) the public interest in disclosure, (3) the degree of invasion of\npersonal privacy, and (4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested\ninformation.\" National Ass' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department, 399\nIll. App. 3d 1, 13 (2010). \n\nT]he core purpose of the FOIA is to expose what the government is doing, not\n\nwhat its private citizens are up to.'\" Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety v. City of\nChicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 211 (2004) (quoting Lakin Law Firm, P.C. v. F.T.C., 352 F.3d\n1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 2003)). In contrast to the diminished privacy interests of arrestees, the right\n\n2 See 5 ILCS 140/9.5(d) (West 2023 Supp.) (\" The Public Access Counselor shall forward a copy of\n\nto privacy \"is strongest where the individuals in question 'have been investigated but never\npublicly charged.'\" Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep' t of\nJustice, 846 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. \nDep' t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16-\n009, issued November 7, 2016, at 16 (disclosure of information identifying suspect of a crime\nwho had not been arrested or charged would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of\npersonal privacy). \n\nAdditionally, while there is a strong public interest in information reflecting how\npublic officials perform their public duties, there is generally a lower public interest in domestic\nmatters involving public officials that do not rise to the level of an arrest or the charging of a\ncriminal offense. See, for instance, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 32478, issued October 4, \n2016, at 3-4 (police report concerning domestic matter involving a police officer and his family\non private property where no arrests were made exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(c)). \n\nIn his response to this office, the State's Attorney stated that the incident\n\nunderlying the requested report was a marital dispute in which no arrests were made and did not\ninvolve the public duties of public officials. He argued that disclosure of the report would\ntherefore be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy for multiple parties in the report. \n\nIn his reply, \n\nargued that there is \"significant public interest in [one of\n\nthe subjects'] actions leading up to her resignation [ from public office], including the\ncircumstances surrounding her marriage.\" 3 He speculated that a publicly reported investigation\ninto her conduct as a public official could be connected to the circumstances of her marriage. \n\nfurther argued that there is a public interest in the way public employees or officials\nresponded to the 9-1-1 call and investigated the circumstances surrounding the withheld report. \nIn response to\nreply, the State's Attorney noted that any cause of action related to\nthis report would have arisen in Madison County, and that he did not have jurisdiction over this\nincident. \n\nApplying the four-factor balancing test set out above, \n\nhas not\n\ninterest in disclosure other than the general public interest in information\n\ndescribed a personal\nconcerning a public official who is the subject of a publicly reported investigation. This office's\nconfidential\nreview of the withheld report confirmed that it concerns a highly personal\nthat did not result in any arrests or criminal charges by the Sheriff's Office. Further, the incident\ndid not involve any actions related to the public duties of any public officials who are the\nsubjects of the report. There is an acute right to privacy in records concerning such incidents. \nTo the limited extent that the report reflects the duties of responding officers, the report cannot\nbe meaningfully redacted. See Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 266 Ill. App. 3d 421, \n\n427 (1994) (concluding that public body properly withheld records that could not be\nmeaningfully redacted to avoid the disclosure\" of exempt information). Lastly, \nnot appear to have any alternative means to access the report. \n\ndoes\n\nWeighing these factors, the privacy interests of the subjects of the report clearly\noutweigh the public interest in disclosure under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Sheriff's\nOffice sustained its burden of proving that the report is exempt from disclosure pursuant to\nsection 7(1)(c). \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at benjamin. silver@ilag. gov or (773) 590- 7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86037 f 71c proper sho"}
{"id":1137,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-04-22","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["86063"],"title":"City of Centralia properly withheld business records under 7(1)(b), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(q)","filename":"86063, issued April 22, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2281,"summary":"The requester challenged the City of Centralia's partial denial of records regarding business licensing and enforcement, specifically contesting the application of FOIA exemptions and the adequacy of the search. The PAC determined that the City improperly withheld certain records under section 7(1)(q) but otherwise found the City's search and other redactions appropriate.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested business licensing and enforcement records from the City of Centralia, but the City partially denied the request, citing exemptions for private information, attorney-client communications, and examination data. The citizen challenged the partial denial, arguing the search was insufficient and the exemptions were misapplied. The Public Access Bureau of the Illinois Attorney General reviewed the records and concluded that the City conducted a reasonable search and properly applied the exemptions under sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(q) of FOIA. The determination addresses only the records that were the subject of the FOIA request and does not broadly state that no additional records are ever required to be released.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau determined that the City of Centralia performed a reasonable search and properly withheld records under sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(q) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the City of Centralia properly applied FOIA exemptions 7(1)(b), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(q) to withhold records related to business licensing and enforcement.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(m)","7(1)(q)"],"public_body":"City of Centralia","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in source)","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"business records","subject_description":"The request sought records concerning business transfer verification, tobacco licensing, and enforcement plans for a specific business address.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_q/86063%2C%20issued%20April%2022%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["business license","FOIA exemption","records request","public records","City of Centralia"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Legal & Financial Records","full_text_pre_clean":"April 22, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Kim Enke\nCity Clerk\nCity of Centralia\nPO Box 569\n101 South Locust\nCentralia, Illinois 62801\nkaenke@cityofcentralia. org\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 86063\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Enke: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn March 22, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City of\nCentralia ( City)  seeking records related to business transfer verification,  tobacco licensing and\nenforcement, and the City's enforcement plan for a business located at a specified address.  On\nMarch 28, 2025,  the City granted the request\n7(1)(b), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(q) of FOIA.1 On April 1, 2025, \nreferenced Request for Review contesting City' s response.   Specifically,  he contested the City' s\npartial denial of his request and the adequacy of the City's search for responsive records. \n\nin part and denied it in part pursuant\n\nsubmitted the above-\n\nto sections\n\neffective July 1, 2024; 103-865, effective January 1, 2025). \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), ( 1)(m), (1)(q) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Act 103-605, \n\n\fThe Honorable Kim Enke\nApril 22, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn April 10, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCity and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the contested records for this office' s\nconfidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nasserted exemptions.   This office also asked the City to provide a detailed description of its\nsearch for responsive records.  On April 16, 2025, the City furnished those materials to this\noffice,  including both a complete copy of its written response and a redacted copy for forwarding\nto\nhe\nOn that same date, this office forwarded the redacted copy to\nreplied the same day. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nReasonable Search\n\nWhen presented with a FOIA request,  a public body is required to conduct a\n\nreasonable search tailored to the nature of [that] particular request.\"   Campbell v. U.S. \nDepartment of Justice,  164 F.3d 20, 28 ( D.C. Cir. 1998).   Whether a particular search is\nreasonable depends on the specific facts and is judged on a case-by-case basis.  Better Gov't\nAss' n v. City of Chicago,  2020 IL App ( 1st)  190038, ¶  31.   The crucial\nsearch was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents.  Better Gov't Ass'n, 2020\nIL App ( 1st)  190038,  ¶  31.   Speculation that records may exist does not \" undermine the\nreasonableness of the agency's search[.]\"   Moore v. F.B.I., 366 Fed. Appx. 659, 661 (7th Cir. \n2010). \n\nissue is whether the\n\ninvestigates compliance.   The Clerk' s office maintains the application records in\n\nIn its response to this office,  the City explained that tobacco licensing applications\nare submitted to the Clerk's office, licenses are issued and revoked by the Mayor, and the Police\nDepartment\npaper files by year of issuance, business name, and address, which the Clerk confirmed searching\nin response to this FOIA request.   The City further stated that the Clerk searched for responsive\ne-mails using the business address and e-mail address of the applicant.  The City also confirmed\nthat the Mayor and Police Department performed searches but found no additional records\nresponsive to this FOIA request.  In his reply, \nenforcement\nthe subject business, have recently lost licenses. \n\nrecords should exist because similar businesses,  which he alleges are connected to\n\nspeculated that additional\n\n\fThe Honorable Kim Enke\nApril 22, 2025\nPage 3\n\nThe City's search efforts appear to have been reasonably calculated to locate any\n\nFOIA request.   The City consulted with the divisions\n\nrecords responsive to\nresponsible for the application process, compliance, and maintenance of business records.  The\nCity also conducted an e- mail search using relevant keywords.   Although\nspeculates that the City should have additional enforcement records because of a recent license\nrevocation action against a previous business at the specified address,  he has not provided any\nbasis from which this office could conclude that the City is withholding additional records.  The\nCity confirmed that its Police Department,  which is responsible for enforcement and therefore\nwould be aware of any enforcement activities related to the business, conducted a search for\nresponsive records.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the City performed a reasonable\nsearch for records responsive to\n\nMarch 22, 2025, FOIA request. \n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information, unless\nlaw or a court order.\"  \n\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal\nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \"private information\" as: \n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver' s license number,  employee identification number,  biometric\nidentifiers, personal financial information, passwords or other\naccess codes,  medical records,  home or personal\nnumbers, and personal email addresses.  Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\nlicense plates,  except as\n\ntelephone\n\nIn its response,  the City explained that it redacted personal\naddresses, and home addresses of the officers of a corporation.  This office's confidential review\nof the unredacted records confirmed the City' s description of the redacted private information. \n\ntelephone numbers,  personal e- mail\n\nIn his reply, \n\nargued that the City should not have redacted this\n\ninformation because it pertains to \"corporate actors, not private citizens. The public has a clear\ninterest in learning whether the same individuals— previously sanctioned— are simply\nrepackaging under new names.\" 2\nof this business against the officers of previous businesses that had had licenses revoked.  \nHowever, \"private information\" is exempt from disclosure under the plain language of section\n7(1)( b) \" unless disclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal\ncourt order.\"  When an individual uses a home address, personal e-mail address, or personal\n\nexplained that he wished to compare the officers\n\nlaw, or a\n\n2Letter from\n\nto [ Benjamin]  Silver, [ Supervising Attorney,  Public Access Bureau] \n\nApril 16, 2025), at [2]. \n\n\fThe Honorable Kim Enke\nApril 22, 2025\nPage 4\n\nphone number for both business and personal activities, that information constitutes \"private\ninformation\"  as that term is defined by FOIA.   See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. \n17464, issued January 16, 2011, at 2-3 (residential phone numbers used for both personal and\nbusiness purposes exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)( b)).   There is no suggestion that\nanother State law, a federal law, or a court order requires disclosure of the home or personal\ntelephone numbers,  personal e-mail addresses,  or home addresses responsive to\nrequest, despite the fact that the redacted information belongs to the officers of a corporation.  \nBecause personal phone numbers,  personal e- mail addresses,  and home addresses are exempt\nfrom disclosure under section 7(1)(b) of FOIA, this office concludes that the City did not\nimproperly redact that information from its response to\n\nrequest. \n\nSection 7(1)( m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney or\n\nauditor representing the public body that would not be subject to\ndiscovery in litigation,  and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect\nto internal audits of public bodies.  \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m).  People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1997).  A party\nasserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney- client privilege must\nshow that: \"( 1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was\nmade to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices; and (3) it remained confidential.\"  Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228\n2006).   Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only to the communications of a client to his\nattorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his client.\"  In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. \nApp.  3d 363,  374 ( 1990);  see also People v. Radojcic,  2013 IL 114197, ¶  40 (\"[ T] he modern\nview is that the privilege is a two-way street, protecting both the client's communications to the\nattorney and the attorney' s advice to the client.\").   A public body that withholds records under\nsection 7(1)(m) \"can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption\nis applicable under the circumstances.\"  ( Emphasis in original.)   Illinois Education Ass' n v. \nIllinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003). \n\nIn its response to this office, the City stated that it withheld correspondence with\n\nthe City Attorney regarding the application specified in the FOIA request,  as well as additional\ncorrespondence with the City Attorney.  In his reply, \n\nalleged that the City's\n\n\fThe Honorable Kim Enke\nApril 22, 2025\nPage 5\n\nassertion of the 7(1)(m) exemption \" appears to mask factual communications or policy advice, \nnot privileged legal strategy.  The redactions conceal the City' s review process and\nrecommendations for issuing licenses to rebranded entities—a matter of public concern, not\nprivileged advice.\" 3\n\nThe redacted version of the e- mails provided to\n\nplainly shows that\nthe communications occurred between the City Attorney and the Mayor and Clerk on behalf of\nthe City.  This office' s confidential\ncommunications in which legal advice was sought, and provided, relating to City business.  \nThere is no indication that these communications have been shared with any outside parties that\nwould waive the attorney-client privilege.  Accordingly, this office concludes that the City did\nnot improperly redact those portions of the records under section 7(1)( m)  of FOIA. \n\nreview of the records confirmed that they reflect\n\nSection 7(1)( q) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)( q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ t]est questions,  scoring keys, \n\nand other examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or\nemployment.\"   The Public Access Bureau has previously determined that public bodies may\nproperly withhold certain information collected during the examination, testing, or interview\nprocess that could frustrate those processes as \" other examination data\"  under section 7(1)( q).  \nSee, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 71541, issued February 13, 2022, at 3 (concluding\nthat \" other examination data\"  includes interview questions,  as well as \" evaluative handwritten\nand typed notes by interviewers\");  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26217, issued July 10, \n2014,  at 2 (concluding that \" test questions,  answer sheets,  interviewers'  notes,  rating forms,  and\nother records relied upon to formulate results\" of a police sergeants' promotional examination\nwere \" within the scope of the section 7(1)( q)  exemption.\");  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. \n40721, issued July 21, 2016 (test scores exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(q)). \n\nOn the other hand, this office has also determined that portions of applications\n\nthat do not arise from an examination,  testing,  or an\n\nconcerning the background of an applicant\ninterview of the applicant do not provide insight into the public body's evaluative process and are\ntherefore outside the scope of the section 7(1)( q) exemption.   See,  e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 18783, issued March 8, 2013, at 3 (\"A background check assesses factual information\nconcerning the applicant' s personal history rather than his or her performance on an\nexamination.\");  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 61662, issued January 22, 2021, at 4\nconcluding that background investigation results do not fall within the scope of section 7(1)( q) \nbecause they \"are not test-related information or 'other examination data' that would frustrate the\npublic body' s]  applicant\n\ntesting process if disclosed[.]\"). \n\n3Letter from\n\nto [ Benjamin]  Silver, [ Supervising Attorney,  Public Access Bureau] \n\nApril 16, 2025), at [2]. \n\n\fThe Honorable Kim Enke\nApril 22, 2025\nPage 6\n\nThe City stated that as part of its license application process, it examines and\n\nconfirms the information provided by the applicant\ninformation filed with the State of Illinois.  The City asserted that records related to that review\nconstitute \" examination data\"  exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)( q). \n\nin its application,  including registration\n\nThis office' s confidential\n\nreview of the records withheld pursuant to section\n\n7(1)(q) found that the records are not test questions, scoring keys, or other examination data\ncollected as part of the City' s testing or examination process,  but are instead routine factual\ndocuments regarding the background of an applicant.  Disclosure of these records would not\nfrustrate the City' s application process.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the City has not\ndemonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that these records are exempt pursuant to section\n7(1)( q).   This office requests that the City provide\nsubject only to permissible redaction of private information pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. \n\nwith copies of those records\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86063 f 3a search proper 71b proper 71m proper 71q improper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Records on business transfer verification and tobacco licensing","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-86063/","full_text":"April 22, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Kim Enke\nCity Clerk\nCity of Centralia\nPO Box 569\n101 South Locust\nCentralia, Illinois 62801\nkaenke@cityofcentralia. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86063\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Enke: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2023 Supp.)). \n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nOn March 22, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the City of\nCentralia (City) seeking records related to business transfer verification, tobacco licensing and\nenforcement, and the City's enforcement plan for a business located at a specified address. On\nMarch 28, 2025, the City granted the request\n7(1)(b), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(q) of FOIA.1 On April 1, 2025, \nreferenced Request for Review contesting City's response. Specifically, he contested the City's\npartial denial of his request and the adequacy of the City's search for responsive records. \n\nOn April 10, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCity and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the contested records for this office's\nconfidential review, together with a detailed explanation of the legal and factual bases for the\nasserted exemptions. This office also asked the City to provide a detailed description of its\nsearch for responsive records. On April 16, 2025, the City furnished those materials to this\noffice, including both a complete copy of its written response and a redacted copy for forwarding\nto\nhe\nOn that same date, this office forwarded the redacted copy to\nreplied the same day. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022). \n\nReasonable Search\n\nWhen presented with a FOIA request, a public body is required to conduct a\n\nreasonable search tailored to the nature of [that] particular request.\" Campbell v. U.S. \nDepartment of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Whether a particular search is\nreasonable depends on the specific facts and is judged on a case-by-case basis. Better Gov't\nAss' n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. The crucial\nsearch was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents. Better Gov't Ass'n, 2020\nIL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. Speculation that records may exist does not \" undermine the\nreasonableness of the agency's search[.]\" Moore v. F.B.I., 366 Fed. Appx. 659, 661 (7th Cir. \n2010). \n\nissue is whether the\n\ninvestigates compliance. The Clerk's office maintains the application records in\n\nIn its response to this office, the City explained that tobacco licensing applications\nare submitted to the Clerk's office, licenses are issued and revoked by the Mayor, and the Police\nDepartment\npaper files by year of issuance, business name, and address, which the Clerk confirmed searching\nin response to this FOIA request. The City further stated that the Clerk searched for responsive\ne-mails using the business address and e-mail address of the applicant. The City also confirmed\nthat the Mayor and Police Department performed searches but found no additional records\n\nThe City's search efforts appear to have been reasonably calculated to locate any\n\nFOIA request. The City consulted with the divisions\n\nrecords responsive to\nresponsible for the application process, compliance, and maintenance of business records. The\nCity also conducted an e- mail search using relevant keywords. Although\nspeculates that the City should have additional enforcement records because of a recent license\nrevocation action against a previous business at the specified address, he has not provided any\nbasis from which this office could conclude that the City is withholding additional records. The\nCity confirmed that its Police Department, which is responsible for enforcement and therefore\nwould be aware of any enforcement activities related to the business, conducted a search for\nresponsive records. Accordingly, this office concludes that the City performed a reasonable\nsearch for records responsive to\n\nMarch 22, 2025, FOIA request. \n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]rivate information, unless\nlaw or a court order.\" \n\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal\nSection 2(c-5) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c-5) (West 2023 Supp.)) defines \"private information\" as: \n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, \ndriver's license number, employee identification number, biometric\nidentifiers, personal financial information, passwords or other\naccess codes, medical records, home or personal\nnumbers, and personal email addresses. Private information also\nincludes home address and personal\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of\nattribution to any person. (Emphasis added.) \n\nlicense plates, except as\n\ntelephone\n\nIn its response, the City explained that it redacted personal\naddresses, and home addresses of the officers of a corporation. This office's confidential review\nof the unredacted records confirmed the City's description of the redacted private information. \n\ntelephone numbers, personal e- mail\n\nIn his reply, \n\nargued that the City should not have redacted this\n\ninformation because it pertains to \"corporate actors, not private citizens. The public has a clear\ninterest in learning whether the same individuals— previously sanctioned— are simply\nrepackaging under new names.\" 2\nof this business against the officers of previous businesses that had had licenses revoked. \nHowever, \"private information\" is exempt from disclosure under the plain language of section\n7(1)(b) \" unless disclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal\ncourt order.\" When an individual uses a home address, personal e-mail address, or personal\n\nphone number for both business and personal activities, that information constitutes \"private\ninformation\" as that term is defined by FOIA. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n17464, issued January 16, 2011, at 2-3 (residential phone numbers used for both personal and\nbusiness purposes exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b)). There is no suggestion that\nanother State law, a federal law, or a court order requires disclosure of the home or personal\ntelephone numbers, personal e-mail addresses, or home addresses responsive to\nrequest, despite the fact that the redacted information belongs to the officers of a corporation. \nBecause personal phone numbers, personal e- mail addresses, and home addresses are exempt\nfrom disclosure under section 7(1)(b) of FOIA, this office concludes that the City did not\nimproperly redact that information from its response to\n\nrequest. \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure: \n\nCommunications between a public body and an attorney or\n\nauditor representing the public body that would not be subject to\ndiscovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or\nfor a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or\nadministrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising\nthe public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect\nto internal audits of public bodies. \n\nCommunications protected by the attorney- client privilege are within the scope of\n\nsection 7(1)(m). People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1997). A party\nasserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney- client privilege must\nshow that: \"(1) a statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was\nmade to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or\nservices; and (3) it remained confidential.\" Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228\n2006). Moreover, \"[ t]he privilege applies not only to the communications of a client to his\nattorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his client.\" In re Marriage of Granger, 197 Ill. \nApp. 3d 363, 374 (1990); see also People v. Radojcic, 2013 IL 114197, ¶ 40 (\"[ T] he modern\nview is that the privilege is a two-way street, protecting both the client's communications to the\nattorney and the attorney's advice to the client.\"). A public body that withholds records under\nsection 7(1)(m) \"can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption\nis applicable under the circumstances.\" (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Education Ass' n v. \nIllinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003). \n\nIn its response to this office, the City stated that it withheld correspondence with\n\nthe City Attorney regarding the application specified in the FOIA request, as well as additional\n\nassertion of the 7(1)(m) exemption \" appears to mask factual communications or policy advice, \nnot privileged legal strategy. The redactions conceal the City's review process and\nrecommendations for issuing licenses to rebranded entities—a matter of public concern, not\nprivileged advice.\" 3\n\nThe redacted version of the e- mails provided to\n\nplainly shows that\nthe communications occurred between the City Attorney and the Mayor and Clerk on behalf of\nthe City. This office's confidential\ncommunications in which legal advice was sought, and provided, relating to City business. \nThere is no indication that these communications have been shared with any outside parties that\nwould waive the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, this office concludes that the City did\nnot improperly redact those portions of the records under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. \n\nreview of the records confirmed that they reflect\n\nSection 7(1)(q) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ t]est questions, scoring keys, \n\nand other examination data used to determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or\nemployment.\" The Public Access Bureau has previously determined that public bodies may\nproperly withhold certain information collected during the examination, testing, or interview\nprocess that could frustrate those processes as \" other examination data\" under section 7(1)(q). \nSee, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 71541, issued February 13, 2022, at 3 (concluding\nthat \" other examination data\" includes interview questions, as well as \" evaluative handwritten\nand typed notes by interviewers\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 26217, issued July 10, \n2014, at 2 (concluding that \" test questions, answer sheets, interviewers' notes, rating forms, and\nother records relied upon to formulate results\" of a police sergeants' promotional examination\nwere \" within the scope of the section 7(1)(q) exemption.\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n40721, issued July 21, 2016 (test scores exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(q)). \n\nOn the other hand, this office has also determined that portions of applications\n\nthat do not arise from an examination, testing, or an\n\nconcerning the background of an applicant\ninterview of the applicant do not provide insight into the public body's evaluative process and are\ntherefore outside the scope of the section 7(1)(q) exemption. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 18783, issued March 8, 2013, at 3 (\"A background check assesses factual information\nconcerning the applicant's personal history rather than his or her performance on an\nexamination.\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 61662, issued January 22, 2021, at 4\nconcluding that background investigation results do not fall within the scope of section 7(1)(q) \nbecause they \"are not test-related information or 'other examination data' that would frustrate the\n\nThe City stated that as part of its license application process, it examines and\n\nconfirms the information provided by the applicant\ninformation filed with the State of Illinois. The City asserted that records related to that review\nconstitute \" examination data\" exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(q). \n\nin its application, including registration\n\nThis office's confidential\n\nreview of the records withheld pursuant to section\n\n7(1)(q) found that the records are not test questions, scoring keys, or other examination data\ncollected as part of the City's testing or examination process, but are instead routine factual\ndocuments regarding the background of an applicant. Disclosure of these records would not\nfrustrate the City's application process. Accordingly, this office concludes that the City has not\ndemonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that these records are exempt pursuant to section\n7(1)(q). This office requests that the City provide\nsubject only to permissible redaction of private information pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. \n\nwith copies of those records\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at benjamin.silver@ilag.gov or (773) 590-7878. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86063 f 3a search proper 71b proper 71m proper 71q improper mun"}
{"id":1138,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-09-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["86152"],"title":"PAC analyzes Gurnee SD 156 redaction of legal fee invoices under 7(1)(m)","filename":"86152, issued September 17, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2214,"summary":"A requester sought legal fee invoices related to Title IX matters from Gurnee School District 156, which the District redacted citing attorney-client privilege. The PAC determined that the District's redactions were narrowly tailored to protect confidential legal advice and thus properly withheld under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A school-district employee requested legal-fee invoices related to Title IX matters. The PAC found that the redactions were narrowly tailored to confidential attorney-client communications and that the district met its burden under section 7(1)(m); generic billing information already disclosed was not at issue. The matter was closed.","holding":"","legal_question":"Whether Gurnee School District 156 properly redacted legal fee invoices under the attorney-client privilege exemption of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(m)).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(m)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(m)"],"public_body":"Gurnee School District 156","requesting_party":"District employee","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"legal fees","subject_description":"The request sought non-privileged billing details from legal invoices regarding Title IX matters.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_m/Attorney-client-privilege/86152%2C%20issued%20September%2017%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["legal fees","attorney-client privilege","Title IX","redaction","school district"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"September 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nDr. Luis Correa\nSuperintendent/FOIA Officer\nGurnee School District 156\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nlcorrea@d56. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86152\n\nDear\n\nand Dr. Correa : \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (f) (West 2024)). \n\nOn March 25, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Gurnee\n\nSchool District 156  (School District)  seeking copies of any legal fee invoices issued to the\nSchool District regarding Title IX matters between December 1, 2024, and the present date. \nclarified that she only sought the non-privileged billing details of these invoices, \n\nincluding dates of service, a general description of the services provided, total amounts billed, \nand the names of the firms/attorneys.  On April 1, 2025, the School District provided\nwith certain responsive records,  subject to redactions made pursuant\nFOIA.1 On April 5, 2025, \ncontesting the School District's response.  She explained that she is a District employee and that\nher request was prompted by a Title IX complaint she had filed .  \n\nto section 7( 1)( m)  of\nsubmitted the above -referenced Request for Review\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective July 1, \n\n2024;  103 -865, effective January 1, 2025). \n\n\fDr. Luis Correa\nSeptember 17, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn April 15, 2025, this office sent a copy of this Request for Review to the\nSchool District and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for our\nconfidential review,  and a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the assertion of\nsection 7(1)(m) of FOIA.  The School District did not respond to this office.  On May 29, 2025, \nthis office again forwarded a copy of the Request for Review and inquiry letter to the School\nDistrict and requested a response.   On June 11, 2025, the School District provided this office\nwith the requested materials.  On June 12, 2025, this office forwarded the School District's\nresponse to\n\nshe replied on June 23,  2025. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\"  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024 ); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept.  of Public Health , 218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds a\nrecord \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\"  that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.  5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024 ).  The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed.  Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University , 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure communications between a\npublic body and an attorney which would not be subject to discovery in litigation, including\ncommunications covered by the attorney - client privilege.   The Illinois Supreme Court has\nsummarized the attorney -client privilege as:  \n\n1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2)  from a\nprofessional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3)  the\ncommunications relating to that purpose, (4)  made in confidence, \n5) by the client, ( 6) are permanently protected, ( 7) from disclosure\nby himself or the legal advisor, (8)  except the protection be\nwaived.  Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of\nEducation , 204 Ill. 2d 456, 467 (2003). \n\nIn People v. ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel , 294 Ill. App.  3d 193,  203 -04 ( 1997),  the\n\nIllinois Supreme Court concluded that \"information regarding a client's fees generally is not a\nconfidential communication' between an attorney and client, and thus is not protected by the\nattorney client privilege.  [Citations.] * * *  The payment of fees is merely incidental to the\nattorney -client relationship and typically does not involve the disclosure of confidential\ncommunications arising from the relationship.\"   The court in Stukel,  however,  acknowledged that\nc] ertain types of billing records may contain explanations for legal fees and may indicate the\n\n\fDr. Luis Correa\nSeptember 17, 2025\nPage 3\n\ntype of work done or matters discussed between the attorney and client.  As such, they could\nreveal the substance of confidential attorney-client discussions, and be subject to valid claims of\nattorney -client privilege or exemption under [ FOIA].\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Stukel,  294 Ill. App. \n3d at 201.  Because the records at issue \"made no reference to the pending litigation other than to\nname the payee law firm, and designate the amount and the date of each payment[,]\" ( Stukel,  294\nIll. App. 3d at 201), the court did not further elaborate on the type of information that could be\nproperly redacted from legal billing invoices based on the attorney -client privilege.  Construing\nStukel and other legal precedents on the subject of legal billing invoices,  the Attorney General\nhas issued two binding opinions ( Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No.  12 -005,  issued March 12, \n2012;  Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  No.  14 -002,  issued April 15,  2014)  concluding that while\ndetailed descriptions of work performed may be redacted pursuant to section 7(1)(m), generic\ndescriptions (such as \" held telephone conference\" or \"drafted e -mail\") are not exempt from\ndisclosure. \n\nAs an initial matter, \n\nprovided this office with an unredacted copy of\none of the requested invoices containing her handwritten notes.  In its response to this office, the\nSchool District clarified that \"the invoice was not provided to\nobtained the invoice without authorization and through improper channels.\" 2 Therefore, the\nSchool District argued that it has not waived its attorney - client privilege and/ or the\ncorresponding exemption under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.  This office has not received any\ninformation to contradict the School District' s assertion that it did not provide\nor any\nother third parties with these records to waive the attorney-client privilege .  Therefore, this office\nwill address the applicability of section 7(1)(m) to the redactions made in the remaining invoice, \nInvoice 34776.  \n\nRather, \n\nIn her Request for Review, \n\nargued that the School District improperly\n\nwithheld portions of the legal invoices she requested because they \" provide evidence\ndemonstrating how the Superintendent * * *  may have retaliated against [her] * * *  followi ng\nher] filing of the Title IX compliant.\" 3 In its response to this office, the School District\nreiterated that it properly withheld certain portions of the requested legal invoices pursuant\nsection 7(1)(m).  The School District explained: \n\nto\n\nThe invoices produced to\nfairly reflect the general nature of the work performed (e.g., \ntelephone conference with \" or \" review and respond to e -mail\nfrom\"), the District representative involved, the date of the work, \n\nin response to her request\n\n2Letter from Ryan J. Gillespie,  Engler Callaway Baasten &  Sraga,  LLC., to Christina Lucente -\nMcCullough,  Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( June 11, \n2025),  at 2. \n\n3E- mail from\n\nto Public Access ( April 5, 2025). \n\n\fDr. Luis Correa\nSeptember 17, 2025\nPage 4\n\nthe amount of time expended, and the rate and amount billed for\neach item. (citation omitted).  The undersigned counsel's law firm\ndoes not include the names of attorneys on its invoices.  The\nremaining information in the invoices was properly redacted\nbecause it would disclose the specific types of work performed,  the\nnature of matters discussed and advice given, the substance of\nattorney -client discussions, the nature of documents prepared the\nissues researched,  and/ or the District' s motivations for seeking\nlegal advice.   As the case law cited above demonstrates,  such\ninformation is protected by the attorney - client privilege and thus\nfalls under the attorney -client exemption in Section 7(1)( m).[4] \n\nIn her reply, \n\nargued that the attorney who reviewed her Title IX\n\ncomplaint was not acting as a legal advisor to the District and,  therefore,  the redacted\ninformation in the invoice did not constitute confidential attorney - client communications.   She\ncontended that certain  \"statements from attorney Aimme LeBlanc show she served in an\ninvestigatory ––not advisory ––capacity.\" 5 Ms. Cortes cited the Illinois Supreme Court's decision\nin Center Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC , 2012 IL 113107, as support for this assertion.  \nIn Center Partners,  the court held that the attorney -client privilege was not waived when\nattorneys exchanged legal documents and provided statements related to legal advice during a\ndeposition,  as part of the discovery process,  so long as this information is not \" used by the client\nto gain a tactical advantage in litigation.\" Center Partners, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 76.  The case did\nnot concern whether the attorney -client privilege applied to communications involving an\nattorney acting in an investigatory rather than advisory capacity . 6\n\nOther courts, however, have squarely addressed this issue and held that that the\n\nattorney -client privilege protects communications with clients in the course of an attorney's\ninvestigation provided that they are acting in their capacity as an attorney .  In Sandra T.E. v. \nSouth Berwyn School District 100, 600 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2010),  a law firm conducted a\nfactual investigation that \" was an integral part of the package of legal services for which it was\nhired and a necessary prerequisite to the provision of legal advice about how the District should\n\n4Letter from Ryan J. Gillespie,  Engler Callaway Baasten &  Sraga,  LLC., to Christina Lucente -\nMcCullough,  Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( June 11, \n2025),  at 3. \n\n5Letter from\n\nto Christina Lucente -McCullough,  Assistant Attorney General,  Public\n\nAccess Bureau,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General [ June 23, 2025],  at [2]. \n\nreply also referenced a case captioned In re Subpoenaed Grand Jury Witness.   To the\nextent she is referring to In re Subpoenaed Grand Jury Witness,  171 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1999), which the School\nDistrict cited in its response to this office, the court held that the attorney -client privilege protected the identity of\nindividuals or entities who paid legal fees for defendants.   That ruling has no relevance to this matter. \n\n\fDr. Luis Correa\nSeptember 17, 2025\nPage 5\n\nrespond .\"  The court concluded:  \" Because the [ public body's]  lawyers were hired in their\ncapacity as lawyers to provide legal services —including a factual investigation—the attorney -\nclient privilege applies to the communications made and documents generated during that\ninvestigation.\"  Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 620 ;  see also In re Kellogg Brown &  Root, Inc., 756\nF.3d 754,  760 ( D.C. Cir. 2014) (\" In the context of an organization' s internal\ninvestigation,  if one\nof the significant purposes of the internal investigation was to obtain or provide legal advice, the\nprivilege will apply.\"). \n\nIn response to this office' s request for clarification of the nature of the services\n\nthat underlie the records withheld under section 7( 1)( m),  counsel for the School District\nexplained that attorney Aimee LeBlanc conducted a factual investigation and submitted findings\nto another attorney who acted as the decision -maker.  That attorney then consulted with a third\nattorney who acted as the School District's legal advisor.  Counsel added that additional legal\nadvice was provided concerning personnel matters that arose during the investigation.  \napparent from this explanation that the legal services provided to the School District were not\nlimited to fact-finding unrelated to legal advice .  Instead, the purpose of the investigation was to\nequip the attorney acting as the School District's legal advisor with the necessary facts to render\nlegal advice .  \n\nIt is\n\nThis office has reviewed and compared the redacted version of the invoice\n\nprovided to\nwith the complete version .   The redacted version reveals the dates on\nwhich work was performed, the numbers of hours billed, and the corresponding amount billed\nfor each entry.  Many of the entries also disclose the type of work performed (such as \"telephone\nconferences,\" \" review and respond to e -mail,\" \" travel to and attend Title IX interview\"),  and the\nsubject of the work in instances when the subject is stated in general terms.   Additionally,  many\nof the entries do not appear related to Title IX matters; those entries concern other issues for\nwhich the District received legal services .  With respect to the entries concerning Title IX\nmatters, the redacted information concerns specific details of legal advice provided by the School\nDistrict's attorneys and the factual investigation that laid the groundwork for that legal advice .  \nBecause the School District' s redactions were narrowly tailored to information that would reveal\nthe substance of confidential attorney -client communications, this office concludes that the\nSchool District sustained its burden of demonstrating that the redacted information concerning\nTitle IX matters is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.  \n\n\fDr. Luis Correa\nSeptember 17, 2025\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This letter shall serve to close this matter.  If you\nhave any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86152 f 71m proper sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ryan J. Gillespie\nAssociate,  Engler Callaway Bassten &  Sraga,  LLC\n2215 York Road, Suite 400\nOak Brook, Illinois 60523\nrgillespie@ecbslaw.com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Legal fee invoices for Title IX matters","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":"A school district employee requested legal fee invoices related to Title IX matters, but the district redacted portions, claiming they were protected by attorney-client privilege. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau issued a determination analyzing whether the redactions were allowed under FOIA exemption 7(1)(m). The source document is incomplete and does not state a final conclusion on whether the exemption applied.","human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-86152/","full_text":"September 17, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nDr. Luis Correa\nSuperintendent/FOIA Officer\nGurnee School District 156\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nlcorrea@d56. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86152\n\nDear\n\nand Dr. Correa: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5 (f) (West 2024)). \n\nOn March 25, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Gurnee\n\nSchool District 156 (School District) seeking copies of any legal fee invoices issued to the\nSchool District regarding Title IX matters between December 1, 2024, and the present date. \nclarified that she only sought the non-privileged billing details of these invoices, \n\nincluding dates of service, a general description of the services provided, total amounts billed, \nand the names of the firms/attorneys. On April 1, 2025, the School District provided\nwith certain responsive records, subject to redactions made pursuant\nFOIA.1 On April 5, 2025, \ncontesting the School District's response. She explained that she is a District employee and that\nher request was prompted by a Title IX complaint she had filed. \n\nto section 7(1)(m) of\nsubmitted the above -referenced Request for Review\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(m) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103 -605, effective July 1, \n\nOn April 15, 2025, this office sent a copy of this Request for Review to the\nSchool District and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive records for our\nconfidential review, and a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the assertion of\nsection 7(1)(m) of FOIA. The School District did not respond to this office. On May 29, 2025, \nthis office again forwarded a copy of the Request for Review and inquiry letter to the School\nDistrict and requested a response. On June 11, 2025, the School District provided this office\nwith the requested materials. On June 12, 2025, this office forwarded the School District's\nresponse to\n\nshe replied on June 23, 2025. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \nIllinois Dept. of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds a\nrecord \" has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024). The exemptions from disclosure are to be\nnarrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, \n407 (1997). \n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure communications between a\npublic body and an attorney which would not be subject to discovery in litigation, including\ncommunications covered by the attorney - client privilege. The Illinois Supreme Court has\nsummarized the attorney -client privilege as: \n\n1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a\nprofessional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the\ncommunications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, \n5) by the client, (6) are permanently protected, (7) from disclosure\nby himself or the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be\nwaived. Illinois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of\nEducation, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 467 (2003). \n\nIn People v. ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 203 -04 (1997), the\n\nIllinois Supreme Court concluded that \"information regarding a client's fees generally is not a\nconfidential communication' between an attorney and client, and thus is not protected by the\nattorney client privilege. [Citations.] * * * The payment of fees is merely incidental to the\nattorney -client relationship and typically does not involve the disclosure of confidential\ncommunications arising from the relationship.\" The court in Stukel, however, acknowledged that\nc] ertain types of billing records may contain explanations for legal fees and may indicate the\n\ntype of work done or matters discussed between the attorney and client. As such, they could\nreveal the substance of confidential attorney-client discussions, and be subject to valid claims of\nattorney -client privilege or exemption under [ FOIA].\" (Emphasis added.) Stukel, 294 Ill. App. \n3d at 201. Because the records at issue \"made no reference to the pending litigation other than to\nname the payee law firm, and designate the amount and the date of each payment[,]\" (Stukel, 294\nIll. App. 3d at 201), the court did not further elaborate on the type of information that could be\nproperly redacted from legal billing invoices based on the attorney -client privilege. Construing\nStukel and other legal precedents on the subject of legal billing invoices, the Attorney General\nhas issued two binding opinions (Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 12 -005, issued March 12, \n2012; Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14 -002, issued April 15, 2014) concluding that while\ndetailed descriptions of work performed may be redacted pursuant to section 7(1)(m), generic\ndescriptions (such as \" held telephone conference\" or \"drafted e -mail\") are not exempt from\ndisclosure. \n\nAs an initial matter, \n\nprovided this office with an unredacted copy of\none of the requested invoices containing her handwritten notes. In its response to this office, the\nSchool District clarified that \"the invoice was not provided to\nobtained the invoice without authorization and through improper channels.\" 2 Therefore, the\nSchool District argued that it has not waived its attorney - client privilege and/ or the\ncorresponding exemption under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. This office has not received any\ninformation to contradict the School District's assertion that it did not provide\nor any\nother third parties with these records to waive the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, this office\nwill address the applicability of section 7(1)(m) to the redactions made in the remaining invoice, \nInvoice 34776. \n\nRather, \n\nIn her Request for Review, \n\nargued that the School District improperly\n\nwithheld portions of the legal invoices she requested because they \" provide evidence\ndemonstrating how the Superintendent * * * may have retaliated against [her] * * * followi ng\nher] filing of the Title IX compliant.\" 3 In its response to this office, the School District\nreiterated that it properly withheld certain portions of the requested legal invoices pursuant\nsection 7(1)(m). The School District explained: \n\nto\n\nThe invoices produced to\nfairly reflect the general nature of the work performed (e.g., \ntelephone conference with \" or \" review and respond to e -mail\nfrom\"), the District representative involved, the date of the work, \n\nin response to her request\n\n2 Letter from Ryan J. Gillespie, Engler Callaway Baasten & Sraga, LLC., to Christina Lucente -\nMcCullough, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (June 11, \n\nthe amount of time expended, and the rate and amount billed for\neach item. (citation omitted). The undersigned counsel's law firm\ndoes not include the names of attorneys on its invoices. The\nremaining information in the invoices was properly redacted\nbecause it would disclose the specific types of work performed, the\nnature of matters discussed and advice given, the substance of\nattorney -client discussions, the nature of documents prepared the\nissues researched, and/ or the District's motivations for seeking\nlegal advice. As the case law cited above demonstrates, such\ninformation is protected by the attorney - client privilege and thus\nfalls under the attorney -client exemption in Section 7(1)(m).[4] \n\nIn her reply, \n\nargued that the attorney who reviewed her Title IX\n\ncomplaint was not acting as a legal advisor to the District and, therefore, the redacted\ninformation in the invoice did not constitute confidential attorney - client communications. She\ncontended that certain \"statements from attorney Aimme LeBlanc show she served in an\ninvestigatory ––not advisory ––capacity.\" 5 Ms. Cortes cited the Illinois Supreme Court's decision\nin Center Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, 2012 IL 113107, as support for this assertion. \nIn Center Partners, the court held that the attorney -client privilege was not waived when\nattorneys exchanged legal documents and provided statements related to legal advice during a\ndeposition, as part of the discovery process, so long as this information is not \" used by the client\nto gain a tactical advantage in litigation.\" Center Partners, 2012 IL 113107, ¶ 76. The case did\nnot concern whether the attorney -client privilege applied to communications involving an\nattorney acting in an investigatory rather than advisory capacity. 6\n\nOther courts, however, have squarely addressed this issue and held that that the\n\nattorney -client privilege protects communications with clients in the course of an attorney's\ninvestigation provided that they are acting in their capacity as an attorney. In Sandra T.E. v. \nSouth Berwyn School District 100, 600 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2010), a law firm conducted a\nfactual investigation that \" was an integral part of the package of legal services for which it was\nhired and a necessary prerequisite to the provision of legal advice about how the District should\n\n4 Letter from Ryan J. Gillespie, Engler Callaway Baasten & Sraga, LLC., to Christina Lucente -\nMcCullough, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (June 11, \n2025), at 3. \n\n5 Letter from\n\nto Christina Lucente -McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, Public\n\nAccess Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General [ June 23, 2025], at [2]. \n\nreply also referenced a case captioned In re Subpoenaed Grand Jury Witness. To the\nextent she is referring to In re Subpoenaed Grand Jury Witness, 171 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1999), which the School\nDistrict cited in its response to this office, the court held that the attorney -client privilege protected the identity of\nindividuals or entities who paid legal fees for defendants. That ruling has no relevance to this matter. \n\nrespond.\" The court concluded: \" Because the [ public body's] lawyers were hired in their\ncapacity as lawyers to provide legal services —including a factual investigation—the attorney -\nclient privilege applies to the communications made and documents generated during that\ninvestigation.\" Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 620; see also In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756\nF.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (\" In the context of an organization's internal\ninvestigation, if one\nof the significant purposes of the internal investigation was to obtain or provide legal advice, the\nprivilege will apply.\"). \n\nIn response to this office's request for clarification of the nature of the services\n\nthat underlie the records withheld under section 7(1)(m), counsel for the School District\nexplained that attorney Aimee LeBlanc conducted a factual investigation and submitted findings\nto another attorney who acted as the decision -maker. That attorney then consulted with a third\nattorney who acted as the School District's legal advisor. Counsel added that additional legal\nadvice was provided concerning personnel matters that arose during the investigation. \napparent from this explanation that the legal services provided to the School District were not\nlimited to fact-finding unrelated to legal advice. Instead, the purpose of the investigation was to\nequip the attorney acting as the School District's legal advisor with the necessary facts to render\nlegal advice. \n\nIt is\n\nThis office has reviewed and compared the redacted version of the invoice\n\nprovided to\nwith the complete version. The redacted version reveals the dates on\nwhich work was performed, the numbers of hours billed, and the corresponding amount billed\nfor each entry. Many of the entries also disclose the type of work performed (such as \"telephone\nconferences,\" \" review and respond to e -mail,\" \" travel to and attend Title IX interview\"), and the\nsubject of the work in instances when the subject is stated in general terms. Additionally, many\nof the entries do not appear related to Title IX matters; those entries concern other issues for\nwhich the District received legal services. With respect to the entries concerning Title IX\nmatters, the redacted information concerns specific details of legal advice provided by the School\nDistrict's attorneys and the factual investigation that laid the groundwork for that legal advice. \nBecause the School District's redactions were narrowly tailored to information that would reveal\nthe substance of confidential attorney -client communications, this office concludes that the\nSchool District sustained its burden of demonstrating that the redacted information concerning\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTINA LUCENTE-MCCULLOUGH\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86152 f 71m proper sd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ryan J. Gillespie\nAssociate, Engler Callaway Bassten & Sraga, LLC\n2215 York Road, Suite 400\nOak Brook, Illinois 60523\nrgillespie@ecbslaw.com"}
{"id":1139,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-05-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["86210"],"title":"Lombard Police Department properly redacted police report under 7(1)(c) without consent","filename":"86210, issued May 13, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":982,"summary":"The requester challenged the Lombard Police Department's redaction of a medical assist police report, but the PAC determined the redactions were proper under FOIA's personal privacy exemption.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested a police report regarding a medical incident involving their mother-in-law, but the police department redacted personal information. The PAC ruled that the department acted correctly because the requester did not provide written consent or legal authorization from the individual named in the report. The requester may submit a new request if they obtain the necessary written consent from the subject.","holding":"The Lombard Police Department properly redacted the requested police report pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA because the requester lacked written consent from the subject of the report.","legal_question":"Whether the Lombard Police Department properly redacted a police report under the personal privacy exemption of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c)) in the absence of written consent from the subject of the report.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Lombard Police Department","requesting_party":"Requester (name redacted in source document)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought an unredacted police report concerning a medical assist incident involving a third party.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_c/Highly-personal-information/86210%2C%20issued%20May%2013%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police report","privacy","redaction","medical records","consent"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"May 13, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 86210\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2023 Supp.)).   For the reasons explained\nbelow,  this office has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn March 14, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Lombard\n\nPolice Department ( Department)  seeking a copy of the police report involving a \" medical assist\" \nto an identified person at an identified address.   The person identified in the FOIA request is not\nconnection with the incident or the\n\nand the FOIA request did not explain\nindividual.   On March 17, 2025,  the Department\npursuant to section 7(1)(b) and 7(1)( c) of FOIA. 1\n\nfurnished\n\na report with redactions\n\nOn April 9, 2025,  this office received a letter from\n\nchallenging the\n\nredactions and explaining that after\nreceived the redacted report from the Department, \nhe contacted the Department to explain that the identified resident is his mother- in-law and that\nboth of you are aware of her health issues.   On April 16, 2025, \nfurnished this office a\ncopy of the FOIA request and the Department' s response to complete this Request for Review\nfile. \n\n2024;  103- 865,  effective January 1, 2025.  \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.),  as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July 1,  \n\n\fMay 13, 2025\nPage 2\n\nIn an attempt to resolve this matter,  the Public Access Counselor contacted\n\nby e-mail on April 28, 2025,  and asked if the individual named in the report had consented\nin writing to her obtaining this report on their behalf,  or if she had any other documents,  such as\na medical power of attorney or guardianship,  that reflected that the individual had consented to\nher receiving personal medical information about them.   The next day, \nresponded by\nreiterating that he and his family are aware of the individual' s issues,  but that he could obtain a\nwritten consent to disclosure from his mother- in-law if necessary.  \nalso indicated that\nhe would attempt to call this office.  As of the date of this letter,  the Public Access Counselor has\nnot received a call from\n\nOn May 1, 2025,  the Public Access Counselor asked the Department to provide\n\nthis office a copy of the redacted report it provided in response to the request,  along with its\nredaction log; it provided those records later that day.   The report is described as an \" assist fire\ndepartment\"  incident in a private residence/ home in which an officer was dispatched for \"an\nunresponsive person in the bedroom.\"   The Department redacted the date of birth and home\nphone number for the individual\nnumber for another person present on the scene,  and a paragraph from the narrative.   The\nredaction log reflects that the Department relied on sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)( c) of FOIA.  There\nis no indication in the report that the Department conducted a criminal\ninvestigation or arrested\nanyone in connection with the incident,  and the Request for Review explains that the subject of\nthe report survived the medical\n\nlisted on the report,  the name,  date of birth, and mobile phone\n\nincident. \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy\"  as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or\nobjectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject' s right to privacy outweighs any\nlegitimate public interest in obtaining the information.\"  \"[ T]he core purpose of the FOIA is to\nexpose what the government\nfor Neighborhood Safety v. City of Chicago,  348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 211 ( 2004) ( quoting Lakin\nLaw Firm, P.C. v. F.T.C., 352 F.3d 1122,  1124 ( 7th Cir. 2003)).   \n\nis doing,  not what its private citizens are up to.'\"   Chicago Alliance\n\nBased on this office's review of the report,  disclosure of additional\nconcerning the Department' s assistance with an unresponsive person without the written consent\nof that person would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to that person.  \n\ninformation\n\nFOIA request to the Department did not include that person' s written consent to allow\n\ninformation to be disclosed.   Although this office recognizes\n\npersonal\nhave personal\nperson' s medical history,  the specific report at issue concerns a highly personal matter and this\noffice has not received or reviewed information indicating that there is a public interest in\n\ninterest in the requested report,  and\n\nhas indicated that she is aware of the\n\n\fMay 13, 2025\nPage 3\n\ndisclosure of the information in the records that outweighs the subject' s right to privacy under the\ncircumstances.   Even if\nnot object to them obtaining an unredacted copy of the report,  the section 7(1)(c) exemption\npermits the Department to withhold details of the type of incident documented in the report\nwithout the written consent of the subject.   Accordingly,  this office concludes that the allegation\nthat the Department violated FOIA by providing a redacted report in response to the request is\nunfounded.    \n\nare certain that the subject of the report would\n\nconsent to disclosure from the subject of this incident to provide to the Department.   Once\n\nobtain that written consent,  they may wish to submit a new FOIA request to\n\ne-mail to this office stated that he believed he could obtain written\n\nthe Department with that information included.   \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  you may contact me at\n\nleah. bartelt@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86210 f unf pd\n\ncc:  \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Margaret Devine\nRecords Clerk,  Lombard Police Department\n235 East Wilson Avenue\nLombard,  Illinois 60148\ndevinem@villageoflombard. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Unredacted police report of a medical assist incident","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-86210/","full_text":"May 13, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86210\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons explained\nbelow, this office has determined that your Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn March 14, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a FOIA request to the Lombard\n\nPolice Department (Department) seeking a copy of the police report involving a \" medical assist\" \nto an identified person at an identified address. The person identified in the FOIA request is not\nconnection with the incident or the\n\nand the FOIA request did not explain\nindividual. On March 17, 2025, the Department\npursuant to section 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1\n\nfurnished\n\na report with redactions\n\nOn April 9, 2025, this office received a letter from\n\nchallenging the\n\nredactions and explaining that after\nreceived the redacted report from the Department, \nhe contacted the Department to explain that the identified resident is his mother- in-law and that\nboth of you are aware of her health issues. On April 16, 2025, \nfurnished this office a\ncopy of the FOIA request and the Department's response to complete this Request for Review\nfile. \n\n2024; 103- 865, effective January 1, 2025. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2023 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 103- 605, effective July 1, \n\nIn an attempt to resolve this matter, the Public Access Counselor contacted\n\nby e-mail on April 28, 2025, and asked if the individual named in the report had consented\nin writing to her obtaining this report on their behalf, or if she had any other documents, such as\na medical power of attorney or guardianship, that reflected that the individual had consented to\nher receiving personal medical information about them. The next day, \nresponded by\nreiterating that he and his family are aware of the individual's issues, but that he could obtain a\nwritten consent to disclosure from his mother- in-law if necessary. \nalso indicated that\nhe would attempt to call this office. As of the date of this letter, the Public Access Counselor has\nnot received a call from\n\nOn May 1, 2025, the Public Access Counselor asked the Department to provide\n\nthis office a copy of the redacted report it provided in response to the request, along with its\nredaction log; it provided those records later that day. The report is described as an \" assist fire\ndepartment\" incident in a private residence/ home in which an officer was dispatched for \"an\nunresponsive person in the bedroom.\" The Department redacted the date of birth and home\nphone number for the individual\nnumber for another person present on the scene, and a paragraph from the narrative. The\nredaction log reflects that the Department relied on sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. There\nis no indication in the report that the Department conducted a criminal\ninvestigation or arrested\nanyone in connection with the incident, and the Request for Review explains that the subject of\nthe report survived the medical\n\nlisted on the report, the name, date of birth, and mobile phone\n\nincident. \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] ersonal information\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\" (Emphasis added.) Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy\" as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or\nobjectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any\nlegitimate public interest in obtaining the information.\" \"[ T]he core purpose of the FOIA is to\nexpose what the government\nfor Neighborhood Safety v. City of Chicago, 348 Ill. App. 3d 188, 211 (2004) (quoting Lakin\nLaw Firm, P.C. v. F.T.C., 352 F.3d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 2003)). \n\nis doing, not what its private citizens are up to.'\" Chicago Alliance\n\nBased on this office's review of the report, disclosure of additional\nconcerning the Department's assistance with an unresponsive person without the written consent\nof that person would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to that person. \n\ninformation\n\nFOIA request to the Department did not include that person's written consent to allow\n\ninformation to be disclosed. Although this office recognizes\n\npersonal\nhave personal\nperson's medical history, the specific report at issue concerns a highly personal matter and this\noffice has not received or reviewed information indicating that there is a public interest in\n\ndisclosure of the information in the records that outweighs the subject's right to privacy under the\ncircumstances. Even if\nnot object to them obtaining an unredacted copy of the report, the section 7(1)(c) exemption\npermits the Department to withhold details of the type of incident documented in the report\nwithout the written consent of the subject. Accordingly, this office concludes that the allegation\nthat the Department violated FOIA by providing a redacted report in response to the request is\nunfounded. \n\nare certain that the subject of the report would\n\nconsent to disclosure from the subject of this incident to provide to the Department. Once\n\nobtain that written consent, they may wish to submit a new FOIA request to\n\ne-mail to this office stated that he believed he could obtain written\n\nthe Department with that information included. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, you may contact me at\n\nleah. bartelt@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLEAH BARTELT\nPublic Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86210 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Margaret Devine\nRecords Clerk, Lombard Police Department\n235 East Wilson Avenue\nLombard, Illinois 60148\ndevinem@villageoflombard. org"}
{"id":1140,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-11","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["86566"],"title":"Village of Orland Park partly misapplied recurrent requester threshold to FOIA requests","filename":"86566, issued June 11, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":894,"summary":"The requester challenged the Village of Orland Park's designation of him as a 'recurrent requester' under FOIA. The PAC determined the Village improperly applied the designation to the April 22 request but correctly applied it to the April 23 request based on the volume of prior submissions.","plain_summary":"A requester challenged the Village of Orland Park for labeling him a 'recurrent requester,' which allows a public body more time to respond to FOIA requests. The Attorney General's office found that the Village did not have enough evidence to support the label for the first request, but did have enough for the second request. This means the Village must follow standard FOIA timelines for the first request but can use the extended recurrent requester timeline for the second.","holding":"The Village improperly designated the requester as a recurrent requester for his April 22 request, but correctly identified him as such for his April 23 request.","legal_question":"Did the Village of Orland Park correctly calculate the number of FOIA requests submitted by the requester to meet the statutory threshold for 'recurrent requester' status under 5 ILCS 140/2(g)?","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2(g)","5 ILCS 140/3.2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Orland Park","requesting_party":"Mr. [Name Redacted]","pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"recurrent requester","subject_description":"The dispute concerns whether the requester met the statutory threshold of 50 FOIA requests within a 52-week period to be classified as a recurrent requester.","ocr_status":"llm_reocr","ocr_quality":96.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_g/86566%2C%20issued%20June%2011%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["recurrent requester","FOIA response time","FOIA procedure"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Requester Status","full_text_pre_clean":"June 11,  2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\n\nDeputy Village Clerk\n\nVillage of Orland Park\n\n14700 South Ravinia Avenue\n\nOrland Park, Illinois 60462\n\nasnodsmith@orlandpark. org\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 86566\n\nDear\n\nand Ms.  Snodsmith: \n\nThis determination\n\nis issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)).   \n\nOn April 22,  2025,  and April 23,  2025, \n\nsubmitted FOIA requests to the\n\nVillage of Orland Park ( Village).   On April 28,  2025,  the Village notified\n\nthat his\n\nrequests qualified as requests from a recurrent\n\nrequester under section 2( g)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS\n\n140/ 2(g) (West 2024))  and that it would respond to the requests in accordance with section 3.2 of\n\nFOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3.2 ( West 2024)).   On May 6,  2025,  this office received\n\ncomplete Request for Review disputing his recurrent\n\nrequester status.     \n\nOn May 15,  2025,  this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nVillage and asked it to provide a written response addressing how the Village determined that\n\nmet the threshold for qualifying as a recurrent\n\nrequester under section 2(g) of FOIA. \n\nThis office also requested copies of the requests used in its calculations or a log of the relevant\n\nFOIA requests.   On May 22,  2025,  this office received the requested response and a log of FOIA\n\n\fMs.  Alexandra Snodsmith\n\nJune 11, 2025\n\nPage 2\n\nrequests;  this office received an updated log of additional\n\nrequests on June 6, 2025.   On May 23, \n\n2025,  this office forwarded a copy of the Village' s response to\n\nhe replied that same\n\nday,  maintaining that the Village improperly treated him as a recurrent\n\nrequester.   \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA defines a \" recurrent requester\"  as a \" person\"  who, \"in the 12\n\nmonths immediately preceding the request,  has submitted to the same public body \"( i) a\n\nminimum of 50 requests for records, ( ii) a minimum of 15 requests for records within a 30- day\n\nperiod,  or ( iii) a minimum of 7 requests for records within a 7-day period.\"  ( Emphasis added.)  \n\nA public body' s time to respond to a request by a recurrent\n\nrequester\n\nis extended to 21 business\n\ndays after receipt of the request.   5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(a) ( West 2024).   Thus,  each time a requester\n\nsubmits a FOIA request to a public body, the public body \"may look back 52 weeks prior to the\n\ndate\"  the request was received to determine whether the requester continues to qualify as a\n\nrecurrent requester.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29472, issued October 23, 2014, at 2; \n\nsee also Ill. Att' y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr.  77350 77529,  issued September 18,  2023 ( concluding\n\nthat requester did not meet\n\nthreshold for qualifying as a recurrent\n\nrequester because he did not\n\nsubmit at least 50 requests in the 52 weeks immediately preceding his requests). \n\nIn its response to this office,  the Village stated:  \n\nOn January 14,  2025, \n\nmet the criteria of a\n\nrecurrent requester as he had submitted a minimum of 50 requests\n\nfor records ( enclosed for your review)  within a 12 month time\n\nperiod.  It is the Village’ s understanding\n\nthat once a requester\n\nqualifies as recurrent, \n\nthat designation remains for one year from\n\nthe date on which the submitted request went over the threshold as\n\ndefined in Section 3(g) of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3(g).  In this case, \n\nrecurrent\n\nrequester status would remain in effect\n\nuntil January 14,  2026.[\n\n1]   \n\nUnder the plain language of section 2(g), the recurrent\n\nrequester designation does\n\nnot automatically\n\nlast for a year from the time that a requester previously met the threshold.  \n\nRather,  a requester would continue to qualify as a recurrent\n\nrequester\n\nif the person submitted at\n\nleast 50 requests in the 12 months prior to the date of the request at issue ( or if they submitted the\n\nrequisite number of requests described in section 2(g)(ii) or 2(g)( iii) during the 12 months prior\n\nto the request at issue).   Based on this office' s review of the Village' s FOIA log, \n\nsubmitted a total of 49 requests in the 52 weeks preceding the April 22,  2025,  request and 50\n\nrequests preceding the April 23,  2025,  request.   Accordingly, \n\nthis office concludes that the\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief,  Public Access Bureau,  Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( May 22,  2025). \n\n1Letter\n\nfrom Alexandra Snodsmith,  Deputy Village Clerk,  Village of Orland Park,  to Teresa Lim, \n\n\fMs.  Alexandra Snodsmith\n\nJune 11, 2025\n\nPage 3\n\nVillage improperly designated\n\nas a recurrent\n\nrequester\n\nin connection with his April\n\n22,  2025,  request but that he submitted the requisite number of requests to qualify as a recurrent\n\nrequester as of his April 23,  2025,  request.  \n\nThis office requests that the Village refrain from treating\n\nas a recurrent\n\nrequester unless he has submitted at least 50 requests in the 52 weeks immediately preceding the\n\nrequest.   \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion.   This letter shall serve to close this matter.   If you\n\nhave any questions,  please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\n\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86566 f 2g recurrent\n\nreq proper\n\nimproper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":"June 11, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\n\nDeputy Village Clerk\n\nVillage of Orland Park\n\n14700 South Ravinia Avenue\n\nOrland Park, Illinois 60462\n\nasnodsmith@orlandpark. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86566\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Snodsmith: \n\nThis determination\n\nis issued pursuant\n\nto section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024)). \n\nOn April 22, 2025, and April 23, 2025, \n\nsubmitted FOIA requests to the\n\nVillage of Orland Park (Village). On April 28, 2025, the Village notified\n\nthat his\n\nrequests qualified as requests from a recurrent\n\nrequester under section 2(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n\n140/ 2(g) (West 2024)) and that it would respond to the requests in accordance with section 3.2 of\n\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3.2 (West 2024)). On May 6, 2025, this office received\n\ncomplete Request for Review disputing his recurrent\n\nrequester status. \n\nOn May 15, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nVillage and asked it to provide a written response addressing how the Village determined that\n\nmet the threshold for qualifying as a recurrent\n\nrequester under section 2(g) of FOIA. \n\nThis office also requested copies of the requests used in its calculations or a log of the relevant\n\nFOIA requests. On May 22, 2025, this office received the requested response and a log of FOIA\n\nrequests; this office received an updated log of additional\n\nrequests on June 6, 2025. On May 23, \n\n2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's response to\n\nhe replied that same\n\nday, maintaining that the Village improperly treated him as a recurrent\n\nrequester. \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA defines a \" recurrent requester\" as a \" person\" who, \"in the 12\n\nmonths immediately preceding the request, has submitted to the same public body \"(i) a\n\nminimum of 50 requests for records, (ii) a minimum of 15 requests for records within a 30- day\n\nperiod, or (iii) a minimum of 7 requests for records within a 7-day period.\" (Emphasis added.) \n\nA public body's time to respond to a request by a recurrent\n\nrequester\n\nis extended to 21 business\n\ndays after receipt of the request. 5 ILCS 140/ 3.2(a) (West 2024). Thus, each time a requester\n\nsubmits a FOIA request to a public body, the public body \"may look back 52 weeks prior to the\n\ndate\" the request was received to determine whether the requester continues to qualify as a\n\nrecurrent requester.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29472, issued October 23, 2014, at 2; \n\nsee also Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 77350 77529, issued September 18, 2023 (concluding\n\nthat requester did not meet\n\nthreshold for qualifying as a recurrent\n\nrequester because he did not\n\nsubmit at least 50 requests in the 52 weeks immediately preceding his requests). \n\nIn its response to this office, the Village stated: \n\nOn January 14, 2025, \n\nmet the criteria of a\n\nrecurrent requester as he had submitted a minimum of 50 requests\n\nfor records (enclosed for your review) within a 12 month time\n\nperiod. It is the Village’ s understanding\n\nthat once a requester\n\nqualifies as recurrent, \n\nthat designation remains for one year from\n\nthe date on which the submitted request went over the threshold as\n\ndefined in Section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(g). In this case, \n\nrecurrent\n\nrequester status would remain in effect\n\nuntil January 14, 2026.[\n\n1] \n\nUnder the plain language of section 2(g), the recurrent\n\nrequester designation does\n\nnot automatically\n\nlast for a year from the time that a requester previously met the threshold. \n\nRather, a requester would continue to qualify as a recurrent\n\nrequester\n\nif the person submitted at\n\nleast 50 requests in the 12 months prior to the date of the request at issue (or if they submitted the\n\nrequisite number of requests described in section 2(g)(ii) or 2(g)(iii) during the 12 months prior\n\nto the request at issue). Based on this office's review of the Village's FOIA log, \n\nsubmitted a total of 49 requests in the 52 weeks preceding the April 22, 2025, request and 50\n\nrequests preceding the April 23, 2025, request. Accordingly, \n\nthis office concludes that the\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (May 22, 2025). \n\nVillage improperly designated\n\nas a recurrent\n\nrequester\n\nin connection with his April\n\n22, 2025, request but that he submitted the requisite number of requests to qualify as a recurrent\n\nrequester as of his April 23, 2025, request. \n\nThis office requests that the Village refrain from treating\n\nas a recurrent\n\nrequester unless he has submitted at least 50 requests in the 52 weeks immediately preceding the\n\nrequest. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\n\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\n\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86566 f 2g recurrent\n\nreq proper\n\nimproper mun","plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A village's calculation of FOIA requests for recurrent requester status","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-86566/","full_text":"KWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nJune 11, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n[REDACTED]\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nDeputy Village Clerk\nVillage of Orland Park\n14700 South Ravinia Avenue\nOrland Park, Illinois 60462\nasnodsmith@orlandpark.org\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86566\n\nDear [REDACTED] and Ms. Snodsmith:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2024)).\n\nOn April 22, 2025, and April 23, 2025, [REDACTED] submitted FOIA requests to the\nVillage of Orland Park (Village). On April 28, 2025, the Village notified [REDACTED] that his\nrequests qualified as requests from a recurrent requester under section 2(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS\n140/2(g) (West 2024)) and that it would respond to the requests in accordance with section 3.2 of\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/3.2 (West 2024)). On May 6, 2025, this office received [REDACTED]’s\ncomplete Request for Review disputing his recurrent requester status.\n\nOn May 15, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nVillage and asked it to provide a written response addressing how the Village determined that\n[REDACTED] met the threshold for qualifying as a recurrent requester under section 2(g) of FOIA.\nThis office also requested copies of the requests used in its calculations or a log of the relevant\nFOIA requests. On May 22, 2025, this office received the requested response and a log of FOIA\n\nMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nJune 11, 2025\nPage 2\nrequests; this office received an updated log of additional requests on June 6, 2025. On May 23,\n2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's response to [REDACTED]; he replied that same\nday, maintaining that the Village improperly treated him as a recurrent requester.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2(g) of FOIA defines a \"recurrent requester\" as a \"person\" who, \"in the 12\nmonths immediately preceding the request, has submitted to the same public body \"(i) a\nminimum of 50 requests for records, (ii) a minimum of 15 requests for records within a 30-day\nperiod, or (iii) a minimum of 7 requests for records within a 7-day period.\" (Emphasis added.)\nA public body's time to respond to a request by a recurrent requester is extended to 21 business\ndays after receipt of the request. 5 ILCS 140/3.2(a) (West 2024). Thus, each time a requester\nsubmits a FOIA request to a public body, the public body \"may look back 52 weeks prior to the\ndate\" the request was received to determine whether the requester continues to qualify as a\n\"recurrent requester.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29472, issued October 23, 2014, at 2;\nsee also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 77350 77529, issued September 18, 2023 (concluding\nthat requester did not meet threshold for qualifying as a recurrent requester because he did not\nsubmit at least 50 requests in the 52 weeks immediately preceding his requests).\n\nIn its response to this office, the Village stated:\n\nOn January 14, 2025, [REDACTED] met the criteria of a\nrecurrent requester as he had submitted a minimum of 50 requests\nfor records (enclosed for your review) within a 12 month time\nperiod. It is the Village's understanding that once a requester\nqualifies as recurrent, that designation remains for one year from\nthe date on which the submitted request went over the threshold as\ndefined in Section 3(g) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/3(g). In this case,\n[REDACTED] recurrent requester status would remain in effect\nuntil January 14, 2026.[1]\n\nUnder the plain language of section 2(g), the recurrent requester designation does\nnot automatically last for a year from the time that a requester previously met the threshold.\nRather, a requester would continue to qualify as a recurrent requester if the person submitted at\nleast 50 requests in the 12 months prior to the date of the request at issue (or if they submitted the\nrequisite number of requests described in section 2(g)(ii) or 2(g)(iii) during the 12 months prior\nto the request at issue). Based on this office's review of the Village's FOIA log, [REDACTED]\nsubmitted a total of 49 requests in the 52 weeks preceding the April 22, 2025, request and 50\nrequests preceding the April 23, 2025, request. Accordingly, this office concludes that the\n\n1Letter from Alexandra Snodsmith, Deputy Village Clerk, Village of Orland Park, to Teresa Lim,\nDeputy Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (May 22, 2025).\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\nMs. Alexandra Snodsmith\nJune 11, 2025\nPage 3\n\nVillage improperly designated [REDACTED] as a recurrent requester in connection with his April\n22, 2025, request but that he submitted the requisite number of requests to qualify as a recurrent\nrequester as of his April 23, 2025, request.\n\nThis office requests that the Village refrain from treating [REDACTED] as a recurrent\nrequester unless he has submitted at least 50 requests in the 52 weeks immediately preceding the\nrequest.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\n[REDACTED]\n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86566 f 2g recurrent req proper improper mun\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1141,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["86704"],"title":"Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Responsibility not required to create records identifying employees","filename":"86704, issued June 9, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":600,"summary":"The requester sought the names of Department employees involved in the adjudication of a specific complaint, and the PAC determined that the request was an improper attempt to force the agency to answer questions rather than produce existing records.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked a state agency to identify specific employees who worked on their previous complaint. The agency stated it had no records to provide, and the PAC agreed, explaining that FOIA is for requesting existing documents, not for asking agencies to answer questions or create new information.","holding":"The PAC concluded that no further action is warranted because FOIA does not require a public body to create new records or answer questions.","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required under FOIA to answer questions or create new records to identify specific employees involved in a past administrative process.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Responsibility","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records creation","subject_description":"The requester sought the identities of agency staff involved in the processing of a prior complaint.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_d/Doesnt-Identify/86704%2C%20issued%20June%209%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["records creation","answering questions","FOIA request","agency records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Records Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"June 9, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 86704\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)).  For the reasons set forth\nbelow,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nYou sent a letter,  dated March 31,  2025,  to the Illinois Department of Financial\n\nand Professional Responsibility (Department) seeking, in relevant part, the names of all\nDepartment parties associated with the adjudication of your complaint number\nApril 10, 2025, the Department responded to your request, which it received on April 8, 2025, \nstating that it could not locate responsive records.   Additionally,  the Department asserted that it\nwas not required to create or prepare any records that it does not maintain.  In letters dated April\n21, 2025,  and April 24, 2025,  you submitted this Request for Review contesting the failure by\nthe Department to provide you with the information you sought. \n\nOn\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022);  see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006).  However, \"[ a] \nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \ninformation, or statistics.\"  Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional\nRegulation,  2014 IL App ( 4th)  130427, ¶ 33, 8 N.E.3d 11, 19 ( 2014).   In addition,  FOIA does not\nrequire a public body to create new records or answer questions in response to a request.  Kenyon\nv. Garrels,  184 Ill. App.  3d 28, 32 ( 1989). \n\n\fJune 9, 2025\nPage 2\n\nIn Judicial Watch,  Inc. v. Department of State,  177 F. Supp.  3d 450,  455 ( D.D.C. \n\n2016), a federal district court considered whether a request seeking \"' records that identify the\nnumber and names of all current and former'  State Department officials ' who used email\naddresses other than their assigned 'state.gov' email addresses to conduct official State\nDepartment business'\"  constituted a proper request for records under FOIA.   The court held that\nthe request \" is really a question that asks 'who at the State Department used private email for\nconducting official business?'  A question is not a request for records under FOIA and an agency\nhas no duty to answer a question posed as a FOIA request.\"   Judicial Watch, 177 F. Supp. 3d at\n455- 56;  see also Hudgins v. IRS,  620 F. Supp.  19, 21 ( D.D.C. 1985) ( FOIA does not require \" an\nagency to answer questions disguised as a FOIA request\").    \n\nRather than reasonably describing and asking for copies of records that may\n\ncontain the information you are seeking,  your letter to the Department sought the identities of\nDepartment employees generally involved with the processing and review of a complaint you\npreviously submitted to the Department.   As discussed above,  the requirements of FOIA do not\napply to such a question that asks for a discrete piece of information.  Accordingly, this office\nhas determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86704 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kathleen Anderson\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois Department of Financial &  Professional Regulation\n555 West Monroe Street, 5th Floor\nChicago,  Illinois 60661\nFPR.FOIA@Illinois.gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Staff identities in complaint processing","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-86704/","full_text":"June 9, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86704\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2023 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nYou sent a letter, dated March 31, 2025, to the Illinois Department of Financial\n\nand Professional Responsibility (Department) seeking, in relevant part, the names of all\nDepartment parties associated with the adjudication of your complaint number\nApril 10, 2025, the Department responded to your request, which it received on April 8, 2025, \nstating that it could not locate responsive records. Additionally, the Department asserted that it\nwas not required to create or prepare any records that it does not maintain. In letters dated April\n21, 2025, and April 24, 2025, you submitted this Request for Review contesting the failure by\nthe Department to provide you with the information you sought. \n\nOn\n\nUnder FOIA, \"[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are\n\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern\nIllinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). However, \"[ a] \nrequest to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not general data, \ninformation, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional\nRegulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33, 8 N.E.3d 11, 19 (2014). In addition, FOIA does not\nrequire a public body to create new records or answer questions in response to a request. Kenyon\n\nIn Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of State, 177 F. Supp. 3d 450, 455 (D.D.C. \n\n2016), a federal district court considered whether a request seeking \"' records that identify the\nnumber and names of all current and former' State Department officials ' who used email\naddresses other than their assigned 'state.gov' email addresses to conduct official State\nDepartment business'\" constituted a proper request for records under FOIA. The court held that\nthe request \" is really a question that asks 'who at the State Department used private email for\nconducting official business?' A question is not a request for records under FOIA and an agency\nhas no duty to answer a question posed as a FOIA request.\" Judicial Watch, 177 F. Supp. 3d at\n455- 56; see also Hudgins v. IRS, 620 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1985) (FOIA does not require \" an\nagency to answer questions disguised as a FOIA request\"). \n\nRather than reasonably describing and asking for copies of records that may\n\ncontain the information you are seeking, your letter to the Department sought the identities of\nDepartment employees generally involved with the processing and review of a complaint you\npreviously submitted to the Department. As discussed above, the requirements of FOIA do not\napply to such a question that asks for a discrete piece of information. Accordingly, this office\nhas determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86704 f no fi war sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kathleen Anderson\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation\n555 West Monroe Street, 5th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nFPR.FOIA@Illinois.gov"}
{"id":1142,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-07-31","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["86749"],"title":"McHenry County Sheriff's Office properly withheld jail surveillance video under 7(1)(e)","filename":"86749, issued July 31, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":626,"summary":"The requester sought video footage from a McHenry County Sheriff's Office jail dayroom, which the Sheriff's Office denied under the security exemption of FOIA. The PAC reviewed the footage and determined that its disclosure would pose a security risk to the facility.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested jail surveillance video, but the Sheriff's Office refused to release it, citing security concerns. The Attorney General's office reviewed the video and agreed that releasing it would expose security blind spots in the jail that inmates could exploit. Therefore, the denial was found to be lawful and the case is closed.","holding":"The McHenry County Sheriff's Office properly withheld the requested jail surveillance footage under section 7(1)(e) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the McHenry County Sheriff's Office properly withheld jail surveillance footage pursuant to the exemption for records that relate to or affect the security of correctional institutions under 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(e).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(e)"],"public_body":"McHenry County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought surveillance video footage from a specific dayroom area within a county jail facility.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_e/86749%2C%20issued%20July%2031%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["jail surveillance","security exemption","video footage","correctional facility"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"July 31, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86749\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2024)).   For the reasons explained below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that your allegations are unfounded. \n\nOn April 16, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the McHenry County\n\nSheriff' s Office ( Sheriff' s Office)  seeking,  in relevant part,  video footage of block 3, section 1, \ndayroom related to a November 4, 2024, incident.  On April 21, 2025, the Sheriff's Office denied\nyour request\n2024)).  On May 14, 2025, this office received your complete Request for Review contesting the\nSheriff' s Office' s denial. \n\nto section 7(1)( e)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)( e) ( West\n\nin its entirety pursuant\n\nSection 7(1)( e)  of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecords that relate to or affect\n\nthe security of correctional institutions and detention facilities.\"  In Glynn v. Dep't of\nCorrections,  the Illinois Appellate Court held that this exemption \" applies to records that could\njeopardize the security of a correctional center or detention facility if disclosed, rather than any\nrecords merely pertaining to security in any manner whatsoever.\" 1 Therefore,  when a public\nbody withholds records under section 7(1)(e), it carries the burden of demonstrating \"that\ndisclosure of a requested record could pose a potential security risk to a correctional\n\nfacility.\" 2\n\n1Glynn v. Dep't of Corrections, 2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶ 34. \n\n2Glynn,  2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶ 34. \n\n\fJuly 31, 2025\nPage 2\n\nThe court further explained that it did \" not doubt that many prison surveillance camera footage\nwill be found to be exempt under this court's interpretation of section 7(1)(e),\"  but that\ndetermination requires consideration of variables such as \" the type of room filmed,  the contents\nof the footage; whether the recording is of most, but not all, of the room; and whether the agency\ndemonstrates that disclosure of the footage would pose a potential security risk to a correctional\ninstitution or detention facility.\"3 Because the trial court had not reviewed the footage to confirm\nthe Illinois Department of Corrections'  vague assertion that disclosure would reveal blind spots\nthat jeopardize prison security, the appellate court remanded the case for an in camera review of\nthe footage.   Glynn,  2023 IL App ( 1st)  211657, ¶¶  47- 48. \n\nThe Sheriff' s Office' s denial asserted that disclosure of the requested footage\n\nwould jeopardize of the safety and security of its detention facility and correctional officers by\nexposing the surveillance system' s blind spots.   Although the Sheriff' s Office' s justification for\nwithholding the footage was somewhat vague and conclusory, the Sheriff's Office provided this\noffice with a copy of the requested footage for our confidential review,  and this office confirms\nthat its disclosure could pose a potential security risk to the facility.  Specifically, the footage\nresponsive to your request for \" block 3, section 1, dayroom\"  reveals most,  but not all, of a jail\ncommon area, including significant blind spots that potentially could be exploited by inmates to\nevade detection of dangerous or impermissible conduct.   Under these circumstances,  the Sheriff' s\nOffice did not improperly withhold the footage at issue under section 7(1)(e) of FOIA, and this\noffice has determined that your allegations are unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86749 f unf sho\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Michelle Montgomery\nFOIA Officer\nMcHenry County Sheriff' s Office\nsheriff@mchenrycountyil.gov\n\n3Glynn,  2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶ 51. \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Jail surveillance footage from a dayroom area","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-86749/","full_text":"July 31, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 86749\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2024)). For the reasons explained below, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that your allegations are unfounded. \n\nOn April 16, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the McHenry County\n\nSheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) seeking, in relevant part, video footage of block 3, section 1, \ndayroom related to a November 4, 2024, incident. On April 21, 2025, the Sheriff's Office denied\nyour request\n2024)). On May 14, 2025, this office received your complete Request for Review contesting the\nSheriff's Office's denial. \n\nto section 7(1)(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(e) (West\n\nin its entirety pursuant\n\nSection 7(1)(e) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecords that relate to or affect\n\nthe security of correctional institutions and detention facilities.\" In Glynn v. Dep't of\nCorrections, the Illinois Appellate Court held that this exemption \" applies to records that could\njeopardize the security of a correctional center or detention facility if disclosed, rather than any\nrecords merely pertaining to security in any manner whatsoever.\" 1 Therefore, when a public\n\nThe court further explained that it did \" not doubt that many prison surveillance camera footage\nwill be found to be exempt under this court's interpretation of section 7(1)(e),\" but that\ndetermination requires consideration of variables such as \" the type of room filmed, the contents\nof the footage; whether the recording is of most, but not all, of the room; and whether the agency\ndemonstrates that disclosure of the footage would pose a potential security risk to a correctional\ninstitution or detention facility.\"3 Because the trial court had not reviewed the footage to confirm\nthe Illinois Department of Corrections' vague assertion that disclosure would reveal blind spots\nthat jeopardize prison security, the appellate court remanded the case for an in camera review of\nthe footage. Glynn, 2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶¶ 47- 48. \n\nThe Sheriff's Office's denial asserted that disclosure of the requested footage\n\nwould jeopardize of the safety and security of its detention facility and correctional officers by\nexposing the surveillance system's blind spots. Although the Sheriff's Office's justification for\nwithholding the footage was somewhat vague and conclusory, the Sheriff's Office provided this\noffice with a copy of the requested footage for our confidential review, and this office confirms\nthat its disclosure could pose a potential security risk to the facility. Specifically, the footage\nresponsive to your request for \" block 3, section 1, dayroom\" reveals most, but not all, of a jail\ncommon area, including significant blind spots that potentially could be exploited by inmates to\nevade detection of dangerous or impermissible conduct. Under these circumstances, the Sheriff's\nOffice did not improperly withhold the footage at issue under section 7(1)(e) of FOIA, and this\noffice has determined that your allegations are unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Springfield\n\naddress listed on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n86749 f unf sho\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Michelle Montgomery\nFOIA Officer\nMcHenry County Sheriff's Office\nsheriff@mchenrycountyil.gov\n\n3 Glynn, 2023 IL App (1st) 211657, ¶ 51."}
{"id":1143,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-06-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["87081"],"title":"Macon County Sheriff properly withheld booking video under 7(1)(e)","filename":"87081, issued June 18, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":498,"summary":"The requester sought video footage of their booking at the Macon County Jail, which the Sheriff's Office denied citing security concerns. The PAC determined that the denial was proper because releasing footage of the booking area could compromise jail security by revealing blind spots or facility layout.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested video footage of their booking process at the Macon County Jail. The Sheriff's Office refused to release the video, arguing that it would reveal security details about the jail's layout and camera blind spots. The Attorney General's office agreed with the Sheriff, concluding that the video is exempt from disclosure to protect the safety and security of the detention facility.","holding":"The Macon County Sheriff's Office properly withheld the requested booking video footage under section 7(1)(e) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether the Macon County Sheriff's Office properly invoked section 7(1)(e) of FOIA to withhold surveillance footage of a jail booking area.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(e)"],"public_body":"Macon County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request involved surveillance video footage of a jail booking area.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_e/87081%2C%20issued%20June%2018%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["jail security","surveillance video","booking footage","exemption 7(1)(e)"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"June 18, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 87081;  MC- 334\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5( c) ( West 2024)).   For the reasons explained below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn May 21, 2025 , you submitted a FOIA request to the Macon County Sheriff's\nOffice  (Sheriff's Office) seeking video footage of a search performed during your booking at the\nMacon County Jail on May 20, 2025.   On May 28, 2025,  the Sheriff' s Office denied your request\nin its entirety pursuant\nto section 7( 1)( e)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7 (1)( e) ( West 2024)).   On June\n12, 2025 , this office received your complete Request for Review contesting the Sheriff's Office's\ndenial. \n\nSection 7(1)(e) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecords that relate to or affect\ninstitutions and detention facilities.\"   The Public Access Bureau has\n\nthe security of correctional\npreviously determined in certain circumstances that the disclosure of video footage of the\nholding or booking area of a detention facility would pose a security threat by enabling the\nviewer to determine the range of the security cameras or by revealing blind spots that detainees\ncould exploit to harm others while evading detection.  See, for example , Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev.  Ltr. 40573,  issued August 17,  2016 ( video footage depicting police department' s jail cell\nand booking area exempt from disclosure because it revealed blind spots and police activity such\nas shift changes that could be used to undermine jail security); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n36649, issued November 28, 2018 (determining that disclosure of surveillance footage of a jail's\nbooking bullpen, sally port, hallways, and other internal areas would enable the viewer to\ndetermine blind spots and exits that could be exploited to undermine jail security );  Ill. Att' y Gen. \n\n\fJune 18, 2025\nPage 2\n\nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 58417, issued July 11, 2022 (concluding that release of footage of booking\nand hallway areas could undermine the safety of a county jail). \n\nYour FOIA request specifically seeks footage that captures the booking area of\nthe Macon County Jail.  Because release of footage of that area of the jail could undermine the\nsafety of the facility by showing this area's internal layout and potential blind spots, the Sheriff's\nOffice did not improperly withhold the video footage pursuant\nAccordingly,  this office has determined that no further inquiry is warranted in this matter. \n\nto section 7( 1)( e)  of FOIA.  \n\nThis file is closed .  If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nbenjamin.silver@ilag.gov . \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n87081 f no fi war sho\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Chad Gordy\nFOIA Officer\nMacon County Sheriff 's Office\n333 South Franklin Street\nDecatur,  Illinois 62523\nfoiainformation@macon - sheriff -il.us\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Surveillance footage of a jail booking area","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-87081/","full_text":"June 18, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 87081; MC- 334\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2024)). For the reasons explained below, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn May 21, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the Macon County Sheriff's\nOffice (Sheriff's Office) seeking video footage of a search performed during your booking at the\nMacon County Jail on May 20, 2025. On May 28, 2025, the Sheriff's Office denied your request\nin its entirety pursuant\nto section 7(1)(e) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7 (1)(e) (West 2024)). On June\n12, 2025, this office received your complete Request for Review contesting the Sheriff's Office's\ndenial. \n\nSection 7(1)(e) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecords that relate to or affect\ninstitutions and detention facilities.\" The Public Access Bureau has\n\nthe security of correctional\npreviously determined in certain circumstances that the disclosure of video footage of the\nholding or booking area of a detention facility would pose a security threat by enabling the\nviewer to determine the range of the security cameras or by revealing blind spots that detainees\ncould exploit to harm others while evading detection. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. \nRev. Ltr. 40573, issued August 17, 2016 (video footage depicting police department's jail cell\nand booking area exempt from disclosure because it revealed blind spots and police activity such\nas shift changes that could be used to undermine jail security); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n36649, issued November 28, 2018 (determining that disclosure of surveillance footage of a jail's\nbooking bullpen, sally port, hallways, and other internal areas would enable the viewer to\ndetermine blind spots and exits that could be exploited to undermine jail security); Ill. Att' y Gen. \n\nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 58417, issued July 11, 2022 (concluding that release of footage of booking\nand hallway areas could undermine the safety of a county jail). \n\nYour FOIA request specifically seeks footage that captures the booking area of\nthe Macon County Jail. Because release of footage of that area of the jail could undermine the\nsafety of the facility by showing this area's internal layout and potential blind spots, the Sheriff's\nOffice did not improperly withhold the video footage pursuant\nAccordingly, this office has determined that no further inquiry is warranted in this matter. \n\nto section 7(1)(e) of FOIA. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\nbenjamin.silver@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n87081 f no fi war sho\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Chad Gordy\nFOIA Officer\nMacon County Sheriff 's Office\n333 South Franklin Street\nDecatur, Illinois 62523\nfoiainformation@macon - sheriff -il.us"}
{"id":1144,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-07-29","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["87818"],"title":"Fairfield Police Department properly redacted bodycam footage of non-subjects under 7.5(cc)","filename":"87818, issued July 29, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1593,"summary":"The requester challenged the Fairfield Police Department's redaction of body camera footage, which excluded portions depicting other individuals. The PAC determined the redactions were proper under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act and FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested body camera footage from the Fairfield Police Department. The Department provided the parts of the video showing the requester but redacted parts showing other people. The Attorney General's office agreed with the Department, stating that the law only allows individuals to see footage where they are the subject of the police encounter.","holding":"The Fairfield Police Department did not improperly redact the body camera footage because the requester is only entitled to footage where they are the subject of the encounter.","legal_question":"Whether the Fairfield Police Department properly redacted body camera footage to exclude portions depicting individuals other than the requester pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act and FOIA section 7.5(cc).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7.5","50 ILCS 706/10-20"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7.5(cc)"],"public_body":"Fairfield Police Department","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The requester sought unredacted body camera footage of a police encounter that included other individuals.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7.5/7.5_cc/not-flagged-not-subject/87818%2C%20issued%20July%2029%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["body camera","police records","redaction","privacy"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"July 29, 2025\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 87818\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2024)).   For the reasons explained below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn February 3, 2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Fairfield Police\n\nDepartment ( Department)  seeking,  in relevant part,  body camera footage related to an incident\nthat occurred on December 28, 2024.   On February 6, 2025,  the Department denied the body\ncamara footage in the entirety pursuant to section 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer-\nWorn Body Camera Act (Body Camera Act). 1 On March 24, 2025,  you submitted a Request for\nReview to the Public Access Bureau ( 2025 PAC 86131)  contesting the Department' s denial.  \nAfter this office contacted the Department,  on May 9, 2025,  this office received confirmation\nthat the Department provided you with a supplemental\nportions of the recording that depicted you as the subject of the encounter.   The Department' s\nsupplemental response indicated that it redacted portions of the body camera footage pursuant\nsection 7.5(cc) of FOIA 2 and explained that \"[ y]ou have been provided the portions of the\nencounter that your subject to.  However,  the portions involving the other subject have been\nredacted[.]\" 3\n\nresponse that included a copy of the\n\n150 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2024). \n\n018, effective June 30, 2025. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5 (West 2024),  as amended by Public Act 104-010, effective June 16, 2025;  104-\n\n3Letter from Keith A. Colclasure,  Chief of Police,  Fairfield Police Department,  to\n\nMay 2, 2025).   \n\n\fJuly 29, 2025\nPage 2\n\nOn June 26, 2025,  you submitted this Request for Review contesting the\n\nDepartment' s denial of the portions of body camera videos that do not depict you.  Specifically, \nyou stated: \n\nI am requesting all police officer' s body camera recordings, \nboth audio and video.  I believe I am well within my rights to have\nthem.  I believe I have the right to know what was said since I am\nthe one who called the police for help. I was across the street when\nthe police officers were talking to the other party,  they were\noutside,  in open view where audio and video is allowed by the\npublic, they were not inside the privacy of their house.[ 4] \n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\"  Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act provides,  in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy,  at the time of the recording,  any\nrecording which is flagged,  due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm,  use of force,  arrest or detention,  or\nresulting death or bodily harm,  shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness;  and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject' s\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph ( 1) of this\n\nsubsection ( b), any recording which is flagged due to the\nfiling of a complaint,  discharge of a firearm,  use of force, \narrest or detention,  or resulting death or bodily harm shall\n\n2025).  \n\n4Letter from\n\nto Public Access Counselor,  Office of the Attorney General ( June 26, \n\n\fJuly 29, 2025\nPage 3\n\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request,  the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose,  in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject' s attorney,  or\nthe officer or his or her legal representative. ( Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nBased on this law, the Department\n\nis required to disclose,  pursuant to FOIA, body\n\ncamera recordings from law enforcement officer worn body cameras only if the recordings are\n1) flagged for any of the reasons specified in section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act, or (2) \nif they are requested by the subject of the encounter captured on the recording or the subject' s\nattorneys.   The Public Access Bureau has consistently concluded that the \" subject of the\nencounter\"  in section 10-20(b)(3) of the Body Camera Act means the person who appeared in the\nrecording and \" interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a law enforcement\nactivity.\"   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 48793,  issued August 31, 2017,  at 4; Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 76458,  issued June 26, 2023,  at 3-4.    \n\nOn July 15, 2025,  in a telephone conversation with an Assistant Attorney General\n\nAAG) in the Public Access Bureau,  you stated that you called the police because your\nneighbor' s dogs were running at large.   You stated that you are seeking body camera footage that\nincludes the entire discussion the responding police officers held with your neighbor.   You\nexplained that you received the footage that depicted your interactions with the police,  but that\nyou are seeking footage of the entire encounter.   You stated that although your neighbor was not\ntaken into custody,  he was issued a Notice to Appear in court ( NTA) for an ordinance violation\nof dogs running at large.   You also stated that you should be entitled to footage of the entire\nencounter because all the events took place in the open. \n\nThe location of where an encounter occurred is not the determinative factor for\nwhether a body- worn camera recording can be disclosed.   As described above,  a recording is\nsubject to disclosure under section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act only if it was flagged for\nany of the enumerated reasons,  including \" due to\n\narrest or detention.\"   A recording flagged due to arrest or detention is further discussed\nelsewhere in the Body Camera Act as meaning that \" the encounter resulted in a detention or\narrest,  excluding traffic stops which resulted in only a minor traffic offense or a business\noffense[.]\" 5\n\n550 ILCS 706/10-20(a)( 7)(B)(iv) (West 2024). \n\n\fJuly 29, 2025\nPage 4\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 ( Code)  expressly distinguishes an arrest\n\nfrom the issuance of a NTA by providing:  \" Whenever a peace officer is authorized to arrest a\nperson without a warrant he may instead issue to such person a notice to appear.\"   725 ILCS\n5/107-12 (West 2024).   The Code defines \" notice to appear\" 6 as \" a written request issued by a\npeace officer that a person appear before a court at a stated time and place.\"   In opinion No. S-\n1395 issued October 5, 1978 ( 1978 Ill. Att'y Gen.  Op. S-1395 at 3-4), Attorney General Scott\nopined that \"[ t]he person who is given a [ NTA]  is not taken into custody;  nor is he, in any way, \nrestrained.  * * *  \" A [NTA]  is an alternative to arrest,  and thus,  by definition,  a person who is\ngiven a [ NTA]  is not under arrest.\"  ( Emphasis added.)   Thus,  a person who is given a NTA is\nnot the subject of an arrest.  \" Detention\"  is not defined in the Body Camera Act or in the Code, \nbut is generally defined as \" the act or an instance of holding a person in custody[.]\"   Black' s Law\nDictionary 563 ( 11th ed.  2019). \n\nOn June 15, 2025,  the AAG contacted the FOIA officer with the Department\n\nto\nclarify whether the encounter resulted in an arrest.   The FOIA officer confirmed in a telephone\nconversation with the AAG that a NTA for a violation of a local ordinance was issued for dogs\nrunning at large.   He also explained that the Department had provided you with the portions of\nthe footage in which you are the subject and redacted portions which would disclose the identity\nof other parties to the encounter.   The Department also shared copies of the contested footage\nwith this office. \n\nThis office' s review of the footage confirmed that an NTA was issued,  but the\nsubject was not arrested or subjected to a detention by being taken into custody.   Because the\ninformation this office has received reflects that the body camera footage has not been flagged\nfor any reason set forth under section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act, you are not\nauthorized to obtain footage of the other subject captured on the recordings.   The Body Camera\nAct prohibits disclosure of unflagged recordings depicting events that occur in public settings\nunless the person who requests the recording is the subject of the encounter with law\nenforcement or their attorney.   The Department provided you with the portions that depicted you\nas the subject of the encounter,  and redacted only the portions capturing other parties.  \nAccordingly,  this office concludes that the Department did not improperly redact the footage\npursuant to section 7.5(cc) of FOIA.   \n\n6725 ILCS 5/107- 1 (West 2024).  \n\n\fJuly 29, 2025\nPage 5\n\nTherefore,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that this Request for Review is\n\nunfounded.   This file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at\nmatthew. goodman@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATT GOODMAN\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n87818 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Keith A. Colclasure\nFOIA Officer\nFairfield Police Department\n1002 Leininger Road\nFairfield,  Illinois 62837\ncolclasure@fairfieldpd. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police body-camera footage of an encounter with others","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-87818/","full_text":"July 29, 2025\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 87818\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2024)). For the reasons explained below, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn February 3, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the Fairfield Police\n\nDepartment (Department) seeking, in relevant part, body camera footage related to an incident\nthat occurred on December 28, 2024. On February 6, 2025, the Department denied the body\ncamara footage in the entirety pursuant to section 10-20(b) of the Law Enforcement Officer-\nWorn Body Camera Act (Body Camera Act). 1 On March 24, 2025, you submitted a Request for\nReview to the Public Access Bureau (2025 PAC 86131) contesting the Department's denial. \nAfter this office contacted the Department, on May 9, 2025, this office received confirmation\nthat the Department provided you with a supplemental\nportions of the recording that depicted you as the subject of the encounter. The Department's\nsupplemental response indicated that it redacted portions of the body camera footage pursuant\nsection 7.5(cc) of FOIA 2 and explained that \"[ y]ou have been provided the portions of the\nencounter that your subject to. However, the portions involving the other subject have been\nredacted[.]\" 3\n\nresponse that included a copy of the\n\n150 ILCS 706/10-20(b) (West 2024). \n\n018, effective June 30, 2025. \n\n25 ILCS 140/7.5 (West 2024), as amended by Public Act 104-010, effective June 16, 2025; 104-\n\nOn June 26, 2025, you submitted this Request for Review contesting the\n\nDepartment's denial of the portions of body camera videos that do not depict you. Specifically, \nyou stated: \n\nI am requesting all police officer's body camera recordings, \nboth audio and video. I believe I am well within my rights to have\nthem. I believe I have the right to know what was said since I am\nthe one who called the police for help. I was across the street when\nthe police officers were talking to the other party, they were\noutside, in open view where audio and video is allowed by the\npublic, they were not inside the privacy of their house.[ 4] \n\nSection 7.5(cc) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ r]ecordings made under the\nLaw Enforcement Officer- Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that\nAct.\" Section 10-20(b) of the Body Camera Act provides, in relevant part: \n\nRecordings made with the use of an officer- worn body\ncamera are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of\nInformation Act, except that: \n\n1) if the subject of the encounter has a reasonable\n\nexpectation of privacy, at the time of the recording, any\nrecording which is flagged, due to the filing of a complaint, \ndischarge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or\nresulting death or bodily harm, shall be disclosed in\naccordance with the Freedom of Information Act if: \n\nA) the subject of the encounter captured on\n\nthe recording is a victim or witness; and\n\nB) the law enforcement agency obtains\n\nwritten permission of the subject or the subject's\nlegal representative; \n\n2) except as provided in paragraph (1) of this\n\nbe disclosed in accordance with the Freedom of\nInformation Act; and\n\n3) upon request, the law enforcement agency shall\n\ndisclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information\nAct, the recording to the subject of the encounter\ncaptured on the recording or to the subject's attorney, or\nthe officer or his or her legal representative. (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nBased on this law, the Department\n\nis required to disclose, pursuant to FOIA, body\n\ncamera recordings from law enforcement officer worn body cameras only if the recordings are\n1) flagged for any of the reasons specified in section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act, or (2) \nif they are requested by the subject of the encounter captured on the recording or the subject's\nattorneys. The Public Access Bureau has consistently concluded that the \" subject of the\nencounter\" in section 10-20(b)(3) of the Body Camera Act means the person who appeared in the\nrecording and \" interacted with a law enforcement officer in the course of a law enforcement\nactivity.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48793, issued August 31, 2017, at 4; Ill. Att'y Gen. \nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 76458, issued June 26, 2023, at 3-4. \n\nOn July 15, 2025, in a telephone conversation with an Assistant Attorney General\n\nAAG) in the Public Access Bureau, you stated that you called the police because your\nneighbor's dogs were running at large. You stated that you are seeking body camera footage that\nincludes the entire discussion the responding police officers held with your neighbor. You\nexplained that you received the footage that depicted your interactions with the police, but that\nyou are seeking footage of the entire encounter. You stated that although your neighbor was not\ntaken into custody, he was issued a Notice to Appear in court (NTA) for an ordinance violation\nof dogs running at large. You also stated that you should be entitled to footage of the entire\nencounter because all the events took place in the open. \n\nThe location of where an encounter occurred is not the determinative factor for\nwhether a body- worn camera recording can be disclosed. As described above, a recording is\nsubject to disclosure under section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act only if it was flagged for\nany of the enumerated reasons, including \" due to\n\narrest or detention.\" A recording flagged due to arrest or detention is further discussed\nelsewhere in the Body Camera Act as meaning that \" the encounter resulted in a detention or\narrest, excluding traffic stops which resulted in only a minor traffic offense or a business\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) expressly distinguishes an arrest\n\nfrom the issuance of a NTA by providing: \" Whenever a peace officer is authorized to arrest a\nperson without a warrant he may instead issue to such person a notice to appear.\" 725 ILCS\n5/107-12 (West 2024). The Code defines \" notice to appear\" 6 as \" a written request issued by a\npeace officer that a person appear before a court at a stated time and place.\" In opinion No. S-\n1395 issued October 5, 1978 (1978 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. S-1395 at 3-4), Attorney General Scott\nopined that \"[ t]he person who is given a [ NTA] is not taken into custody; nor is he, in any way, \nrestrained. * * * \" A [NTA] is an alternative to arrest, and thus, by definition, a person who is\ngiven a [ NTA] is not under arrest.\" (Emphasis added.) Thus, a person who is given a NTA is\nnot the subject of an arrest. \" Detention\" is not defined in the Body Camera Act or in the Code, \nbut is generally defined as \" the act or an instance of holding a person in custody[.]\" Black's Law\nDictionary 563 (11th ed. 2019). \n\nOn June 15, 2025, the AAG contacted the FOIA officer with the Department\n\nto\nclarify whether the encounter resulted in an arrest. The FOIA officer confirmed in a telephone\nconversation with the AAG that a NTA for a violation of a local ordinance was issued for dogs\nrunning at large. He also explained that the Department had provided you with the portions of\nthe footage in which you are the subject and redacted portions which would disclose the identity\nof other parties to the encounter. The Department also shared copies of the contested footage\nwith this office. \n\nThis office's review of the footage confirmed that an NTA was issued, but the\nsubject was not arrested or subjected to a detention by being taken into custody. Because the\ninformation this office has received reflects that the body camera footage has not been flagged\nfor any reason set forth under section 10-20(b)(2) of the Body Camera Act, you are not\nauthorized to obtain footage of the other subject captured on the recordings. The Body Camera\nAct prohibits disclosure of unflagged recordings depicting events that occur in public settings\nunless the person who requests the recording is the subject of the encounter with law\nenforcement or their attorney. The Department provided you with the portions that depicted you\nas the subject of the encounter, and redacted only the portions capturing other parties. \nAccordingly, this office concludes that the Department did not improperly redact the footage\n\nTherefore, the Public Access Bureau concludes that this Request for Review is\n\nunfounded. This file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at\nmatthew. goodman@ilag. gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMATT GOODMAN\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n87818 f unf pd\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Keith A. Colclasure\nFOIA Officer\nFairfield Police Department\n1002 Leininger Road\nFairfield, Illinois 62837\ncolclasure@fairfieldpd. org"}
{"id":1145,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-09-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["88226"],"title":"Madison County State's Attorney - Private law firm compensation records not public records","filename":"88226, issued September 24, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1242,"summary":"The requester sought compensation records for individual attorneys at a private law firm contracted by Madison County, but the PAC determined these records are not public records under FOIA.","plain_summary":"A citizen asked the Public Access Bureau to review a response from the Madison County State's Attorney's Office regarding a FOIA request for records of how a private law firm compensates its attorneys for work done for the County. The Bureau determined that the request was unfounded because the internal compensation and timekeeping records of the private law firm are not 'directly related' to the governmental function the firm performs for the County, as required by section 7(2) of FOIA. The Bureau concluded that these records pertain to the private affairs of the firm and its attorneys, not to the substance of the government function, and therefore are not public records subject to disclosure.","holding":"The PAC determined that the requested internal compensation records of a private law firm are not public records subject to FOIA disclosure because they are not 'directly related' to the governmental function under section 7(2) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether internal compensation records of a private law firm contracted by a public body constitute 'public records' under section 2(c) of FOIA.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Madison County State's Attorney's Office","requesting_party":"Mr. David K. Livingstone","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public records definition","subject_description":"The requester sought internal payroll and compensation records of a private law firm that provides legal services to Madison County.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_2/88226%2C%20issued%20September%2024%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["private law firm","public records","compensation records","FOIA definition"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Records Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"September 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 88226\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5( c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5( c) ( West 2024)).   For the reasons explained below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn July 3 , 2025 , you emailed a FOIA request to four attorneys employed by a\nprivate law firm seeking copies of records regarding the payment and compensation of those\nattorneys,  as well as compensation of the law firm 's partners,  in connection with the attorneys' \nwork on behalf of Madison County  (County).   On July 18,  2025,  the Madison County State' s\nAttorney's Office  (State's Attorney's Office) responded that the records you requested are not\npublic records under FOIA.  On July 27, 2025 , you submitted the above -referenced Request for\nReview contesting the State's Attorney's Office's response. \n\nOn August 11,  2025,  a Supervising Attorney in the Public Access Bureau\n\ncontacted an Assistant State's Attorney by telephone to clarify the relationship between the\nattorneys at the private law firm and the State's Attorney's Office.  The Assistant State's Attorney\nexplained that the State's Attorney's Office does not maintain records regarding the\ncompensation of individual attorneys or partners at the private law firm, nor does it compensate\nindividual attorneys at the firm.   Rather,  the firm submits invoices to the County for work\nperformed , and the County pays the firm from its tort fund.  The State's Attorney's Office\nprovided a copy of redacted invoices that it had provided to you in response to a previous FOIA\nrequest.  The invoices document the hours each attorney worke d on specific issues for the\nCounty and the charge for that work, as well as a narrative explaining the work performed. \n\n\fSeptember 24, 2025\nPage 2\n\nFOIA provides that \"all records in the custody or possession of a public body\" are\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2  (West 2024).   Your FOIA request\nand Request for Review indicate that you are not seeking records in the possession of the State's\nAttorney's Office , but instead, records in the possession of a private law firm with several\nattorneys who perform work for Madison County from time to time on an as-needed basis.  You\nassert that any such records that exist are subject to disclosure by the State's Attorney's Office\nunder section 7( 2)  of FOIA. 1 That section provides: \n\nA public record that is not in the possession of a public\n\nbody but is in the possession of a party with whom the agency has\ncontracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the\npublic body, and that directly relates to the governmental\nfunction and is not otherwise exempt under this Act, shall be\nconsidered a public record of the public body, for purposes of this\nAct.  (Emphasis added.) \n\nUnder this provision, public records in the possession of a contractor that directly relate to a\nfunction that the contractor has contracted to perform for the public body are\ngovernmental\nconsidered to be records of the public body.  See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No 13 -018, issued\nDecember 3, 2013. \n\nFOIA does not define the term \" directly relates.\"   The Illinois Appellate Court has\n\nrecognized tha t this modifier significantly limits th e scope of section 7( 2)  of FOIA:  \" This\nrequirement makes clear the legislature ' s intention that the general public may not access all of a\nthird party's records merely because it has contracted with a public body to perform a\ngovernmental function.  FOIA is not concerned with private affairs.\"  Chicago Tribune v. \nCollege of DuPage,  2017 IL App ( 2d) 160 274, ¶  53.   The Public Access Bureau has previously\ndetermined that the résumé and employment application of the director of a non -profit\ncorporation that was contracted to perform a governmental\nfunction did not \" directly relate\"  to\nthat function.  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 33802, issued January 29, 2020, at 7 (\" The\nrecords would reveal nothing about the substance of the government function that [the company] \nhas been contracted to perform.  There is no indication that the General Assembly intende d\nsection 7( 2)  to require disclosure of the personnel records of employees of private entities.\"). \n\nIn your Request for Review, you argue that the attorneys' \" timekeeping, billing\n\nrecords, and compensation — all reflecting public work — are directly related to \" the\ngovernmental function of representing the County in court.2 You argue that these records, held\nby the law firm,  are similar to a settlement agreement at issue in Rushton v.  Dep artment of\nCorrections, 2019 IL 124552. \n\n15 ILCS 140/ 7(2) (West 2024). \n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( July 27, 2025). \n\n\fSeptember 24, 2025\nPage 3\n\nIn Rushton , the Illinois Supreme Court held that a settlement agreement that a\n\ncontracted medical provider reached with the estate of a prison inmate who died of cancer\ndirectly related to the governmental function of providing medical care to inmates.   Rushton , \n2019 IL 124552, ¶ 41.  The court concluded that the \"[ t]he settlement agreement directly relates\nto performance of that governmental function. It is the settlement of a claim that [ the provider's] \ninadequate medical care —its alleged inadequate performance of its governmental function —led\nto the death of an inmate.  The connection is neither indirect nor tangential.\"  ( Emphasis in\noriginal.)   Rushton ,  2019 IL 124552, ¶  31.   The court emphasized ,  however,  that the \" directly\nrelates\"  requirement \"helps to ensure that parties are only able to access records of private\ncontractors that are truly related to its exercise of a governmental function and not those records\nthat are only incidentally or tangentially related to the contract with the governme nt.\"  Rushton , \n2019 IL 124552, ¶ 29. \n\nUnlike the settlement agreement at issue in Rushton , which directly related to the\n\nsubstantive performance of the governmental function that the provider was contracted to\nperform, the law firm's internal compensation and timekeeping records are merely tangentially or\nincidentally related to its work for the County.  The invoices that the State's Attorney's Office\npreviously provided to you , which document the substantive work of the law firm' s attorneys on\nbehalf of the County and which were submitted to the County for payment with public funds , are\nthe compensation and timekeeping records that directly relate to the governmental function\nperformed by the firm —the provision of legal services on an as-needed basis.  In contrast, the\nrecords you now seek document\nthe firm' s internal recordkeeping and management practices .  \nRecords reflecting how a private law firm compensate d attorneys who per formed legal services\nfor the County pertain to the private affairs of those attorneys and the firm.  City of Champaign v. \nMadigan , 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶ 31  (\"FOIA is not concerned with an individual's private\naffairs.\"). \n\nThis letter serves to close this matter.   If you have any questions,  please contact\n\nme at ( 773)  590 -7878 or benjamin. silver@ilag. gov . \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n88226 f unf sao\n\n\fSeptember 24, 2025\nPage 4\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. David K. Livingstone\nAssistant State's Attorney, Civil Division Chief\nMadison County State's Attorney's Office\n157 North Main Street, Suite 402\nEdwardsville, Illinois 62025\ndklivingstone@madisoncountyil.\n\ngov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A private law firm's internal payroll records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-88226/","full_text":"September 24, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 88226\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2024)). For the reasons explained below, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn July 3, 2025, you emailed a FOIA request to four attorneys employed by a\nprivate law firm seeking copies of records regarding the payment and compensation of those\nattorneys, as well as compensation of the law firm 's partners, in connection with the attorneys' \nwork on behalf of Madison County (County). On July 18, 2025, the Madison County State's\nAttorney's Office (State's Attorney's Office) responded that the records you requested are not\npublic records under FOIA. On July 27, 2025, you submitted the above -referenced Request for\nReview contesting the State's Attorney's Office's response. \n\nOn August 11, 2025, a Supervising Attorney in the Public Access Bureau\n\ncontacted an Assistant State's Attorney by telephone to clarify the relationship between the\nattorneys at the private law firm and the State's Attorney's Office. The Assistant State's Attorney\nexplained that the State's Attorney's Office does not maintain records regarding the\ncompensation of individual attorneys or partners at the private law firm, nor does it compensate\nindividual attorneys at the firm. Rather, the firm submits invoices to the County for work\nperformed, and the County pays the firm from its tort fund. The State's Attorney's Office\nprovided a copy of redacted invoices that it had provided to you in response to a previous FOIA\nrequest. The invoices document the hours each attorney worke d on specific issues for the\nCounty and the charge for that work, as well as a narrative explaining the work performed. \n\nFOIA provides that \"all records in the custody or possession of a public body\" are\npresumed to be open to inspection or copying. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024). Your FOIA request\nand Request for Review indicate that you are not seeking records in the possession of the State's\nAttorney's Office, but instead, records in the possession of a private law firm with several\nattorneys who perform work for Madison County from time to time on an as-needed basis. You\nassert that any such records that exist are subject to disclosure by the State's Attorney's Office\nunder section 7(2) of FOIA. 1 That section provides: \n\nA public record that is not in the possession of a public\n\nbody but is in the possession of a party with whom the agency has\ncontracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the\npublic body, and that directly relates to the governmental\nfunction and is not otherwise exempt under this Act, shall be\nconsidered a public record of the public body, for purposes of this\nAct. (Emphasis added.) \n\nUnder this provision, public records in the possession of a contractor that directly relate to a\nfunction that the contractor has contracted to perform for the public body are\ngovernmental\nconsidered to be records of the public body. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No 13 -018, issued\nDecember 3, 2013. \n\nFOIA does not define the term \" directly relates.\" The Illinois Appellate Court has\n\nrecognized tha t this modifier significantly limits th e scope of section 7(2) of FOIA: \" This\nrequirement makes clear the legislature ' s intention that the general public may not access all of a\nthird party's records merely because it has contracted with a public body to perform a\ngovernmental function. FOIA is not concerned with private affairs.\" Chicago Tribune v. \nCollege of DuPage, 2017 IL App (2d) 160 274, ¶ 53. The Public Access Bureau has previously\ndetermined that the résumé and employment application of the director of a non -profit\ncorporation that was contracted to perform a governmental\nfunction did not \" directly relate\" to\nthat function. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 33802, issued January 29, 2020, at 7 (\" The\nrecords would reveal nothing about the substance of the government function that [the company] \nhas been contracted to perform. There is no indication that the General Assembly intende d\nsection 7(2) to require disclosure of the personnel records of employees of private entities.\"). \n\nIn your Request for Review, you argue that the attorneys' \" timekeeping, billing\n\nrecords, and compensation — all reflecting public work — are directly related to \" the\ngovernmental function of representing the County in court.2 You argue that these records, held\nby the law firm, are similar to a settlement agreement at issue in Rushton v. Dep artment of\n\nIn Rushton, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a settlement agreement that a\n\ncontracted medical provider reached with the estate of a prison inmate who died of cancer\ndirectly related to the governmental function of providing medical care to inmates. Rushton, \n2019 IL 124552, ¶ 41. The court concluded that the \"[ t]he settlement agreement directly relates\nto performance of that governmental function. It is the settlement of a claim that [ the provider's] \ninadequate medical care —its alleged inadequate performance of its governmental function —led\nto the death of an inmate. The connection is neither indirect nor tangential.\" (Emphasis in\noriginal.) Rushton, 2019 IL 124552, ¶ 31. The court emphasized, however, that the \" directly\nrelates\" requirement \"helps to ensure that parties are only able to access records of private\ncontractors that are truly related to its exercise of a governmental function and not those records\nthat are only incidentally or tangentially related to the contract with the governme nt.\" Rushton, \n2019 IL 124552, ¶ 29. \n\nUnlike the settlement agreement at issue in Rushton, which directly related to the\n\nsubstantive performance of the governmental function that the provider was contracted to\nperform, the law firm's internal compensation and timekeeping records are merely tangentially or\nincidentally related to its work for the County. The invoices that the State's Attorney's Office\npreviously provided to you, which document the substantive work of the law firm's attorneys on\nbehalf of the County and which were submitted to the County for payment with public funds, are\nthe compensation and timekeeping records that directly relate to the governmental function\nperformed by the firm —the provision of legal services on an as-needed basis. In contrast, the\nrecords you now seek document\nthe firm's internal recordkeeping and management practices. \nRecords reflecting how a private law firm compensate d attorneys who per formed legal services\nfor the County pertain to the private affairs of those attorneys and the firm. City of Champaign v. \nMadigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶ 31 (\"FOIA is not concerned with an individual's private\naffairs.\"). \n\nThis letter serves to close this matter. If you have any questions, please contact\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. David K. Livingstone\nAssistant State's Attorney, Civil Division Chief\nMadison County State's Attorney's Office\n157 North Main Street, Suite 402\nEdwardsville, Illinois 62025\ndklivingstone@madisoncountyil.\n\ngov"}
{"id":1146,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-08-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["88239"],"title":"South Suburban College employee bereavement acknowledgments not public records under FOIA","filename":"88239, issued August 8, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":917,"summary":"The requester sought records of South Suburban College's acknowledgments of employee family member deaths, which the College denied as not constituting public business. The PAC determined that no further action is warranted because the records do not directly document the use of public funds under FOIA Section 2.5.","plain_summary":"A requester asked South Suburban College for sympathy cards and memorial announcements acknowledging employee family member deaths. The college denied the request, saying these were personal matters. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau agreed, determining that the records pertain to private affairs rather than the transaction of public business, and therefore are not public records subject to FOIA disclosure. The Bureau also noted that the records do not directly document the use of public funds under a separate FOIA provision.","holding":"The PAC determined that the requested records regarding employee bereavement acknowledgments do not constitute public records subject to disclosure under FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether records concerning a public body's acknowledgments of employee family member deaths constitute 'public records' under FOIA Section 2.5.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/2.5"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"South Suburban College","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public records definition","subject_description":"The request sought records related to the college's internal acknowledgments of employee bereavement.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/2/2_c/88239%2C%20issued%20August%208%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public records","FOIA definition","public funds","college records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Records Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nSTATE OF ILLINOIS \n\nAugust 8, 2025 \n\nKWAMERAOUL \nA HORNEY GENERAL \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review - 2025 PAC 88239 \n\nDear \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of \n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS  140/9.5(c) (West 2024)).  For the reasons set forth below, the \nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn July 24, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to South Suburban College \n\n(\"College\" or \"SSC\") seeking copies of \"[a]ll documents reflecting [the College's] \nacknowledgements of employee family member deaths, including but not limited to\" 1  sympathy \ncards and letters, e-mail announcements, and memorial service announcements.  Your request \nincluded certain search parameters.  On July 28, 2025, the College responded that \"[t]his request \nis not related to a 'transaction of public business' and therefore is not public record.\"2\n\nThat same day, you submitted the above-referenced Request for Review \n\ncontesting the College's response.  You argued: \n\nI believe these records reflect the use of official SSC resources in \nresponding to employee bereavements, and that they speak to \n\n1E-mail from\n\nto FOIA Officer, South Suburban College (July 24, 2025). \n\n- (July 28, 2025). \n\n2E-mail from Patrick Rush, Vice President of Administration, South Suburban College, to -\n\n500 South 2nd Street \nSpringfield, Illinois 62701 \n(217) 782-1090 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n\n115 South LaSalle Street \nChicago, Illinois 60603 \n(312) 814-3000 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C \nCarbondale, Illinois 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-6416 \n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service. \n\nWW\\v.IllinoisAttomeyGeneral.gov \n\n\fAugust 8, 2025 \nPage 2 \n\nwhether such acknowledgments are handled consistently and \nequitably as part of institutional practice. These communications, \nissued from official accounts or offices, reflect SSC's discretionary \nuse of public resources and relate directly to employee engagement \nand morale, which are valid public concerns. [\n\nl \n\n3\n\nFOIA is intended to ensure public access to \"full and complete information \n\nregarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent them \nas public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act.\"  5 ILCS 140/1 \n(West 2024).  FOIA requires that \"[e]ach public body shall make available to any person for \ninspection or copying all public records[.]\"  (Emphasis added.)  5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2024). \nSection 2(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2024)) defines \"public records\" as \"all records* * \n* pertaining to the transaction of public business, regardless of physical form or \ncharacteristics, having been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in \nthe possession of, or under the control of any public body.\"  (Emphasis added.)  A record \npertains to the transaction of public business when it \"pertain[s] to 'business or community \ninterests as opposed to private affairs.'  Indeed, FOIA is not concerned with an individual's \nprivate affairs.''  City  of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ,r 31. \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that messages expressing \n\ncondolences pertain to private affairs rather than public duties or the transaction of public \nbusiness, and therefore such records are not public records subject to disclosure under FOIA. \nSee,for instance,  Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 71689, issued May 5, 2023, at 3 (text \nmessages sent and received by mayor of City of Chicago consisting of condolences were not \npublic records).  Your request specifically seeks the content ofrecords such as sympathy cards \nand announcements of memorial services which acknowledge the deaths of family members of \nCollege employees, and not contextual records such as bereavement policies about how the \nCollege approaches these matters.  The content of the records you requested necessarily pertains \nto private affairs of employees, and your request did not focus on any topic of public business \nrelated to the provision of educational services.  Although the transmission of such records may \nhave involved the use of public resources, 4 and although the communications may enhance \nemployee engagement and morale, those factors do not transform the communications into \npublic records available via FOIA because the subject of employee family member deaths \nfundamentally does not pertain to the College's transaction of public business as an educational \ninstitution. \n\n3E-mail from - to Public Access Counselor (July 28, 2025). \n\n4As to the use of public funds, section 2.5 ofFOIA (5 ILCS 140/2.5 (West 2024)) provides that \n\n\"[a]ll records relating to the obligation, receipt, and use of public funds of the State, units of local government, and \nschool districts are public records subject to inspection and copying by the public.\"  Section 2.5 ofFOIA does not \napply to your request because although any records like the kinds you requested would, by virtue of being sent by \nthe College, tangentially relate to the use of public funds, such records do not directly document or reflect the use of \npublic funds, unlike invoices, budgets, and other records that fall squarely within the scope of section 2.5 of FOIA. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\fAugust 8, 2025 \nPage 3 \n\nAccordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this \n\nmatter.  If you have any FOIA questions, you may contact me at the Chicago address on the \nbottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH \nAssistant Attorney General \nPublic Access Bureau \n\n88239 f no fi war univ \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail \nMr. Patrick Rush \nVice President of Administration \nSouth Suburban College \n15800 State Street \nSouth Holland, Illinois 60473 \nPrush@ssc.edu \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General \n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"College records of employee bereavement acknowledgments","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-88239/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL \nSTATE OF ILLINOIS \n\nAugust 8, 2025 \n\nKWAMERAOUL \nA HORNEY GENERAL \n\nVia electronic mail \n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review - 2025 PAC 88239 \n\nDear \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of \n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2024)). For the reasons set forth below, the \nPublic Access Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn July 24, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to South Suburban College \n\n(\"College\" or \"SSC\") seeking copies of \"[a]ll documents reflecting [the College's] \nacknowledgements of employee family member deaths, including but not limited to\" 1 sympathy \ncards and letters, e-mail announcements, and memorial service announcements. Your request \nincluded certain search parameters. On July 28, 2025, the College responded that \"[t]his request \nis not related to a 'transaction of public business' and therefore is not public record.\"2\n\nThat same day, you submitted the above-referenced Request for Review \n\ncontesting the College's response. You argued: \n\nI believe these records reflect the use of official SSC resources in \nresponding to employee bereavements, and that they speak to \n\n1E-mail from\n\nto FOIA Officer, South Suburban College (July 24, 2025). \n\n- (July 28, 2025). \n\n2E-mail from Patrick Rush, Vice President of Administration, South Suburban College, to -\n\n500 South 2nd Street \nSpringfield, Illinois 62701 \n(217) 782-1090 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n\n115 South LaSalle Street \nChicago, Illinois 60603 \n(312) 814-3000 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C \nCarbondale, Illinois 62903 \n(618) 529-6400 • Fax: (618) 529-6416 \n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7-1-1 relay service. \n\nwhether such acknowledgments are handled consistently and \nequitably as part of institutional practice. These communications, \nissued from official accounts or offices, reflect SSC's discretionary \nuse of public resources and relate directly to employee engagement \nand morale, which are valid public concerns. [\n\nl \n\n3\n\nFOIA is intended to ensure public access to \"full and complete information \n\nregarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent them \nas public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act.\" 5 ILCS 140/1 \n(West 2024). FOIA requires that \"[e]ach public body shall make available to any person for \ninspection or copying all public records[.]\" (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2024). \nSection 2(c) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2024)) defines \"public records\" as \"all records* * \n* pertaining to the transaction of public business, regardless of physical form or \ncharacteristics, having been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in \nthe possession of, or under the control of any public body.\" (Emphasis added.) A record \npertains to the transaction of public business when it \"pertain[s] to 'business or community \ninterests as opposed to private affairs.' Indeed, FOIA is not concerned with an individual's \nprivate affairs.'' City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662,,r 31. \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that messages expressing \n\ncondolences pertain to private affairs rather than public duties or the transaction of public \nbusiness, and therefore such records are not public records subject to disclosure under FOIA. \nSee,for instance, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 71689, issued May 5, 2023, at 3 (text \nmessages sent and received by mayor of City of Chicago consisting of condolences were not \npublic records). Your request specifically seeks the content ofrecords such as sympathy cards \nand announcements of memorial services which acknowledge the deaths of family members of \nCollege employees, and not contextual records such as bereavement policies about how the \nCollege approaches these matters. The content of the records you requested necessarily pertains \nto private affairs of employees, and your request did not focus on any topic of public business \nrelated to the provision of educational services. Although the transmission of such records may \nhave involved the use of public resources, 4 and although the communications may enhance \nemployee engagement and morale, those factors do not transform the communications into \npublic records available via FOIA because the subject of employee family member deaths \nfundamentally does not pertain to the College's transaction of public business as an educational \ninstitution. \n\n3E-mail from - to Public Access Counselor (July 28, 2025). \n\n4 As to the use of public funds, section 2.5 ofFOIA (5 ILCS 140/2.5 (West 2024)) provides that \n\n\"[a]ll records relating to the obligation, receipt, and use of public funds of the State, units of local government, and \nschool districts are public records subject to inspection and copying by the public.\" Section 2.5 ofFOIA does not \napply to your request because although any records like the kinds you requested would, by virtue of being sent by \nthe College, tangentially relate to the use of public funds, such records do not directly document or reflect the use of \npublic funds, unlike invoices, budgets, and other records that fall squarely within the scope of section 2.5 of FOIA. \n\nAccordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this \n\nmatter. If you have any FOIA questions, you may contact me at the Chicago address on the \nbottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nKATIE GOLDSMITH \nAssistant Attorney General \nPublic Access Bureau \n\n88239 f no fi war univ \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail \nMr. Patrick Rush \nVice President of Administration \nSouth Suburban College \n15800 State Street \nSouth Holland, Illinois 60473 \nPrush@ssc.edu \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1147,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-10-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["88300"],"title":"University of Illinois properly withheld police training curriculum as educational records under 7(1)(j)(iv)","filename":"88300, issued October 7, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":992,"summary":"The requester sought police training materials from the University of Illinois, which the University denied citing FOIA exemptions; the PAC determined the records were properly withheld as educational materials.","plain_summary":"A requester asked the University of Illinois for police training curriculum and lesson plans. The University refused to release them, claiming they were protected educational records. The Attorney General's office agreed with the University, concluding that the records are exempt from disclosure because they are used by faculty for educational purposes.","holding":"The University of Illinois properly withheld the requested police training materials under section 7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA.","legal_question":"Whether police training curriculum and lesson plans used by the University of Illinois Police Training Institute qualify as exempt educational materials under section 7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7(1)(j)(iv)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(j)(iv)","7(1)(g)"],"public_body":"University of Illinois","requesting_party":"Mr. Sam Stecklow (Invisible Institute)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"educational records","subject_description":"The request sought curriculum, lesson plans, and slides related to law enforcement training on involuntary mental health commitments.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_j/88300%2C%20issued%20October%207%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["police training","educational records","FOIA exemption","University of Illinois"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nOctober 7,  2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Sam Stecklow\n\nInvisible Institute\n\nfoia@invisibleinstitute. com\n\nRE:  FOIA Request\n\nfor Review —  2025 PAC 88300\n\nDear Mr. Stecklow: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9. 5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further inquiry is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn June 26,  2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to the University of Illinois\n\nUniversity) seeking copies of the curriculum, lesson plans,  and slides of the University' s Police\nTraining Institute ( Institute)  that \" relate in any way to the use of Involuntary Commitment\nPetitions in mental health cases by law enforcement\npresent. 2 On July 11,  2025,  after extending the time to respond by five additional business days\npursuant to section 3( e)  of FOIA,3 the University denied your request pursuant to sections\n7( 1)(\n\nj)( iv) and 7( 1)( g)  of FOIA. 4\n\nfrom January 1,  2019,  to the\n\nofficers[,]\" \n\nOn July 30,  2025, this office received your Request for Review contesting the\n\ndenial.  With respect\ntraining instructors did not qualify as \" faculty members\" \nthat the Institute is a training facility, not an educational institution. \n\nto the University' s assertion of section 7( 1)(\n\nj)( iv), you argued that the police\n\ninvolved in \" educational matters,\"  and\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9. 5( c) ( West 2024). \n\nJune 26,  2025). \n\n2E- mail from Sam Stecklow, Invisible Institute, Experimental Station, to [ University of Illinois] \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 3( e) ( West 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 7( 1)(\n\nj)( iv), ( 1)( g) ( West 2024). \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago,  Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive,  Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217)  782- 1090 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n\n312)  814- 3000 •  Fax: ( 312)  814- 3806\n\n618)  529- 6400 •  Fax: ( 618)  529- 6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7- 1- 1 relay service. \n\nwww.\n\nIllinoisAttorneyGeneral. gov\n\n\fMr.  Sam Stecklow\n\nOctober 7,  2025\n\nPage 2\n\nSection 7( 1)(\n\nj)(\n\niv)  of FOIA exempts from disclosure \" course materials or research\n\nmaterials used by faculty members\" \npreviously determined that the plain meaning of the term \" course materials\"  encompasses\nmaterials such as curricula,  lesson plans,  and slides that are used in an educational setting.  See\nIll. Att' y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr.  78019,  issued January 5,  2024;  Ill. Att' y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. \nLtr.  64950,  issued October 8,  2020. \n\nin connection with \" educational matters.\"  This office has\n\nIn response to your request,  the University stated that it classifies the Institute' s\n\nlaw.  In particular,  the University cited section 4( a)  of Article IX, \n\ninstructors as faculty of the University under certain provisions of the University's own statutes, \nas well as state and federal\nwhich defines the Institute' s instructors as members of the University' s academic staff.5\nAdditionally, section 3( a)( 2)  of Article II of the University of Illinois Statutes provides that\nmembers of the Academic Staff having the title \" Instructor,\"  may be extended faculty privileges\nunder the bylaws of the particular academic unit.6 Furthermore,  as the University argued in its\nthe Institute' s instructors are part of \"[t]he teaching, research and extension faculties\n\nresponse, \n\nof'  the University.?  Black' s Law Dictionary defines \" faculty\"  as the \"[\nschool.\"  Black' s Law Dictionary 534 ( 5th ed.  1979).  Although the Institute' s instructors are not\ntenured professors, they are nonetheless part of the University's \" faculty.\" \n\nt] eaching staff of a\n\nThe Institute is affiliated with the University, and it offers \" specialty classes\"  in a\nvariety of subjects relating to police training,  in addition to a \" basic law enforcement course. i8 It\nhas an academic research division which it describes as focusing on \" producing new and more\ni9 Moreover,  the Institute' s website highlights its use of an \" Adult\neffective teaching methods[.]\nLearning Model,\"  which it describes as \" a shift from military -style police academies to police\ntraining institutes based on adult learning principles. i10 In contrast\nofficer may receive on the job, or from superiors in their own police department, the Institute\noffers educational courses in its association with a university.  Therefore,  the materials used in\nthose courses pertain to educational matters. \n\nto the basic training a police\n\nhttps:// www.bauillinois.edu/ governance/ statutes. \n\n5Art. IX, Sec.  4( a),  University of Illinois Statutes,  as amended July 20,  2023,  available at\n\n6Art.  II, Sec.  3( a)( 2),  University of Illinois Statutes,  as amended July 20,  2023,  available at\n\nhttps:// www.botuillinois. edu/ governance/ statutes. \n\n7See 110 ILCS 70/ 36e ( West 2024). \n\nlast visited September 16,  2025). \n\n8University of Illinois Urbana - Champaign,  Police Training Institute,  https:// pti. illinois. edu/ about/ \n\nlast visited September\n\n16,  2025). \n\n9University of Illinois Urbana -Champaign,  Police Training Institute,  https:// pti.illinois. edu/ about/ \n\nlast visited September\n\n16,  2025). \n\n10University of Illinois Urbana -Champaign,  Police Training Institute,  https:// pti.illinois. edu/ about/ \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMr.  Sam Stecklow\n\nOctober 7,  2025\n\nPage 3\n\nBecause the records you requested are course materials used by faculty members\n\nin connection with educational matters, they are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section\n7( 1)(\n\nAccordingly,  this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this\n\nj)( iv). 11\n\nmatter. \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions,  you may contact me at\n\nmichael.knight@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J.  KNIGHT\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n88300 f no fi war univ\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs.  Adrienne Nazon\n\nVice President,  External Relations and Communications\n\nChief Records Officer\n\nUniversity of Illinois\nfoia- our@mx. uillinois. edu\n\n11Because the requested records are exempt from disclosure under section 7( 1)(\n\nj)( iv), this office\n\ndeclines to address the applicability of section 7( 1)( g). \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Police training curriculum and lesson plans","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-88300/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nOctober 7, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Sam Stecklow\n\nInvisible Institute\n\nfoia@invisibleinstitute. com\n\nRE: FOIA Request\n\nfor Review — 2025 PAC 88300\n\nDear Mr. Stecklow: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9. 5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further inquiry is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn June 26, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the University of Illinois\n\nUniversity) seeking copies of the curriculum, lesson plans, and slides of the University's Police\nTraining Institute (Institute) that \" relate in any way to the use of Involuntary Commitment\nPetitions in mental health cases by law enforcement\npresent. 2 On July 11, 2025, after extending the time to respond by five additional business days\npursuant to section 3(e) of FOIA,3 the University denied your request pursuant to sections\n7(1)(j)(iv) and 7(1)(g) of FOIA. 4\n\nfrom January 1, 2019, to the\n\nofficers[,]\" \n\nOn July 30, 2025, this office received your Request for Review contesting the\n\ndenial. With respect\ntraining instructors did not qualify as \" faculty members\" \nthat the Institute is a training facility, not an educational institution. \n\nto the University's assertion of section 7(1)(j)(iv), you argued that the police\n\ninvolved in \" educational matters,\" and\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9. 5(c) (West 2024). \n\nJune 26, 2025). \n\n2E- mail from Sam Stecklow, Invisible Institute, Experimental Station, to [ University of Illinois] \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 3(e) (West 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(j)(iv), (1)(g) (West 2024). \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217) 782- 1090 • Fax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 • Fax: (312) 814- 3806\n\n618) 529- 6400 • Fax: (618) 529- 6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities can reach us by using the 7- 1- 1 relay service. \n\nSection 7(1)(j)(iv) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \" course materials or research\n\nmaterials used by faculty members\" \npreviously determined that the plain meaning of the term \" course materials\" encompasses\nmaterials such as curricula, lesson plans, and slides that are used in an educational setting. See\nIll. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 78019, issued January 5, 2024; Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. \nLtr. 64950, issued October 8, 2020. \n\nin connection with \" educational matters.\" This office has\n\nIn response to your request, the University stated that it classifies the Institute's\n\nlaw. In particular, the University cited section 4(a) of Article IX, \n\ninstructors as faculty of the University under certain provisions of the University's own statutes, \nas well as state and federal\nwhich defines the Institute's instructors as members of the University's academic staff.5\nAdditionally, section 3(a)(2) of Article II of the University of Illinois Statutes provides that\nmembers of the Academic Staff having the title \" Instructor,\" may be extended faculty privileges\nunder the bylaws of the particular academic unit.6 Furthermore, as the University argued in its\nthe Institute's instructors are part of \"[t]he teaching, research and extension faculties\n\nresponse, \n\nof' the University.? Black's Law Dictionary defines \" faculty\" as the \"[\nschool.\" Black's Law Dictionary 534 (5th ed. 1979). Although the Institute's instructors are not\ntenured professors, they are nonetheless part of the University's \" faculty.\" \n\nt] eaching staff of a\n\nThe Institute is affiliated with the University, and it offers \" specialty classes\" in a\nvariety of subjects relating to police training, in addition to a \" basic law enforcement course. i8 It\nhas an academic research division which it describes as focusing on \" producing new and more\ni9 Moreover, the Institute's website highlights its use of an \" Adult\neffective teaching methods[.]\nLearning Model,\" which it describes as \" a shift from military -style police academies to police\ntraining institutes based on adult learning principles. i10 In contrast\nofficer may receive on the job, or from superiors in their own police department, the Institute\noffers educational courses in its association with a university. Therefore, the materials used in\nthose courses pertain to educational matters. \n\nto the basic training a police\n\nhttps:// www.bauillinois.edu/ governance/ statutes. \n\n5 Art. IX, Sec. 4(a), University of Illinois Statutes, as amended July 20, 2023, available at\n\n6 Art. II, Sec. 3(a)(2), University of Illinois Statutes, as amended July 20, 2023, available at\n\nhttps:// www.botuillinois. edu/ governance/ statutes. \n\n7 See 110 ILCS 70/ 36e (West 2024). \n\nlast visited September 16, 2025). \n\n8 University of Illinois Urbana - Champaign, Police Training Institute, https:// pti. illinois. edu/ about/ \n\nlast visited September\n\n16, 2025). \n\n9 University of Illinois Urbana -Champaign, Police Training Institute, https:// pti.illinois. edu/ about/ \n\nlast visited September\n\n16, 2025). \n\n10 University of Illinois Urbana -Champaign, Police Training Institute, https:// pti.illinois. edu/ about/ \n\nBecause the records you requested are course materials used by faculty members\n\nin connection with educational matters, they are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section\n7(1)(Accordingly, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this\n\nj)(iv). 11\n\nmatter. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, you may contact me at\n\nmichael.knight@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nMICHAEL J. KNIGHT\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n88300 f no fi war univ\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Adrienne Nazon\n\nVice President, External Relations and Communications\n\nChief Records Officer\n\nUniversity of Illinois\nfoia- our@mx. uillinois. edu\n\n11 Because the requested records are exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(j)(iv), this office\n\ndeclines to address the applicability of section 7(1)(g). \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1148,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-09-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["88619"],"title":"Metra did not violate FOIA by withholding unsuccessful applicant materials under 7(1)(c)","filename":"88619, issued September 9, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":872,"summary":"The requester sought internal job applications and résumés for unsuccessful applicants at Metra, which Metra denied under FOIA Section 7(1)(c). The PAC determined that Metra properly withheld the records because the privacy interests of the unsuccessful applicants outweigh the public interest in disclosure.","plain_summary":"A requester asked Metra for the job applications and résumés of people who applied for positions but were not hired. Metra refused to release this information, arguing it would violate the privacy of those applicants. The Attorney General's office agreed with Metra, concluding that the privacy rights of unsuccessful job applicants generally outweigh the public's interest in seeing those documents.","holding":"Metra did not violate FOIA by withholding the identities and application materials of unsuccessful job applicants under the personal privacy exemption.","legal_question":"Does the disclosure of unsuccessful job applicant résumés and applications constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(c)?","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Metra","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"personnel records","subject_description":"The request sought internal job applications and résumés for unsuccessful applicants within Metra's Safety and Transportation departments.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_c/Highly-personal-information/88619%2C%20issued%20September%209%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["personnel records","job applications","privacy exemption","unsuccessful applicants"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"September 9, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 88619;  25-FOIA- 461\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below,  the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn July 30, 2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to Metra seeking,  relevant to this\n\nRequest for Review,  copies of internal applications and résumés for certain job postings within\nMetra' s Safety and Transportation departments.   On August 13, 2025,  Metra denied this portion\nof your request in its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA, 2 explaining that the disclosure\nof the identities of the unsuccessful applicants would constitute an unwarranted invasion of those\nindividuals'  personal privacy.   Metra disclosed the requested records for the successful\napplicants.   On August 14, 2025,  you submitted your Request for Review challenging the denial. \n\nSection 7(1)( c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy,  unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\"   Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject' s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining\nthe information.\" \n\n15 ILCS 140/9.5(c) (West 2024). \n\n25 ILCS 140/7(1)(c) (West 2024). \n\n\fSeptember 9, 2025\nPage 2\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that records identifying\n\npending or unsuccessful applicants for public employment or promotion are exempt from\ndisclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA because they contain information that is personal\nin nature,  the disclosure would be objectionable to a reasonable person and would constitute an\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy.   See,  for example,  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. \n84684,  issued January 13, 2025 ( names of public employees are exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(c) in the particular context of pending applications for promotions or other public\nemployment);  Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 58010,  issued October 9, 2019,  at 5-6 (\" records\nidentifying [ public employees]  as seeking promotion do not bear on their current duties as public\nemployees.\");   Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev. Ltr. 59938,  issued October 21, 2019,  at 3\ndisclosure of information identifying existing public employees seeking promotions or new\npositions does not bear on their current duties and could lead to embarrassment and dissuade\nthem from seeking promotions or new positions,  and,  therefore,  the disclosure of such\ninformation would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy).   \n\nYou argue that the \" qualifications,  education,  and work history of [the\n\nunsuccessful]  applicants directly bear on whether Metra engaged in discriminatory hiring\nthat bears on the public duty of public\npractices,  a matter of significant public concern[]\" \nemployees. 3 You further allege that \"[ t]he demographic spreadsheets provided by Metra confirm\nthat Black internal candidates applied but were not interviewed for these positions.   The withheld\nresumes are necessary to assess whether their exclusion was based on qualifications or\ndiscriminatory criteria.\" 4 You also contend that Metra should release redacted versions of the\nunsuccessful applicants'  materials. \n\nAlthough this office recognizes the public interest in ensuring that public bodies\nengage in non- discriminatory hiring practices,  the personal details of individuals'  unsuccessful\nemployment applications do not bear on the duties of the public employees making the hiring\ndecisions.   Further,  the right to privacy of the applicants rather than the employees making the\nhiring decisions is at issue.   Merely redacting names from unsuccessful employment applications\nwould not be sufficient to protect the identities of the applicants,  as applications are typically\nreplete with specific,  personally identifying information in addition to names.   To the extent that\ncomparison of the applications to the data in the demographic spreadsheets you received would\nenable the races of individual applicants to be discerned,  the Illinois Appellate Court has\nrecognized that individuals have a significant right to privacy in their racial identities that was\nnot outweighed by the public interest in records responsive to a FOIA request designed to shed\nlight on whether or not a state' s attorney' s office engaged in discriminatory hiring practices.   CBS\nInc., v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 948- 49 (1990) ( finding \" that publication of the names and\nraces together of the individual assistant State' s Attorneys could constitute a substantial\n\ninvasion\n\n3E- mail from\n\n4E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( August 14, 2025). \n\nto Public Access Counselor ( August 14, 2025). \n\n\fSeptember 9, 2025\nPage 3\n\nof personal privacy[ ]\"  and upholding a lower court decision that such information is exempt\nfrom disclosure).   Accordingly,  this office concludes that Metra did not violate FOIA by denying\nyour request pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. \n\nThis file is closed.   If you have any questions,  please contact me at (217)  843-\n\n0564 or laura.harter@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau,  Springfield\n\n88619 f no fi war reg auth\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Dylan Shiver\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nMetra\n547 West Jackson Boulevard\nChicago,  Illinois 60661\nfoia@metrarr. com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Job applications and résumés of unsuccessful applicants","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-88619/","full_text":"September 9, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 88619; 25-FOIA- 461\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat no further action is warranted in this matter. \n\nOn July 30, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to Metra seeking, relevant to this\n\nRequest for Review, copies of internal applications and résumés for certain job postings within\nMetra's Safety and Transportation departments. On August 13, 2025, Metra denied this portion\nof your request in its entirety pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA, 2 explaining that the disclosure\nof the identities of the unsuccessful applicants would constitute an unwarranted invasion of those\nindividuals' personal privacy. Metra disclosed the requested records for the successful\napplicants. On August 14, 2025, you submitted your Request for Review challenging the denial. \n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p]ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual\nsubjects of the information.\" Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" \nas \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person\nand in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has consistently determined that records identifying\n\npending or unsuccessful applicants for public employment or promotion are exempt from\ndisclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA because they contain information that is personal\nin nature, the disclosure would be objectionable to a reasonable person and would constitute an\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. \n84684, issued January 13, 2025 (names of public employees are exempt from disclosure under\nsection 7(1)(c) in the particular context of pending applications for promotions or other public\nemployment); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 58010, issued October 9, 2019, at 5-6 (\" records\nidentifying [ public employees] as seeking promotion do not bear on their current duties as public\nemployees.\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 59938, issued October 21, 2019, at 3\ndisclosure of information identifying existing public employees seeking promotions or new\npositions does not bear on their current duties and could lead to embarrassment and dissuade\nthem from seeking promotions or new positions, and, therefore, the disclosure of such\ninformation would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy). \n\nYou argue that the \" qualifications, education, and work history of [the\n\nunsuccessful] applicants directly bear on whether Metra engaged in discriminatory hiring\nthat bears on the public duty of public\npractices, a matter of significant public concern[]\" \nemployees. 3 You further allege that \"[ t]he demographic spreadsheets provided by Metra confirm\nthat Black internal candidates applied but were not interviewed for these positions. The withheld\nresumes are necessary to assess whether their exclusion was based on qualifications or\ndiscriminatory criteria.\" 4 You also contend that Metra should release redacted versions of the\nunsuccessful applicants' materials. \n\nAlthough this office recognizes the public interest in ensuring that public bodies\nengage in non- discriminatory hiring practices, the personal details of individuals' unsuccessful\nemployment applications do not bear on the duties of the public employees making the hiring\ndecisions. Further, the right to privacy of the applicants rather than the employees making the\nhiring decisions is at issue. Merely redacting names from unsuccessful employment applications\nwould not be sufficient to protect the identities of the applicants, as applications are typically\nreplete with specific, personally identifying information in addition to names. To the extent that\ncomparison of the applications to the data in the demographic spreadsheets you received would\nenable the races of individual applicants to be discerned, the Illinois Appellate Court has\nrecognized that individuals have a significant right to privacy in their racial identities that was\nnot outweighed by the public interest in records responsive to a FOIA request designed to shed\nlight on whether or not a state's attorney's office engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. CBS\nInc., v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 948- 49 (1990) (finding \" that publication of the names and\nraces together of the individual assistant State's Attorneys could constitute a substantial\n\nof personal privacy[ ]\" and upholding a lower court decision that such information is exempt\nfrom disclosure). Accordingly, this office concludes that Metra did not violate FOIA by denying\nyour request pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (217) 843-\n\n0564 or laura.harter@ilag. gov. Thank you. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau, Springfield\n\n88619 f no fi war reg auth\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Dylan Shiver\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\nMetra\n547 West Jackson Boulevard\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nfoia@metrarr. com"}
{"id":1149,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-09-30","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["88977","88978"],"title":"City of Springfield, Sangamon County State's Attorney not required to create records or answer questions under FOIA","filename":"88977 88978, issued September 30, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1520,"summary":"The requester sought native, unaltered zip files from Snap, Inc. provided to the City of Springfield and the Sangamon County State's Attorney's Office, but the PAC determined no further action was warranted because the public bodies either did not possess the records or were not required to create new records or answer questions.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for specific digital files from the City and the State's Attorney's Office. The PAC found that the government agencies either did not have the records or were not legally required to create new files or answer the requester's specific questions. Consequently, the PAC closed the case without finding any violations.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the City of Springfield and the Sangamon County State's Attorney's Office did not violate FOIA because they are not required to create new records or answer questions in response to a FOIA request.","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required to create new records or answer questions in response to a FOIA request for specific digital data.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)","7(1)(o)"],"public_body":"City of Springfield and Sangamon County State's Attorney's Office","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"records production","subject_description":"The requester sought native, unaltered digital files (zip files) provided by Snap, Inc. to law enforcement agencies.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":90.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Obligation-to-disclose-non-exempt-portions-of-records-that-contain-information-subject-to-redaction/88977%2088978%2C%20issued%20September%2030%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["digital records","FOIA request","creation of records","Snap Inc"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Search & Production","full_text_pre_clean":"September 30, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:   FOIA Request for Review –  2025 PAC 88977,  88978\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5( c) ( West 202 4 )).  For the reasons set forth below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted in th ese matters. \n\nOn August 11 , 2025 , you submitted a FOIA request to the City of Springfield\n\nCity) seeking a record provided by Snap, Inc. in relation to a court case.  Your request specified\nthat you wanted the record \" unaltered or 'unzipped '\"  and that you would \" like a copy of the zip\nfile that was sent by snap inc [.]\" 1 On August 22, 2025, the City responded that it did not possess\nrecords responsive to your request and suggested that the Sangamon County State's Attorney's\nOffice (State's Attorney's Office) may possess the records you sought. \n\nOn August 19, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the State's Attorney's\n\nOffice seeking \" 1. The native,  unaltered zip file sent by snap inc mentioned in the certificate of\nauthenticity 127a. 2. The original delivery record from snap inc (email, law enforcement portal, \netc.). 3. Any records reflecting account attribute history or changes.\" 2 On September 2, 2025, the\nState's Attorney's Office provided you with copies of the file from Snap Inc . with redactions\npursuant to sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), and 7(1)(o) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c), ( 1)(o) \nWest 2024)).   The State' s Attorney' s Office stated that, \"[ w] hile you requested ' the native, \n\n1FOIA Request 40579 from\n\nto City of Springfield ( August 11, 2025). \n\n2FOIA Request from\n\nto Sangamon County State's Attorney' s Office (dated\n\nAugust 22, 2025). \n\n\fSeptember 30, 2025\nPage 2\n\nunaltered zip file,' portions of the document have been redacted.\" 3 The State's Attorney's Office\nalso stated that it possessed no records responsive to your request for the delivery record or\nrecords reflecting account attribute history or changes . \n\nOn September 8, 2025, you completed the submission of your Requests for\n\nReview contesting the responses by the City (2025 PAC 88977) and State's Attorney's Office\n2025 PAC 88978),  which again specified that you seek the \" native,  unaltered Snap Inc.  ZIP\" \nfile. 4 You argued that the City' s response was inadequate because you \" sought the native\nelectronic file [.]\"5  ( Emphasis in original.)  You argued, citing section 6 of FOIA,6 that the\nState's Attorney's Office must provide the records \" in the electronic format in which they are\nmaintained when feasible [.]\"7  ( Emphasis in original.) \n\nSection 6( a)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 6( a) ( West 202 4 )) provides: \n\nWhen a person requests a copy of a record maintained in an\nelectronic format, the public body shall furnish it in the electronic\nformat specified by the requester, if feasible .  (Emphasis added.) \n\nFeasible\"  is defined as \" capable of being done or carried out.\" 8 Thus, a public body must\ncomply with a request for a record in a specific electronic format only if the public body is\ncapable of doing so in accordance with the provisions of FOIA. \n\nSection 7( 1)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 7( 1) ( West 2024))  provides: \n\nWhen a request is made to inspect or copy a public record\nthat contains information that is exempt from disclosure under this\nSection,  but also contains information that is not exempt from\ndisclosure,  the public body may elect to redact the information\nthat is exempt.  The public body shall make the remaining\ninformation available for inspection and copying.  (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nAttorney' s Office, to\n\nSeptember 2, 2025), at 1. \n\n3Letter from Jason P. Young, Freedom of Information Officer, Sangamon County State's\n\n4E-mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( September 2, 2025). \n\n5E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( September 2, 2025). \n\n65 ILCS 140/ 6 (West 2024). \n\n7E-mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( September 2, 2025). \n\n8Merriam - Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ feasible ( last\n\nvisited September 24, 2025 ). \n\n\fSeptember 30, 2025\nPage 3\n\nThe General Assembly's clear intent is to allow public bodies to provide redacted records to\nrequesters when certain confidential\nunder section 7. \n\ninformation within the records is exempt from disclosure\n\nYour FOIA requests and Requests for Review specifically seek \" unaltered\"  or\n\nnative\" copies of the file provided by Snap Inc.  You argued that \"the agency should produce\nthe records in the electronic format in which they are maintained\"  and that \" redactions can be\nprovided separately without altering the native file.\" 9  ( Emphasis in original.) \n\nHowever, \"[ i]t is always presumed that the legislature did not intend to cause\n\nabsurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.\"   People v. Garcia , 241 Ill. 2d 416, 421 (2011).  \nRequiring public bodies to provide unaltered files and separately provide redactions would defeat\nthe General Assembly' s intent of allowing public bodies to withhold or redact certain types of\ninformation pursuant to the exemptions enumerated under section 7 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7\nWest 2024 )).  Therefore , the State's Attorney's Office cannot provide you with a copy of the\nnative, unaltered zip file \" because the zip file contains information that the State's Attorney's\nOffice asserts is exempt from disclosure under those section 7 exemptions.10 Although a public\nbody may be required to provide an unaltered or native record when the record contains no\nexempt information, it is not feasible for a public body to provide an unaltered or native record\nwhen the public body applies permissible exemption s. \n\nWith regard to the remaining parts of your requests,  there is no indication that the\nState' s Attorney' s Office maintains a record responsive to your request for the  \"original delivery\nrecord from snap inc ,\" as the zip file was uploaded onto Evidence. com by a detective ,  as stated\nin the return on search warrant.  The State's Attorney's Office simply had to log into its\nEvidence.com account to view the file.  Further, your request to the City 's police department\nstated you were seeking a copy of the zip file that was referenced in a certificate of authenticity\nfrom Snap Inc.  You then quoted language from that certificate in which Snap Inc.  certified that\na] ttached is a true and correct copy of\" the zip file of the data that was requested in the search\n\n9E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor ( September 2, 2025). \n\n10Although your Requests for Review did not challenge the State's Attorney's Office's application\nof any FOIA exemptions, a cursory review of the redacted records finds they are replete with information exempt\nfrom disclosure.   For instance,  section 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information,  unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\"   Section 2(c-5) of\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c -5) (West 2024))  defines \" private information\"  as: \n\nU]nique identifiers,  including a person' s social security number, driver' s license\nnumber,  employee identification number,  biometric identifiers,  personal\nfinancial information,  passwords or other access codes,  medical records,  home\nor personal telephone numbers,  and personal email addresses.   Private\ninformation also includes home address and personal license plates,  except as\notherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to\nany person.  ( Emphasis added.) \n\n\fSeptember 30, 2025\nPage 4\n\nwarrant.  Therefore, you appear to possess records concerning the delivery of the zip file from\nSnap Inc.  Regarding your request for \" records reflecting account attribute history or changes ,\" \nthis item appears to ask the State's Attorney's Office to provide general information concerning\nwhen it viewed or downloaded the zip file from Evidence.com and whether it made any changes\nto the file.  \"A request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not\ngeneral data, information, or statistics.\"   Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & \nProfessional Regulation,  2014 IL App ( 4th)  130427, ¶  33 ; see also Kenyon v.  Garrels , 184 Ill. \nApp.  3d 28, 32 ( 1989) ( a public body is not required to answer questions or create new records in\nresponse to a FOIA request).   Rather than reasonably identifying a public records that may\ncontain the information you are seeking, you request seeks unspecified data.   Accordingly, this\noffice has no basis to conclude that the City and State's Attorney's Office improperly responded\nto your requests, and , and this office has determined that no further inquiry is warranted in these\nmatters. \n\nThese files are closed.  If you have any questions, please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n88977 88978 f no fi war pd sao\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael Hampleman\nFOIA Officer\nCity of Springfield\n300 South Seventh Street, Room 106\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\ncityclerk@cwlp.com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jason P. Young\nFreedom of Information Officer\nSangamon County State's Attorney's Office\n200 South Ninth Street,  Room 402\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\njason.young@sangamonil.gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Native digital files from Snap, Inc","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-88977/","full_text":"September 30, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 88977, 88978\n\nDear\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 202 4)). For the reasons set forth below, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that no further action is warranted in th ese matters. \n\nOn August 11, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the City of Springfield\n\nCity) seeking a record provided by Snap, Inc. in relation to a court case. Your request specified\nthat you wanted the record \" unaltered or 'unzipped '\" and that you would \" like a copy of the zip\nfile that was sent by snap inc [.]\" 1 On August 22, 2025, the City responded that it did not possess\nrecords responsive to your request and suggested that the Sangamon County State's Attorney's\nOffice (State's Attorney's Office) may possess the records you sought. \n\nOn August 19, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the State's Attorney's\n\nOffice seeking \" 1. The native, unaltered zip file sent by snap inc mentioned in the certificate of\nauthenticity 127a. 2. The original delivery record from snap inc (email, law enforcement portal, \netc.). 3. Any records reflecting account attribute history or changes.\" 2 On September 2, 2025, the\nState's Attorney's Office provided you with copies of the file from Snap Inc. with redactions\npursuant to sections 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), and 7(1)(o) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(o) \nWest 2024)). The State's Attorney's Office stated that, \"[ w] hile you requested ' the native, \n\nunaltered zip file,' portions of the document have been redacted.\" 3 The State's Attorney's Office\nalso stated that it possessed no records responsive to your request for the delivery record or\nrecords reflecting account attribute history or changes. \n\nOn September 8, 2025, you completed the submission of your Requests for\n\nReview contesting the responses by the City (2025 PAC 88977) and State's Attorney's Office\n2025 PAC 88978), which again specified that you seek the \" native, unaltered Snap Inc. ZIP\" \nfile. 4 You argued that the City's response was inadequate because you \" sought the native\nelectronic file [.]\"5 (Emphasis in original.) You argued, citing section 6 of FOIA,6 that the\nState's Attorney's Office must provide the records \" in the electronic format in which they are\nmaintained when feasible [.]\"7 (Emphasis in original.) \n\nSection 6(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(a) (West 202 4)) provides: \n\nWhen a person requests a copy of a record maintained in an\nelectronic format, the public body shall furnish it in the electronic\nformat specified by the requester, if feasible. (Emphasis added.) \n\nFeasible\" is defined as \" capable of being done or carried out.\" 8 Thus, a public body must\ncomply with a request for a record in a specific electronic format only if the public body is\ncapable of doing so in accordance with the provisions of FOIA. \n\nSection 7(1) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 7(1) (West 2024)) provides: \n\nWhen a request is made to inspect or copy a public record\nthat contains information that is exempt from disclosure under this\nSection, but also contains information that is not exempt from\ndisclosure, the public body may elect to redact the information\nthat is exempt. The public body shall make the remaining\ninformation available for inspection and copying. (Emphasis\nadded.) \n\nAttorney's Office, to\n\nSeptember 2, 2025), at 1. \n\n3 Letter from Jason P. Young, Freedom of Information Officer, Sangamon County State's\n\n4E-mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor (September 2, 2025). \n\n5E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor (September 2, 2025). \n\n65 ILCS 140/ 6 (West 2024). \n\n7E-mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor (September 2, 2025). \n\n8 Merriam - Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ feasible (last\n\nThe General Assembly's clear intent is to allow public bodies to provide redacted records to\nrequesters when certain confidential\nunder section 7. \n\ninformation within the records is exempt from disclosure\n\nYour FOIA requests and Requests for Review specifically seek \" unaltered\" or\n\nnative\" copies of the file provided by Snap Inc. You argued that \"the agency should produce\nthe records in the electronic format in which they are maintained\" and that \" redactions can be\nprovided separately without altering the native file.\" 9 (Emphasis in original.) \n\nHowever, \"[ i]t is always presumed that the legislature did not intend to cause\n\nabsurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.\" People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416, 421 (2011). \nRequiring public bodies to provide unaltered files and separately provide redactions would defeat\nthe General Assembly's intent of allowing public bodies to withhold or redact certain types of\ninformation pursuant to the exemptions enumerated under section 7 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7\nWest 2024)). Therefore, the State's Attorney's Office cannot provide you with a copy of the\nnative, unaltered zip file \" because the zip file contains information that the State's Attorney's\nOffice asserts is exempt from disclosure under those section 7 exemptions.10 Although a public\nbody may be required to provide an unaltered or native record when the record contains no\nexempt information, it is not feasible for a public body to provide an unaltered or native record\nwhen the public body applies permissible exemption s. \n\nWith regard to the remaining parts of your requests, there is no indication that the\nState's Attorney's Office maintains a record responsive to your request for the \"original delivery\nrecord from snap inc,\" as the zip file was uploaded onto Evidence. com by a detective, as stated\nin the return on search warrant. The State's Attorney's Office simply had to log into its\nEvidence.com account to view the file. Further, your request to the City 's police department\nstated you were seeking a copy of the zip file that was referenced in a certificate of authenticity\nfrom Snap Inc. You then quoted language from that certificate in which Snap Inc. certified that\na] ttached is a true and correct copy of\" the zip file of the data that was requested in the search\n\n9E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor (September 2, 2025). \n\n10 Although your Requests for Review did not challenge the State's Attorney's Office's application\nof any FOIA exemptions, a cursory review of the redacted records finds they are replete with information exempt\nfrom disclosure. For instance, section 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ p] rivate information, unless\ndisclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order.\" Section 2(c-5) of\nFOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 2(c -5) (West 2024)) defines \" private information\" as: \n\nU]nique identifiers, including a person's social security number, driver's license\n\nwarrant. Therefore, you appear to possess records concerning the delivery of the zip file from\nSnap Inc. Regarding your request for \" records reflecting account attribute history or changes,\" \nthis item appears to ask the State's Attorney's Office to provide general information concerning\nwhen it viewed or downloaded the zip file from Evidence.com and whether it made any changes\nto the file. \"A request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and not\ngeneral data, information, or statistics.\" Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & \nProfessional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33; see also Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. \nApp. 3d 28, 32 (1989) (a public body is not required to answer questions or create new records in\nresponse to a FOIA request). Rather than reasonably identifying a public records that may\ncontain the information you are seeking, you request seeks unspecified data. Accordingly, this\noffice has no basis to conclude that the City and State's Attorney's Office improperly responded\nto your requests, and, and this office has determined that no further inquiry is warranted in these\nmatters. \n\nThese files are closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\n\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J. SILVER\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n88977 88978 f no fi war pd sao\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael Hampleman\nFOIA Officer\nCity of Springfield\n300 South Seventh Street, Room 106\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\ncityclerk@cwlp.com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Jason P. Young\nFreedom of Information Officer\nSangamon County State's Attorney's Office\n200 South Ninth Street, Room 402\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\njason.young@sangamonil.gov"}
{"id":1150,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-09-25","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["89273"],"title":"IL Dept. of Financial & Professional Regulation not in violation for lacking disciplinary records","filename":"89273, issued September 25, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1444,"summary":"The requester challenged the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation's response to a FOIA request for disciplinary case file records, arguing the production was incomplete. The PAC determined the Department did not improperly withhold records because it does not possess the requested hearing materials and other records are exempt from disclosure.","plain_summary":"A requester asked for records related to a 2013 disciplinary case, but the Department only provided a single order. The requester complained to the Attorney General's office, believing more records should exist. The PAC found that the Department does not actually have the additional records requested and that other parts of the file are legally protected from release.","holding":"The Department did not improperly withhold records because it does not possess the requested hearing materials and the remaining case file materials are exempt from disclosure.","legal_question":"Whether the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation violated FOIA by failing to produce records beyond the initial order provided in response to the request.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(a)","7(1)(b)","7(1)(c)","7(1)(t)"],"public_body":"Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"disciplinary records","subject_description":"The requester sought various records, including investigative materials and hearing transcripts, related to a 2013 administrative disciplinary order.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_t/89273%2C%20issued%20September%2025%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["disciplinary records","incomplete response","record possession","FOIA exemptions"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"September 25, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 89273\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) ( West 2024)).   For the reasons set forth below,  the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn June 30, 2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nFinancial and Professional Regulation (Department) seeking various records related to an\nadministrative order that was issued in 2013- MBR- 41.   On August 28, 2025,  the Department\nprovided a copy of an Order to Cease and Desist issued in No. 2013-MBR-41, subject to\nredactions pursuant to section 7(1)( a),  7(1)( b),  and 7(1)( c) of FOIA. 1 Additionally,  the\nDepartment cited section 1326.210 of title 2 of the Illinois Administrative Code.2\n\nOn September 16, 2025, this office received your Request for Review questioning\n\nhow a disciplinary case file could consist of only a judgment order.   You asserted that the\nDepartment's response was incomplete in that you did not receive any records supporting the\norder that you received,  such as the complaint or initiating document,  investigative materials, \ninternal communications, hearing transcripts, and exhibits or evidence considered. \n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\"   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 ( West 2024);  see also Southern Illinoisan v. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), ( 1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2024). \n\n2019. \n\n22 Ill. Adm. Code § 1326.210 ( West 2024),  amended at 43 Ill. Reg. 14647,  effective December 20, \n\n\fSeptember 25, 2025\nPage 2\n\nIllinois Department of Public Health,  218 Ill. 2d 390,  415 ( 2006).   A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure.   5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024).   When presented with a FOIA request,  a public\nbody must perform a reasonable search under the particular circumstances of the matter.  Better\nGovernment Ass' n v. City of Chicago,  2020 IL App ( 1st)  190038, ¶  31.   However, \"[ a]  requester\nis entitled only to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug\nEnforcement Administration,  678 F.2d 315,  321 ( D.C. Cir. 1982). \n\nOn September 24, 2025,  this office spoke with the Department' s FOIA officer, \n\nKathleen Anderson, regarding your request.  Ms. Kathleen explained that your request was\ninitially understood to seek records concerning your disciplinary case and thus the Department\nmistakenly provided you with records pertaining to your own case.  However, upon your\nclarification,  the Department searched for records concerning the case,  No. 2013- MBR- 41, \nwhich involved a company as the named party.  Ms. Anderson explained that this case was\nhandled by its Division of Banking,  which follows a different process than the process employed\nby its Division of Professional Regulation to regulate licensees and other entities or individuals.  \nShe stated that the Division of Banking starts its process by issuing a final order,  which a party\nmay then challenge by requesting a hearing.  If such a request is not received, then the final order\nstands.   Ms. Anderson consulted with an attorney in the Division of Banking and confirmed that\nno request for hearing was received after the division issued the final order in No. 2013-MBR-\n41.   Therefore,  the Department did not have any additional records to provide related to any\nhearings.  With regard to materials that were prepared by the Department prior to the final order, \nMs. Anderson asserted that section 1326. 220( d) of title 2 of the Illinois Administrative Code3\nprohibits the Department from disclosing those types of materials.  \n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\"  Sections 1326.210 and 1326.220 of title 2 of the Illinois Administrative Code\ncontain rules and regulations related to records maintained by the Department.   The latter section\nprovides that the Department shall not disclose, pursuant to FOIA, the following: \n\nd)         Division of Banking: \n\n1)         Confidential supervisory information. (See Section\n7(1)( a)  of FOIA and 205 ILS 635/ 1-4(ii)) \n\n2)          Information contained in or related to examination, \noperating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or\nfor the use of the Department\n\nfor the regulation or\n\n20, 2019. \n\n32 Ill. Adm. Code § 1326.220(d) (West 2024), amended at 43 Ill. Reg. 14647,  effective December\n\n\fSeptember 25, 2025\nPage 3\n\nsupervision of financial\nFOIA).[4] \n\ninstitutions. ( See Section 7(1)( t) of\n\nSection 1-4(ii) of the Residential Mortgage License Act of 19875 defines\n\nconfidential supervisory information\" as: \n\nA]ny report of examination, visitation, or investigation\n\nprepared by the Commissioner under this Act, any report of\nexamination visitation, or investigation prepared by the state\nregulatory authority of another state that examines a licensee,  any\ndocument or record prepared or obtained in connection with\nor relating to any examination,  visitation,  or investigation,  and\nany record prepared or obtained by the Commissioner to the extent\nthat the record summarizes or contains information derived from\nany report, document, or record described in this subsection. \nConfidential supervisory information\"  does not include any\ninformation or record routinely prepared by a licensee and\nmaintained in the ordinary course of business or any information or\nrecord that is required to be made publicly available pursuant to\nlaw or rule.  ( Emphasis added.) \nState or federal\n\nSection 7(1)( t) of FOIA6 exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation contained in or\n\nrelated to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of\na public body responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial\ncompanies, or pharmacy benefit managers, unless disclosure is otherwise required by State law.\"  \nThe Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that this exemption encompasses\ninformation submitted by financial institutions to regulators for examination purposes.  Ill. Att'y\nGen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 16976,  issued March 26, 2012,  at 4-5 (determining that a specific\ndatabase of information submitted by financial institutions that was used by department\nexaminers in connection with the licensing process could be withheld). \n\ninstitutions,  insurance\n\nThe Department's search appears reasonably calculated to have located records\n\nresponsive to your request.   The Department appropriately consulted with its Division of\nBanking as the case specified in your request was handled by that division.  Your previous\nFebruary 14, 2017,  request to the Department similarly sought records of the complaint, \npreliminary hearing, and formal administrative hearing for this case.  The Department confirmed\n\n42 Ill. Adm. Code § 1326.220(d) (West 2024), amended at 43 Ill. Reg. 14647, effective December\n\n20, 2019. \n\n2025.  \n\n5205 ILCS 635/1-4(ii) (West 2024), as amended by Public Act 103-1015, effective January 1,  \n\n65 ILCS 140/7(1)(t) (West 2024). \n\n\fSeptember 25, 2025\nPage 4\n\nfor the regulation or supervision of financial\n\nthat it does not maintain records related to any hearing because the named party did not request a\nhearing.  As to any complaints and investigative materials, the Department's regulations prohibit\nthe disclosure of \" confidential supervisory information\"  and \" information contained in or related\nto examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of the\nDepartment\ninstitutions.\"   Based on this office' s\nreview, the cease-and-desist order that was issued in No. 2013-MBR-41 was against a company\nthat the Department alleged to have violated provisions of the Residential Mortgage License Act\nof 1987 and the Mortgage Rescue Fraud Act.  Any complaints against the company, as well as\ninvestigative records and internal correspondence,  would pertain to the Department' s\nexamination or investigation of the company's mortgage loan activities.  Those records fall\nwithin the broad categories of records that are exempt from disclosure under the Department' s\nrules and regulations implementing the Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987 and section\n7(1)( t) of FOIA.   The Department' s February 28, 2017,  response also cited the Residential\nMortgage License Act of 1987 as a basis for partially denying your previous request.  Because\nthe Department does not possess records of any hearing or administrative proceeding in No. \n2013-MBR-41 and because the Department is prohibited from providing any remaining case file\nmaterials,  this office concludes that the Department did not improperly withhold records\nresponsive to your June 30, 2025, request.  Accordingly, this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the bottom of the first page of this letter.  \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n89273 f unf sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kathleen Anderson\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation\n555 West Monroe Street, Suite 500\nChicago,  Illinois 60661\nFPR.FOIA@illinois.gov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Investigative materials and hearing transcripts from a 2013 disciplinary order","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-89273/","full_text":"September 25, 2025\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review – 2025 PAC 89273\n\nDear\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9.5(c) (West 2024)). For the reasons set forth below, the\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn June 30, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the Illinois Department of\n\nFinancial and Professional Regulation (Department) seeking various records related to an\nadministrative order that was issued in 2013- MBR- 41. On August 28, 2025, the Department\nprovided a copy of an Order to Cease and Desist issued in No. 2013-MBR-41, subject to\nredactions pursuant to section 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b), and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 1 Additionally, the\nDepartment cited section 1326.210 of title 2 of the Illinois Administrative Code.2\n\nOn September 16, 2025, this office received your Request for Review questioning\n\nhow a disciplinary case file could consist of only a judgment order. You asserted that the\nDepartment's response was incomplete in that you did not receive any records supporting the\norder that you received, such as the complaint or initiating document, investigative materials, \ninternal communications, hearing transcripts, and exhibits or evidence considered. \n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\nopen to inspection or copying.\" 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024); see also Southern Illinoisan v. \n\n15 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) (West 2024). \n\n2019. \n\n22 Ill. Adm. Code § 1326.210 (West 2024), amended at 43 Ill. Reg. 14647, effective December 20, \n\nIllinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds\nrecords \"has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence\" that the records are exempt\nfrom disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2024). When presented with a FOIA request, a public\nbody must perform a reasonable search under the particular circumstances of the matter. Better\nGovernment Ass' n v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190038, ¶ 31. However, \"[ a] requester\nis entitled only to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain.\" Yeager v. Drug\nEnforcement Administration, 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982). \n\nOn September 24, 2025, this office spoke with the Department's FOIA officer, \n\nKathleen Anderson, regarding your request. Ms. Kathleen explained that your request was\ninitially understood to seek records concerning your disciplinary case and thus the Department\nmistakenly provided you with records pertaining to your own case. However, upon your\nclarification, the Department searched for records concerning the case, No. 2013- MBR- 41, \nwhich involved a company as the named party. Ms. Anderson explained that this case was\nhandled by its Division of Banking, which follows a different process than the process employed\nby its Division of Professional Regulation to regulate licensees and other entities or individuals. \nShe stated that the Division of Banking starts its process by issuing a final order, which a party\nmay then challenge by requesting a hearing. If such a request is not received, then the final order\nstands. Ms. Anderson consulted with an attorney in the Division of Banking and confirmed that\nno request for hearing was received after the division issued the final order in No. 2013-MBR-\n41. Therefore, the Department did not have any additional records to provide related to any\nhearings. With regard to materials that were prepared by the Department prior to the final order, \nMs. Anderson asserted that section 1326. 220(d) of title 2 of the Illinois Administrative Code3\nprohibits the Department from disclosing those types of materials. \n\nSection 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation specifically\n\nprohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal\nor State law.\" Sections 1326.210 and 1326.220 of title 2 of the Illinois Administrative Code\ncontain rules and regulations related to records maintained by the Department. The latter section\nprovides that the Department shall not disclose, pursuant to FOIA, the following: \n\nd) Division of Banking: \n\n1) Confidential supervisory information. (See Section\n7(1)(a) of FOIA and 205 ILS 635/ 1-4(ii)) \n\n2) Information contained in or related to examination, \noperating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or\nfor the use of the Department\n\nfor the regulation or\n\n20, 2019. \n\n32 Ill. Adm. Code § 1326.220(d) (West 2024), amended at 43 Ill. Reg. 14647, effective December\n\nsupervision of financial\nFOIA).[4] \n\ninstitutions. (See Section 7(1)(t) of\n\nSection 1-4(ii) of the Residential Mortgage License Act of 19875 defines\n\nconfidential supervisory information\" as: \n\nA]ny report of examination, visitation, or investigation\n\nprepared by the Commissioner under this Act, any report of\nexamination visitation, or investigation prepared by the state\nregulatory authority of another state that examines a licensee, any\ndocument or record prepared or obtained in connection with\nor relating to any examination, visitation, or investigation, and\nany record prepared or obtained by the Commissioner to the extent\nthat the record summarizes or contains information derived from\nany report, document, or record described in this subsection. \nConfidential supervisory information\" does not include any\ninformation or record routinely prepared by a licensee and\nmaintained in the ordinary course of business or any information or\nrecord that is required to be made publicly available pursuant to\nlaw or rule. (Emphasis added.) \nState or federal\n\nSection 7(1)(t) of FOIA6 exempts from disclosure \"[ i]nformation contained in or\n\nrelated to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of\na public body responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial\ncompanies, or pharmacy benefit managers, unless disclosure is otherwise required by State law.\" \nThe Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that this exemption encompasses\ninformation submitted by financial institutions to regulators for examination purposes. Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 16976, issued March 26, 2012, at 4-5 (determining that a specific\ndatabase of information submitted by financial institutions that was used by department\nexaminers in connection with the licensing process could be withheld). \n\ninstitutions, insurance\n\nThe Department's search appears reasonably calculated to have located records\n\nresponsive to your request. The Department appropriately consulted with its Division of\nBanking as the case specified in your request was handled by that division. Your previous\nFebruary 14, 2017, request to the Department similarly sought records of the complaint, \npreliminary hearing, and formal administrative hearing for this case. The Department confirmed\n\n42 Ill. Adm. Code § 1326.220(d) (West 2024), amended at 43 Ill. Reg. 14647, effective December\n\n20, 2019. \n\n2025. \n\n5205 ILCS 635/1-4(ii) (West 2024), as amended by Public Act 103-1015, effective January 1, \n\nfor the regulation or supervision of financial\n\nthat it does not maintain records related to any hearing because the named party did not request a\nhearing. As to any complaints and investigative materials, the Department's regulations prohibit\nthe disclosure of \" confidential supervisory information\" and \" information contained in or related\nto examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of the\nDepartment\ninstitutions.\" Based on this office's\nreview, the cease-and-desist order that was issued in No. 2013-MBR-41 was against a company\nthat the Department alleged to have violated provisions of the Residential Mortgage License Act\nof 1987 and the Mortgage Rescue Fraud Act. Any complaints against the company, as well as\ninvestigative records and internal correspondence, would pertain to the Department's\nexamination or investigation of the company's mortgage loan activities. Those records fall\nwithin the broad categories of records that are exempt from disclosure under the Department's\nrules and regulations implementing the Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987 and section\n7(1)(t) of FOIA. The Department's February 28, 2017, response also cited the Residential\nMortgage License Act of 1987 as a basis for partially denying your previous request. Because\nthe Department does not possess records of any hearing or administrative proceeding in No. \n2013-MBR-41 and because the Department is prohibited from providing any remaining case file\nmaterials, this office concludes that the Department did not improperly withhold records\nresponsive to your June 30, 2025, request. Accordingly, this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have questions, please contact me at the Chicago\n\naddress on the bottom of the first page of this letter. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nTERESA LIM\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n89273 f unf sa\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Kathleen Anderson\nFOIA Officer\nIllinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation\n555 West Monroe Street, Suite 500\nChicago, Illinois 60661\nFPR.FOIA@illinois.gov"}
{"id":1151,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2026-01-13","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["90484"],"title":"Lake County Sheriff's Office improperly redacted 911 call recordings under 7(1)(c)","filename":"90484, issued January 13, 2026.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2580,"summary":"ProPublica requested audio recordings of 911 calls regarding a suicidal person and a car crash, which the Lake County Sheriff's Office partially redacted. The PAC determined that the Sheriff's Office failed to demonstrate that the privacy interests outweighed the public interest in disclosure.","plain_summary":"ProPublica requested 911 audio recordings from the Lake County Sheriff's Office, which redacted the decedent's statements, citing privacy concerns for surviving family members. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau reviewed the request and concluded that the Sheriff's Office improperly redacted the recording. The Bureau found that the Sheriff's Office failed to show that privacy interests outweighed the public interest in disclosure, distinguishing the case from precedent involving graphic death-scene photographs. The determination does not explicitly order the release of the unredacted recordings, only that the redaction was improper.","holding":"The Lake County Sheriff's Office improperly redacted the requested 911 call recordings.","legal_question":"Whether the Lake County Sheriff's Office met its burden of proving that the redacted portions of a 911 call recording were exempt from disclosure under FOIA Section 7(1)(c).","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":["7(1)(c)"],"public_body":"Lake County Sheriff's Office","requesting_party":"ProPublica (Vernal Coleman/Sarah Matthews)","pac_outcome":"Improperly withheld records","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"police records","subject_description":"The request sought 911 audio recordings related to a report of a suicidal person and a subsequent vehicle crash.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/7_1/Exemptions-which-permit-redacting-withholding-exempt-information-records/7_1_c/Compelling-public-interest-in-disclosure/90484%2C%20issued%20January%2013%2C%202026.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["911 recording","privacy exemption","police records","FOIA redaction"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Police & Investigative Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 13,  2026\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs.  Sarah Matthews\n\nDeputy General Counsel\nProPublica\n\n155 Avenue of the Americas,  13th Floor\n\nNew York,  New York 10013\n\nsarah. matthews@propublica. org\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs.  Stevie Best\n\nAdministrative Clerk/ FOIA Officer\n\nLake County Sheriffs Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nsheriff@lakecountyil. gov\n\nRE:  FOIA Request\n\nfor Review —  2023 PAC 76968;  FOIA P850865- 060123\n\nDear Ms.  Matthews and Ms.  Best: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9. 5( f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act ( FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow,  the Public Access Bureau concludes that\n\nthe Lake County Sheriffs Office ( Sheriffs Office)  improperly redacted a 911 call recording\nresponsive to ProPublica' s September 8,  2025,  FOIA request. \n\nOn that date,  Mr.  Vernal Coleman,  a reporter for ProPublica,  submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest\n\nto the Sheriffs Office seeking \"[ d] igital copies of any/all audio recordings of phone calls\n\nto the Lake County 911 Communications Center reporting of a possibly suicidal person and\nsubsequent car crash at Great Lakes Naval Station received fielded by a dispatcher between the\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9.5( f) (West 2024), as amendedby Public Act 104- 438,  effective January 1,  2026. \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago,  Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive,  Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217)  782- 1090 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n\n312)  814- 3000 •  Fax: ( 312)  814- 3806\n\n618)  529- 6400 •  Fax: ( 618)  529- 6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities\n\ncan reach us by using the 7- 1- 1 relay service. \n\nwww.\n\nIllinoisAttorneyGeneral.\n\ngov\n\n\fMs.  Sarah Matthews\n\nMs.  Stevie Best\n\nJanuary 13,  2026\nPage 2\n\nhours of 8 pm and midnight on May 4,  2025.\" 2 On September 11,  2025,  the Sheriffs Office\ndenied the request pursuant\n4 Subsequently, Mr. Coleman and an attorney for ProPublica\ndeceased has the right to privacy.\"\ncalled the Sheriff' s Office to dispute its denial,  and on September 23,  2025,  the Sheriffs Office\n\nasserting that \"[ t] he family of the\n\nto section 7( 1)( c)  of FOIA, 3\n\nissued a revised response.  The Sheriffs Office disclosed the dispatchers'  side of the conversation\n\nbut still redacted the decedent' s statements from the one recording containing them,  and asserted: \n\nThe United States Supreme Court held that a deceased\n\nperson' s family members have a privacy interest in preventing the\ndisclosure of details related to their family member' s death. \nNational Archives & RecordsAdm' n v. Favish,  541 U. S.  157,  168- \n171 ( 2004).  The Supreme Court explained that \"[ f]amily members\nhave a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and\nobjecting to unwarranted public exploitation that,  by intruding\nupon their own grief,  tends to degrade the rites and respect\nseek to accord to the deceasedperson who was once their own.\"  Id. \n\nthey\n\nat 168,  124 S. Ct.  1570.  See also 2010 Ill. Att' y Gen.  Pub.  Access\nOp.  10- 003,  at 11 the Attorney General concluded that,  based on\nsection 7( 1)( c)  of FOIA (\" the release of the post- mortem\nphotographs\"  of decedents to newspaper reporters \" would\nconstitute an unwarranted invasion of the surviving family\nmembers'  personal privacy.\")  Under these precedents,  audio of the\ndecedent's words prior to his suicide would constitute an\nunwarranted invasion of surviving family members' privacy, and is\ntherefore exempt. \n\nIn an effort to protect the deceased family members' \nprivacy and to also provide transparency surrounding public\nemployees performing their job duties,  we have edited the\nrequested 911 audio.  Statements of the decedent remain redacted\n\npursuant\n911 dispatchers.  This reflects the appropriate balance between\n\nc),  but we have not withheld the statements of the\n\nto 7( 1)(\n\n2FOIAportalmessage from Vernal Coleman to Lake County Sheriffs Office ( September 8,  2025). \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7( 1)( c) ( West 2024). \n\nto Vernal Coleman ( September 11,  2025). \n\n4FOIAportalmessage from Stephanie Best, Administrative Clerk/ FOIA Officer,  Sheriff' s Office, \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Sarah Matthews\n\nMs.  Stevie Best\n\nJanuary 13,  2026\nPage 3\n\npublic interest and privacy interests pursuant to the Illinois FOIA\nstatute,  5 ILCS 140/ 7( 1)( c). [\n\n5] \n\nOn November 19,  2025,  Ms.  Sarah Matthews, Deputy General Counsel for\n\nProPublica, completed the submission of a Request for Review contesting the Sheriffs Office' s\npartial denial.  Ms. Matthews argued that the 911 recordings are distinguishable from post- \nmortem photographs,  and that any privacy interests the decedent's surviving family members\nhave in the audio recordings are clearly outweighed by the public interest in disclosure: \n\nD] isclosure of the requested audio is in the utmost public interest, \nas evidenced by ProPublica' s prior,  award -winning reporting on the\ncontents of 911 calls. [ Citation.]  Such records are routinely\nreleased and for good reason.  Members of the public have a vested\ninterest in access to complete information about 911 calls — \n\nincluding statements made by both parties to the call —so they can\nfully evaluate how first responders react in emergency situations. \nInformation gleaned from actual conversations between callers and\nemergency response personnel provide a vital oversight\ntool by\nwhich the public can identify issues that may jeopardize public\nsafety and help ensure that governments maintain an emergency\nsystem that can effectively respond when citizens need urgent\nassistance. [ 6] \n\nMs.  Matthews provided a link to ProPublica' s reportorial series on 911 call analysis and posts\nabout accolades the series had received. \n\nOn November 24,  2025, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\n\nfactual bases for the redactions. \n\nReview to the Sheriffs Office and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive\nrecordings for this office' s confidential review,  and a detailed written explanation of the legal and\nIn particular, this office asked the Sheriffs Office to explain\nwhy the privacy interests here outweigh the public interest in disclosure.  The following day, the\nSheriffs Office sent this office those materials.  As its written answer, the Sheriffs Office simply\nstated that it had provided its explanation for the redactions in its response to the request.  On\nDecember\n\n1,  2025,  Ms.  Matthews replied that because the Sheriff' s Office made no new\n\narguments,  ProPublica had no further reply. \n\n5FOIAportalmessage from Stephanie Best, Administrative Clerk/ FOIA Officer,  Sheriffs Office, \n\nto Vernal Coleman ( September 23,  2025). \n\n6Letterfrom Sarah Matthews,  Deputy General Counsel,  ProPublica,  to Public Access Counselor\nNovember 5,  2025) ( citing Brett Murphy,  Series:  Prosecutors and Judges Push for Conviction Reviews,  Ban on\nJunk Science of 911 Call Analysis,  ProPublica ( February 24,  2023,  1: 00 p. m.  EST), \nhttps:// www.propublica. org/ series/ 911- call- analysis- forensic- science- investigation). \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Sarah Matthews\n\nMs.  Stevie Best\n\nJanuary 13,  2026\nPage 4\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying.  Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that\n140/ 1. 2 ( West 2024). \n\nit is exempt. \"  5 ILCS\n\nSection 7( 1)( c)  of FOIA\n\nSection 7( 1)( c)  of FOIA exempts\n\nfrom disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records,  the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy.\"  Section 7( 1)( c)  defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy\" as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable\nperson and in which the subject' s right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest\nobtaining the information.\"  Section 7( 1)( c)  expressly does not exempt from disclosure\ninformation that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials.\" \n\nin\n\nA public body' s contention that the release of information would constitute an\n\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy is evaluated on a case - by -case basis.  Chicago\nJourneymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 v. Department ofPublic Health,  327 I11.  App. 3d 192, \n196 ( 2001). \n\nIllinois courts weigh the following four factors to evaluate the applicability of\n\nsection 7( 1)( c): \"(\n\n1)  the [ requester' s] \n\ninterest in disclosure, ( 2)  the public interest in disclosure, \n3)  the degree of invasion of personal privacy, and ( 4)  the availability of alternative means of\nobtaining the requested information.\"  National Assn of Criminal Defense Lawyers v.  Chicago\nPolice Department,  399 Ill. App.  3d 1,  13 ( 2010).  The General Assembly' s use of the language\nclearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\"  evinces a \" stricter standard to claim\nexemption\" which the government agency possessing the records bears the burden of sustaining. \nEmphasis\n\nin original.)  Schessler v. Department of Conservation,  256 I11.  App.  3d 198,  202\n\n1994). \n\nUnder the first and second factors, ProPublica's personal interest in the records is\nthe same as its professional journalistic interest.  ProPublica has a specific interest in reviewing\nto its extensive reporting on 911 call analysis.  ProPublica' s\n911 call recordings pursuant\npersonal interest in disclosure is closely aligned with the public interest in disclosure,  as\nProPublica' s reporting on 911 call analysis directly concerns the public interest in examining and\nrectifying issues surrounding the handling of 911 calls and their use in the justice system. \nProPublica has asserted a strong public interest in disclosure in the interests of public safety,  and\nit is evident that ProPublica would use the records to inform the public and policymakers about\nsignificant matters involving public health and welfare. \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Sarah Matthews\n\nMs.  Stevie Best\n\nJanuary 13,  2026\nPage 5\n\nAs to the third factor — the degree of invasion of personal privacy —the Sheriffs\n\nOffice bases its argument on the alleged privacy interests of unspecified surviving family\nmembers.  This office' s review of the unredacted copies of the responsive 911 call recordings\n\nconfirmed that one contains dialogue between a 911 caller who was later found deceased and\n\npolice dispatch.  The Sheriffs Office did not indicate that any family members had requested that\nthe recording remain confidential or otherwise asserted privacy interests in the recording.  Thus, \nthe extent to which disclosure of the decedent's words in the audio recording would in fact be\nperceived as an inappropriate intrusion by any surviving family member is not apparent from the\nSheriff' s Office' s response. \n\nAssuming that the decedent has close surviving family members who would\n\nobject to the disclosure of the unredacted recording,  however,  the Sheriffs Office has not shown\nthat the privacy interests are so high that they outweigh any legitimate public interest in\ndisclosure.  National Archives &  Records Adm' n v.  Favish is distinguishable because although\n\nthat case also concerned a reported suicide,  the records were graphic death - scene photographs, \nthe decedent' s surviving family members attested to the harassment they were already receiving\nand their anguish over a photograph that had been leaked to the press,  and the public interest in\ndisclosure was low because law enforcement had conducted an exhaustive investigation of the\n\nmatter.  Favish,  541 U. S.  at 162- 67.  Moreover,  the court' s holding was limited to recognizing\nsurviving family members' right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative' s death - \nscene images.\"  Favish,  541 U. S.  at 170.  Similarly,  the binding opinion the Sheriffs Office cited\nIll. Att' y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  10- 003,  issued October 22,  2010)  concerned graphic and gruesome\npost-mortem photographs,  and the requesting parties did not assert that disclosure would\nprovide any information regarding the causes of death that cannot be gleaned from the\ndocumentary records\"  already disclosed to them.  Ill. Att'y Gen.  Pub.  Acc.  Op.  10- 003,  at 7,  11. \n\nAlthough the Sheriff' s Office did not cite this case,  New York Times Co.  v. \n\nNational Aeronautics &  Space Administration,  782 F.  Supp.  628 ( D. D. C.  1991), \n\nis somewhat\n\nmore analogous\n\nto this matter in that it pertains to near - death audio recordings.  There,  the\n\nfederal district court found that the surviving family members of the astronauts killed in the\nSpace Shuttle Challenger disaster had a personal privacy interest in non -disclosure of the tape\nrecordings of the astronauts'  voices captured in flight that outweighed the public' s interest in\ndisclosure of the tape.  New York Times,  782 F.  Supp.  at 633.  NASA had disclosed a transcript\nof the astronauts'  last words,  withholding only the audio recording.  New York Times,  782 F. \nSupp.  at 630.  The court explained that the privacy interest was in the sound of the astronauts' \nvoices, and it was substantial because the surviving family members \" may be subjected not just\nto a barrage of mailings and personal solicitations, but also to a panoply of telephone calls from\nmedia groups as well as a disruption of their peace of mind every time a portion of the tape is\nplayed within their hearing.\"  New York Times,  782 F.  Supp.  at 631- 32.  In contrast, \nexplained,  the requester' s claim that disclosure of the recording would shed significant\n\nlight on\n\nthe court\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fs. Sarah Matthews\n\nMs.  Stevie Best\n\nJanuary 13,  2026\nPage 6\n\nNASA' s operations was \" extremely speculative\"  and unpersuasive,  particularly given that the\ndisclosed transcript revealed every word spoken onboard.  New York Times,  782 F. Supp.  at 633. \n\nUnlike the circumstances in Favish and New York Times,  which ( 1)  were high - \n\nprofile matters of national interest that had already resulted in significant intrusions of close\nfamily members'  personal privacy, ( 2)  in which surrounding issues had been thoroughly\ninvestigated by government agencies,  and ( 3)  about which documentary records setting forth\nextensive facts had been disclosed,  the information this office has received about the\n\ncircumstances of this matter indicates a lower propensity to significantly invade personal privacy\nand a greater public interest in disclosure.  While the Sheriffs Office did revise its response to\ndisclose the dispatch side of the audio recordings,  thus shedding some light on the manner in\nwhich the government employees handled the 911 call,  the disclosure of the caller' s portion of\nthe recording is essential\nwords and manner of speaking impacted the law enforcement\nclose family members might find it objectionable to disclose the caller portions of the recordings\ngiven the subject matter and timing,  this office' s review did not identify any content of the\nstatements or vocal tones that suggested overriding privacy interests in any particular portion of\nthe recordings. \n\nto ProPublica' s public interest purpose of assessing how the caller' s\nresponse.  Additionally,  while\n\nLastly, this office has not received any indication that the unredacted call\n\nrecordings can be obtained through any other means. \n\nOn balance,  this office concludes that the Sheriffs Office did not sustain its\n\nburden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the redacted portions of the recording\nare exempt from disclosure.  The legitimate and significant public interest in disclosure of an\nunredacted copy of the recording to ProPublica outweighs the implicated privacy interests as\narticulated by the Sheriffs Office.  Accordingly, this office asks the Sheriffs Office to provide\nProPublica with an unredacted copy of the recording. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that the resolution of this matter\n\ndoes not require the issuance of a binding opinion.  This file is closed.  If you have any\nquestions,  please contact me at ( 773)  590- 7951. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nBureau Chief\n\nPublic Access Bureau,  Chicago\n\n90484 f 71c improper sho\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"911 audio recordings of a suicidal person report and crash","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-90484/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 13, 2026\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Sarah Matthews\n\nDeputy General Counsel\nProPublica\n\n155 Avenue of the Americas, 13th Floor\n\nNew York, New York 10013\n\nsarah. matthews@propublica. org\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Stevie Best\n\nAdministrative Clerk/ FOIA Officer\n\nLake County Sheriffs Office\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nsheriff@lakecountyil. gov\n\nRE: FOIA Request\n\nfor Review — 2023 PAC 76968; FOIA P850865- 060123\n\nDear Ms. Matthews and Ms. Best: \n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 9. 5(f) of the Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\n\nthe Lake County Sheriffs Office (Sheriffs Office) improperly redacted a 911 call recording\nresponsive to ProPublica's September 8, 2025, FOIA request. \n\nOn that date, Mr. Vernal Coleman, a reporter for ProPublica, submitted a FOIA\n\nrequest\n\nto the Sheriffs Office seeking \"[ d] igital copies of any/all audio recordings of phone calls\n\nto the Lake County 911 Communications Center reporting of a possibly suicidal person and\nsubsequent car crash at Great Lakes Naval Station received fielded by a dispatcher between the\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9.5(f) (West 2024), as amendedby Public Act 104- 438, effective January 1, 2026. \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217) 782- 1090 • Fax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 • Fax: (312) 814- 3806\n\n618) 529- 6400 • Fax: (618) 529- 6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities\n\nhours of 8 pm and midnight on May 4, 2025.\" 2 On September 11, 2025, the Sheriffs Office\ndenied the request pursuant\n4 Subsequently, Mr. Coleman and an attorney for ProPublica\ndeceased has the right to privacy.\"\ncalled the Sheriff's Office to dispute its denial, and on September 23, 2025, the Sheriffs Office\n\nasserting that \"[ t] he family of the\n\nto section 7(1)(c) of FOIA, 3\n\nissued a revised response. The Sheriffs Office disclosed the dispatchers' side of the conversation\n\nbut still redacted the decedent's statements from the one recording containing them, and asserted: \n\nThe United States Supreme Court held that a deceased\n\nperson's family members have a privacy interest in preventing the\ndisclosure of details related to their family member's death. \nNational Archives & RecordsAdm' n v. Favish, 541 U. S. 157, 168- \n171 (2004). The Supreme Court explained that \"[ f]amily members\nhave a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and\nobjecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding\nupon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect\nseek to accord to the deceasedperson who was once their own.\" Id. \n\nthey\n\nat 168, 124 S. Ct. 1570. See also 2010 Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Access\nOp. 10- 003, at 11 the Attorney General concluded that, based on\nsection 7(1)(c) of FOIA (\" the release of the post- mortem\nphotographs\" of decedents to newspaper reporters \" would\nconstitute an unwarranted invasion of the surviving family\nmembers' personal privacy.\") Under these precedents, audio of the\ndecedent's words prior to his suicide would constitute an\nunwarranted invasion of surviving family members' privacy, and is\ntherefore exempt. \n\nIn an effort to protect the deceased family members' \nprivacy and to also provide transparency surrounding public\nemployees performing their job duties, we have edited the\nrequested 911 audio. Statements of the decedent remain redacted\n\npursuant\n911 dispatchers. This reflects the appropriate balance between\n\nc), but we have not withheld the statements of the\n\nto 7(1)(2FOIAportalmessage from Vernal Coleman to Lake County Sheriffs Office (September 8, 2025). \n\n35 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(c) (West 2024). \n\nto Vernal Coleman (September 11, 2025). \n\n4FOIAportalmessage from Stephanie Best, Administrative Clerk/ FOIA Officer, Sheriff's Office, \n\npublic interest and privacy interests pursuant to the Illinois FOIA\nstatute, 5 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(c). [\n\n5] \n\nOn November 19, 2025, Ms. Sarah Matthews, Deputy General Counsel for\n\nProPublica, completed the submission of a Request for Review contesting the Sheriffs Office's\npartial denial. Ms. Matthews argued that the 911 recordings are distinguishable from post- \nmortem photographs, and that any privacy interests the decedent's surviving family members\nhave in the audio recordings are clearly outweighed by the public interest in disclosure: \n\nD] isclosure of the requested audio is in the utmost public interest, \nas evidenced by ProPublica's prior, award -winning reporting on the\ncontents of 911 calls. [ Citation.] Such records are routinely\nreleased and for good reason. Members of the public have a vested\ninterest in access to complete information about 911 calls — \n\nincluding statements made by both parties to the call —so they can\nfully evaluate how first responders react in emergency situations. \nInformation gleaned from actual conversations between callers and\nemergency response personnel provide a vital oversight\ntool by\nwhich the public can identify issues that may jeopardize public\nsafety and help ensure that governments maintain an emergency\nsystem that can effectively respond when citizens need urgent\nassistance. [ 6] \n\nMs. Matthews provided a link to ProPublica's reportorial series on 911 call analysis and posts\nabout accolades the series had received. \n\nOn November 24, 2025, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\n\nfactual bases for the redactions. \n\nReview to the Sheriffs Office and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the responsive\nrecordings for this office's confidential review, and a detailed written explanation of the legal and\nIn particular, this office asked the Sheriffs Office to explain\nwhy the privacy interests here outweigh the public interest in disclosure. The following day, the\nSheriffs Office sent this office those materials. As its written answer, the Sheriffs Office simply\nstated that it had provided its explanation for the redactions in its response to the request. On\nDecember\n\n1, 2025, Ms. Matthews replied that because the Sheriff's Office made no new\n\narguments, ProPublica had no further reply. \n\n5FOIAportalmessage from Stephanie Best, Administrative Clerk/ FOIA Officer, Sheriffs Office, \n\nto Vernal Coleman (September 23, 2025). \n\n6 Letterfrom Sarah Matthews, Deputy General Counsel, ProPublica, to Public Access Counselor\nNovember 5, 2025) (citing Brett Murphy, Series: Prosecutors and Judges Push for Conviction Reviews, Ban on\nJunk Science of 911 Call Analysis, ProPublica (February 24, 2023, 1: 00 p. m. EST), \nhttps:// www.propublica. org/ series/ 911- call- analysis- forensic- science- investigation). \n\nDETERMINATION\n\nAll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be\n\nopen to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from\ndisclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that\n140/ 1. 2 (West 2024). \n\nit is exempt. \" 5 ILCS\n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA\n\nSection 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts\n\nfrom disclosure \"[ p] ersonal\n\ninformation\n\ncontained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted\ninvasion of personal privacy.\" Section 7(1)(c) defines \" unwarranted invasion of personal\nprivacy\" as \" the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable\nperson and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest\nobtaining the information.\" Section 7(1)(c) expressly does not exempt from disclosure\ninformation that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials.\" \n\nin\n\nA public body's contention that the release of information would constitute an\n\nunwarranted invasion of personal privacy is evaluated on a case - by -case basis. Chicago\nJourneymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 v. Department ofPublic Health, 327 I11. App. 3d 192, \n196 (2001). \n\nIllinois courts weigh the following four factors to evaluate the applicability of\n\nsection 7(1)(c): \"(1) the [ requester's] \n\ninterest in disclosure, (2) the public interest in disclosure, \n3) the degree of invasion of personal privacy, and (4) the availability of alternative means of\nobtaining the requested information.\" National Assn of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago\nPolice Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 (2010). The General Assembly's use of the language\nclearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy\" evinces a \" stricter standard to claim\nexemption\" which the government agency possessing the records bears the burden of sustaining. \nEmphasis\n\nin original.) Schessler v. Department of Conservation, 256 I11. App. 3d 198, 202\n\n1994). \n\nUnder the first and second factors, ProPublica's personal interest in the records is\nthe same as its professional journalistic interest. ProPublica has a specific interest in reviewing\nto its extensive reporting on 911 call analysis. ProPublica's\n911 call recordings pursuant\npersonal interest in disclosure is closely aligned with the public interest in disclosure, as\nProPublica's reporting on 911 call analysis directly concerns the public interest in examining and\nrectifying issues surrounding the handling of 911 calls and their use in the justice system. \nProPublica has asserted a strong public interest in disclosure in the interests of public safety, and\nit is evident that ProPublica would use the records to inform the public and policymakers about\n\nAs to the third factor — the degree of invasion of personal privacy —the Sheriffs\n\nOffice bases its argument on the alleged privacy interests of unspecified surviving family\nmembers. This office's review of the unredacted copies of the responsive 911 call recordings\n\nconfirmed that one contains dialogue between a 911 caller who was later found deceased and\n\npolice dispatch. The Sheriffs Office did not indicate that any family members had requested that\nthe recording remain confidential or otherwise asserted privacy interests in the recording. Thus, \nthe extent to which disclosure of the decedent's words in the audio recording would in fact be\nperceived as an inappropriate intrusion by any surviving family member is not apparent from the\nSheriff's Office's response. \n\nAssuming that the decedent has close surviving family members who would\n\nobject to the disclosure of the unredacted recording, however, the Sheriffs Office has not shown\nthat the privacy interests are so high that they outweigh any legitimate public interest in\ndisclosure. National Archives & Records Adm' n v. Favish is distinguishable because although\n\nthat case also concerned a reported suicide, the records were graphic death - scene photographs, \nthe decedent's surviving family members attested to the harassment they were already receiving\nand their anguish over a photograph that had been leaked to the press, and the public interest in\ndisclosure was low because law enforcement had conducted an exhaustive investigation of the\n\nmatter. Favish, 541 U. S. at 162- 67. Moreover, the court's holding was limited to recognizing\nsurviving family members' right to personal privacy with respect to their close relative's death - \nscene images.\" Favish, 541 U. S. at 170. Similarly, the binding opinion the Sheriffs Office cited\nIll. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. 10- 003, issued October 22, 2010) concerned graphic and gruesome\npost-mortem photographs, and the requesting parties did not assert that disclosure would\nprovide any information regarding the causes of death that cannot be gleaned from the\ndocumentary records\" already disclosed to them. Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. 10- 003, at 7, 11. \n\nAlthough the Sheriff's Office did not cite this case, New York Times Co. v. \n\nNational Aeronautics & Space Administration, 782 F. Supp. 628 (D. D. C. 1991), \n\nis somewhat\n\nmore analogous\n\nto this matter in that it pertains to near - death audio recordings. There, the\n\nfederal district court found that the surviving family members of the astronauts killed in the\nSpace Shuttle Challenger disaster had a personal privacy interest in non -disclosure of the tape\nrecordings of the astronauts' voices captured in flight that outweighed the public's interest in\ndisclosure of the tape. New York Times, 782 F. Supp. at 633. NASA had disclosed a transcript\nof the astronauts' last words, withholding only the audio recording. New York Times, 782 F. \nSupp. at 630. The court explained that the privacy interest was in the sound of the astronauts' \nvoices, and it was substantial because the surviving family members \" may be subjected not just\nto a barrage of mailings and personal solicitations, but also to a panoply of telephone calls from\nmedia groups as well as a disruption of their peace of mind every time a portion of the tape is\nplayed within their hearing.\" New York Times, 782 F. Supp. at 631- 32. In contrast, \n\nNASA's operations was \" extremely speculative\" and unpersuasive, particularly given that the\ndisclosed transcript revealed every word spoken onboard. New York Times, 782 F. Supp. at 633. \n\nUnlike the circumstances in Favish and New York Times, which (1) were high - \n\nprofile matters of national interest that had already resulted in significant intrusions of close\nfamily members' personal privacy, (2) in which surrounding issues had been thoroughly\ninvestigated by government agencies, and (3) about which documentary records setting forth\nextensive facts had been disclosed, the information this office has received about the\n\ncircumstances of this matter indicates a lower propensity to significantly invade personal privacy\nand a greater public interest in disclosure. While the Sheriffs Office did revise its response to\ndisclose the dispatch side of the audio recordings, thus shedding some light on the manner in\nwhich the government employees handled the 911 call, the disclosure of the caller's portion of\nthe recording is essential\nwords and manner of speaking impacted the law enforcement\nclose family members might find it objectionable to disclose the caller portions of the recordings\ngiven the subject matter and timing, this office's review did not identify any content of the\nstatements or vocal tones that suggested overriding privacy interests in any particular portion of\nthe recordings. \n\nto ProPublica's public interest purpose of assessing how the caller's\nresponse. Additionally, while\n\nLastly, this office has not received any indication that the unredacted call\n\nrecordings can be obtained through any other means. \n\nOn balance, this office concludes that the Sheriffs Office did not sustain its\n\nburden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the redacted portions of the recording\nare exempt from disclosure. The legitimate and significant public interest in disclosure of an\nunredacted copy of the recording to ProPublica outweighs the implicated privacy interests as\narticulated by the Sheriffs Office. Accordingly, this office asks the Sheriffs Office to provide\nProPublica with an unredacted copy of the recording. \n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that the resolution of this matter\n\ndoes not require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any\nquestions, please contact me at (773) 590- 7951. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nBureau Chief\n\nPublic Access Bureau, Chicago\n\n90484 f 71c improper sho\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1152,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2026-01-05","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["90586"],"title":"Township High School District 113 advised on multipart FOIA request obligations","filename":"90586, issued January 5, 2026.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1923,"summary":"The requester submitted a twenty-two-part FOIA request to Township High School District 113 for various administrative and employment records, and the PAC closed the file without further action while providing guidance on FOIA compliance.","plain_summary":"A requester asked a school district for a large volume of documents, and the PAC reviewed the district's response. The PAC decided to close the case without taking formal action against the district, but reminded the district that it must clearly explain when it does not have records responsive to specific parts of a request. The PAC also advised the requester to keep future complaints focused strictly on FOIA and Open Meetings Act issues.","holding":"The PAC determined that no further action was necessary and closed the file, while advising the District on its obligations to clearly identify non-responsive portions of multipart requests.","legal_question":"Whether the District complied with its obligations under FOIA to respond to a multipart request for public records.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Township High School District 113","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"FOIA compliance","subject_description":"The request involved a broad, twenty-two-part FOIA request seeking various school district policies, employment records, and investigative documents.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/3/3_g/Categorical-requests/90586%2C%20issued%20January%205%2C%202026.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["FOIA request","school district","multipart request","public records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"FOIA Response Process","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nJanuary 5,  2026\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Kathryn Anderson\n\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\n\n1040 Park Avenue West\n\nHighland Park,  Illinois 60035\n\nkanderson@dist113. org\n\nRE:  FOIA Request\n\nfor Review —  2025 PAC 90586\n\nDear\n\nand Ms.  Anderson: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9. 5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau will take\nno further action in this matter, but this letter provides guidance in the Public Access Bureau's\neducational capacity.\n\n2\n\nOn September\n\n11,  2025, \n\nsubmitted a twenty -two- part FOIA\n\nrequest to Township High School District 113 ( District) seeking copies of various categories of\nrecords,  such as certain District policies,  mission statements,  job postings,  employment\napplications,  correspondence,  and documents regarding investigations of applicants and District\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9. 5( c) ( West 2024). \n\nadvice and education to both the public and public officials.  See 15 ILCS 205/ 7( a), ( b), ( c) ( West 2024). \n\n2In addition to resolving Requests for Review, the Public Access Bureau is charged with providing\n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago,  Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive,  Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217)  782- 1090 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n\n312)  814- 3000 •  Fax: ( 312)  814- 3806\n\n618)  529- 6400 •  Fax: ( 618)  529- 6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities\n\ncan reach us by using the 7- 1- 1 relay service. \n\nwww.\n\nIllinoisAttomeyGeneral. gov\n\n\fMs.  Kathryn Anderson\n\nJanuary 5,  2026\nPage 2\n\nemployees.  On September 18,  2025,  the District notified\nrequest as \" voluminous\"  as defined in section 2( h)  of FOIA. 3 The District informed\n\nthat it was treating the\n\nthat he had ten business days to amend the request such that it would no longer be voluminous, \n\nwhich he declined to do.  Therefore,  the District extended its time to respond to the request\nto section 3. 6( d)  of FOIA. 4 On October 9,  2025,  the District respond by providing\npursuant\nwith a link to the District' s website for the policies and missions statement,  citing\n\nsection 8. 5( a)  of FOIA. 5 The District also provided\ndeemed responsive to the request,  but indicated that it redacted and withheld other information\n\nwith copies of some records it\n\nand documents pursuant\n\nto sections 7( 1)( a),  7( 1)( b),  7( 1)( c),  7( 1)( f), and 7. 5( r) of FOIA. 6\n\nOn November 12,  2025, \n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau challenging the District' s response. \n\nIn his Request for Review, \n\nargued,  among other\n\nthings,  that \"[ n] one of the enumerated requests are responded to\n\nindividually or specifically.  The appended documents shed little if any light as to what the\n7\nDistrict is responding to what it is ignoring or to which it has no responsive documents.\"\n\nAlthough FOIA \" is not intended to compel public bodies to interpret or advise\n\nrequesters as to the meaning or significance of the public recordsi8 when a FOIA request\ncontains multiple parts, a public body's response should clearly identify which records\ncorrespond to each portion of the request.  See Ill. Att' y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 30548,  issued\nJuly 10,  2015,  at 3;  see also Rockford Police Benevolent and Protective Assn,  Unit No.  6 v. \nMorrissey,  398 Ill. App.  3d 145,  150 ( 2010) (\" To meet its burden * * *, \nthe public body must\nprovide a detailed justification for its claim of exemption,  addressing the requested records\nspecifically and in a manner allowing for adequate adversarial\nbody does not maintain any records that respond to portions of a request,  it should explicitly tell\nthe requester in its response.  See Ill. Att'y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 57553,  issued April 22, \n2019. \n\ntesting.\").  Likewise,  if a public\n\n35 ILCS 140/ 2( h) ( West 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 3. 6( d) ( West 2024). \n\n55 ILCS 140/ 8. 5( a) ( West 2024). \n\n65 ILCS 140/ 7( 1)( a), (\n\n1)( b), ( 1)( c), ( 1)( f) (West 2024);  5 ILCS 140/ 7. 5 ( West 2024),  as amended\n\nby Public Acts 104- 010,  effective June 16,  2025;  104- 018,  effective June 30,  2025;  104- 417,  effective August\n2025;  104- 428,  effective August\n\n18,  2025. \n\n15, \n\nAccess Bureau ( November\n\n11,  2025). \n\nLetter from\n\nto Public Access Counselor,  Office of the Attorney General,  Public\n\n85 ILCS 140/ 3. 3 ( West 2024). \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Kathryn Anderson\n\nJanuary 5,  2026\nPage 3\n\nIn this instance,  the District's response did not make clear to which parts of\n\nto which parts the District did not\nmaintain responsive records,  or which records were redacted or withheld under the cited FOIA\n\nthe provided records corresponded, \n\nFOIA request\n\nexemptions.  Nonetheless, \n\nrequest\n\nis unduly burdensome on its face. \n\nSection 3( g)  of FOIA9 provides,  in pertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\n\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest\nin the information.  Before invoking\nthis exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions.  If any public body\nresponds to a categorical\nrequest by stating that compliance would\nunduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are\nmet,  it shall do so in writing,  specifying the reasons why it would\nbe unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body.  Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request\n\nfor information. \n\nIllinois courts analyzing section 3( g)  of FOIA have determined that a categorical FOIA request\nseeking a broad range of records must be specifically targeted to advance a significant public\ninterest to outweigh the burden of compliance on a public body.  See, for example,  Sargent\nShriver National Center on Poverty Law,  Inc.  v. Board of Education of City of Chicago,  2018 IL\nApp ( 1st)  171846, ¶¶  39- 41 ( determining that although the topic of the school -to -prison pipeline\nis of significant public interest,  the year -long scope of the request\nreports in a large school district was indicative of a fishing expedition rather than an\nappropriately targeted request,  such as a request limited to suspected misconduct within a\nspecific school or of a specific officer,  or schools with the highest student arrest\n\nfor employee misconduct\n\nrates);  National\n\nAss' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v.  Chicago Police Department,  399 Ill. App.  3d 1,  17 ( 2010) \n\nA request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate, review, redact and\n\narrange for inspection a vast quantity of material\n\nthat is largely unnecessary to the [ requester' s] \n\nan undue burden.\");  see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 69259,  issued\n\npurpose constitutes\nFebruary 1,  2022,  at 3- 4 ( taking no further action on a request\nseeking categories of communications because the requests were overly broad and unduly\nburdensome on their face,  and the requester did not identify a public interest\noutweighed the burden of compliance). \n\nfor review involving five requests\n\nin disclosure that\n\n95 ILCS 140/ 3( g) ( West 2024). \n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Kathryn Anderson\n\nJanuary 5,  2026\nPage 4\n\nHere, \n\nrequest is vast in scope,  seeking twenty-two different\n\ncategories of records,  some of which do not include specific time parameters.  Other portions\nseek broad categories of records rather than those tailored to the requests' primary purpose, \nwhich\nargued was improper and may have potentially violated State and federal anti -discrimination\nlaws.  The Request for Review also indicates that the request\n\nindicated was to discover information about a District hiring decision that he\n\nis intended to shed light on\n\nsystematic misconduct and a lack of oversight and corrective action.  While there is certainly\npublic interest\nin the disclosure of information regarding the District' s hiring process and alleged\nmisconduct,  it is not apparent to this office that the stated public interest warrants the disclosure\nof all the requested records.  See, for example,  Ill. Att' y Gen.  PAC Req.  Rev.  Ltr. 47671,  issued\nAugust 10,  2017,  at 4 (\" There is no question that the public interest in collective bargaining\ngenerally and unionization at Noble is high,  but there is no indication that [ the requester' s] \nrequest for all e-mails sent or received by the three individuals at issue over that 17- day period\ncontaining the broad term ' union'  could not be appropriately narrowed to more specifically target\n\nrecords responsive\n\nto the purpose of her request.\").  Although the District did not raise the\n\nsection 3( g)  exemption in its response to the request,  it may appropriately offer\nopportunity to narrow his request to manageable proportions at this time under these\ncircumstances.  See Kelly v.  Village of Kenilworth,  2019 IL App ( 1st)  170780, ¶  49. \n\nthe\n\nBecause the FOIA request at issue in this matter is overly broad and because the\nDistrict' s response lacks sufficient detail concerning the extent to which it possesses responsive\nrecords and the nature of the records that were withheld,  this office will not take further action at\n\nthis juncture but instead asks the parties to confer about potentially resolving this matter,  at least\npartially,  in a mutually agreeable manner.  We suggest that the District confer with\nto clarify its response and the type of records that were withheld and recommend that\n\nsignificantly narrow the scope of his request to exclude any documents the District has\n\nalready provided to him and to more specifically target records directly responsive to the purpose\nof his request.  For example, \nfrom any source concerning\nto complaints\nconcerning particular topics or subject matters.  For each part of the request,  the District should\nissue a response that clearly delineates which specific records correspond to which portion of the\nrequest\nwhether records responsive to each part of the request were withheld or redacted and a citation to\nthe exemption( s)  that the District relied upon for those actions.  If the District has no documents\n\nmay wish to revise his request for \" prior complaints\nduring his tenure as athletic director\"  1° \n\nin a manner that would allow for adequate adversarial\n\ntesting,  including explaining\n\nresponsive to a particular portion of the multipart request, it should expressly state that in its\n\nresponse. \n\nThis office also notes that\n\ns Request for Review contains allegations\n\nand arguments beyond the scope of this office's authority, which is limited to reviewing alleged\n\n11,  2025). \n\n10Letter\n\nfrom\n\nto Dr.  Chala Holland,  Township High School District 113 ( September\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fMs.  Kathryn Anderson\n\nJanuary 5,  2026\nPage 5\n\nviolations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. ( West 2024)).  See\n15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West 2024).  If\nshould limit his complaints to FOIA and OMA matters that the General Assembly has authorized\nthe Public Access Counselor to review. \n\nsubmits any future Requests for Review,  he\n\nThis file is closed.  If you have FOIA questions,  my e- mail address is\n\nshannon.barnaby@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\n\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n90586 f no fi war sd\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"School district policies, employment records, and investigative documents","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-90586/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nJanuary 5, 2026\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Kathryn Anderson\n\nFreedom of Information Act Officer\n\n1040 Park Avenue West\n\nHighland Park, Illinois 60035\n\nkanderson@dist113. org\n\nRE: FOIA Request\n\nfor Review — 2025 PAC 90586\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Anderson: \n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 9. 5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nInformation Act (FOIA). 1 For the reasons explained below, the Public Access Bureau will take\nno further action in this matter, but this letter provides guidance in the Public Access Bureau's\neducational capacity.\n\n2\n\nOn September\n\n11, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a twenty -two- part FOIA\n\nrequest to Township High School District 113 (District) seeking copies of various categories of\nrecords, such as certain District policies, mission statements, job postings, employment\napplications, correspondence, and documents regarding investigations of applicants and District\n\n15 ILCS 140/ 9. 5(c) (West 2024). \n\nadvice and education to both the public and public officials. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(a), (b), (c) (West 2024). \n\n2 In addition to resolving Requests for Review, the Public Access Bureau is charged with providing\n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217) 782- 1090 • Fax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 • Fax: (312) 814- 3806\n\nemployees. On September 18, 2025, the District notified\nrequest as \" voluminous\" as defined in section 2(h) of FOIA. 3 The District informed\n\nthat it was treating the\n\nthat he had ten business days to amend the request such that it would no longer be voluminous, \n\nwhich he declined to do. Therefore, the District extended its time to respond to the request\nto section 3. 6(d) of FOIA. 4 On October 9, 2025, the District respond by providing\npursuant\nwith a link to the District's website for the policies and missions statement, citing\n\nsection 8. 5(a) of FOIA. 5 The District also provided\ndeemed responsive to the request, but indicated that it redacted and withheld other information\n\nwith copies of some records it\n\nand documents pursuant\n\nto sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), 7(1)(f), and 7. 5(r) of FOIA. 6\n\nOn November 12, 2025, \n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau challenging the District's response. \n\nIn his Request for Review, \n\nargued, among other\n\nthings, that \"[ n] one of the enumerated requests are responded to\n\nindividually or specifically. The appended documents shed little if any light as to what the\n7\nDistrict is responding to what it is ignoring or to which it has no responsive documents.\"\n\nAlthough FOIA \" is not intended to compel public bodies to interpret or advise\n\nrequesters as to the meaning or significance of the public recordsi8 when a FOIA request\ncontains multiple parts, a public body's response should clearly identify which records\ncorrespond to each portion of the request. See Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 30548, issued\nJuly 10, 2015, at 3; see also Rockford Police Benevolent and Protective Assn, Unit No. 6 v. \nMorrissey, 398 Ill. App. 3d 145, 150 (2010) (\" To meet its burden * * *, \nthe public body must\nprovide a detailed justification for its claim of exemption, addressing the requested records\nspecifically and in a manner allowing for adequate adversarial\nbody does not maintain any records that respond to portions of a request, it should explicitly tell\nthe requester in its response. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 57553, issued April 22, \n2019. \n\ntesting.\"). Likewise, if a public\n\n35 ILCS 140/ 2(h) (West 2024). \n\n45 ILCS 140/ 3. 6(d) (West 2024). \n\n55 ILCS 140/ 8. 5(a) (West 2024). \n\n65 ILCS 140/ 7(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(f) (West 2024); 5 ILCS 140/ 7. 5 (West 2024), as amended\n\nby Public Acts 104- 010, effective June 16, 2025; 104- 018, effective June 30, 2025; 104- 417, effective August\n2025; 104- 428, effective August\n\n18, 2025. \n\n15, \n\nAccess Bureau (November\n\nIn this instance, the District's response did not make clear to which parts of\n\nto which parts the District did not\nmaintain responsive records, or which records were redacted or withheld under the cited FOIA\n\nthe provided records corresponded, \n\nFOIA request\n\nexemptions. Nonetheless, \n\nrequest\n\nis unduly burdensome on its face. \n\nSection 3(g) of FOIA9 provides, in pertinent part: \n\nRequests calling for all records falling within a category\n\nshall be complied with unless compliance with the request would\n\nbe unduly burdensome for the complying public body and there is\nno way to narrow the request and the burden on the public body\noutweighs the public interest\nin the information. Before invoking\nthis exemption, the public body shall extend to the person making\nthe request an opportunity to confer with it in an attempt to reduce\nthe request to manageable proportions. If any public body\nresponds to a categorical\nrequest by stating that compliance would\nunduly burden its operation and the conditions described above are\nmet, it shall do so in writing, specifying the reasons why it would\nbe unduly burdensome and the extent to which compliance will so\nburden the operations of the public body. Such a response shall be\ntreated as a denial of the request\n\nfor information. \n\nIllinois courts analyzing section 3(g) of FOIA have determined that a categorical FOIA request\nseeking a broad range of records must be specifically targeted to advance a significant public\ninterest to outweigh the burden of compliance on a public body. See, for example, Sargent\nShriver National Center on Poverty Law, Inc. v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2018 IL\nApp (1st) 171846, ¶¶ 39- 41 (determining that although the topic of the school -to -prison pipeline\nis of significant public interest, the year -long scope of the request\nreports in a large school district was indicative of a fishing expedition rather than an\nappropriately targeted request, such as a request limited to suspected misconduct within a\nspecific school or of a specific officer, or schools with the highest student arrest\n\nfor employee misconduct\n\nrates); National\n\nAss' n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2010) \n\nA request that is overly broad and requires the public body to locate, review, redact and\n\narrange for inspection a vast quantity of material\n\nthat is largely unnecessary to the [ requester's] \n\nan undue burden.\"); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 69259, issued\n\npurpose constitutes\nFebruary 1, 2022, at 3- 4 (taking no further action on a request\nseeking categories of communications because the requests were overly broad and unduly\nburdensome on their face, and the requester did not identify a public interest\n\nHere, \n\nrequest is vast in scope, seeking twenty-two different\n\ncategories of records, some of which do not include specific time parameters. Other portions\nseek broad categories of records rather than those tailored to the requests' primary purpose, \nwhich\nargued was improper and may have potentially violated State and federal anti -discrimination\nlaws. The Request for Review also indicates that the request\n\nindicated was to discover information about a District hiring decision that he\n\nis intended to shed light on\n\nsystematic misconduct and a lack of oversight and corrective action. While there is certainly\npublic interest\nin the disclosure of information regarding the District's hiring process and alleged\nmisconduct, it is not apparent to this office that the stated public interest warrants the disclosure\nof all the requested records. See, for example, Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47671, issued\nAugust 10, 2017, at 4 (\" There is no question that the public interest in collective bargaining\ngenerally and unionization at Noble is high, but there is no indication that [ the requester's] \nrequest for all e-mails sent or received by the three individuals at issue over that 17- day period\ncontaining the broad term ' union' could not be appropriately narrowed to more specifically target\n\nrecords responsive\n\nto the purpose of her request.\"). Although the District did not raise the\n\nsection 3(g) exemption in its response to the request, it may appropriately offer\nopportunity to narrow his request to manageable proportions at this time under these\ncircumstances. See Kelly v. Village of Kenilworth, 2019 IL App (1st) 170780, ¶ 49. \n\nthe\n\nBecause the FOIA request at issue in this matter is overly broad and because the\nDistrict's response lacks sufficient detail concerning the extent to which it possesses responsive\nrecords and the nature of the records that were withheld, this office will not take further action at\n\nthis juncture but instead asks the parties to confer about potentially resolving this matter, at least\npartially, in a mutually agreeable manner. We suggest that the District confer with\nto clarify its response and the type of records that were withheld and recommend that\n\nsignificantly narrow the scope of his request to exclude any documents the District has\n\nalready provided to him and to more specifically target records directly responsive to the purpose\nof his request. For example, \nfrom any source concerning\nto complaints\nconcerning particular topics or subject matters. For each part of the request, the District should\nissue a response that clearly delineates which specific records correspond to which portion of the\nrequest\nwhether records responsive to each part of the request were withheld or redacted and a citation to\nthe exemption(s) that the District relied upon for those actions. If the District has no documents\n\nmay wish to revise his request for \" prior complaints\nduring his tenure as athletic director\" 1° \n\nin a manner that would allow for adequate adversarial\n\ntesting, including explaining\n\nresponsive to a particular portion of the multipart request, it should expressly state that in its\n\nresponse. \n\nThis office also notes that\n\ns Request for Review contains allegations\n\nand arguments beyond the scope of this office's authority, which is limited to reviewing alleged\n\nviolations of FOIA and the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. (West 2024)). See\n15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2024). If\nshould limit his complaints to FOIA and OMA matters that the General Assembly has authorized\nthe Public Access Counselor to review. \n\nsubmits any future Requests for Review, he\n\nThis file is closed. If you have FOIA questions, my e- mail address is\n\nshannon.barnaby@ilag.gov. \n\nVery truly yours, \n\nSHANNON BARNABY\n\nSenior Assistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n90586 f no fi war sd\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1153,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":null,"date_issued":"2025-12-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["91083"],"title":"Village of Minier may charge fee for paper copies when records not in electronic format","filename":"91083, issued December 24, 2025.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":817,"summary":"A requester challenged the Village of Minier's assessment of copying fees for paper records, arguing that they should be provided in electronic format at no cost. The PAC determined that because the records are maintained only in paper format, the Village is not required to provide them electronically and may charge a fee for paper copies.","plain_summary":"A citizen requested bank statements from the Village of Minier and asked for them in electronic format to avoid fees. The Village stated they only keep these records on paper and charged a fee to copy them, which the citizen challenged. The Attorney General's office ruled that the Village is allowed to charge for paper copies because they are not required to scan paper documents into an electronic format for a FOIA request.","holding":"The Village of Minier did not violate FOIA by charging a fee for paper copies of records that are not maintained in an electronic format.","legal_question":"Whether a public body is required to provide records in an electronic format and waive fees when the records are only maintained in paper format.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 140/3","5 ILCS 140/6"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"FOIA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Minier","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"fees","subject_description":"The requester sought bank statements from the Village of Minier and contested the assessment of copying fees for paper records.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/FOIA/6/6_b/91083%2C%20issued%20December%2024%2C%202025.pdf","sha256":null,"needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["fees","copying costs","electronic records","paper records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Fees & Burdensome Requests","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 24,  2025\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE:  FOIA Request for Review —  2025 PAC 91083\n\nDear\n\nInformation Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 9. 5( c) ( West 2024)).  For the reasons explained below,  the\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9. 5( c)  of the Freedom of\n\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 2,  2025,  you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Minier\n\nfor 2020,  2021,  2022,  2023,  and 2024.  On December 9,  2025,  the Village provided\n\nVillage)  seeking copies of the Village' s bank statements from September,  October,  and\nNovember\nyou with the first 50 pages of responsive records in portable document format ( PDF)  and\nresponded that it would provide the remaining 444 pages once you had paid a fee pursuant\nsection 6( b)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 6( b) ( West 2024)).  On December 10,  2025,  you replied that\nyou had asked for PDF copies and should not be assessed any fee.  On that same date,  the\nVillage explained that it did not maintain the records in electronic format and therefore could\n\nto\n\ncharge the fee for copies of the records.  Also on that date,  you submitted the above -referenced\nRequest for Review contesting the Village's assessment of a fee. \n\nSection 3( b)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3( b) ( West 2024))  provides: \n\nSubject to the fee provisions of Section 6 of this Act, each\npublic body shall promptly provide,  to any person who submits a\nrequest,  a copy of any public record required to be disclosed by\nsubsection ( a)  of this Section and shall certify such copy if so\nrequested. \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield,  Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago,  Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive,  Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217)  782- 1090 •  Fax: ( 217)  782- 7046\n\n312)  814- 3000 •  Fax: ( 312)  814- 3806\n\n618)  529- 6400 •  Fax: ( 618)  529- 6416\n\nIndividuals with hearing or speech disabilities\n\ncan reach us by using the 7- 1- 1 relay service. \n\nwww.\n\nIllinoisAttorneyGeneral.\n\ngov\n\n\fDecember 24,  2025\n\nPage 2\n\nSections 6( a)  and 6( b)  of FOIA ( 5 ILCS 140/ 6( a), ( b) ( West 2024))  address the\napplicable fees for copies of electronic and paper records.  Section 6( a)  of FOIA provides,  in\npertinent part: \" When a person requests a copy of a record maintained in an electronic format, \nthe public body shall furnish it in the electronic format specified by the requester, if feasible.\" \nEmphasis added.)  Section 6( b)  of FOIA provides, in pertinent part: \n\nExcept when a fee is otherwise fixed by statute, each public\nbody may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual\ncost for reproducing and certifying public records and for the use, \nby any person, of the equipment of the public body to copy\nrecords. No fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of black and\nwhite, letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester. The fee\nfor black and white,  letter or legal sized copies shall not exceed 15\n\ncents per page. \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that \"[ t] he plain language of section 6( a) \nrequires a public body to provide records in electronic format ifthe public body maintains those\nrecords in electronic format. * * * [\n\nS] ection 6( a)  does not require a public body to furnish in\n\nelectronic format records maintained solely in paper format, even if the public body has the\nresources to reproduce those records in PDF.\" \n\nIll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 28697,  issued\n\nApril 18,  2014,  at 2. ( Emphasis in original.) \n\nOn December 23,  2025,  the Village Clerk confirmed in a telephone conversation\n\nwith a Supervising Attorney in the Public Access Bureau that,  although the Village offered to\nprovide you with the remaining 444 pages via e- mail,  it has not yet scanned those pages in and\nmaintains the records only in paper format.  Because the Village is not required to provide you\nwith electronic copies of records that are maintained only in paper format,  and because section\n6( b)  of FOIA allows the Village to charge 15 cents per page for paper copies,  the Village' s fee\nassessment did not violate the requirements of FOIA.  Accordingly,  this office concludes that\nyour Request\n\nfor Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed.  If you have any questions,  please contact me at ( 773)  590- \n\n7878 or benjamin. silver@ilag. gov. \n\n91083 f unf mun\n\nVery truly yours, \n\nBENJAMIN J.  SILVER\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\fDecember 24,  2025\n\nPage 3\n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs.  Sasha Horner\n\nClerk/ Collector\n\nVillage of Minier\n\n110 West Central\n\nMinier,  Illinois 61759\n\nminier@minier. com\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Bank statements and copying fees for paper records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-91083/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nDecember 24, 2025\n\nKWAME RAOUL\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: FOIA Request for Review — 2025 PAC 91083\n\nDear\n\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 9. 5(c) (West 2024)). For the reasons explained below, the\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant\n\nto section 9. 5(c) of the Freedom of\n\nPublic Access Bureau has determined that this Request for Review is unfounded. \n\nOn December 2, 2025, you submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Minier\n\nfor 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024. On December 9, 2025, the Village provided\n\nVillage) seeking copies of the Village's bank statements from September, October, and\nNovember\nyou with the first 50 pages of responsive records in portable document format (PDF) and\nresponded that it would provide the remaining 444 pages once you had paid a fee pursuant\nsection 6(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(b) (West 2024)). On December 10, 2025, you replied that\nyou had asked for PDF copies and should not be assessed any fee. On that same date, the\nVillage explained that it did not maintain the records in electronic format and therefore could\n\nto\n\ncharge the fee for copies of the records. Also on that date, you submitted the above -referenced\nRequest for Review contesting the Village's assessment of a fee. \n\nSection 3(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 3(b) (West 2024)) provides: \n\nSubject to the fee provisions of Section 6 of this Act, each\npublic body shall promptly provide, to any person who submits a\nrequest, a copy of any public record required to be disclosed by\nsubsection (a) of this Section and shall certify such copy if so\nrequested. \n\n500 South 2nd Street\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701\n\n115 South LaSalle Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\n1745 Innovation Drive, Suite C\n\nCarbondale, \n\nIllinois 62903\n\n217) 782- 1090 • Fax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 • Fax: (312) 814- 3806\n\nSections 6(a) and 6(b) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/ 6(a), (b) (West 2024)) address the\napplicable fees for copies of electronic and paper records. Section 6(a) of FOIA provides, in\npertinent part: \" When a person requests a copy of a record maintained in an electronic format, \nthe public body shall furnish it in the electronic format specified by the requester, if feasible.\" \nEmphasis added.) Section 6(b) of FOIA provides, in pertinent part: \n\nExcept when a fee is otherwise fixed by statute, each public\nbody may charge fees reasonably calculated to reimburse its actual\ncost for reproducing and certifying public records and for the use, \nby any person, of the equipment of the public body to copy\nrecords. No fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of black and\nwhite, letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester. The fee\nfor black and white, letter or legal sized copies shall not exceed 15\n\ncents per page. \n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that \"[ t] he plain language of section 6(a) \nrequires a public body to provide records in electronic format ifthe public body maintains those\nrecords in electronic format. * * * [\n\nS] ection 6(a) does not require a public body to furnish in\n\nelectronic format records maintained solely in paper format, even if the public body has the\nresources to reproduce those records in PDF.\" \n\nIll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 28697, issued\n\nApril 18, 2014, at 2. (Emphasis in original.) \n\nOn December 23, 2025, the Village Clerk confirmed in a telephone conversation\n\nwith a Supervising Attorney in the Public Access Bureau that, although the Village offered to\nprovide you with the remaining 444 pages via e- mail, it has not yet scanned those pages in and\nmaintains the records only in paper format. Because the Village is not required to provide you\nwith electronic copies of records that are maintained only in paper format, and because section\n6(b) of FOIA allows the Village to charge 15 cents per page for paper copies, the Village's fee\nassessment did not violate the requirements of FOIA. Accordingly, this office concludes that\nyour Request\n\nfor Review is unfounded. \n\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (773) 590- \n\n7878 or benjamin. silver@ilag. gov. \n\ncc: \n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Sasha Horner\n\nClerk/ Collector\n\nVillage of Minier\n\n110 West Central\n\nMinier, Illinois 61759\n\nminier@minier. com\n\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General"}
{"id":1154,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-08-12","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["14722"],"title":"McHenry County Committee violated OMA by holding private meeting on redistricting","filename":"14722, issued August 12, 2011.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1936,"summary":"The PAC investigated whether a private gathering of McHenry County Board members prior to a committee meeting constituted an improper meeting under the Open Meetings Act. The PAC determined that the gathering of a majority of a quorum to discuss public business violated OMA requirements for openness, notice, and recordkeeping.","plain_summary":"A reporter alleged that county board members held a private meeting to discuss redistricting maps before an official committee meeting. The Attorney General's office found that this gathering met the legal definition of a 'meeting' and violated state law because it was not open to the public, lacked proper notice, and was not recorded. Because the meeting already occurred and no official action was taken, the PAC closed the file with a warning to the board to follow OMA rules in the future.","holding":"The McHenry County Board's Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by holding an unannounced, private meeting to discuss public business.","legal_question":"Whether a private gathering of a majority of a quorum of a public body to discuss public business constitutes a 'meeting' under the Open Meetings Act, even if members rotate in and out.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02","5 ILCS 120/2","5 ILCS 120/2.02(a)","5 ILCS 120/2.06(a)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"McHenry County Board, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs Committee","requesting_party":"Mr. Kevin P. Craver, Northwest Herald","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The committee held an unannounced private gathering to discuss an alternative redistricting map prior to a scheduled public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/14722, issued August 12, 2011.pdf","sha256":"590e42a1f94bbdefef0ab547c6912c8b19b3fd2736d9fe5740bc2d45ac502451","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","quorum","redistricting","meeting notice","open meetings act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nAugust 12, 2011\n\nVia Electronic Mail\nMr. Kevin P. Craver, SeniorReporter\nNorthwest Herald\nkcraver@shawsuburban.com\nThe Honorable Ken Koehler\nChairman, McHenry County Board\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRE:\n\nOpenMeetingsActRequestforReview-2011 PAC 14722\n\nDear Mr. Craver and Mr. Koehler:\nPursuant to section 3.S(a) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(a)\n(West 2010)), we have received aRequest forReview in which Mr. Kevin Craver of the\nNorthwest Herald alleges the Legislative and Intergovernrnental Affairs Committee (Committee)\nof the McHenry County Board (Board) failed to comply with the requirements of OMA. We\nhave considered the Board's response to the allegations in theRequest forReview as well as Mr.\nCraver's reply to that response.\nMr. Craver alleges that six Board members held a private gathering on May 24,\n2011, about one hour before a scheduled meeting of the committee, to discuss an alternative to a\nproposed redistricting map. Three of the Board members who participated in the private\ngathering belonged to the seven-person committee. The proposed redistricting map, which was\non the agenda for the scheduled committee meeting, required committee approval before it could\nbe considered by the full Board.\nIn response to our further inquiry, the Board indicated that several Board\nmembers met to:\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main. Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-64 I 6\n\n\fMr. Ken Koehler\nAugust 12,-2011\nPage 2\n\n[D]etermine whether an alternative map, drawing different\nboundary lines for proposed districts, should be considered or\nbrought forward to the Legislative Committee meeting. * * * The\ndiscussion that took place was simply to determine whether the\nproposed alternate map * * • met the approval of a few other\nmembers of the County Board who would be significantly affected\nby changes to the map. 1\nThe discussion initially included two members of the committee, Marc Munaretto\nand Nick Provenzano. A third committee member then arrived:\nWhen John Jung arrived it was immediately realized that the three\nof them could not be part of the discussion at the same time. To\navoid a violation of the Open Meetings Act, one of the three\nLegislative Committee [m]embers left the gathering and did not\nreturn until one of the two remaining members had left the room.\nJohn Jung and Nick Provenzano alternated out of the discussion at\nleast one time in order to view the map and/or provide comments\non the suggested map changes to be brought to the Legislative\nCommittee. 2\nThere was no agenda for the private gathering, and no minutes were recorded.\nMr. Craver's Request for Review alleges that the private gathering \"violates both the letter and\nthe spirit of [OMA], which is a meaningless law if public bodies can meet without notice and\nwithout recording minutes simply by swapping out one or more members. \" 3\nMinutes from the subsequent committee meeting show that the committee\ndiscussed the alternate map but ultimately adopted the original proposed redistricting map by a\nvote of 4-3, with Mr. Jung voting in favor and Mr. Munaretto and Mr. Provenzano voting in\nopposition. Mr. Munaretto then distributed copies of the alternate map via email to all 24 Board\nmembers \"for the purpose of having the County Board still consider the alternate map, even\nthough the Legislative Committee had passed the Resolution with the original map.\" The\n1\n\nLetter rrom Kenneth D. Koehler, McHenry County Board Chairman, to Steve Silverman,\nAssistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General (June 30, 2011).\n'Id.\n'Email rrom Kevin P. Craver, Senior Reporter, Northwest Herald, to Sarah Pratt, Acting Public\nAccess Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (June 9, 2011, 7: 19 p.m.).\n4\n\nLetter rrom Kenneth D. Koehler, McHenry County Board Chairman, to Steve Silverman,\nAssistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General (June 30, 2011).\n\n\fMr. Ken Koehler\nAugust 12, 2011\nPage 3\n\noriginal proposed redistricting map was approved at the Board's June 21, 2011, meeting;\namendments based on the alternate map were rejected.\n\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2 (West 2010)) provides that \"all meetings of\npublic bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 2.02(a) (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 20 I 0)) also requires a\npublic body to provide at least 48 hours advance notice for all special meetings, \"except a\nmeeting held in the event ofa bona fide emergency[.]\" In addition, section 2.06(a) (5 ILCS\n120/2.06(a) (West 2010)) requires public bodies to \"keep written minutes of all their meetings,\nwhether open or closed, and a verbatim record ofall their closed meetings in the form of an\naudio or video recording.\"\nThe facts are undisputed that the committee failed to provide notice for the private\ngathering, close the gathering to the public pursuant to a section 2(c) exception (5 ILCS 120/2(c)\n(West 2010)) in accordance with the procedural requirements of section 2(a), or keep written\nminutes or a verbatim recording of the discussion. Therefore, our determination hinges on\nwhether the private gathering constitutes a \"meeting\" under OMA. Section 1.02 (5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2010)) defines a public meeting as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose ofdiscussing public business or, for a 5-member\npublic body, a quorum of the members ofa public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business. (Emphasis added.)\nWe note that \"contemporaneous interactive communication\" under section 1.02 does not require\nthe continuous and uninterrupted presence of a majority of a quorum. \"Contemporaneous\" is\ndefined as \"existing, occurring, or originating during the same time,\" as in \"the\ncomtemporaneous publication of two articles\" or \"contemporaneous accounts of the battle from\nofficers on both sides[.]\" 5 \"Interactive\" is defined as \"mutually or reciprocally active\" or\n\"involving the actions or input of a user; especially : of, relating to, or being a two-way\nelectronic communication system (as a telephone, cable television, or a computer) that involves a\nuser's orders (as for information or merchandise) or responses (as to a poll)[.]\" (Emphasis in\n5\n\nMerriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at\n\nhttp://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/contemporaneous?show= O&t= l 3 12929447 (last visited August 9,\n2011).\n\n\fMr. Ken Koehler\nAugust 12, 2011\nPage 4\n\noriginal./ Thus, a \"contemporaneous interactive communication\" occurs in the same general\ntime frame, but is not necessarily simultaneous. See John H. Brechin, E-Mail and the Open\nMeetings Act, Illinois Bar Journal, 94 ILBJ 666, 667 (2006).\nIllinois courts do not appear to have considered whether the requirements of\nOMA apply to a gathering in which a public body intentionally avoids the simultaneous presence\nof a majority of a quorum by alternating members in and out of the discussion. Courts in other\njurisdictions, however, have been intolerant of similar practices. A federal District Court found\nthat a series of informal gatherings of small groups individually composed of less than a quorum.\nof the members of the San Antonio City Council prior to a scheduled meeting violated the Texas\nversion of OMA because the discussions were intended to \"reach a decision in private while\navoiding the technical requirements\" of the law. Esperanza Peace and Justice Center v. City of\nSan Antonio, 316 F. Supp.2d 433, 477 (W.D. Tex., 2001). Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court\nheld that members of the Cincinnati City Council who collectively formed a quorum violated the\nOhio Sunshine law by gathering in small groups for private, back-to-back discussions regarding\na new football stadium. State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 3d 540, 544, 669\nN .E.2d 903, 906-07 (1996).\nTo find that Cincinnati's game of \"legislative musical chairs\" is\nallowable under the Sunshine Law would be to ignore the\nlegislative intent of the statute, disregard its evident purpose, and\nallow an absurd result. • • * To rule in Cincinnati's favor would be\nto endorse the behavior undertaken by city council and the city\nmanager in this case and make it applicable to every city council\nmeeting in Ohio. The statute that exists to shed light on\ndeliberations of public bodies cannot be interpreted in a manner\nwhich would result in the public being left in the dark.\nOMA is intended to \"ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly[,]\" and to \"protect the citizen's right to\nknow[.]\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2010)). Further, \"citizens shall be given advance notice of and the\nright to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in\nany way.\" (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2010). The Office of the Attorney General\nhas noted that \"whether a gathering falls within the definition of a meeting, as used in the Act,\nwould depend on the peculiar facts in each situation.\" 1974 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 123. A gathering\nin which facts are exchanged for the purpose of reaching a decision and different courses of\nactions are contemplated constitutes a meeting under OMA. Nabhani v. Cog/ianese, 552 F.\nSupp. 657, 661 (N.D. Ill., 1982).\n6\n\nMerriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam­\nwebster.com/dictionary/interactive (last visited August 9, 2011).\n\n\fMr. Ken Koehler\nAugust 12, 2011\nPage 5\n\nIn this instance, it is undisputed that three members of the committee, which is a\nmajority of a quorum, were physically present for a private gathering to discuss an alternative to\nthe proposed redistricting map. The members of the committee participated in a\ncontemporaneous, interactive discussion concerning the alternative map, which the committee\nsubsequently considered a short time later at its scheduled meeting. Although it does not appear\nthat the members of the committee acted in bad faith by rotating in and out of the private\ngathering, it is clear they did so in order to discuss committee business without triggering the\nopenness, notice, and recordkeeping requirements of OMA. We conclude that this maneuvering\nviolated the spirit and intent of OMA. Finding otherwise would have the absurd result of\nsanctioning secret deliberations and discussions of public business provided that members of a\npublic body rotate in and out of the meeting room to avoid the simultaneous presence of a\nmajority of a quorum. Further, a \"meeting\" under OMA only requires contemporaneous -- rather\nthan simultaneous -- interactive communication of a majority of a quorum. Accordingly, we\nconclude that the private gathering constituted a \"meeting\" under section 1.02 of OMA, and that\nthe committee violated the openness, notice, and recordkeeping requirements of sections 2,\n2.02(a), and 2.06(a) of OMA.\nThere is no remedial action that the committee can take to redress these\nviolations, as the meeting was neither recorded nor documented with minutes, and the\ndiscussions did not lead to the adoption of the alternate redistricting map. However, we urge\nmembers of the committee to adhere to the requirements of OMA, and to avoid attempting to\ncircumvent those requirements by rotating members in and out of discussions pertaining to\ncommittee business.\nIf you have any question, please contact me at (312) 814-6756. This letter shall\nserve to close this matter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n14722 rfr o vio county\ncc:\n\nMs. Jamie Rein, Assistant State's Attorney\nMcHenry County State's Attorney's Office\njmrein@co.mchenry.il.us\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A committee's private discussion of a redistricting map","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-14722/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nAugust 12, 2011\n\nVia Electronic Mail\nMr. Kevin P. Craver, SeniorReporter\nNorthwest Herald\nkcraver@shawsuburban.com\nThe Honorable Ken Koehler\nChairman, McHenry County Board\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRE:\n\nOpenMeetingsActRequestforReview-2011 PAC 14722\n\nDear Mr. Craver and Mr. Koehler:\nPursuant to section 3.S(a) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(a)\n(West 2010)), we have received aRequest forReview in which Mr. Kevin Craver of the\nNorthwest Herald alleges the Legislative and Intergovernrnental Affairs Committee (Committee)\nof the McHenry County Board (Board) failed to comply with the requirements of OMA. We\nhave considered the Board's response to the allegations in theRequest forReview as well as Mr.\nCraver's reply to that response.\nMr. Craver alleges that six Board members held a private gathering on May 24,\n2011, about one hour before a scheduled meeting of the committee, to discuss an alternative to a\nproposed redistricting map. Three of the Board members who participated in the private\ngathering belonged to the seven-person committee. The proposed redistricting map, which was\non the agenda for the scheduled committee meeting, required committee approval before it could\nbe considered by the full Board.\nIn response to our further inquiry, the Board indicated that several Board\nmembers met to:\n\n[D]etermine whether an alternative map, drawing different\nboundary lines for proposed districts, should be considered or\nbrought forward to the Legislative Committee meeting. * * * The\ndiscussion that took place was simply to determine whether the\nproposed alternate map * * • met the approval of a few other\nmembers of the County Board who would be significantly affected\nby changes to the map. 1\nThe discussion initially included two members of the committee, Marc Munaretto\nand Nick Provenzano. A third committee member then arrived:\nWhen John Jung arrived it was immediately realized that the three\nof them could not be part of the discussion at the same time. To\navoid a violation of the Open Meetings Act, one of the three\nLegislative Committee [m]embers left the gathering and did not\nreturn until one of the two remaining members had left the room.\nJohn Jung and Nick Provenzano alternated out of the discussion at\nleast one time in order to view the map and/or provide comments\non the suggested map changes to be brought to the Legislative\nCommittee. 2\nThere was no agenda for the private gathering, and no minutes were recorded.\nMr. Craver's Request for Review alleges that the private gathering \"violates both the letter and\nthe spirit of [OMA], which is a meaningless law if public bodies can meet without notice and\nwithout recording minutes simply by swapping out one or more members. \" 3\nMinutes from the subsequent committee meeting show that the committee\ndiscussed the alternate map but ultimately adopted the original proposed redistricting map by a\nvote of 4-3, with Mr. Jung voting in favor and Mr. Munaretto and Mr. Provenzano voting in\nopposition. Mr. Munaretto then distributed copies of the alternate map via email to all 24 Board\nmembers \"for the purpose of having the County Board still consider the alternate map, even\nthough the Legislative Committee had passed the Resolution with the original map.\" The\n1\n\nLetter rrom Kenneth D. Koehler, McHenry County Board Chairman, to Steve Silverman,\nAssistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General (June 30, 2011).\n'Id.\n'Email rrom Kevin P. Craver, Senior Reporter, Northwest Herald, to Sarah Pratt, Acting Public\n\noriginal proposed redistricting map was approved at the Board's June 21, 2011, meeting;\namendments based on the alternate map were rejected.\n\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2 (West 2010)) provides that \"all meetings of\npublic bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 2.02(a) (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 20 I 0)) also requires a\npublic body to provide at least 48 hours advance notice for all special meetings, \"except a\nmeeting held in the event ofa bona fide emergency[.]\" In addition, section 2.06(a) (5 ILCS\n120/2.06(a) (West 2010)) requires public bodies to \"keep written minutes of all their meetings,\nwhether open or closed, and a verbatim record ofall their closed meetings in the form of an\naudio or video recording.\"\nThe facts are undisputed that the committee failed to provide notice for the private\ngathering, close the gathering to the public pursuant to a section 2(c) exception (5 ILCS 120/2(c)\n(West 2010)) in accordance with the procedural requirements of section 2(a), or keep written\nminutes or a verbatim recording of the discussion. Therefore, our determination hinges on\nwhether the private gathering constitutes a \"meeting\" under OMA. Section 1.02 (5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2010)) defines a public meeting as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose ofdiscussing public business or, for a 5-member\npublic body, a quorum of the members ofa public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business. (Emphasis added.)\nWe note that \"contemporaneous interactive communication\" under section 1.02 does not require\nthe continuous and uninterrupted presence of a majority of a quorum. \"Contemporaneous\" is\ndefined as \"existing, occurring, or originating during the same time,\" as in \"the\ncomtemporaneous publication of two articles\" or \"contemporaneous accounts of the battle from\nofficers on both sides[.]\" 5 \"Interactive\" is defined as \"mutually or reciprocally active\" or\n\"involving the actions or input of a user; especially: of, relating to, or being a two-way\nelectronic communication system (as a telephone, cable television, or a computer) that involves a\nuser's orders (as for information or merchandise) or responses (as to a poll)[.]\" (Emphasis in\n5\n\nMerriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at\n\nhttp://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/contemporaneous?show= O&t= l 3 12929447 (last visited August 9,\n\noriginal./ Thus, a \"contemporaneous interactive communication\" occurs in the same general\ntime frame, but is not necessarily simultaneous. See John H. Brechin, E-Mail and the Open\nMeetings Act, Illinois Bar Journal, 94 ILBJ 666, 667 (2006).\nIllinois courts do not appear to have considered whether the requirements of\nOMA apply to a gathering in which a public body intentionally avoids the simultaneous presence\nof a majority of a quorum by alternating members in and out of the discussion. Courts in other\njurisdictions, however, have been intolerant of similar practices. A federal District Court found\nthat a series of informal gatherings of small groups individually composed of less than a quorum.\nof the members of the San Antonio City Council prior to a scheduled meeting violated the Texas\nversion of OMA because the discussions were intended to \"reach a decision in private while\navoiding the technical requirements\" of the law. Esperanza Peace and Justice Center v. City of\nSan Antonio, 316 F. Supp.2d 433, 477 (W.D. Tex., 2001). Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court\nheld that members of the Cincinnati City Council who collectively formed a quorum violated the\nOhio Sunshine law by gathering in small groups for private, back-to-back discussions regarding\na new football stadium. State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 3d 540, 544, 669\nN.E.2d 903, 906-07 (1996).\nTo find that Cincinnati's game of \"legislative musical chairs\" is\nallowable under the Sunshine Law would be to ignore the\nlegislative intent of the statute, disregard its evident purpose, and\nallow an absurd result. • • * To rule in Cincinnati's favor would be\nto endorse the behavior undertaken by city council and the city\nmanager in this case and make it applicable to every city council\nmeeting in Ohio. The statute that exists to shed light on\ndeliberations of public bodies cannot be interpreted in a manner\nwhich would result in the public being left in the dark.\nOMA is intended to \"ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly[,]\" and to \"protect the citizen's right to\nknow[.]\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2010)). Further, \"citizens shall be given advance notice of and the\nright to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in\nany way.\" (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2010). The Office of the Attorney General\nhas noted that \"whether a gathering falls within the definition of a meeting, as used in the Act,\nwould depend on the peculiar facts in each situation.\" 1974 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 123. A gathering\nin which facts are exchanged for the purpose of reaching a decision and different courses of\n\nIn this instance, it is undisputed that three members of the committee, which is a\nmajority of a quorum, were physically present for a private gathering to discuss an alternative to\nthe proposed redistricting map. The members of the committee participated in a\ncontemporaneous, interactive discussion concerning the alternative map, which the committee\nsubsequently considered a short time later at its scheduled meeting. Although it does not appear\nthat the members of the committee acted in bad faith by rotating in and out of the private\ngathering, it is clear they did so in order to discuss committee business without triggering the\nopenness, notice, and recordkeeping requirements of OMA. We conclude that this maneuvering\nviolated the spirit and intent of OMA. Finding otherwise would have the absurd result of\nsanctioning secret deliberations and discussions of public business provided that members of a\npublic body rotate in and out of the meeting room to avoid the simultaneous presence of a\nmajority of a quorum. Further, a \"meeting\" under OMA only requires contemporaneous -- rather\nthan simultaneous -- interactive communication of a majority of a quorum. Accordingly, we\nconclude that the private gathering constituted a \"meeting\" under section 1.02 of OMA, and that\nthe committee violated the openness, notice, and recordkeeping requirements of sections 2,\n2.02(a), and 2.06(a) of OMA.\nThere is no remedial action that the committee can take to redress these\nviolations, as the meeting was neither recorded nor documented with minutes, and the\ndiscussions did not lead to the adoption of the alternate redistricting map. However, we urge\nmembers of the committee to adhere to the requirements of OMA, and to avoid attempting to\ncircumvent those requirements by rotating members in and out of discussions pertaining to\ncommittee business.\nIf you have any question, please contact me at (312) 814-6756. This letter shall\nserve to close this matter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n14722 rfr o vio county\ncc:\n\nMs. Jamie Rein, Assistant State's Attorney\nMcHenry County State's Attorney's Office\njmrein@co.mchenry.il.us"}
{"id":1155,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-11-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["21622"],"title":"Westmont School Board violated OMA by discussing general staffing strategy in closed session","filename":"21622, issued November 9, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1181,"summary":"The PAC investigated a complaint alleging that the Westmont Community Unit School District No. 201 Board of Education improperly discussed staffing strategy and a retiree in a closed session. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by discussing general staffing strategy, which does not fall under the personnel exception.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board discussed staffing and retirement issues behind closed doors. The Attorney General's office found that the board broke the law because they discussed general staffing plans, which must be done in public, rather than specific personnel matters. No further action was required because the board had already received training on the issue.","holding":"The Board of Education violated section 2(a) of the Open Meetings Act by discussing general staffing strategy in a closed session.","legal_question":"Whether the Board of Education's discussion of general staffing strategy during a closed session fell within the scope of the personnel exception under section 2(c)(1) of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(a)","5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1)"],"public_body":"Westmont Community Unit School District No. 201 Board of Education","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The board held a closed session discussion regarding general staffing strategy and a retiree.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_c/2_c_1/21622, issued November 9, 2018.pdf","sha256":"1f3c9f1b59009464d5856ae26cf34df22e6791ba74ce704749fe1bcca939a84b","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","school board","personnel exception","staffing strategy"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nNovember 9, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Terry L. Hodges\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer,\nRodick &\n\nKohn LLP\n\n3030 Salt Creek Lane\nSuite 202\nArlington Heights,. Illinois 60005\nthodges@hlerk. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2012 PAC 21622\nDear\n\nand Ms. Hodges:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Westmont Community Unit School District No. 201 ( District) Board\n\nof Education ( Board) held an improper closed session discussion during its August 21, 2012,\nmeeting.\n\nOn September 27, 2012, this office received\n\nRequest\n\nfor Review alleging that the Board improperly discussed matters concerning a retiree and\nstrategy related to staffing a position. On October 10, 2012, this office sent the Board a copy of\n\nRequest for Review and asked it to respond to the allegations that the Board\nviolated OMA. On October 24, 2012, counsel for the Board provided this office with a written\n\nanswer and copies of the open and closed session minutes of the August 21, 2012, meeting. On\n\nOctober 26, 2012, this office sent\n\na copy of the Board' s answer; he did not reply.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main,\n\nCarbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMs. Terry L. Hodges\nNovember 9, 2018\nPage 2\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2010). Section 2( a) of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2010)) provides that all meetings of a public body shall be open to the\npublic unless the subject of the discussion falls within one of the exceptions set out in section\n2( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c) ( West 2010)).\n\nThe section 2( c)( 1) exception permits a public\n\nbody to discuss in closed session \"[ t] he appointment, employment, compensation, discipline,\n\nperformance, or dismissal of specific employees of the public body or legal counsel for the\npublic body, including hearing testimony on a complaint lodged against an employee of the\npublic body or against legal counsel for the public body to determine its validity.\" Section 2( b)\nof OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( b) ( West 2010)) states that \"[ t] he exceptions contained in subsection ( c)\n\nare in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and therefore, the\n\nexceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly within their scope.\"\nIn construing section 2( c)( 1) of OMA, the Attorney General has concluded that\nthe General Assembly did not intend to permit public bodies to hold general discussions\nconcerning\n\ncategories\n\nof employees\n\nin closed\n\nsession\n\npursuant\n\nto section 2( c)( 1).\"\n\nIII. Att' y Gen.\n\nPub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 013, issued December 23, 2016, at 4; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 43077, issued 43077, issued November 3, 2016 ( section 2( c)( 1) does not authorize\n\ngeneral discussions of employment positions). Rather, \" section 2( c)( 1) of OMA ' is intended to\n\npermit public bodies to candidly discuss the relative merits of individual employees, or the\nconduct of individual employees.\"'\nIll. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 013, at 5 ( quoting Ill.\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 12- 011, issued July 11, 2012, at 3.\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that it went into closed session\n\nunder section 2( c)( 1) of OMA to discuss health insurance benefits for a retiree, the retirement of\n\na particular employee in the business office, and the resulting vacancy. The Board asserted that\nthe discussion of the retiree was permitted because the definition of \"employee\"\n\nin section 2( d)\n\nof OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( d) ( West 2010)) is not limited to current employees. The Board' s\nresponse to this office explained that the closed session discussion \" concerned a dispute with a\n\nformer employee over health insurance benefits to be paid under an employment agreement.\"'\nBecause the Board' s discussion of the former employee concerned the compensation of the\nemployee pursuant to an employment agreement that originated in an employer- employee\n\nrelationship, this office concludes that the Board' s discussion on that topic was within the scope\n\nof the section 2( c)( 1) exception cited by the Board.\n\nLetter from Terry L. Hodges, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, to Matthew\nSebek, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( October 24, 2012),\n\nat\n\n1.\n\n\fMs. Terry L. Hodges\nNovember 9, 2018\nPage 3\n\nWith respect to the discussion of matters concerning the employee in the business\noffice, the Board asserted its discussion was proper under section 2( c)( 1) of OMA because it\nconcerned the retiring employee' s performance and \" the appointment and compensation of the\n\nemployee' s replacement.\" 2 Based on this office' s review of the Board' s answer, the closed\nsession minutes, and the affidavit of the District' s business manager, it appears that the Board\n\ndeviated in its discussions of the particular retiring employee to the position in general and the\n\ncompensation for the position. Although discussions concerning the specific retiring employee\nwere authorized by section 2( c)( 1), discussion of related budgetary matters and staffing of the\nemployment position in general, as opposed to an individual candidate for the position, are not\nwithin the scope of the exception. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated\n\nsection 2( a) of OMA. Because counsel for the Board stated that she had discussed the narrow\n\nscope of the section 2(c)( 1) exception with the Board at its September 11, 2012, training, no\n\nfurther remedial action is needed. This office reminds the Board to confine its closed session\ndiscussions to topics authorized by the exceptions pursuant to which it enters closed session, and\nto construe those exceptions narrowly.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that the resolution of this matter\n\ndoes not require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed: If you have any\nquestions, you may contact me at ( 217) 782- 9054, mhartman@atg. state. il.us, or at the\nSpringfield address on the bottom of the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nT HA\n\nTMAN\n\nAsst tant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n21622 0 201 improper sd\n\nLetter from Terry L. Hodges, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, to Matthew\n\nSebek, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( October 24, 2012),\n\nat\n\n1.\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school board's closed-session discussion of staffing strategy","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-21622/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nNovember 9, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Terry L. Hodges\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer,\nRodick &\n\nKohn LLP\n\n3030 Salt Creek Lane\nSuite 202\nArlington Heights,. Illinois 60005\nthodges@hlerk. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2012 PAC 21622\nDear\n\nand Ms. Hodges:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Westmont Community Unit School District No. 201 (District) Board\n\nof Education (Board) held an improper closed session discussion during its August 21, 2012,\nmeeting.\n\nOn September 27, 2012, this office received\n\nRequest\n\nfor Review alleging that the Board improperly discussed matters concerning a retiree and\nstrategy related to staffing a position. On October 10, 2012, this office sent the Board a copy of\n\nRequest for Review and asked it to respond to the allegations that the Board\nviolated OMA. On October 24, 2012, counsel for the Board provided this office with a written\n\nanswer and copies of the open and closed session minutes of the August 21, 2012, meeting. On\n\nOctober 26, 2012, this office sent\n\na copy of the Board's answer; he did not reply.\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2010). Section 2(a) of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2010)) provides that all meetings of a public body shall be open to the\npublic unless the subject of the discussion falls within one of the exceptions set out in section\n2(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c) (West 2010)).\n\nThe section 2(c)(1) exception permits a public\n\nbody to discuss in closed session \"[ t] he appointment, employment, compensation, discipline,\n\nperformance, or dismissal of specific employees of the public body or legal counsel for the\npublic body, including hearing testimony on a complaint lodged against an employee of the\npublic body or against legal counsel for the public body to determine its validity.\" Section 2(b)\nof OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(b) (West 2010)) states that \"[ t] he exceptions contained in subsection (c)\n\nare in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and therefore, the\n\nexceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly within their scope.\"\nIn construing section 2(c)(1) of OMA, the Attorney General has concluded that\nthe General Assembly did not intend to permit public bodies to hold general discussions\nconcerning\n\ncategories\n\nof employees\n\nin closed\n\nsession\n\npursuant\n\nto section 2(c)(1).\"\n\nIII. Att' y Gen.\n\nPub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 013, issued December 23, 2016, at 4; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 43077, issued 43077, issued November 3, 2016 (section 2(c)(1) does not authorize\n\ngeneral discussions of employment positions). Rather, \" section 2(c)(1) of OMA ' is intended to\n\npermit public bodies to candidly discuss the relative merits of individual employees, or the\nconduct of individual employees.\"'\nIll. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 013, at 5 (quoting Ill.\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 12- 011, issued July 11, 2012, at 3.\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that it went into closed session\n\nunder section 2(c)(1) of OMA to discuss health insurance benefits for a retiree, the retirement of\n\na particular employee in the business office, and the resulting vacancy. The Board asserted that\nthe discussion of the retiree was permitted because the definition of \"employee\"\n\nin section 2(d)\n\nof OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(d) (West 2010)) is not limited to current employees. The Board's\nresponse to this office explained that the closed session discussion \" concerned a dispute with a\n\nformer employee over health insurance benefits to be paid under an employment agreement.\"'\nBecause the Board's discussion of the former employee concerned the compensation of the\nemployee pursuant to an employment agreement that originated in an employer- employee\n\nrelationship, this office concludes that the Board's discussion on that topic was within the scope\n\nWith respect to the discussion of matters concerning the employee in the business\noffice, the Board asserted its discussion was proper under section 2(c)(1) of OMA because it\nconcerned the retiring employee's performance and \" the appointment and compensation of the\n\nemployee's replacement.\" 2 Based on this office's review of the Board's answer, the closed\nsession minutes, and the affidavit of the District's business manager, it appears that the Board\n\ndeviated in its discussions of the particular retiring employee to the position in general and the\n\ncompensation for the position. Although discussions concerning the specific retiring employee\nwere authorized by section 2(c)(1), discussion of related budgetary matters and staffing of the\nemployment position in general, as opposed to an individual candidate for the position, are not\nwithin the scope of the exception. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated\n\nsection 2(a) of OMA. Because counsel for the Board stated that she had discussed the narrow\n\nscope of the section 2(c)(1) exception with the Board at its September 11, 2012, training, no\n\nfurther remedial action is needed. This office reminds the Board to confine its closed session\ndiscussions to topics authorized by the exceptions pursuant to which it enters closed session, and\nto construe those exceptions narrowly.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that the resolution of this matter\n\ndoes not require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed: If you have any\nquestions, you may contact me at (217) 782- 9054, mhartman@atg. state. il.us, or at the\nSpringfield address on the bottom of the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nT HA\n\nTMAN\n\nAsst tant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n21622 0 201 improper sd\n\nLetter from Terry L. Hodges, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, to Matthew\n\nSebek, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (October 24, 2012),\n\nat\n\n1."}
{"id":1156,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-06-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["24827"],"title":"Champaign School Board did not violate OMA via email discussions on appointments","filename":"24827, issued June 8, 2015.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1238,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Champaign Unit School District 4 Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act by using email to decide board actions and make appointments. The PAC determined that the Board did not violate the Act, though it cautioned members about the risks of using email for public business.","plain_summary":"A citizen alleged that a school board president's e-mails to board members about committee assignments constituted an improper private deliberation and final action under the Open Meetings Act. The PAC found that most of the e-mails involved fewer than a majority of a quorum, that the president's e-mails to a majority of a quorum did not elicit any deliberative responses from other members, and that a tentative e-mail statement about appointments was not final action because the board later voted on those matters in open session. The PAC found no violation but cautioned the board to be mindful of OMA when discussing public business by e-mail between meetings.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the Board did not hold improper meetings or take final action via private email communications.","legal_question":"Whether the use of email communications by a majority of a quorum of a public body to discuss and decide board appointments and negotiation teams constitutes a violation of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Champaign Unit School District 4 Board of Education","requesting_party":"Mr. Josh Rohrscheib","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The use of email by school board members to conduct board business and make appointments outside of a public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/meetings-via-electronic-means/24827, issued June 8, 2015.pdf","sha256":"6b2773e34b5b4c072b6196faee5c1bf94f2e44722e6f87fc294cab08422f8c5f","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["email","school board","open meetings act","deliberation"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJune 8, 2015\n\nMr. Josh Rohrscheib\nRohrscheib\n\nLaw Office\n\n236 North Water Street\nSuite 300A\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nFranczek Radelet\nAttorneys and Counselors\n300 South Wacker Drive\nSuite 3400\nChicago, Illinois 60606\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2013 PAC 24827\n\nDear Mr. Rohrscheib and Mr. Crowley:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2012)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Champaign Unit School District 4 Board of Education ( Board) did not\n\nhold improper meetings concerning appointments of Board members to leadership positions and\nnegotiation teams, or take final action via private e- mail communications.\n\nOn June 6, 2013, Mr. Josh Rohrscheib submitted a Request for Review alleging\nthat then -incumbent Board President Stig Lanesskog \" sent out emails that appear to have the\neffect of deciding Board action prior to a meeting. These emails included all the incoming\nmembers of the school board.\"'\n\nSpecifically, Mr. Rohrscheib alleged that Mr. Lanesskog sent\n\nBoard members e- mails concerning negotiation teams and appointed Board members to\nnegotiation teams via e- mail.\n\nOn June 17, 2013, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nE- mail from Josh Rohrscheib to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral ( June 6, 2013).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n\nIllinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n312) 814- 3000 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1 nn 1 Fast Main. Carbondale. Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529 -( 100 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Josh Rohrscheib\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nJune 8, 2015\nPage 2\n\nDistrict and asked it to provide a written response to the allegations in the Request for Review\ntogether with copies of all e-mails that Board members exchanged with other Board members\nconcerning leadership positions or negotiation teams since April 6, 2013. The District furnished\nthe records together with a written response asserting that none of the e-mails constituted a\nmeeting under OMA.\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2012)) provides that \"all meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1.02 (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2012)) defines a \"public\nmeeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\nUnder this statutory definition, a \"meeting\" may include communications through\ne-mail or other electronic means. The Board is comprised of seven members. Accordingly, four\nBoard members comprise a quorum, and a majority of the quorum is three members. Therefore,\nif at least three members of the Board engaged in contemporaneous, interactive e-mail\ncommunications concerning \"public business\" those discussions would have constituted a\nmeeting or meetings of the Board subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of\nOMA.\nThis office has reviewed the e-mails in question. Most of those e-mails were\nexchanged by no more than two members of the Board. With respect to e-mails that were sent\nby Mr. Lanesskog to at least a majority of a quorum of the Board, the District asserted:\nUnder the law, it is impossible for Mr. Lanesskog's emails standing\nalone to violate OMA. For there to be a violation, there must be a\ncontemporaneous discussion, such as a reply email delivered in\nclose proximity in time to the original email. There, however, is\nno evidence of any contemporaneous interaction between any\nindividuals as a result of Mr. Lanesskog's email. The only reply of\n\n\f�---------------Mr. Josh Rohrscheib\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nJune 8, 2015\nPage 3\n\nwhich the School District is aware is * * * from an individual who\nwas not yet a Board member, is written five hours after Mr.\nLanesskog's email, and merely congratulates Mr. Lanesskog on his\nelection. 2\nThis office's review of the records in question confirms that none of the e-mails sent by Mr.\nLanesskog elicited responses in which a majority of a quorum of the Board discussed public\nbusiness. Accordingly, this office concludes that the e-mails sent and received by Board\nmembers did not constitute a meeting subject to the requirements of OMA.\nThe Request for Review also asserted that Mr. Lanesskog appointed Board\nmembers to certain positions via e-mail. We construe that claim as alleging that the Board\nviolated section 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West 2012)), which provides that \"[f]inal action\nshall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other\ninformation that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\" The Board responded\nto that allegation by acknowledging that certain e-mails discussed the possibility of appointing\nBoard members to certain positions, but asserted that \"no definitive decisions are made. Instead,\nthe Board voted for officers at its organization meeting on May 6 in open session and appointed\nnegotiation team members in open session at an open meeting on June I 0(.]\" 3\nIn one of the e-mails, Mr. Lanesskog appears to tentatively appoint negotiation\nteams, but indicates that the appointments have not been finalized. Such a tentative statement by\na single Board member does not manifest final action by the Board. Further, the District\nconfirmed that the Board subsequently voted to elect officers and appoint negotiation teams\nduring open meetings. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did not violate section 2(e) of\nOMA by taking final action via e-mail.\nAlthough we recognize that it is sometimes expedient for members of a public\nbody to communicate with one another between meetings, e-mails concerning public business\nwhich are sent to or received by a majority of a quorum skirt the purpose of OMA, 4 and have the\npotential to violate the Act, albeit unintentionally. We therefore caution the members of the\nBoard to be mindful of the requirements of OMA, as well as the public policy favoring the open\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, Assistant Public Access Counselor, Illinois\nAttorney General's Office (July 2, 2013).\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet P.C., Assistant Public Access Counselor, Illinois\nAttorney General's Office (July 2, 2013).\n'Section I of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2012)) provides that \"is is the intent of this Act to\nensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\n\fMr. Josh Rohrscheib\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nJune 8, 2015\nPage4\n\ndiscussion of matters affecting the public interest, before engaging in such e-mail\ncommunications.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(312) 814-6756.\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nAssistant Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n24827 o 2e proper sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A citizen complained that a school board was making decisions and appointments through private emails rather than in public meetings. The Attorney General's office investigated and found no violation of the Open Meetings Act. However, they warned the board members that using email to discuss public business among a majority of members can undermine the law and should be avoided.","card_headline":"School board members' emails about appointments","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-24827/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJune 8, 2015\n\nMr. Josh Rohrscheib\nRohrscheib\n\nLaw Office\n\n236 North Water Street\nSuite 300A\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nFranczek Radelet\nAttorneys and Counselors\n300 South Wacker Drive\nSuite 3400\nChicago, Illinois 60606\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2013 PAC 24827\n\nDear Mr. Rohrscheib and Mr. Crowley:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2012)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Champaign Unit School District 4 Board of Education (Board) did not\n\nhold improper meetings concerning appointments of Board members to leadership positions and\nnegotiation teams, or take final action via private e- mail communications.\n\nOn June 6, 2013, Mr. Josh Rohrscheib submitted a Request for Review alleging\nthat then -incumbent Board President Stig Lanesskog \" sent out emails that appear to have the\neffect of deciding Board action prior to a meeting. These emails included all the incoming\nmembers of the school board.\"'\n\nSpecifically, Mr. Rohrscheib alleged that Mr. Lanesskog sent\n\nBoard members e- mails concerning negotiation teams and appointed Board members to\nnegotiation teams via e- mail.\n\nOn June 17, 2013, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nE- mail from Josh Rohrscheib to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral (June 6, 2013).\n\nDistrict and asked it to provide a written response to the allegations in the Request for Review\ntogether with copies of all e-mails that Board members exchanged with other Board members\nconcerning leadership positions or negotiation teams since April 6, 2013. The District furnished\nthe records together with a written response asserting that none of the e-mails constituted a\nmeeting under OMA.\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2012)) provides that \"all meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1.02 (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2012)) defines a \"public\nmeeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\nUnder this statutory definition, a \"meeting\" may include communications through\ne-mail or other electronic means. The Board is comprised of seven members. Accordingly, four\nBoard members comprise a quorum, and a majority of the quorum is three members. Therefore,\nif at least three members of the Board engaged in contemporaneous, interactive e-mail\ncommunications concerning \"public business\" those discussions would have constituted a\nmeeting or meetings of the Board subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of\nOMA.\nThis office has reviewed the e-mails in question. Most of those e-mails were\nexchanged by no more than two members of the Board. With respect to e-mails that were sent\nby Mr. Lanesskog to at least a majority of a quorum of the Board, the District asserted:\nUnder the law, it is impossible for Mr. Lanesskog's emails standing\nalone to violate OMA. For there to be a violation, there must be a\n\nwhich the School District is aware is * * * from an individual who\nwas not yet a Board member, is written five hours after Mr.\nLanesskog's email, and merely congratulates Mr. Lanesskog on his\nelection. 2\nThis office's review of the records in question confirms that none of the e-mails sent by Mr.\nLanesskog elicited responses in which a majority of a quorum of the Board discussed public\nbusiness. Accordingly, this office concludes that the e-mails sent and received by Board\nmembers did not constitute a meeting subject to the requirements of OMA.\nThe Request for Review also asserted that Mr. Lanesskog appointed Board\nmembers to certain positions via e-mail. We construe that claim as alleging that the Board\nviolated section 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West 2012)), which provides that \"[f]inal action\nshall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other\ninformation that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\" The Board responded\nto that allegation by acknowledging that certain e-mails discussed the possibility of appointing\nBoard members to certain positions, but asserted that \"no definitive decisions are made. Instead,\nthe Board voted for officers at its organization meeting on May 6 in open session and appointed\nnegotiation team members in open session at an open meeting on June I 0(.]\" 3\nIn one of the e-mails, Mr. Lanesskog appears to tentatively appoint negotiation\nteams, but indicates that the appointments have not been finalized. Such a tentative statement by\na single Board member does not manifest final action by the Board. Further, the District\nconfirmed that the Board subsequently voted to elect officers and appoint negotiation teams\nduring open meetings. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did not violate section 2(e) of\nOMA by taking final action via e-mail.\nAlthough we recognize that it is sometimes expedient for members of a public\nbody to communicate with one another between meetings, e-mails concerning public business\nwhich are sent to or received by a majority of a quorum skirt the purpose of OMA, 4 and have the\npotential to violate the Act, albeit unintentionally. We therefore caution the members of the\nBoard to be mindful of the requirements of OMA, as well as the public policy favoring the open\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, Assistant Public Access Counselor, Illinois\nAttorney General's Office (July 2, 2013).\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet P.C., Assistant Public Access Counselor, Illinois\nAttorney General's Office (July 2, 2013).\n'Section I of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2012)) provides that \"is is the intent of this Act to\nensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\nMr. Josh Rohrscheib\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nJune 8, 2015\nPage4\n\ndiscussion of matters affecting the public interest, before engaging in such e-mail\ncommunications.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(312) 814-6756.\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nAssistant Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n24827 o 2e proper sd"}
{"id":1157,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-01-31","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["32435"],"title":"Local School Council of Orozco Academy violated OMA by locking doors at meeting","filename":"32435, issued January 31, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2602,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Local School Council (LSC) of Jose Clemente Orozco Academy violated the Open Meetings Act by locking school doors and preventing public access to a meeting. The PAC determined that the LSC failed to make the meeting reasonably accessible to the public in violation of section 2.01 of the OMA.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that they were locked out of a school council meeting despite there being available space inside. The Attorney General's office agreed, finding that the Local School Council failed to provide reasonable access to the public. Because the meeting already occurred, no specific remedy was ordered.","holding":"The Local School Council violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to ensure its meeting was reasonably accessible to the public.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide reasonable access to a meeting when school doors are locked and no alternative accommodations are made for the public.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.01"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Local School Council of Jose Clemente Orozco Academy","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting access","subject_description":"The public body locked the doors to a school building during a meeting, preventing members of the public from attending.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.01/Convenience-and-openness-of-meeting-times-and-places/32435, issued January 31, 2018.pdf","sha256":"5ce3147ff24c68000d74e115ea4e691e2b42f643ad234d78cfa867e03e286f2a","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting access","public meeting","school board","open meetings act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nSr. Efrain Martinez\nDirector/ Principal\n\nJose Clemente Orozco Academy\n1940\n\nWest\n\n18th Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60608\nemartinezl0@cps.\n\nedu\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2014 PAC 32435\nDear\n\nand Sr. Martinez:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Local School Council ( LSC) of Jose Clemente Orozco Academy ( Academy) did not\nmake its November 20, 2014, meeting reasonably accessible to the public.'\nOn November 24, 2014,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that members of the public were not allowed access to the LSC' s\nNovember 20, 2014, meeting, and that the LSC did not take alternative measures to afford\n\naccess. Specifically, she alleged that \"[ b] oth front and back doors to the school were locked and\nno\n\nattendant\n\nwas\n\nthere to let people in during the entire duration\n\nof the\n\nmeeting[,]\"\n\neven though\n\nt] here were vacant seats and space especially after the children were sent to the gym.\" 2 She\nclaimed that \"[ t] hose who were not allowed in the room and were in the hallway were not given\nan alternative way to participate. They were not given agendas and there were no speakers, or an\n\nThis office notes that the LSC currently has a different membership than it had at the time of the\nmeeting at issue.\n\n2Letter from\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Attorney General ( November 24, 2014).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (877) 844-5461 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nStreet, Chicago,\n\nIllinois\n\n60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\n1\n\nFax: ( 312)\n\n100 West Randolph\n1001\n\nEast\n\nMain, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 •\n\n1' Y: ( 800) 964- 3013 •\n\nTTY: ( 877)\n\n675- 9339 •\n\n814- 3806\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fSr. Efrain Martinez\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 2\n\nalternate room of any opportunity for them to hear the meeting.\" 3 Further, she claimed that\nt] he LSC took a vote to stay in the current space even after being informed that there were\npeople in the hallway and people not being let into the building and the gym was available and\nwould have accommodated those wanting to attend. i'\nOn December 3, 2014, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request\n\nfor Review to the Academy' s Principal, Mrs. Nancy Paulette -Aguirre, and asked the LSC to\nprovide this office with copies of the agenda and minutes of its November 20, 2014, meeting,\ntogether with a written response to the allegation that the public was denied access to the\n\nmeeting. On December 11, 2014, Mrs. Miriam Arriaga, then -LSC Chairperson, submitted those\nmaterials on behalf of the LSC. The agenda included as an item: \" Approval and vote to request,\n\nMrs. Barbara Byrd -Bennett, CEO of the CPS, the suspension or dismissal of the school principal,\n\nMrs. Nancy Paulette- Aguirre. i5 Ms. Arriaga stated that the LSC did not limit access to the\nmeeting, but rather that Chicago Public Schools \" security limited access to latecomers per the\nbuilding' s fire code. i6 Additionally, she asserted that \"[ t] he LSC does not have access to whether\nschool entrances remain locked. The 50+ attendees ( as indicated by the sign in sheet), and news\n\nmedia present demonstrate that the public was indeed allowed to attend.\" 7 As to\nclaim that the LSC could have moved the meeting to accommodate the crowd, she further stated:\nDue to the commotion that ensued because of limited\n\nspace, the LSC considered moving the meeting to an alternate\nlocation. However, in an effort to continue the meeting with\n\nminimal interruptions, the majority of LSC members decided to\ncontinue the meeting in the original location. The OMA does not\nspecify that public meetings must be moved in order to\naccommodate a crowd that is larger than anticipated. 181\nLetter from\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Attorney General ( November 24, 2014).\n\nLetter from\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Attorney General ( November 24, 2014).\n\nJose Clemente Orozco Academy Local School Council, Agenda Item 9, Approval and vote to\nrequest, Mrs. Barbara Byrd -Bennett, CEO of the CPS, the suspension or dismissal of the school principal, Mrs.\n\nNancy Paulette -Aguirre (November 20, 2014).\nLetter from Miriam Arriaga, LSC Chairperson, to Josh Jones, Assistant Attorney General, Public\nAccess Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( December 11, 2014).\nLetter from Miriam Arriaga, LSC Chairperson, to Josh Jones, Assistant Attorney General, Public\nAccess Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( December 11, 2014).\n\nAccess\n\nBureau,\n\nLetter from Miriam Arriaga, LSC Chairperson, to Josh Jones, Assistant Attorney General, Public\nof the\nAttorney General ( December 11, 2014).\n\nOffice\n\n\fSr. Efrain Martinez\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 3\n\nSeparately, on December 16, 2014, Mrs. Paulette - Aguirre submitted a response\n\ncorroborating the allegations in the Request for Review. In particular, with respect to any\nattempts to accommodate the crowd in attendance, she stated:\n\nMany parents were protesting when they realized that they\n\nwere not going to provide them with access to room 104/ 106.\nSome of the parents who were already in room 104/ 106 asked the\n\nLSC to have the meeting in a larger room. In response to this\nrequest, Mr. Montes de Oca [ Director of LSC Relations] directed\nthe LSC to make a motion and to vote for it. The majority of the\nLSC voted to remain in room 104/ 106 despite of knowing that we\ncould have accommodated all of them in the gym. In previous\noccasions the location of the LSC was changed to accommodate\n\nthe attendants. 191\n\nOn December 23, 2014,\n\nreplied, reiterating her claims.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder OMA, \"[\n\ni] t is the public policy of this State that public bodies exist to aid\n\nin the conduct of the people' s business and that the people have a right to be informed as to the\nthe right\nconduct of their business.\"\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). \"[ C] itizens shall be given * * *\n\nto attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any\nway.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes is\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq.\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West 2016). Accordingly, this office does not have the\nauthority to review alleged violations of other statutes, such as whether the LSC violated the\nIllinois School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/ 1- 1 et seq. ( West 2016)) by requiring staff members who had\nclocked out and were attending the meeting on personal time to instead supervise students.\nWest 2016)).\n\nSection 2. 01 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ all!\n\nmeetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are\nconvenient\n\nand open\n\nto the\n\npublic.\" \"\n\nBy its plain terms, section 2. 01 requires a venue that is not\n\nonly ' open,' but ' convenient,' to the public.\"\n\nGerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 111. App. 3d\n\nLetter from Nancy Paulette, Jose Clemente Orozco, School Principal, to [ Josh] Jones ( December\n16, 2014).\n\n\fSr. Efrain Martinez\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 4\n\n352, 359 ( 4th Dist. 2003). Thus, \" an open meeting in an inconvenient place violates the Act.\"\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 359.\nIn Gerwin, the leading Illinois case on meeting room accessibility, the plaintiffs\n\nappealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against a county board for allegedly violating section 2. 01\n\nof OMA by holding a meeting in an inconvenient place. Gerwin, 345 I11. App. 3d at 353. When\na Local landfill informed the county board that it wanted to expand, opponents collected 500\nsignatures on petitions and took out large advertisements in local and regional newspapers\n\nencouraging citizens to attend upcoming meetings. Gerwin, 345 III. App. 3d at 354. After an\noverflow crowd attended a meeting of a committee of the board, a board member asked whether\nthe upcoming board meeting could be moved to a bigger room, but the meeting was not moved.\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 355. The plaintiffs alleged that the landfill had asked supporters to\narrive early for the board meeting to fill the meeting room, and they did so; only a few protesters\nwere allowed entrance. Gerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 356. About 100 members of the public were\nrelegated to the area outside the meeting room, where no seating was available and it was\nuncomfortable,\n\nthem.\"\n\nand the plaintiffs alleged that the Board \" made no arrangements\n\nto accommodate\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 356.\n\nAddressing the meaning of \"convenient,\" the court stated that \"[ a] meeting can be\nopen in the sense that no one is prohibited from attending it, but it can be held in such an illsuited, unaccommodating,\n\nunadvantageous\n\nplace that members of the public, as a practical\n\nmatter, would be deterred from attending it.\" Gerwin, 345 111. App. 3d at 361. Still, the court\nfound that \"[ i] t would be\n\nunreasonable\n\nto suppose the legislature\n\nintended * * *\n\nthat public\n\nbodies hold their meetings ' at such locations as are sufficient to accommodate all interested\n\nmembers of the public, such that they may see and hear all proceedings in reasonable comfort\nand\nsafety.' ( Emphasis in original.) Gerwin, 345 111. App. 3d at 361. Accordingly, as quoted\nabove, what section 2. 01 requires instead is \" reasonable accessibility.\"\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d\n\nat 362 (\" Renting a football stadium for public meetings might be inconvenient, or\nunadvantageous, to the public as a whole because of the cost. By the same token, holding public\nmeetings in a small room might be inconvenient to the public because persons wanting to attend\nwould\nhave difficulty gaining admittance.\").\nBecause the reasonableness of the meeting space\nwas a question of fact that needed to be explored, the court held that the trial court had\n\nimproperly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. Gerwin, 345 I11. App. 3d at 362.\nIn this case, it is undisputed that certain members of the public were not allowed\n\naccess to the meeting room for the LSC' s November 20, 2014, meeting. The parties dispute\nwhether the LSC was required to take steps under the circumstances\n\nto provide the public with\n\nreasonable access to the meeting.\nThe open\n\nsession\n\nminutes\n\nof the\n\nmeeting provide,\n\nin pertinent\n\npart:\n\n\fSr. Efrain Martinez\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 5\n\nA parent interjected to say that parents were outside the\nclassroom and the security guards would not let them in. Parents\nbegan to express their dissatisfaction\n\nwith this situation and argued\n\nthat * * *\n\nall the parents had been invited, it was an open meeting,\nwhich was breaking the law and that that all the parents should be\nallowed into the room. The principal [ said] that the room was\n\nalready at capacity. Mr. Willy Montes de Oca explained that \" this\n\nwas the council meeting. The council is the only one in this case by\nlaw decides what will happen, whether to continue with the\n\nmeeting or not. Also, the meeting should not be interrupted so they\ncan finish on time. Otherwise the council will have to decide to\ncontinue\n\nor cancel\".\n\nMr. Montes de Oca also clarified that \" here\n\nthere is no violation of the open meeting together. The place is\nopen; all arrived and as anywhere first come first serve. The\n\nmeeting for this space has a maximum capacity; therefore there is\n\nno more capacity. The council decides whether you want to move\nto another place or not, but this is the LSC meeting. The council is\nthe one who decides. The public in this case should not interrupt\n\nthe meeting of the council. That' s all I recommend and they decide\nwhether to continue the meeting or not, they have the last word.\"\nMs. Arriaga said \" thank you very much to all and the\ncouncil has decided to continue with the meeting and next is the\nprincipal' s presentation.\"\n\nMs. Paulette said \" I do not understand\n\nhow that was decided no one asked me to stay or cancel and I am\npart of the council\". Mr. Montes de Oca suggested that a motion be\n\nmade and vote carried out. 11ol\n\nA motion then passed to stay in room 104/ 106.\"\nUpon review, the facts this office received concerning the LSC' s November 20,\n\n2014, meeting demonstrate that the LSC failed to provide reasonable access to the meeting under\nthe circumstances.\n\nThe available information indicates that the LSC should have anticipated and\n\nprepared for a large crowd on that date, as the agenda provided that the LSC would consider the\n\ncontroversial matter of suspending or dismissing Principal Paulette -Aguirre. Members of the\n10Jose Clemente Orozco Academy Local School Council, Meeting, November 20, 2014, Minutes\n3.\n\nJose Clemente Orozco Academy Local School Council, Meeting, November 20, 2014, Minutes\n3.\n\n\fSr. Efrain Martinez\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 6\n\npublic raised concerns about the size of the meeting room during the meeting and proposed that\n\nit be moved, but the LSC declined, despite apparently having the gym as an alternative location\nthat could have accommodated the excluded members of the public. In its response to this\noffice, LSC did not explain why it did not attempt to take any steps to accommodate the\n\nmembers of the public who were locked out of the meeting room and out of the building\naltogether, such as moving to a larger room or setting up an overflow room. Although a public\n\nbody is not required to ensure that every meeting is accessible to every member of the public\nwho wishes to attend, a public body must take steps in response to increased public interest in\norder to ensure that its meetings are reasonably accessible. See, e.g., Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 37216 37291 37970, issued February 24, 2016, at 7, 10 ( more public comment sign- ups\nthan usual should have signaled to public body that it would have to take measures to\naccommodate large crowd in order to provide reasonable access). Because the LSC did not take\n\nmeasures to try to accommodate the public and provide reasonable access to the meeting even\n\nafter being notified that additional parents wanted to attend, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the LSC violated section 2. 01 of OMA in connection with its November 20, 2014, meeting.\n\nIn this instance, there are no available means for the LSC to remedy its violation.\nThis office advises the LSC to take steps to ensure that its future meetings are reasonably\naccessible to the public, and reminds the LSC to otherwise adhere to all of the requirements of\nOMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at the Chicago address on the first page of this letter or ( 312)\n814- 8413.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n32435\n\no\n\n201\n\nlocation\n\nimproper\n\nsd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Locked school doors during a public meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-32435/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nSr. Efrain Martinez\nDirector/ Principal\n\nJose Clemente Orozco Academy\n1940\n\nWest\n\n18th Street\n\nChicago, Illinois 60608\nemartinezl0@cps.\n\nedu\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2014 PAC 32435\nDear\n\nand Sr. Martinez:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Local School Council (LSC) of Jose Clemente Orozco Academy (Academy) did not\nmake its November 20, 2014, meeting reasonably accessible to the public.'\nOn November 24, 2014,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that members of the public were not allowed access to the LSC's\nNovember 20, 2014, meeting, and that the LSC did not take alternative measures to afford\n\naccess. Specifically, she alleged that \"[ b] oth front and back doors to the school were locked and\nno\n\nattendant\n\nwas\n\nthere to let people in during the entire duration\n\nof the\n\nmeeting[,]\"\n\neven though\n\nt] here were vacant seats and space especially after the children were sent to the gym.\" 2 She\nclaimed that \"[ t] hose who were not allowed in the room and were in the hallway were not given\nan alternative way to participate. They were not given agendas and there were no speakers, or an\n\nThis office notes that the LSC currently has a different membership than it had at the time of the\nmeeting at issue.\n\n2 Letter from\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Attorney General (November 24, 2014).\n\nalternate room of any opportunity for them to hear the meeting.\" 3 Further, she claimed that\nt] he LSC took a vote to stay in the current space even after being informed that there were\npeople in the hallway and people not being let into the building and the gym was available and\nwould have accommodated those wanting to attend. i'\nOn December 3, 2014, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request\n\nfor Review to the Academy's Principal, Mrs. Nancy Paulette -Aguirre, and asked the LSC to\nprovide this office with copies of the agenda and minutes of its November 20, 2014, meeting,\ntogether with a written response to the allegation that the public was denied access to the\n\nmeeting. On December 11, 2014, Mrs. Miriam Arriaga, then -LSC Chairperson, submitted those\nmaterials on behalf of the LSC. The agenda included as an item: \" Approval and vote to request,\n\nMrs. Barbara Byrd -Bennett, CEO of the CPS, the suspension or dismissal of the school principal,\n\nMrs. Nancy Paulette- Aguirre. i5 Ms. Arriaga stated that the LSC did not limit access to the\nmeeting, but rather that Chicago Public Schools \" security limited access to latecomers per the\nbuilding's fire code. i6 Additionally, she asserted that \"[ t] he LSC does not have access to whether\nschool entrances remain locked. The 50+ attendees (as indicated by the sign in sheet), and news\n\nmedia present demonstrate that the public was indeed allowed to attend.\" 7 As to\nclaim that the LSC could have moved the meeting to accommodate the crowd, she further stated:\nDue to the commotion that ensued because of limited\n\nspace, the LSC considered moving the meeting to an alternate\nlocation. However, in an effort to continue the meeting with\n\nminimal interruptions, the majority of LSC members decided to\ncontinue the meeting in the original location. The OMA does not\nspecify that public meetings must be moved in order to\naccommodate a crowd that is larger than anticipated. 181\nLetter from\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Attorney General (November 24, 2014).\n\nLetter from\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Attorney General (November 24, 2014).\n\nJose Clemente Orozco Academy Local School Council, Agenda Item 9, Approval and vote to\nrequest, Mrs. Barbara Byrd -Bennett, CEO of the CPS, the suspension or dismissal of the school principal, Mrs.\n\nNancy Paulette -Aguirre (November 20, 2014).\nLetter from Miriam Arriaga, LSC Chairperson, to Josh Jones, Assistant Attorney General, Public\nAccess Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (December 11, 2014).\nLetter from Miriam Arriaga, LSC Chairperson, to Josh Jones, Assistant Attorney General, Public\nAccess Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (December 11, 2014).\n\nAccess\n\nBureau,\n\nLetter from Miriam Arriaga, LSC Chairperson, to Josh Jones, Assistant Attorney General, Public\n\nSeparately, on December 16, 2014, Mrs. Paulette - Aguirre submitted a response\n\ncorroborating the allegations in the Request for Review. In particular, with respect to any\nattempts to accommodate the crowd in attendance, she stated:\n\nMany parents were protesting when they realized that they\n\nwere not going to provide them with access to room 104/ 106.\nSome of the parents who were already in room 104/ 106 asked the\n\nLSC to have the meeting in a larger room. In response to this\nrequest, Mr. Montes de Oca [ Director of LSC Relations] directed\nthe LSC to make a motion and to vote for it. The majority of the\nLSC voted to remain in room 104/ 106 despite of knowing that we\ncould have accommodated all of them in the gym. In previous\noccasions the location of the LSC was changed to accommodate\n\nthe attendants. 191\n\nOn December 23, 2014,\n\nreplied, reiterating her claims.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder OMA, \"[\n\ni] t is the public policy of this State that public bodies exist to aid\n\nin the conduct of the people's business and that the people have a right to be informed as to the\nthe right\nconduct of their business.\"\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). \"[ C] itizens shall be given * * *\n\nto attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any\nway.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq.\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2016). Accordingly, this office does not have the\nauthority to review alleged violations of other statutes, such as whether the LSC violated the\nIllinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/ 1- 1 et seq. (West 2016)) by requiring staff members who had\nclocked out and were attending the meeting on personal time to instead supervise students.\nWest 2016)).\n\nSection 2. 01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 (West 2016)) provides that \"[ all!\n\nmeetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are\nconvenient\n\nand open\n\nto the\n\npublic.\" \"\n\nBy its plain terms, section 2. 01 requires a venue that is not\n\nonly ' open,' but ' convenient,' to the public.\"\n\nGerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 111. App. 3d\n\nLetter from Nancy Paulette, Jose Clemente Orozco, School Principal, to [ Josh] Jones (December\n\n352, 359 (4th Dist. 2003). Thus, \" an open meeting in an inconvenient place violates the Act.\"\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 359.\nIn Gerwin, the leading Illinois case on meeting room accessibility, the plaintiffs\n\nappealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against a county board for allegedly violating section 2. 01\n\nof OMA by holding a meeting in an inconvenient place. Gerwin, 345 I11. App. 3d at 353. When\na Local landfill informed the county board that it wanted to expand, opponents collected 500\nsignatures on petitions and took out large advertisements in local and regional newspapers\n\nencouraging citizens to attend upcoming meetings. Gerwin, 345 III. App. 3d at 354. After an\noverflow crowd attended a meeting of a committee of the board, a board member asked whether\nthe upcoming board meeting could be moved to a bigger room, but the meeting was not moved.\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 355. The plaintiffs alleged that the landfill had asked supporters to\narrive early for the board meeting to fill the meeting room, and they did so; only a few protesters\nwere allowed entrance. Gerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 356. About 100 members of the public were\nrelegated to the area outside the meeting room, where no seating was available and it was\nuncomfortable,\n\nthem.\"\n\nand the plaintiffs alleged that the Board \" made no arrangements\n\nto accommodate\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 356.\n\nAddressing the meaning of \"convenient,\" the court stated that \"[ a] meeting can be\nopen in the sense that no one is prohibited from attending it, but it can be held in such an illsuited, unaccommodating,\n\nunadvantageous\n\nplace that members of the public, as a practical\n\nmatter, would be deterred from attending it.\" Gerwin, 345 111. App. 3d at 361. Still, the court\nfound that \"[ i] t would be\n\nunreasonable\n\nto suppose the legislature\n\nintended * * *\n\nthat public\n\nbodies hold their meetings ' at such locations as are sufficient to accommodate all interested\n\nmembers of the public, such that they may see and hear all proceedings in reasonable comfort\nand\nsafety.' (Emphasis in original.) Gerwin, 345 111. App. 3d at 361. Accordingly, as quoted\nabove, what section 2. 01 requires instead is \" reasonable accessibility.\"\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d\n\nat 362 (\" Renting a football stadium for public meetings might be inconvenient, or\nunadvantageous, to the public as a whole because of the cost. By the same token, holding public\nmeetings in a small room might be inconvenient to the public because persons wanting to attend\nwould\nhave difficulty gaining admittance.\").\nBecause the reasonableness of the meeting space\nwas a question of fact that needed to be explored, the court held that the trial court had\n\nimproperly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. Gerwin, 345 I11. App. 3d at 362.\nIn this case, it is undisputed that certain members of the public were not allowed\n\naccess to the meeting room for the LSC's November 20, 2014, meeting. The parties dispute\nwhether the LSC was required to take steps under the circumstances\n\nto provide the public with\n\nreasonable access to the meeting.\nThe open\n\nsession\n\nA parent interjected to say that parents were outside the\nclassroom and the security guards would not let them in. Parents\nbegan to express their dissatisfaction\n\nwith this situation and argued\n\nthat * * *\n\nall the parents had been invited, it was an open meeting,\nwhich was breaking the law and that that all the parents should be\nallowed into the room. The principal [ said] that the room was\n\nalready at capacity. Mr. Willy Montes de Oca explained that \" this\n\nwas the council meeting. The council is the only one in this case by\nlaw decides what will happen, whether to continue with the\n\nmeeting or not. Also, the meeting should not be interrupted so they\ncan finish on time. Otherwise the council will have to decide to\ncontinue\n\nor cancel\".\n\nMr. Montes de Oca also clarified that \" here\n\nthere is no violation of the open meeting together. The place is\nopen; all arrived and as anywhere first come first serve. The\n\nmeeting for this space has a maximum capacity; therefore there is\n\nno more capacity. The council decides whether you want to move\nto another place or not, but this is the LSC meeting. The council is\nthe one who decides. The public in this case should not interrupt\n\nthe meeting of the council. That's all I recommend and they decide\nwhether to continue the meeting or not, they have the last word.\"\nMs. Arriaga said \" thank you very much to all and the\ncouncil has decided to continue with the meeting and next is the\nprincipal's presentation.\"\n\nMs. Paulette said \" I do not understand\n\nhow that was decided no one asked me to stay or cancel and I am\npart of the council\". Mr. Montes de Oca suggested that a motion be\n\nmade and vote carried out. 11ol\n\nA motion then passed to stay in room 104/ 106.\"\nUpon review, the facts this office received concerning the LSC's November 20,\n\n2014, meeting demonstrate that the LSC failed to provide reasonable access to the meeting under\nthe circumstances.\n\nThe available information indicates that the LSC should have anticipated and\n\nprepared for a large crowd on that date, as the agenda provided that the LSC would consider the\n\ncontroversial matter of suspending or dismissing Principal Paulette -Aguirre. Members of the\n\npublic raised concerns about the size of the meeting room during the meeting and proposed that\n\nit be moved, but the LSC declined, despite apparently having the gym as an alternative location\nthat could have accommodated the excluded members of the public. In its response to this\noffice, LSC did not explain why it did not attempt to take any steps to accommodate the\n\nmembers of the public who were locked out of the meeting room and out of the building\naltogether, such as moving to a larger room or setting up an overflow room. Although a public\n\nbody is not required to ensure that every meeting is accessible to every member of the public\nwho wishes to attend, a public body must take steps in response to increased public interest in\norder to ensure that its meetings are reasonably accessible. See, e.g., Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 37216 37291 37970, issued February 24, 2016, at 7, 10 (more public comment sign- ups\nthan usual should have signaled to public body that it would have to take measures to\naccommodate large crowd in order to provide reasonable access). Because the LSC did not take\n\nmeasures to try to accommodate the public and provide reasonable access to the meeting even\n\nafter being notified that additional parents wanted to attend, the Public Access Bureau concludes\nthat the LSC violated section 2. 01 of OMA in connection with its November 20, 2014, meeting.\n\nIn this instance, there are no available means for the LSC to remedy its violation.\nThis office advises the LSC to take steps to ensure that its future meetings are reasonably\naccessible to the public, and reminds the LSC to otherwise adhere to all of the requirements of\nOMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at the Chicago address on the first page of this letter or (312)\n814- 8413.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n32435\n\no\n\n201\n\nlocation\n\nimproper\n\nsd"}
{"id":1158,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-02-27","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["32578"],"title":"Waukegan School Board violated OMA by failing to provide notice or agenda for collective bargaining meeting","filename":"32578, issued February 27, 2015.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1940,"summary":"The PAC determined that the Waukegan Public Schools Board violated the Open Meetings Act by holding a meeting to discuss collective bargaining without providing public notice or an agenda. The PAC clarified that while such discussions may be held in closed session, the board must first convene a properly noticed open meeting.","plain_summary":"A school board held a private meeting to discuss teacher contract negotiations without telling the public or posting an agenda. The Attorney General's office ruled this was illegal because even if a meeting is meant to be private, the board must first hold a public meeting and follow proper procedures to move into a closed session. The board was warned to follow these rules in the future.","holding":"The Board of Waukegan Public Schools violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide advance notice or an agenda for a meeting held on October 7, 2014.","legal_question":"Whether a school board violates the Open Meetings Act by holding a meeting to discuss collective bargaining negotiations without providing public notice or an agenda.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2","5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Waukegan Public Schools, Community Unit School District Number 60","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The board held an unannounced meeting to discuss collective bargaining negotiations.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":92.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_c/2_c_2/32578, issued February 27, 2015.pdf","sha256":"9a47ff3c633d0e6bb3cb2980ff3676e4baff3d9e3ce7e31163a51c4703d052b4","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","agenda","school board","collective bargaining","closed session"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nFebruary 27, 2015\n\nA- \" FORNEY GENERAL\n\nelectronic\n\nmail\n\nThomas A. Morris, Jr.\nferal Counsel\nPublic Schools\ni Unit School District Number 60\n1201\n\nNorth\n\nSheridan\n\nRoad\n\nWaukegan, Illinois 60085\n\ntmorris@wps60. org\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2014 PAC 32578\n\nand Mr. Morris:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2012)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nau concludes that the Board of Waukegan Public Schools, Community Unit School District\nlber 60 ( Board) violated OMA by meeting on October 7, 2014, without providing advance\n\nce, an agenda, or otherwise abiding by OMA.\nOn December 5, 2014,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that on October 7, 2014, the Board held a meeting concerning a\nteachers' strike without providing advance notice or allowing the public to observe the opening\n\nof the meeting.\n\nstated that he went to the location of the meeting, but was denied\nOn December 18, 2014, this office forwarded a copy of\n\nRequest\n\nfor, Review to the Board and asked it to respond to his allegation and to explain whether the\n\nBoard' s October 7, 2014, meeting consisted of collective bargaining negotiations.\n\nOn January\n\n15,E 2015, this office received the Board' s response affirming that members of the Board, outside\ncounsel, and a member of the Board' s negotiating team met on October 7, 2014, \" without 48\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 • \"\n\nITY (877) 8445461 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\nYIN. ( 800) 964- 3013 •\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n60601 • (\n618) 529- 6400 •\nTIT: (877) 675- 9339 •\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416 ®—\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois\n\n\fThomas A. Morris, Jr.\n\nuary 27, 2015\n2\n\nhours' advance public notice, an agenda, public participation or tape recording of the meeting[.]\"'\nThe Board alleged that the meeting was convened under the authority of the Illinois Educational\nLabor Relations Act ( 115 ILCS 5/ 1 et seq. ( West 2012)) and claimed that section 18 of that Act\n115 ILCS 5/ 18 ( West 2012)) makes OMA \" inapplicable to unilateral labor negotiation\n\ndiscussions.\" Z The Board also provided this office with minutes of the October 7, 2014, meeting\nindicating that it voted to enter closed session pursuant to the Illinois Educational Labor\nRelations Act and section 2( c)( 2) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c)( 2) ( West 2013 Supp.), as amended\nbylPublic Acts 98- 756, effective July 16, 2014; 98- 1039, effective August 25, 2014).\n\ndid not submit a written reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2012). To that end,\nion 2( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2013 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 98- 756,\nctive July 16, 2014; 98- 1039, effective August 25, 2014) provides: \"[ a] Il meetings of public\nies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in accordance\n\nt Section 2a.\" Section 2( c)( 2) of OMA permits a public body to hold a closed meeting to\nuss \"[ c] ollective negotiating matters between the public body and its employees or their\nesentatives, or deliberations concerning salary schedules for one or more classes of\n\ndoyees.\" However, section 2a of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2a ( West 2012)) only allows a public\ny to \" hold a meeting closed to the public, or close a portion of a meeting to the public, upon a\nDrity vote of a quorum present, taken at a meeting open to the public for which notice has\n2 given as required by this Act.\" ( Emphasis added.) Additionally, section 2. 02( a) of OMA (5\nS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2012)) provides: \"[ p] ublic notice of any special meeting except a\n\nting held in the event of a bonafide emergency, or of any rescheduled regular meeting, or of\nreconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which notice shall\ninclude the agenda[.]\"\n\nRequest for Review alleged that he went to the Board' s meeting\nplace on October 7, 2014, and was told by the Superintendent that the Board was having a closed\nmeeting, despite not having provided advance notice to the public or otherwise abiding by OMA.\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that it did not provide advance notice or\n\npost an agenda for its October 7, 2014, Board meeting, but claimed that the meeting was exempt\nfrom OMA under section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, which provides:\n\nt] he provisions of the Open Meetings Act shall not apply to collective bargaining negotiations\nand grievance arbitrations conducted pursuant to this Act.\" In support of its position, the Board\n\nLetter from Thomas A. Morris, Jr., General Counsel, Waukegan Public Schools, to Josh Jones,\n\nAttorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( January 13, 2015).\nLetter from Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, by Anthony Ficarelli, to Thomas A. Morris, Jr., General\nWaukegan Community Unit School District 60 ( January 8, 2015).\n\n\fThomas A. Morris, Jr.\nruary 27. 2015\n\ncited the dissent in a 1987 Appellate Court case. See Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board\n\nv. Homer Community Consolidated School District No. 208, 160 Ill. App. 3d 730 ( 4th Dist.\n1987) ( McCullough, J., dissenting). The Board has not cited any binding authority supporting\nthe position that section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act makes OMA\ninapplicable to the Board' s unilateral labor negotiation discussions.\n\nRather, the Board cited two\n\njudicial opinions and a formal Attorney General opinion which each acknowledge that\n\ndiscussions concerning collective bargaining are properly held in closed session during public\nmeetings pursuant to DMA' s collective bargaining exception. See Illinois Educational Labor\nRelations Board v. Homer Community Consolidated School District No. 208, 132 Ill. 2d 29, 36\n\n1989); People v. Board of Education of District 170 ofLee and Ogle Counties, 40 Ill. App. 3d\n819, 821- 23 ( 2nd Dist. 1976); Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 80- 024, issued August 12, 1980, at 9- 11.\n\nIn construing statutory provisions such as section 18 of the Illinois Educational\nLabor Relations Act and section 2( c)( 2) of OMA, the primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate\nthe\nof the General Assembly. See Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public\nor\n\nHealth,\n\n218 111. 2d 390, 415, 844 N. E. 2d 1, 14 ( 2006). The best indicator of legislative intent is\n\nthe language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e. g., Bettis\n\nv. Marsaglia, 2014 IL 117050, 113, 23 N.E.3d 351, 356 ( 2014). When a statutory provision is\n\nambiguous, a reviewing body turns \" to aids of statutory construction, including legislative\nhistory and established rules of construction.\" BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014\nIL 116311, ¶ 38, 6 N. E. 3d 162, 170 ( 2014). \"\n\nUnder the doctrine of in pari materia, two\n\nlegislative acts that address the same subject are considered with reference to one another, so that\nthey may be given harmonious effect.\" ( Emphasis in original.) See, e. g., Citizens Opposing\nPollution v. ExxonMobil Coal USA., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 24, 962 N. E. 2d 956, 964 ( 2012).\n\nIt is\n\nalso a well- established principle of statutory construction that \" each word, clause and sentence of\n\na statute must be given a reasonable construction, if possible, and should not be rendered\n\nsuperfluous.\"\n\nSee, e. g., Home Star Bank and Financial Services v. Emergency Care and Health\n\nOrganization, Ltd., 2014 IL 115526, ¶ 24, 6 N. E. 3d 128, 135 ( 2014).\nUnder the plain language of section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations\n\nAct, \" collective bargaining negotiations\" are not subject to OMA. Negotiations are commonly\nunderstood to involve parties with differing interests each advocating for their own interests;\nBlack' s Law Dictionary defines negotiations as \"[ d] ealings conducted between two or more\n\nparties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.\" Black' s Law Dictionary ( 9th ed. 2009),\navailable at Westlaw BLACKS. Section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act does\n\nnot Irefer to discussions concerning collective bargaining negotiations, but to the collective\nbargaining negotiations themselves. Accordingly, the plain language of section 18 of the Illinois\nEducational Labor Relations Act does not evince the intent to remove a public body' s internal\ndiscussions concerning collective bargaining negotiations from the purview of OMA.\nThis interpretation is further supported by the fact that OMA contains its own\n\nexcepting collective bargaining negotiations from discussion in an open meeting.\n\nAs\n\n\fnas A. Morris, Jr.\n27, 2015\n\nset forth above, section 2( c)( 2) of OMA allows a public body to hold a closed session discussion\n\nof \"[c] ollective negotiating matters between the public body and its employees or their\nrepresentatives[.]\"\n\nIf, as the Board contends, section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor\n\nRelations Act renders OMA inapplicable to discussions of collective bargaining matters by a\nschool board, as opposed to applying only to negotiations or grievance arbitrations conducted\n\nunder that Act where both educational employees and employers are present, then section 2( c)( 2)\n\nof OMA is superfluous. The exception permitting a public body to discuss collective negotiation\nmatters in closed session would be pointless if OMA does not apply to a public body' s discussion\n\nof collective bargaining negotiations.\n\nOn the other hand, section 18 of the Illinois Educational\n\nLabor Relations Act and section 2( c)( 2) of OMA can be construed in a manner that gives effect\nto both provisions: section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act applies when a\n\npublic body meets with the opposing party in a collective bargaining dispute to negotiate,\nwhereas a public body' s internal discussions about collective bargaining matters are subject to\nOMA. Thus, it comports with and effectuates both section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor\nRelations Act and section 2( c)( 2) of OMA to conclude that OMA applies when a board holds a\nmeeting for the members to discuss collective negotiating matters among themselves.\n\nAccordingly, the Board violated OMA by holding a meeting that was subject to\n\non October 7, 2014, without providing advance notice, an agenda, or otherwise abiding by\nWe note that the conclusion that OMA applies to unilateral meetings to discuss collective\n\nning does not mean that those discussions cannot be confidential; it simply means that a\nthat wishes to discuss collective negotiating matters confidentially must make a motion\n\nte to enter closed session during a properly - noticed open meeting to discuss those matters.\non our review of the minutes and the Board' s assertions, it appears that no final action was\nat the Board' s October 7, 2014, meeting. We caution the Board to comply with all the\nements of OMA in the future.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA JOSHUA M. JONES\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\no 202 notice improper sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"An unannounced meeting on collective bargaining","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-32578/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nFebruary 27, 2015\n\nA- \" FORNEY GENERAL\n\nelectronic\n\nmail\n\nThomas A. Morris, Jr.\nferal Counsel\nPublic Schools\ni Unit School District Number 60\n1201\n\nNorth\n\nSheridan\n\nRoad\n\nWaukegan, Illinois 60085\n\ntmorris@wps60. org\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2014 PAC 32578\n\nand Mr. Morris:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nOMA) (5 ILCS 140/ 3. 5(e) (West 2012)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nau concludes that the Board of Waukegan Public Schools, Community Unit School District\nlber 60 (Board) violated OMA by meeting on October 7, 2014, without providing advance\n\nce, an agenda, or otherwise abiding by OMA.\nOn December 5, 2014,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that on October 7, 2014, the Board held a meeting concerning a\nteachers' strike without providing advance notice or allowing the public to observe the opening\n\nof the meeting.\n\nstated that he went to the location of the meeting, but was denied\nOn December 18, 2014, this office forwarded a copy of\n\nRequest\n\nfor, Review to the Board and asked it to respond to his allegation and to explain whether the\n\nBoard's October 7, 2014, meeting consisted of collective bargaining negotiations.\n\nOn January\n\n15,E 2015, this office received the Board's response affirming that members of the Board, outside\ncounsel, and a member of the Board's negotiating team met on October 7, 2014, \" without 48\n\n®—\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois\n\nThomas A. Morris, Jr.\n\nuary 27, 2015\n2\n\nhours' advance public notice, an agenda, public participation or tape recording of the meeting[.]\"'\nThe Board alleged that the meeting was convened under the authority of the Illinois Educational\nLabor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/ 1 et seq. (West 2012)) and claimed that section 18 of that Act\n115 ILCS 5/ 18 (West 2012)) makes OMA \" inapplicable to unilateral labor negotiation\n\ndiscussions.\" Z The Board also provided this office with minutes of the October 7, 2014, meeting\nindicating that it voted to enter closed session pursuant to the Illinois Educational Labor\nRelations Act and section 2(c)(2) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c)(2) (West 2013 Supp.), as amended\nbylPublic Acts 98- 756, effective July 16, 2014; 98- 1039, effective August 25, 2014).\n\ndid not submit a written reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2012). To that end,\nion 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2013 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 98- 756,\nctive July 16, 2014; 98- 1039, effective August 25, 2014) provides: \"[ a] Il meetings of public\nies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance\n\nt Section 2a.\" Section 2(c)(2) of OMA permits a public body to hold a closed meeting to\nuss \"[ c] ollective negotiating matters between the public body and its employees or their\nesentatives, or deliberations concerning salary schedules for one or more classes of\n\ndoyees.\" However, section 2a of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2a (West 2012)) only allows a public\ny to \" hold a meeting closed to the public, or close a portion of a meeting to the public, upon a\nDrity vote of a quorum present, taken at a meeting open to the public for which notice has\n2 given as required by this Act.\" (Emphasis added.) Additionally, section 2. 02(a) of OMA (5\nS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2012)) provides: \"[ p] ublic notice of any special meeting except a\n\nting held in the event of a bonafide emergency, or of any rescheduled regular meeting, or of\nreconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which notice shall\ninclude the agenda[.]\"\n\nRequest for Review alleged that he went to the Board's meeting\nplace on October 7, 2014, and was told by the Superintendent that the Board was having a closed\nmeeting, despite not having provided advance notice to the public or otherwise abiding by OMA.\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that it did not provide advance notice or\n\npost an agenda for its October 7, 2014, Board meeting, but claimed that the meeting was exempt\nfrom OMA under section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, which provides:\n\nt] he provisions of the Open Meetings Act shall not apply to collective bargaining negotiations\nand grievance arbitrations conducted pursuant to this Act.\" In support of its position, the Board\n\nLetter from Thomas A. Morris, Jr., General Counsel, Waukegan Public Schools, to Josh Jones,\n\nAttorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (January 13, 2015).\nLetter from Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, by Anthony Ficarelli, to Thomas A. Morris, Jr., General\nWaukegan Community Unit School District 60 (January 8, 2015).\n\nThomas A. Morris, Jr.\nruary 27. 2015\n\ncited the dissent in a 1987 Appellate Court case. See Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board\n\nv. Homer Community Consolidated School District No. 208, 160 Ill. App. 3d 730 (4th Dist.\n1987) (McCullough, J., dissenting). The Board has not cited any binding authority supporting\nthe position that section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act makes OMA\ninapplicable to the Board's unilateral labor negotiation discussions.\n\nRather, the Board cited two\n\njudicial opinions and a formal Attorney General opinion which each acknowledge that\n\ndiscussions concerning collective bargaining are properly held in closed session during public\nmeetings pursuant to DMA's collective bargaining exception. See Illinois Educational Labor\nRelations Board v. Homer Community Consolidated School District No. 208, 132 Ill. 2d 29, 36\n\n1989); People v. Board of Education of District 170 ofLee and Ogle Counties, 40 Ill. App. 3d\n819, 821- 23 (2nd Dist. 1976); Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 80- 024, issued August 12, 1980, at 9- 11.\n\nIn construing statutory provisions such as section 18 of the Illinois Educational\nLabor Relations Act and section 2(c)(2) of OMA, the primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate\nthe\nof the General Assembly. See Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public\nor\n\nHealth,\n\n218 111. 2d 390, 415, 844 N. E. 2d 1, 14 (2006). The best indicator of legislative intent is\n\nthe language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e. g., Bettis\n\nv. Marsaglia, 2014 IL 117050, 113, 23 N.E.3d 351, 356 (2014). When a statutory provision is\n\nambiguous, a reviewing body turns \" to aids of statutory construction, including legislative\nhistory and established rules of construction.\" BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014\nIL 116311, ¶ 38, 6 N. E. 3d 162, 170 (2014). \"\n\nUnder the doctrine of in pari materia, two\n\nlegislative acts that address the same subject are considered with reference to one another, so that\nthey may be given harmonious effect.\" (Emphasis in original.) See, e. g., Citizens Opposing\nPollution v. ExxonMobil Coal USA., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 24, 962 N. E. 2d 956, 964 (2012).\n\nIt is\n\nalso a well- established principle of statutory construction that \" each word, clause and sentence of\n\na statute must be given a reasonable construction, if possible, and should not be rendered\n\nsuperfluous.\"\n\nSee, e. g., Home Star Bank and Financial Services v. Emergency Care and Health\n\nOrganization, Ltd., 2014 IL 115526, ¶ 24, 6 N. E. 3d 128, 135 (2014).\nUnder the plain language of section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations\n\nAct, \" collective bargaining negotiations\" are not subject to OMA. Negotiations are commonly\nunderstood to involve parties with differing interests each advocating for their own interests;\nBlack's Law Dictionary defines negotiations as \"[ d] ealings conducted between two or more\n\nparties for the purpose of reaching an understanding.\" Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009),\navailable at Westlaw BLACKS. Section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act does\n\nnot Irefer to discussions concerning collective bargaining negotiations, but to the collective\nbargaining negotiations themselves. Accordingly, the plain language of section 18 of the Illinois\nEducational Labor Relations Act does not evince the intent to remove a public body's internal\ndiscussions concerning collective bargaining negotiations from the purview of OMA.\nThis interpretation is further supported by the fact that OMA contains its own\n\nexcepting collective bargaining negotiations from discussion in an open meeting.\n\nAs\n\nnas A. Morris, Jr.\n27, 2015\n\nset forth above, section 2(c)(2) of OMA allows a public body to hold a closed session discussion\n\nof \"[c] ollective negotiating matters between the public body and its employees or their\nrepresentatives[.]\"\n\nIf, as the Board contends, section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor\n\nRelations Act renders OMA inapplicable to discussions of collective bargaining matters by a\nschool board, as opposed to applying only to negotiations or grievance arbitrations conducted\n\nunder that Act where both educational employees and employers are present, then section 2(c)(2)\n\nof OMA is superfluous. The exception permitting a public body to discuss collective negotiation\nmatters in closed session would be pointless if OMA does not apply to a public body's discussion\n\nof collective bargaining negotiations.\n\nOn the other hand, section 18 of the Illinois Educational\n\nLabor Relations Act and section 2(c)(2) of OMA can be construed in a manner that gives effect\nto both provisions: section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act applies when a\n\npublic body meets with the opposing party in a collective bargaining dispute to negotiate,\nwhereas a public body's internal discussions about collective bargaining matters are subject to\nOMA. Thus, it comports with and effectuates both section 18 of the Illinois Educational Labor\nRelations Act and section 2(c)(2) of OMA to conclude that OMA applies when a board holds a\nmeeting for the members to discuss collective negotiating matters among themselves.\n\nAccordingly, the Board violated OMA by holding a meeting that was subject to\n\non October 7, 2014, without providing advance notice, an agenda, or otherwise abiding by\nWe note that the conclusion that OMA applies to unilateral meetings to discuss collective\n\nning does not mean that those discussions cannot be confidential; it simply means that a\nthat wishes to discuss collective negotiating matters confidentially must make a motion\n\nte to enter closed session during a properly - noticed open meeting to discuss those matters.\non our review of the minutes and the Board's assertions, it appears that no final action was\nat the Board's October 7, 2014, meeting. We caution the Board to comply with all the\nements of OMA in the future.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA JOSHUA M. JONES\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\no 202 notice improper sd"}
{"id":1159,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-06-04","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["33732"],"title":"Village of Campton Hills Board did not violate OMA by allowing trustee to attend by phone","filename":"33732, issued June 4, 2015.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1859,"summary":"A Village Trustee alleged that the Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by allowing another trustee to participate in a meeting remotely by telephone. The PAC determined that the Board acted within its discretion under OMA and its own rules in permitting the remote attendance.","plain_summary":"A village trustee complained that another board member was improperly allowed to attend a meeting by phone. The Attorney General's office reviewed the situation and found that the board followed its own rules and state law in allowing the remote participation. Therefore, no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred.","holding":"The Board of Trustees of the Village of Campton Hills did not violate the Open Meetings Act by permitting a trustee to participate in a meeting via audio conference.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by allowing a member to participate in a meeting via audio conference under the provisions of 5 ILCS 120/7.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/7"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Trustees of the Village of Campton Hills","requesting_party":"James W. Kopec","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"remote meeting","subject_description":"The propriety of a village trustee participating in a public meeting via audio conference.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/7/7_a_b_c/33732, issued June 4, 2015.pdf","sha256":"f14334f00bc6c7a426262c9bbeec489ba0d5a799141d8d238fc279be9f944afc","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["remote meeting","audio conference","trustee attendance","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 4, 2015\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. James W. Kopec\nTrustee, Village of Campton Hills\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf, Partner\nAncel, Glink, Diamond, Bush,\nDiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C.\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njtappendorf@ancelglink.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review-2015 PAC 33732\nDear Mr. Kopec and Ms. Tappendorf:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2012)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the available information and documents do not demonstrate that the Board of\nTrustees of the Village of Campton Hills (Board) violated OMA by permitting a village trustee\nto participate in its February 18, 2015, meeting by telephone.\nOn February 20, 2015, the Public Access Bureau received a Request for Review\nfrom Village Trustee James W. Kopec alleging that the Board violated OMA by allowing\nVillage Trustee Al Lenkaitis, Jr., to attend its February 18, 2015, meeting remotely by telephone\nwithout prior notification to the recording secretary or clerk as required by section 7(b) of OMA\n(5 ILCS 120/7(b) (West 2012), as amended by Public Act 98-992, effective August 18, 2014).\nOn February 27, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Board (via\nthe village president) and asked for copies of the February 18, 2015, meeting minutes and\nagenda, together with a written response to Trustee Kopec's allegation. On March 10, 2015, the\nvillage president responded that she agreed with Trustee Kopec that the Board had violated\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TI'Y: (877) 844-5461 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main. C.arhondale. Illinois n2go1 • ihl8i s;7g_M(){i • 'llV· iH.771 f..7C:..QHQ • i;'\"\"' /f..Hn ,1aJJ.1t.\n\n�\n\n\fMr. James W. Kopec\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nJune 4, 2015\nPage 2\n\nOMA by allowing Trustee Lenkaitis to participate in the meeting by telephone because he had\nnot notified the interim village clerk in advance. The village president enclosed: (I) a copy of\nthe Village Code section on attendance by audio conferencing; 1 (2) a memorandum from the\nBoard's special legislative counsel asserting that the authority to allow a trustee to participate by\ntelephone rests solely with the Board; (3) a memorandum from the village attorney refuting the\nmemorandum from the Board's special legislative counsel by claiming that the Board did not\nhave the ability to approve of Trustee Lenkaitis's participation by telephone because he no longer\nprincipally resides within the Village; (4) past meeting minutes; and (5) materials from the\ninternet indicating that Trustee Lenkaitis has moved his principal residence away from the\nVillage for employment purposes.\nOn March 27, 2015, this office also received a response from the Board's special\nlegislative counsel asserting that she represents the Board and that it deserved the opportunity to\nrespond. The special legislative counsel stated that Trustee Lenkaitis had notified the village\nadministrator by e-mail that he would be participating in future meetings by telephone and that\nthe administrator had forwarded the message to the interim village clerk. The special legislative\ncounsel enclosed an e-mail string in which the administrator forwarded Trustee Lenkaitis's\nDecember 15, 2014, notification to the interim village clerk on December 18, 2014.\nOn March 30, 2015, the village president replied to the special legislative\ncounsel's response by claiming, in pertinent part: (I) Trustee Lenkaitis did not use the form that\ntrustees are requested to complete when they wish to attend a meeting by telephone; (2) Trustee\nLenkaitis was required to specify the reason why he would not physically attend meetings; and\n(3) OMA does not permit a blanket request to attend all future meetings by telephone.\nLater that day, the special legislative counsel responded, in pertinent part, that\nneither a State statute nor the Village Code requires a trustee to submit a request for remote\nattendance on a particular form, and further asserted:\n[I]t is up to the Village Board to determine whether one of its\nmembers is eligible to attend a meeting electronically based on the\nstatutory standards for participating electronically. The Board\ndiscussed the eligibility issue at its meeting (as shown in the\nmeeting minutes), and a majority determined that [Trustee\nLenkaitis] was qualified to attend electronically because he was\naway on business. The allegations about his residency or non­\nresidency are not relevant to the question of whether the Board\nfollowed the OMA in determining that he was eligible to attend a\n'Campton Hills, Ill., Village Code tit. 1, ch. 19 (February 19, 2013).\n\n\fMr. James W. Kopec\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nJune 4, 2015\nPage 3\n\nmeeting electronically based on his being away on business, nor\nare they within the PAC's authority under the OMA and FOIA\nstatutes.2\nOn April 20, 2015, Trustee Kopec replied that he had not been aware ofTrustee\nLenkaitis's December 15, 2014, notification, but that the Board should nonetheless have denied\nTrustee Lenkaitis's participation based upon the interim clerk's statement during the February 18,\n2015, meeting that he had not received Trustee Lenkaitis's notification.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSections 7(a), 7(b), and 7(c) ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/7(a), (b), (c) (West 2012), as\namended by Public Act 98-992, effective August 18, 2014) provide, in pertinent part:\n(a) !fa quorum of the members ofthe public body is\nphysically present as required by Section 2.01, a majority\nof the public body may allow a member of that body to\nattend the meeting by other means ifthe member is\nprevented from physically attending because of: (i)\npersonal illness or disability; (ii) employment purposes or\nthe business ofthe public body; or (iii) a family or other\nemergency. \"Other means\" is by video or audio conference.\n(b) Jfa member wishes to attend a meeting by other means, the\nmember must notify the recording secretary or clerk ofthe\npublic body before the meeting unless advance notice is\nimpractical.\n(c) A majority ofthe public body may allow a member to\nattend a meeting by other means only in accordance with\nand to the extent allowed by rules adopted by the public\nbody. The rules must conform to the requirements and\nrestrictions ofthis Section, may further limit the extent to\nwhich attendance by other means is allowed, and may\nprovide for the giving ofadditional notice to the public or\nfurther facilitate public access to meetings.\n\n'E-mail from Julie Tappendorf, Partner, Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C.,\nto [Josh] Jones (March 30, 2015).\n\n\fMr. James W. Kopec\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nJune 4, 2015\nPage 4\n\nThe Village has adopted rules allowing remote attendance as required by section\n7(c), which paraphrase sections 7(a) and 7(b) of OMA and: (I) require all votes to be taken by\nroll call; (2) permit all persons present, including members of the public, to participate in the\naudio conference if the meeting is or includes a public hearing; and (3) make records subject to\nreview, discussion, or adoption during the meeting available to the member attending by audio\nconference.\nUnder the plain language of section 7(b) of OMA, a village board member who\nwishes to attend a meeting by audio conference is required to notify the clerk and/or recording\nsecretary in advance, unless that would be impractical. The Board's special legislative counsel\nhas provided evidence that the interim village clerk received notice by e-mail in advance of the\nFebruary 18, 2015, Board meeting that Trustee Lenkaitis would participate in future meetings by\ntelephone. OMA does not specify that a member of a public body who wishes to attend a\nmeeting via audio conference must contact the clerk or recording secretary directly, nor does it\nrequire notice to be given on a particular form. Further, OMA does not prohibit a board member\nfrom providing prospective notice for multiple meetings. We conclude that in these\ncircumstances, sufficient notice of intent to participate electronically was provided by Trustee\nLenkaitis.\nTurning to the allegation that the Board did not have the authority to allow\nTrustee Lenkaitis to participate in meetings by telephone because he no longer maintains his\nprimary residence in the Village, the plain language of section 7(a) specifies that a majority of\nthe members of a public body \"may allow\" a member to attend a meeting remotely because of a\npersonal illness or disability, employment purposes or the business of the public body, or a\nfamily or other emergency. The village attorney has contended that \"employment purposes\"\nrefers to temporary business trips, and that because Trustee Lenkaitis is residing outside of the\nVillage, his absence cannot be considered to be for employment purposes under section 7(a). 3\nHowever, as the Board's special legislative counsel notes, under section 7 of OMA the authority\nto permit a board member to attend a meeting by audio conference is vested in the Board.\nMoreover, with respect to the issue of whether a trustee is no longer eligible to serve on the\nBoard, section 3.l-10-50(c)(l) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.l-10-50(c)(l) (West\n2012)) provides: \"A vacancy occurs in an office by reason of*** more than temporary removal\nof residence from the municipality[.] * * * The corporate authorities have the authority to\ndetermine whether a vacancy under this subsection has occurred.\" 4 Apparently, the Board had\n'Memorandum from J. William BraithwaiteNillage Attorney, Bazos, Freeman, Kramer, Schuster\n& Braithwaite, LLC, to Julie Tappendorf(February 18, 2015), at 1-2.\n4\n\nWe note that pursuant to section 7(c)(3) of the Attorney General Act (15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West\n2012)), the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of OMA and the\nFreedom of Information Act (5 lLCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2012)).\n\n\fMr. James W. Kopec\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nJune 4, 2015\nPage 5\n\nnot, as of its February 18, 2015, meeting, taken action to determine whether Trustee Lenkaitis\nhad vacated his office.\nIn fact, the minutes of the February I 8, 2015, meeting state that Trustee Andersen\nreported that Trustee Lenkaitis was not sure whether his out-of-town employment would be\ntemporary or permanent but that he was not putting his house in the Village up for sale. 5\nSubsequently, the Board voted to allow Trustee Lenkaitis to participate in the meeting via audio\nconference in accordance with its codified rule on remote attendance. The Board had discretion\nunder section 7(a) of OMA to allow Trustee Lenkaitis to participate in the February 18, 2015,\nmeeting via audio conference. Its decision to do so was not clearly unreasonable or contrary to\nits rules. Consequently, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Board violated OMA by\nallowing Trustee Lenkaitis to participate telephonically.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, you may contact me at\nthe Chicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to close this matt_er.\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n33732 o 7 attendance proper mun\n\n'Village of Campton Hills Board, Meeting, February 18, 2015, Minutes 2.\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A trustee's audio-conference participation in a meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-33732/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 4, 2015\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. James W. Kopec\nTrustee, Village of Campton Hills\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf, Partner\nAncel, Glink, Diamond, Bush,\nDiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C.\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njtappendorf@ancelglink.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review-2015 PAC 33732\nDear Mr. Kopec and Ms. Tappendorf:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2012)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the available information and documents do not demonstrate that the Board of\nTrustees of the Village of Campton Hills (Board) violated OMA by permitting a village trustee\nto participate in its February 18, 2015, meeting by telephone.\nOn February 20, 2015, the Public Access Bureau received a Request for Review\nfrom Village Trustee James W. Kopec alleging that the Board violated OMA by allowing\nVillage Trustee Al Lenkaitis, Jr., to attend its February 18, 2015, meeting remotely by telephone\nwithout prior notification to the recording secretary or clerk as required by section 7(b) of OMA\n(5 ILCS 120/7(b) (West 2012), as amended by Public Act 98-992, effective August 18, 2014).\nOn February 27, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Board (via\nthe village president) and asked for copies of the February 18, 2015, meeting minutes and\nagenda, together with a written response to Trustee Kopec's allegation. On March 10, 2015, the\nvillage president responded that she agreed with Trustee Kopec that the Board had violated\n\nOMA by allowing Trustee Lenkaitis to participate in the meeting by telephone because he had\nnot notified the interim village clerk in advance. The village president enclosed: (I) a copy of\nthe Village Code section on attendance by audio conferencing; 1 (2) a memorandum from the\nBoard's special legislative counsel asserting that the authority to allow a trustee to participate by\ntelephone rests solely with the Board; (3) a memorandum from the village attorney refuting the\nmemorandum from the Board's special legislative counsel by claiming that the Board did not\nhave the ability to approve of Trustee Lenkaitis's participation by telephone because he no longer\nprincipally resides within the Village; (4) past meeting minutes; and (5) materials from the\ninternet indicating that Trustee Lenkaitis has moved his principal residence away from the\nVillage for employment purposes.\nOn March 27, 2015, this office also received a response from the Board's special\nlegislative counsel asserting that she represents the Board and that it deserved the opportunity to\nrespond. The special legislative counsel stated that Trustee Lenkaitis had notified the village\nadministrator by e-mail that he would be participating in future meetings by telephone and that\nthe administrator had forwarded the message to the interim village clerk. The special legislative\ncounsel enclosed an e-mail string in which the administrator forwarded Trustee Lenkaitis's\nDecember 15, 2014, notification to the interim village clerk on December 18, 2014.\nOn March 30, 2015, the village president replied to the special legislative\ncounsel's response by claiming, in pertinent part: (I) Trustee Lenkaitis did not use the form that\ntrustees are requested to complete when they wish to attend a meeting by telephone; (2) Trustee\nLenkaitis was required to specify the reason why he would not physically attend meetings; and\n(3) OMA does not permit a blanket request to attend all future meetings by telephone.\nLater that day, the special legislative counsel responded, in pertinent part, that\nneither a State statute nor the Village Code requires a trustee to submit a request for remote\nattendance on a particular form, and further asserted:\n[I]t is up to the Village Board to determine whether one of its\nmembers is eligible to attend a meeting electronically based on the\nstatutory standards for participating electronically. The Board\ndiscussed the eligibility issue at its meeting (as shown in the\nmeeting minutes), and a majority determined that [Trustee\nLenkaitis] was qualified to attend electronically because he was\n\nmeeting electronically based on his being away on business, nor\nare they within the PAC's authority under the OMA and FOIA\nstatutes.2\nOn April 20, 2015, Trustee Kopec replied that he had not been aware ofTrustee\nLenkaitis's December 15, 2014, notification, but that the Board should nonetheless have denied\nTrustee Lenkaitis's participation based upon the interim clerk's statement during the February 18,\n2015, meeting that he had not received Trustee Lenkaitis's notification.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSections 7(a), 7(b), and 7(c) ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/7(a), (b), (c) (West 2012), as\namended by Public Act 98-992, effective August 18, 2014) provide, in pertinent part:\n(a) !fa quorum of the members ofthe public body is\nphysically present as required by Section 2.01, a majority\nof the public body may allow a member of that body to\nattend the meeting by other means ifthe member is\nprevented from physically attending because of: (i)\npersonal illness or disability; (ii) employment purposes or\nthe business ofthe public body; or (iii) a family or other\nemergency. \"Other means\" is by video or audio conference.\n(b) Jfa member wishes to attend a meeting by other means, the\nmember must notify the recording secretary or clerk ofthe\npublic body before the meeting unless advance notice is\nimpractical.\n(c) A majority ofthe public body may allow a member to\nattend a meeting by other means only in accordance with\nand to the extent allowed by rules adopted by the public\nbody. The rules must conform to the requirements and\nrestrictions ofthis Section, may further limit the extent to\nwhich attendance by other means is allowed, and may\nprovide for the giving ofadditional notice to the public or\nfurther facilitate public access to meetings.\n\n'E-mail from Julie Tappendorf, Partner, Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & Krafthefer, P.C.,\n\nThe Village has adopted rules allowing remote attendance as required by section\n7(c), which paraphrase sections 7(a) and 7(b) of OMA and: (I) require all votes to be taken by\nroll call; (2) permit all persons present, including members of the public, to participate in the\naudio conference if the meeting is or includes a public hearing; and (3) make records subject to\nreview, discussion, or adoption during the meeting available to the member attending by audio\nconference.\nUnder the plain language of section 7(b) of OMA, a village board member who\nwishes to attend a meeting by audio conference is required to notify the clerk and/or recording\nsecretary in advance, unless that would be impractical. The Board's special legislative counsel\nhas provided evidence that the interim village clerk received notice by e-mail in advance of the\nFebruary 18, 2015, Board meeting that Trustee Lenkaitis would participate in future meetings by\ntelephone. OMA does not specify that a member of a public body who wishes to attend a\nmeeting via audio conference must contact the clerk or recording secretary directly, nor does it\nrequire notice to be given on a particular form. Further, OMA does not prohibit a board member\nfrom providing prospective notice for multiple meetings. We conclude that in these\ncircumstances, sufficient notice of intent to participate electronically was provided by Trustee\nLenkaitis.\nTurning to the allegation that the Board did not have the authority to allow\nTrustee Lenkaitis to participate in meetings by telephone because he no longer maintains his\nprimary residence in the Village, the plain language of section 7(a) specifies that a majority of\nthe members of a public body \"may allow\" a member to attend a meeting remotely because of a\npersonal illness or disability, employment purposes or the business of the public body, or a\nfamily or other emergency. The village attorney has contended that \"employment purposes\"\nrefers to temporary business trips, and that because Trustee Lenkaitis is residing outside of the\nVillage, his absence cannot be considered to be for employment purposes under section 7(a). 3\nHowever, as the Board's special legislative counsel notes, under section 7 of OMA the authority\nto permit a board member to attend a meeting by audio conference is vested in the Board.\nMoreover, with respect to the issue of whether a trustee is no longer eligible to serve on the\nBoard, section 3.l-10-50(c)(l) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.l-10-50(c)(l) (West\n2012)) provides: \"A vacancy occurs in an office by reason of*** more than temporary removal\nof residence from the municipality[.] * * * The corporate authorities have the authority to\ndetermine whether a vacancy under this subsection has occurred.\" 4 Apparently, the Board had\n'Memorandum from J. William BraithwaiteNillage Attorney, Bazos, Freeman, Kramer, Schuster\n& Braithwaite, LLC, to Julie Tappendorf(February 18, 2015), at 1-2.\n4\n\nWe note that pursuant to section 7(c)(3) of the Attorney General Act (15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West\n2012)), the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of OMA and the\n\nnot, as of its February 18, 2015, meeting, taken action to determine whether Trustee Lenkaitis\nhad vacated his office.\nIn fact, the minutes of the February I 8, 2015, meeting state that Trustee Andersen\nreported that Trustee Lenkaitis was not sure whether his out-of-town employment would be\ntemporary or permanent but that he was not putting his house in the Village up for sale. 5\nSubsequently, the Board voted to allow Trustee Lenkaitis to participate in the meeting via audio\nconference in accordance with its codified rule on remote attendance. The Board had discretion\nunder section 7(a) of OMA to allow Trustee Lenkaitis to participate in the February 18, 2015,\nmeeting via audio conference. Its decision to do so was not clearly unreasonable or contrary to\nits rules. Consequently, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Board violated OMA by\nallowing Trustee Lenkaitis to participate telephonically.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, you may contact me at\nthe Chicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to close this matt_er.\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n33732 o 7 attendance proper mun\n\n'Village of Campton Hills Board, Meeting, February 18, 2015, Minutes 2."}
{"id":1160,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-06-29","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["35946"],"title":"Republican precinct committeemen meeting not subject to Open Meetings Act","filename":"35946, issued June 29, 2015.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":500,"summary":"The requester alleged that a Republican precinct committeemen meeting violated the Open Meetings Act due to a lack of an agenda and public comment, but the PAC determined the meeting was not subject to the Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a political party meeting failed to follow Open Meetings Act rules regarding agendas and public participation. The Attorney General's office investigated and concluded that the meeting was a private political event, not a government meeting, and therefore the Open Meetings Act did not apply.","holding":"The PAC determined that no further action is warranted because the meeting in question was a partisan political gathering rather than a meeting of a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether a meeting of Republican precinct committeemen constitutes a meeting of a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Republican precinct committeemen (Iroquois County)","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed - no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The requester challenged the lack of public notice and public comment opportunities at a political party precinct committeemen meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/exclusion-of-purely-political-gatherings/35946, issued June 29, 2015.pdf","sha256":"296f9f180de9f035327884d6cc47c07ec453ad8d852c568cd7c7295fde548d97","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","political meeting","agenda","public comment"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATfORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 29, 2015\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2015 PAC 35946\nDe�\nPursuant to section 3.5(a) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(a)\n(West 2014)), the Public Access Bureau has received your Request for Review alleging possible\nviolations of OMA in connection with a Republican precinct committeemen meeting in Iroquois\nCounty. For the reasons set forth below, we have determined that no further action on this\nmatter is warranted.\nYour June 19, 2015, Request for Review alleged that you attended a Republican\nprecinct committeemen meeting on June 18, 2015, for which no agenda was posted and at which\nno public comment was allowed.\nSection 3.5(a) of OMA provides that \"a person who believes that a violation of\nthis Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for review with the Public Access\nCounselor[,]\" which \"must include a summary of the facts supporting the allegation.\" (Emphasis\nadded.) Section 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014)) defines \"public body\" as:\nall legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the\nState, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\n\nSOOSouch Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (877) 844-5461 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nJOO West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (312) 81_4-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\n\fJune 29, 2015\nPage 2\nOM A \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials, or truly political\nmeetings at which party business is discussed.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191,\n202 (1980).\nIn a telephone conversation with an attorney in the Public Access Bureau on June\n26, 2015, you confirmed that your Request for Review concerns a partisan meeting of\nRepublican precinct committeemen, rather than a meeting of a public body as defined above.\nFurther, you confirmed that a majority of a quorum of the Iroquois County Board was not in\nattendance at the meeting. 1 Thus, your Request for Review does not provide facts from which\nwe could conclude that a public body violated OMA.\nAccordingly, we have determined that no further action is warranted on this\nmatter. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address on the first page of\nthis letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n35946 o no fi war not a pb\n\n'The only meetings that are subject to OMA are \"gathering[s] • • • ofa majority ofa quorum of\nthe members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\" (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2014).\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A political party precinct committeemen meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-35946/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATfORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 29, 2015\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2015 PAC 35946\nDe�\nPursuant to section 3.5(a) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(a)\n(West 2014)), the Public Access Bureau has received your Request for Review alleging possible\nviolations of OMA in connection with a Republican precinct committeemen meeting in Iroquois\nCounty. For the reasons set forth below, we have determined that no further action on this\nmatter is warranted.\nYour June 19, 2015, Request for Review alleged that you attended a Republican\nprecinct committeemen meeting on June 18, 2015, for which no agenda was posted and at which\nno public comment was allowed.\nSection 3.5(a) of OMA provides that \"a person who believes that a violation of\nthis Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for review with the Public Access\nCounselor[,]\" which \"must include a summary of the facts supporting the allegation.\" (Emphasis\nadded.) Section 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014)) defines \"public body\" as:\nall legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the\nState, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\n\nSOOSouch Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (877) 844-5461 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nJOO West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (312) 81_4-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\nOM A \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials, or truly political\nmeetings at which party business is discussed.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191,\n202 (1980).\nIn a telephone conversation with an attorney in the Public Access Bureau on June\n26, 2015, you confirmed that your Request for Review concerns a partisan meeting of\nRepublican precinct committeemen, rather than a meeting of a public body as defined above.\nFurther, you confirmed that a majority of a quorum of the Iroquois County Board was not in\nattendance at the meeting. 1 Thus, your Request for Review does not provide facts from which\nwe could conclude that a public body violated OMA.\nAccordingly, we have determined that no further action is warranted on this\nmatter. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address on the first page of\nthis letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n35946 o no fi war not a pb\n\n'The only meetings that are subject to OMA are \"gathering[s] • • • ofa majority ofa quorum of\nthe members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\" (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2014)."}
{"id":1161,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-11-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["37299"],"title":"Hinsdale D86 school board did not violate OMA in closed self-evaluation session","filename":"37299, issued November 18, 2015.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":590,"summary":"A Board of Education member alleged that the Board improperly used a closed session to discuss political disagreements rather than board procedures, but the PAC found the discussion remained within the scope of the self-evaluation exception.","plain_summary":"A school board member complained that their board held a private meeting that was supposed to be about improving board procedures but was actually used to attack political opponents. The Attorney General's office reviewed the matter and determined that the discussion was appropriate and stayed within the legal rules for closed-door self-evaluation meetings. As a result, no violation of the Open Meetings Act was found.","holding":"The Board of Education for Hinsdale High School District 86 did not violate the Open Meetings Act by holding a closed session to discuss board procedures.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violated the Open Meetings Act by discussing internal board interactions and political disagreements during a closed session held under the self-evaluation exception of 5 ILCS 120/2(c)(16).","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(16)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(16)"],"public_body":"Board of Education for Hinsdale High School District 86","requesting_party":"A member of the Board of Education","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The closed session involved a self-evaluation of board procedures facilitated by a representative of the Illinois Association of School Boards.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_c/2_c_16/37299, issued November 18, 2015.pdf","sha256":"18ef3ba1b9091e3aceef66012a0aa28849ce737fbd957c0584a26afabdafe53b","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","school board","self-evaluation","OMA"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nNovember 18, 2015\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nHodges Loizzi Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn LLP\n3030 Salt Creek Lane, Suite 202\nArlington Heights, Illinois 60005\nsrichart@hlerk.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2015 PAC 37299\nDea\n\nand Mr. Richart:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99-402, effective August 19,\n2015). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Board of\nEducation for Hinsdale High School District 86 (Board) did not violate OMA when holding a\nclosed session during a July I 0, 20 I 5, special meeting to discuss self-evaluation of Board\nprocedures.\nOn September 3, 2015,\nsubmitted a Request for Review\nalleging that the Board violated OMA during the closed session on July 10, 2015, by discussing\nmatters outside the scope of the exception provided in section 2(c)(l6) ofOMA (5 ILCS\n120/2(c)( l6) (West 2014)), which provides that part ofa meeting may be closed for the purpose\nof\"[s]elf evaluation, practices and procedures or professional ethics, when meeting with a\nrepresentative of a statewide association of which the public body is a member.\" In particular,\nwho is a member of the Board, alleged that the Board \"abused the OMA exception\nby engaging in an unseemly session ofsuppression of the political minority position as well as\nutilizing this vehicle to engage in a mud-slinging session.\" 1\n1\n\nI.\n\nLetter fro�to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor (September 4, 2015), at\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nI 00 West Randolph Street. Chicago, Illinois. 6060 I • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (3 I 2) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\f\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nNovember 18, 2015\nPage 3\n\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"all meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" As described above, part of the July 10, 2015, special meeting was\nclosed pursuant to section 2(c)(l6) of OMA.\nWe have reviewed and considered the verbatim record of the closed session for\nthe July 10, 2015, special meeting, as well as the other materials provided by the Board. As\ndescribed by the Board, a representative of the Illinois Association of School Boards met with\nfive members of the Board to discuss Board procedures and how to improve them. Board\nmembers discussed the internal interactions between the members of the Board and candidly\ncommented on those interactions. However, the context of those comments was the discussion\nof the Board's procedures and consistent with the scope of section 2(c)(l6) of OMA.\nFurthermore, the Board's discussion was facilitated by a representative of a statewide association\nof which it is a part, and the discussion did not involve substantive issues. Accordingly, we\nconclude that the Board did not violate OMA when conducting the closed session at the July 10,\n2015, special meeting.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance ofa binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at nolson@atg.state.il.us or (217) 782-9078.\nVery truly yours,\n\n3 7299 o 2cl6 proper sd\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Closed-session self-evaluation of board procedures","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-37299/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nNovember 18, 2015\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nHodges Loizzi Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn LLP\n3030 Salt Creek Lane, Suite 202\nArlington Heights, Illinois 60005\nsrichart@hlerk.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2015 PAC 37299\nDea\n\nand Mr. Richart:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99-402, effective August 19,\n2015). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Board of\nEducation for Hinsdale High School District 86 (Board) did not violate OMA when holding a\nclosed session during a July I 0, 20 I 5, special meeting to discuss self-evaluation of Board\nprocedures.\nOn September 3, 2015,\nsubmitted a Request for Review\nalleging that the Board violated OMA during the closed session on July 10, 2015, by discussing\nmatters outside the scope of the exception provided in section 2(c)(l6) ofOMA (5 ILCS\n120/2(c)(l6) (West 2014)), which provides that part ofa meeting may be closed for the purpose\nof\"[s]elf evaluation, practices and procedures or professional ethics, when meeting with a\nrepresentative of a statewide association of which the public body is a member.\" In particular,\nwho is a member of the Board, alleged that the Board \"abused the OMA exception\nby engaging in an unseemly session ofsuppression of the political minority position as well as\nutilizing this vehicle to engage in a mud-slinging session.\" 1\n1\n\nI.\n\nLetter fro�to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor (September 4, 2015), at\n\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"all meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" As described above, part of the July 10, 2015, special meeting was\nclosed pursuant to section 2(c)(l6) of OMA.\nWe have reviewed and considered the verbatim record of the closed session for\nthe July 10, 2015, special meeting, as well as the other materials provided by the Board. As\ndescribed by the Board, a representative of the Illinois Association of School Boards met with\nfive members of the Board to discuss Board procedures and how to improve them. Board\nmembers discussed the internal interactions between the members of the Board and candidly\ncommented on those interactions. However, the context of those comments was the discussion\nof the Board's procedures and consistent with the scope of section 2(c)(l6) of OMA.\nFurthermore, the Board's discussion was facilitated by a representative of a statewide association\nof which it is a part, and the discussion did not involve substantive issues. Accordingly, we\nconclude that the Board did not violate OMA when conducting the closed session at the July 10,\n2015, special meeting.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance ofa binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at nolson@atg.state.il.us or (217) 782-9078.\nVery truly yours,\n\n3 7299 o 2cl6 proper sd\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau"}
{"id":1162,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-01-11","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["37391"],"title":"Cahokia Board of Trustees violated OMA by restricting public comment with sign-up rule","filename":"37391, issued January 11, 2016.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3212,"summary":"A citizen alleged that the Village of Cahokia Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting her from speaking during a public meeting and requiring advance submission of questions. The PAC determined that the Board's restrictive public comment policies violated the OMA's requirement to provide members of the public an opportunity to address public officials.","plain_summary":"A citizen at a Village of Cahokia board meeting requested to make a comment but was told she had to submit a form before noon that day. When she persisted, the mayor ordered her removed. The Illinois Attorney General's office concluded that the Board's advance sign-up rule was not reasonably necessary to maintain order, and therefore the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting the citizen from speaking. The document does not state any remedy or order to amend the rules.","holding":"The Board of Trustees of the Village of Cahokia violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during a public meeting.","legal_question":"Whether a public body may prohibit a member of the public from addressing the board during an open meeting and impose restrictive pre-registration requirements for public comment.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Trustees of the Village of Cahokia","requesting_party":"Mr. Robert J. Sprague","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public comment","subject_description":"The dispute concerns the Village of Cahokia's restrictive policies regarding public comment and the removal of a citizen from a board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/3.5/3.5_a/37391, issued January 11, 2016.pdf","sha256":"6cd7ac05085dd3e9a3acf55912867ec45b72ea8c6078014d4ddb6dc2d949b6e1","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","open meeting","right to speak","board rules"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Robert J. Sprague\nSprague and Urban\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nrsprague@spragueurban.\n\ncom\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review — 2015 PAC 37391\nDear\n\nMr. Sprague:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99- 402, effective August 19,\n2015). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes that the Board of Trustees of the\n\nVillage of Cahokia ( Board) violated OMA by prohibiting a member of the public from\naddressing the Board during its August 25, 2015, meeting.\nOn September 9, 2015,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\nthis office alleging that at the August 25, 2015, Board meeting:\na citizen who was unable to submit a question, tried to make a\n\ncomment at our public board meeting. She was not loud, or rude.\nShe politely asked if she could make a comment, and told him [ the\nMayor] he did not have to answer. She was told she could not\nspeak, and then [ the Mayor] turned around and ordered the Police\nChief to have her removed from the\nbuilding.\n\nOn July 14th our\n\nmayor created a new ordinance stating questions must be\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 •\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 •\n1001 East Main,\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\nCarbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Robert J. Sprague\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\nPage 2\n\nsubmitted 7 hours in advance. The form that must be filled out\n\nsays nothing about comments, and even if it did, would that make\nit legal for him not to allow citizens to make a comment at a public\n\nboard meeting? 111\nOn September 21, 2015, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\nReview letter to the Mayor and asked for a written response to the allegations therein. This\n\noffice also requested a copy of the Board' s rules governing public comment during meetings,\ntogether with copies of the agenda and the minutes of the August 25, 2015, meeting for our\nreview. In a letter dated October 2, 2015, counsel for the Village, Mr. Robert J. Sprague,\n\nresponded that\nis not the woman who was removed from the meeting. The lady that\nwas removed from the meeting was escorted out of the meeting for being disruptive and she\nwould not stop talking after the question and answer session was over in order for the meeting to\n\ncontinue peacefully. This lady was asked to leave.\" 2 On October 14, 2015, Mr. Sprague' s office\nprovided the Public Access Bureau with copies of the agenda and minutes of the Board' s August\n\n25, 2015, meeting, copies of the rules for addressing the Board during its meetings, and the form\nthat the Board requires members of the public to fill out in advance of meetings in order to\nspeak.\n\nThe agenda for the Board' s August 25, 2015, regular meeting lists:\nOFFICIAL RULES FOR COMMENTS: Forms for questions\ncan be obtained from the Clerk' s Office and in order to speak must\n\nbe made by 12 noon on the day of the meeting. Speaking will be\n\nlimited to two ( 2) minutes. The Mayor, at his discretion, may\nextend the time, shorten the time or limit the number of speakers. 131\nThe heading \" Public Comments &\n\nQuestions\" appears next on the agenda. 4 The meeting\n\nminutes reflect that this item of business was conducted in a question and answer format, during\nwhich members of the public asked the questions which had been previously submitted on the\nforms, and the mayor responded.\n\n1(\n\nLetter from\n\nSeptember 9, 2015).\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois\n\nLetter from Robert J. Sprague, Sprague and Urban, to Edie Steinberg, Office of the Attorney\n\nGeneral ( October 2, 2015).\n\nVillage of Cahokia Board of Trustees Regular Meeting, Agenda ( August 25, 2015).\nVillage of Cahokia Board of Trustees Regular Meeting, Agenda ( August 25, 2015).\n\n\fMr. Robert J. Sprague\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\nPage 3\n\nThe Board' s public comment rules provide that:\n\na)\n\nPersons desiring to address the Village Board of the Village of\nCahokia shall fill out a form entitled \" Request For Citizen\n\nComments.\" The \" Request For Citizen Comments\" form may\nbe obtained from the Office of the Village Clerk. The \" Request\nFor Citizen Comments\" form shall be delivered to the Office of\n\nthe Village Clerk before 12 noon on the day of the meeting in\norder to be allowed to speak at that meeting.\nb) No persons addressing the Village Board, may be allowed to\nspeak more than two minutes unless the Mayor allows an\n\nextension of time. The Mayor, as presiding officer may in his\ndiscretion shorten the time. The Mayor, in his discretion may\nlimit the number of people allowed to speak. 151\nThe Village of Cahokia's \" Request For Citizen Comments\" form directs the\n\nperson who wishes to comment to print or type the following information: \" Date of Request\";\nName of Person Addressing the Council\"; \" Organization ( if applicable)\"; \" Address\";\nTelephone\"; \" Subject ( Please list the questions\n\nyou\n\nare\n\ngoing to ask)\";\n\nand \" Date of\n\nAppearance.\" 6\nOn October\nreplied via e- mail, stating that the woman who was\nremoved from the meeting had not been rude or disorderly.\nalso alleged that the\nBoard' s rules improperly require members of the public who wish to address the Board to submit\ntheir questions before noon on the date of a Board meeting, whereas the Board does not\n\ndisseminate copies of the resolutions or ordinances that will be discussed during its meetings\nuntil later in the afternoon on meeting dates.\nThis office has reviewed a video recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nBoard' s August 25, 2015, Board meeting. The video shows the Mayor stating the name of each\nperson who submitted a question in advance of the meeting, prompting them to ask their\n5Official Rules Of Procedure For Addressing Village Board Of The Village of Cahokia ( undated).\n6REQUEST FOR CITIZEN COMMENTS, Village of Cahokia.\nCahokia Village Board, Meeting, August 25, 2015, available at\nhttps:// www. youtube. com/ watch? v= w6KXnTOAFCg ( last visited November 18, 2015)\n\nat 7: 48 to\n\n8: 32.\n\n\fMr. Robert J. Sprague\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\nPage 4\n\nquestions. After each question, the Mayor provided an answer but did not allow any follow- up\nquestions or comments, stating that questions had to have been submitted by noon that day. As\nthe Mayor finished with the pre -submitted questions, a woman said \" excuse me, I would like to\nmake a comment.\"\n\nThe Mayor replied that if she would like to make a comment she would have\n\nto submit a question by noon on the date of a meeting. After some additional dialogue during\nwhich the woman repeated her request to comment and others attending the meeting asserted that\nthe woman had a right to address the Board, the Mayor signaled with his hand in an apparent\n\ngesture to have the woman removed from the meeting. Although not shown on the video, both\nparties agree that the woman was escorted out of the meeting. At no time did the woman raise\nher voice or use profanity; the entire exchange took less than a minute.\nDETERMINATION\n\nStanding\nAs a preliminary matter, this office notes that the Board' s response to this office\n\nstated that\n\nnot the person who was removed from the meeting. If the Board' s\n\nresponse is intended to suggest that\ndoes not have standing to file this Request for\nReview, it is incorrect. Section 3. 5( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2014), as amended by\nPublic Act 99- 402, effective August 19, 2015) broadly provides that \"[ a] person who believes\nthat a violation of this Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney General not later than 60 days\nafter the alleged violation.\" OMA does not limit standing to a person whose rights were most\n\ndirectly affected by the alleged violation. To the contrary, OMA expressly provides that any\nperson who believes a public body has violated OMA may file a Request for Review.\nRules for Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA, provides that \" rainy person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" Indeed, the Attorney General has previously concluded that section 2. 06( g) of OMA\nrequires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for members of the\npublic to address public officials at open meetings.\" I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012,\n\nissued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued\nSeptember 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language of section 2. 06( g) of OMA, public comment\nmust be permitted in accordance with the public body' s established and recorded rules.\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\n\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that public bodies may promulgate reasonable\ntime, place,\n\nand\n\nmanner\"\n\nrestrictions\n\nthat are narrowly -tailored\n\nand\n\nnecessary to further\n\na\n\n\fMr. Robert J. Sprague\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\nPage 5\n\nsignificant governmental interest. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F. Supp.\n2d 912, 922 ( N. D. Ill. 2009). For example, a public body may adopt reasonable rules governing\npublic comment in order to maintain decorum and ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently.\n\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 ( W.D. Mich. 2008); see also 111. Att'y Gen. Pub.\nAcc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than to\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 459.\nA rule that promotes order and decorum by requiring members of the public to\n\nsign up in advance to address a public body does not violate the first amendment to the United\nStates Constitution provided that it is reasonable in time and scope. Timmon v. Jeffries, No.\n\n1: 08—CV- 645, 2009 WL 270043, at * 3 ( W.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2009) ( collection of sign- up forms\nimmediately before public comment portion of meeting was a permissible narrowly tailored\nrestriction) see also Bach v. School Board of City of Virginia Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741\n\nE. D. Va. 2001) ( requiring speakers to sign- up in advance of meeting is a reasonable content\nneutral regulation). However, an advance sign up rule that is enforced to prevent a member of\nthe public from addressing a public body violates OMA if it is not reasonably necessary to\npromote a significant governmental interest. Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued\n\nSeptember 30, 2014, at 6 ( rule requiring members of the public to sign up to comment five days\nin advance of meetings, before the Board was required to post its agenda, imposed an\nunreasonable\n\nrestriction\n\non public\n\ncomment).\n\nThe Board' s rules require members of the public to do more than merely notify\nthe Board that they intend to participate in public comment. Rather than requiring the public to\n\nsimply sign- up to speak immediately before or during the meeting, or by sending the Clerk an email or letter, or telephoning the Clerk' s office on the day of the meeting, the Board' s rules\nrequire a person who wishes to \" comment\"\n\nto obtain and fill out a particular form, available at\n\nthe Clerk' s Office, and submit it to the Clerk before noon on the day of a meeting. The Board\n\ndid not provide any information indicating that the use of its form is necessary to promote order\nand decorum at meetings, or to further any other significant governmental interest. A sign- up\nsheet set out just prior to the meeting asking for the names of individuals who wish to address the\nBoard, or simply requiring prospective speakers to notify the Clerk' s Office shortly before the\n\nmeeting could accomplish the same goal of running a timely and orderly meeting in a much less\nrestrictive\n\nmanner.\n\nMoreover, the Board' s advance sign- up form requires citizens to submit, in\naddition to their names, their addresses, and phone numbers, as well as the subject or list of\n\nquestions they intend to ask. Requiring a member of the public to set forth his or her question or\ncomment in writing in advance of a meeting may create a chilling effect on speech at public\nmeetings.\n\nA person may be reluctant to put comments\n\nin writing, especially\n\nif the comments\n\n\fMr. Robert J. Sprague\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\nPage 6\n\nmay be controversial, although controversial statements are no less protected from government\n\ncensorship under the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 8 In addition, the requirement\ncould be enforced to restrict the content of s' peech by precluding comments a person may wish to\nmake after reviewing the resolutions or other information disseminated by the Board later in the\nday or during the meeting.\nA person also may be reluctant to put comments in writing or participate in public\n\ncomment when he or she must submit an address and telephone number to the public body in\norder to do so. It is impermissible for a public body to require an individual to state his or her\n\naddress during a meeting in order to provide a comment. I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7. Similarly, it is unclear how requiring a speaker to submit\nhis or her address or telephone number on a form before addressing the Board advances any\nsignificant governmental interest. Section ( a) of the Board's rules, along with the required form,\ntends to restrict rather than accommodate the statutory right of members of the public to address\n\nthe Board. Because section ( a) of the Board' s rules, including the required sign- up form,\nunnecessarily restricts individuals from addressing the Board, it is not a reasonable rule within\nthe meaning of section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\nIn this instance, the Board refused to allow a member of the public to speak\n\nduring the designated public comment period because she had not filled out and submitted a\nspecific form in advance of the meeting in accordance with section ( a) of the Board' s rules. It is\nalso undisputed that the police escorted the woman out of the meeting at the direction of the\n\nMayor for requesting to comment. The Board has not provided any facts supporting its\ncontention that the woman was disruptive. The video recording of the meeting reveals that she\nwas neither loud nor disrespectful, nor was she attempting to comment outside of the designated\npublic comment period. Because the Board enforced an unreasonable rule to infringe on the\n\nwoman' s statutory right to address the Board during its August 25, 2015, meeting, we conclude\nthat the Board violated section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\nAddressing the Board\nMoreover, it appears that the Board has misinterpreted OMA' s public comment\n\nrequirement as providing for a controlled question and answer session, as opposed to a forum\nwhere each person may speak his or her mind. The Attorney General has concluded that section\n\n2. 06( g) of OMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for\nmembers\n\nof the public\n\nto address\n\npublic\n\nofficials\n\nat\n\nopen meetings.\" (\n\nEmphasis added.) Ill.\n\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, at\n8U. S. Const., amend.\n\nI (\" Congressshall make no law * * *\n\nabridging the freedom of speech.\").\n\n\fMr. Robert\n\nJ. Sprague\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\nPage 7\n\n4. Section 2. 06( g) does not mandate that public bodies conduct a question and answer session;\nrather, a public\nbody must allow an opportunity during open meetings for \" any person * * * to\naddress\" the public officials present. \" Address\" used as a verb is defined as \" to speak or write\n\ndirectly to. i9 Thus, the plain language of section 2. 06( g) of OMA contemplates the opportunity\nfor citizens to express their views to members of a public body by making comments or asking\nquestions. OMA does not require any response by or answers from public officials. Although\nOMA does not prohibit the Board from allowing citizens to submit questions in advance of the\nmeeting and then providing answers at the meeting, that practice is not \" public comment\" and\n\ndoes not satisfy the requirement of section 2. 06( g). Accordingly, this office directs the Board to\nallow the public to address the Board, rather than limiting members of the public to asking\nquestions.\n\nWe note, however, that the right to public comment is not absolute, and may be\nproperly curtailed if a speaker acts in an insulting or unruly manner that disrupts the order and\ndecorum of a meeting. Although the statutory right to public comment includes the right to\n\nexpress criticism, a public body is not required to tolerate insulting or disorderly conduct that\ninterferes with its ability to conduct a business meeting.\nIn this instance the Board's rules for public comment may have been promulgated\nto allow time for public officials, particularly the mayor, to determine how to answer questions\nthat would be asked at public meetings.\n\nAs noted above, however, OMA does not require the\n\nBoard or the Mayor to respond to questions during an open meeting. Accordingly, signing up on\na particular form seven hours before the meeting, listing personal information, and describing the\ncontent of questions or comments should not be prerequisites to addressing the Board. We\n\nrequest that the Board amend its rules governing public comment to ensure that any restrictions\non the public' s statutory right to address the Board are narrowly tailored to further a significant\ngovernmental interest.\n\nMerriam - Webster Dictionary, http:// www. merriam- webster. com/ dictionary/ address ( last visited\nDecember\n\n4, 2015).\n\n\fMr. Robert J. Sprague\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\nPage 8\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed.\n\nIf you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at ( 312) 814- 5201.\n\nEDIE STEINBERG\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n37391 o 206g improper pub comment mun\ncc:\n\nThe Honorable Curtis McCall, Jr.\nMayor, Village of Cahokia\n\n103 Main Street\nCahokia, Illinois 62206\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A village board's restrictive public comment policies","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-37391/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 11, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Robert J. Sprague\nSprague and Urban\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nrsprague@spragueurban.\n\ncom\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review — 2015 PAC 37391\nDear\n\nMr. Sprague:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99- 402, effective August 19,\n2015). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes that the Board of Trustees of the\n\nVillage of Cahokia (Board) violated OMA by prohibiting a member of the public from\naddressing the Board during its August 25, 2015, meeting.\nOn September 9, 2015,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\nthis office alleging that at the August 25, 2015, Board meeting:\na citizen who was unable to submit a question, tried to make a\n\ncomment at our public board meeting. She was not loud, or rude.\nShe politely asked if she could make a comment, and told him [ the\nMayor] he did not have to answer. She was told she could not\nspeak, and then [ the Mayor] turned around and ordered the Police\nChief to have her removed from the\nbuilding.\n\nOn July 14th our\n\nmayor created a new ordinance stating questions must be\n\nsubmitted 7 hours in advance. The form that must be filled out\n\nsays nothing about comments, and even if it did, would that make\nit legal for him not to allow citizens to make a comment at a public\n\nboard meeting? 111\nOn September 21, 2015, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\nReview letter to the Mayor and asked for a written response to the allegations therein. This\n\noffice also requested a copy of the Board's rules governing public comment during meetings,\ntogether with copies of the agenda and the minutes of the August 25, 2015, meeting for our\nreview. In a letter dated October 2, 2015, counsel for the Village, Mr. Robert J. Sprague,\n\nresponded that\nis not the woman who was removed from the meeting. The lady that\nwas removed from the meeting was escorted out of the meeting for being disruptive and she\nwould not stop talking after the question and answer session was over in order for the meeting to\n\ncontinue peacefully. This lady was asked to leave.\" 2 On October 14, 2015, Mr. Sprague's office\nprovided the Public Access Bureau with copies of the agenda and minutes of the Board's August\n\n25, 2015, meeting, copies of the rules for addressing the Board during its meetings, and the form\nthat the Board requires members of the public to fill out in advance of meetings in order to\nspeak.\n\nThe agenda for the Board's August 25, 2015, regular meeting lists:\nOFFICIAL RULES FOR COMMENTS: Forms for questions\ncan be obtained from the Clerk's Office and in order to speak must\n\nbe made by 12 noon on the day of the meeting. Speaking will be\n\nlimited to two (2) minutes. The Mayor, at his discretion, may\nextend the time, shorten the time or limit the number of speakers. 131\nThe heading \" Public Comments &\n\nQuestions\" appears next on the agenda. 4 The meeting\n\nminutes reflect that this item of business was conducted in a question and answer format, during\nwhich members of the public asked the questions which had been previously submitted on the\nforms, and the mayor responded.\n\n1(Letter from\n\nSeptember 9, 2015).\n\nto Lisa Madigan, Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois\n\nLetter from Robert J. Sprague, Sprague and Urban, to Edie Steinberg, Office of the Attorney\n\nThe Board's public comment rules provide that:\n\na)\n\nPersons desiring to address the Village Board of the Village of\nCahokia shall fill out a form entitled \" Request For Citizen\n\nComments.\" The \" Request For Citizen Comments\" form may\nbe obtained from the Office of the Village Clerk. The \" Request\nFor Citizen Comments\" form shall be delivered to the Office of\n\nthe Village Clerk before 12 noon on the day of the meeting in\norder to be allowed to speak at that meeting.\nb) No persons addressing the Village Board, may be allowed to\nspeak more than two minutes unless the Mayor allows an\n\nextension of time. The Mayor, as presiding officer may in his\ndiscretion shorten the time. The Mayor, in his discretion may\nlimit the number of people allowed to speak. 151\nThe Village of Cahokia's \" Request For Citizen Comments\" form directs the\n\nperson who wishes to comment to print or type the following information: \" Date of Request\";\nName of Person Addressing the Council\"; \" Organization (if applicable)\"; \" Address\";\nTelephone\"; \" Subject (Please list the questions\n\nyou\n\nare\n\ngoing to ask)\";\n\nand \" Date of\n\nAppearance.\" 6\nOn October\nreplied via e- mail, stating that the woman who was\nremoved from the meeting had not been rude or disorderly.\nalso alleged that the\nBoard's rules improperly require members of the public who wish to address the Board to submit\ntheir questions before noon on the date of a Board meeting, whereas the Board does not\n\ndisseminate copies of the resolutions or ordinances that will be discussed during its meetings\nuntil later in the afternoon on meeting dates.\nThis office has reviewed a video recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nBoard's August 25, 2015, Board meeting. The video shows the Mayor stating the name of each\nperson who submitted a question in advance of the meeting, prompting them to ask their\n5 Official Rules Of Procedure For Addressing Village Board Of The Village of Cahokia (undated).\n\nquestions. After each question, the Mayor provided an answer but did not allow any follow- up\nquestions or comments, stating that questions had to have been submitted by noon that day. As\nthe Mayor finished with the pre -submitted questions, a woman said \" excuse me, I would like to\nmake a comment.\"\n\nThe Mayor replied that if she would like to make a comment she would have\n\nto submit a question by noon on the date of a meeting. After some additional dialogue during\nwhich the woman repeated her request to comment and others attending the meeting asserted that\nthe woman had a right to address the Board, the Mayor signaled with his hand in an apparent\n\ngesture to have the woman removed from the meeting. Although not shown on the video, both\nparties agree that the woman was escorted out of the meeting. At no time did the woman raise\nher voice or use profanity; the entire exchange took less than a minute.\nDETERMINATION\n\nStanding\nAs a preliminary matter, this office notes that the Board's response to this office\n\nstated that\n\nnot the person who was removed from the meeting. If the Board's\n\nresponse is intended to suggest that\ndoes not have standing to file this Request for\nReview, it is incorrect. Section 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2014), as amended by\nPublic Act 99- 402, effective August 19, 2015) broadly provides that \"[ a] person who believes\nthat a violation of this Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney General not later than 60 days\nafter the alleged violation.\" OMA does not limit standing to a person whose rights were most\n\ndirectly affected by the alleged violation. To the contrary, OMA expressly provides that any\nperson who believes a public body has violated OMA may file a Request for Review.\nRules for Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA, provides that \" rainy person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" Indeed, the Attorney General has previously concluded that section 2. 06(g) of OMA\nrequires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for members of the\npublic to address public officials at open meetings.\" I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012,\n\nissued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued\nSeptember 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language of section 2. 06(g) of OMA, public comment\nmust be permitted in accordance with the public body's established and recorded rules.\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\n\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that public bodies may promulgate reasonable\ntime, place,\n\nand\n\nmanner\"\n\nsignificant governmental interest. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F. Supp.\n2d 912, 922 (N. D. Ill. 2009). For example, a public body may adopt reasonable rules governing\npublic comment in order to maintain decorum and ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently.\n\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (W.D. Mich. 2008); see also 111. Att'y Gen. Pub.\nAcc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than to\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 459.\nA rule that promotes order and decorum by requiring members of the public to\n\nsign up in advance to address a public body does not violate the first amendment to the United\nStates Constitution provided that it is reasonable in time and scope. Timmon v. Jeffries, No.\n\n1: 08—CV- 645, 2009 WL 270043, at * 3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2009) (collection of sign- up forms\nimmediately before public comment portion of meeting was a permissible narrowly tailored\nrestriction) see also Bach v. School Board of City of Virginia Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741\n\nE. D. Va. 2001) (requiring speakers to sign- up in advance of meeting is a reasonable content\nneutral regulation). However, an advance sign up rule that is enforced to prevent a member of\nthe public from addressing a public body violates OMA if it is not reasonably necessary to\npromote a significant governmental interest. Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued\n\nSeptember 30, 2014, at 6 (rule requiring members of the public to sign up to comment five days\nin advance of meetings, before the Board was required to post its agenda, imposed an\nunreasonable\n\nrestriction\n\non public\n\ncomment).\n\nThe Board's rules require members of the public to do more than merely notify\nthe Board that they intend to participate in public comment. Rather than requiring the public to\n\nsimply sign- up to speak immediately before or during the meeting, or by sending the Clerk an email or letter, or telephoning the Clerk's office on the day of the meeting, the Board's rules\nrequire a person who wishes to \" comment\"\n\nto obtain and fill out a particular form, available at\n\nthe Clerk's Office, and submit it to the Clerk before noon on the day of a meeting. The Board\n\ndid not provide any information indicating that the use of its form is necessary to promote order\nand decorum at meetings, or to further any other significant governmental interest. A sign- up\nsheet set out just prior to the meeting asking for the names of individuals who wish to address the\nBoard, or simply requiring prospective speakers to notify the Clerk's Office shortly before the\n\nmeeting could accomplish the same goal of running a timely and orderly meeting in a much less\nrestrictive\n\nmanner.\n\nMoreover, the Board's advance sign- up form requires citizens to submit, in\naddition to their names, their addresses, and phone numbers, as well as the subject or list of\n\nquestions they intend to ask. Requiring a member of the public to set forth his or her question or\ncomment in writing in advance of a meeting may create a chilling effect on speech at public\n\nmay be controversial, although controversial statements are no less protected from government\n\ncensorship under the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 8 In addition, the requirement\ncould be enforced to restrict the content of s' peech by precluding comments a person may wish to\nmake after reviewing the resolutions or other information disseminated by the Board later in the\nday or during the meeting.\nA person also may be reluctant to put comments in writing or participate in public\n\ncomment when he or she must submit an address and telephone number to the public body in\norder to do so. It is impermissible for a public body to require an individual to state his or her\n\naddress during a meeting in order to provide a comment. I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7. Similarly, it is unclear how requiring a speaker to submit\nhis or her address or telephone number on a form before addressing the Board advances any\nsignificant governmental interest. Section (a) of the Board's rules, along with the required form,\ntends to restrict rather than accommodate the statutory right of members of the public to address\n\nthe Board. Because section (a) of the Board's rules, including the required sign- up form,\nunnecessarily restricts individuals from addressing the Board, it is not a reasonable rule within\nthe meaning of section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\nIn this instance, the Board refused to allow a member of the public to speak\n\nduring the designated public comment period because she had not filled out and submitted a\nspecific form in advance of the meeting in accordance with section (a) of the Board's rules. It is\nalso undisputed that the police escorted the woman out of the meeting at the direction of the\n\nMayor for requesting to comment. The Board has not provided any facts supporting its\ncontention that the woman was disruptive. The video recording of the meeting reveals that she\nwas neither loud nor disrespectful, nor was she attempting to comment outside of the designated\npublic comment period. Because the Board enforced an unreasonable rule to infringe on the\n\nwoman's statutory right to address the Board during its August 25, 2015, meeting, we conclude\nthat the Board violated section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\nAddressing the Board\nMoreover, it appears that the Board has misinterpreted OMA's public comment\n\nrequirement as providing for a controlled question and answer session, as opposed to a forum\nwhere each person may speak his or her mind. The Attorney General has concluded that section\n\n2. 06(g) of OMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for\nmembers\n\nof the public\n\nto address\n\npublic\n\nofficials\n\nat\n\nopen meetings.\" (Emphasis added.) Ill.\n\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, at\n\n4. Section 2. 06(g) does not mandate that public bodies conduct a question and answer session;\nrather, a public\nbody must allow an opportunity during open meetings for \" any person * * * to\naddress\" the public officials present. \" Address\" used as a verb is defined as \" to speak or write\n\ndirectly to. i9 Thus, the plain language of section 2. 06(g) of OMA contemplates the opportunity\nfor citizens to express their views to members of a public body by making comments or asking\nquestions. OMA does not require any response by or answers from public officials. Although\nOMA does not prohibit the Board from allowing citizens to submit questions in advance of the\nmeeting and then providing answers at the meeting, that practice is not \" public comment\" and\n\ndoes not satisfy the requirement of section 2. 06(g). Accordingly, this office directs the Board to\nallow the public to address the Board, rather than limiting members of the public to asking\nquestions.\n\nWe note, however, that the right to public comment is not absolute, and may be\nproperly curtailed if a speaker acts in an insulting or unruly manner that disrupts the order and\ndecorum of a meeting. Although the statutory right to public comment includes the right to\n\nexpress criticism, a public body is not required to tolerate insulting or disorderly conduct that\ninterferes with its ability to conduct a business meeting.\nIn this instance the Board's rules for public comment may have been promulgated\nto allow time for public officials, particularly the mayor, to determine how to answer questions\nthat would be asked at public meetings.\n\nAs noted above, however, OMA does not require the\n\nBoard or the Mayor to respond to questions during an open meeting. Accordingly, signing up on\na particular form seven hours before the meeting, listing personal information, and describing the\ncontent of questions or comments should not be prerequisites to addressing the Board. We\n\nrequest that the Board amend its rules governing public comment to ensure that any restrictions\non the public's statutory right to address the Board are narrowly tailored to further a significant\ngovernmental interest.\n\nMerriam - Webster Dictionary, http:// www. merriam- webster. com/ dictionary/ address (last visited\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed.\n\nIf you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at (312) 814- 5201.\n\nEDIE STEINBERG\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n37391 o 206g improper pub comment mun\ncc:\n\nThe Honorable Curtis McCall, Jr.\nMayor, Village of Cahokia\n\n103 Main Street\nCahokia, Illinois 62206"}
{"id":1163,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-12-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["37555"],"title":"RTAC of Region 11 is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act","filename":"37555, issued December 6, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3422,"summary":"The PAC determined that Regional Trauma Advisory Committees (RTACs) are public bodies subject to the Open Meetings Act (OMA) and must comply with its requirements, including public notice and record-keeping.","plain_summary":"A reporter challenged whether Regional Trauma Advisory Committees (RTACs) were required to follow the Open Meetings Act. The Attorney General's office decided that these committees are indeed public bodies and must hold open meetings, provide public notice, and keep minutes. This means these committees can no longer conduct their business in private.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the Region 11 Trauma Advisory Committee and all other RTACs are public bodies subject to the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether Regional Trauma Advisory Committees (RTACs) constitute 'public bodies' as defined by the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Regional Trauma Advisory Committee (RTAC) of Region 11","requesting_party":"Ms. Kristen Schorsch, Crain's Chicago Business","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body definition","subject_description":"The determination addresses whether regional trauma advisory committees are subject to the transparency requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-public-body/advisory-bodies/37555, issued December 6, 2017.pdf","sha256":"84df6adfff6eaf8de5f382bfd7cf7c7e24953515d4464d648f432ef54f7dd2f1","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","Open Meetings Act","RTAC","transparency","committee meetings"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTA TE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Kristen Schorsch\nHealth care reporter\nCrain's Chicago Business\nkschorsch@crain.com\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. William Bryant, MPA\nActing Freedom oflnformation Officer\nDivision of Legal Services\nIllinois Department of Public Health\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nWilliam.Bryant@illinois.gov\nRE: OMA Request for Review-2015 PAC 37555\nDear Ms. Schorsch and Mr. Bryant:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3 .5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access B ureau\nconcludes that the Regional Trauma Advisory Committee (RTAC) of Region 11 (Region 11\nTAC) is a public body subject to the requirements of OMA. 1\nOn September 17, 2015, Ms. Kristen Schorsch, a reporter for Crain's Chicago\nBusiness, submitted this Request for Review alleging that the Region 11 TAC had failed to\nadhere to the requirements of OMA. Ms. Schorsch contended that RTACs are subcommittees of\nthe Illinois Department of Public Health (Department), and thus \"public bodies\" under OMA.\nMs. Schorsch stated that after years of protests, plans to open a trauma center on the south side of\nChicago were announced, but approval was first required from the Region 11 TAC. Because the\n'Although the Request for Review.concerns Region 11 in particular, •this\n•• determination applies to\nall RTACs that have been formed.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield. Illinois 62706 • (217)782-1090 • TTY: (217)785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nIOOWestRandolphStreet,Oiicago.Dlinois,60601 • (312)814-3000 • TTY: (312)814-3374 • Fax:(312)814-3806\nI 001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6,2017\nPage2\n\nRegion 11 TAC \"appear[red] to be the first major hurdle to opening a new trauma center in\nChicago,\" Ms. Schorsch asserted that its meetings \"should be open considering how important\ntheir decisions are to patient care. \" 2 Ms. Schorsch further contended:\nThese committees were formed by state statute and they're making\ndecisions that impact patient care statewide, which in trauma cases\nis life or death. They can determine which hospitals are allowed to\nbe in particular trauma regions, which means they determine where\ngunshot and stabbing victims get care. And yet the public has little\ninsight into how their decisions are madeY1\nIn addition, Ms. Schorsch argued that \"the hospitals within [the Region 11 TAC] can protect\ntheir own market share by selecting which players deliver trauma care services. These hospitals\nare non-profit and are heavily-supported with taxpayer money. \"4\nOn September28,2015, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nDepartment and asked it to provide a detailed written response to Ms. Schorsch's allegations,\ntogether with copies of any notices, agendas, or minutes from Region 11 TAC meetings, whether\nopen or closed, within the previous 60 days.\nOn October 8,2015, the Department provided a written response, asserting that\nthe RTACs are neither subsidiary bodies of the Department nor public bodies under OMA. On\nNovember 16,2015, Ms. Schorsch replied, in pertinent part:\n[T]he Region 11 [TAC] is led by the directors of the six trauma\ncenters in Chicago. By determining who can and can't provide\ntrauma care, they can prevent more potential competitors who\ncould take away patients from their facilities from entering the\nmarket. * * *\n\n'E-mail from Kristen Schorsch, Health care reporter, Crain's Chicago Business, to Sarah Pratt,\nPublic Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (September 17, 2015).\n'E-mail from Kristen Schorsch, Health care reporter, Crain's Chicago Business, to Sarah _Pratt,\nPublic Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (September 17, 2015).\nE-mail from Kristen Schorsch, Health care reporter, Crain's Chicago Business, to Sarah Pratt,\nPublic Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (September 17,2015).\n4\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6, 2017\nPage 3\n\nIt's in the best interest of good governance and public\naccess to have the RTAC meetings open to the public.151\nOn January 13, 2016, this office sent a second letter to the Department seeking\nadditional information concerning the manner in which the RTACs conduct their business and\ntheir relation to the State Trauma Advisory Council, and again requesting copies of Region 11\nTAC meeting records for our confidential review. On January 27, 2016, the Department\nprovided the requested materials, explaining that because the RTACs function independently.of\nthe Department, it does not know all of the types of records that an RTAC might create or\nmaintain during its meetings; however, because the Department's local representative at times\ninformally attends Region 11 TAC meetings, the Department had 37 such responsive records in\nits possession and provided them for this office's confidential review.\nOn June 8, 2017, Ms. Schorsch reiterated her concern about the secrecy of the\nRegion 11 TAC's meetings to this office, noting that the University of Chicago had announced in\na news release the day before that the Region 11 TAC had unanimously approved the\nUniversity's plans to be designated as a Level I adult trauma center.\nDETERMINATION\n\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of[OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (2014).\nIt is undisputed that the RTACs have not adhered to the requirements cifOMA;\nTherefore, this determination analyzes whether the RTACs are public bodies subject to the\nrequirements of OMA. Section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2014)) defines a \"public\nbody\" as:\n[A)ll legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\n'E-mail from Kristen Schorsch, Health care reporter, Crain's Chicago Business, to [Christopher]\nBoggs (November 16, 2015) ..\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6, 2017\nPage 4\n\nSection 3.25(e) of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (EMS\nSystems Act) (210 ILCS 50/3.25(e) (West 2014)) provides that an RTAC is:\na committee formed within an Emergency Medical Services (EMS)\nRegion, to advise the Region's Trauma Center Medical Directors\nCommittee, consisting ofat least the Trauma Center Medical\nDirectors and Trauma Coordinators from each Trauma Center\nwithin the Region, one EMS Medical Director from a resource\nhospital within the Region, one EMS System Coordinator from\nanother resource hospital within the Region, one representative\neach from a public and private vehicle service provider which\ntransports trauma patients within the Region, an administrative\nrepresentative from each trauma center within the Region, one\nEMR, EMD, EMT, EMT-I, A-EMT, Paramedic, ECRN, or PHRN\nrepresenting the highest level of EMS personnel practicing within\nthe Region, one emergency physician and one Trauma Nurse\nSpecialist (TNS) currently practicing in a trauma center. The\nDepartment's Regional EMS Coordinator for each Region shall\nserve as a non-voting member ofthat Region's Trauma Advisory\nCommittee.\nEvery 2 years, the members ofthe Trauma Center Medical\nDirectors Committee shall rotate serving as Committee Chair, and\nselect the vehicle service providers, EMS personnel, emergency\nphysician, EMS System Coordinator and TNS who shall serve on\nthe [RTAC].\nEvery EMS Region must develop an EMS Region Plan (Plan) for the\nDepartment's approval. 210 ILCS 50/3.25(a) (West 2014). Each plan is developed by the\nRegion's EMS Medical Directors Committee with advice from the Regional EMS Advisory\nCommittee, but the portions concerning trauma are to be \"developed jointly with the Region's\nTrauma Center Medical Directors or Trauma Center Medical Directors Committee, whichever is\napplicable, with advice from the [RTAC], ifsuch [an RTAC] has been established in the\nRegion.\" 210 ILCS 50/3.25(a) (West 2014). Additionally, as Ms. Schorsch noted, RTACs play\na statutory role in the designation ofnew trauma centers. The Department has the authority and\nresponsibility to designate hospitals as Level I or Level II Trauma Centers, but \"shall designate a\nnew trauma center only when a local or regional need for such trauma center has been\nidentified.\" 210 ILCS 50/3.90(b)(4) (West 2014). To make that judgment, the Department must\n\"request an assessment oflocal or regional need from the applicable EMS Region's Trauma\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6, 2017\nPage 5\nCenter Medical Directors Committee, with advice from the [RTAC].\" 210 ILCS 50/3.90(b)(4)\n(West 2014).\nIn its first response to this office, the Department described the RTACs as private,\nnot-for-profit organizations that act as \"forum[s] for trauma center employees and a few other\nstatutorily-named individuals to openly discuss regional health care needs.\" 6 The Department\nanalogized the RTACs to other entities that, while required to comply with various government\nregulations, are not considered government subsidiaries subject to the requirements of OMA,\nciting Rockford Newspapers, Inc. v. Northern Illinois Council on Alcoholism & Drug\nDependence, 64 Ill. App. 3d 94, 96 (1978). In that case, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a\nnot-for-profit corporation that administered drug and alcohol treatment programs was not subject\nto the provisions of OMA, despite the fact that it was primarily government-funded and its\nactivities were regulated and monitored by various levels of government. See Rockford, 64 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 96 (\"The amount or percentage of governmental funding of a private entity should\nhave no bearing on whether that entity is characterized as a subsidiary for purposes of the Open\nMeetings Act. Although the Act itself provides that a particular entity need not be publically\nfunded in order to be required to hold open meetings, it does not state that public funding alone\nwill make a particular entity subject to the Act.\").\nThe Department's reliance on the court's holding in Rockford is misplaced. Ms.\nSchorsch's Request for Review emphasized RTACs' role in developing plans to assist regional\ntrauma centers in coordinating patient care, which sharply contrasts with the administrative\nnature of the drug treatment council at issue in Rockford. Once formed, RTAC approval is the\nfirst major step in opening new trauma centers in their respective regions; their recommendations\nguide the course of whether a new trauma center is even created at all. Conversely, the drug\ntreatment council in Rockford was merely a private party that contracted with the state to\nperform a social service, and it lacked any independent authority to develop or recommend the\nneed for such treatment under the law. Thus, regardless of the level of public funding received\nby the hospitals that comprise RTACs, the significant role that RTACs are authorized to play in\nthe formulation of governmental actions and policies distinguishes them from non-profit entities\nthat have no such statutory role.\nThe remainder of the Department's arguments relied on University Professionals\nof Illinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856, 865\n(1st Dist. 2003). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a group of presidents and chancellors of\npublic universities (the Council), which made recommendations to the Illinois Board of Higher\nEducation (IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE meetings to discuss issues\n'Letter from William Bryant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R.. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 2015), at I.\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6, 2017\nPage 6\n\nrelated to funding for public education. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 858. The court considered the\nfollowing factors to be relevant to the determination of whether an entity is an advisory body for\npurposes of OMA:\n[!] who appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; [2] the\nentity's assigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute; [3] whether its role is solely advisory\nor whether it also has a deliberative or investigative function; [4]\nwhether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise\naccountable to any public body; [5] whether the group has a\nbudget; [6] its place within the larger organization or institution of\nwhich it is a part; and [7] the impact of decisions or\nrecommendations that the group makes. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n858.\nThe court held that the group was not an advisory body of IBHE in part because it was not\nincorporated into the formal organizational structure of IBHE, a factor that the court identified as\na \"primary consideration in determining whether an organization is a public body under the\nMeetings Act.\" (Emphasis added.) Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 865.. The court explained that.\"the\nCouncil was formed by the presidents and chancellors of the various state universities to express\nits views to the IBHE. Granted, its role is advisory but that role is one that the Council [and not\nIBHE] created.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866. The court also noted that the plaintiff had not\nalleged that the group had a \"deliberative or investigative function in relation to the IBHE or that\nthe Council is subject to government control. It does not appear that the Council is otherwise\naccountable to any public body. It does not appear to have.a budget[,] and no member of the\nCouncil is a member of the IBHE.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866.\nThe Department asserted that under the factors set forth in Stukel, the RTACs\nshould not be considered public bodies subject to the requirements of OMA. Under the first\nfactor, the Department noted that no RTAC members are appointed by the Governor or the\nDepartment's Director; rather, membership is determined by one's employer and job title, and\nmembers are not paid for their tenure. However, the Department acknowledged that the\ncomposition of each RTAC is mandated by statute, including the requirement that a Department\nemployee - the Regional EMS Coordinator - shall serve as a non-voting member. See 210 ILCS\n50/3.25(e) (West 2014). The fact that each Trauma Center Medical Directors Committee has the\nsole authority to appoint members to its region's RTAC signifies the formality of those entities,\nin contrast with the self-initiated gatherings at issue in Stukel.\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6, 2017\nPage 7\n\nSecondly, the Department stated that theRTACs are not tasked with advising the\nDepartment directly, but instead are authorized to advise committees that then report to the\nDepartment. As cited above, the EMS Systems Act delineates a significant role forRTACs in\ndeveloping plans and recommendations for the Department's approval and action. RTACs have\nclearly-defined assigned duties.\nInsisting thatRTACs are purely advisory bodies lacking deliberative or\ninvestigative functions as outlined in Stukel, the Department next drew a contrast with the State\nTrauma Advisory Council, which is expressly designated as \"an advisory body to the\nDepartment on matters related to trauma care and trauma centers.\" 210 ILCS 50/3.205(a) (West\n2014). Without the benefit ofRegion 11 TAC meeting minutes to review, the nature ofRTAC\nfunctions is difficult for this office to assess. The Department did verify, though, that unlike\nRTACs, the State Trauma Advisory Council plays no role in the formation of EMSRegion\nPlans, which, again, must be submitted to the Department for approval. Moreover, under section\n3.30 of the EMS Systems Act (210 ILCS 50/3.30 (West 2014)), EMS Region Plans are required\nto meet extensive criteria, indicating a substantial need for deliberation.\nUnder the fourth Stukel factor, the Department noted that the discretion to even\ncreate anRTAC for a specific region lies solely with theRegion's Trauma Center Medical\nDirector (see 210 ILCS 50/3.25(b) (West 2014)), further asserting that \"if the Medical Director\nchooses to create anRTAC, the Department has no authority over theRTAC, does not schedule\nRTAC meetings, and does not set or control the agenda ofRTAC meetings.\" 7 However, the\nDepartment thus acknowledged that the very existence ofRTACs is ultimately subject to\ngovernmental control. The Department designates EMSRegions (210 ILCS 50/3.15 (West\n2014)), makes requirements for both EMS Medical Directors (210 ILCS 50/3.20 (West 2014))\nand Trauma Center Medical Directors (77 Ill. Adm. Code §5 I 5.2030 (2015), last amended at 25\nIll. Reg. 16386, effective December 20, 2001), stipulates what Trauma Center Medical Directors\nor Trauma Center Medical Directors Committees must include in EMSRegion Plans (210 ILCS\n50/3.30 (West 2014)), and designates and oversees all Trauma Centers (210 ILCS 50/3.90 (West\n2014)). When a dispute arises over the contents of an EMSRegion Plan between theRegion's\nEMS Medical Directors Committee and Trauma Center Medical Directors or Trauma Center\nMedical Directors Committee, whichever is applicable, the Department's Director \"shall\nintervene through a mechanism established by the Department[.]\" 210 ILCS 50/3.25(c) (West\n2014). These and other provisions of the EMS Systems Act and corresponding Department rules\ndemonstrate thatRTACs are directly accountable to Trauma Center Medical Directors or Trauma\nCenter Medical Directors Committees, whichever is applicable, which in tum are accountable to\nthe Department.\n'Letter from William Bryant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 20 I 5), at 4.\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6, 2017\nPage 8\n\nNext, the Department acknowledged that RTACs may have budgets, but stated\nthat it does not provide them with funding. Additionally, the Department argued that the RTACs\nare not part ofthe Department's formal organizational structure, which the court in Stukel\nidentified as a primary consideration in determining whether a public body is subject to OMA.\nThe Department also recognized, however, that \"[e]ach RTAC is part ofone ofthe 11 EMS\nRegions designated by administrative rule\" (77 Ill. Adm. Code §515.200 (2015)), and \"assist[s] *\n• • in determining the trauma needs of the region.\" 8 Given that RTACs have an express\nstatutory role in developing EMS Region Plans and designating new trauma centers in order for\nthe Department to fulfill its own statutory responsibilities, RTACs are not outside entities. To\nthe contrary, RTACs have a formal place in planning and decision-making processes under the\nauthority ofthe Department.\nAs to the final Stukel factor, the Department contended that an RTAC's decisions\nhave minimal direct impact on the Department, but granted that \"an RTAC's recommendations\nmay be relatively significant in its region.\" 9 As Ms. Schorsch highlighted, the advice of an\nRTAC can have a considerable impact on the designation ofa new trauma center as well as the\nformulation of an EMS Region Plan. The impact of an RTAC's recommendations may be most\ndirectly felt within its Region, but the Regions are extensively managed by the Department, so\nweighty decisions within a Region also reverberate to the Department.\nTaking all of these factors into account, RTACs have the characteristics of\nadvisory bodies, and should conduct themselves accordingly. In particular, the duties and\ncomposition ofRTACs are set by statute, are accountable to entities directly subject to the\nDepartment's control, have a formal role in the decision-making process, and make irripactful\nrecommendations. Because OMA defines a \"public body\" to include advisory bodies ofthe\nState, this office concludes that RTACs are subject to the requirements of OMA.\nFor the reasons stated above, this office requests that each RTAC conduct its\nmeetings incompliance with OMA. Specifically, the RTACs should provide advance notice 10 of\nall future meetings, which should be held in locations that are open and convenient to the\n\n'Letter from William Bry ant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 2015), at 4.\nLetter from William Bryant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 2015), at 5.\n9\n\n10See 5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2016).\n\n\fMs. Kristen Schorsch\nMr. William Bryant\nDecember 6, 2017\nPage 9\n\npublic. 11 The RTACs should also keep written minutes of all meetings 12 and provide an\nopportunity for public commentY This office further requests that each RTAC member\ncomplete the OMA electronic training curriculum developed and administered by the Public·\nAccess Counselor. See 5 ILCS 120/1.05 (West 2016).\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address listed on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n37555 o vio spd\n\n\"See 5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016).\n\"See 5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2016).\n13See 5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016).\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Regional trauma advisory committees' OMA status","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-37555/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTA TE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Kristen Schorsch\nHealth care reporter\nCrain's Chicago Business\nkschorsch@crain.com\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. William Bryant, MPA\nActing Freedom oflnformation Officer\nDivision of Legal Services\nIllinois Department of Public Health\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nWilliam.Bryant@illinois.gov\nRE: OMA Request for Review-2015 PAC 37555\nDear Ms. Schorsch and Mr. Bryant:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access B ureau\nconcludes that the Regional Trauma Advisory Committee (RTAC) of Region 11 (Region 11\nTAC) is a public body subject to the requirements of OMA. 1\nOn September 17, 2015, Ms. Kristen Schorsch, a reporter for Crain's Chicago\nBusiness, submitted this Request for Review alleging that the Region 11 TAC had failed to\nadhere to the requirements of OMA. Ms. Schorsch contended that RTACs are subcommittees of\nthe Illinois Department of Public Health (Department), and thus \"public bodies\" under OMA.\nMs. Schorsch stated that after years of protests, plans to open a trauma center on the south side of\nChicago were announced, but approval was first required from the Region 11 TAC. Because the\n'Although the Request for Review.concerns Region 11 in particular, •this\n•• determination applies to\nall RTACs that have been formed.\n\nIt's in the best interest of good governance and public\naccess to have the RTAC meetings open to the public.151\nOn January 13, 2016, this office sent a second letter to the Department seeking\nadditional information concerning the manner in which the RTACs conduct their business and\ntheir relation to the State Trauma Advisory Council, and again requesting copies of Region 11\nTAC meeting records for our confidential review. On January 27, 2016, the Department\nprovided the requested materials, explaining that because the RTACs function independently.of\nthe Department, it does not know all of the types of records that an RTAC might create or\nmaintain during its meetings; however, because the Department's local representative at times\ninformally attends Region 11 TAC meetings, the Department had 37 such responsive records in\nits possession and provided them for this office's confidential review.\nOn June 8, 2017, Ms. Schorsch reiterated her concern about the secrecy of the\nRegion 11 TAC's meetings to this office, noting that the University of Chicago had announced in\na news release the day before that the Region 11 TAC had unanimously approved the\nUniversity's plans to be designated as a Level I adult trauma center.\nDETERMINATION\n\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of[OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (2014).\nIt is undisputed that the RTACs have not adhered to the requirements cifOMA;\nTherefore, this determination analyzes whether the RTACs are public bodies subject to the\nrequirements of OMA. Section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2014)) defines a \"public\nbody\" as:\n[A)ll legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\n'E-mail from Kristen Schorsch, Health care reporter, Crain's Chicago Business, to [Christopher]\n\nSection 3.25(e) of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (EMS\nSystems Act) (210 ILCS 50/3.25(e) (West 2014)) provides that an RTAC is:\na committee formed within an Emergency Medical Services (EMS)\nRegion, to advise the Region's Trauma Center Medical Directors\nCommittee, consisting ofat least the Trauma Center Medical\nDirectors and Trauma Coordinators from each Trauma Center\nwithin the Region, one EMS Medical Director from a resource\nhospital within the Region, one EMS System Coordinator from\nanother resource hospital within the Region, one representative\neach from a public and private vehicle service provider which\ntransports trauma patients within the Region, an administrative\nrepresentative from each trauma center within the Region, one\nEMR, EMD, EMT, EMT-I, A-EMT, Paramedic, ECRN, or PHRN\nrepresenting the highest level of EMS personnel practicing within\nthe Region, one emergency physician and one Trauma Nurse\nSpecialist (TNS) currently practicing in a trauma center. The\nDepartment's Regional EMS Coordinator for each Region shall\nserve as a non-voting member ofthat Region's Trauma Advisory\nCommittee.\nEvery 2 years, the members ofthe Trauma Center Medical\nDirectors Committee shall rotate serving as Committee Chair, and\nselect the vehicle service providers, EMS personnel, emergency\nphysician, EMS System Coordinator and TNS who shall serve on\nthe [RTAC].\nEvery EMS Region must develop an EMS Region Plan (Plan) for the\nDepartment's approval. 210 ILCS 50/3.25(a) (West 2014). Each plan is developed by the\nRegion's EMS Medical Directors Committee with advice from the Regional EMS Advisory\nCommittee, but the portions concerning trauma are to be \"developed jointly with the Region's\nTrauma Center Medical Directors or Trauma Center Medical Directors Committee, whichever is\napplicable, with advice from the [RTAC], ifsuch [an RTAC] has been established in the\nRegion.\" 210 ILCS 50/3.25(a) (West 2014). Additionally, as Ms. Schorsch noted, RTACs play\na statutory role in the designation ofnew trauma centers. The Department has the authority and\nresponsibility to designate hospitals as Level I or Level II Trauma Centers, but \"shall designate a\nnew trauma center only when a local or regional need for such trauma center has been\nidentified.\" 210 ILCS 50/3.90(b)(4) (West 2014). To make that judgment, the Department must\n\nCenter Medical Directors Committee, with advice from the [RTAC].\" 210 ILCS 50/3.90(b)(4)\n(West 2014).\nIn its first response to this office, the Department described the RTACs as private,\nnot-for-profit organizations that act as \"forum[s] for trauma center employees and a few other\nstatutorily-named individuals to openly discuss regional health care needs.\" 6 The Department\nanalogized the RTACs to other entities that, while required to comply with various government\nregulations, are not considered government subsidiaries subject to the requirements of OMA,\nciting Rockford Newspapers, Inc. v. Northern Illinois Council on Alcoholism & Drug\nDependence, 64 Ill. App. 3d 94, 96 (1978). In that case, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a\nnot-for-profit corporation that administered drug and alcohol treatment programs was not subject\nto the provisions of OMA, despite the fact that it was primarily government-funded and its\nactivities were regulated and monitored by various levels of government. See Rockford, 64 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 96 (\"The amount or percentage of governmental funding of a private entity should\nhave no bearing on whether that entity is characterized as a subsidiary for purposes of the Open\nMeetings Act. Although the Act itself provides that a particular entity need not be publically\nfunded in order to be required to hold open meetings, it does not state that public funding alone\nwill make a particular entity subject to the Act.\").\nThe Department's reliance on the court's holding in Rockford is misplaced. Ms.\nSchorsch's Request for Review emphasized RTACs' role in developing plans to assist regional\ntrauma centers in coordinating patient care, which sharply contrasts with the administrative\nnature of the drug treatment council at issue in Rockford. Once formed, RTAC approval is the\nfirst major step in opening new trauma centers in their respective regions; their recommendations\nguide the course of whether a new trauma center is even created at all. Conversely, the drug\ntreatment council in Rockford was merely a private party that contracted with the state to\nperform a social service, and it lacked any independent authority to develop or recommend the\nneed for such treatment under the law. Thus, regardless of the level of public funding received\nby the hospitals that comprise RTACs, the significant role that RTACs are authorized to play in\nthe formulation of governmental actions and policies distinguishes them from non-profit entities\nthat have no such statutory role.\nThe remainder of the Department's arguments relied on University Professionals\nof Illinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856, 865\n(1st Dist. 2003). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a group of presidents and chancellors of\npublic universities (the Council), which made recommendations to the Illinois Board of Higher\nEducation (IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE meetings to discuss issues\n'Letter from William Bryant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R.. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 2015), at I.\n\nrelated to funding for public education. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 858. The court considered the\nfollowing factors to be relevant to the determination of whether an entity is an advisory body for\npurposes of OMA:\n[!] who appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; [2] the\nentity's assigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute; [3] whether its role is solely advisory\nor whether it also has a deliberative or investigative function; [4]\nwhether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise\naccountable to any public body; [5] whether the group has a\nbudget; [6] its place within the larger organization or institution of\nwhich it is a part; and [7] the impact of decisions or\nrecommendations that the group makes. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n858.\nThe court held that the group was not an advisory body of IBHE in part because it was not\nincorporated into the formal organizational structure of IBHE, a factor that the court identified as\na \"primary consideration in determining whether an organization is a public body under the\nMeetings Act.\" (Emphasis added.) Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 865.. The court explained that.\"the\nCouncil was formed by the presidents and chancellors of the various state universities to express\nits views to the IBHE. Granted, its role is advisory but that role is one that the Council [and not\nIBHE] created.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866. The court also noted that the plaintiff had not\nalleged that the group had a \"deliberative or investigative function in relation to the IBHE or that\nthe Council is subject to government control. It does not appear that the Council is otherwise\naccountable to any public body. It does not appear to have.a budget[,] and no member of the\nCouncil is a member of the IBHE.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866.\nThe Department asserted that under the factors set forth in Stukel, the RTACs\nshould not be considered public bodies subject to the requirements of OMA. Under the first\nfactor, the Department noted that no RTAC members are appointed by the Governor or the\nDepartment's Director; rather, membership is determined by one's employer and job title, and\nmembers are not paid for their tenure. However, the Department acknowledged that the\ncomposition of each RTAC is mandated by statute, including the requirement that a Department\nemployee - the Regional EMS Coordinator - shall serve as a non-voting member. See 210 ILCS\n50/3.25(e) (West 2014). The fact that each Trauma Center Medical Directors Committee has the\nsole authority to appoint members to its region's RTAC signifies the formality of those entities,\n\nSecondly, the Department stated that theRTACs are not tasked with advising the\nDepartment directly, but instead are authorized to advise committees that then report to the\nDepartment. As cited above, the EMS Systems Act delineates a significant role forRTACs in\ndeveloping plans and recommendations for the Department's approval and action. RTACs have\nclearly-defined assigned duties.\nInsisting thatRTACs are purely advisory bodies lacking deliberative or\ninvestigative functions as outlined in Stukel, the Department next drew a contrast with the State\nTrauma Advisory Council, which is expressly designated as \"an advisory body to the\nDepartment on matters related to trauma care and trauma centers.\" 210 ILCS 50/3.205(a) (West\n2014). Without the benefit ofRegion 11 TAC meeting minutes to review, the nature ofRTAC\nfunctions is difficult for this office to assess. The Department did verify, though, that unlike\nRTACs, the State Trauma Advisory Council plays no role in the formation of EMSRegion\nPlans, which, again, must be submitted to the Department for approval. Moreover, under section\n3.30 of the EMS Systems Act (210 ILCS 50/3.30 (West 2014)), EMS Region Plans are required\nto meet extensive criteria, indicating a substantial need for deliberation.\nUnder the fourth Stukel factor, the Department noted that the discretion to even\ncreate anRTAC for a specific region lies solely with theRegion's Trauma Center Medical\nDirector (see 210 ILCS 50/3.25(b) (West 2014)), further asserting that \"if the Medical Director\nchooses to create anRTAC, the Department has no authority over theRTAC, does not schedule\nRTAC meetings, and does not set or control the agenda ofRTAC meetings.\" 7 However, the\nDepartment thus acknowledged that the very existence ofRTACs is ultimately subject to\ngovernmental control. The Department designates EMSRegions (210 ILCS 50/3.15 (West\n2014)), makes requirements for both EMS Medical Directors (210 ILCS 50/3.20 (West 2014))\nand Trauma Center Medical Directors (77 Ill. Adm. Code §5 I 5.2030 (2015), last amended at 25\nIll. Reg. 16386, effective December 20, 2001), stipulates what Trauma Center Medical Directors\nor Trauma Center Medical Directors Committees must include in EMSRegion Plans (210 ILCS\n50/3.30 (West 2014)), and designates and oversees all Trauma Centers (210 ILCS 50/3.90 (West\n2014)). When a dispute arises over the contents of an EMSRegion Plan between theRegion's\nEMS Medical Directors Committee and Trauma Center Medical Directors or Trauma Center\nMedical Directors Committee, whichever is applicable, the Department's Director \"shall\nintervene through a mechanism established by the Department[.]\" 210 ILCS 50/3.25(c) (West\n2014). These and other provisions of the EMS Systems Act and corresponding Department rules\ndemonstrate thatRTACs are directly accountable to Trauma Center Medical Directors or Trauma\nCenter Medical Directors Committees, whichever is applicable, which in tum are accountable to\nthe Department.\n'Letter from William Bryant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 20 I 5), at 4.\n\nNext, the Department acknowledged that RTACs may have budgets, but stated\nthat it does not provide them with funding. Additionally, the Department argued that the RTACs\nare not part ofthe Department's formal organizational structure, which the court in Stukel\nidentified as a primary consideration in determining whether a public body is subject to OMA.\nThe Department also recognized, however, that \"[e]ach RTAC is part ofone ofthe 11 EMS\nRegions designated by administrative rule\" (77 Ill. Adm. Code §515.200 (2015)), and \"assist[s] *\n• • in determining the trauma needs of the region.\" 8 Given that RTACs have an express\nstatutory role in developing EMS Region Plans and designating new trauma centers in order for\nthe Department to fulfill its own statutory responsibilities, RTACs are not outside entities. To\nthe contrary, RTACs have a formal place in planning and decision-making processes under the\nauthority ofthe Department.\nAs to the final Stukel factor, the Department contended that an RTAC's decisions\nhave minimal direct impact on the Department, but granted that \"an RTAC's recommendations\nmay be relatively significant in its region.\" 9 As Ms. Schorsch highlighted, the advice of an\nRTAC can have a considerable impact on the designation ofa new trauma center as well as the\nformulation of an EMS Region Plan. The impact of an RTAC's recommendations may be most\ndirectly felt within its Region, but the Regions are extensively managed by the Department, so\nweighty decisions within a Region also reverberate to the Department.\nTaking all of these factors into account, RTACs have the characteristics of\nadvisory bodies, and should conduct themselves accordingly. In particular, the duties and\ncomposition ofRTACs are set by statute, are accountable to entities directly subject to the\nDepartment's control, have a formal role in the decision-making process, and make irripactful\nrecommendations. Because OMA defines a \"public body\" to include advisory bodies ofthe\nState, this office concludes that RTACs are subject to the requirements of OMA.\nFor the reasons stated above, this office requests that each RTAC conduct its\nmeetings incompliance with OMA. Specifically, the RTACs should provide advance notice 10 of\nall future meetings, which should be held in locations that are open and convenient to the\n\n'Letter from William Bry ant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 2015), at 4.\nLetter from William Bryant, Acting Freedom of Information Officer, to Christopher R. Boggs,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 8, 2015), at 5.\n\npublic. 11 The RTACs should also keep written minutes of all meetings 12 and provide an\nopportunity for public commentY This office further requests that each RTAC member\ncomplete the OMA electronic training curriculum developed and administered by the Public·\nAccess Counselor. See 5 ILCS 120/1.05 (West 2016).\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address listed on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n37555 o vio spd\n\n\"See 5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016).\n\"See 5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2016).\n13 See 5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)."}
{"id":1164,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-04-12","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["37831"],"title":"Maine Township Board violated OMA by failing to post meeting agenda","filename":"37831, issued April 12, 2019.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2336,"summary":"A requester alleged that Maine Township violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to post proper meeting notices and by holding private 'agency funding hearings.' The PAC determined that the Township violated OMA but closed the matter after the Township agreed to conduct future hearings in full compliance with the Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Maine Township Board of Trustees failed to post the agenda for a September 29, 2015 meeting on its website, and also held a series of 'agency funding hearings' without proper notice. The Attorney General's office found that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by not posting the agenda, but noted that the Board remedied that violation by re-voting on the actions at a later meeting. Regarding the funding hearings, the office analyzed whether they constituted 'meetings' under the Act but did not reach a final determination; it noted the Board's assertion that no deliberation occurred and that the hearings consisted of presentations and questions.","holding":"The PAC found that the Maine Township Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to post the agenda for its September 29, 2015 meeting on its website, but that the violation was remedied by subsequent ratification. The PAC did not make a final determination on whether the 'agency funding hearings' violated the Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Maine Township Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide proper notice for a meeting and by conducting 'agency funding hearings' in private.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2","5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Maine Township Board of Trustees","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The Board held private 'agency funding hearings' and failed to post meeting agendas on the Township website.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/37831, issued April 12, 2019.pdf","sha256":"d3691ad6e425567b87e42f6e6791d770884537b11b89685db7ba9cae954feac4","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","open meetings act","public hearing","township board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAMERAOUL\nAl'TORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 12, 2019\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kurt S. Asprooth\nAncel Glink\n140 South Dearborn Street, 6th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\nkasprooth@ancelglink.com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2015 PAC 37831\nDear -and Mr. Asprooth:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)).\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging\nOn October 2, 2015,\nthat the Maine Township (Township) Board of Trustees (Board) had potentially violated OMA\nby: (I) holding a meeting on September 29, 2015, without having provided proper advance\nnotice on the Township's website, and (2) holding a series of unnoticed meetings about funding\nbetween the end of August 2015 and the Board's September 29, 2015, meeting. On October 6,\n2015, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Township and asked it to respond\nto-allegations. On October 14, 2015, the Township's then-attorney, Mr. Daniel J.\nDowd, responded, acknowledging that the Township had not posted the agenda for the Board's\nSeptember 29, 2015, meeting on its website. He argued, however, that the \"agency funding\nhearings\" the Board had held on September 21, 2015, and September 28, 2015, did not qualify as\nmeetings subject to OMA. 1\nLetter from Daniel J. Dowd, Dowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd., to Josh Jones, Supervising Attorney,\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 14, 2015).\n1\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (217) 782-1090 • rlTY: (877) 844-5461 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n601 South University Ave.: Carbondale, IL 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TIY: (877) 675-9.B9 • Fax (618) 529-6416 •E@af:>-\n\n\fMr. Kurt S. Asprooth\nApril 12,2019\nPage 2\n\nOn October 19, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's response to.\n- On October 23, 2015, he submitted a reply, asking that the Board re-vote on the action\nitems pertaining to expenditures from the Board's September 29, 2015, meeting to remedy the\nlack of proper notice for that meeting. He also continued to question why the \"agency funding\nhearings\" were not held in accordance with OMA.\nOn October 26, 2015, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau\ncontacted Mr. Dowd by telephone and asked: (I) whether the Board would consider re-voting on\nthe action items from its September 29, 2015, meeting, and (2) whether he had sat in on the\n\"agency funding hearings\" or was otherwise able to corroborate that the Board had not·\ndeliberated during those hearings. Mr. Dowd stated that he would follow up with the Board\nabout re-voting and that he had not been present for the \"agency funding hearings\" but that he\nwould seek to provide verification that no deliberation among the members of the Board had\noccurred. On October 30, 2015, Mr. Dowd notified this office that the Board had agreed to\ninclude as action items on its November 24, 2015, meeting agenda all of the items on which it\nhad voted during its September 29, 2015, meeting, in order to ratify those actions. On December\n30, 2015, the Board sent this office a copy of the minutes of its November 24, 2015, meeting,\nand asserted that the minutes document the ratification of the action items from the September\n29, 2015, meeting. The Board also provided a signed statement from the Township Supervisor,\nCarol A. Teschky, pursuant to this office's request for verification that the Board did not\ndeliberate about public business during the \"agency funding hearings.\" On January 4, 2016, this\noffice forwarded a copy of that supplemental response to - he did not submit a reply.\nANALYSIS\n\"The Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\nThe September 29, 2015, Meeting\npart:\n\nSection 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2016)) provides, in relevant\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal\noffice of the public body and at the location where the meeting is\nto be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the\nmeeting. A public body that has a website that the full-time staff of\n\n\fMr. Kurt S. Asprooth\nApril 12, 2019\nPage 3\n\nthe public body maintains shall also post on its website the.agenda\nof any regular meetings of the governing body of that public body.\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that the Township's website\nwas maintained by full-time Township staff and that it had neglected to post the agenda for its\nSeptember 29, 2015, meeting on the Township's website. As\n-requested, however, the\nBoard subsequently re-voted on the action items from that meeting during its November 24,\n2015, meeting. Therefore, the Board remedied that violation. See Board of Education School\nDistrict No. 67 v. Sikorski, 214 Ill. App. 3d 945,952 (1st Dist. 1991) (concluding that a public\nbody had \"ratified and cured\" a decision made during an unauthorized closed session by\nsubsequently discussing and voting on the matter in open session).\n\n■■■\n\nThe \"Agency Funding Hearings\"\nThe requirements of OMA apply to each \"meeting\" of a public body. 5 ILCS\n120/1 (West 2016). Section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines \"meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.]\nIf a gathering of the members of a public body meets this definition, then all the requirements of\nOMA apply, including proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2016)),\nholding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the public (5\nILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016)), keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2016)), and allowing\npublic comment (5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)).\nOMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials,\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d\n191,202 (1980); see also Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 660-61 (N.D. Ill. 1982):\nA \"meeting\" under the Act, has been variously described as a\ngathering \"designed to discuss or reach an accord with regard to\npublic business,\" [citation], or as '\"collective discussion .. , and\nexchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision.\"' [C_itation]\n\n\fMr. Kurt S. Asprooth\nApril 12, 2019\nPage 4\nWebster's Third New International Dictionary (I 976) defines\n\"deliberate\" as follows: \"to ponder or think about with measured\ncareful consideration and often with formal discussion before\nreaching a decision or conclusion.\"\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. The Office of the\nAttorney General has also noted that \"[i]n theory, there is no absolute prohibition against the\nmembers of a public body attending an 'informational meeting' without triggering the application\nof' OMA, as long as the members do not make \"[d]eliberational statements\" or engage in the\ndiscussion of public business amongst themselves. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, issued July\n14, 1995, at 10-11. In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the \"mere fact that a\nmajority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in a bona fide\npresentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" does not make a\ngathering subject to OMA, but that the extensive discussions of public business by members of\ntwo county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA. (Emphasis in\noriginal.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11; see also Nabhani, 552 F. Supp. at 661 (a\ngathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \"no examining or\nweighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a\ndecision, [and] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\").\nIn his Request for Review,-alleged that between the Board's August\n2015 regular meeting and its September 29, 2015, meeting, the Board had \"apparently held a\nseries of'funding meetings' which are a crucial part of the annual budget for Maine Township, as\nin a significant amount of the funds the Township allocates annually.\" 2 -further\nalleged that the Board had not posted agendas for those meetings. In the Board's response to this\noffice, Mr. Dowd addressed the notion that the Board had not conducted its September 21, 2015,\nand September 28, 2015, \"agency funding hearings\" in accordance with OMA as follows:\nAt these hearings, interested social service agencies are allotted 15\nminutes each to present a request for a funding grant to the\nTownship Board of Trustees for the upcoming Township fiscal\nyear. There is no agenda per se for these meetings, but a list of the\nagencies presenting and the time of their presentment is passed out\nto the Board of Trustees members and the public at the beginning\nof the meeting. There is no deliberation or action taken by the\n\nI\n\n2, 2015).\n\n2 E-mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney General (October\n\n\fMr. Kurt S. Asprooth\nApril 12, 2019\nPage 5\nBoard at these hearings and no public participation is allowed.\nDecisions on the funding requests made at these hearings is acted\nupon by the Board of Trustees later as a specified agenda item at\none of its regular monthly meetings.131\nAfter this office sought further verification from Mr. Dowd about whether the Board had\ndeliberated about public business during these hearings, as mentioned above, he provided the\nfollowing statement from Supervisor Teschky:\nOn September 21, 2015, September 28, 2015_and October\n14, 2015 Maine Township held Agency Funding Hearings.\nVarious social service agencies appeared before the\nTrustees, Supervisor and Maine Township Department heads to\nmake a 15 minute presentation followed by questions from the\nabove. No minutes were ever taken and no votes were taken.\nThese hearings have been held every year since 1985)41\nUnder the definition of \"meeting\" set forth in OMA, the Board was required to\nconduct its \"agency funding hearings\" in accordance with the Act ifit deliberated about public\nbusiness. Mr. Dowd asserted to this office, based on what he was told by the Board, that the\nBoard did not deliberate during these hearings. When asked for some sort of verification for that\nassertion, such as a signed statement or affidavit, he provided Supervisor Teschky's signed\nstatement, which did not directly state that the Board did not deliberate during the hearings but\nindicated that they consisted of presentations followed by questions. Yet, \" [d]eliberation * * *\nconnotes not only collective discussion, but the collective acquisition and exchange of facts\npreliminary to the ultimate decision.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, at 125 (quoting Sacramento\nNewspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board ofSupervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 47-48, 69\nCal. Rptr. 480, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)). In the same opinion, the Attorney General also quoted\nSacramento Newspaper Guild for the proposition that open meetings regulations must\nencompass \"the collective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as the ultimate step of official\naction.\" (Emphasi_s added.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, at 125 (quoting Sacramento\nNewspaper Guild, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 50, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487).\n\n'Letter from Daniel J. Dowd;Dowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd., to Josh Jones, Supervising Attorney,\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 14, 2015), at 2.\n'Supervisor's Statement by Carol A. Teschky, Maine Township Supervisor (undated).\n\n\fMr: Kurt S. Asprooth\nApril 12,2019\nPage 6\n. Agency funding decisions are an important aspect of the Township's public\nbusiness. The information available to this office indicates that the \"Agency Funding Hearings\"\ninvolved an \"exchange of facts preliminary to a decision\" on which agencies to fund within the\nmeaning of Nabhani. The Board appears to have engaged in collective inquiry phase of\ndeliberation during these \"Agency Funding Hearings,\" gathering information as a group as part\nof its decision-making process on the expenditure of public funds. Under these circumstances,\nthis office concludes that the Board violated OMA by holding the \"Agency Funding Hearings\" in\nprivate.\nOn March 29, 2019, this office contacted the Township to ask whether the Board\nwas still holding \"Agency Funding Hearings\" in the same manner as in September 2015. The\nBoard's current attorney, Mr. Kurt Asprooth, confirmed to this office that the Board had held the\nhearings in the same or a similar manner since that time. Mr. Asprooth also confirmed, however,\nthat the Board would hold its future \"Agency Funding Hearings\" as part of open meetings held in\nfull compliance with OMA, including providing proper advance notice, keeping minutes, and\nallowing public comment, as he had counseled the Board to that effect and had received the\nBoard's agreement. This is a welcome development, as this is the remedy this office would have\nasked the Board to implement.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (312) 814-8413.\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n37831 o 202 notice proper improper 2a meeting improper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Private agency funding hearings and missing meeting agendas","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-37831/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAMERAOUL\nAl'TORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 12, 2019\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kurt S. Asprooth\nAncel Glink\n140 South Dearborn Street, 6th Floor\nChicago, Illinois 60603\n\nkasprooth@ancelglink.com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2015 PAC 37831\nDear -and Mr. Asprooth:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)).\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging\nOn October 2, 2015,\nthat the Maine Township (Township) Board of Trustees (Board) had potentially violated OMA\nby: (I) holding a meeting on September 29, 2015, without having provided proper advance\nnotice on the Township's website, and (2) holding a series of unnoticed meetings about funding\nbetween the end of August 2015 and the Board's September 29, 2015, meeting. On October 6,\n2015, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Township and asked it to respond\nto-allegations. On October 14, 2015, the Township's then-attorney, Mr. Daniel J.\nDowd, responded, acknowledging that the Township had not posted the agenda for the Board's\nSeptember 29, 2015, meeting on its website. He argued, however, that the \"agency funding\nhearings\" the Board had held on September 21, 2015, and September 28, 2015, did not qualify as\nmeetings subject to OMA. 1\nLetter from Daniel J. Dowd, Dowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd., to Josh Jones, Supervising Attorney,\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 14, 2015).\n1\n\nOn October 19, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's response to.\n- On October 23, 2015, he submitted a reply, asking that the Board re-vote on the action\nitems pertaining to expenditures from the Board's September 29, 2015, meeting to remedy the\nlack of proper notice for that meeting. He also continued to question why the \"agency funding\nhearings\" were not held in accordance with OMA.\nOn October 26, 2015, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau\ncontacted Mr. Dowd by telephone and asked: (I) whether the Board would consider re-voting on\nthe action items from its September 29, 2015, meeting, and (2) whether he had sat in on the\n\"agency funding hearings\" or was otherwise able to corroborate that the Board had not·\ndeliberated during those hearings. Mr. Dowd stated that he would follow up with the Board\nabout re-voting and that he had not been present for the \"agency funding hearings\" but that he\nwould seek to provide verification that no deliberation among the members of the Board had\noccurred. On October 30, 2015, Mr. Dowd notified this office that the Board had agreed to\ninclude as action items on its November 24, 2015, meeting agenda all of the items on which it\nhad voted during its September 29, 2015, meeting, in order to ratify those actions. On December\n30, 2015, the Board sent this office a copy of the minutes of its November 24, 2015, meeting,\nand asserted that the minutes document the ratification of the action items from the September\n29, 2015, meeting. The Board also provided a signed statement from the Township Supervisor,\nCarol A. Teschky, pursuant to this office's request for verification that the Board did not\ndeliberate about public business during the \"agency funding hearings.\" On January 4, 2016, this\noffice forwarded a copy of that supplemental response to - he did not submit a reply.\nANALYSIS\n\"The Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\nThe September 29, 2015, Meeting\npart:\n\nthe public body maintains shall also post on its website the.agenda\nof any regular meetings of the governing body of that public body.\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that the Township's website\nwas maintained by full-time Township staff and that it had neglected to post the agenda for its\nSeptember 29, 2015, meeting on the Township's website. As\n-requested, however, the\nBoard subsequently re-voted on the action items from that meeting during its November 24,\n2015, meeting. Therefore, the Board remedied that violation. See Board of Education School\nDistrict No. 67 v. Sikorski, 214 Ill. App. 3d 945,952 (1st Dist. 1991) (concluding that a public\nbody had \"ratified and cured\" a decision made during an unauthorized closed session by\nsubsequently discussing and voting on the matter in open session).\n\n■■■\n\nThe \"Agency Funding Hearings\"\nThe requirements of OMA apply to each \"meeting\" of a public body. 5 ILCS\n120/1 (West 2016). Section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines \"meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.]\nIf a gathering of the members of a public body meets this definition, then all the requirements of\nOMA apply, including proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2016)),\nholding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the public (5\nILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016)), keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2016)), and allowing\npublic comment (5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)).\nOMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials,\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d\n\nWebster's Third New International Dictionary (I 976) defines\n\"deliberate\" as follows: \"to ponder or think about with measured\ncareful consideration and often with formal discussion before\nreaching a decision or conclusion.\"\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. The Office of the\nAttorney General has also noted that \"[i]n theory, there is no absolute prohibition against the\nmembers of a public body attending an 'informational meeting' without triggering the application\nof' OMA, as long as the members do not make \"[d]eliberational statements\" or engage in the\ndiscussion of public business amongst themselves. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, issued July\n14, 1995, at 10-11. In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the \"mere fact that a\nmajority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in a bona fide\npresentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" does not make a\ngathering subject to OMA, but that the extensive discussions of public business by members of\ntwo county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA. (Emphasis in\noriginal.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11; see also Nabhani, 552 F. Supp. at 661 (a\ngathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \"no examining or\nweighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a\ndecision, [and] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\").\nIn his Request for Review,-alleged that between the Board's August\n2015 regular meeting and its September 29, 2015, meeting, the Board had \"apparently held a\nseries of'funding meetings' which are a crucial part of the annual budget for Maine Township, as\nin a significant amount of the funds the Township allocates annually.\" 2 -further\nalleged that the Board had not posted agendas for those meetings. In the Board's response to this\noffice, Mr. Dowd addressed the notion that the Board had not conducted its September 21, 2015,\nand September 28, 2015, \"agency funding hearings\" in accordance with OMA as follows:\nAt these hearings, interested social service agencies are allotted 15\nminutes each to present a request for a funding grant to the\nTownship Board of Trustees for the upcoming Township fiscal\nyear. There is no agenda per se for these meetings, but a list of the\nagencies presenting and the time of their presentment is passed out\nto the Board of Trustees members and the public at the beginning\n\nBoard at these hearings and no public participation is allowed.\nDecisions on the funding requests made at these hearings is acted\nupon by the Board of Trustees later as a specified agenda item at\none of its regular monthly meetings.131\nAfter this office sought further verification from Mr. Dowd about whether the Board had\ndeliberated about public business during these hearings, as mentioned above, he provided the\nfollowing statement from Supervisor Teschky:\nOn September 21, 2015, September 28, 2015_and October\n14, 2015 Maine Township held Agency Funding Hearings.\nVarious social service agencies appeared before the\nTrustees, Supervisor and Maine Township Department heads to\nmake a 15 minute presentation followed by questions from the\nabove. No minutes were ever taken and no votes were taken.\nThese hearings have been held every year since 1985)41\nUnder the definition of \"meeting\" set forth in OMA, the Board was required to\nconduct its \"agency funding hearings\" in accordance with the Act ifit deliberated about public\nbusiness. Mr. Dowd asserted to this office, based on what he was told by the Board, that the\nBoard did not deliberate during these hearings. When asked for some sort of verification for that\nassertion, such as a signed statement or affidavit, he provided Supervisor Teschky's signed\nstatement, which did not directly state that the Board did not deliberate during the hearings but\nindicated that they consisted of presentations followed by questions. Yet, \" [d]eliberation * * *\nconnotes not only collective discussion, but the collective acquisition and exchange of facts\npreliminary to the ultimate decision.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, at 125 (quoting Sacramento\nNewspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board ofSupervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 47-48, 69\nCal. Rptr. 480, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)). In the same opinion, the Attorney General also quoted\nSacramento Newspaper Guild for the proposition that open meetings regulations must\nencompass \"the collective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as the ultimate step of official\naction.\" (Emphasi_s added.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, at 125 (quoting Sacramento\nNewspaper Guild, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 50, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487).\n\n'Letter from Daniel J. Dowd;Dowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd., to Josh Jones, Supervising Attorney,\n\n. Agency funding decisions are an important aspect of the Township's public\nbusiness. The information available to this office indicates that the \"Agency Funding Hearings\"\ninvolved an \"exchange of facts preliminary to a decision\" on which agencies to fund within the\nmeaning of Nabhani. The Board appears to have engaged in collective inquiry phase of\ndeliberation during these \"Agency Funding Hearings,\" gathering information as a group as part\nof its decision-making process on the expenditure of public funds. Under these circumstances,\nthis office concludes that the Board violated OMA by holding the \"Agency Funding Hearings\" in\nprivate.\nOn March 29, 2019, this office contacted the Township to ask whether the Board\nwas still holding \"Agency Funding Hearings\" in the same manner as in September 2015. The\nBoard's current attorney, Mr. Kurt Asprooth, confirmed to this office that the Board had held the\nhearings in the same or a similar manner since that time. Mr. Asprooth also confirmed, however,\nthat the Board would hold its future \"Agency Funding Hearings\" as part of open meetings held in\nfull compliance with OMA, including providing proper advance notice, keeping minutes, and\nallowing public comment, as he had counseled the Board to that effect and had received the\nBoard's agreement. This is a welcome development, as this is the remedy this office would have\nasked the Board to implement.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (312) 814-8413.\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n37831 o 202 notice proper improper 2a meeting improper mun"}
{"id":1165,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-12-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["37850"],"title":"Oswego Township Board violated OMA by imposing ad hoc one-minute public comment limit","filename":"37850, issued December 7, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1924,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Oswego Township Board of Trustees violated OMA by failing to provide an agenda and improperly restricting public comment during an August 2015 meeting. The PAC determined the Board complied with notice requirements but violated OMA by improperly restricting public comment.","plain_summary":"This determination letter addresses whether the Oswego Township Board of Trustees complied with OMA's meeting notice requirements (5 ILCS 120/2.02) and public comment rules (5 ILCS 120/2.06(g)) at its August 11, 2015 regular meeting. The Public Access Bureau found no violation regarding agenda posting, because the motion to limit public comment was listed on the agenda and OMA does not require distribution of printed agendas to attendees. However, the Bureau concluded the Board violated section 2.06(g) by imposing an ad hoc one-minute limit on public comment that was not adopted pursuant to an established and recorded rule applicable to all meetings, but instead was crafted for a single contentious meeting. The rule for future public bodies: restrictions on the statutory right to address public officials must be based on established and recorded rules, not case-by-case limits imposed in anticipation of controversial topics or large crowds.","holding":"A public body violates section 2.06(g) of OMA when it restricts public comment through an ad hoc, meeting-specific rule rather than an established and recorded rule applicable to all meetings, even though posting an agenda item describing the proposed restriction satisfies section 2.02(c).","legal_question":"Did the Oswego Township Board of Trustees violate the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide a meeting agenda and by imposing unreasonable restrictions on public comment?","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06(g)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Oswego Township Board of Trustees","requesting_party":"Mr. [Name Redacted]","pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public comment","subject_description":"The board voted to limit public comment to one minute per person with a 'no questions' policy during a regular meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/37850, issued December 7, 2017.pdf","sha256":"e6e2c0bd7c7c74086dc67b717ee0c8ebb857855df682dc449cd2e5a7126a7d93","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","meeting agenda","township board","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Brian LeClercq\n\nTownship Supervisor\nOswego Township\n84 Templeton\nP. O. Box 792\n\nOswego, Illinois 60543\n\nbrian. leclercq@oswegotownship. com\nRE: OMA Request for Review— 2015 PAC 37850\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. LeClercq:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Trustees ( Board) of Oswego Township ( Township) did not\nviolate the advance notice requirements of OMA in connection with its August 11, 2015, regular\n\nmeeting, but improperly restricted\n\nright to address the Board during that\n\nmeeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn October 5, 2015,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\n\nAccess Bureau alleging that the Board violated the requirements of OMA during its August 11,\n2015, regular meeting by voting to limit public comment to one minute per person \" with the\n\nstipulation of 'No Questions' to shield the Road Commissioner, Gary Grosskopf, from public\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001\n\nFast Main, Carbondale.\n\n61 R1 529- 6400 •\n\nTTV • /\n\n61\n\nRI\n\n579_\n\nbin1 •\n\nI — (\n\nFIR\\\n\n\fMr. Brian LeClercq\nDecember\n\n7, 2017\n\nPage 2\n\nscrutiny. He also stated that he \" believe[ d] the vote to change [ the] meeting rules was not on the\nmeeting agenda that night\" and alleged that \" Oswego Township does not supply citizens with a\nprinted monthly meeting agenda. i2\n\nOn October 14, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Board and asked it to provide a written response to\n\nOMA allegations, together\n\nwith copies of the agenda, minutes, and any existing verbatim recording of the meeting. On\n\nOctober 22, 2015, this office received the Township' s written response, along with copies of the\nagenda and minutes. On October 26, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Board' s response\nto\nhe did not reply. On April 14, 2016, this office sent the Board a follow up letter,\nasking the Board to clarify whether the change to the public comment rule was for all meetings\ngoing forward or limited to that one meeting. This office also asked the Board to explain the\nlegal rationale for the one -minute rule, including whether it was put in place to limit comments\nabout Road Commissioner Grosskopf. Further, this office asked the Board to provide copies of\n\nits public comment policy in effect on August 11, 2015, and any policy currently in effect. On\nApril 27, 2016, this office received a supplemental response from the Board; it provided no rules\ngoverning public comment.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is \" the public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (\n\nWest 2016). \" The Open Meetings Act provides that\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d 161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\nAgenda\n\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides: \"\n\nAn agenda\n\nfor each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal office of the public body and at the\nlocation where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the\nmeeting.\" Additionally, section 2. 02( c) of (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)) provides: \" Any\n\nagenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\nordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting.\"\nOMA - Request for Review by Public Access Counselor form submitted by\nOctober 5, 2015).\n\n2OMA Request for Review by Public Access Counselor form submitted by\nOctober 5, 2015).\n\n\fMr. Brian LeClercq\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 3\n\ncontended that the Board did not provide citizens with a printed copy\nof the agenda for its August 11, 2015, meeting. Although OMA requires a public body to post a\n\ncopy of its meeting agenda at its principal office and at the location of the meeting at least 48\nhours in advance of the meeting, it does not require a public body to distribute copies of its\nagenda to citizens who attend an open meeting. Further,\ndid not allege that the\nBoard failed to post notice of its August 11, 2015, meeting at the Board' s principal office and the\n\nmeeting location. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board did not violate section\n2. 02( a) of OMA.\n\nAdditionally, this office' s review of the agenda for the Board' s August 11, 2015,\nmeeting showed that it listed: \" MOTION: To limit public comments to one minute each. i3\ndid not provide any facts contradicting that this motion was listed on the agenda.\nTherefore, based on the available information, the Board did not violate section 2. 02( c) of OMA\n\nwhen it voted to restrict public comment during the meeting because the general subject matter\nof that final action was listed on the agenda.\nPublic Comment\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" Under the plain language of section 2. 06( g), a public body\nmay restrict public comment only pursuant to rules it has established and recorded, which must\ntend to accommodate, rather than unreasonably limit, the right to address public officials. See\n\n111. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014, at 4, 7 ( requiring members\nof the public to announce their home addresses before addressing board members violated\n\nsection 2. 06( g) because it was not an established and recorded rule and it unreasonably restricted\nthe right to public comment); I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48439, issued August 3, 2017, at\n4 ( public body' s limitation of an individual' s comments to two minutes from its normal five\n\nminutes violated section 2. 06( g) because it was not pursuant to an established and recorded rule).\nThe Attorney General has opined in a binding opinion ( III. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc.\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5- 6) that:\n\npublic bodies may generally promulgate reasonable \" time, place\nand manner\" regulations that are necessary to further a significant\ngovernmental\n\ninterest. * * * [\n\nT] he primary purpose of adopting\n\n3Oswego Township Board of Trustees, Agenda Item ( unnumbered), MOTION: To limit public\ncomments to one minute each ( August\n\n11,\n\n2015).\n\n\fMr. Brian LeClercq\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 4\n\nrules governing public comment pursuant to section 2. 06( g) of\nOMA is to accommodate the speaker' s statutory right to address\nthe public body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain\norder and decorum at public meetings.\n\nNotwithstanding the legitimate interest in maintaining decorum, in order to withstand\nconstitutional muster, any restrictions on public comment that are content - based \" must serve a\n\ncompelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose.\" See I.A. Rana\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922- 23 ( N. D. Ill. 2009).\nIn the Board' s April, 22, 2016, response to this office, the Township Supervisor,\nJames K. Detzler, asserted:\n\nhad complained to the media about our Road\nCommissioner['] s time in Florida and in anticipation for a large\ncrowd that night I limited the response to one minute for that\nmeeting only.\n\nDepending on the crowd that evening we believed we did\nnot want\n\nto be there until\n\nall\n\nhours\n\nof the\n\n4\n\nevening.\n\nSupervisor Detzler further asserted that the members of the public were normally permitted to\nspeak as long as they wished.\nThis office has also reviewed a copy of the minutes of the August 11, 2015,\nmeeting. The minutes confirm that the Board voted to limit comments to one minute per person\nbefore it requested attendees who wished to speak to come forward. 5\n\nThe Board did not provide this office with a copy of any established and recorded\nrules goveming public comment. Further, the Board did not otherwise demonstrate that at its\nAugust 11, 2015, meeting, it acted in accordance with an established and recorded rule\n\npermitting it to approve a temporary time limit on public comments. Unlike an established and\nrecorded rule on public comments that applies consistently to all meetings, the rule approved in\n\nthis case limited the amount of time each member of the public could speak during a single\nmeeting where a contentious issue was expected to be discussed. Indeed, the Board' s response to\nthis office acknowledged that it imposed this restriction in anticipation of a large turnout at the\n\nLetter from James K. Detzler, Oswego Township Supervisor, Oswego Township, to Ivan 0.\nTaylor Jr., Public Access Bureau ( April 22, 2016).\n\n50swego Township Board, Meeting, August 11,\n\n2015, Minutes 2.\n\n\fMr. Brian LeClercq\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 5\n\nmeeting and the possibility that many members of the public would want to address the Board\n\nconcerning the Road Commissioner. Although a public body may adopt reasonable rules aimed\nat promoting efficiency and preserving decorum, the Board' s one -minute limit was an ad hoc\nrule— not\n\nan established\n\nand recorded\n\nrule—\n\ndesigned to restrict the public' s right to address\n\npublic officials at the August 11, 2015, meeting. Therefore, this office concludes that the Board\nviolated section 2. 06( g) of OMA by improperly limiting public comment during that meeting.\n\nThere are no means for the Board to remedy its violation of section 2. 06( g) at this\ntime. If the Board has not already established and recorded rules governing public comment,\nwhich apply to all open meetings, the plain language of section 2. 06( g) of OMA requires it to do\nso. This office suggests that if the Board wishes to impose time limitations on public comment,\n\nit should establish and record rules containing reasonable restrictions, such as two or three\nminutes per person per meeting, or a limit on the total amount of time spent on public comment,\npursuant to section 2. 06( g) of OMA. Many public bodies establish rules that specify the head of\nthe public body may extend normal time limits for public comment if warranted by public\ninterest in an issue.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n37850\n\no\n\n202 notice\n\nproper\n\n206g pub comment improper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A board's ad hoc limit on public comment time and questions","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-37850/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Brian LeClercq\n\nTownship Supervisor\nOswego Township\n84 Templeton\nP. O. Box 792\n\nOswego, Illinois 60543\n\nbrian. leclercq@oswegotownship. com\nRE: OMA Request for Review— 2015 PAC 37850\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. LeClercq:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Trustees (Board) of Oswego Township (Township) did not\nviolate the advance notice requirements of OMA in connection with its August 11, 2015, regular\n\nmeeting, but improperly restricted\n\nright to address the Board during that\n\nmeeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn October 5, 2015,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\n\nAccess Bureau alleging that the Board violated the requirements of OMA during its August 11,\n2015, regular meeting by voting to limit public comment to one minute per person \" with the\n\nstipulation of 'No Questions' to shield the Road Commissioner, Gary Grosskopf, from public\n\nscrutiny. He also stated that he \" believe[ d] the vote to change [ the] meeting rules was not on the\nmeeting agenda that night\" and alleged that \" Oswego Township does not supply citizens with a\nprinted monthly meeting agenda. i2\n\nOn October 14, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Board and asked it to provide a written response to\n\nOMA allegations, together\n\nwith copies of the agenda, minutes, and any existing verbatim recording of the meeting. On\n\nOctober 22, 2015, this office received the Township's written response, along with copies of the\nagenda and minutes. On October 26, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's response\nto\nhe did not reply. On April 14, 2016, this office sent the Board a follow up letter,\nasking the Board to clarify whether the change to the public comment rule was for all meetings\ngoing forward or limited to that one meeting. This office also asked the Board to explain the\nlegal rationale for the one -minute rule, including whether it was put in place to limit comments\nabout Road Commissioner Grosskopf. Further, this office asked the Board to provide copies of\n\nits public comment policy in effect on August 11, 2015, and any policy currently in effect. On\nApril 27, 2016, this office received a supplemental response from the Board; it provided no rules\ngoverning public comment.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is \" the public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). \" The Open Meetings Act provides that\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d 161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\nAgenda\n\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides: \"\n\nAn agenda\n\nfor each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal office of the public body and at the\nlocation where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the\nmeeting.\" Additionally, section 2. 02(c) of (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)) provides: \" Any\n\nagenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\n\ncontended that the Board did not provide citizens with a printed copy\nof the agenda for its August 11, 2015, meeting. Although OMA requires a public body to post a\n\ncopy of its meeting agenda at its principal office and at the location of the meeting at least 48\nhours in advance of the meeting, it does not require a public body to distribute copies of its\nagenda to citizens who attend an open meeting. Further,\ndid not allege that the\nBoard failed to post notice of its August 11, 2015, meeting at the Board's principal office and the\n\nmeeting location. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board did not violate section\n2. 02(a) of OMA.\n\nAdditionally, this office's review of the agenda for the Board's August 11, 2015,\nmeeting showed that it listed: \" MOTION: To limit public comments to one minute each. i3\ndid not provide any facts contradicting that this motion was listed on the agenda.\nTherefore, based on the available information, the Board did not violate section 2. 02(c) of OMA\n\nwhen it voted to restrict public comment during the meeting because the general subject matter\nof that final action was listed on the agenda.\nPublic Comment\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" Under the plain language of section 2. 06(g), a public body\nmay restrict public comment only pursuant to rules it has established and recorded, which must\ntend to accommodate, rather than unreasonably limit, the right to address public officials. See\n\n111. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014, at 4, 7 (requiring members\nof the public to announce their home addresses before addressing board members violated\n\nsection 2. 06(g) because it was not an established and recorded rule and it unreasonably restricted\nthe right to public comment); I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48439, issued August 3, 2017, at\n4 (public body's limitation of an individual's comments to two minutes from its normal five\n\nminutes violated section 2. 06(g) because it was not pursuant to an established and recorded rule).\nThe Attorney General has opined in a binding opinion (III. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc.\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5- 6) that:\n\npublic bodies may generally promulgate reasonable \" time, place\nand manner\" regulations that are necessary to further a significant\ngovernmental\n\ninterest. * * * [\n\nrules governing public comment pursuant to section 2. 06(g) of\nOMA is to accommodate the speaker's statutory right to address\nthe public body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain\norder and decorum at public meetings.\n\nNotwithstanding the legitimate interest in maintaining decorum, in order to withstand\nconstitutional muster, any restrictions on public comment that are content - based \" must serve a\n\ncompelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose.\" See I.A. Rana\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922- 23 (N. D. Ill. 2009).\nIn the Board's April, 22, 2016, response to this office, the Township Supervisor,\nJames K. Detzler, asserted:\n\nhad complained to the media about our Road\nCommissioner['] s time in Florida and in anticipation for a large\ncrowd that night I limited the response to one minute for that\nmeeting only.\n\nDepending on the crowd that evening we believed we did\nnot want\n\nto be there until\n\nall\n\nhours\n\nof the\n\n4\n\nevening.\n\nSupervisor Detzler further asserted that the members of the public were normally permitted to\nspeak as long as they wished.\nThis office has also reviewed a copy of the minutes of the August 11, 2015,\nmeeting. The minutes confirm that the Board voted to limit comments to one minute per person\nbefore it requested attendees who wished to speak to come forward. 5\n\nThe Board did not provide this office with a copy of any established and recorded\nrules goveming public comment. Further, the Board did not otherwise demonstrate that at its\nAugust 11, 2015, meeting, it acted in accordance with an established and recorded rule\n\npermitting it to approve a temporary time limit on public comments. Unlike an established and\nrecorded rule on public comments that applies consistently to all meetings, the rule approved in\n\nthis case limited the amount of time each member of the public could speak during a single\nmeeting where a contentious issue was expected to be discussed. Indeed, the Board's response to\nthis office acknowledged that it imposed this restriction in anticipation of a large turnout at the\n\nmeeting and the possibility that many members of the public would want to address the Board\n\nconcerning the Road Commissioner. Although a public body may adopt reasonable rules aimed\nat promoting efficiency and preserving decorum, the Board's one -minute limit was an ad hoc\nrule— not\n\nan established\n\nand recorded\n\nrule—\n\ndesigned to restrict the public's right to address\n\npublic officials at the August 11, 2015, meeting. Therefore, this office concludes that the Board\nviolated section 2. 06(g) of OMA by improperly limiting public comment during that meeting.\n\nThere are no means for the Board to remedy its violation of section 2. 06(g) at this\ntime. If the Board has not already established and recorded rules governing public comment,\nwhich apply to all open meetings, the plain language of section 2. 06(g) of OMA requires it to do\nso. This office suggests that if the Board wishes to impose time limitations on public comment,\n\nit should establish and record rules containing reasonable restrictions, such as two or three\nminutes per person per meeting, or a limit on the total amount of time spent on public comment,\npursuant to section 2. 06(g) of OMA. Many public bodies establish rules that specify the head of\nthe public body may extend normal time limits for public comment if warranted by public\ninterest in an issue.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n37850\n\no\n\n202 notice\n\nproper\n\n206g pub comment improper mun"}
{"id":1166,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-08-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["38037"],"title":"Carrollton City Council violated OMA by restricting public comment to residents and agenda items","filename":"38037, issued August 1, 2016.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1376,"summary":"The PAC determined that the City of Carrollton City Council violated the Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment at its October 13, 2015, meeting to only City residents and items listed on the agenda.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a city council meeting restricted public comments to only city residents and only to topics already on the meeting agenda. The Attorney General's office ruled that these restrictions were illegal under the Open Meetings Act. The city was advised to create new, reasonable rules for public participation that do not unfairly limit who can speak or what they can discuss.","holding":"The City Council violated section 2.06(g) of the Open Meetings Act by imposing impermissible restrictions on public comment.","legal_question":"Whether a public body may restrict public comment at an open meeting to only residents and to items specifically listed on the meeting agenda.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06(g)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Carrollton City Council","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in source)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public comment","subject_description":"The City Council restricted public comment at a meeting to residents and agenda items only.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/unreasonable-rules/38037, issued August 1, 2016.pdf","sha256":"ba00847ce08d9bbd800638b3753d8b6ac29d7b9088cc7034721690edf4e73d2d","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","open meetings act","meeting rules","agenda items"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nAugust\n\n1, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Earl \" Joe\" Harness, Jr.\nMayor Pro Tempore\n\nCity of Carrollton\n621 South Main Street\nCarrollton, Illinois 62016\nRe:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review 2015 PAC 38037\n\nand Mr. Harness:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons discussed below, this office\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS\n\nconcludes that the City Council ( Council) of the City of Carrollton ( City) violated section\n\n2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2014)) by restricting public comment to City\nresidents and to items listed on the agenda during the Council' s October 13, 2015, meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn October 14, 2015,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that\nthe Council limited public comment at its October 13, 2015, regular meeting to matters on the\n\nagenda and prohibited attendees who were not City residents, including\n\nfrom\n\naddressing the Council. On October 20, 2015, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the\nRequest for Review to the Mayor Pro Tempore ( Mayor), in his capacity as the head of the\nCouncil, and asked for a written response to the allegations therein. This office also requested a\n\ncopy of any established and recorded Council rules governing public comment during meetings,\nand copies of the agenda, open session minutes, and any audio or video recordings of the\n\nOctober 13, 2015, meeting. On October 26, 2015, the City Clerk provided this office with a\n\n500\n\nSouth Second\n\nStreet,\n\nSpringfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n1001\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\n217)\n\n782- 1090 •\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (\n\n217)\n\n785 - 2771 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 217)\n\n782- 7046\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fThe Honorable Earl \" Joe\" Harness, Jr.\nAugust 1, 2016\nPage 2\n\ncopy\noftherecei\nagenda\nan audio written\nrecordinresponse\ng of the tomeeti\nAdditionally,\nthis office\nved and\nthe Mayor's\nthenalg.legati\nons in whichon heNovember\nconfirmed9, 2015,\nthat he\n\nhad limited public comment to \"subjects on the agenda\" and prohibited non-residents ofthe City\nfrom addressing the Council \" sinOn\nce these\nhave been the people most disrupted [ sic] in conducting\nNovember 13, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the\na\n\nmeeting for\n\nthe past 4 mos.\"'\n\nMayor' s response to\n\nOn November 16, 2015, she replied by emphasizing that\n\nMayor's response acknowledged that the conduct she had alleged \" did indeed take place. i2\nOn November 18, 2015, the City Clerk confirmed to the Public Access Bureau via\ne- mail that on the date of the meeting in question the City did not have established and recorded\n\nrules concerning public comment during Council meetings. On December 8, 2015, the City\nClerk provided the Public Access Bureau with a copy ofthe minutes ofthe Council's October 13,\n2015, meeting.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA, which was added by Public Act 96- 1473, effective\n\nJanuary 1, 2011, provides that \"[ a]ny person shall be permitted an opportunity to address public\nofficials under the rules established and recorded by the public body.\"\n\nIn its response to this office, the Council acknowledged that the Mayor restricted\n\npublic comment at the October 13, 2015, meeting to residents of the City and to matters listed on\nthe agenda. The meeting minutes corroborate that the Mayor announced that \" comments would\nbe limited to the agenda and would be limited to citizens of the city only. i3 To explain those\nextemporaneous restrictions, the Mayor asserted that non-residents were being prohibited from\naddressing the Council because they had been disruptive at past meetings. However, the Council\ndid not cite any evidence that\nor any other non-resident had been disruptive at any\n\nprior meeting,\n\nportion of the meeting before or after the Mayor stated that\n\nthey would be prohibited from speaking. Therefore, the Council did not establish that it was\nnecessary or even reasonable to categorically prohibit all non-residents from commenting in\norder to maintain order at the meeting.\nLetter from [Earl \"Joe\" Harness, Jr] to Leah Bartelt, Ass't Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau (\n\nundated)\n\n2E -mail from\n\nto Public Access and Leah Bartelt (November 16, 2015).\n\n3City ofCarrollton City Council, Regular Meeting, October 13, 2015, Minutes 5.\n\n\fThe Honorable Earl \" Joe\" Harness, Jr.\nAugust 1, 2016\nPage 3\n\nWith respect to limiting public comment to agenda items, the Mayor stated in the\nCouncil' s response that he imposed that restriction because \" we must post [the agenda] 48 hrs in\nlbody' spost d agenda to\nagec)\nsubject \"matter\nsion\nsection\n\nand\n\nonce\n\nthe\n\ninside\n\nis cast in stone for the\n\n2. 02( c) ( West2014))\n1\nILCS 120/\n2. 02(02( c) of OMA ( 5\nf\nset forth the\n\ndoes\nor\n\nresolution\n\nfinal\n\nemphasis\n\nat the meeting[ ] (\n\naction\n\nadded),\n\nthat\n\nrequire\n\nG\n\na\n\ninance\n\nthat will\n\ndoes not\n\nthe\n\nprohibit\n\nject of\n\ndiscussion\n\nof\n\nmatters not on an agenda by the public body, nor does it prohibit members of the public from\ncommenting on matters that do not appear on the agenda during the public comment portion of\nthe meeting. Rice v. Board ofTrustees ofAdams County, Ill., 326 I11. App. 3d 1120, 1123 ( 4th\nDist. 2002) ( concluding that a public body may \" consider\" items not specifically set forth on an\nagenda by deliberation and discussion, but may not take final action without sufficient advance\nnotice on the agenda). Further, it is undisputed that the Council had not established and recorded\nany\nrules limiting\npublic comment\nuding non-resi\nthe Council.\nAccordingly,\nthis officeto agenda\nconcludesitemsthatortheexclCouncil\nviolateddents\nsectionfrom2.06(addressi\ng) of ng\nOMA during its October 13, 2015, meeting by extemporaneously imposing those restrictions.\nMoreover, a rule purporting to limit the right to comment to residents of the City\nwould run afoul of section 2.06(g) of OMA. Section 2.06( g) specifically provides that 'Piny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity\nto address\nofficialsa public\nunder body\nthe rules\nEmphasis\nadded.)public\nAlthough\nmayestablished\nadopt\nby the\n\npublic\n\nbody.\" (\n\nreasonable rules governing the manner in which members ofthe public provide comments during\nopen meetings, \" a person's right to comment at an open meeting is not contingent upon where he\nor she resides.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14-009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7.\n\nand\n\nrecorded\n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that a rule establishing a blanket prohibition on public\ncomment by non-residents would impermissibly restrict the right to public comment guaranteed\nby section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\n\nSimilarly, a rule limiting participants to speaking only on subjects listed on the\n\nagenda would also exceed the scope ofpermissible rulemaking authori\nbodyzed by section 2.06 g).\nAs discussed above,\nof items\n\nnot\n\npreclude\nOMA does not\n\nspecifically\n\nset\n\nmembers\n\nforth in the agenda,\" (\n\nof a public\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( ))\n\nfrom\n\nthe codeatn\n\n01e \"\n\nas long as\n\nthe public body does not take final action on items not listed on the agenda. Given that the\npublic body itselfis able to discuss matters that are not specifically listed on the agenda, a rule\nthat would prohibit members ofthe public from addressing matters that are not listed on the\nagenda would impermissibly restrict the right to public comment as outlined in section 2.06(g).\nLetter from [ Earl \" Joe\" Harness, Jr.] to Leah Bartelt, Ass't Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau (\n\nundated).\n\n\fThe Honorable Earl \" Joe\" Harness, Jr.\nAugust 1, 2016\nPage 4\n\nIn accordance with this determination, the Public Access Bureau suggests that the\nCouncil consider appropriate action to establish and record reasonable rules to govern public\ncomment at its meetings.\ndoes\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this mattct de\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contat\n312) 814- 6437. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLEAH BARTELT\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n38037 o 206g pub\n\ncomment\n\nimproper\n\nmun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Public comment restrictions at a council meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-38037/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nAugust\n\n1, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Earl \" Joe\" Harness, Jr.\nMayor Pro Tempore\n\nCity of Carrollton\n621 South Main Street\nCarrollton, Illinois 62016\nRe:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review 2015 PAC 38037\n\nand Mr. Harness:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons discussed below, this office\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS\n\nconcludes that the City Council (Council) of the City of Carrollton (City) violated section\n\n2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2014)) by restricting public comment to City\nresidents and to items listed on the agenda during the Council's October 13, 2015, meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn October 14, 2015,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that\nthe Council limited public comment at its October 13, 2015, regular meeting to matters on the\n\nagenda and prohibited attendees who were not City residents, including\n\nfrom\n\naddressing the Council. On October 20, 2015, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the\nRequest for Review to the Mayor Pro Tempore (Mayor), in his capacity as the head of the\nCouncil, and asked for a written response to the allegations therein. This office also requested a\n\ncopy of any established and recorded Council rules governing public comment during meetings,\nand copies of the agenda, open session minutes, and any audio or video recordings of the\n\nOctober 13, 2015, meeting. On October 26, 2015, the City Clerk provided this office with a\n\n500\n\nSouth Second\n\nStreet,\n\nSpringfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (1001\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\n217)\n\n782- 1090 •\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (217)\n\n785 - 2771 •\n\ncopy\noftherecei\nagenda\nan audio written\nrecordinresponse\ng of the tomeeti\nAdditionally,\nthis office\nved and\nthe Mayor's\nthenalg.legati\nons in whichon heNovember\nconfirmed9, 2015,\nthat he\n\nhad limited public comment to \"subjects on the agenda\" and prohibited non-residents ofthe City\nfrom addressing the Council \" sinOn\nce these\nhave been the people most disrupted [ sic] in conducting\nNovember 13, 2015, this office forwarded a copy of the\na\n\nmeeting for\n\nthe past 4 mos.\"'\n\nMayor's response to\n\nOn November 16, 2015, she replied by emphasizing that\n\nMayor's response acknowledged that the conduct she had alleged \" did indeed take place. i2\nOn November 18, 2015, the City Clerk confirmed to the Public Access Bureau via\ne- mail that on the date of the meeting in question the City did not have established and recorded\n\nrules concerning public comment during Council meetings. On December 8, 2015, the City\nClerk provided the Public Access Bureau with a copy ofthe minutes ofthe Council's October 13,\n2015, meeting.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA, which was added by Public Act 96- 1473, effective\n\nJanuary 1, 2011, provides that \"[ a]ny person shall be permitted an opportunity to address public\nofficials under the rules established and recorded by the public body.\"\n\nIn its response to this office, the Council acknowledged that the Mayor restricted\n\npublic comment at the October 13, 2015, meeting to residents of the City and to matters listed on\nthe agenda. The meeting minutes corroborate that the Mayor announced that \" comments would\nbe limited to the agenda and would be limited to citizens of the city only. i3 To explain those\nextemporaneous restrictions, the Mayor asserted that non-residents were being prohibited from\naddressing the Council because they had been disruptive at past meetings. However, the Council\ndid not cite any evidence that\nor any other non-resident had been disruptive at any\n\nprior meeting,\n\nportion of the meeting before or after the Mayor stated that\n\nthey would be prohibited from speaking. Therefore, the Council did not establish that it was\nnecessary or even reasonable to categorically prohibit all non-residents from commenting in\norder to maintain order at the meeting.\nLetter from [Earl \"Joe\" Harness, Jr] to Leah Bartelt, Ass't Attorney General, Public Access\n\nWith respect to limiting public comment to agenda items, the Mayor stated in the\nCouncil's response that he imposed that restriction because \" we must post [the agenda] 48 hrs in\nlbody' spost d agenda to\nagec)\nsubject \"matter\nsion\nsection\n\nand\n\nonce\n\nthe\n\ninside\n\nis cast in stone for the\n\n2. 02(c) (West2014))\n1\nILCS 120/\n2. 02(02(c) of OMA (5\nf\nset forth the\n\ndoes\nor\n\nresolution\n\nfinal\n\nemphasis\n\nat the meeting[ ] (action\n\nadded),\n\nthat\n\nrequire\n\nG\n\na\n\ninance\n\nthat will\n\ndoes not\n\nthe\n\nprohibit\n\nject of\n\ndiscussion\n\nof\n\nmatters not on an agenda by the public body, nor does it prohibit members of the public from\ncommenting on matters that do not appear on the agenda during the public comment portion of\nthe meeting. Rice v. Board ofTrustees ofAdams County, Ill., 326 I11. App. 3d 1120, 1123 (4th\nDist. 2002) (concluding that a public body may \" consider\" items not specifically set forth on an\nagenda by deliberation and discussion, but may not take final action without sufficient advance\nnotice on the agenda). Further, it is undisputed that the Council had not established and recorded\nany\nrules limiting\npublic comment\nuding non-resi\nthe Council.\nAccordingly,\nthis officeto agenda\nconcludesitemsthatortheexclCouncil\nviolateddents\nsectionfrom2.06(addressi\ng) of ng\nOMA during its October 13, 2015, meeting by extemporaneously imposing those restrictions.\nMoreover, a rule purporting to limit the right to comment to residents of the City\nwould run afoul of section 2.06(g) of OMA. Section 2.06(g) specifically provides that 'Piny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity\nto address\nofficialsa public\nunder body\nthe rules\nEmphasis\nadded.)public\nAlthough\nmayestablished\nadopt\nby the\n\npublic\n\nbody.\" (reasonable rules governing the manner in which members ofthe public provide comments during\nopen meetings, \" a person's right to comment at an open meeting is not contingent upon where he\nor she resides.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14-009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7.\n\nand\n\nrecorded\n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that a rule establishing a blanket prohibition on public\ncomment by non-residents would impermissibly restrict the right to public comment guaranteed\nby section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\n\nSimilarly, a rule limiting participants to speaking only on subjects listed on the\n\nagenda would also exceed the scope ofpermissible rulemaking authori\nbodyzed by section 2.06 g).\nAs discussed above,\nof items\n\nnot\n\npreclude\nOMA does not\n\nspecifically\n\nset\n\nmembers\n\nforth in the agenda,\" (of a public\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) ())\n\nfrom\n\nthe codeatn\n\n01e \"\n\nas long as\n\nthe public body does not take final action on items not listed on the agenda. Given that the\npublic body itselfis able to discuss matters that are not specifically listed on the agenda, a rule\nthat would prohibit members ofthe public from addressing matters that are not listed on the\nagenda would impermissibly restrict the right to public comment as outlined in section 2.06(g).\nLetter from [ Earl \" Joe\" Harness, Jr.] to Leah Bartelt, Ass't Attorney General, Public Access\n\nIn accordance with this determination, the Public Access Bureau suggests that the\nCouncil consider appropriate action to establish and record reasonable rules to govern public\ncomment at its meetings.\ndoes\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this mattct de\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contat\n312) 814- 6437. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLEAH BARTELT\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n38037 o 206g pub\n\ncomment\n\nimproper\n\nmun"}
{"id":1167,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-02-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["39667"],"title":"Mokena Community Park District OMA email meeting complaint insufficient evidence","filename":"39667, issued February 18, 2016.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1331,"summary":"A Park District board member alleged that the Board President conducted public business via email with a majority of the board regarding an open seat and an executive director's contract. The PAC determined there was insufficient evidence to conclude that these communications constituted an illegal meeting under the Open Meetings Act.","plain_summary":"A board member complained that the Park District board was conducting public business through private emails, which would violate the Open Meetings Act's requirement for public discussion. The Attorney General's office investigated but could not find enough evidence to prove that an illegal 'meeting' occurred. The office warned the board that using email to discuss public business among a majority of members risks violating the law.","holding":"The PAC found insufficient evidence to determine that the Mokena Community Park District violated the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether email communications between members of a public body regarding public business constitute a 'meeting' under section 1.02 of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"insufficient_info","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Mokena Community Park District","requesting_party":"a member of the Board","pac_outcome":"Insufficient evidence of a violation","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The alleged use of email by board members to deliberate on an open board seat and an executive director's contract.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":91.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/meetings-via-electronic-means/39667, issued February 18, 2016.pdf","sha256":"20683ca7906c3042c95fa142439794bf43afb262cec95fdff772d098f1abf418","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["email","public business","meeting definition","board communications"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 18, 20 I 6\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Gina L. Madden\nAttorney for the Mokena Community Park District\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nGmaddenlaw@gmail.com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 39667\nDear -and Ms. Madden:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99-402, effective August 19,\n2015). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that there is insufficient\nevidence to find that Board of Commissioners for the Mokena Community Park District (Board)\nviolated OMA.\nwho is a member of the Board,\nOn January 18, 2016\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that the Board President conducted public business via\ne-mail with the entire Board on two subjects-an open Board seat and the Executive Director's\ncontract-�lying with the procedural requirements of OMA. In support of this\nallegation-provided copies of e-mail communications between Board members. On\nJanuary 27, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and\nrequested it to provide a detailed explanation of how the Board considered the two subject\nmatters at issue and to address whether any gathering of Board members by electronic means on\nor about January 15, 2016, was a \"meeting\" as defined by section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2014)). This office also requested copies of all e-mail correspondence related to\nthese matters, including but not limited to, correspondence between and among Board members.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\nI 001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMs. Gina L. Madden\nFebruary 18, 2016\nPage 2\n\nOn February 5, 2016, counsel for the Board submitted a written response to this\noffice together with relevant e-mails. The Board described that the Board President had sent an\ne-mail to all Board members on January 15, 2016, at 4:55 p.m. requesting that the members\nsubmit a list of three recommended candidates for the open Board seat and that the e-mail\ninstructed the Board members to \"cc all commissioners.\"' The Board contended that the \"email\nwas sent to all Commissioners in an effort to remain transparent and share as much information\nwith the entire Board as possible in order to avoid any appearances of favoritism during this\nselection process.\" 2 The Board provided copies of two e-mails from Board members responding\nto the President's original e-mail which had been sent on January 15, 2016, at 4:55 p.m. The first\ne-mail response was sent to the entire Board on January 15, 2016, at 6:16 p.m. The other e-mail\nwas sent to the entire Board on January 18, 2016, at 10:40 a.m. Both e-mails listed only three\nnames without any comment or other text. The Board argued that these e-mails did not\nconstitute a \"contemporaneous interactive communication\" as defined by OMA because they\ntook place over a three-day period. With respect to the Executive Director's contract, the Board\nasserted that no Board members responded to the e-mails between the Board President and\ncounsel for the Board, even though they were copied on the messages.\nThis office forwar� the Board's response t�on February\n11, 2016. On February 15, 2016-replied.\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act\n99-78, effective July 20, 2015; 99-235, effective January I, 2016; 99-480, effective September 9,\n2015) provides that \"all meetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in\nsubsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1.02 of OMA defines a\n\"public meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication,\nof a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member\n'Letter from Gina L. Madden to Neil P. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n(February 5, 2016), at I.\n2\n\nLetter from Gina L. Madden to Neil P. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n(February 5, 2016), at I.\n\n\fMs. Gina L. Madden\nFebruary 18, 2016\nPage 3\n\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business. (Emphasis added.)\nUnder this statutory definition, a \"meeting\" may include communications through\ne-mail or other electronic means. The full Board is comprised of seven members, although six\nmembers served on the Board at the relevant time period because of a vacant seat. Accordingly,\nunder either the measure of the full seven-member Board or the existing six-member Board, four\nBoard members comprise a quorum, and a majority of the quorum is three members. Therefore,\ncontemporaneous, interactive e-mail or other electronic communications involving at least three\nmembers of the Board which concern \"public business\" would ordinarily constitute a meeting of\nthe Board which would be subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of OMA.\nIn previous determinations with similar circumstances in which one member of a\npublic body solicited feedback on public business from other members via e-mail, the Public\nAccess Bureau has noted that \"Illinois' appellate courts have not yet been called upon to decide\nhow close in time electronic communications must be in order to be 'contemporaneous,' for\npurposes of OMA; nor does the legislative history of the statutory language provide any\nguidance in defining 'contemporaneous.\"' Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18676, issued\nSeptember 9, 2013, at 3 (quoting Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. 17172, issued September 7,\n2012, at 3). In those matters, this office determined that we could not conclude that e-mails sent\nover a period of hours or longer were \"contemporaneous\" as a matter oflaw. Likewise, the e­\nmails relating to the vacant Board seat are also separated by more than an hour, in the case of\none, and more than two days, in the case of the other. Therefore, given the significant time\nperiods between the three e-mails, we cannot conclude that those e-mails constituted\n\"contemporaneous interactive communication\" among a majority of a quorum of the Board.\nSimilarly, with respect to the e-mails regarding the Executive Director contract, no Board\nmember responded to e-mails between the Board President and counsel for the Board.\nTherefore, based on the available information, there was no \"contemporaneous interactive\ncommunication\" between any of the Board members on that subject. Accordingly, there is\ninsufficient evidence from which this office can conclude that the Board violated OMA.\nAlthough we recognize that it is sometimes expedient for members of a public\nbody to communicate with one another between meetings, e-mails concerning public business\nwhich are sent to or received by a majority of a quorum skirt the purpose of OMA, 3 and have the\npotential to violate OMA. We therefore caution the members of the Board to be mindful of the\nrequirements ofOMA, as well as the public policy favoring the open discussion of matters\naffecting the public interest, before engaging in such e-mail communications.\n'Section I of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014)) provides that \"is is the intent of this Act to\nensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\n\fMs. Gina L. Madden\nFebruary 18, 2016\nPage4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at nolson@atg.state.il.us or (217) 782-9078.\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n39667 o 2a meeting proper pkd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Board members' emails on a board seat and contract","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-39667/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 18, 20 I 6\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Gina L. Madden\nAttorney for the Mokena Community Park District\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nGmaddenlaw@gmail.com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 39667\nDear -and Ms. Madden:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99-402, effective August 19,\n2015). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that there is insufficient\nevidence to find that Board of Commissioners for the Mokena Community Park District (Board)\nviolated OMA.\nwho is a member of the Board,\nOn January 18, 2016\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that the Board President conducted public business via\ne-mail with the entire Board on two subjects-an open Board seat and the Executive Director's\ncontract-�lying with the procedural requirements of OMA. In support of this\nallegation-provided copies of e-mail communications between Board members. On\nJanuary 27, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and\nrequested it to provide a detailed explanation of how the Board considered the two subject\nmatters at issue and to address whether any gathering of Board members by electronic means on\nor about January 15, 2016, was a \"meeting\" as defined by section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2014)). This office also requested copies of all e-mail correspondence related to\nthese matters, including but not limited to, correspondence between and among Board members.\n\nOn February 5, 2016, counsel for the Board submitted a written response to this\noffice together with relevant e-mails. The Board described that the Board President had sent an\ne-mail to all Board members on January 15, 2016, at 4:55 p.m. requesting that the members\nsubmit a list of three recommended candidates for the open Board seat and that the e-mail\ninstructed the Board members to \"cc all commissioners.\"' The Board contended that the \"email\nwas sent to all Commissioners in an effort to remain transparent and share as much information\nwith the entire Board as possible in order to avoid any appearances of favoritism during this\nselection process.\" 2 The Board provided copies of two e-mails from Board members responding\nto the President's original e-mail which had been sent on January 15, 2016, at 4:55 p.m. The first\ne-mail response was sent to the entire Board on January 15, 2016, at 6:16 p.m. The other e-mail\nwas sent to the entire Board on January 18, 2016, at 10:40 a.m. Both e-mails listed only three\nnames without any comment or other text. The Board argued that these e-mails did not\nconstitute a \"contemporaneous interactive communication\" as defined by OMA because they\ntook place over a three-day period. With respect to the Executive Director's contract, the Board\nasserted that no Board members responded to the e-mails between the Board President and\ncounsel for the Board, even though they were copied on the messages.\nThis office forwar� the Board's response t�on February\n11, 2016. On February 15, 2016-replied.\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act\n99-78, effective July 20, 2015; 99-235, effective January I, 2016; 99-480, effective September 9,\n2015) provides that \"all meetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in\nsubsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1.02 of OMA defines a\n\"public meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication,\nof a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member\n'Letter from Gina L. Madden to Neil P. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n(February 5, 2016), at I.\n2\n\nLetter from Gina L. Madden to Neil P. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business. (Emphasis added.)\nUnder this statutory definition, a \"meeting\" may include communications through\ne-mail or other electronic means. The full Board is comprised of seven members, although six\nmembers served on the Board at the relevant time period because of a vacant seat. Accordingly,\nunder either the measure of the full seven-member Board or the existing six-member Board, four\nBoard members comprise a quorum, and a majority of the quorum is three members. Therefore,\ncontemporaneous, interactive e-mail or other electronic communications involving at least three\nmembers of the Board which concern \"public business\" would ordinarily constitute a meeting of\nthe Board which would be subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of OMA.\nIn previous determinations with similar circumstances in which one member of a\npublic body solicited feedback on public business from other members via e-mail, the Public\nAccess Bureau has noted that \"Illinois' appellate courts have not yet been called upon to decide\nhow close in time electronic communications must be in order to be 'contemporaneous,' for\npurposes of OMA; nor does the legislative history of the statutory language provide any\nguidance in defining 'contemporaneous.\"' Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18676, issued\nSeptember 9, 2013, at 3 (quoting Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. 17172, issued September 7,\n2012, at 3). In those matters, this office determined that we could not conclude that e-mails sent\nover a period of hours or longer were \"contemporaneous\" as a matter oflaw. Likewise, the e­\nmails relating to the vacant Board seat are also separated by more than an hour, in the case of\none, and more than two days, in the case of the other. Therefore, given the significant time\nperiods between the three e-mails, we cannot conclude that those e-mails constituted\n\"contemporaneous interactive communication\" among a majority of a quorum of the Board.\nSimilarly, with respect to the e-mails regarding the Executive Director contract, no Board\nmember responded to e-mails between the Board President and counsel for the Board.\nTherefore, based on the available information, there was no \"contemporaneous interactive\ncommunication\" between any of the Board members on that subject. Accordingly, there is\ninsufficient evidence from which this office can conclude that the Board violated OMA.\nAlthough we recognize that it is sometimes expedient for members of a public\nbody to communicate with one another between meetings, e-mails concerning public business\nwhich are sent to or received by a majority of a quorum skirt the purpose of OMA, 3 and have the\npotential to violate OMA. We therefore caution the members of the Board to be mindful of the\nrequirements ofOMA, as well as the public policy favoring the open discussion of matters\naffecting the public interest, before engaging in such e-mail communications.\n'Section I of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014)) provides that \"is is the intent of this Act to\nensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\nMs. Gina L. Madden\nFebruary 18, 2016\nPage4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at nolson@atg.state.il.us or (217) 782-9078.\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n39667 o 2a meeting proper pkd"}
{"id":1168,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-07-31","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["39850"],"title":"Neoga School District partially violated OMA by failing to post meeting schedule and January 2016 notice","filename":"39850, issued July 31, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2324,"summary":"The PAC investigated allegations that the Neoga Community Unit School District No. 3 failed to properly post meeting notices, annual meeting schedules, and employee compensation information. The PAC determined the District violated OMA regarding meeting notices and schedules but complied with requirements regarding compensation disclosures.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board failed to properly post meeting notices and an annual meeting schedule, and did not post required employee compensation information. The Attorney General's office found that the board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to post an annual schedule of regular meetings, but did not violate the Act regarding the posting of IMRF compensation information. The office also found that the board violated the Act in connection with posting notice of its January 20, 2016, meeting on its website, but determined no further action was needed because the error was corrected.","holding":"The Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to post an annual schedule of regular meetings and in connection with posting notice of its January 20, 2016, meeting on its website, but did not violate the Act regarding the posting of IMRF compensation information.","legal_question":"Did the school district violate the Open Meetings Act by failing to post meeting notices, annual meeting schedules, and IMRF compensation information on its website?","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02","5 ILCS 120/2.03"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Neoga Community Unit School District No. 3","requesting_party":"Mr. Kirk Allen","pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The adequacy of the school district's website postings for meeting agendas, annual meeting schedules, and employee compensation.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_a/Posting-agendas-for-regular-and-special-meetings,-contents-of-discussion/39850, issued July 31, 2017.pdf","sha256":"5cc103e4553830c9261973e1d1aa06dcb5cefda805ff609b8c52d3f9dfe3baef","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","school district","transparency","annual schedule","compensation"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\nSTATE\n\nGENERAL\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nA r1ORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 31, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Kirk Allen\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks.com\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Elizabeth Pressler, Ph. D.\nPart- time Superintendent\n\nNeoga Community Unit School District 143\nP. O. Box 280\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nepressler@neogacusd3.\n\nnet\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ben Johnson\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal\n\nNeoga Community Unit School District 43\nP. O. Box 280\nNeoga, Illinois 62447\nbjohnson@neogacusd3.\n\nRE:\n\nnet\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 39850\n\nDear Mr. Allen, Ms. Pressler, and Mr. Johnson:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education ( Board) of Neoga Community Unit School\nDistrict No. 3( District) violated the requirements of OMA in connection with posting notice of\nits January 20, 2016, meeting on its website and posting an annual schedule of its regular\nmeetings, but did not violate OMA with regard to posting Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund\nIMRF) compensation information.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\n100 West Randolph\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nStreet- Chicago,\n\nIllinois, 60601 • (\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale. Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMs. Elizabeth\n\nPressler\n\nMr. Ben Johnson\n\nJuly 31, 2017\nPage 2\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn January 27, 2016, Mr. Kirk Allen submitted a Request for Review to the\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that the Board posted the agenda for its January 20, 2016, special\nmeeting on its website less than 48 hours in advance of the meeting. He also alleged that while\n\nnotice for the meeting was posted at the Board's principal office, it was not posted at the building\nwhere the meeting was held. Mr. Allen further alleged that the Board' s website lacked both a\nschedule of regular meetings and compensation information for employees with total\n\ncompensation packages exceeding $ 75, 000.\n\nOn February 8, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Board and asked it to provide a written response to Mr. Allen's allegations. This office also\n\nasked the Board to clarify whether the District's website was maintained by a full- time District\nstaff, and to provide a copy of any notice that was posted. On February 23, 2016, this office\n\nreceived the requested materials. That same day, this office forwarded a copy of the Board' s\nresponse to Mr. Allen; he replied on February 29, 2016.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is the \" public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). \"\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d 161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\nMeeting Notice\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where the\n\nmeeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthe meeting. * * *\nPublic notice of any special meeting * * *\nshall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which\nnotice shall also include the agenda for the special,\nrescheduled,\n\nor\n\nreconvened\n\nmeeting[.) (\n\nEmphasis\n\nadded.)\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMs. Elizabeth Pressler\nMr. Ben Johnson\n\nJuly 31, 2017\nPage 3\n\nAdditionally, section 2. 02( 6) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides:\n\nPublic notice shall be given by posting a copy of the notice\nat the principal office of the body holding the meeting or, if no\nsuch office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be\nheld. In addition, a public body that has a website that the fulltime staff of the public body maintains shall post notice on its\n\nwebsite of all meetings of the governing body of the public body.\nEmphasis added.)\n\nSection 2. 02( c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) further provides that \"[ t] he public\n\nbody conducting a public meeting shall ensure that at least one copy of any requested notice and\nagenda for the meeting is continuously available for public review during the entire 48- hour\nperiod preceding the meeting.\"\n\nIn his Request for Review, Mr. Allen stated that the January 20, 2016, meeting\nwas a special meeting and that the Board failed to post the agenda at the location of the meeting\nat least 48 hours before the meeting began. Under the plain language of section 2. 02( a) of OMA,\nthe requirement that the agenda be posted at both the public body' s principal office and the\nmeeting location applies only to regular meetings; under sections 2. 02( a) and 2. 02( 6), the agenda\nfor a special meeting only needs to be posted at a public body' s principal office. 111. Att' y Gen.\nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18425, issued August 2, 2012, at 2. Because Mr. Allen acknowledged that\nthe agenda was posted at the Board's principal office, the Board did not fail to post physical\n\nnotice of the meeting in accordance with OMA. Although Mr. Allen claimed in his reply that\nthis agenda was not continuously available in accordance with section 2. 02( c) because \" the\nlocation is not lighted and\n\nyou cannot\n\nview what\n\nis posted\n\nwhen\n\nit is dark out[,]\"\n\nI\n\nposting the\n\nagenda on the front door of a public body' s principal office is sufficient to provide notice of a\nspecial meeting.\n\nWith respect to posting notice of the January 20, 2016, special meeting on its\nwebsite, the Board first confirmed that its website was maintained by full-time staff, signifying\nthat it was required to post notice of the meeting on its website. The Board then explained that\nthe agenda was posted on the District' s website on January 18, 2016, at approximately 5: 00 p.m.,\nbut that when Mr. Allen contacted the District on January 19, 2016, and stated that he could not\nlocate the agenda on the website, the employee who posts the agendas \" took a look at the website\n\nE- mail from Kirk Allen\n\nto [ Public\n\nAccess Bureau] ( February 29, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\n\nMs. Elizabeth Pressler\nMr. Ben Johnson\n\nJuly 31, 2017\nPage 4\n\nand discovered that on the day prior, January 18, 2016, she had clicked on the wrong tab and\ninadvertently\n\nposted\n\nthe meeting\n\nnotice\n\nunder\n\nthe wrong\n\nheading on the website.\"\n\n2\n\nSpecifically,\n\nshe had posted the agenda on the website' s \" Board of Education Meeting Archives\" section\n\nrather than the \" Board of Education Meeting\" section. 3 The Board stated that the mistake was\npromptly corrected and that \"[ s] ince discovering [ the] error on the morning of the 19th, the\ndistrict technologist — Alicia Kessler — rearranged the tabs to make it less likely that such an error\nmight occur in the future.i4 Mr. Allen replied, in pertinent part: \" I appreciate the matter has\n\nbeen addressed and corrected so that future meeting notices are property shared with the\npublic.\" 5\nWhile OMA does not specify where on a website an agenda must be posted, the\npublic policy underlying OMA is to provide \" advance notice of and the right to attend all\nmeetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS\n120/ 1 ( West 2016).\n\nHere, a member of the public could not have been expected to check the\n\narchives section of a public body' s website for information about future scheduled meetings.\n\nNonetheless, the available information indicates that the initial posting of the agenda in an\ninapplicable portion of the website was unintentional and that the Board corrected the error.\n\nAdditionally, the revisions to the layout of the Board' s website may help to prevent future\nmisplaced postings. In light of these corrective measures, this office has determined that no\n\nfurther action is required to remedy this violation.\nAnnual Schedule of Regular Meetings\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA provides: \"\n\nEvery public body shall give public notice of\n\nthe schedule of regular meetings at the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state\nthe regular dates, times, and places of such meetings.\"\n\nLikewise, section 2. 03 of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 03 ( West 2016)) provides that \" each body subject to this Act must, at the beginning of\neach calendar or fiscal year, prepare and make available a schedule of all its regular meetings for\n\nsuch calendar or fiscal year, listing the times and places of such meetings.\"\n\n2Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 ( February 22, 2016), at 1.\n\n3Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 ( February 22, 2016), at 1.\nLetter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\n\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.-Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD#3 ( February 22, 2016), at 1.\nE- mail from Kirk Allen to [ Public Access Bureau] ( February 29, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMs. Elizabeth Pressler\nMr. Ben Johnson\n\nJuly 31, 2017\nPage 5\n\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that it had maintained \" a\n\nrunning record\" of its regular meeting dates rather than posting a schedule of its regular meetings\n\nat the beginning of the calendar or fiscal year. 6 The Board stated that the pertinent employees\nwere directed to post the regular board meeting schedule that was approved on June 11, 2015\nfor the 2015- 2016 school year, as well as all future approved regular board meeting schedules in\n\norder that the District meet the intent of the law.\" 7 Because it is undisputed that the Board had\nnot given public notice of its schedule of regular meetings at the beginning of the calendar or\nfiscal year, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 02( a) of OMA. However,\n\ngiven that the Board subsequently posted its annual regular meetings schedule on its website8\nand communicated with the employees who maintain the website about OMA' s posting\nrequirements, no further corrective action is warranted\nSection 7.3( a) of OMA\nSection 7. 3( a) of OMA ( 5 TLCS 120/ 7. 3( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nWithin 6 business days after an employer participating in\nIMRF] approves a budget, that employer must post on its website\n\nthe total compensation package for each employee having a total\ncompensation\n\npackage\n\nthat exceeds $ 75, 000\n\nper year. * * *\n\nIf an\n\nemployer maintains a website, it may choose to post a physical\ncopy of this information at the principal office of the employer in\n\nlieu of posting the information directly on the website; however,\nthe employer must post directions on the website on how to access\nthat information.\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated:\n\n6Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 ( February 22, 2016), at 2.\nLetter from Elizabeth\n\nPressler,\n\nPart- time Superintendent,\n\nNeoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\n\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 ( February 22, 2016), at 2.\n\n8The Board included with its written response a snapshot of its current website to illustrate that an\nannual\n\nregular meeting schedule\n\nis now posted.\n\n\fr.Kirk Allen\n\nMs. Elizabeth Pressler\nMr. Ben Johnson\n\nJuly 31, 2017\nPage 6\n\nThe District's practice has been to publish all salaries and benefits\n\nfor all licensed employees, including those IMRF employees\n\nearning in excess of $75, 000 per year. At this time the District does\nnot employ any IMRF employee earning in excess of $75, 000;\n\ntherefore, no posting of this category was necessary. i91\nMr. Allen replied:\n\nAfter review, I do find the salary information posted.\nAlthough I did not see it before I cannot state it was not there for\n\nsure during my first review. I concur the posting applies to IMRF\nbenefits and the school district confirms they have no [ personnel]\n\nmeeting the requirements for posting. 1101\nThe available information indicates that total compensation packages for all\n\nDistrict employees were posted on the District' s website. Accordingly, this office concludes that\nthe Board did not violate section 7. 3( a) of OMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n39850 o 202 notice proper improper 73 posting proper sd\n\n9Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 ( February 22, 2016), at 2.\n10E - mail from Kirk Allen to [ Public Access Bureau] ( February 29, 2016).\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school district's website postings for meeting agendas and schedules","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-39850/","full_text":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\nSTATE\n\nGENERAL\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nA r1ORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 31, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Kirk Allen\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks.com\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Elizabeth Pressler, Ph. D.\nPart- time Superintendent\n\nNeoga Community Unit School District 143\nP. O. Box 280\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nepressler@neogacusd3.\n\nnet\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ben Johnson\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal\n\nNeoga Community Unit School District 43\nP. O. Box 280\nNeoga, Illinois 62447\nbjohnson@neogacusd3.\n\nRE:\n\nnet\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 39850\n\nDear Mr. Allen, Ms. Pressler, and Mr. Johnson:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education (Board) of Neoga Community Unit School\nDistrict No. 3(District) violated the requirements of OMA in connection with posting notice of\nits January 20, 2016, meeting on its website and posting an annual schedule of its regular\nmeetings, but did not violate OMA with regard to posting Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund\nIMRF) compensation information.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn January 27, 2016, Mr. Kirk Allen submitted a Request for Review to the\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that the Board posted the agenda for its January 20, 2016, special\nmeeting on its website less than 48 hours in advance of the meeting. He also alleged that while\n\nnotice for the meeting was posted at the Board's principal office, it was not posted at the building\nwhere the meeting was held. Mr. Allen further alleged that the Board's website lacked both a\nschedule of regular meetings and compensation information for employees with total\n\ncompensation packages exceeding $ 75, 000.\n\nOn February 8, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Board and asked it to provide a written response to Mr. Allen's allegations. This office also\n\nasked the Board to clarify whether the District's website was maintained by a full- time District\nstaff, and to provide a copy of any notice that was posted. On February 23, 2016, this office\n\nreceived the requested materials. That same day, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's\nresponse to Mr. Allen; he replied on February 29, 2016.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is the \" public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). \"\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d 161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\nMeeting Notice\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where the\n\nmeeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthe meeting. * * *\nPublic notice of any special meeting * * *\nshall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which\nnotice shall also include the agenda for the special,\nrescheduled,\n\nor\n\nAdditionally, section 2. 02(6) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides:\n\nPublic notice shall be given by posting a copy of the notice\nat the principal office of the body holding the meeting or, if no\nsuch office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be\nheld. In addition, a public body that has a website that the fulltime staff of the public body maintains shall post notice on its\n\nwebsite of all meetings of the governing body of the public body.\nEmphasis added.)\n\nSection 2. 02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) further provides that \"[ t] he public\n\nbody conducting a public meeting shall ensure that at least one copy of any requested notice and\nagenda for the meeting is continuously available for public review during the entire 48- hour\nperiod preceding the meeting.\"\n\nIn his Request for Review, Mr. Allen stated that the January 20, 2016, meeting\nwas a special meeting and that the Board failed to post the agenda at the location of the meeting\nat least 48 hours before the meeting began. Under the plain language of section 2. 02(a) of OMA,\nthe requirement that the agenda be posted at both the public body's principal office and the\nmeeting location applies only to regular meetings; under sections 2. 02(a) and 2. 02(6), the agenda\nfor a special meeting only needs to be posted at a public body's principal office. 111. Att' y Gen.\nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18425, issued August 2, 2012, at 2. Because Mr. Allen acknowledged that\nthe agenda was posted at the Board's principal office, the Board did not fail to post physical\n\nnotice of the meeting in accordance with OMA. Although Mr. Allen claimed in his reply that\nthis agenda was not continuously available in accordance with section 2. 02(c) because \" the\nlocation is not lighted and\n\nyou cannot\n\nview what\n\nis posted\n\nwhen\n\nit is dark out[,]\"\n\nI\n\nposting the\n\nagenda on the front door of a public body's principal office is sufficient to provide notice of a\nspecial meeting.\n\nWith respect to posting notice of the January 20, 2016, special meeting on its\nwebsite, the Board first confirmed that its website was maintained by full-time staff, signifying\nthat it was required to post notice of the meeting on its website. The Board then explained that\nthe agenda was posted on the District's website on January 18, 2016, at approximately 5: 00 p.m.,\nbut that when Mr. Allen contacted the District on January 19, 2016, and stated that he could not\nlocate the agenda on the website, the employee who posts the agendas \" took a look at the website\n\nand discovered that on the day prior, January 18, 2016, she had clicked on the wrong tab and\ninadvertently\n\nposted\n\nthe meeting\n\nnotice\n\nunder\n\nthe wrong\n\nheading on the website.\"\n\n2\n\nSpecifically,\n\nshe had posted the agenda on the website's \" Board of Education Meeting Archives\" section\n\nrather than the \" Board of Education Meeting\" section. 3 The Board stated that the mistake was\npromptly corrected and that \"[ s] ince discovering [ the] error on the morning of the 19th, the\ndistrict technologist — Alicia Kessler — rearranged the tabs to make it less likely that such an error\nmight occur in the future.i4 Mr. Allen replied, in pertinent part: \" I appreciate the matter has\n\nbeen addressed and corrected so that future meeting notices are property shared with the\npublic.\" 5\nWhile OMA does not specify where on a website an agenda must be posted, the\npublic policy underlying OMA is to provide \" advance notice of and the right to attend all\nmeetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS\n120/ 1 (West 2016).\n\nHere, a member of the public could not have been expected to check the\n\narchives section of a public body's website for information about future scheduled meetings.\n\nNonetheless, the available information indicates that the initial posting of the agenda in an\ninapplicable portion of the website was unintentional and that the Board corrected the error.\n\nAdditionally, the revisions to the layout of the Board's website may help to prevent future\nmisplaced postings. In light of these corrective measures, this office has determined that no\n\nfurther action is required to remedy this violation.\nAnnual Schedule of Regular Meetings\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA provides: \"\n\nEvery public body shall give public notice of\n\nthe schedule of regular meetings at the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state\nthe regular dates, times, and places of such meetings.\"\n\nLikewise, section 2. 03 of OMA (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 03 (West 2016)) provides that \" each body subject to this Act must, at the beginning of\neach calendar or fiscal year, prepare and make available a schedule of all its regular meetings for\n\nsuch calendar or fiscal year, listing the times and places of such meetings.\"\n\n2 Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 (February 22, 2016), at 1.\n\n3 Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 (February 22, 2016), at 1.\n\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that it had maintained \" a\n\nrunning record\" of its regular meeting dates rather than posting a schedule of its regular meetings\n\nat the beginning of the calendar or fiscal year. 6 The Board stated that the pertinent employees\nwere directed to post the regular board meeting schedule that was approved on June 11, 2015\nfor the 2015- 2016 school year, as well as all future approved regular board meeting schedules in\n\norder that the District meet the intent of the law.\" 7 Because it is undisputed that the Board had\nnot given public notice of its schedule of regular meetings at the beginning of the calendar or\nfiscal year, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 02(a) of OMA. However,\n\ngiven that the Board subsequently posted its annual regular meetings schedule on its website8\nand communicated with the employees who maintain the website about OMA's posting\nrequirements, no further corrective action is warranted\nSection 7.3(a) of OMA\nSection 7. 3(a) of OMA (5 TLCS 120/ 7. 3(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nWithin 6 business days after an employer participating in\nIMRF] approves a budget, that employer must post on its website\n\nthe total compensation package for each employee having a total\ncompensation\n\npackage\n\nthat exceeds $ 75, 000\n\nper year. * * *\n\nIf an\n\nemployer maintains a website, it may choose to post a physical\ncopy of this information at the principal office of the employer in\n\nlieu of posting the information directly on the website; however,\nthe employer must post directions on the website on how to access\nthat information.\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated:\n\n6 Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 (February 22, 2016), at 2.\nLetter from Elizabeth\n\nPressler,\n\nPart- time Superintendent,\n\nNeoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\n\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 (February 22, 2016), at 2.\n\n8 The Board included with its written response a snapshot of its current website to illustrate that an\n\nThe District's practice has been to publish all salaries and benefits\n\nfor all licensed employees, including those IMRF employees\n\nearning in excess of $75, 000 per year. At this time the District does\nnot employ any IMRF employee earning in excess of $75, 000;\n\ntherefore, no posting of this category was necessary. i91\nMr. Allen replied:\n\nAfter review, I do find the salary information posted.\nAlthough I did not see it before I cannot state it was not there for\n\nsure during my first review. I concur the posting applies to IMRF\nbenefits and the school district confirms they have no [ personnel]\n\nmeeting the requirements for posting. 1101\nThe available information indicates that total compensation packages for all\n\nDistrict employees were posted on the District's website. Accordingly, this office concludes that\nthe Board did not violate section 7. 3(a) of OMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n39850 o 202 notice proper improper 73 posting proper sd\n\n9 Letter from Elizabeth Pressler, Part- time Superintendent, Neoga CUSD# 3, and Ben Johnson,\nAssistant Superintendent/ Jr.- Sr. High Principal, Neoga CUSD# 3 (February 22, 2016), at 2.\n10E - mail from Kirk Allen to [ Public Access Bureau] (February 29, 2016)."}
{"id":1170,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-12-19","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["40515"],"title":"St. Clair County Board violated OMA by taking action on vague agenda items","filename":"40515, issued December 19, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3181,"summary":"The PAC investigated a complaint that the St. Clair County Board of Trustees took final action on eight resolutions without providing sufficient notice or public explanation. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to describe the general subject matter of the resolutions on its agenda and failing to provide a sufficient public recital of the matters being considered.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the St. Clair County Board voted on eight resolutions without telling the public what those resolutions were about. The Attorney General's office agreed, finding that the Board's agenda was too vague and that they did not explain the business being conducted during the meeting. The Board was advised to improve its future meeting practices to ensure the public is properly informed.","holding":"The St. Clair County Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by taking final action on resolutions without providing adequate notice of their subject matter or a sufficient public recital during the meeting.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act by taking final action on resolutions identified only by number without describing the general subject matter on the agenda or providing a public recital of the matters being considered.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(e)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"St. Clair County Board of Trustees","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The adequacy of agenda descriptions and public recitals for final actions taken on resolutions during a public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_e/Public-recital-requirement/40515, issued December 19, 2017.pdf","sha256":"5a4c7f1834d3665c2b60ba3c9f75f2beaa963653a9440bd5f0792ad3a8bcdbb3","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting agenda","public notice","final action","Open Meetings Act","transparency"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember\n\nVia electronic\n\n19, 2017\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\n\nThe Honorable Mark Kern, Chairman\n\nSt. Clair County State' s Attorney\n\nSt. Clair County Board of Trustees\n\n10 Public Square\n\n10 Public\n\nSquare\n\nBelleville, Illinois 62220\n\nBelleville, Illinois 62220\n\nbrendan. kelly@co. st- clair. il. us\n\nmkern@co. st- clair. il. us\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 40515\n\nDear\n\nMr. Kelly, and Mr. Kern:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Board of Trustees of St. Clair County ( Board) violated OMA during its\nFebruary 29, 2016, Board meeting by taking final action on eight resolutions without having\ndescribed the general subject matter of each resolution on its agenda, and by failing to provide\nsufficient public recital of the nature of the matters being considered in connection with those\nvotes.\n\nOn February 29, 2016,\nthat\n\nfiled a Request for Review alleging\n\nduring the Board meeting earlier that evening,\n\nthe Board: (\n\n1) took final action to approve\n\neight resolutions that were identified on the agenda only by resolution number; and ( 2) did not\n\ninform the public of the nature of these resolutions prior to voting during the meeting. On March\n11, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and requested that it\nprovide a detailed written response to the allegations together with copies of the agenda, minutes,\n\nand any recording of its February 29, 2016, meeting. On April 11, 2016, the Public Access\nBureau received 165 pages of records from the Board, including a copy of its agenda, but not the\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n1001\n\nFact\n\nMain\n\nCarbondale\n\nMinnie\n\n6) 001 .\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n312) 814- 3000 •\nI s\\\n\ncoo_< nnn .\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\nrc\n\ncan\n\nAnna.\n\nc..,..\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\nt<\n\nicn\n\ncnn\n\nccic\n\n\fThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\nThe Honorable Mark Kern\nDecember 19, 2017\nPage 2\n\nrequested minutes.'\n\nThe Board also provided a letter in response to the Request for Review. On\n\nMay 27, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Board' s response letter to\n\nhe\n\ndid not reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe public policy of this State, as declared in section 1 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1\nWest 2016)), is that \" public bodies exist to aid in the conduct of the people' s business and that\nthe people have a right to be informed as to the conduct of their business.\"\nSection 2. 02( c) of OMA\n\nSection 2. 02( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nagenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\nordinance that will\n\nbe the subject of final action at the meeting.\" (\n\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThe Senate\n\ndebate on House Bill No. 4687, which was enacted as Public Act 97- 827, effective January 1,\n2013, adding section 2. 02( c) of OMA, indicates that the General Assembly intended this\nprovision to ensure that agendas provide sufficiently descriptive advance notice of the matters\nupon which a public body anticipates taking final action:\nT] here was just no real requirement as to how specific [ public\n\nbodies] needed to be to the public of what they were going to\ndiscuss that would be final action. And this just says that you have\nto have\n\ngeneral notice if you' re going to have and take final\naction, as to generally what's going to be discussed so that —that\na * * *\n\npeople who follow their units of local government know what\n\nthey' re going to be acting upon. Remarks of Sen. Dillard, May 16,\n2012, Senate Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at 47.\nIn his Request for Review,\n\nalleged that the Board violated OMA\n\nby failing to set forth the general subject matter of the following eight resolutions listed on its\nFebruary 29, 2016, meeting agenda under item 9.f.:\n9.\n\nCommittee Reports\n\nThis office obtained a copy of the February 29, 2016, Board minutes from the St. Clair County\nwebsite at: http:// co. st- clair. il. us/ government/ openMeetings/ meetings/ Documents/ 2016/ February/ countyBoard2- 2916. pdf (last visited September 9, 2017).\n\n\fThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\nThe Honorable Mark Kern\nDecember\n\n19, 2017\n\nPage 3\n\nf.\n\nTransportation\n1.\n\nCommittee:\n\nRes. # 2141 - 16 - RT through # 2148- 16-\n\nRT[.] I21\nThe agenda provided no other information describing these resolutions. The meeting minutes\ndocument that, pursuant to this agenda item, the Board approved these eight resolutions. 3\n\nThe Board contends that the agenda was sufficient because, in addition to posting\na copy of the agenda in the county courthouse lobby and on the county' s website, the Board had\nposted a copy of each of the resolutions on the website. The Board, however, did not indicate\n\nthat it had posted copies of the resolutions in the county courthouse lobby where the agenda was\nposted. A member of the public reading the agenda in the courthouse lobby would have had no\ninformation describing the general subject matter of the Transportation Committee resolutions on\n\nwhich the Board would be voting during the meeting. Although posting copies of the resolutions\non the county website is commendable and does increase transparency, because the agenda itself\ndid not identify the general subject matter of these final actions, this office concludes that the\nBoard violated\n\nsection\n\n2. 02( c) of OMA.\n\nFurther, the Board did not provide any support for the assertion that an agenda\nposted on a public body' s website need not set forth the general subject matter of a resolution on\n\nwhich the public body intends to vote during the meeting as long as a copy of the resolution is\nalso posted on the public body' s website. In the case cited by the Board, Board of Education of\nSpringfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General ofIllinois, 2015 IL App (4th) 140941,\n44 N. E. 3d 1245 ( 2015), affd, 2017 IL 120343, 77 N. E. 3d 625 ( 2017), the court discussed that a\n\ncopy of the resolution at issue was posted on the public body' s website together with the agenda,\nbut the issue before the court was the sufficiency of that Board' s public recital, as required by\nsection 2( e) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( e) ( West 2012)), before it took final action, rather than the\n\nnotice required by section 2. 02( c) to be on the agenda. See Springfield School District, 2015 IL\nApp ( 4th) 140941, ¶ 36, 44 N. E. 3d at 1252. Further, the agenda item at issue in that case,\nApproval of a Resolution regarding the * * *\n\nAgreement * * *\n\nbetween * * *\n\nMilton and the\n\nBoard,\" identified the general subject matter of that final action. See Springfield School District,\n\n2015 IL App ( 4th) 140941, ¶ 39, 44 N. E. 3d at 1252. Because the plain language of section\n2. 02( c) requires the agenda itself to set forth the general subject matter of each item on which the\n\n2St. Clair County Board, Agenda Item 9. f, Transportation Committee: Res # 2141 - 16 -RT through\n2148 -16 -RT ( February 29, 2016).\n3St. Clair County Board, Meeting, February 29, 2016, Minutes 10- 13.\n\n\fThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\nThe Honorable Mark Kern\nDecember 19, 2017\nPage 4\n\npublic body intends to take final action, and because the agenda posted on the county' s website\ndid not do so here, the Board violated section 2. 02( c) of OMA.°\n\nTo prevent further violations of OMA, the Board should list on its meeting\nagendas the general subject matter of each resolution to be considered for final action, rather than\nmerely\n\nusing resolution\n\nnumbers.\n\nSection 2( e) of OMA\n\nSection 2( e) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( e) ( West 2015 Supp.)) provides that \"[ f]inal\n\naction shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other\ninformation that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\nIn Springfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 64. 77 N.E.3d at 636, the Court\nheld that \" under section 2( e) of the Open Meetings Act, a public recital must take place at the\n\nopen meeting before the matter is voted upon; the recital must announce the nature of the matter\n\nunder consideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular transaction or issue, but need\nnot provide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\" In that case, the school board\n\npresident had recited \"' approval of a resolution regarding the separation agreement'\n\nas well as\n\nthe text of the resolution itself: \"' The Board President recommends that the Board of Education\nof Springfield School District No. 186 vote to approve the separation agreement and release\nbetween Dr. Walter Milton, Jr., and the Board of Education.\"' Springfield School District, 2017\nIL 120343, ¶ 81, 77 N. E. 3d at 638. The Court concluded that the school board' s public recital\nwas adequate: \"\nThe Board president recited the general nature of the matter under\n\nconsideration— a separation agreement and release— and specific detail sufficient to identify the\nparticular transaction— the separation agreement was between Dr. Milton and the Board.\"\nSpringfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 83, 77 N. E. 3d at 638.\nFurther, the Court distinguished a recent decision in which the Illinois Appellate\nCourt had concluded that \"[ w] hatever the standard might be for a public recital, the Board failed\n\nto meet it in this case.\" Allen v. Clark County Park District Board of Commissioners, 2016 IL\nApp ( 4th) 150963, ¶ 31, 67 N. E. 3d 536, 541 ( 2016). As explained by the Court in Springfield\n\nSchool District, the presiding officer of the public body in Allen had only \" publicly recited the\ngeneral nature of the two matters being considered: lease rates and revised covenants. He did\nnot, however, provide sufficient other information to inform the public of the specific business\n\nbeing conducted: What type of real or personal property was being leased? What existing\n4This office also notes that it is in contravention of the public policy of the State — that the public\nbe informed regarding the conduct of the public's business —to require members of the public to review a packet\ncontaining over 100 pages\n\nof records\n\nto ascertain\n\nif there is an agenda\n\nitem of interest.\n\n\fThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\nThe Honorable Mark Kern\nDecember\n\n19, 2017\n\nPage 5\n\nbeing revised?\" Springfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 79, 77 N. E. 3d at\n638. In other words, a public body must identify both \" the general nature of the matter under\nconsideration\" and \" specific detail sufficient to identify the particular transaction\" to satisfy the\ncovenants were\n\nrequirements of section 2( e) of OMA. Springfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 83, 77\nN. E. 3d at 638.\n\nHere, there is no dispute that the Board informed the public at its February 29,\n2016, meeting that it was planning to vote to approve resolutions from its Transportation\n\nCommittee.\n\nRequest for Review asserted that simply identifying the proposed\n\naction as resolutions by the Transportation Committee was not a sufficient public recital because\nthe Board had not informed the public of either the subject matter or the general nature of each\n\nresolution.\n\nThe minutes of the February 29, 2016, meeting provide:\nA motion was made by Mr. Roy Mosley Jr., seconded by\n\nMr. C. Richard Vernier that the Highway Resolutions as submitted\nbe adopted.\n\nDiscussion ensued with questions and comments from Mr.\n\nFrank Heiligenstein regarding Jefferson Road asking the\nTransportation Committee to come up with funds to correct the\ndefects on Jefferson Road and others as there are funds for the\nFront Street project in East St. Louis. Chairman Kem responded\n\nstating that since the subsidence on Jefferson Road is now over, the\nproblems can now be addressed. Chairman Kern further advised\n\nthat Front Street project is a public private partnership and that St.\nClair County has worked to bring in federal funds, state funds, and\nfunds from the local industry in the area and there are no County\ndollars in it. Chairman Kern stated Front Street being improved\nwill open up commercial development and real estate tax revenues\n\nderived from that commercial property will certainly help St. Clair\nCounty. Mr. C. Richard Vernier commented regarding distribution\nof funds being spent.\nMotion Carried\n\non roll call\n\nas\n\nfollows:\n\n\fThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\nThe Honorable Mark Kern\nDecember 19, 2017\nPage 6\n\nThe Chairman announced that the Resolutions were\n\nadopted unanimously. 151\nAs explained above, section 2( e) requires that a public recital \" announce the\n\nnature of the matter under consideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular\ntransaction or issue, but need not provide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\"\n\nSpringfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 64, 77 N.E. 3d at 636. For example, with respect\n\nto resolution number 2141 - 16 -RT ( authorizing the Chairman of the Board to enter into a contract\nto repair Jefferson Road), at a minimum the Board was required to announce the general nature\nof the matter under consideration—\n\na contract —\n\nand provide details sufficient to identify the\n\nparticular transaction— to repair Jefferson Road. 6\nAlthough the minutes establish that the Board discussed the Front Street project,\n\nthere is no indication that the Board publicly recited the general nature of each of the three\nresolutions pertaining to Front Street with detail sufficient to identify either the general nature of\nthe matter or the particular transaction. The Board did not demonstrate that it publicly recited\nthe general subject matter of the resolutions, which provided for: a portion of Front Street to be\n\nadded to the St. Clair County highway system ( 2143 - 16 -RT); a portion of Front Street to be\ndesignated a Class 1I1 Truck Route ( 2144 - 16 -RT), and; entering into an agreement with the\nIllinois Department of Transportation ( 2145 - 16 -RT). Additionally, the minutes do not establish\n\n5St. Clair County Board, Meeting, February 29, 2016, Minutes 13. The eight resolutions were set\nforth in the minutes and are summarized\n\nas follows: (\n\n1)\n\n2141 - 16 - RT authorized\n\nthe Chairman\n\nof the Board to enter\n\ninto a contract to repair Jefferson Road with Hank' s Excavating & Landscaping, Inc.; ( 2) 2142 -I6 -RT authorized the\nChairman of the Board to enter into a contract for construction of a left turn lane from Scott -Troy Road, C. H. 61, to\n\nHilltop Drive with The Kilian Corporation; ( 3) 2143 - 16 -RT resolved that the Front Street, from Trendley Avenue to\n700 feet north of Winter Street, be added to the highway system of St. Clair County; ( 4) 2144 - 16 -RT resolved that\nFront Street, from Trendley Avenue to 700 feet north of Winter Street, be designated a Class 111 Truck Route; ( 5)\n2145 - 16 - RT authorized\n\nthe Chairman\n\nof the Board to execute the prepared\n\nagreement\n\nwith the Illinois Department\n\nof Transportation for the division of costs and maintenance responsibilities for the Front Street construction; ( 6)\n\n2146 - 16 -RT authorized the Chairman of the Board to execute the prepared agreement with the City of Fairview\nHeights which provides for the costs and maintenance responsibilities for the construction of a Relief Storm Sewer\nlocated in the Fox Creek Subdivision; ( 7) 2147 - 16 - RT authorized the Chairman of the Board to execute the prepared\n\nagreement with the Caseyville Township Sewer System for the costs and maintenance responsibilities for the\nremoval and relocation of a sanitary sewer main; ( 8) 2148 - I6 -RT authorized the Chairman of the Board to execute\nan agreement\n\nwith Oates Associates,\n\nInc. to perform the design and preparation\n\nof plans for the relocation\n\nof the\n\nsanitary sewer main.\n\nAlthough the minutes reflect a discussion in which a Board member asked the Transportation\n\nCommittee to come up with funds for defects on Jefferson Road, this appears to be a request for future funding and\nthere is no indication that this discussion related to resolution number 2141 - 16 - RT.\n\n\fThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\nThe Honorable Mark Kern\nDecember 19, 2017\nPage 7\n\nthat the Board engaged in any discussion regarding, or otherwise publicly recited the nature of,\nthe resolutions numbered 2142 - 16 -RT, 2146 -16 -RT, 2147 -16 -RT, and 2148 -16 -RT.\nThe Board maintains that because these resolutions were discussed at the\n\nTransportation Committee meeting, no further public recital was necessary at the Board meeting.\nThe Board, however, has provided no legal support for the assertion that discussing the\n\nresolutions at a separate committee meeting relieved the Board of its obligation to make a proper\npublic recital before voting to approve the resolutions. The plain language of section 2( e)\nrequires final action to \" be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being\nconsidered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\n\nIf\n\nthis requirement could be satisfied by a different public body providing a public recital at an\nearlier meeting, a public body voting on a matter would have the option of doing so without\nproviding the public with any meaningful information about the subjects of final action. Such a\nconstruction would effectively negate the requirements of section 2( e), allowing public bodies to\n\ndiscuss matters only at committee meetings, and then vote at a later meeting without providing\nany information to the public about the business being conducted. People v. Hunter, 2013 IL\n114100, ¶ 13, 986 N. E. 2d 1185, 1189 ( 2013) ( a reviewing body \" presumes that the legislature did\nintend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.\"). Accordingly. this office concludes\n\nnot\n\nthat the Board violated section 2( e) of OMA.\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions in this determination, this office requests that\nthe Board review its practices to ensure that agenda items set forth the \" general subject matter\"\n\nof any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action and that the Board provide\nsufficient public recitals under section 2( e) of OMA in the future.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor\n\nhas determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion.\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at ( 312) 814- 5201.\nVerytruly yours,\n\nIE STE\n\nBERG\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n40515\n\no 202c notice\n\nimproper 2e improper co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Agenda descriptions and public recitals for final actions on resolutions","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-40515/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember\n\nVia electronic\n\n19, 2017\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Brendan Kelly\n\nThe Honorable Mark Kern, Chairman\n\nSt. Clair County State's Attorney\n\nSt. Clair County Board of Trustees\n\n10 Public Square\n\n10 Public\n\nSquare\n\nBelleville, Illinois 62220\n\nBelleville, Illinois 62220\n\nbrendan. kelly@co. st- clair. il. us\n\nmkern@co. st- clair. il. us\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 40515\n\nDear\n\nMr. Kelly, and Mr. Kern:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Board of Trustees of St. Clair County (Board) violated OMA during its\nFebruary 29, 2016, Board meeting by taking final action on eight resolutions without having\ndescribed the general subject matter of each resolution on its agenda, and by failing to provide\nsufficient public recital of the nature of the matters being considered in connection with those\nvotes.\n\nOn February 29, 2016,\nthat\n\nfiled a Request for Review alleging\n\nduring the Board meeting earlier that evening,\n\nthe Board: (1) took final action to approve\n\neight resolutions that were identified on the agenda only by resolution number; and (2) did not\n\ninform the public of the nature of these resolutions prior to voting during the meeting. On March\n11, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and requested that it\nprovide a detailed written response to the allegations together with copies of the agenda, minutes,\n\nand any recording of its February 29, 2016, meeting. On April 11, 2016, the Public Access\nBureau received 165 pages of records from the Board, including a copy of its agenda, but not the\n\nrequested minutes.'\n\nThe Board also provided a letter in response to the Request for Review. On\n\nMay 27, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's response letter to\n\nhe\n\ndid not reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe public policy of this State, as declared in section 1 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1\nWest 2016)), is that \" public bodies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business and that\nthe people have a right to be informed as to the conduct of their business.\"\nSection 2. 02(c) of OMA\n\nSection 2. 02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nagenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\nordinance that will\n\nbe the subject of final action at the meeting.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\nThe Senate\n\ndebate on House Bill No. 4687, which was enacted as Public Act 97- 827, effective January 1,\n2013, adding section 2. 02(c) of OMA, indicates that the General Assembly intended this\nprovision to ensure that agendas provide sufficiently descriptive advance notice of the matters\nupon which a public body anticipates taking final action:\nT] here was just no real requirement as to how specific [ public\n\nbodies] needed to be to the public of what they were going to\ndiscuss that would be final action. And this just says that you have\nto have\n\ngeneral notice if you' re going to have and take final\naction, as to generally what's going to be discussed so that —that\na * * *\n\npeople who follow their units of local government know what\n\nthey' re going to be acting upon. Remarks of Sen. Dillard, May 16,\n2012, Senate Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at 47.\nIn his Request for Review,\n\nalleged that the Board violated OMA\n\nby failing to set forth the general subject matter of the following eight resolutions listed on its\nFebruary 29, 2016, meeting agenda under item 9.f.:\n9.\n\nCommittee Reports\n\nThis office obtained a copy of the February 29, 2016, Board minutes from the St. Clair County\nwebsite at: http:// co. st- clair. il. us/ government/ openMeetings/ meetings/ Documents/ 2016/ February/ countyBoard2- 2916. pdf (last visited September 9, 2017).\n\nf.\n\nTransportation\n1.\n\nCommittee:\n\nRes. # 2141 - 16 - RT through # 2148- 16-\n\nRT[.] I21\nThe agenda provided no other information describing these resolutions. The meeting minutes\ndocument that, pursuant to this agenda item, the Board approved these eight resolutions. 3\n\nThe Board contends that the agenda was sufficient because, in addition to posting\na copy of the agenda in the county courthouse lobby and on the county's website, the Board had\nposted a copy of each of the resolutions on the website. The Board, however, did not indicate\n\nthat it had posted copies of the resolutions in the county courthouse lobby where the agenda was\nposted. A member of the public reading the agenda in the courthouse lobby would have had no\ninformation describing the general subject matter of the Transportation Committee resolutions on\n\nwhich the Board would be voting during the meeting. Although posting copies of the resolutions\non the county website is commendable and does increase transparency, because the agenda itself\ndid not identify the general subject matter of these final actions, this office concludes that the\nBoard violated\n\nsection\n\n2. 02(c) of OMA.\n\nFurther, the Board did not provide any support for the assertion that an agenda\nposted on a public body's website need not set forth the general subject matter of a resolution on\n\nwhich the public body intends to vote during the meeting as long as a copy of the resolution is\nalso posted on the public body's website. In the case cited by the Board, Board of Education of\nSpringfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General ofIllinois, 2015 IL App (4th) 140941,\n44 N. E. 3d 1245 (2015), affd, 2017 IL 120343, 77 N. E. 3d 625 (2017), the court discussed that a\n\ncopy of the resolution at issue was posted on the public body's website together with the agenda,\nbut the issue before the court was the sufficiency of that Board's public recital, as required by\nsection 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(e) (West 2012)), before it took final action, rather than the\n\nnotice required by section 2. 02(c) to be on the agenda. See Springfield School District, 2015 IL\nApp (4th) 140941, ¶ 36, 44 N. E. 3d at 1252. Further, the agenda item at issue in that case,\nApproval of a Resolution regarding the * * *\n\nAgreement * * *\n\nbetween * * *\n\nMilton and the\n\nBoard,\" identified the general subject matter of that final action. See Springfield School District,\n\n2015 IL App (4th) 140941, ¶ 39, 44 N. E. 3d at 1252. Because the plain language of section\n2. 02(c) requires the agenda itself to set forth the general subject matter of each item on which the\n\n2 St. Clair County Board, Agenda Item 9. f, Transportation Committee: Res # 2141 - 16 -RT through\n\npublic body intends to take final action, and because the agenda posted on the county's website\ndid not do so here, the Board violated section 2. 02(c) of OMA.°\n\nTo prevent further violations of OMA, the Board should list on its meeting\nagendas the general subject matter of each resolution to be considered for final action, rather than\nmerely\n\nusing resolution\n\nnumbers.\n\nSection 2(e) of OMA\n\nSection 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(e) (West 2015 Supp.)) provides that \"[ f]inal\n\naction shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other\ninformation that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\nIn Springfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 64. 77 N.E.3d at 636, the Court\nheld that \" under section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act, a public recital must take place at the\n\nopen meeting before the matter is voted upon; the recital must announce the nature of the matter\n\nunder consideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular transaction or issue, but need\nnot provide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\" In that case, the school board\n\npresident had recited \"' approval of a resolution regarding the separation agreement'\n\nas well as\n\nthe text of the resolution itself: \"' The Board President recommends that the Board of Education\nof Springfield School District No. 186 vote to approve the separation agreement and release\nbetween Dr. Walter Milton, Jr., and the Board of Education.\"' Springfield School District, 2017\nIL 120343, ¶ 81, 77 N. E. 3d at 638. The Court concluded that the school board's public recital\nwas adequate: \"\nThe Board president recited the general nature of the matter under\n\nconsideration— a separation agreement and release— and specific detail sufficient to identify the\nparticular transaction— the separation agreement was between Dr. Milton and the Board.\"\nSpringfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 83, 77 N. E. 3d at 638.\nFurther, the Court distinguished a recent decision in which the Illinois Appellate\nCourt had concluded that \"[ w] hatever the standard might be for a public recital, the Board failed\n\nto meet it in this case.\" Allen v. Clark County Park District Board of Commissioners, 2016 IL\nApp (4th) 150963, ¶ 31, 67 N. E. 3d 536, 541 (2016). As explained by the Court in Springfield\n\nSchool District, the presiding officer of the public body in Allen had only \" publicly recited the\ngeneral nature of the two matters being considered: lease rates and revised covenants. He did\nnot, however, provide sufficient other information to inform the public of the specific business\n\nbeing conducted: What type of real or personal property was being leased? What existing\n4 This office also notes that it is in contravention of the public policy of the State — that the public\nbe informed regarding the conduct of the public's business —to require members of the public to review a packet\ncontaining over 100 pages\n\nbeing revised?\" Springfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 79, 77 N. E. 3d at\n638. In other words, a public body must identify both \" the general nature of the matter under\nconsideration\" and \" specific detail sufficient to identify the particular transaction\" to satisfy the\ncovenants were\n\nrequirements of section 2(e) of OMA. Springfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 83, 77\nN. E. 3d at 638.\n\nHere, there is no dispute that the Board informed the public at its February 29,\n2016, meeting that it was planning to vote to approve resolutions from its Transportation\n\nCommittee.\n\nRequest for Review asserted that simply identifying the proposed\n\naction as resolutions by the Transportation Committee was not a sufficient public recital because\nthe Board had not informed the public of either the subject matter or the general nature of each\n\nresolution.\n\nThe minutes of the February 29, 2016, meeting provide:\nA motion was made by Mr. Roy Mosley Jr., seconded by\n\nMr. C. Richard Vernier that the Highway Resolutions as submitted\nbe adopted.\n\nDiscussion ensued with questions and comments from Mr.\n\nFrank Heiligenstein regarding Jefferson Road asking the\nTransportation Committee to come up with funds to correct the\ndefects on Jefferson Road and others as there are funds for the\nFront Street project in East St. Louis. Chairman Kem responded\n\nstating that since the subsidence on Jefferson Road is now over, the\nproblems can now be addressed. Chairman Kern further advised\n\nthat Front Street project is a public private partnership and that St.\nClair County has worked to bring in federal funds, state funds, and\nfunds from the local industry in the area and there are no County\ndollars in it. Chairman Kern stated Front Street being improved\nwill open up commercial development and real estate tax revenues\n\nderived from that commercial property will certainly help St. Clair\nCounty. Mr. C. Richard Vernier commented regarding distribution\nof funds being spent.\n\nThe Chairman announced that the Resolutions were\n\nadopted unanimously. 151\nAs explained above, section 2(e) requires that a public recital \" announce the\n\nnature of the matter under consideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular\ntransaction or issue, but need not provide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\"\n\nSpringfield School District, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 64, 77 N.E. 3d at 636. For example, with respect\n\nto resolution number 2141 - 16 -RT (authorizing the Chairman of the Board to enter into a contract\nto repair Jefferson Road), at a minimum the Board was required to announce the general nature\nof the matter under consideration—\n\na contract —\n\nand provide details sufficient to identify the\n\nparticular transaction— to repair Jefferson Road. 6\nAlthough the minutes establish that the Board discussed the Front Street project,\n\nthere is no indication that the Board publicly recited the general nature of each of the three\nresolutions pertaining to Front Street with detail sufficient to identify either the general nature of\nthe matter or the particular transaction. The Board did not demonstrate that it publicly recited\nthe general subject matter of the resolutions, which provided for: a portion of Front Street to be\n\nadded to the St. Clair County highway system (2143 - 16 -RT); a portion of Front Street to be\ndesignated a Class 1I1 Truck Route (2144 - 16 -RT), and; entering into an agreement with the\nIllinois Department of Transportation (2145 - 16 -RT). Additionally, the minutes do not establish\n\n5 St. Clair County Board, Meeting, February 29, 2016, Minutes 13. The eight resolutions were set\nforth in the minutes and are summarized\n\nas follows: (1)\n\n2141 - 16 - RT authorized\n\nthe Chairman\n\nof the Board to enter\n\ninto a contract to repair Jefferson Road with Hank's Excavating & Landscaping, Inc.; (2) 2142 -I6 -RT authorized the\nChairman of the Board to enter into a contract for construction of a left turn lane from Scott -Troy Road, C. H. 61, to\n\nHilltop Drive with The Kilian Corporation; (3) 2143 - 16 -RT resolved that the Front Street, from Trendley Avenue to\n700 feet north of Winter Street, be added to the highway system of St. Clair County; (4) 2144 - 16 -RT resolved that\nFront Street, from Trendley Avenue to 700 feet north of Winter Street, be designated a Class 111 Truck Route; (5)\n2145 - 16 - RT authorized\n\nthe Chairman\n\nof the Board to execute the prepared\n\nagreement\n\nwith the Illinois Department\n\nof Transportation for the division of costs and maintenance responsibilities for the Front Street construction; (6)\n\n2146 - 16 -RT authorized the Chairman of the Board to execute the prepared agreement with the City of Fairview\nHeights which provides for the costs and maintenance responsibilities for the construction of a Relief Storm Sewer\nlocated in the Fox Creek Subdivision; (7) 2147 - 16 - RT authorized the Chairman of the Board to execute the prepared\n\nagreement with the Caseyville Township Sewer System for the costs and maintenance responsibilities for the\nremoval and relocation of a sanitary sewer main; (8) 2148 - I6 -RT authorized the Chairman of the Board to execute\nan agreement\n\nwith Oates Associates,\n\nInc. to perform the design and preparation\n\nof plans for the relocation\n\nof the\n\nsanitary sewer main.\n\nAlthough the minutes reflect a discussion in which a Board member asked the Transportation\n\nCommittee to come up with funds for defects on Jefferson Road, this appears to be a request for future funding and\n\nthat the Board engaged in any discussion regarding, or otherwise publicly recited the nature of,\nthe resolutions numbered 2142 - 16 -RT, 2146 -16 -RT, 2147 -16 -RT, and 2148 -16 -RT.\nThe Board maintains that because these resolutions were discussed at the\n\nTransportation Committee meeting, no further public recital was necessary at the Board meeting.\nThe Board, however, has provided no legal support for the assertion that discussing the\n\nresolutions at a separate committee meeting relieved the Board of its obligation to make a proper\npublic recital before voting to approve the resolutions. The plain language of section 2(e)\nrequires final action to \" be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being\nconsidered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\n\nIf\n\nthis requirement could be satisfied by a different public body providing a public recital at an\nearlier meeting, a public body voting on a matter would have the option of doing so without\nproviding the public with any meaningful information about the subjects of final action. Such a\nconstruction would effectively negate the requirements of section 2(e), allowing public bodies to\n\ndiscuss matters only at committee meetings, and then vote at a later meeting without providing\nany information to the public about the business being conducted. People v. Hunter, 2013 IL\n114100, ¶ 13, 986 N. E. 2d 1185, 1189 (2013) (a reviewing body \" presumes that the legislature did\nintend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.\"). Accordingly. this office concludes\n\nnot\n\nthat the Board violated section 2(e) of OMA.\n\nIn accordance with the conclusions in this determination, this office requests that\nthe Board review its practices to ensure that agenda items set forth the \" general subject matter\"\n\nof any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action and that the Board provide\nsufficient public recitals under section 2(e) of OMA in the future.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor\n\nhas determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion.\nThis file is closed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (312) 814- 5201.\nVerytruly yours,\n\nIE STE\n\nBERG\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n40515\n\no 202c notice\n\nimproper 2e improper co"}
{"id":1172,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-03-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["40638"],"title":"Village of Brookfield not required to post advisory committee minutes online","filename":"40638, issued March 18, 2016.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":584,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Village of Brookfield violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to post minutes of its advisory committees on its website. The PAC determined that the Open Meetings Act only requires the posting of minutes for the governing body, not advisory committees, and closed the matter.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Village of Brookfield was not posting meeting minutes for its advisory committees online. The Attorney General's office reviewed the law and explained that the requirement to post minutes online only applies to the main governing body, not advisory groups. Therefore, the Village did not break the law.","holding":"The PAC determined that the Village of Brookfield did not violate the Open Meetings Act because the statute does not require advisory committee minutes to be posted on a public body's website.","legal_question":"Does Section 2.06(b) of the Open Meetings Act require a public body to post the meeting minutes of its advisory committees on its website?","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Brookfield","requesting_party":"Mr. Michael A. Towner","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The requester sought to compel the Village of Brookfield to post advisory committee meeting minutes on its website.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_b/40638, issued March 18, 2016.pdf","sha256":"fe51e993253047b9a4139bcbce335a21d945865f53a2c99da369380c00019b8c","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting minutes","advisory committee","website posting","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMarch 18, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael\n\nA. Towner\n\nHoneywell LLC, UOP\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmichael. towner@honeywell. com\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 40638\nDear Mr. Towner:\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has received your March 8, 2016, Request for Review\n\nalleging that the Village of Brookfield ( Village) may have violated the Open Meetings Act\nOMA). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further\naction on this matter is warranted.\n\nSection 3. 5( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2014), as amended by Public\nct 99- 402, effective August 19, 2015) provides:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\n\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral\n\nnot\n\nlater than 60 days\n\nafter\n\nthe alleged\n\nviolation. * * *\n\nThe\n\nfor review * * *\n\nmust include a summary of the facts\nsupporting the allegation. ( Emphasis added.)\nrequest\n\nYour Request for Review alleges that the Village has not posted on its website the\n\nminutes from the meetings of any of its advisory committees. Section 2. 06( b) of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n120/ 2. 06( b) ( West 2014)) states:\n\nA] public body that has a website that the full-time staff of the\npublic body maintains shall post the minutes of a regular meeting\nof its governing body open to the public on the public body' s\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618)\n\n529- 6416\n\n\fr.\nMichael A. Towner\nMarch 18, 2016\nPage 2\n\nwebsite within 10 days after the approval of the minutes by the\npublic body. ( Emphasis added.)\n\nThe plain language of section 2. 06( b) requires only the governing body of the\npublic body to post its meeting minutes on the public body's website. The Village operates a\nVillage Manager form of government under which the Village Board of Trustees ( Village Board)\nappoints the Village Manager.'\n\nSee 65 ILCS 5/ 5- 1- 4 ( West 2014).\n\nBecause the Village Board is\n\nthe Village' s governing body, section 2. 06( b) of OMA does not require advisory committees'\nmeeting minutes to be posted on the Village' s website. Therefore, your Request for Review does\nnot provide a summary of facts from which this office could conclude that the Village violated\n\nOMA. Accordingly, we have determined that no further action is warranted as to this matter.\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me at ( 312) 814- 6437 or the Chicago\naddress on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLEAH\n\nBARTELT\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n40638 o no fi war mun\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kit P. Ketchmark\nVillage President\nVillage of Brookfield\n8820 Brookfield Avenue\nBrookfield, Illinois 60513\nkketchmark@brookfieldil.\n\ngov\n\nVillage of Brookfield, Village Manager' s Office, http:// brookfieldil. gov/ departments/ villagemanagers- office ( last visited\n\nMarch\n\n18, 2016).\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Advisory committee meeting minutes posted online","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-40638/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMarch 18, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Michael\n\nA. Towner\n\nHoneywell LLC, UOP\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmichael. towner@honeywell. com\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 40638\nDear Mr. Towner:\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has received your March 8, 2016, Request for Review\n\nalleging that the Village of Brookfield (Village) may have violated the Open Meetings Act\nOMA). For the reasons set forth below, the Public Access Bureau concludes that no further\naction on this matter is warranted.\n\nSection 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2014), as amended by Public\nct 99- 402, effective August 19, 2015) provides:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\n\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral\n\nnot\n\nlater than 60 days\n\nafter\n\nthe alleged\n\nviolation. * * *\n\nThe\n\nfor review * * *\n\nmust include a summary of the facts\nsupporting the allegation. (Emphasis added.)\nrequest\n\nYour Request for Review alleges that the Village has not posted on its website the\n\nminutes from the meetings of any of its advisory committees. Section 2. 06(b) of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/ 2. 06(b) (West 2014)) states:\n\nA] public body that has a website that the full-time staff of the\npublic body maintains shall post the minutes of a regular meeting\nof its governing body open to the public on the public body's\n\nwebsite within 10 days after the approval of the minutes by the\npublic body. (Emphasis added.)\n\nThe plain language of section 2. 06(b) requires only the governing body of the\npublic body to post its meeting minutes on the public body's website. The Village operates a\nVillage Manager form of government under which the Village Board of Trustees (Village Board)\nappoints the Village Manager.'\n\nSee 65 ILCS 5/ 5- 1- 4 (West 2014).\n\nBecause the Village Board is\n\nthe Village's governing body, section 2. 06(b) of OMA does not require advisory committees'\nmeeting minutes to be posted on the Village's website. Therefore, your Request for Review does\nnot provide a summary of facts from which this office could conclude that the Village violated\n\nOMA. Accordingly, we have determined that no further action is warranted as to this matter.\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me at (312) 814- 6437 or the Chicago\naddress on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLEAH\n\nBARTELT\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n40638 o no fi war mun\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kit P. Ketchmark\nVillage President\nVillage of Brookfield\n8820 Brookfield Avenue\nBrookfield, Illinois 60513\nkketchmark@brookfieldil.\n\ngov\n\nVillage of Brookfield, Village Manager's Office, http:// brookfieldil. gov/ departments/ villagemanagers- office (last visited\n\nMarch\n\n18, 2016)."}
{"id":1173,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-02-10","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["40768"],"title":"Insufficient evidence Royal Lakes Board violated OMA on agenda items or training","filename":"40768, issued February 10, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1591,"summary":"Requesters alleged the Village of Royal Lakes Board of Trustees took final action on items not listed on the posted agenda and that a trustee failed to complete mandatory OMA training. The PAC determined there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations of an improper agenda and closed the matter.","plain_summary":"Village officials alleged that the Board of Trustees voted on items that were not properly listed on the meeting agenda and that a specific trustee had not completed required legal training. The Attorney General's office investigated but found there was not enough evidence to prove these violations occurred. Consequently, the office closed the case without taking further action.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau concluded that there is insufficient evidence to find that the Village of Royal Lakes Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by taking final action on items not included on the posted agenda and whether a trustee failed to complete mandatory OMA training.","disposition":"insufficient_info","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02","5 ILCS 120/1.05"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Royal Lakes Board of Trustees","requesting_party":"Former Village clerk and Village trustees","pac_outcome":"Insufficient evidence of violation","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The dispute concerned whether the Board of Trustees took final action on items not properly noticed on a meeting agenda and compliance with OMA training requirements.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.05/40768, issued February 10, 2017.pdf","sha256":"34d0504f5099517d1a35493a563c4edd12c284cc30192729fad93bbf1eba8ecd","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting agenda","OMA training","public notice","village board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":",:;,:::.T\":::tl:.\"\"t-\n\n((, ����\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nST ATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary IO, 2017\n\nMs. Angela Sanders\nVillage Clerk\nVillage of Royal Lakes\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 40768\nDear\n\nand Ms. Sanders:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.S(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that there is insufficient evidence to find that the Village of Royal Lakes\nBoard of Trustees (Board) violated OMA.\nOn March 16, 2016,\n- (col�\"requesters\") submitted this Request for Review to the Public\nAccess Bureau.� is the former Village clerk an\nare Village trustees. The requesters alleged that the Board took final action on items at a special\nmeeting when those items were not on an agenda posted at least 48 hours in advance of the\nmeeting, which occurred at 6 p.m. on March 11, 2016. The requesters furnished two agendas\nthat purportedly listed the items for the March 11, 2016, meeting: one contained a single item\nentitled \"Paying of Bills,\" and the other contained ten items, including three relating to the\nappointments of new Village officials. The requesters alleged that the agenda containing the\nsingle item had been posted and distributed to the trustees, but the Board convened and took final\naction on the items on the ten-item agenda. The requesters also alleged that Mr. London\nSimmons, who was sworn in as a trustee in May 2015, had not completed OMA training as\nrequired by section I.OS of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.05 (West 2014)).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, lllinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217)782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, lllinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMs. Angela Sanders\nFebruary I 0, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn March 23, 2016, this office sent the Board a copy of the Request for Review\nand asked it to provide a detailed written response to the allegations in the Request for Review\ntogether with copies of any agendas, minutes, and any existing verbatim recordings for the\nMarch 11, 2016, meeting.\nOn March 30, 2016, the Board submitted a written response to the Request for\nReview. It provided a photograph that was time-stamped as taken on March 9, 2016 at 4:43\np.m., and claimed that the photograph depicted Mr. Simmons posting the agenda for the March\n11, 2016, special meeting. It also provided an additional photograph, which was not time­\nstamped, and claimed that photograph depicted the agenda that was posted on March 9, 2016.\nThis agenda was the ten-item agenda with the new appointments.\nOn April 6, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's response to the\nrequesters. On April 11, 2016, the requesters delivered a written reply to the Board's response,\nand asserted that the photographs did not demonstrate that the full ten-item agenda was the one\nposted at the village hall in advance of the meeting. The requesters also noted that the Board had\nnot addressed the issue of Mr. Simmons's OMA training.\nOn April 12, 2016, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau\nhad a telephone conversation with Mr. Simmons in which he stated that he had completed OMA\n�when he became a trustee in 2015, and had provided the certificate of completion t�\n-who was the Village clerk at the time. He stated that now the Village staff could not\nlocate the certificate.\nDETERMINATION\nThe intent of OMA is to \"ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \"given\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014).\nPosting of Agenda\nSection 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"[p]ublic\nnotice of any special meeting except a meeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of\nany rescheduled regular meeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours\nbefore such meeting, which notice shall also include the agenda for the special, rescheduled, or\nreconvened meeting[.]\" In addition, section 2.02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(c) (West 2014))\nprovides that \"[a]ny agenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter\nof any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting.\"\n\n\fMs. Angela Sanders\nFebruary 10, 2017\nPage 3\n\nThe Board asserts that the full ten-item agenda was posted at 4:43 p.m. on March\n9, 2016, which is more than 48 hours in advance of the special meeting held at 6 p.m. on March\n11, 2016. The requesters dispute the Board's proof of the required posting, and assert that it has\nnot demonstrated which version of the agenda was posted at that time because there is not a full\ndepiction of the full ten-item agenda being posted that is time-stamped. They further assert that\nthe version of the agenda received by the trustees was the single-item agenda, not the full\nagenda. Because there is conflicting evidence regarding the posting of the agenda, there is\ninsufficient evidence from which this office could conclude the Village violated section 2.02 of\nOMA by failing to post the meeting agenda with the full slate of items for final action. However,\nwe caution the Village to ensure that any future agendas are posted at 48 hours in advance, and\nthat these agendas contain the general subject matter of all resolutions or ordinances on which\nthe Village anticipates taking final action.\nOMA Training\nSection l.05(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.0S(b) (West 2014)) provides the\nrequirements for members of public bodies to complete the electronic training program\ndeveloped by the Public Access Counselor:\nExcept as otherwise provided in this Section, each elected\nor appointed member of a public body subject to this Act who\nbecomes such a member after the effective date of this amendatory\nAct of the 97th General Assembly shall successfully complete the\nelectronic training curriculum developed and administered by the\nPublic Access Counselor. For these members, the training must be\ncompleted not later than the 90th day after the date the member:\n(I)\n\ntakes the oath of office, if the member is required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person's duties\nas a member of the public body; or\n\n(2)\n\notherwise assumes responsibilities as a member of\nthe public body, if the member is not required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person's duties\nas a member of the governmental body.\n\nEach member successfully completing the electronic\ntraining curriculum shall file a copy of the certificate of completion\nwith the public body.\n\n\fMs. Angela Sanders\nFebruary 10, 2017\nPage 4\n***\nThe failure of one or more members of a public body to\ncomplete the training required by this Section does not affect the\nvalidity of an action taken by the public body.\nAn elected or appointed member of a public body subject to\nthis Act who has successfully completed the training required\nunder this subsection (b) and filed a copy of the certificate of\ncompletion with the public body is not required to subsequently\ncomplete the training required under this subsection (b).\nNeither the Board nor Mr. Simmons himself has furnished a copy of the certificate of completion\nreflecting that Mr. Simmons successfully completed the OMA electronic training when he took\nthe oath of office as a trustee in 2015. However, according to training records maintained by the\nPublic Access Counselor, Mr. Simmons successfully completed OMA training when he was the\nVillage Mayor on November 16, 2012; those records do not reflect that he successfully\ncompleted training when he was sworn in as a trustee in 2015. 1 Under section l.05(b) of OMA,\nan elected or appointed member of a public body who has previously completed the training is\nnot required to subsequently complete the training. Accordingly, this office cannot conclude that\nthe Board or Mr. Simmons failed to comply with the training requirements of OMA; moreover,\nunder section 1.05(b), any violation of the training requirements would not invalidate any action\ntaken by the Board. However, given updates in the training since 2012 and Mr. Simmons's gap\nin service on the Board, this office strongly recommends that he complete the current version of\nthe training.\nThe parties raise numerous additional issues related to the governance of the\nVillage of Royal Lakes. The Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to resolving disputes\nconcerning the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2014)) and\nOMA. 15 ILCS 205/7(c) (West 2014). Therefore, these allegations are not subject to review by\nthis office.\n\n1\n\nMr. Simmons previously served as Village Mayor until 2013. See Simmons Appointed after\nRoyal Lakes Mayor Resigns, Macoupin County Enquirer-Democrat, available at\nhttp://enquirerdemocrat.com/simmons-appointed-royal-lakes-mayor-resigns/.\n\n\fFebruary 10, 2017\nPage 5\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave questions, you may contact me at (217) 782-9078 or nolson@atg.state.il.us. Thank you.\nVery truly yours,\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n40768 o 105 training complete 202 notice proper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Final action on unagendaed items and OMA training","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-40768/","full_text":",:;,:::.T\":::tl:.\"\"t-\n\n((, ����\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nST ATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary IO, 2017\n\nMs. Angela Sanders\nVillage Clerk\nVillage of Royal Lakes\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 40768\nDear\n\nand Ms. Sanders:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.S(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that there is insufficient evidence to find that the Village of Royal Lakes\nBoard of Trustees (Board) violated OMA.\nOn March 16, 2016,\n- (col�\"requesters\") submitted this Request for Review to the Public\nAccess Bureau.� is the former Village clerk an\nare Village trustees. The requesters alleged that the Board took final action on items at a special\nmeeting when those items were not on an agenda posted at least 48 hours in advance of the\nmeeting, which occurred at 6 p.m. on March 11, 2016. The requesters furnished two agendas\nthat purportedly listed the items for the March 11, 2016, meeting: one contained a single item\nentitled \"Paying of Bills,\" and the other contained ten items, including three relating to the\nappointments of new Village officials. The requesters alleged that the agenda containing the\nsingle item had been posted and distributed to the trustees, but the Board convened and took final\naction on the items on the ten-item agenda. The requesters also alleged that Mr. London\nSimmons, who was sworn in as a trustee in May 2015, had not completed OMA training as\nrequired by section I.OS of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.05 (West 2014)).\n\nOn March 23, 2016, this office sent the Board a copy of the Request for Review\nand asked it to provide a detailed written response to the allegations in the Request for Review\ntogether with copies of any agendas, minutes, and any existing verbatim recordings for the\nMarch 11, 2016, meeting.\nOn March 30, 2016, the Board submitted a written response to the Request for\nReview. It provided a photograph that was time-stamped as taken on March 9, 2016 at 4:43\np.m., and claimed that the photograph depicted Mr. Simmons posting the agenda for the March\n11, 2016, special meeting. It also provided an additional photograph, which was not time­\nstamped, and claimed that photograph depicted the agenda that was posted on March 9, 2016.\nThis agenda was the ten-item agenda with the new appointments.\nOn April 6, 2016, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's response to the\nrequesters. On April 11, 2016, the requesters delivered a written reply to the Board's response,\nand asserted that the photographs did not demonstrate that the full ten-item agenda was the one\nposted at the village hall in advance of the meeting. The requesters also noted that the Board had\nnot addressed the issue of Mr. Simmons's OMA training.\nOn April 12, 2016, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau\nhad a telephone conversation with Mr. Simmons in which he stated that he had completed OMA\n�when he became a trustee in 2015, and had provided the certificate of completion t�\n-who was the Village clerk at the time. He stated that now the Village staff could not\nlocate the certificate.\nDETERMINATION\nThe intent of OMA is to \"ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \"given\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014).\nPosting of Agenda\nSection 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"[p]ublic\nnotice of any special meeting except a meeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of\nany rescheduled regular meeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours\nbefore such meeting, which notice shall also include the agenda for the special, rescheduled, or\nreconvened meeting[.]\" In addition, section 2.02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(c) (West 2014))\nprovides that \"[a]ny agenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter\n\nThe Board asserts that the full ten-item agenda was posted at 4:43 p.m. on March\n9, 2016, which is more than 48 hours in advance of the special meeting held at 6 p.m. on March\n11, 2016. The requesters dispute the Board's proof of the required posting, and assert that it has\nnot demonstrated which version of the agenda was posted at that time because there is not a full\ndepiction of the full ten-item agenda being posted that is time-stamped. They further assert that\nthe version of the agenda received by the trustees was the single-item agenda, not the full\nagenda. Because there is conflicting evidence regarding the posting of the agenda, there is\ninsufficient evidence from which this office could conclude the Village violated section 2.02 of\nOMA by failing to post the meeting agenda with the full slate of items for final action. However,\nwe caution the Village to ensure that any future agendas are posted at 48 hours in advance, and\nthat these agendas contain the general subject matter of all resolutions or ordinances on which\nthe Village anticipates taking final action.\nOMA Training\nSection l.05(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.0S(b) (West 2014)) provides the\nrequirements for members of public bodies to complete the electronic training program\ndeveloped by the Public Access Counselor:\nExcept as otherwise provided in this Section, each elected\nor appointed member of a public body subject to this Act who\nbecomes such a member after the effective date of this amendatory\nAct of the 97th General Assembly shall successfully complete the\nelectronic training curriculum developed and administered by the\nPublic Access Counselor. For these members, the training must be\ncompleted not later than the 90th day after the date the member:\n(I)\n\ntakes the oath of office, if the member is required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person's duties\nas a member of the public body; or\n\n(2)\n\notherwise assumes responsibilities as a member of\nthe public body, if the member is not required to\n\n***\nThe failure of one or more members of a public body to\ncomplete the training required by this Section does not affect the\nvalidity of an action taken by the public body.\nAn elected or appointed member of a public body subject to\nthis Act who has successfully completed the training required\nunder this subsection (b) and filed a copy of the certificate of\ncompletion with the public body is not required to subsequently\ncomplete the training required under this subsection (b).\nNeither the Board nor Mr. Simmons himself has furnished a copy of the certificate of completion\nreflecting that Mr. Simmons successfully completed the OMA electronic training when he took\nthe oath of office as a trustee in 2015. However, according to training records maintained by the\nPublic Access Counselor, Mr. Simmons successfully completed OMA training when he was the\nVillage Mayor on November 16, 2012; those records do not reflect that he successfully\ncompleted training when he was sworn in as a trustee in 2015. 1 Under section l.05(b) of OMA,\nan elected or appointed member of a public body who has previously completed the training is\nnot required to subsequently complete the training. Accordingly, this office cannot conclude that\nthe Board or Mr. Simmons failed to comply with the training requirements of OMA; moreover,\nunder section 1.05(b), any violation of the training requirements would not invalidate any action\ntaken by the Board. However, given updates in the training since 2012 and Mr. Simmons's gap\nin service on the Board, this office strongly recommends that he complete the current version of\nthe training.\nThe parties raise numerous additional issues related to the governance of the\nVillage of Royal Lakes. The Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to resolving disputes\nconcerning the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2014)) and\nOMA. 15 ILCS 205/7(c) (West 2014). Therefore, these allegations are not subject to review by\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave questions, you may contact me at (217) 782-9078 or nolson@atg.state.il.us. Thank you.\nVery truly yours,\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n40768 o 105 training complete 202 notice proper mun"}
{"id":1174,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-06-30","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["41771","41807"],"title":"Collinsville TIF Board did not violate OMA by holding 10:00 a.m. meeting","filename":"41771 41807, issued June 30, 2016.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2174,"summary":"The PAC reviewed allegations that the Collinsville Southwest Corridors TIF Joint Review Board violated the Open Meetings Act by holding a meeting at 10:00 a.m. on a weekday, which the complainants argued was inconvenient for the public. The PAC determined that the meeting time did not violate the OMA requirement that meetings be held at times convenient to the public.","plain_summary":"Citizens complained that a local government board held a meeting at 10:00 a.m. on a Wednesday, arguing that this time was inconvenient for working residents. The Attorney General's office reviewed the complaint and decided that the meeting time was not a violation of the law. This means the board was permitted to hold the meeting during standard business hours.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the City of Collinsville did not violate the Open Meetings Act by scheduling a public meeting at 10:00 a.m. on a weekday.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by scheduling a meeting at 10:00 a.m. on a weekday, thereby failing to meet at a time 'convenient to the public' as required by 5 ILCS 120/2.01.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.01"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Collinsville Southwest Corridors TIF Joint Review Board","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The complaint challenged the convenience of a 10:00 a.m. weekday meeting time for a TIF Joint Review Board.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.01/Convenience-and-openness-of-meeting-times-and-places/41771 41807, issued June 30, 2016.pdf","sha256":"0aef05930e716060828a3d983f0975cb46c32c1e0be09e4a92aec2563f89b241","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting time","convenient to the public","Open Meetings Act","TIF board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"b•\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 30, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Mitchell Bair\n\nCity Manager\nCity of Collinsville\n125 South Center Street\n\nCollinsville, Illinois 62234\n\nmbair @collinsvilleil. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review— 2016 PAC 41771; 2016 PAC 41807\nDear\n\nand Mr. Bair:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99- 402, effective August\n\n19, 2015). The Public Access Bureau received two Requests for Review alleging the same\nviolation of OMA with respect to the May 4, 2016, meeting of the Collinsville Southwest\nCorridors TIF Joint Review Board ( Board). Therefore, we have consolidated those matters for\nthis determination. For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nscheduling the May 4, 2016, meeting of the Board at 10: 00 a.m. did not violate the provisions of\nOMA requiring that public bodies meet at times and places convenient to the public.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn May 6, 2016, the Public Access Bureau received a Request for Review in\n\nwhich\n\nalleged the Board had violated OMA by holding its May 4, 2016,\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785- 2771 • Fax:( 217) 782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax:( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901•(\n\n618) 529- 6400• TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403•\n\nFax:( 618)\n\n529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Mitchell Bair\n\nJune 30, 2016\nPage 2\n\nmeeting at an inconvenient time. Specifically,\n\nalleged that the Board' s 10: 00 a.m.\n\nmeeting on a Wednesday was inconvenient because it was in the middle of a work day and most\nresidents were unable to attend the meeting. On May 9, 2016, the Public Access Bureau\n\nreceived a Request for Review from\nwho also alleged that the Board' s May 4,\n2016, meeting time was inconvenient and that it had been intentionally scheduled to exclude\nmembers of the public from attending. Both\nfurther assert that the\nmeeting was intentionally scheduled at an inconvenient time to affect the selection of the public\nmember of the Board.\n\nOn May 17, 2016, this office forwarded copies of the Requests for Review to the\n\nBoard and asked it to provide a written response to the allegations of\n\nOn May 26, 2016, the Board responded, asserting that a weekday meeting during business hours\nis not an inconvenient time. The Board stated that the May 4, 2016, meeting time had been\nannounced at the April 11, 2016, Collinsville City Council ( Council) meeting. The Board also\nstated that it had published notice of the meeting in the Belleville News- Democrat on April 19,\n\n2016, and had posted the meeting agenda at City Hall and on the City's website on April 28,\n2016. The Board' s response stated that 7 members of the public, including\nwere\npresent at the May 4, 2016, meeting and that an additional 25 members of the public viewed the\nBoard' s live webcast of the meeting.\nOn May 26, 2016, this office sent copies of the Board' s response to\n\nand\nand offered them the opportunity to reply. On June 13, 2016,\nreplied\nby asserting that the meeting was held at an inconvenient time to discourage public participation.\n\nalleged that more than 100 people had attended the March 22, 2016, evening\nmeeting of the Council concerning the proposed tax increment financing district( TIF District)\nand an equal number were expected to attend a Council meeting on June 13, 2016, when the TIF\n\nDistrict was to be discussed.\n\nstated that \"only 4 members of the public who\n\nregularly attend every council meeting as gadflies, the chairman of the chamber of commerce, a\npreselected public member of the proposed TIF JRB, and a newspaper reporter attended\"'\n\nMay 4, 2016, Board meeting.\n\nthe\n\nalso alleged that the meeting time prevented a\n\nsufficient number of members of the public from attending the meeting to allow for a proper\nselection of the public member of the Board.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nLetter from\n\nBureau] ( June 13, 2015).\n\nto [ Matt] Hartman, [ Assistant Attorney General], [ Public Access\n\n\fMr. Mitchell Bair\n\nJune 30, 2016\nPage 3\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d\n161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989). Section 2. 01 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2.01 ( West 2014) provides, in\npertinent part, that \"[ a] ll meetings required by [ the] Act to be public shall be held at specified\ntimes and places which are convenient and open to the public.\"\n\nallege that the Board held its May 4, 2016, meeting at an inconvenient time because the meeting\nwas scheduled during regular business hours when many people are at work.\n\nOMA does not define what is \" convenient.\" Undefined statutory terms must be\ngiven their plain and ordinary meaning. Exelon Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 275\n\n2009) ( finding that where a statute fails to specifically define a word, a court may use a\n\ndictionary to determine the word' s plain and ordinary meaning). \"' Convenient' means ' suited to a\npersonal\n\ncomfort\n\nor to easy performance' or'\n\naffording accommodation\n\nor\n\nadvantage.\"'\n\nGerwin v.\n\nLivingston Co. Board, 345 Ill. App. 3d 352, 361 ( 4th Dist. 2003) ( quoting Merriam- Webster's\n\nCollegiate Dictionary 252 ( 10th ed. 2000)). Although the court in Gerwin addressed the issue of\n\nwhether a meeting place ( a small room) rather than a meeting time was convenient, the term\nconvenient\" in section\nnot synonymous\n\nunder\n\n2. 01 modifies\n\nboth \" times\" and \" places.\" \" Open\" and \" convenient\" are\n\nthe Act; accordingly, \"[\n\na] meeting can be open in the sense that no one is\n\nprohibited from attending it, but it can be held in such an ill- suited, unaccommodating,\nunadvantageous place that members of the public, as a practical matter, would be deterred from\n\nattending it.\" Gerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 361. To the same extent, a meeting can be held at\nsuch an unaccommodating, unadvantageous time that the public would be unreasonably\ndeterred from attending it. The concept of public convenience implies a \" rule of\nreasonableness,\n\nnot ' absolute\n\naccessibility'\n\nbut' reasonable accessibility.\"'\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App.\n\n3d at 362, quoting State ex rel. Badke v. Village Board ofthe Village ofGreendale, 173 Wis. 2d\n553, 579, 494 N. W. 2d 408, 418 ( 1993).\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that holding meetings\n\nduring regular business hours does not violate section 2. 01 of OMA. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 39854, issued June 22, 2016 (concluding that special meetings by a village board\n\nconcerning the budget and a tax levy, each held on a Tuesday, one at 4: 00 p. m. and one at 5: 00\n\np.m., did not violate OMA); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29045, issued May 5, 2014\ndetermining that facts provided were not sufficient to show that a meeting by a township board\nat 3: 00 p. m. on a Tuesday was inconvenient); Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 20968, issued\n\nAugust 23, 2013 ( finding that a township' s monthly meeting at noon on a weekday complied\nwith the requirements of OMA); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 14311, issued June 6, 2011\nconcluding that weekday meetings of a county board and its committees during regular business\n\nhours did not violate OMA); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\n\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 12761, issued March 17, 2011\n\n\fMr. Mitchell Bair\nJune 30, 2016\nPage 4\n\nholding that a school board' s rescheduled regular meeting at 4: 00 p.m. and committee meetings\nat noon did not violate OMA). Given that members of the public have different work schedules\nand other obligations, no particular meeting time is likely to be convenient to all who might wish\n\nto attend. A public meeting held during regular business hours is not inherently inconvenient.\nThe facts alleged do not support a conclusion that the meeting time was so\ninconvenient that it violated OMA.\nhave alleged that the Boards\nmeeting time during regular business hours was actually inconvenient because few people were\nable to attend the meeting. In support of this assertion,\n\ncontrasted the smaller\n\nattendance at the May 4, 2016, meeting of the Board with prior evening meetings of the Council\n\nconcerning the TIF District, which had been well attended. However, any number of factors\n\nother than the scheduling of the meeting could have affected public interest in attending. We are\nnot in a position to speculate as to what factors might have influenced members of the public not\nto attend May 4, 2016, meeting.\nAlthough\n\nIn addition, at least four members of the public did attend the Board' s meeting.\n\nalleged that the members of the public who attended \" are\n\nwatchdogs who regularly attend every city council meeting and speak, i2 their presence should\nnot be discounted on that basis.\n\nFurther, members of the public wishing to attend the Board's meeting had\nsignificant advance notice of the time of the meeting. According to the Board, the meeting time\nwas publicly announced three weeks before at a Council meeting and was published two weeks\n\nbefore in the local newspaper. The agenda was also physically posted at City Hall and on the\n\nCity's website six days before the meeting. If members of the public who work during the day\nwished to attend the City' s meeting, they had ample time in which to make arrangements to do\n\nso. Moreover, the Board made the meeting available to the public by live webcast.\n\nalso alleged that the Board intentionally scheduled the\nmeeting at an inconvenient time to discourage public participation concerning the TIF District\nproposal. The Board explained that it decided the meeting time based on the former City\nmanager contacting Board members in 2015 \" to determine which dates and times were preferred\n\nto ensure a quorum would be met for each meeting. i3 The former City manager determined that\na majority of the members of the Board preferred weekday mornings for meeting times.\n2016).\n\nAttorney General,\n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General( May 9,\n\n3Letter from Mitchell Bair, City Manager, City of Collinsville, to Matthew S. Hartman, Assistant\nPublic Access Bureau( May 26, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Mitchell Bair\nJune 30, 2016\nPage 5\n\ndisputed the accuracy of the Board's explanation, asserting that the former City manager\ncould not have known to contact the Board' s members concerning the scheduling of the May 4,\n2016, Board meeting for the proposed TIF District because he was relieved of his duties in July,\n2015. However, it is not unlikely that the former City manager would have asked Board\nmembers sometime in early 2015 about their preference for meeting times because the Board is\nrequired to hold an annual meeting under section 11- 74.4- 5( e) of the Illinois Municipal Code ( 65\n\nILCS 5/ 11- 74. 4- 5( e) ( West 2014)). The City's website indicates that the Board held only one\nmeeting in 2015, on March 25, 2015, at 10 a.m.\n\nBecause a public meeting held during regular business hours is not inherently\n\ninconvenient to the public and because\n\nhave not provided sufficient\n\nfacts to show that the meeting was held at such an unaccommodating, unadvantageous time that\nthe public would be unreasonably deterred from attending it, this office concludes that\nscheduling the Board' s May 4, 2016, meeting at 10: 00 a.m. did not violate OMA.\n\nPlease also note that the Public Access Counselor' s authority is limited to\nresolving disputes concerning OMA and the Freedom of Information ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et\nseq. ( West 2014). See 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c) ( West 2014). To the extent that\nallege that the selection of the public member of the Board was improper under the Illinois\nMunicipal Code, that claim does not allege violations of either FOIA or OMA. Therefore, this\noffice does not have authority to review that allegation.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of these matters do\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Please contact me at ( 217) 782- 9054 or the\nSpringfield address listed on the first page of this letter if you have questions. This\ncorrespondence\n\nserves to close these matters.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n41771\n\n41807 o 201 time proper\n\nmun\n\n\fMr. Mitchell Bair\nJune 30, 2016\nPage 6\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Kimberly Wasser\nAdministrative Coordinator/ City Clerk\nFreedom of Information Officer\nCity of Collinsville\n125 South Center Street\nCollinsville, Illinois 62234\nkwasser @collinsvilleil. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A TIF joint review board's 10:00 a.m. meeting time","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-41771/","full_text":"b•\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 30, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Mitchell Bair\n\nCity Manager\nCity of Collinsville\n125 South Center Street\n\nCollinsville, Illinois 62234\n\nmbair @collinsvilleil. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review— 2016 PAC 41771; 2016 PAC 41807\nDear\n\nand Mr. Bair:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99- 402, effective August\n\n19, 2015). The Public Access Bureau received two Requests for Review alleging the same\nviolation of OMA with respect to the May 4, 2016, meeting of the Collinsville Southwest\nCorridors TIF Joint Review Board (Board). Therefore, we have consolidated those matters for\nthis determination. For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that\nscheduling the May 4, 2016, meeting of the Board at 10: 00 a.m. did not violate the provisions of\nOMA requiring that public bodies meet at times and places convenient to the public.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn May 6, 2016, the Public Access Bureau received a Request for Review in\n\nwhich\n\nalleged the Board had violated OMA by holding its May 4, 2016,\n\nmeeting at an inconvenient time. Specifically,\n\nalleged that the Board's 10: 00 a.m.\n\nmeeting on a Wednesday was inconvenient because it was in the middle of a work day and most\nresidents were unable to attend the meeting. On May 9, 2016, the Public Access Bureau\n\nreceived a Request for Review from\nwho also alleged that the Board's May 4,\n2016, meeting time was inconvenient and that it had been intentionally scheduled to exclude\nmembers of the public from attending. Both\nfurther assert that the\nmeeting was intentionally scheduled at an inconvenient time to affect the selection of the public\nmember of the Board.\n\nOn May 17, 2016, this office forwarded copies of the Requests for Review to the\n\nBoard and asked it to provide a written response to the allegations of\n\nOn May 26, 2016, the Board responded, asserting that a weekday meeting during business hours\nis not an inconvenient time. The Board stated that the May 4, 2016, meeting time had been\nannounced at the April 11, 2016, Collinsville City Council (Council) meeting. The Board also\nstated that it had published notice of the meeting in the Belleville News- Democrat on April 19,\n\n2016, and had posted the meeting agenda at City Hall and on the City's website on April 28,\n2016. The Board's response stated that 7 members of the public, including\nwere\npresent at the May 4, 2016, meeting and that an additional 25 members of the public viewed the\nBoard's live webcast of the meeting.\nOn May 26, 2016, this office sent copies of the Board's response to\n\nand\nand offered them the opportunity to reply. On June 13, 2016,\nreplied\nby asserting that the meeting was held at an inconvenient time to discourage public participation.\n\nalleged that more than 100 people had attended the March 22, 2016, evening\nmeeting of the Council concerning the proposed tax increment financing district(TIF District)\nand an equal number were expected to attend a Council meeting on June 13, 2016, when the TIF\n\nDistrict was to be discussed.\n\nstated that \"only 4 members of the public who\n\nregularly attend every council meeting as gadflies, the chairman of the chamber of commerce, a\npreselected public member of the proposed TIF JRB, and a newspaper reporter attended\"'\n\nMay 4, 2016, Board meeting.\n\nthe\n\nalso alleged that the meeting time prevented a\n\nsufficient number of members of the public from attending the meeting to allow for a proper\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989). Section 2. 01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2.01 (West 2014) provides, in\npertinent part, that \"[ a] ll meetings required by [ the] Act to be public shall be held at specified\ntimes and places which are convenient and open to the public.\"\n\nallege that the Board held its May 4, 2016, meeting at an inconvenient time because the meeting\nwas scheduled during regular business hours when many people are at work.\n\nOMA does not define what is \" convenient.\" Undefined statutory terms must be\ngiven their plain and ordinary meaning. Exelon Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 275\n\n2009) (finding that where a statute fails to specifically define a word, a court may use a\n\ndictionary to determine the word's plain and ordinary meaning). \"' Convenient' means ' suited to a\npersonal\n\ncomfort\n\nor to easy performance' or'\n\naffording accommodation\n\nor\n\nadvantage.\"'\n\nGerwin v.\n\nLivingston Co. Board, 345 Ill. App. 3d 352, 361 (4th Dist. 2003) (quoting Merriam- Webster's\n\nCollegiate Dictionary 252 (10th ed. 2000)). Although the court in Gerwin addressed the issue of\n\nwhether a meeting place (a small room) rather than a meeting time was convenient, the term\nconvenient\" in section\nnot synonymous\n\nunder\n\n2. 01 modifies\n\nboth \" times\" and \" places.\" \" Open\" and \" convenient\" are\n\nthe Act; accordingly, \"[\n\na] meeting can be open in the sense that no one is\n\nprohibited from attending it, but it can be held in such an ill- suited, unaccommodating,\nunadvantageous place that members of the public, as a practical matter, would be deterred from\n\nattending it.\" Gerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 361. To the same extent, a meeting can be held at\nsuch an unaccommodating, unadvantageous time that the public would be unreasonably\ndeterred from attending it. The concept of public convenience implies a \" rule of\nreasonableness,\n\nnot ' absolute\n\naccessibility'\n\nbut' reasonable accessibility.\"'\n\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App.\n\n3d at 362, quoting State ex rel. Badke v. Village Board ofthe Village ofGreendale, 173 Wis. 2d\n553, 579, 494 N. W. 2d 408, 418 (1993).\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously determined that holding meetings\n\nduring regular business hours does not violate section 2. 01 of OMA. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 39854, issued June 22, 2016 (concluding that special meetings by a village board\n\nconcerning the budget and a tax levy, each held on a Tuesday, one at 4: 00 p. m. and one at 5: 00\n\np.m., did not violate OMA); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29045, issued May 5, 2014\ndetermining that facts provided were not sufficient to show that a meeting by a township board\nat 3: 00 p. m. on a Tuesday was inconvenient); Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 20968, issued\n\nAugust 23, 2013 (finding that a township's monthly meeting at noon on a weekday complied\nwith the requirements of OMA); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 14311, issued June 6, 2011\nconcluding that weekday meetings of a county board and its committees during regular business\n\nholding that a school board's rescheduled regular meeting at 4: 00 p.m. and committee meetings\nat noon did not violate OMA). Given that members of the public have different work schedules\nand other obligations, no particular meeting time is likely to be convenient to all who might wish\n\nto attend. A public meeting held during regular business hours is not inherently inconvenient.\nThe facts alleged do not support a conclusion that the meeting time was so\ninconvenient that it violated OMA.\nhave alleged that the Boards\nmeeting time during regular business hours was actually inconvenient because few people were\nable to attend the meeting. In support of this assertion,\n\ncontrasted the smaller\n\nattendance at the May 4, 2016, meeting of the Board with prior evening meetings of the Council\n\nconcerning the TIF District, which had been well attended. However, any number of factors\n\nother than the scheduling of the meeting could have affected public interest in attending. We are\nnot in a position to speculate as to what factors might have influenced members of the public not\nto attend May 4, 2016, meeting.\nAlthough\n\nIn addition, at least four members of the public did attend the Board's meeting.\n\nalleged that the members of the public who attended \" are\n\nwatchdogs who regularly attend every city council meeting and speak, i2 their presence should\nnot be discounted on that basis.\n\nFurther, members of the public wishing to attend the Board's meeting had\nsignificant advance notice of the time of the meeting. According to the Board, the meeting time\nwas publicly announced three weeks before at a Council meeting and was published two weeks\n\nbefore in the local newspaper. The agenda was also physically posted at City Hall and on the\n\nCity's website six days before the meeting. If members of the public who work during the day\nwished to attend the City's meeting, they had ample time in which to make arrangements to do\n\nso. Moreover, the Board made the meeting available to the public by live webcast.\n\nalso alleged that the Board intentionally scheduled the\nmeeting at an inconvenient time to discourage public participation concerning the TIF District\nproposal. The Board explained that it decided the meeting time based on the former City\nmanager contacting Board members in 2015 \" to determine which dates and times were preferred\n\nto ensure a quorum would be met for each meeting. i3 The former City manager determined that\na majority of the members of the Board preferred weekday mornings for meeting times.\n2016).\n\nAttorney General,\n\n2E- mail from\n\nto Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General(May 9,\n\n3 Letter from Mitchell Bair, City Manager, City of Collinsville, to Matthew S. Hartman, Assistant\n\ndisputed the accuracy of the Board's explanation, asserting that the former City manager\ncould not have known to contact the Board's members concerning the scheduling of the May 4,\n2016, Board meeting for the proposed TIF District because he was relieved of his duties in July,\n2015. However, it is not unlikely that the former City manager would have asked Board\nmembers sometime in early 2015 about their preference for meeting times because the Board is\nrequired to hold an annual meeting under section 11- 74.4- 5(e) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65\n\nILCS 5/ 11- 74. 4- 5(e) (West 2014)). The City's website indicates that the Board held only one\nmeeting in 2015, on March 25, 2015, at 10 a.m.\n\nBecause a public meeting held during regular business hours is not inherently\n\ninconvenient to the public and because\n\nhave not provided sufficient\n\nfacts to show that the meeting was held at such an unaccommodating, unadvantageous time that\nthe public would be unreasonably deterred from attending it, this office concludes that\nscheduling the Board's May 4, 2016, meeting at 10: 00 a.m. did not violate OMA.\n\nPlease also note that the Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to\nresolving disputes concerning OMA and the Freedom of Information (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et\nseq. (West 2014). See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c) (West 2014). To the extent that\nallege that the selection of the public member of the Board was improper under the Illinois\nMunicipal Code, that claim does not allege violations of either FOIA or OMA. Therefore, this\noffice does not have authority to review that allegation.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of these matters do\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Please contact me at (217) 782- 9054 or the\nSpringfield address listed on the first page of this letter if you have questions. This\ncorrespondence\n\nserves to close these matters.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Kimberly Wasser\nAdministrative Coordinator/ City Clerk\nFreedom of Information Officer\nCity of Collinsville\n125 South Center Street\nCollinsville, Illinois 62234\nkwasser @collinsvilleil. org"}
{"id":1175,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-12-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["41778"],"title":"St. Clair Township Board violated OMA by failing to provide proper meeting notice","filename":"41778, issued December 7, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1169,"summary":"The PAC investigated a complaint that the St. Clair Township Board of Trustees failed to provide proper notice for a rescheduled meeting and concluded that the Board violated OMA by failing to make the meeting agenda available for the required 48-hour period.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the St. Clair Township Board of Trustees rescheduled a meeting without giving the public proper notice or making the agenda available as required by law. The Attorney General's office found that the Board failed to keep the meeting agenda available for the required 48 hours before the meeting took place. While the Board cannot fix this past mistake, the PAC issued this letter to remind them of their legal obligation to provide proper notice for future meetings.","holding":"The St. Clair Township Board of Trustees violated section 2.02(a) of the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide proper advance notice for its rescheduled meeting.","legal_question":"Did the St. Clair Township Board of Trustees violate section 2.02(a) of the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide proper advance notice and agenda availability for a rescheduled meeting?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"St. Clair Township Board of Trustees","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The Board rescheduled a regular meeting without ensuring the agenda was available for public review for the required 48-hour period.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":98,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.03/41778, issued December 7, 2017.pdf","sha256":"6a0c53f85e6a3c45b7f877cd19472bc2c849056eb0d2622b7781a851fe38775f","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","rescheduled meeting","agenda","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Dave Barnes, Sr.\nSupervisor\n\nSt. Clair Township Board of Trustees\n107 Service Street\nSwansea, Illinois 62226\n\ndave@stclairtownship. com\nRE:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 41778\n\nand Mr. Barnes:\nThis determination\n\nletter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nBureau concludes that the St. Clair Township Board of Trustees ( Board) violated OMA by\nfailing to provide proper advance notice for its April 26, 2016, meeting.\nOn May 6, 2016,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\nAccess Bureau alleging that the Board violated the requirements of OMA by rescheduling a\n\nregularly scheduled April 26, 2016, meeting to April 19, 2016, without posting proper notice in\nthe local newspaper and at the Township office. On June 2, 2016, this office forwarded a copy\nof the Request for Review to the Board and asked it to provide this office with copies of the\n\nagenda, open session minutes, and open session recording ( if one was made) of the April 19,\n2016, meeting.\nOn June 6, 2016, the Board provided this office with copies of the agenda and\n\nopen session minutes for the April 19, 2016, meeting, and Mr. Barnes provided a brief written\nresponse on behalf of the Board. On February 8, 2017, this office forwarded the Board' s\nresponse to\nhe did not submit a reply.\n\n500\n\nSouth Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (\n\n100 West Randolph\n\nStreet,\n\nChicago,\n\nIllinois,\n\n60601 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (\n\n217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217)\n\n782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (\n\n312)\n\nFax: ( 312)\n\n814- 3806\n\nLI Cr, <\n\nIn\n\nann.\n\nTv. /\n\nLION\n\nCIn\n\n814- 3374 •\nCAW) .\n\nC...,. .<.\n\nON\n\nCM\n\nCI\n\nIn\n\n\fMr. Dave Barnes, Sr.\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 2\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\nGosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n\n161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 2. 03 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 03 ( West 2016)) provides:\n\nIn addition to the notice required by Section 2. 02, each\nbody subject to this Act must, at the beginning of each calendar or\nfiscal year, prepare and make available a schedule of all its regular\n\nmeetings for such calendar or fiscal year, listing the times and\nplaces\n\nof such\n\nmeetings.\n\nIf a change is made in regular meeting dates, at least 10\ndays' notice of such change shall be given by publication in a\n\nnewspaper of general circulation in the area in which such body\nfunctions. * * *\n\nNotice of such change shall also be posted at the\n\nprincipal office of the public body or, if no such office exists, at\nthe building in which the meeting is to be held. Notice of such\nchange shall also be supplied to those news media which have filed\n\nan annual request for notice as provided in paragraph ( b) of\nSection 2. 02. ( Emphasis added.)\n\nUnder the plain language of section 2. 03 of OMA, only a change in the regular\nmeeting dates requires ten days' advance notice by publication.\n\nIf, for example, a public body\n\nchanged its regular monthly meeting from the first Monday of each month to the second Tuesday\nof the month, notice by publication would be required. There is no requirement to notify the\npublic of one rescheduled meeting outside of posting notice and an agenda 48 hours before a\nmeeting as required by section 2. 02 of OMA.\nTo that end, section 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides,\nin pertinent part:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal\noffice of the public body and at the location where the meeting is\nto be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the\nmeeting. A public body that has a website that the full- time staff\nof the\n\npublic\n\nbody maintains shall also post on its website the\n\n\fMr. Dave Barnes, Sr.\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 3\n\nagenda of any regular meetings of the governing body of that\nbody. * * *\nPublic notice of any special meeting except a\nmeeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of any\npublic\n\nrescheduled regular meeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall\n\nbe given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which notice shall\nalso include the agenda for the special, rescheduled, or reconvened\nmeeting[.] (\n\nEmphasis added.)\n\nalleges that the Board failed to post notice at the Township office and\nin the local newspaper. In its response to that allegation, the Board stated: \" Due to the Board\n\nonly rescheduling a meeting, ' not changing the entire schedule', we only needed to furnish the\nnotice and agenda to the registered\n\nnews media.\"'\n\nAlthough OMA did not require the Board to post notice of a single rescheduled\n\nmeeting in the local newspaper, section 2. 02( a) did require the Board to post such notice at least\n48 hours before the rescheduled meeting at the Boards principal office and at the location of the\nmeeting. The Board' s June 6, 2016, response to this office indicated that it only furnished notice\n\nof the April 19, 2016, meeting to the news media, and did not dispute\nallegation\nthat notice for the meeting was not posted at the location of the meeting and at the Board' s\nprincipal office. Because the available information indicates that the agenda for the Board's\n\nApril 19, 2016, regular meeting was not continuously available for public review during the\nentire 48- hour period preceding the meeting, this office concludes that the Board violated section\n2. 02( a) of OMA.\n\nWhile there are no means for the Board to remedy its violation in this instance,\nthe Board should be mindful of its obligation to provide proper advance notice for rescheduled\nmeetings in accordance with section 2. 02( a) of OMA.\n\nLetter from Dave Barnes, Supervisor, St. Clair Township, to Office of the Attorney General,\nAttn:\n\nS. Piya Mukherjee ( June 6, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Dave Barnes, Sr.\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 312) 814- 5383 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nS. PIYA MUKHERJEE\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n41778\n\no 202 notice\n\nimproper\n\nmun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Rescheduling a meeting without 48-hour agenda notice","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-41778/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Dave Barnes, Sr.\nSupervisor\n\nSt. Clair Township Board of Trustees\n107 Service Street\nSwansea, Illinois 62226\n\ndave@stclairtownship. com\nRE:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 41778\n\nand Mr. Barnes:\nThis determination\n\nletter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nBureau concludes that the St. Clair Township Board of Trustees (Board) violated OMA by\nfailing to provide proper advance notice for its April 26, 2016, meeting.\nOn May 6, 2016,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\nAccess Bureau alleging that the Board violated the requirements of OMA by rescheduling a\n\nregularly scheduled April 26, 2016, meeting to April 19, 2016, without posting proper notice in\nthe local newspaper and at the Township office. On June 2, 2016, this office forwarded a copy\nof the Request for Review to the Board and asked it to provide this office with copies of the\n\nagenda, open session minutes, and open session recording (if one was made) of the April 19,\n2016, meeting.\nOn June 6, 2016, the Board provided this office with copies of the agenda and\n\nopen session minutes for the April 19, 2016, meeting, and Mr. Barnes provided a brief written\nresponse on behalf of the Board. On February 8, 2017, this office forwarded the Board's\nresponse to\nhe did not submit a reply.\n\n500\n\nSouth Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (100 West Randolph\n\nStreet,\n\nChicago,\n\nIllinois,\n\n60601 • (217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: (217)\n\n782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (312)\n\nFax: (312)\n\n814- 3806\n\nLI Cr, <\n\nIn\n\nann.\n\nTv. /\n\nLION\n\nCIn\n\n814- 3374 •\nCAW).\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\nGosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n\n161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 2. 03 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 03 (West 2016)) provides:\n\nIn addition to the notice required by Section 2. 02, each\nbody subject to this Act must, at the beginning of each calendar or\nfiscal year, prepare and make available a schedule of all its regular\n\nmeetings for such calendar or fiscal year, listing the times and\nplaces\n\nof such\n\nmeetings.\n\nIf a change is made in regular meeting dates, at least 10\ndays' notice of such change shall be given by publication in a\n\nnewspaper of general circulation in the area in which such body\nfunctions. * * *\n\nNotice of such change shall also be posted at the\n\nprincipal office of the public body or, if no such office exists, at\nthe building in which the meeting is to be held. Notice of such\nchange shall also be supplied to those news media which have filed\n\nan annual request for notice as provided in paragraph (b) of\nSection 2. 02. (Emphasis added.)\n\nUnder the plain language of section 2. 03 of OMA, only a change in the regular\nmeeting dates requires ten days' advance notice by publication.\n\nIf, for example, a public body\n\nchanged its regular monthly meeting from the first Monday of each month to the second Tuesday\nof the month, notice by publication would be required. There is no requirement to notify the\npublic of one rescheduled meeting outside of posting notice and an agenda 48 hours before a\nmeeting as required by section 2. 02 of OMA.\nTo that end, section 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides,\nin pertinent part:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal\noffice of the public body and at the location where the meeting is\n\nagenda of any regular meetings of the governing body of that\nbody. * * *\nPublic notice of any special meeting except a\nmeeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of any\npublic\n\nrescheduled regular meeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall\n\nbe given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which notice shall\nalso include the agenda for the special, rescheduled, or reconvened\nmeeting[.] (Emphasis added.)\n\nalleges that the Board failed to post notice at the Township office and\nin the local newspaper. In its response to that allegation, the Board stated: \" Due to the Board\n\nonly rescheduling a meeting, ' not changing the entire schedule', we only needed to furnish the\nnotice and agenda to the registered\n\nnews media.\"'\n\nAlthough OMA did not require the Board to post notice of a single rescheduled\n\nmeeting in the local newspaper, section 2. 02(a) did require the Board to post such notice at least\n48 hours before the rescheduled meeting at the Boards principal office and at the location of the\nmeeting. The Board's June 6, 2016, response to this office indicated that it only furnished notice\n\nof the April 19, 2016, meeting to the news media, and did not dispute\nallegation\nthat notice for the meeting was not posted at the location of the meeting and at the Board's\nprincipal office. Because the available information indicates that the agenda for the Board's\n\nApril 19, 2016, regular meeting was not continuously available for public review during the\nentire 48- hour period preceding the meeting, this office concludes that the Board violated section\n2. 02(a) of OMA.\n\nWhile there are no means for the Board to remedy its violation in this instance,\nthe Board should be mindful of its obligation to provide proper advance notice for rescheduled\nmeetings in accordance with section 2. 02(a) of OMA.\n\nLetter from Dave Barnes, Supervisor, St. Clair Township, to Office of the Attorney General,\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (312) 814- 5383 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nS. PIYA MUKHERJEE\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n41778\n\no 202 notice\n\nimproper\n\nmun"}
{"id":1176,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-07-05","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["41800"],"title":"City of Earlville City Council violated OMA by holding meeting without notice","filename":"41800, issued July 5, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2348,"summary":"The PAC determined that the City of Earlville City Council violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide public notice and keep minutes for a gathering of aldermen, and that certain members failed to complete mandatory OMA training.","plain_summary":"A local newspaper editor complained that three City Council members held a private gathering to discuss city business without public notice or minutes. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau concluded that this gathering violated the Open Meetings Act because it involved a majority of a quorum deliberating public business. The Bureau also noted an allegation that three aldermen failed to complete required OMA training, but did not make a finding on that issue. The letter cautions the City Council to comply with OMA in the future.","holding":"The City of Earlville violated the Open Meetings Act by holding a meeting of a majority of a quorum of the City Council without providing public notice or keeping minutes.","legal_question":"Whether a gathering of three aldermen constituted a 'meeting' under the Open Meetings Act requiring public notice and minutes, and whether those members complied with mandatory OMA training requirements.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.05","5 ILCS 120/2","5 ILCS 120/2.02","5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Earlville City Council","requesting_party":"Mr. Stuart Bloom (The Earlville Post)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"A gathering of three aldermen to discuss city business without public notice or minutes.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/41800, issued July 5, 2017.pdf","sha256":"b05223ebf98db10131e9b8f70adb17e786077a1259bd6ac008ea1d03cc6118ee","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["open meetings act","public notice","meeting minutes","oma training","city council"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"�--.-\n\n�\n\n�r\n�:;.,,\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nAlTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJuly 5, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Stuart Bloom\nEditor\nThe Earlville Post\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\neditor@earlvillepost.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Michael S. Hall\nMayor\nCity of Earlville\n210 West Railroad Street\nP.O. Box 98\nEarlville, Illinois.60518\nmayor@earlvilleil.org\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 41800\nDear Mr. Bloom and Mr. Hall:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS l20/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the City of Earlville (City) City Council (City Council) violated the requirements\nof OMA.\nOn May 9, 2016, Mr. Stuart Bloom submitted this Request for Review, on behalf\nof the Earlville Post, alleging that three City Council members held a gathering without (1)\nproviding the public with advance notice of the meeting and (2) keeping written minutes of the\nmeeting as required by OMA. Specifically, Mr. Bloom stated that the gathering of City Council\nmembers first became public at a meeting held by the City Council on May 4, 2016, when Mayor\nHall mentioned that on April 21, 2016, three particular aldermen met to discuss city business.\nMr. Bloom asserts that during the May 4, 2016, meeting an alderman \"publicly acknowledged\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • lTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\nI 001 E,est Main, Carbondale, Illinois 6290 I • (6 I 8) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Stuart Bloom\nMr. Michael S. Hall\nJuly 5, 2017\nI•\nPage 2\n\nthat the meeting had taken place but said it was not subject to the Open Meetings Act because it\ndid not involve 'deliberations' but only 'information gathering.\"' 1 He also alleged that three\nnamed aldermen failed to complete their OMA training within 90 days of taking their oaths of\noffice on May 15, 2015, as required by section l.05(b) of OMA (5 ILCS l 20/l .05(b) (West\n2014)).\nOn May 18, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the City\nCouncil and requested that it provide a detailed response to the allegations in the Request for\nReview. On June 8, 2016, this office received the City Council's written response. On August\n22, 2016, this office forwarded a copy ofthe City Council's response to Mr. Bloom; he did not\nreply.\nDETERMINATION\nGathering of City Council Members\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"[a]ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 2.06(a) (5 lLCS l20/2.06(a) (West 2014), as amended by\nPublic Act 99-5 I 5, effective June 30, 2016) provides in relevant part, \"[a]ll public bodies shall\nkeep written minutes of all their meetings.\"\nSection 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2014)) defines \"meeting\" as:\n{A/ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor.other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority ofa quorum of the members of a public body heldfor\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.] (Emphasis added.)\n!fa gathering of public body members is determined to be a \"meeting,\" then all the requirements\nof OMA apply, including proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 lLCS 120/2.02) (West\n2014)), and keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2014)).\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the defini!,ion of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\n'Letter from Stuart Bloom, Editor, The Earlville Post, to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor,\nOffice of the Attorney General (May 5, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Stuart Bloom\nMr. Michael S. Hall\nJuly 5,2017\nPage 3\n\nsituation.\" 197llll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. A \"meeting\" has\nbeen described by some courts as a gathering \"'designed to discuss or reach an accord with\nregard to public �usiness[.]'\" Nabhani v. Cog/ianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 (N.D. Ill. 1982)\n(quoting People ex rel. Defanis v. Barr, 83 111.2d 191,210).\nIn People ex rel. Defanis v. Barr, 83 111.2d 191, 198 (1980), the Illinois Supreme\nCourt determined that a gathering of nine city council members that occurred prior to a city\ncouncil meeting in which the city council members discussed party matters, a future election, and\nmatters that the city council would consider at its meeting later that night, violated the intent and\nthe terms of OMA even though the meeting was informal and no votes were taken. In reaching\nthis decision, the Barr court stated that the public policy of a presumption of openness as\narticulated in section 1 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014))2 would \"be poorly served were we\nto carve out exceptions***for informal [meetings] where, as here, public business was\ndeliberated.\" Barr,\n' 83 Ill.2d at 199.\nFurther, in State v. Swanson, 92 Wis.2d 310, 315-16, 284 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Wis.\n1979), the Wisc<;insin Supreme Court found that aldermen holding a \"conference\" with a\nneighboring city for the purpose of exchanging information regarding annexation issues was a\n\"meeting\" for the purposes of that state's open meeting law. See also, Orange County\nPublications, Division of Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Council ofNewburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409,\n401 N.Y.S.2d 84 .(N. Y. App. Div. 1978) (rejecting a city council's contention that informally\ngathering in the c.ity manager's office to discuss matters four days prior to city council meetings\nwere not \"meetings\" in violation of the State ofNew York's open meeting law); Sacramento\nNewspaper Guild v. Sacramento Cty. Bd. ofSup'rs, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 50, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480\n(Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (\"There is rarely any purpose to a nonpublic pre-meeting conference except\nto conduct some part of the decisional process behind closed doors. Only by embracing the\ncollective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as the ultimate step of official action, can an\nopen meeting regulation frustrate these evasive devices.\")\nHere, the City Council is comprised of six aldermen. Accordingly, four City\nCouncil members comprise a quorum, and a majority of the quorum is three members. In his\n2\n\nSection I of OMA provides in relevant part:\n\nIt is the public policy of this State that public bodies exist to aid in the\nconduct of the people's business and that the people have a right to be informed\nas to the conduct of their business. In order that the people shall be informed, the\nGeneral Assembly finds and declares that it is the intent of this Act to ensure\nthat the actions of public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be\nconducted openly.\n\n\fMr. Stuart Blooni\nMr. Michael S. Hall\nJuly 5, 2017\nPage 4\n\nRequest for Review, Mr. Bloom asserts that three of the six trustees gathered on April 21, 2016,\nand the City Council does not dispute this assertion. The question, therefore, is whether the\naldermen's gathering constituted a City Council meeting.\nIn its response to this office, the City Council describes the April 21, 20 I 6,\ngathering as follows:\nSuperintendent of Public Works, Roger Torman, called\nAlderman Michael Konsoer to request to meet with him at one of\nthe properties the city owns to discuss a possible proposal from an\nadjacent property owner. Mr. Konsoer returned Mr. Torman's call\nand they set up a time to meet on April 21, 20 I 6. When Mr.\nTorman arrived for the meeting Alderman Michael Konsoer was\nth�re as well as Alderman Kenneth Bonine and Alderman Walter\nGrimm. Mr. Torman had not spoken to Alderman Bonine or\nAlderman Grimm about meeting with them on that date and time.\nThe location of the city property lines and structure was discussed\nas well as a possible proposal by the adjacent property owner to\ntrade some property for an access easement and repairs to the roof\non a city structure at the location. To my knowledge there were no\nvo,tes taken Pl (Emphasis added.)\nAs described in the City Council's response to this office, the purpose of the April\n21, 2016, gathering was to discuss a potential land deal between an adjacent private property\nowner and properties that the City owned. The City Council's response described the general\ntopics discussed ,1:1s the location of property lines, the possibility of trading City property in\nexchange for granting a member of the public an easement, as well as other such matters\nconcerning the City. These topics clearly and directly pertain to the public business of the City.\nThe City Council asserted in its response to this office that the City employee who\narranged the April 21, 2016, gathering did not anticipate a majority of a quorum of City Council\nmembers to be in; attendance. However, OMA's broad definition of \"meeting\" is not limited to\ngatherings in which it is anticipated that at least a majority of a quorum of a public body will be\npresent. Rather,,'.1ny gathering held by a majority of a quorum of a public body for the purpose\nof discussing public business constitutes a \"meeting\" under the Act.\n\n'Letter from Michael S. Hall, Mayor, City of Earlville, to Shari L. West, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau (June I, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Stuart Bloom\nMr. Michael S. l;lall\nJuly 5, 2017\nPage 5\n\nIn this instance, the facts are undisputed that a majority of a quorum of the City\nCouncil engaged :in deliberative discussions of public business during the April 21, 2016,\ngathering. Accordingly, this office concludes that the City Council violated (1) section 2.02 of\nOMA by holding that meeting without proper posting of notice and an agenda; and (2) section\n2.06(a) of OMA by failing to keep minutes of the meeting. Because the City Council does not\nappear to have voted upon items of final action at the meeting, no remedial action is required, but\nthis office cautions the City Council to comply with all of the requirements of OMA when\nholding meetings subject to the Act.\nOMA Training\nSection l .0S(b) of OMA provides the requirements for members of public bodies\nto complete the electronic training program developed by the Public Access Counselor:\nExcept as otherwise provided in this Section, each elected\nolappointed member of a public body subject to this Act who\nbecomes such a member after the effective date of this amendatory\nAct of the 97th General Assembly shall successfully complete the\nelectronic training curriculum developed and administered by the\nPublic Access Counselor. For these members, the training must be\ncompleted not later than the 90th day after the date the member:\n(1)\n\ntakes the oath of office, if the member is required\nto take an oath of office to assume the person's\nduties as a member of the public body; or\n\n(2)\n\notherwise assumes responsibilities as a member of\nthe public body, if the member is not required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person's duties\nas a member of the governmental body.\n\nEach member successfully completing the electronic\ntraining curriculum shall file a copy of the certificate of completion\nwith the public body.\n***\nThe failure of one or more members of a public body to\ncomplete the training required by this Section does not affect the\nvalidity of an action taken by the public body.\n\n\fMr. Stuart Bloom\nMr. Michael S. Hall\nJuly5,2017\nPage 6\n\nAn elected or appointed member of a public body subject to\nthis Act who has successfully completed the training required\nunder this subsection (b) and filed a copy of the certificate of\ncompletion with the public body is not required to subsequently\ncomplete the training required under this subsection (b).\n(Emphasis added.)\nIn his Request for Review, Mr. Bloom alleged that Aldermen Konsoer, Bonine,\nand Grimm failed to complete their OMA training within 90 days of taking their oaths of office\non May 15, 2015. The City Council confirmed in its response to this office that all three of the\nabove-mentioned aldermen took their oaths of office on May 15, 2015. In addition, the City\nCouncil furnished this office with copies of the certificates of completion reflecting that all three\nof these aldermeD have successfully completed the OMA electronic training.\nBecause the aldermen wear sworn in on May 15,2015, they had until August 11,\n2015 - 90 days after the day they took the oath of office - to complete their OMA electronic\ntraining. The certificates of completion provided by the City Council shows that Mr. Konsoer\nsuccessfully completed the OMA training on November 6, 2015; Mr. Bonine successfully\ncompleted the OMA training on November 9,2015; and Mr. Grimm successfully completed the\nOMA training on November 12, 2015. Accordingly, this office concludes that Mr. Konsoer, Mr.\nBonine, and Mr. Grimm failed to complywith the training requirements of OMA.\nBecause the City Council has demonstrated that the aldermen in question have\nnow successfully completed the OMA electronic training and because the plain language of\nsection l .05(b) p_rovides that any violation of the training requirements does not invalidate any\naction taken by the City Council, no further remedial action is required. However, this office\ncautions the City Council members to comply with all of the training requirements of OMA in\nthe future.\n\n'°\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have questions, you may contact me bye­\nmail at sbarnaby@atg.state.il.us, by mail at the address listed on the first page of this letter, or by\nphone at (312)5?P-4480. This letter serves to close this file .\n.. .\n\n\fMr. Stuart Bloom\nMr. Michael S. Hall\nJuly 5, 2017\nPage 7\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n41800 o 2a meeting improper202 notice improper 206 minutes improper I 05 training incomplete\nmun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A gathering of three aldermen about city business","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-41800/","full_text":"�--.-\n\n�\n\n�r\n�:;.,,\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nAlTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJuly 5, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Stuart Bloom\nEditor\nThe Earlville Post\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\neditor@earlvillepost.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Michael S. Hall\nMayor\nCity of Earlville\n210 West Railroad Street\nP.O. Box 98\nEarlville, Illinois.60518\nmayor@earlvilleil.org\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 41800\nDear Mr. Bloom and Mr. Hall:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS l20/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the City of Earlville (City) City Council (City Council) violated the requirements\nof OMA.\nOn May 9, 2016, Mr. Stuart Bloom submitted this Request for Review, on behalf\nof the Earlville Post, alleging that three City Council members held a gathering without (1)\nproviding the public with advance notice of the meeting and (2) keeping written minutes of the\nmeeting as required by OMA. Specifically, Mr. Bloom stated that the gathering of City Council\nmembers first became public at a meeting held by the City Council on May 4, 2016, when Mayor\nHall mentioned that on April 21, 2016, three particular aldermen met to discuss city business.\nMr. Bloom asserts that during the May 4, 2016, meeting an alderman \"publicly acknowledged\n\nthat the meeting had taken place but said it was not subject to the Open Meetings Act because it\ndid not involve 'deliberations' but only 'information gathering.\"' 1 He also alleged that three\nnamed aldermen failed to complete their OMA training within 90 days of taking their oaths of\noffice on May 15, 2015, as required by section l.05(b) of OMA (5 ILCS l 20/l.05(b) (West\n2014)).\nOn May 18, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the City\nCouncil and requested that it provide a detailed response to the allegations in the Request for\nReview. On June 8, 2016, this office received the City Council's written response. On August\n22, 2016, this office forwarded a copy ofthe City Council's response to Mr. Bloom; he did not\nreply.\nDETERMINATION\nGathering of City Council Members\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"[a]ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 2.06(a) (5 lLCS l20/2.06(a) (West 2014), as amended by\nPublic Act 99-5 I 5, effective June 30, 2016) provides in relevant part, \"[a]ll public bodies shall\nkeep written minutes of all their meetings.\"\nSection 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2014)) defines \"meeting\" as:\n{A/ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor.other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority ofa quorum of the members of a public body heldfor\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.] (Emphasis added.)\n!fa gathering of public body members is determined to be a \"meeting,\" then all the requirements\nof OMA apply, including proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 lLCS 120/2.02) (West\n2014)), and keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2014)).\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the defini!,ion of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\n'Letter from Stuart Bloom, Editor, The Earlville Post, to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor,\n\nsituation.\" 197llll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. A \"meeting\" has\nbeen described by some courts as a gathering \"'designed to discuss or reach an accord with\nregard to public �usiness[.]'\" Nabhani v. Cog/ianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 (N.D. Ill. 1982)\n(quoting People ex rel. Defanis v. Barr, 83 111.2d 191,210).\nIn People ex rel. Defanis v. Barr, 83 111.2d 191, 198 (1980), the Illinois Supreme\nCourt determined that a gathering of nine city council members that occurred prior to a city\ncouncil meeting in which the city council members discussed party matters, a future election, and\nmatters that the city council would consider at its meeting later that night, violated the intent and\nthe terms of OMA even though the meeting was informal and no votes were taken. In reaching\nthis decision, the Barr court stated that the public policy of a presumption of openness as\narticulated in section 1 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014))2 would \"be poorly served were we\nto carve out exceptions***for informal [meetings] where, as here, public business was\ndeliberated.\" Barr,\n' 83 Ill.2d at 199.\nFurther, in State v. Swanson, 92 Wis.2d 310, 315-16, 284 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Wis.\n1979), the Wisc<;insin Supreme Court found that aldermen holding a \"conference\" with a\nneighboring city for the purpose of exchanging information regarding annexation issues was a\n\"meeting\" for the purposes of that state's open meeting law. See also, Orange County\nPublications, Division of Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Council ofNewburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409,\n401 N.Y.S.2d 84.(N. Y. App. Div. 1978) (rejecting a city council's contention that informally\ngathering in the c.ity manager's office to discuss matters four days prior to city council meetings\nwere not \"meetings\" in violation of the State ofNew York's open meeting law); Sacramento\nNewspaper Guild v. Sacramento Cty. Bd. ofSup'rs, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 50, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480\n(Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (\"There is rarely any purpose to a nonpublic pre-meeting conference except\nto conduct some part of the decisional process behind closed doors. Only by embracing the\ncollective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as the ultimate step of official action, can an\nopen meeting regulation frustrate these evasive devices.\")\nHere, the City Council is comprised of six aldermen. Accordingly, four City\nCouncil members comprise a quorum, and a majority of the quorum is three members. In his\n2\n\nSection I of OMA provides in relevant part:\n\nIt is the public policy of this State that public bodies exist to aid in the\nconduct of the people's business and that the people have a right to be informed\n\nRequest for Review, Mr. Bloom asserts that three of the six trustees gathered on April 21, 2016,\nand the City Council does not dispute this assertion. The question, therefore, is whether the\naldermen's gathering constituted a City Council meeting.\nIn its response to this office, the City Council describes the April 21, 20 I 6,\ngathering as follows:\nSuperintendent of Public Works, Roger Torman, called\nAlderman Michael Konsoer to request to meet with him at one of\nthe properties the city owns to discuss a possible proposal from an\nadjacent property owner. Mr. Konsoer returned Mr. Torman's call\nand they set up a time to meet on April 21, 20 I 6. When Mr.\nTorman arrived for the meeting Alderman Michael Konsoer was\nth�re as well as Alderman Kenneth Bonine and Alderman Walter\nGrimm. Mr. Torman had not spoken to Alderman Bonine or\nAlderman Grimm about meeting with them on that date and time.\nThe location of the city property lines and structure was discussed\nas well as a possible proposal by the adjacent property owner to\ntrade some property for an access easement and repairs to the roof\non a city structure at the location. To my knowledge there were no\nvo,tes taken Pl (Emphasis added.)\nAs described in the City Council's response to this office, the purpose of the April\n21, 2016, gathering was to discuss a potential land deal between an adjacent private property\nowner and properties that the City owned. The City Council's response described the general\ntopics discussed,1:1s the location of property lines, the possibility of trading City property in\nexchange for granting a member of the public an easement, as well as other such matters\nconcerning the City. These topics clearly and directly pertain to the public business of the City.\nThe City Council asserted in its response to this office that the City employee who\narranged the April 21, 2016, gathering did not anticipate a majority of a quorum of City Council\nmembers to be in; attendance. However, OMA's broad definition of \"meeting\" is not limited to\ngatherings in which it is anticipated that at least a majority of a quorum of a public body will be\npresent. Rather,,'.1ny gathering held by a majority of a quorum of a public body for the purpose\nof discussing public business constitutes a \"meeting\" under the Act.\n\n'Letter from Michael S. Hall, Mayor, City of Earlville, to Shari L. West, Assistant Attorney\n\nIn this instance, the facts are undisputed that a majority of a quorum of the City\nCouncil engaged:in deliberative discussions of public business during the April 21, 2016,\ngathering. Accordingly, this office concludes that the City Council violated (1) section 2.02 of\nOMA by holding that meeting without proper posting of notice and an agenda; and (2) section\n2.06(a) of OMA by failing to keep minutes of the meeting. Because the City Council does not\nappear to have voted upon items of final action at the meeting, no remedial action is required, but\nthis office cautions the City Council to comply with all of the requirements of OMA when\nholding meetings subject to the Act.\nOMA Training\nSection l.0S(b) of OMA provides the requirements for members of public bodies\nto complete the electronic training program developed by the Public Access Counselor:\nExcept as otherwise provided in this Section, each elected\nolappointed member of a public body subject to this Act who\nbecomes such a member after the effective date of this amendatory\nAct of the 97th General Assembly shall successfully complete the\nelectronic training curriculum developed and administered by the\nPublic Access Counselor. For these members, the training must be\ncompleted not later than the 90th day after the date the member:\n(1)\n\ntakes the oath of office, if the member is required\nto take an oath of office to assume the person's\nduties as a member of the public body; or\n\n(2)\n\notherwise assumes responsibilities as a member of\nthe public body, if the member is not required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person's duties\nas a member of the governmental body.\n\nEach member successfully completing the electronic\ntraining curriculum shall file a copy of the certificate of completion\nwith the public body.\n***\nThe failure of one or more members of a public body to\ncomplete the training required by this Section does not affect the\nvalidity of an action taken by the public body.\n\nMr. Stuart Bloom\nMr. Michael S. Hall\nJuly5,2017\nPage 6\n\nAn elected or appointed member of a public body subject to\nthis Act who has successfully completed the training required\nunder this subsection (b) and filed a copy of the certificate of\ncompletion with the public body is not required to subsequently\ncomplete the training required under this subsection (b).\n(Emphasis added.)\nIn his Request for Review, Mr. Bloom alleged that Aldermen Konsoer, Bonine,\nand Grimm failed to complete their OMA training within 90 days of taking their oaths of office\non May 15, 2015. The City Council confirmed in its response to this office that all three of the\nabove-mentioned aldermen took their oaths of office on May 15, 2015. In addition, the City\nCouncil furnished this office with copies of the certificates of completion reflecting that all three\nof these aldermeD have successfully completed the OMA electronic training.\nBecause the aldermen wear sworn in on May 15,2015, they had until August 11,\n2015 - 90 days after the day they took the oath of office - to complete their OMA electronic\ntraining. The certificates of completion provided by the City Council shows that Mr. Konsoer\nsuccessfully completed the OMA training on November 6, 2015; Mr. Bonine successfully\ncompleted the OMA training on November 9,2015; and Mr. Grimm successfully completed the\nOMA training on November 12, 2015. Accordingly, this office concludes that Mr. Konsoer, Mr.\nBonine, and Mr. Grimm failed to complywith the training requirements of OMA.\nBecause the City Council has demonstrated that the aldermen in question have\nnow successfully completed the OMA electronic training and because the plain language of\nsection l.05(b) p_rovides that any violation of the training requirements does not invalidate any\naction taken by the City Council, no further remedial action is required. However, this office\ncautions the City Council members to comply with all of the training requirements of OMA in\nthe future.\n\n'°\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have questions, you may contact me bye­\nmail at sbarnaby@atg.state.il.us, by mail at the address listed on the first page of this letter, or by\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n41800 o 2a meeting improper202 notice improper 206 minutes improper I 05 training incomplete\nmun"}
{"id":1178,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-08-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["42572"],"title":"Forest Ridge SD 142 Board unable to conclude on meeting recording location restriction","filename":"42572, issued August 18, 2016.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":854,"summary":"A requester alleged that a school board restricted the area where members of the public could record a meeting, but the PAC found insufficient evidence to determine a violation occurred.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board forced them to record a meeting from a spot where they couldn't see or hear the board members properly. The board denied this, and because the PAC could not verify the conflicting accounts, they closed the case without finding a violation. However, the PAC reminded the board that they are legally required to have written rules for how the public can record meetings.","holding":"The PAC was unable to conclude that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act based on the conflicting information provided.","legal_question":"Did the Board violate section 2.05 of the Open Meetings Act by allegedly restricting the location from which a member of the public could record a meeting?","disposition":"insufficient_info","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.05"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Forest Ridge School District 142 Board of Education","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Insufficient information to find a violation","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting recording","subject_description":"The complaint concerned the alleged restriction of the physical area where a member of the public could record a board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.05/42572, issued August 18, 2016.pdf","sha256":"792259c3e0367c17ccc2beb639790626aa74753bcaad663c34587dd8c73f0c43","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["recording meetings","public participation","meeting rules","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nAugust 18, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nDr. Paul McDermott\nSuperintendent\nForest Ridge School District 142\n15000 Laramie\n\nOak Forest, Illinois 60452\npmcdennott@p142.\n\nRE:\n\nDear\n\norg\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 42572\n\nand Mr. McDermott:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude from the available information that the Forest Ridge School District\n142 Board of Education ( Board) violated OMA.\n\nIn his Request for Review,\n\nalleged that the Board required\n\nthat people who wished to record its June 21, 2016, meeting do so from a restricted area from\nwhich the president of the Board was not visible and several Board members were not audible.\n\nOn June 28, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and requested a\n\nwritten response to the allegations in the Request for Review together with copies of any rules it\nhas prescribed to govern the public' s statutory right to record meetings. The District' s\nsuperintendent responded on behalf of the Board by stating that the Board permits anyone to\n\nrecord its meetings, and does not require people to record from places in the meeting room where\ntheir ability to see or hear the meeting is obstructed. The superintendent' s response further stated\nthat he attended the June 21, 2016, meeting, and witnessed the following:\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n618)\n\n529- 6400 •\n\nTTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Paul McDermott\n\nAugust 18, 2016\nPage 2\n\nAt the beginning\n\nof the\n\nmeeting,\n\na resident, * * *\n\nseated\n\nherself in the center of the front row of the Board meeting room.\nShe began to unfold the legs of tri -pod for her camera and search\n\nfor an outlet. Because there were people sitting immediately\nbehind her she was asked to move down a few seats as a courtesy\nto those members of the public sitting behind her. She remained in\n\nthe front row and moved only a few seats, perhaps a few feet, from\nher original selection.\n\nNeither Mr. Curran nor anyone placed her\n\nin a position to obstruct her view and I do not believe she was\n\nobstructed in any way.[']\nOn July 7, 2016, this office sent a copy of that response to\n\nhe did not reply.\n\nANALYSIS\n\nThis office construed the Request for Review as alleging a violation of section\n2105 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 05 ( West 2014)), which provides: \" Subject to the provisions\n\nof Section 8- 701 of the Code of Civil Procedure, any person may record the proceedings at\n\nmeetings required to be open by this Act by tape, film or other means. The authority holding the\nmeeting shall prescribe reasonable rules to govern the right to make such recordings.\"\nThe Board' s response to this office asserted that the Board permitted recording of\nits June 21, 2016, meeting, and merely requested that a member of public move a standing\nrecording device from the middle of the front row to enable others in attendance to observe the\n\nmeeting. Such a request does not preclude any member of the public from exercising his or her\nstatutory right to record the meeting.\n\nallegations that members of the public who\n\nwished to record the meeting were confined to a special section where the Board president was\nnot visible and Board members were not audible is uncorroborated and contradicted by the\nBoard's response. Therefore, based on the available information, this office is unable to\nconclude that the Board violated section 2. 05 of OMA.\n\nThis office notes, however, that section 2. 05 of OMA expressly requires the\nBoard and other public bodies to prescribe reasonable rules governing the public' s right to record\n\nmeetings. We requested a copy of the Board' s rules, but did not receive any rules with the\nBoard' s response. Therefore, if the Board has not already done so, it should prescribe reasonable\nrules to govern the public' s right to record meetings as required by section 2. 05 of OMA.\n\nLetter from Dr. Paul McDermott, Superintendent, Forest Ridge School District 142, to Steve\nSilverman,\n\nAssistant Bureau\n\nChief, Public Access\n\nBureau,\n\nOffice of the Attorney General ( undated).\n\n\fMr. Paul McDermott\nAugust 18, 2016\n\nPage 3\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\n312) 814- 6756. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau Chief\nPublic\n\n42572 0 recording 205 proper\n\nsd\n\nAccess\n\nBureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Restriction of recording location at a school board meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-42572/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nAugust 18, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nDr. Paul McDermott\nSuperintendent\nForest Ridge School District 142\n15000 Laramie\n\nOak Forest, Illinois 60452\npmcdennott@p142.\n\nRE:\n\nDear\n\norg\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 42572\n\nand Mr. McDermott:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude from the available information that the Forest Ridge School District\n142 Board of Education (Board) violated OMA.\n\nIn his Request for Review,\n\nalleged that the Board required\n\nthat people who wished to record its June 21, 2016, meeting do so from a restricted area from\nwhich the president of the Board was not visible and several Board members were not audible.\n\nOn June 28, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and requested a\n\nwritten response to the allegations in the Request for Review together with copies of any rules it\nhas prescribed to govern the public's statutory right to record meetings. The District's\nsuperintendent responded on behalf of the Board by stating that the Board permits anyone to\n\nrecord its meetings, and does not require people to record from places in the meeting room where\ntheir ability to see or hear the meeting is obstructed. The superintendent's response further stated\nthat he attended the June 21, 2016, meeting, and witnessed the following:\n\nAt the beginning\n\nof the\n\nmeeting,\n\na resident, * * *\n\nseated\n\nherself in the center of the front row of the Board meeting room.\nShe began to unfold the legs of tri -pod for her camera and search\n\nfor an outlet. Because there were people sitting immediately\nbehind her she was asked to move down a few seats as a courtesy\nto those members of the public sitting behind her. She remained in\n\nthe front row and moved only a few seats, perhaps a few feet, from\nher original selection.\n\nNeither Mr. Curran nor anyone placed her\n\nin a position to obstruct her view and I do not believe she was\n\nobstructed in any way.[']\nOn July 7, 2016, this office sent a copy of that response to\n\nhe did not reply.\n\nANALYSIS\n\nThis office construed the Request for Review as alleging a violation of section\n2105 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 05 (West 2014)), which provides: \" Subject to the provisions\n\nof Section 8- 701 of the Code of Civil Procedure, any person may record the proceedings at\n\nmeetings required to be open by this Act by tape, film or other means. The authority holding the\nmeeting shall prescribe reasonable rules to govern the right to make such recordings.\"\nThe Board's response to this office asserted that the Board permitted recording of\nits June 21, 2016, meeting, and merely requested that a member of public move a standing\nrecording device from the middle of the front row to enable others in attendance to observe the\n\nmeeting. Such a request does not preclude any member of the public from exercising his or her\nstatutory right to record the meeting.\n\nallegations that members of the public who\n\nwished to record the meeting were confined to a special section where the Board president was\nnot visible and Board members were not audible is uncorroborated and contradicted by the\nBoard's response. Therefore, based on the available information, this office is unable to\nconclude that the Board violated section 2. 05 of OMA.\n\nThis office notes, however, that section 2. 05 of OMA expressly requires the\nBoard and other public bodies to prescribe reasonable rules governing the public's right to record\n\nmeetings. We requested a copy of the Board's rules, but did not receive any rules with the\nBoard's response. Therefore, if the Board has not already done so, it should prescribe reasonable\nrules to govern the public's right to record meetings as required by section 2. 05 of OMA.\n\nLetter from Dr. Paul McDermott, Superintendent, Forest Ridge School District 142, to Steve\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n\n312) 814- 6756. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau Chief\nPublic\n\n42572 0 recording 205 proper\n\nsd\n\nAccess\n\nBureau"}
{"id":1179,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-05-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["42647"],"title":"City of Chicago Health in All Policies Task Force ruled a public body under Open Meetings Act","filename":"42647 issued May 18, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1895,"summary":"The PAC determined that the City of Chicago's Health in All Policies Task Force is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act and violated the Act by failing to comply with its requirements during its May 31, 2016, meeting.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a City of Chicago task force was not following open meeting laws. The Attorney General's office agreed, ruling that the task force is a 'public body' and must follow rules like providing public notice, keeping minutes, and allowing public comment. The task force was instructed to follow these rules for all future meetings.","holding":"The Health in All Policies Task Force is a public body under the Open Meetings Act and violated the Act by failing to adhere to its requirements.","legal_question":"Whether the City of Chicago's Health in All Policies Task Force constitutes a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02","5 ILCS 120/2.02","5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Chicago Health in All Policies Task Force","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body definition","subject_description":"The determination addresses whether a city-created task force is required to comply with the Open Meetings Act.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":90.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-public-body/advisory-bodies/42647 issued May 18, 2018.pdf","sha256":"0197072ad4cc2fd912866bdaf3f2cb5495bb36ba7d958ae81cd71b4d1bec05f4","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","open meetings act","meeting notice","public comment","meeting minutes"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMay 1 , 2018\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nDirector of State Legislation\nCity of Chicago Department of Law\nLegal Counsel Division\n121 North LaSalle Street\nChicago, Illinois 60602\nredeatu.kassa@cityofchicago.org\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 016 PAC 42647\n\nDear- and Mr. Kassa:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For thb reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the Health in All Policies Task Fotce (Task Force) is a public body for purposes\nof OMA. The Public Access Bureau further conJludes that the Task Force violated the\nrequirements of the Act in connection with its M�y 31, 2016, meeting.\n\nOn June 27, 2016,\nLbmitted this Request for Review alleging that\nthe Task Force, which was formed pursuant to a May.18, 2016, City of Chicago (City) City\nCouncil resolution, had failed to adhere to the requirements of OMA in connection with its\nmeetings. On July 11, 20 I 6, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the City and\nasked it to furnish a detailed written response to\nallegations.\n�\nOn July 25, 20,16, the City responded, asserting that the Task Force was not a\npublic body under OMA. On September 15, 2016, -replied to each of the City's\narguments, reiterating her contention that the Task Force was subject to the requirements of\nOMA.\n\n500 South Second Street. Springfield. Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090\n• ·TTY: (217)785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n1\nI 00 West Randolph Street. Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main. Carbondale. Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • F;,,,: (618) 529-6416\n.\n\nI\n\n\fMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nMay 18, 2018\nPage 2\nDETERMINATION\n\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA) to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.I' 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2016).\nSection 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 12911.02 (West 2016)) defines \"public body\" as:\n\n[A]ll legislative, executive, admiiystrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cit!fs, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other munifipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissi7ns of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the fo�egoing including but limited to\n_\ncommittees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in\npart by tax revenue, or which expJnd tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committeek or commissions thereof.\n(Emphasis add�d).\nI\n\nIn University Professionals ofIllinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of\nTeachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856 (I st Dist! 2003), the plaintiff alleged that a group of\npresidents and chancellors of public universities {council), which made recommendations to the\nIllinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE\nmeetings to discuss issues related to funding for public education because it constituted an\nadvisory body. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 858. Iµ holding that the Council was not an advisory\nbody of the IBHE for purposes of OMA, the cou considered the following factors to be relevant\nto that assessment:\nr\n[1] who appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointmen�, and whether they arJ paid for their tenure; [2) the\nentity's assigned duties, including Uuties reflected in the entity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute; [3) {vhether its role is solely advisory\nor whether it also has a deliberati+ or investigative function; [4]\nwhether the entity is subject to goyernment control or otherwise\naccountable to any public body; [�) whethe_r the group has a\nbudget; [6) its place within the larger organization or institution of\nwhich it is a part; and [7] the imp 'ct of decisions or\nrecommendations that the group akes. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n858.\n\n\fMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nMay 18, 2018\nPage 3\nTask Force Selectio and Membership\n\nIn its response to this office, the qity described the Task Force's organization and\nstructure in relation to the Stukel factors set out above. Specifically, the City asserted that\ndepartment heads were allowed to attend Task F6rce meetings or, in the alternative, designate\ntechnical employees to work on the respective is�ues in their place. The selection of Task Force\nmembers was an internal, informal department p�ocess and all but two of the 31 Task Force\nmeeting attendees were technical employees. In her reply, - contested the City's\nassertion that the appointment of Task Force merilbers was informal. She emphasized that the\nformally-adopted City resolution both expressly �uthorized department heads to designate\nattendees in their place should they not desire to �erve, but also required various City\ndepartments to work together on the Health in A 1 Policies initiative.\n1\nTask Force Duties and Compensation\nI\n\nThe City emphasized that, becausl members were already City department or\nagency employees, their attendance at meetings ras merely part �b duties and they\nreceived no additional compensation for their serice. However, - noted that, while Task\nForce members may not receive additional compfnsation for their service, they are compensated\nby the City for performing their assigned governyiental duties. - also provided several\nexamples of Chicago-area public bodies that are fubject to the requirements of OMA despite\ntheir members receiving no outside compensatio for their participation. -also\nminimized the fact that the Task Force lacked itslown budget, noting that its members are paid\ngovernment employees and that the Task Force c nvenes in City facilities, uses City supplies\nand administrative resources, and receives legal �upport from the City's law department.\nI\n\nI\n\nTask Force Accountabili� and Recommendations\nI\n\nThe City next asserted that the Ta$k Force's sole purpose was to create a single\nreport with respect to the Health in All Policies initiatives, and that those recommendations\nwould not be binding on the City Council. Similkly, the City asserted, the Task Force was not\ncreated to continually advise� Council, n�r did the Task Force have any investigative or\ndeliberative role. However, - countered !i,y citing the City Council's resolution, which\ncommissioned the Task Force to do the following:\n[I]dentify and pursue opportunitiJ to improve health, including\nbut not limited to affordable, safe,fand healthy housing; active\nliving and transportation; quality education; access to healthy food;\nclean air, water, and soil; parks, rebreation, and green spaces;\nI\neconomic opportunity; and safety d violence prevention. All\n\n\fMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nMay 18,2018\nPage4\n\ndepartments shall participate in developing ongoing channels for\ncross-department collaboration, identifying and pursuing funding\nstreams that support improved heJith outcomes, ensuring that new\ninvestments support community hbalth goals, incorporating health\ncriteria into planning and policy dbvelopment, sharing relevant\ndata, and participating in collaborltive efforts to understand how\nbuilt environment policies and prtigrams are affecting health\noutcomes. [I 1 ,\n- also noted that the Task Force was req j,ired to provide a report and make\nrecommendations concerning,health policies to aid the City Council in its own deliberations.\nSince-submitted her Req6est for Review, the Task Force issued its Final\nReport on August 1, 2017, which noted that \"[a]�er months of deliberation, 16 recommendations\nemerged from the process[.]\"� With respect to t e future of the Task Force, that report also\nprovided the following:\n:\nI.\n'\nThe HiAP Task Force was a working group established for\nthe purpose ofproducing a one-tirp.e report for the City Council of\nthe City of Chicago. To ensure health remains a central\nconsideration ir how the City opefates, the Task Force\nrecommends that its members m�et periodically to share updates\nandfeedhack on the implementation of these recommendations\nand to consider new opportunitie1 to work together to promote\nhealth.\nThe Task Force will continue in the form of a working\ngroup whose members will be designated informally by\ndepartment heads and who will ncit be paid for their participation\nin the working group. The .Task F6rce will not have a budget of its\nown, nor will it be controlled by be part of the formal\norganizational structure of any pu lie body. The Task Force will\nreceive reports on HiAP activities and seek feedback on progress\n\nor\n\nChicago City Council, SR2016-177, Est blishment of Health in All Policies initiative and\ncreation of task force to identify and pursue opportunities to improve health of City residents (May 18, 2016).\n1\n\nCity of Chicago.�ealth in All Policies Tlsk Force, Final Report, August I, 2017, at 7 (available\nat https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/c ph/CD PH/HealthlnAI IPoliciesReport_080120 I 7 .pdf).\n2\n\n\fMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nMay 18, 2018\nPage 5\n\nand emerging opportunities to ad ance health through City\noperations and policy.[Jl (Emphasis added.)\n\nAfter careful review of both partils' arguments in light of the Stukel factors,\ntogether with our review of the final report issued by the Task Force, this office concludes that\nthe Task Force is a public body that is subject to the requirements of OMA. Under the Stukel\ntest, the role of the Task Force in identifying andl incorporating health-related policies affects\nnumerous City departments. Although Task Forte members may have been informally selected\nby department heads through their own internal �rocess, the City Council's resolution expressly\nset out the procedures for such selection. Furthernore, although Task Force members may not\nhave received additional compensation for their �ervice, the City acknowledged that Task Force\nmembership could be considered an obligation of members' taxpayer-funded, government\nemployment-this office has received no inform�tion indicating that Task Force members served\non a voluntary basis. Furthermore, while the Ta�k\nForce may have lacked its own budget, it has\n'\nnot been disputed that the Task Force had several of the City's resources at its disposal. Finally,\nalthough the City contends that the sole purpose bf the Task Force was to issue a single, non­\nbinding report to the City Council, that final rep rt includes a recommendation that it reconvene\nperiodically to receive updates on progress and t hear feedback on ways to promote health\nthrough the conduct of City business.\nl\n1\n\nDespite the Task Force having iss ed its final report, for the reasons set out\nabove, this office requests that the Task Force cohduct\nall future meetings in accordance with the\n'\nprovisions of the Act. Among other things, the �ask Force should provide advance notice of its\nmeetings (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2016)), keep written minutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West\n2016)), and provide members of the public with ful opportunity to address Task Force members\n(5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)). This office al�o requests that each Task Force member\ncomplete the OMA electronic training curriculu� developed and administered by the Public\nAccess Counselor. See 5 ILCS 120/1.05 (West 2016).\n\n3\n\nCity of Chicago Health in All Policies Task Force, Final Report, August I, 2017, at 13 (available\n\nat https://www .cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/c ph/CD PH/HealthlnA IIPoliciesReport_080120 17 .pdf).\n\n\fMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nMay 18, 2018\nPage 6\nThe Public Access Counselor has reterrnined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Tqis letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me at the Spring eld address on the first page of this letter.\nf\nVery truly yours,\n\n42647 o vio mun\n\nCHjUSTOPHER R. BOGGS\nAssjstant Attorney General\nPub ic Access Bureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A city task force's compliance with the Open Meetings Act","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-42647/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMay 1, 2018\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nDirector of State Legislation\nCity of Chicago Department of Law\nLegal Counsel Division\n121 North LaSalle Street\nChicago, Illinois 60602\nredeatu.kassa@cityofchicago.org\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 016 PAC 42647\n\nDear- and Mr. Kassa:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For thb reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the Health in All Policies Task Fotce (Task Force) is a public body for purposes\nof OMA. The Public Access Bureau further conJludes that the Task Force violated the\nrequirements of the Act in connection with its M�y 31, 2016, meeting.\n\nOn June 27, 2016,\nLbmitted this Request for Review alleging that\nthe Task Force, which was formed pursuant to a May.18, 2016, City of Chicago (City) City\nCouncil resolution, had failed to adhere to the requirements of OMA in connection with its\nmeetings. On July 11, 20 I 6, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the City and\nasked it to furnish a detailed written response to\nallegations.\n�\nOn July 25, 20,16, the City responded, asserting that the Task Force was not a\npublic body under OMA. On September 15, 2016, -replied to each of the City's\narguments, reiterating her contention that the Task Force was subject to the requirements of\nOMA.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA) to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.I' 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2016).\nSection 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 12911.02 (West 2016)) defines \"public body\" as:\n\n[A]ll legislative, executive, admiiystrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cit!fs, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other munifipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissi7ns of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the fo�egoing including but limited to\n_\ncommittees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in\npart by tax revenue, or which expJnd tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committeek or commissions thereof.\n(Emphasis add�d).\nI\n\nIn University Professionals ofIllinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of\nTeachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856 (I st Dist! 2003), the plaintiff alleged that a group of\npresidents and chancellors of public universities {council), which made recommendations to the\nIllinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE\nmeetings to discuss issues related to funding for public education because it constituted an\nadvisory body. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 858. Iµ holding that the Council was not an advisory\nbody of the IBHE for purposes of OMA, the cou considered the following factors to be relevant\nto that assessment:\nr\n[1] who appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointmen�, and whether they arJ paid for their tenure; [2) the\nentity's assigned duties, including Uuties reflected in the entity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute; [3) {vhether its role is solely advisory\nor whether it also has a deliberati+ or investigative function; [4]\nwhether the entity is subject to goyernment control or otherwise\n\nTask Force Selectio and Membership\n\nIn its response to this office, the qity described the Task Force's organization and\nstructure in relation to the Stukel factors set out above. Specifically, the City asserted that\ndepartment heads were allowed to attend Task F6rce meetings or, in the alternative, designate\ntechnical employees to work on the respective is�ues in their place. The selection of Task Force\nmembers was an internal, informal department p�ocess and all but two of the 31 Task Force\nmeeting attendees were technical employees. In her reply, - contested the City's\nassertion that the appointment of Task Force merilbers was informal. She emphasized that the\nformally-adopted City resolution both expressly �uthorized department heads to designate\nattendees in their place should they not desire to �erve, but also required various City\ndepartments to work together on the Health in A 1 Policies initiative.\n1\nTask Force Duties and Compensation\nI\n\nThe City emphasized that, becausl members were already City department or\nagency employees, their attendance at meetings ras merely part �b duties and they\nreceived no additional compensation for their serice. However, - noted that, while Task\nForce members may not receive additional compfnsation for their service, they are compensated\nby the City for performing their assigned governyiental duties. - also provided several\nexamples of Chicago-area public bodies that are fubject to the requirements of OMA despite\ntheir members receiving no outside compensatio for their participation. -also\nminimized the fact that the Task Force lacked itslown budget, noting that its members are paid\ngovernment employees and that the Task Force c nvenes in City facilities, uses City supplies\nand administrative resources, and receives legal �upport from the City's law department.\nI\n\nI\n\nTask Force Accountabili� and Recommendations\nI\n\nThe City next asserted that the Ta$k Force's sole purpose was to create a single\nreport with respect to the Health in All Policies initiatives, and that those recommendations\nwould not be binding on the City Council. Similkly, the City asserted, the Task Force was not\ncreated to continually advise� Council, n�r did the Task Force have any investigative or\ndeliberative role. However, - countered !i,y citing the City Council's resolution, which\ncommissioned the Task Force to do the following:\n[I]dentify and pursue opportunitiJ to improve health, including\nbut not limited to affordable, safe,fand healthy housing; active\nliving and transportation; quality education; access to healthy food;\nclean air, water, and soil; parks, rebreation, and green spaces;\nI\neconomic opportunity; and safety d violence prevention. All\n\nMr. Redeatu G. Kassa\nMay 18,2018\nPage4\n\ndepartments shall participate in developing ongoing channels for\ncross-department collaboration, identifying and pursuing funding\nstreams that support improved heJith outcomes, ensuring that new\ninvestments support community hbalth goals, incorporating health\ncriteria into planning and policy dbvelopment, sharing relevant\ndata, and participating in collaborltive efforts to understand how\nbuilt environment policies and prtigrams are affecting health\noutcomes. [I 1,\n- also noted that the Task Force was req j,ired to provide a report and make\nrecommendations concerning,health policies to aid the City Council in its own deliberations.\nSince-submitted her Req6est for Review, the Task Force issued its Final\nReport on August 1, 2017, which noted that \"[a]�er months of deliberation, 16 recommendations\nemerged from the process[.]\"� With respect to t e future of the Task Force, that report also\nprovided the following:\n:\nI.\n'\nThe HiAP Task Force was a working group established for\nthe purpose ofproducing a one-tirp.e report for the City Council of\nthe City of Chicago. To ensure health remains a central\nconsideration ir how the City opefates, the Task Force\nrecommends that its members m�et periodically to share updates\nandfeedhack on the implementation of these recommendations\nand to consider new opportunitie1 to work together to promote\nhealth.\nThe Task Force will continue in the form of a working\ngroup whose members will be designated informally by\ndepartment heads and who will ncit be paid for their participation\nin the working group. The.Task F6rce will not have a budget of its\nown, nor will it be controlled by be part of the formal\norganizational structure of any pu lie body. The Task Force will\nreceive reports on HiAP activities and seek feedback on progress\n\nor\n\nChicago City Council, SR2016-177, Est blishment of Health in All Policies initiative and\ncreation of task force to identify and pursue opportunities to improve health of City residents (May 18, 2016).\n1\n\nCity of Chicago.�ealth in All Policies Tlsk Force, Final Report, August I, 2017, at 7 (available\nat https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/c ph/CD PH/HealthlnAI IPoliciesReport_080120 I 7.pdf).\n\nand emerging opportunities to ad ance health through City\noperations and policy.[Jl (Emphasis added.)\n\nAfter careful review of both partils' arguments in light of the Stukel factors,\ntogether with our review of the final report issued by the Task Force, this office concludes that\nthe Task Force is a public body that is subject to the requirements of OMA. Under the Stukel\ntest, the role of the Task Force in identifying andl incorporating health-related policies affects\nnumerous City departments. Although Task Forte members may have been informally selected\nby department heads through their own internal �rocess, the City Council's resolution expressly\nset out the procedures for such selection. Furthernore, although Task Force members may not\nhave received additional compensation for their �ervice, the City acknowledged that Task Force\nmembership could be considered an obligation of members' taxpayer-funded, government\nemployment-this office has received no inform�tion indicating that Task Force members served\non a voluntary basis. Furthermore, while the Ta�k\nForce may have lacked its own budget, it has\n'\nnot been disputed that the Task Force had several of the City's resources at its disposal. Finally,\nalthough the City contends that the sole purpose bf the Task Force was to issue a single, non­\nbinding report to the City Council, that final rep rt includes a recommendation that it reconvene\nperiodically to receive updates on progress and t hear feedback on ways to promote health\nthrough the conduct of City business.\nl\n1\n\nDespite the Task Force having iss ed its final report, for the reasons set out\nabove, this office requests that the Task Force cohduct\nall future meetings in accordance with the\n'\nprovisions of the Act. Among other things, the �ask Force should provide advance notice of its\nmeetings (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2016)), keep written minutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West\n2016)), and provide members of the public with ful opportunity to address Task Force members\n(5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)). This office al�o requests that each Task Force member\ncomplete the OMA electronic training curriculu� developed and administered by the Public\nAccess Counselor. See 5 ILCS 120/1.05 (West 2016).\n\n3\n\nCity of Chicago Health in All Policies Task Force, Final Report, August I, 2017, at 13 (available\n\nat https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/c ph/CD PH/HealthlnA IIPoliciesReport_080120 17.pdf).\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has reterrnined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Tqis letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me at the Spring eld address on the first page of this letter.\nf\nVery truly yours,\n\n42647 o vio mun\n\nCHjUSTOPHER R. BOGGS\nAssjstant Attorney General\nPub ic Access Bureau"}
{"id":1180,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-12-12","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["44262"],"title":"Kankakee School District 111 Board violated Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment and failing to explain closed session","filename":"44262, issued December 12, 2016.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2650,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Kankakee School District 111 Board of Education improperly restricted public comment and failed to adequately state the purpose for entering a closed session. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by imposing unauthorized restrictions on public comment and failing to properly identify the statutory basis for its second closed session.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board cut off his public comments and failed to explain why they were going into a private closed-door meeting. The Attorney General's office agreed, finding that the board violated the Open Meetings Act by enforcing a restriction on public comment that was not among its established and recorded rules, and by not adequately informing the public of the reason for entering a second closed session. The determination did not address whether the closed session itself was legally permitted or state any further action required.","holding":"The Board violated the Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment in a manner not authorized by its rules and by failing to adequately inform the public of the reason for entering a second closed session.","legal_question":"Whether the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment without established rules and by failing to cite the specific statutory exception for a closed session.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06(g)","5 ILCS 120/2a"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1)"],"public_body":"Kankakee School District 111 Board of Education","requesting_party":"Mr. Brian P. Crowley","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The dispute concerns the board's conduct during a public meeting regarding public comment procedures and the transparency of closed session justifications.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2a/Citing-the-section/44262, issued December 12, 2016.pdf","sha256":"72e8dbbfc83fc4d2c8f2e39c85f4f24e562177b81b88cdcf09185895b44e1953","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","closed session","school board","meeting transparency"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember 12, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Genevra Walters, Superintendent\nKankakee School District 111\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ngenevra- walters@ksdIll. org\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 44262\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Walters:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Kankakee School District 111 Board of Education (Board)\n\nviolated the requirements of OMA in connection with its September 26, 2016, meeting by\nimposing a restriction on public comment that was not authorized by its established and recorded\n\nrules. This office further concludes that during the September 26, 2016, meeting, the Board did\nnot adequately inform the public of its reason for going into a second closed session.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn September 28, 2016,\n\nsubmitted this Request for\n\nReview alleging that during its September 26, 2016, meeting, the Board improperly interrupted\n\nhis public comments and prevented him from using all of his allotted time to speak on one of the\nBoard' s agenda items.\n\nalso alleged that the Board did not accurately\n\nidentify the subject of the Board's second closed session on the meeting' s agenda or in a public\nrecital before entering closed session. We construed the Request for Review as alleging\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: (\n\n618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMs. Genevra Walters\nDecember\n\n12, 2016\n\nPage 2\n\nviolations of sections 2. 06( g) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99515, effective June 30, 2016) and 2a ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2a ( West 2014)) of OMA.\n\nOn October 11, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and requested a written response to the allegations in the Request for Review, together\n\nwith copies of the Board' s established and recorded rules regarding public comment. This office\nalso requested that the Board identify the specific exception in section 2( c) of OMA (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2( c) ( West 2015 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 99- 642, effective July 28, 2016; 99- 646,\neffective July 28, 2016) that it publicly cited and identified as its basis for entering the second\nclosed session during the September 26, 2016, meeting, and provide an explanation of its\napplicability to the content of the closed session discussion.\n\nThis office also requested copies of\n\nthe meeting agenda, open and closed session minutes, and the verbatim recording of the closed\nsession portion of that meeting. On October 21, 2016, the Board provided the requested\n\nmaterials. On October 28, 2016,\n\nsubmitted a reply.'\nDETERMINATION\nPublic Comment\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" ( Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of section 2. 06( g), a public body must\nestablish and record rules and may restrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See I11.\n\nAtt'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014 at 7.\nIn response to this office' s request for a copy of the Board' s established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Board submitted Kankakee School District\n\nNumber 111 School Board Policy 2:230, \" Public Participation at Board of Education Meetings\n\nand Petitions to the Board\" ( Board Policy 2: 230). Board Policy 2: 230 lists five guidelines, which\nwere adopted on November 14, 1994, and last amended on March 14, 2011, that require speakers\nto:\n\n1. Address the Board only at the appropriate time as\nindicated on the agenda and when recognized by the Board\nPresident.\n\n2. Identify oneself and be brief. Ordinarily, comments\nshall be limited to 5 minutes. In unusual circumstances,\n\nand when\n\nan individual has made a request in advance to speak for a longer\nIn his reply,\nraised several novel allegations regarding the September 26,\n2016, meeting. He subsequently filed those allegations in a separate Request for Review which is addressed in 111.\nAtt' y Gen. PAC\n\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 44862, issued December 12, 2016.\n\n\fMs. Genevra Walters\n\nDecember 12, 2016\nPage 3\n\nperiod of time, the individual may be allowed to speak for more\nthan 5 minutes.\n\n3. Observe the Board President' s decision to shorten public\ncomment to conserve time and give the maximum number of\n\nindividuals an opportunity to speak.\n4. Observe the Board President' s decision to determine\nprocedural matters regarding public participation not otherwise\n\ncovered in Board policy.\n\n5. Conduct oneself with respect and civility toward others\nand otherwise abide by Board policy 8: 30, Visitors to and Conduct\n\non School Property. f 1\n\nHowever, the open session recording of the September 26, 2016, meeting shows\n\nthat the Board president recited a different set of guidelines before the public comment period.\nSpecifically, the Board president stated:\nPlease give your name and direct your comments to the\n\nPresident. Comments are limited to five minutes. No personal\nattacks upon Board members, staff, or other persons in attendance\nor absent will be permitted. In addition, discussion of matters\nwhich are currently under legal review will not be permitted. 131\n\nDuring\n\npublic comments, the Board president announced an\n\nadditional guideline that was not listed in Board Policy 2: 230 or in the rules recited by the Board\npresident: that commenters \" cannot speak of personnel issues.\"\n\nThere is no evidence that the\n\nBoard has established and recorded a rule restricting public comment on personnel matters. The\nrule appears to have been announced extemporaneously by the Board president in response to\n\ninterrupted\n\ncomments. The\nsession recording shows that the Board president\nremarks four times to assert that he could not speak of\n2Kankakee School District 111 School Board Policy 2: 230, \" Public Participation at Board of\n\nEducation Meetings and Petitions to the Board.\"\n\n3Kankakee School District 111 Board of Education, Meeting, September 26, 2016, Audio File (on\n\nfile with the Public Access Bureau). When asked to address whether the rules recited by the Board president were\nestablished and recorded pursuant to section 2. 06( g) of OMA, the Board responded that the statement began\n\nappearing on Board meeting agendas in 1994, but it did not recall how the remarks evolved. Although this set of\nrules is beyond the scope of this Request for Review, this office recommends that the Board take appropriate steps\nto establish and record any roles regarding public comment. A public body may promulgate reasonable rules related\n\nto public comment in order to govern meeting decorum and procedure. Timmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465\nW.D. Mich. 2008). Notwithstanding the legitimate interest in establishing rules governing decorum, in order to\nwithstand constitutional muster, any restrictions on public comment that are content -based must be narrowly drawn\n\nto\nserve the purpose of preserving decorum. See LA. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912,\n922 ( N. D. 111. 2009).\n\n\fMs. Genevra Walters\nDecember 12, 2016\nPage 4\n\npersonnel items. Although the Board allowed\n\nto speak for slightly longer\n\nthan five minutes and permitted him to stop speaking of his own accord,\n\ncontends that because of the Board' s restriction on personnel issues, he \" had to use the remainder\nof [his] time talking in allegories. i4 The Board argues that the Board president made a \" request\n\nthat [\nnot mention [ the employee]' s situation by name because the matter\ninvolved a personnel issue and was currently under review by the Board. i5\nContrary to the Board' s assertion, the open session recording establishes that the\nBoard president did more than merely make a request of\nrather, she\n\nimposed an ad hoc rule by interrupting him repeatedly and stating that \" our public guidelines\nstate that you cannot speak of personnel issues. i6 Although the Board president did not\ncompletely prohibit\ncomments, it does appear that the ad hoc rule caused\n\nhim to refrain from fully expressing his views and required him to adopt indirect language to\n\nmake his point. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 06( g) of\n\nOMA by restricting\nstatutory right to address the Board based on a\nrestriction that is not among its established and recorded rules governing public comment.\nSecond Closed Session\n\nThe Request for Review also alleged that the Board entered into a second closed\nsession without citing an accurate basis under section 2( c) of OMA. Section 2( a) of OMA ( 5\n\nILCS 120/2( a) ( West 2015 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 99- 642, effective July 28, 2016;\n\n99- 646, effective July 28, 2016) provides that \"[ ail( meetings of public bodies shall be open to\n\nthe public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\" Section\n\n2a of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2a ( West 2014)) requires that \" a citation to the specific exception\n\ncontained in Section 2[( c)] of this Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public\n\nshall be publicly disclosed at the time of the vote and shall be recorded and entered into the\nthe meeting.\" (\nEmphasis added.) Although a public body does not need to provide a\n\nminutes\n\nof\n\nspecific citation to the OMA statute before going into closed session, it must \" adequately\n\nidentify] the exception\" in section 2( c) on which it will rely to close the meeting. Wyman v.\n\nSchweighart, 385 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1105 ( 2008). See also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n12658, issued July 7, 2011, at 2 ( a public body's motion to close a meeting \" must provide a\n\nsufficiently clear reference to each of the exception( s) it is relying on.\").\nEmail from\n\nAccess Bureau ( October 28, 2016).\n\nto Laura Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public\n\n5Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau ( October 21, 2016), at 3.\n\nKankakee School District 111 Board of Education, Meeting, September 26, 2016, Audio File ( on\n\nfile with Public Access Bureau).\n\n\fMs. Genevra Walters\n\nDecember 12, 2016\nPage 5\n\nBefore entering its second closed session, the Board president stated \" we are now\n\non item I [ of the agenda], I will ask for a motion to go back into closed session.\" 7 Item I of the\nSeptember 26, 2016, Board meeting agenda provided that a second closed session would be\nconvened concerning the \" Appointment, Employment, Compensation, Discipline, Performance,\n\nor Dismissal of Specific Employees of the Public Body. i8 This language is a verbatim excerpt\n\nfrom the exception in section 2( c)( 1) of OMA.9 The Board, however, did not recite this language\nin its motion.\n\nIn its October 21, 2016, response to this office, the Board acknowledged that the\nbetter practice\" is \" to expressly state the reason for the closed session in the motion for the\npublic to hear\" and indicated that it intends to do so in the future. Still, the Board claimed that\nthe motion at issue \" should not have caused any confusion for the public, as the reason for the\nclosed session was clearly set forth in the agenda and the Board referenced the relevant agenda\n\nitem in its motion.i10 This office disagrees. Even though the Board recited the statutory\n\nlanguage of the 2( c)( 1) exception in its agenda, merely stating the letter of the relevant agenda\nitem did not adequately identify that exception \" at the time of the vote\" to go into closed session,\nas required by the plain language of section 2a. Accordingly, this office concludes that the\nBoard violated section 2a of OMA by failing to publicly disclose the relevant exception in\nsection 2( c) of OMA at the time of its vote to close the meeting.\nLastly,\n\nappears to contend that the Board should have\n\ninformed the public that the nature of the second closed session was a due process hearing for the\nemployee at issue. The Board's response to this office, this office' s review of the closed session\n\nminutes, and review of the closed session verbatim recording all confirmed that the subject of the\nclosed session was a specific employee' s employment and potential termination.\n\nConsideration\n\n7Kankakee School District 111 Board of' Education, Meeting, September 26, 2016, Audio File ( on\n\nfile with the Public Access Bureau).\n\n2016).\n\n8Kankakee School District 11 I Board of Education, Meeting, Agenda Item I. ( September 26,\n\n9Section 2( c)( I) of OMA provides that a public body may hold a closed meeting to consider:\nThe appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, performance,\n\nor dismissal of specific employees of the public body or legal counsel for the\npublic body, including hearing testimony on a complaint lodged against an\nemployee of the public body or against legal counsel for the public body to\ndetermine its validity. However, a meeting to consider an increase in\ncompensation to a specific employee of a public body that is subject to the Local\n\nGovernment Wage Increase Transparency Act may not be closed and shall be\nopen to the public and posted and held in accordance with this Act.\n\n10Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau ( October 21, 2016), at 3,\n\nn. l.\n\n\fMs. Genevra Walters\nDecember 12, 2016\nPage 6\n\nof a specific employee' s employment and termination fall squarely within the scope of the\n\nsection 2( c)( 1) exception that the Board cited in item I of the agenda and in the open session\nminutes. Although OMA requires a citation to a specific exception contained in section 2( c), it\n\ndoes not require a public body also to articulate the specific subject matter of its closed session.\nTo require a public recitation of the subject matter of the closed session would defeat the purpose\nof holding a session in private. The general language of section 2( c)( 1) cited in the Boards\n\nagenda adequately identified the exception that authorized the Board to close the meeting. Had\nthe Board verbally recited this language before voting to enter into a second closed session, it\nwould have satisfied the requirements of OMA.\n\nBecause the Boards second closed session discussion was authorized by section\n\n2( c)( 1) even though it did not adequately identify that exception before closing the meeting and\n\nbecause there is no way to remedy its violation of section 2. 06( g) at this time, no remedial action\n\nby the Board is necessary. However, this office cautions the Board to be mindful in the future of\nits obligation to adequately inform the public of the exceptions that authorize it to enter closed\nsession at the time of its votes to do so, and to limit restrictions on public comment to reasonable\nrules that it has established and recorded.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n44262 o 206g pub comment improper 2a improper sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nFranczek Radelet P. C.\n300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400\nChicago, Illinois 60606\nBPC@franczek. com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school board's public comment restrictions and closed-session justification","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-44262/","full_text":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember 12, 2016\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Genevra Walters, Superintendent\nKankakee School District 111\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ngenevra- walters@ksdIll. org\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 44262\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Walters:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Kankakee School District 111 Board of Education (Board)\n\nviolated the requirements of OMA in connection with its September 26, 2016, meeting by\nimposing a restriction on public comment that was not authorized by its established and recorded\n\nrules. This office further concludes that during the September 26, 2016, meeting, the Board did\nnot adequately inform the public of its reason for going into a second closed session.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn September 28, 2016,\n\nsubmitted this Request for\n\nReview alleging that during its September 26, 2016, meeting, the Board improperly interrupted\n\nhis public comments and prevented him from using all of his allotted time to speak on one of the\nBoard's agenda items.\n\nalso alleged that the Board did not accurately\n\nidentify the subject of the Board's second closed session on the meeting's agenda or in a public\nrecital before entering closed session. We construed the Request for Review as alleging\n\nviolations of sections 2. 06(g) (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99515, effective June 30, 2016) and 2a (5 ILCS 120/ 2a (West 2014)) of OMA.\n\nOn October 11, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and requested a written response to the allegations in the Request for Review, together\n\nwith copies of the Board's established and recorded rules regarding public comment. This office\nalso requested that the Board identify the specific exception in section 2(c) of OMA (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2(c) (West 2015 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 99- 642, effective July 28, 2016; 99- 646,\neffective July 28, 2016) that it publicly cited and identified as its basis for entering the second\nclosed session during the September 26, 2016, meeting, and provide an explanation of its\napplicability to the content of the closed session discussion.\n\nThis office also requested copies of\n\nthe meeting agenda, open and closed session minutes, and the verbatim recording of the closed\nsession portion of that meeting. On October 21, 2016, the Board provided the requested\n\nmaterials. On October 28, 2016,\n\nsubmitted a reply.'\nDETERMINATION\nPublic Comment\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" (Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of section 2. 06(g), a public body must\nestablish and record rules and may restrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See I11.\n\nAtt'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014 at 7.\nIn response to this office's request for a copy of the Board's established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Board submitted Kankakee School District\n\nNumber 111 School Board Policy 2:230, \" Public Participation at Board of Education Meetings\n\nand Petitions to the Board\" (Board Policy 2: 230). Board Policy 2: 230 lists five guidelines, which\nwere adopted on November 14, 1994, and last amended on March 14, 2011, that require speakers\nto:\n\n1. Address the Board only at the appropriate time as\nindicated on the agenda and when recognized by the Board\nPresident.\n\n2. Identify oneself and be brief. Ordinarily, comments\nshall be limited to 5 minutes. In unusual circumstances,\n\nand when\n\nan individual has made a request in advance to speak for a longer\nIn his reply,\nraised several novel allegations regarding the September 26,\n2016, meeting. He subsequently filed those allegations in a separate Request for Review which is addressed in 111.\n\nperiod of time, the individual may be allowed to speak for more\nthan 5 minutes.\n\n3. Observe the Board President's decision to shorten public\ncomment to conserve time and give the maximum number of\n\nindividuals an opportunity to speak.\n4. Observe the Board President's decision to determine\nprocedural matters regarding public participation not otherwise\n\ncovered in Board policy.\n\n5. Conduct oneself with respect and civility toward others\nand otherwise abide by Board policy 8: 30, Visitors to and Conduct\n\non School Property. f 1\n\nHowever, the open session recording of the September 26, 2016, meeting shows\n\nthat the Board president recited a different set of guidelines before the public comment period.\nSpecifically, the Board president stated:\nPlease give your name and direct your comments to the\n\nPresident. Comments are limited to five minutes. No personal\nattacks upon Board members, staff, or other persons in attendance\nor absent will be permitted. In addition, discussion of matters\nwhich are currently under legal review will not be permitted. 131\n\nDuring\n\npublic comments, the Board president announced an\n\nadditional guideline that was not listed in Board Policy 2: 230 or in the rules recited by the Board\npresident: that commenters \" cannot speak of personnel issues.\"\n\nThere is no evidence that the\n\nBoard has established and recorded a rule restricting public comment on personnel matters. The\nrule appears to have been announced extemporaneously by the Board president in response to\n\ninterrupted\n\ncomments. The\nsession recording shows that the Board president\nremarks four times to assert that he could not speak of\n2 Kankakee School District 111 School Board Policy 2: 230, \" Public Participation at Board of\n\nEducation Meetings and Petitions to the Board.\"\n\n3 Kankakee School District 111 Board of Education, Meeting, September 26, 2016, Audio File (on\n\nfile with the Public Access Bureau). When asked to address whether the rules recited by the Board president were\nestablished and recorded pursuant to section 2. 06(g) of OMA, the Board responded that the statement began\n\nappearing on Board meeting agendas in 1994, but it did not recall how the remarks evolved. Although this set of\nrules is beyond the scope of this Request for Review, this office recommends that the Board take appropriate steps\nto establish and record any roles regarding public comment. A public body may promulgate reasonable rules related\n\nto public comment in order to govern meeting decorum and procedure. Timmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465\nW.D. Mich. 2008). Notwithstanding the legitimate interest in establishing rules governing decorum, in order to\nwithstand constitutional muster, any restrictions on public comment that are content -based must be narrowly drawn\n\nto\nserve the purpose of preserving decorum. See LA. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912,\n\npersonnel items. Although the Board allowed\n\nto speak for slightly longer\n\nthan five minutes and permitted him to stop speaking of his own accord,\n\ncontends that because of the Board's restriction on personnel issues, he \" had to use the remainder\nof [his] time talking in allegories. i4 The Board argues that the Board president made a \" request\n\nthat [\nnot mention [ the employee]' s situation by name because the matter\ninvolved a personnel issue and was currently under review by the Board. i5\nContrary to the Board's assertion, the open session recording establishes that the\nBoard president did more than merely make a request of\nrather, she\n\nimposed an ad hoc rule by interrupting him repeatedly and stating that \" our public guidelines\nstate that you cannot speak of personnel issues. i6 Although the Board president did not\ncompletely prohibit\ncomments, it does appear that the ad hoc rule caused\n\nhim to refrain from fully expressing his views and required him to adopt indirect language to\n\nmake his point. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 06(g) of\n\nOMA by restricting\nstatutory right to address the Board based on a\nrestriction that is not among its established and recorded rules governing public comment.\nSecond Closed Session\n\nThe Request for Review also alleged that the Board entered into a second closed\nsession without citing an accurate basis under section 2(c) of OMA. Section 2(a) of OMA (5\n\nILCS 120/2(a) (West 2015 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 99- 642, effective July 28, 2016;\n\n99- 646, effective July 28, 2016) provides that \"[ ail(meetings of public bodies shall be open to\n\nthe public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\" Section\n\n2a of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2a (West 2014)) requires that \" a citation to the specific exception\n\ncontained in Section 2[(c)] of this Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public\n\nshall be publicly disclosed at the time of the vote and shall be recorded and entered into the\nthe meeting.\" (Emphasis added.) Although a public body does not need to provide a\n\nminutes\n\nof\n\nspecific citation to the OMA statute before going into closed session, it must \" adequately\n\nidentify] the exception\" in section 2(c) on which it will rely to close the meeting. Wyman v.\n\nSchweighart, 385 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1105 (2008). See also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n12658, issued July 7, 2011, at 2 (a public body's motion to close a meeting \" must provide a\n\nsufficiently clear reference to each of the exception(s) it is relying on.\").\nEmail from\n\nAccess Bureau (October 28, 2016).\n\nto Laura Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public\n\n5 Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau (October 21, 2016), at 3.\n\nKankakee School District 111 Board of Education, Meeting, September 26, 2016, Audio File (on\n\nBefore entering its second closed session, the Board president stated \" we are now\n\non item I [ of the agenda], I will ask for a motion to go back into closed session.\" 7 Item I of the\nSeptember 26, 2016, Board meeting agenda provided that a second closed session would be\nconvened concerning the \" Appointment, Employment, Compensation, Discipline, Performance,\n\nor Dismissal of Specific Employees of the Public Body. i8 This language is a verbatim excerpt\n\nfrom the exception in section 2(c)(1) of OMA.9 The Board, however, did not recite this language\nin its motion.\n\nIn its October 21, 2016, response to this office, the Board acknowledged that the\nbetter practice\" is \" to expressly state the reason for the closed session in the motion for the\npublic to hear\" and indicated that it intends to do so in the future. Still, the Board claimed that\nthe motion at issue \" should not have caused any confusion for the public, as the reason for the\nclosed session was clearly set forth in the agenda and the Board referenced the relevant agenda\n\nitem in its motion.i10 This office disagrees. Even though the Board recited the statutory\n\nlanguage of the 2(c)(1) exception in its agenda, merely stating the letter of the relevant agenda\nitem did not adequately identify that exception \" at the time of the vote\" to go into closed session,\nas required by the plain language of section 2a. Accordingly, this office concludes that the\nBoard violated section 2a of OMA by failing to publicly disclose the relevant exception in\nsection 2(c) of OMA at the time of its vote to close the meeting.\nLastly,\n\nappears to contend that the Board should have\n\ninformed the public that the nature of the second closed session was a due process hearing for the\nemployee at issue. The Board's response to this office, this office's review of the closed session\n\nminutes, and review of the closed session verbatim recording all confirmed that the subject of the\nclosed session was a specific employee's employment and potential termination.\n\nConsideration\n\n7 Kankakee School District 111 Board of' Education, Meeting, September 26, 2016, Audio File (on\n\nfile with the Public Access Bureau).\n\n2016).\n\n8 Kankakee School District 11 I Board of Education, Meeting, Agenda Item I. (September 26,\n\n9 Section 2(c)(I) of OMA provides that a public body may hold a closed meeting to consider:\nThe appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, performance,\n\nor dismissal of specific employees of the public body or legal counsel for the\npublic body, including hearing testimony on a complaint lodged against an\nemployee of the public body or against legal counsel for the public body to\ndetermine its validity. However, a meeting to consider an increase in\ncompensation to a specific employee of a public body that is subject to the Local\n\nGovernment Wage Increase Transparency Act may not be closed and shall be\nopen to the public and posted and held in accordance with this Act.\n\n10 Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nof a specific employee's employment and termination fall squarely within the scope of the\n\nsection 2(c)(1) exception that the Board cited in item I of the agenda and in the open session\nminutes. Although OMA requires a citation to a specific exception contained in section 2(c), it\n\ndoes not require a public body also to articulate the specific subject matter of its closed session.\nTo require a public recitation of the subject matter of the closed session would defeat the purpose\nof holding a session in private. The general language of section 2(c)(1) cited in the Boards\n\nagenda adequately identified the exception that authorized the Board to close the meeting. Had\nthe Board verbally recited this language before voting to enter into a second closed session, it\nwould have satisfied the requirements of OMA.\n\nBecause the Boards second closed session discussion was authorized by section\n\n2(c)(1) even though it did not adequately identify that exception before closing the meeting and\n\nbecause there is no way to remedy its violation of section 2. 06(g) at this time, no remedial action\n\nby the Board is necessary. However, this office cautions the Board to be mindful in the future of\nits obligation to adequately inform the public of the exceptions that authorize it to enter closed\nsession at the time of its votes to do so, and to limit restrictions on public comment to reasonable\nrules that it has established and recorded.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n44262 o 206g pub comment improper 2a improper sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nFranczek Radelet P. C.\n300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400\nChicago, Illinois 60606\nBPC@franczek. com"}
{"id":1181,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-02-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["44489"],"title":"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone Advisory Board is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act","filename":"44489, issued February 15, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":5076,"summary":"The PAC determined that the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone Advisory Board is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act and violated the Act by excluding the public and press from its meetings.","plain_summary":"A news organization complained that the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone Advisory Board refused to allow the public to attend its meetings, claiming it wasn't a 'public body.' The Attorney General's office disagreed, ruling that the Board is subject to the Open Meetings Act and must hold open meetings, provide public notice, and keep minutes. The Board was instructed to comply with these requirements for all future meetings.","holding":"The Advisory Board is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act and improperly denied public access to its meetings.","legal_question":"Whether the Advisory Board of the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone constitutes a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Advisory Board of the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone","requesting_party":"Mr. Doug Nelson (WSPY News)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body status","subject_description":"The determination addresses whether an enterprise zone advisory board is required to comply with the Open Meetings Act.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-public-body/advisory-bodies/44489, issued February 15, 2018.pdf","sha256":"e90815ee7ca118f69f83fb3f712cdfb780d536632b7e5ca5b18db9907d5cc328","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","open meetings","meeting notice","public access"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 15, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Doug Nelson\nPresident, Nelson Enterprises\nwspynews@gmail.com\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf, Partner\nAncel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & Krafthefer\nA Professional Corporation\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njtappendorf@ancelglink.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 44489\nDear Mr. Nelson and Ms. Tappendorf:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3 .5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that the Advisory Board (Advisory Board) of the DeKalb County Enterprise\nZone (Enterprise Zone) is a public body for purposes of OMA and thus violated the requirements\nof the Act in connection with its meeting held on or about August 18, 2016.\nOn October 11, 2016, Mr. Doug Nelson, on behalf of WSPY News (WSPY),\nsubmitted this Request for Review alleging that the Advisory Board had failed to adhere to the\nrequirements of OMA in connection with its meeting held on or about August 18, 2016. Mr.\nNelson stated that when WSPY had requested notice of Advisory Board meetings, the Advisory\nBoard had responded that it would not allow the public or the press to attend its meetings\nbecause it did not believe that it was a public body subject to OMA. Mr. Nelson contended that\nthe Advisory Board is a public body because its \"primary purpose • • • is to determine if\n\n500 South Second Street. Springfield. Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217)782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street. Chicago, Illinois. 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 2\n\napplications for real estate and sales tax abatement are sufficient to receive abatement of taxes[,]\"\nand thus the Advisory Board has \"control of the public purse[.]\" 1\nOn October 25, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nAdvisory Board and asked it to provide this office with copies of its organizing documents,\ntogether with a detailed written response to Mr. Nelson's allegation that it is a public body\nsubject to the requirements of OMA. On November 4, 2016, outside counsel for the DeKalb\nCounty Economic Development Corporation (EDC) provided this office with copies of three\nDeKalb County Board (County Board) resolutions pertaining to the Advisory Board 2 and a\nwritten response. On November 21, 2016, Mr. Nelson submitted a reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (2016).\nSection 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines a \"public body\" as:\n[A]ll legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\nIn its response to this office, the EDC stated that as an initial matter, \"the\nEnterprise Zone is not an entity, private or public. Instead, the Enterprise Zone is a 'zone' that is\ndesignated and established over a specific area pursuant to the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act\" (20\n\n1 E-mail fi-om WSPY News to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney\n\nGeneral (October 6, 2016).\n\n'County of DeKalb, Establishing the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-76 (Nov.\n19, 2014); County of DeKalb, Adopting the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone Intergovernmental Agreement,\nResolution R2014-77 (Nov. 19, 2014); County of DeKalb, Appointing the DeKalb County Economic Development\nCorporation as the Zone Administrator for the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-78 (Nov. 19,\n2014).\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 3\nILCS 655/1 et seq. (West 2016)). 3 In contrast, the EDC acknowledged that the Advisory Board\nis a \"body,\" but argued that \"it is a private one that provides contractual services to certain\ngovernment bodies pursuant to a contract for services.\" (Emphasis in original.)4\nThe EDC then discussed the Advisory Board's implementing resolutions. DeKalb\nCounty Resolution R2014-76, which initiated the Enterprise Zone, provides that certain\n\"Designating Units ofGovernment\"-the DeKalb County Board, Cortland Town Council,\nDeKalb City Council, Genoa City Council, Sandwich City Council, Sycamore City Council, and\nWaterman Village Board---determined that it was necessary for the region to obtain the\nenterprise zone designation. 5 The enterprise zone designation application process is\nadministered by the Illinois Department ofCommerce and Economic Opportunity,6 subject to the\napproval ofthe State's Enterprise Zone Board. 7 However, \"[t]he administration ofan Enterprise\nZone shall be under the jurisdiction of the designating municipality or county.\" 8 Resolution\nR2014-77 approved the intergovernmental agreement (!GA), pursuant to the Intergovernmental\nCooperation Act (5 ILCS 220/1 et seq. (West 2016)), between the Designating Units of\nGovernment. 9 It provides that the Advisory Board shall be comprised ofthe Executive\nCommittee ofthe Board of Directors of the EDC, with the Executive Director ofthe EDC\nserving as Enterprise Zone Administrator.10 The EDC's Executive Committee is elected annually\nat the EDC Annual Meeting. 11 Additionally, Resolution R2014-78 formalized the EDC's role of\n\n'Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 20 I6), at I.\n'Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 2016), at I.\n19, 2014), at I.\n\n'County of DeKalb, Establishing the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-76 (Nov.\n'See 20 ILCS 655/5.1 (West 2016).\n7\n\nSee 20 ILCS 655/5.2.1 (West 2016).\n\n8\n\n20 ILCS 655/8 (West 2016).\n\n'County of DeKalb, Adopting the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone Intergovernmental Agreement,\nResolution R2014-77 (Nov. 19, 2014).\n10\n\nDeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 29.\n\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental A greement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 30.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 4\nadministering the Enterprise Zone. 12 The formation of the Enterprise Zone permits eligible\ncompanies to apply for and obtain property tax abatement pursuant to a memorandum of\nunderstanding with the Enterprise Zone Administrator in return for meeting qualifying\nconditions that are intended to promote economic growth. 13\nClaiming that the Advisory Board \"does not fall within the list expressly\nidentified as public bodies\" in section 1.02 of OMA, the EDC argued that the Advisory Board\ncould only be subject to OMA if it \"somehow qualif[ies] as a subsidiary body of the County or\none of the other governmental entities.\" 14\nThe test for whether an entity qualifies as a subsidiary body was set forth in\nRocliford Newspapers, Inc. v. Northern Illinois Council on Alcoholism & Drug Dependence, 64\nIll. App. 3d 94, 96-97 (1978), as summarized in Hopfv. Topcorp, Inc., 256 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892\n(1st Dist. 1993): \"(]) whether the entity has a legal existence independent of government\nresolution; (2) the nature of the functions performed by the entity; and (3) the degree of\ngovernment control exerted over the entity.\" 15 In Rockford, the Illinois Appellate Court held that\na not-for-profit corporation that administered drug and alcohol treatment programs was not\nsubject to the provisions of OMA, despite the fact that it was primarily government-funded and\nits activities were regulated and monitored by various levels of government. See Rockford, 64\nIll. App. 3d at 96 (\"The amount or percentage of governmental funding of a private entity should\nhave no bearing on whether that entity is characterized as a subsidiary for purposes of the Open\nMeetings Act. Although the Act itself provides that a particular entity need not be publically\nfunded in order to be required to hold open meetings, it does not state that public funding alone\nwill make a particular entity subject to the Act.\").\nApplying the first factor, independent legal existence, to itself, rather than the\nAdvisory Board, the EDC stated that it is a registered 50l(c)(3) non-profit organization. The\nEDC argued that its role in administering the Enterprise Zone does not diminish its status as an\nindependent and private entity, comparing itself to the non-profit organization at issue in\n12 County of DeKalb, Appointing the DeKalb County Economic Development Corporation as the\nZone Administrator for the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-78 (Nov. 19, 2014).\n\n\"See generally County of DeKalb, Establishing the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution\nR2014-76 (Nov. 19, 2014), at I.\n\"Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel GI ink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 2016), at 2.\n\"This office notes that the Illinois Supreme Court in Better Government Ass'n v. Illinois High\nSchool Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, �26, 89 N.E.3d 376, 384 (2017), which was decided after the parties' submissions in\nthis matter, recognized an additional factor: \"the extent to which the entity is publicly funded[.]\"\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 5\nRockford and the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) in Better Government Ass'n v. Jl/inois\nHigh School Ass'n, 2016 IL App (I st) 151356, 56 N.E.3d 497 (2016), ajfd, 2017 IL 121124, 89\nN.E.3d 376 (2017). The EDC stated that membership of the Advisory Board is entirely within\nits control, rather than the control of any governmental unit, and that members of the Advisory\nBoard serve without compensation. In addition, the EDC stated that the Zone Administrator\n(who is also the EDC Director) is paid solely by the EDC, and that the Advisory Board is\nentirely funded through administrative fees paid by businesses in the Enterprise Zone.\nUnder the second factor, the nature of the functions performed by the entity, the\nEDC acknowledged that the Advisory Board provides certain functions and services for the\nDesignating Units of Government, but argued that \"those functions are not governmental in\nnature[ ]\" because they are \"the type of contractual services that are routinely provided by private\nconsultants[.]\" 16 Citing Better Government Ass'n, the EDC argued that the fact that a public\nbody could perform the same functions as the Advisory Board does not transform its functions\ninto governmental functions. See Better Government Ass'n, 2016 IL App (1st) 151356, iJiJ25-28,\n56 N.E.3d at 505 (concluding that \"although a public body could perform the same functions of\nIHSA in developing, supervising, and promoting interscholastic competitions among its member\nschools, the private, independent, not-for-profit IHSA does not perform public, governmental\nfunctions in this case.\"). The EDC also asserted that although the Advisory Board's duties are\nadvisory in nature, the Advisory Board does not advise a public body.\nUnder the third factor, degree of control by a governmental entity, the EDC\nemphasized that the voting membership of the Advisory Board is comprised of the EDC's\nExecutive Committee and Executive Director. According to the EDC, \"[t]here is no day-to-day\nsupervision over the [Advisory Board] by the county or any other governmental entity.\" 17\nIn reply, WSPY first argued that it is important to distinguish the EDC from the\nAdvisory Board. WSPY acknowledged that EDC is a private entity, but asserted that the\nAdvisory Board is a separate entity, stating that the entities have separate meetings with separate\nagendas, meeting structures, and attendance.\nWith respect to whether the Advisory Board has an independent legal existence,\nWSPY argued that it does not, disputing the EDC's claim that membership on the Advisory\nBoard is entirely under the EDC's control. WSPY asserted that under the !GA, the constituent\nbodies that do not have representation on the Advisory Board may appoint non-voting members.\n\"Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 2016), at 3.\n17 Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 2016), at 5.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 6\nThe pertinent provision of the !GA states: \"Representatives of the Designating Units of\nGovernment and Representatives of Taxing Bodies participating in the DeKalb County\nEnterprise Zone Property Tax Abatement Program who do not currently serve on the EDC\nExecutive Committee will be ex-officio, non-voting member[s] of the Advisory Board.\" 18 Thus,\nit appears not that the constituent bodies independently appoint non-voting members to the\nAdvisory Board, but that representatives of the constituent bodies automatically qualify as non­\nvoting Advisory Board members.\nWSPY further argued, however, that the Advisory Board \"does not have an\nindependent legal existence apart from the constituent governments that created\" it, 19 stating that\nimportant decisions must be approved by six of the seven Designating Units of Government. For\ninstance, the !GA provides that in the event that the County or EDC elects to terminate it:\n[T]he parties shall cooperate in good faith to approve a new Zone\nAdministrator and Administration Board that is acceptable to at\nleast six out of seven of the Parties, to approve a new\nAdministration Agreement that is acceptable to at least six out of\nseven of the Parties, and to approve an amendment to this\nAgreement consistent with the Parties' agreement. The\nmembership composition of the Advisory Board and the\nmechanism for selection of members of the Advisory Board shall\nnot change without the approval of at least six out of seven of the\nParties to this Agreement. 120 1\nIn contrast, WSPY argued, a legally independent entity would be able to alter its own operations\nwithout consulting public bodies for approval. WSPY asserted that, given the Advisory Board's\nsole purpose of administering the Enterprise Zone, \"[t]his lack of control over its own destiny\nillustrates that it has no separate legal existence\" from the !GA and the parties to it. 21\nAs to the nature and function of the Advisory Board, WSPY asserted that the\nAdvisory Board makes final decisions on whether applications for tax abatement are accepted or\nrejected. WSPY stated that before the Enterprise Zone was created, tax incentive deals in\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 29.\n19 Letter from Doug Nelson, President, Wspy News, to Josh Jones, Attorney General, Supervising\nAttorney (undated), at *2.\n20\n\nDeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 29-30.\n\n\"Letter from Doug Nelson, President, Wspy News, to Josh Jones, Attorney General, Supervising\nAttorney (undated), at *3.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 7\n\nDeKalb County were discussed and voted upon in open meetings held in accordance with OMA;\nby not adhering to OMA, the Advisory Board \"has dramatically reduced public inspection,\ncomment, and understanding of tax incentive deals\" in the County. 22\nLastly, regarding the degree of governmental control over the Advisory Board,\nWSPY argued that the terms of the !GA are comprehensive. WSPY noted that section IV of the\nIGA23 sets out the Advisory Board's duties, membership composition and terms, voting\nrequirements, and mechanics of dissolution.\nAlthough the parties in this matter focused on the factors used to assess whether\nan entity is a subsidiary body, this office notes that advisory bodies are also identified in section\n1.02 of OMA as public bodies subject to the Act. In University Professionals of Illinois, Local\n4100 of the Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856 (1st Dist. 2003), the\nplaintiff alleged that a group of presidents and chancellors of public universities (Council), which\nmade recommendations to the Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), violated OMA by\nmeeting privately before IBHE meetings to discuss issues related to funding for public education\nbecause it constituted an advisory body. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 858. In holding that the\nCouncil was not an advisory body for purposes of OMA, the court considered the following\nfactors to be relevant to that assessment:\n[I] who appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; [2] the\nentity's assigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute; [3] whether its role is solely advisory\nor whether it also has a deliberative or investigative function; [4]\nwhether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise\naccountable to any public body; (5] whether the group has a\nbudget; [6] its place within the larger organization or institution of\nwhich it is a part; and [7] the impact of decisions or\nrecommendations that the group makes. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n858.\nThese factors have significant overlap with the Rocliford factors, as both sets examine the\nindependence of the entities and the role that they play in the transaction of public business.\n\n22 Letter from Doug Nelson, President, Wspy News, to Josh Jones, Attorney General, Supervising\nAttorney (undated), at *3.\n\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 28-30.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 8\nVarious decisions have been issued by Illinois courts concerning whether entities\nqualified as subsidiary or advisory bodies for purposes of OMA, but none address whether an\nentity may be a public body pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement. The Office of the\nAttorney General, however, has issued opinions concerning the nature of entities formed by\nintergovernmental agreements. In Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, issued November 4, 1999,\nAttorney General Ryan addressed whether DuPage Public Safety Communications (Du-Comm),\nan entity created pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement to provide centralized public safety\ndispatching services, was an \"agency\" required to maintain its records in accordance with the\nLocal Records Act (50 ILCS 205/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Seven municipalities originally entered\ninto the intergovernmental agreement upon passing authorizing ordinances. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op.\nNo. 99-021, at 2. Du-Comm was led by an unpaid board of directors and unpaid executive\ncommittee. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 2. The board of directors, consisting of mayors or\npresidents of the participating municipalities and representatives of the participating fire\nprotection districts, was authorized to approve and adopt Du-Comm's annual budget; contract on\nbehalf of Du-Comm; incur debts, liabilities, or obligations to accomplish its purposes; and\nemploy personnel. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 2-3. The executive committee, consisting\nof the officers of the board of directors and two municipal administrators, two fire chiefs, and\ntwo police chiefs, was responsible for Du-Comm's day-to-day operations. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No.\n99-021, at 3. Each of the parties to the intergovernmental agreement contributed to Du-Comm's\nbudget, owned a common interest in its property, and was liable for its debts. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op.\nNo. 99-021, at 3.\nAttorney General Ryan noted that the purpose of the Local Records Act was to\nfacilitate governmental operations by prohibiting \"any officer or agency\" from disposing of local\npublic records without approval from the applicable Local Records Commission. Ill. Att'y Gen.\nOp. No. 99-021, at 3-4 (quoting 50 ILCS 205/7 (West 1998)). Much like the definition of\n\"public body\" in OMA, the definition of \"agency\" in the Local Records Act included \"all parts,\nboards, departments, bureaus and commissions of any county, municipal corporation or political\nsubdivision.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 4 (quoting 50 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998)).\nAttorney General Ryan stated that the municipalities and fire protection districts that participated\nin Du-Comm were municipal corporations and thus agencies subject to the Local Records Act.\nIll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 5. Given that \"Du-Comm was not created as a separate legal\nentity,\" and no statutory authority existed for the creation of such a separate governmental\nentity, 24 Attorney General Ryan concluded that \"Du-Comm is a joint operation of its member\nmunicipal corporations[,]\" and therefore \"a part of each of the municipal corporations that\ncreated it.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 6. Attorney General Ryan accordingly opined that\n\n24 This office notes that the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act does not provide for an enterprise zone to\nbe a separate legal entity.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 9\nDu-Comm was an \"agency\" subject to the requirements of the Local Records Act. Ill. Att'y Gen.\nOp. No. 99-021, at 7.\nAlthough Attorney General Ryan's analysis of agencies created pursuant to\nintergovernmental agreements in Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021 concerned a different statute, it\nis instructive in this matter given the similarities between the definitions of \"agency\" and \"public\nbody\" and the factors that were considered in determining whether an entity created pursuant to\nan intergovernmental agreement is an \"agency\" under the Local Records Act and the Stukel and\nRocliford factors that are relevant to our determination of whether the Advisory Board is subject\nto OMA.\nUnder the terms of the IGA, the voting members of the Advisory Board are\nappointed by the EDC, a private entity, though representatives of the constituent bodies serve as\nnon-voting members. Advisory Board members do not receive compensation, as was the case\nwith Du-Comm's board of directors and the Council in Stukel. See Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n866. Yet, while the Council in Stukel was self-initiated (Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866), the\nAdvisory Board and Du-Comm's board of directors were created under intergovernmental\nagreements. Better Government Ass'n is also factually distinguishable. In holding that the IHSA\nwas not a public body, the court emphasized that the IHSA \"was not created by a school district\nor any other public body or by any other statute or government resolution. * * * Its authority is\nderived from its board of directors, which is created pursuant to its own constitution.\" (Better\nGovernment Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, ,r37, 89 N.E.3d at 386). Similar to Du-Comm's board of\ndirectors, on the other hand, the Advisory Board is empowered to act only pursuant to the IGA\nand Administration Agreement, which manifest the collective will of the Designating Units of\nGovernment - not the EDC.\nThe duties of the Advisory Board, as set out in the Enterprise Zone's\nAdministration Agreement,25 include implementing and monitoring goals and objectives;\nestablishing operations and management procedures, including appeals processes, and advising\non policies; reporting to the Designating Units of Government and other participating bodies on\nan annual basis as to Zone activities, performance, policies, and procedures; marketing the\nEnterprise Zone; and reporting data to the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic\nOpportunity and Illinois Department of Revenue. These significant, formal responsibilities\naccord with those of Du-Comm's board of directors but contrast sharply with those of the\nCouncil in Stukel, which had no duties assigned by IBHE. See Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866.\nFurther, while the Council in Stukel had no deliberative or investigative function (Stukel, 344 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 866), the Advisory Board has a substantial deliberative function in deciding which\n\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Administration Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 2.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary I 5, 2018\nPage JO\n\ncompanies receive property tax abatements and under what conditions. Thus, the Advisory\nBoard's duties strongly indicate that it is a public body.\nAlthough the EDC argued that the Advisory Board is not supervised by any\npublic body on a day to day basis, the Advisory Board is accountable to the Designating Units of\nGovernment under the !GA and Administration Agreement. Unlike the Council in Stukel, which\nwas not subject to governmental control or otherwise accountable to any public body (Stukel,\n344 Ill. App. 3d at 866), and the IHSA, where \"no public body has control over how the\ngoverning board is established or comprised[,]\" \"[m]embership by individual schools is not\ncompulsory[,]\" and \"[t]he board is not accountable to any particular school district or particular\npublic school[]\" (Better Government Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, 1140, 41, 89 N.E.3d at 386-87), the\nmembership and duties of the Advisory Board are governed by the !GA and Administration\nAgreement. As with Du-Comm and its board of directors, the Advisory Board has no legal\nexistence independent of government resolution; it lacks discretion to act outside of the duties\nestablished by the Designating Units of Government under the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act. See\nIll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05-010, issued December 16, 2005, at 29 (an entity created pursuant to an\nintergovernmental agreement derives its powers from its constituent bodies and possesses no\ninherent powers). Moreover, as WSPY noted, significant changes to the Advisory Board require\nthe agreement of six out of the seven of those public bodies. The degree of governmental control\nto which the Advisory Board is subject indicates that it is a public body.\nThe Advisory Board does not appear to have a budget of its own. Rather, the\nEDC provides the operating expenses for the Enterprise Zone, including expenses involved in the\nAdvisory Board's meetings and its reporting functions. 26 Similar to the IHSA, which \"does not\nreceive any direct governmental funding\" but which earns revenue pursuant to its relationships\nwith public bodies (Better Government Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, 1149-53, 89 N.E.3d at 388-89),\nthe Advisory Board's activities are funded by fees charged to companies seeking property tax\nabatement. In contrast, Du-Comm's budget was funded by its constituent bodies, though\nAttorney General Ryan did not address whether its board of directors had a separate budget. The\nabsence of direct public funding for the Advisory Board is not dispositive of the applicability of\nOMA. See Roclford, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 96.\nThe positioning of the Advisory Board, however, is comparable to Du-Comm's\nboard of directors and is unlike the circumstances discussed in Stukel. The Advisory Board is\nessential to the operation of the Enterprise Zone, but it is not housed within one public body and\ninstead serves the interests of the public bodies that joined together under the !GA and\nAdministration Agreement. In Stukel, the court stated that \"each member [of the Council] is part\nof a larger organization or institution, specifically, the university he or she heads, [but] no\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 32.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 11\nmember of the Council is a member of the IBHE.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866. In this case,\nthe Advisory Board manages Enterprise Zone business for the public bodies that comprise it, just\nas Du-Comm's board of directors manages the agency for the public bodies that comprise it.\nUnder section 5 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (5 ILCS 220/5 (West 2016)):\nAny one or more public agencies may contract with any\none or more other public agencies to perform any governmental\nservice, activity or undertaking or to combine, transfer, or exercise\nany powers, functions, privileges, or authority which any of the\npublic agencies entering into the contract is authorized by law to\nperform, provided that such contract shall be approved by the\ngoverning bodies of each party to the contract and except where\nspecifically and expressly prohibited by law.\nThe Advisory Board administers the joint operation of the Enterprise Zone, playing a central role\nin exercising the combined authority of the constituent bodies with respect to economic\ndevelopment.\nLastly, as with Du-Comm's board of directors, the impact of the Advisory Board's\ndecisions is considerable. In Stukel, no allegation was made as to the impact of the Council's\ndecisions on IBHE (Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866). In contrast, the Advisory Board's consent is\nneeded to: (I) terminate an abatement and/or require repayment of previously abated property\ntaxes due to a failure to maintain sufficient employment levels; 27 (2) waive elements of a\nmemorandum of understanding with an applicant due to a hardship; 28 (3) collect a processing fee\nfor Enterprise Zone activities; 29 and (4) transfer an abatement from one taxpayer to another. 30 In\nparticular, the authority to permit certain companies to avoid meeting performance measures\nwhile still retaining property tax abatement is significant. The ability to decide whether a\ncompany retains property tax abatement strongly militates in favor of construing the Advisory\nBoard as a public body.\nHaving reviewed all of the relevant factors, on balance, this office concludes that\nthe Advisory Board is a public body that is subject to the requirements of OMA. Under both the\nRoc/iford and Stukel tests, the Advisory Board's role in deciding property tax abatement issues\n27 DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 27.\n\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 28.\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 2.\n'°DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 32.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 12\n\nfor the constituent bodies under the !GA is too substantial for the Advisory Board to deliberate\nabout public business behind closed doors. Although the Advisory Board was formed by an\nintergovernmental agreement rather than by a single public body, its governmental role is no less\nsignificant. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 6-7 (\"The fact that an association of units of\nlocal government is given a degree of independence in exercising its granted powers does not\nmean that it is not a part of its originating members.\"); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05-010, at\n29 (an entity created pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement \"must comply with whatever\nrequirements and limitations govern\" the participating units of local government). Accordingly,\nfor the reasons set out above, this office requests that the Advisory Board conduct all future\nmeetings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Among other things, the Advisory Board\nshould provide advance notice of its meetings (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2016)), keep written\nminutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2016)), and provide members of the public with an\nopportunity to address Advisory Board members (5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)). This office\nalso requests that each Advisory Board member complete the OMA electronic training\ncurriculum developed and administered by the Public Access Counselor. See 5 ILCS 120/1.05\n(West 2016).\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(312) 814-8413 or the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to\nclose this file.\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n44489 o vio co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"An enterprise zone advisory board's OMA compliance","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-44489/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 15, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Doug Nelson\nPresident, Nelson Enterprises\nwspynews@gmail.com\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf, Partner\nAncel Glink Diamond Bush DiCianni & Krafthefer\nA Professional Corporation\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njtappendorf@ancelglink.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2016 PAC 44489\nDear Mr. Nelson and Ms. Tappendorf:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons stated below, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that the Advisory Board (Advisory Board) of the DeKalb County Enterprise\nZone (Enterprise Zone) is a public body for purposes of OMA and thus violated the requirements\nof the Act in connection with its meeting held on or about August 18, 2016.\nOn October 11, 2016, Mr. Doug Nelson, on behalf of WSPY News (WSPY),\nsubmitted this Request for Review alleging that the Advisory Board had failed to adhere to the\nrequirements of OMA in connection with its meeting held on or about August 18, 2016. Mr.\nNelson stated that when WSPY had requested notice of Advisory Board meetings, the Advisory\nBoard had responded that it would not allow the public or the press to attend its meetings\nbecause it did not believe that it was a public body subject to OMA. Mr. Nelson contended that\nthe Advisory Board is a public body because its \"primary purpose • • • is to determine if\n\napplications for real estate and sales tax abatement are sufficient to receive abatement of taxes[,]\"\nand thus the Advisory Board has \"control of the public purse[.]\" 1\nOn October 25, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nAdvisory Board and asked it to provide this office with copies of its organizing documents,\ntogether with a detailed written response to Mr. Nelson's allegation that it is a public body\nsubject to the requirements of OMA. On November 4, 2016, outside counsel for the DeKalb\nCounty Economic Development Corporation (EDC) provided this office with copies of three\nDeKalb County Board (County Board) resolutions pertaining to the Advisory Board 2 and a\nwritten response. On November 21, 2016, Mr. Nelson submitted a reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (2016).\nSection 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines a \"public body\" as:\n[A]ll legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\nIn its response to this office, the EDC stated that as an initial matter, \"the\nEnterprise Zone is not an entity, private or public. Instead, the Enterprise Zone is a 'zone' that is\ndesignated and established over a specific area pursuant to the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act\" (20\n\n1 E-mail fi-om WSPY News to Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney\n\nGeneral (October 6, 2016).\n\n'County of DeKalb, Establishing the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-76 (Nov.\n19, 2014); County of DeKalb, Adopting the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone Intergovernmental Agreement,\nResolution R2014-77 (Nov. 19, 2014); County of DeKalb, Appointing the DeKalb County Economic Development\nCorporation as the Zone Administrator for the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-78 (Nov. 19,\n\nILCS 655/1 et seq. (West 2016)). 3 In contrast, the EDC acknowledged that the Advisory Board\nis a \"body,\" but argued that \"it is a private one that provides contractual services to certain\ngovernment bodies pursuant to a contract for services.\" (Emphasis in original.)4\nThe EDC then discussed the Advisory Board's implementing resolutions. DeKalb\nCounty Resolution R2014-76, which initiated the Enterprise Zone, provides that certain\n\"Designating Units ofGovernment\"-the DeKalb County Board, Cortland Town Council,\nDeKalb City Council, Genoa City Council, Sandwich City Council, Sycamore City Council, and\nWaterman Village Board---determined that it was necessary for the region to obtain the\nenterprise zone designation. 5 The enterprise zone designation application process is\nadministered by the Illinois Department ofCommerce and Economic Opportunity,6 subject to the\napproval ofthe State's Enterprise Zone Board. 7 However, \"[t]he administration ofan Enterprise\nZone shall be under the jurisdiction of the designating municipality or county.\" 8 Resolution\nR2014-77 approved the intergovernmental agreement (!GA), pursuant to the Intergovernmental\nCooperation Act (5 ILCS 220/1 et seq. (West 2016)), between the Designating Units of\nGovernment. 9 It provides that the Advisory Board shall be comprised ofthe Executive\nCommittee ofthe Board of Directors of the EDC, with the Executive Director ofthe EDC\nserving as Enterprise Zone Administrator.10 The EDC's Executive Committee is elected annually\nat the EDC Annual Meeting. 11 Additionally, Resolution R2014-78 formalized the EDC's role of\n\n'Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 20 I6), at I.\n'Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 2016), at I.\n19, 2014), at I.\n\n'County of DeKalb, Establishing the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-76 (Nov.\n'See 20 ILCS 655/5.1 (West 2016).\n7\n\nSee 20 ILCS 655/5.2.1 (West 2016).\n\n8\n\n20 ILCS 655/8 (West 2016).\n\n'County of DeKalb, Adopting the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone Intergovernmental Agreement,\n\nadministering the Enterprise Zone. 12 The formation of the Enterprise Zone permits eligible\ncompanies to apply for and obtain property tax abatement pursuant to a memorandum of\nunderstanding with the Enterprise Zone Administrator in return for meeting qualifying\nconditions that are intended to promote economic growth. 13\nClaiming that the Advisory Board \"does not fall within the list expressly\nidentified as public bodies\" in section 1.02 of OMA, the EDC argued that the Advisory Board\ncould only be subject to OMA if it \"somehow qualif[ies] as a subsidiary body of the County or\none of the other governmental entities.\" 14\nThe test for whether an entity qualifies as a subsidiary body was set forth in\nRocliford Newspapers, Inc. v. Northern Illinois Council on Alcoholism & Drug Dependence, 64\nIll. App. 3d 94, 96-97 (1978), as summarized in Hopfv. Topcorp, Inc., 256 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892\n(1st Dist. 1993): \"(]) whether the entity has a legal existence independent of government\nresolution; (2) the nature of the functions performed by the entity; and (3) the degree of\ngovernment control exerted over the entity.\" 15 In Rockford, the Illinois Appellate Court held that\na not-for-profit corporation that administered drug and alcohol treatment programs was not\nsubject to the provisions of OMA, despite the fact that it was primarily government-funded and\nits activities were regulated and monitored by various levels of government. See Rockford, 64\nIll. App. 3d at 96 (\"The amount or percentage of governmental funding of a private entity should\nhave no bearing on whether that entity is characterized as a subsidiary for purposes of the Open\nMeetings Act. Although the Act itself provides that a particular entity need not be publically\nfunded in order to be required to hold open meetings, it does not state that public funding alone\nwill make a particular entity subject to the Act.\").\nApplying the first factor, independent legal existence, to itself, rather than the\nAdvisory Board, the EDC stated that it is a registered 50l(c)(3) non-profit organization. The\nEDC argued that its role in administering the Enterprise Zone does not diminish its status as an\nindependent and private entity, comparing itself to the non-profit organization at issue in\n12 County of DeKalb, Appointing the DeKalb County Economic Development Corporation as the\nZone Administrator for the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution R2014-78 (Nov. 19, 2014).\n\n\"See generally County of DeKalb, Establishing the DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Resolution\nR2014-76 (Nov. 19, 2014), at I.\n\"Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel GI ink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 2016), at 2.\n\"This office notes that the Illinois Supreme Court in Better Government Ass'n v. Illinois High\nSchool Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, �26, 89 N.E.3d 376, 384 (2017), which was decided after the parties' submissions in\nthis matter, recognized an additional factor: \"the extent to which the entity is publicly funded[.]\"\n\nRockford and the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) in Better Government Ass'n v. Jl/inois\nHigh School Ass'n, 2016 IL App (I st) 151356, 56 N.E.3d 497 (2016), ajfd, 2017 IL 121124, 89\nN.E.3d 376 (2017). The EDC stated that membership of the Advisory Board is entirely within\nits control, rather than the control of any governmental unit, and that members of the Advisory\nBoard serve without compensation. In addition, the EDC stated that the Zone Administrator\n(who is also the EDC Director) is paid solely by the EDC, and that the Advisory Board is\nentirely funded through administrative fees paid by businesses in the Enterprise Zone.\nUnder the second factor, the nature of the functions performed by the entity, the\nEDC acknowledged that the Advisory Board provides certain functions and services for the\nDesignating Units of Government, but argued that \"those functions are not governmental in\nnature[ ]\" because they are \"the type of contractual services that are routinely provided by private\nconsultants[.]\" 16 Citing Better Government Ass'n, the EDC argued that the fact that a public\nbody could perform the same functions as the Advisory Board does not transform its functions\ninto governmental functions. See Better Government Ass'n, 2016 IL App (1st) 151356, iJiJ25-28,\n56 N.E.3d at 505 (concluding that \"although a public body could perform the same functions of\nIHSA in developing, supervising, and promoting interscholastic competitions among its member\nschools, the private, independent, not-for-profit IHSA does not perform public, governmental\nfunctions in this case.\"). The EDC also asserted that although the Advisory Board's duties are\nadvisory in nature, the Advisory Board does not advise a public body.\nUnder the third factor, degree of control by a governmental entity, the EDC\nemphasized that the voting membership of the Advisory Board is comprised of the EDC's\nExecutive Committee and Executive Director. According to the EDC, \"[t]here is no day-to-day\nsupervision over the [Advisory Board] by the county or any other governmental entity.\" 17\nIn reply, WSPY first argued that it is important to distinguish the EDC from the\nAdvisory Board. WSPY acknowledged that EDC is a private entity, but asserted that the\nAdvisory Board is a separate entity, stating that the entities have separate meetings with separate\nagendas, meeting structures, and attendance.\nWith respect to whether the Advisory Board has an independent legal existence,\nWSPY argued that it does not, disputing the EDC's claim that membership on the Advisory\nBoard is entirely under the EDC's control. WSPY asserted that under the !GA, the constituent\nbodies that do not have representation on the Advisory Board may appoint non-voting members.\n\"Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau (November 4, 2016), at 3.\n17 Letter from Julie A. Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\nThe pertinent provision of the !GA states: \"Representatives of the Designating Units of\nGovernment and Representatives of Taxing Bodies participating in the DeKalb County\nEnterprise Zone Property Tax Abatement Program who do not currently serve on the EDC\nExecutive Committee will be ex-officio, non-voting member[s] of the Advisory Board.\" 18 Thus,\nit appears not that the constituent bodies independently appoint non-voting members to the\nAdvisory Board, but that representatives of the constituent bodies automatically qualify as non­\nvoting Advisory Board members.\nWSPY further argued, however, that the Advisory Board \"does not have an\nindependent legal existence apart from the constituent governments that created\" it, 19 stating that\nimportant decisions must be approved by six of the seven Designating Units of Government. For\ninstance, the !GA provides that in the event that the County or EDC elects to terminate it:\n[T]he parties shall cooperate in good faith to approve a new Zone\nAdministrator and Administration Board that is acceptable to at\nleast six out of seven of the Parties, to approve a new\nAdministration Agreement that is acceptable to at least six out of\nseven of the Parties, and to approve an amendment to this\nAgreement consistent with the Parties' agreement. The\nmembership composition of the Advisory Board and the\nmechanism for selection of members of the Advisory Board shall\nnot change without the approval of at least six out of seven of the\nParties to this Agreement. 120 1\nIn contrast, WSPY argued, a legally independent entity would be able to alter its own operations\nwithout consulting public bodies for approval. WSPY asserted that, given the Advisory Board's\nsole purpose of administering the Enterprise Zone, \"[t]his lack of control over its own destiny\nillustrates that it has no separate legal existence\" from the !GA and the parties to it. 21\nAs to the nature and function of the Advisory Board, WSPY asserted that the\nAdvisory Board makes final decisions on whether applications for tax abatement are accepted or\nrejected. WSPY stated that before the Enterprise Zone was created, tax incentive deals in\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 29.\n19 Letter from Doug Nelson, President, Wspy News, to Josh Jones, Attorney General, Supervising\nAttorney (undated), at *2.\n20\n\nDeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Intergovernmental Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 29-30.\n\n\"Letter from Doug Nelson, President, Wspy News, to Josh Jones, Attorney General, Supervising\n\nDeKalb County were discussed and voted upon in open meetings held in accordance with OMA;\nby not adhering to OMA, the Advisory Board \"has dramatically reduced public inspection,\ncomment, and understanding of tax incentive deals\" in the County. 22\nLastly, regarding the degree of governmental control over the Advisory Board,\nWSPY argued that the terms of the !GA are comprehensive. WSPY noted that section IV of the\nIGA23 sets out the Advisory Board's duties, membership composition and terms, voting\nrequirements, and mechanics of dissolution.\nAlthough the parties in this matter focused on the factors used to assess whether\nan entity is a subsidiary body, this office notes that advisory bodies are also identified in section\n1.02 of OMA as public bodies subject to the Act. In University Professionals of Illinois, Local\n4100 of the Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856 (1st Dist. 2003), the\nplaintiff alleged that a group of presidents and chancellors of public universities (Council), which\nmade recommendations to the Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), violated OMA by\nmeeting privately before IBHE meetings to discuss issues related to funding for public education\nbecause it constituted an advisory body. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 858. In holding that the\nCouncil was not an advisory body for purposes of OMA, the court considered the following\nfactors to be relevant to that assessment:\n[I] who appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; [2] the\nentity's assigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute; [3] whether its role is solely advisory\nor whether it also has a deliberative or investigative function; [4]\nwhether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise\naccountable to any public body; (5] whether the group has a\nbudget; [6] its place within the larger organization or institution of\nwhich it is a part; and [7] the impact of decisions or\nrecommendations that the group makes. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n858.\nThese factors have significant overlap with the Rocliford factors, as both sets examine the\nindependence of the entities and the role that they play in the transaction of public business.\n\n22 Letter from Doug Nelson, President, Wspy News, to Josh Jones, Attorney General, Supervising\n\nVarious decisions have been issued by Illinois courts concerning whether entities\nqualified as subsidiary or advisory bodies for purposes of OMA, but none address whether an\nentity may be a public body pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement. The Office of the\nAttorney General, however, has issued opinions concerning the nature of entities formed by\nintergovernmental agreements. In Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, issued November 4, 1999,\nAttorney General Ryan addressed whether DuPage Public Safety Communications (Du-Comm),\nan entity created pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement to provide centralized public safety\ndispatching services, was an \"agency\" required to maintain its records in accordance with the\nLocal Records Act (50 ILCS 205/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Seven municipalities originally entered\ninto the intergovernmental agreement upon passing authorizing ordinances. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op.\nNo. 99-021, at 2. Du-Comm was led by an unpaid board of directors and unpaid executive\ncommittee. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 2. The board of directors, consisting of mayors or\npresidents of the participating municipalities and representatives of the participating fire\nprotection districts, was authorized to approve and adopt Du-Comm's annual budget; contract on\nbehalf of Du-Comm; incur debts, liabilities, or obligations to accomplish its purposes; and\nemploy personnel. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 2-3. The executive committee, consisting\nof the officers of the board of directors and two municipal administrators, two fire chiefs, and\ntwo police chiefs, was responsible for Du-Comm's day-to-day operations. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No.\n99-021, at 3. Each of the parties to the intergovernmental agreement contributed to Du-Comm's\nbudget, owned a common interest in its property, and was liable for its debts. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op.\nNo. 99-021, at 3.\nAttorney General Ryan noted that the purpose of the Local Records Act was to\nfacilitate governmental operations by prohibiting \"any officer or agency\" from disposing of local\npublic records without approval from the applicable Local Records Commission. Ill. Att'y Gen.\nOp. No. 99-021, at 3-4 (quoting 50 ILCS 205/7 (West 1998)). Much like the definition of\n\"public body\" in OMA, the definition of \"agency\" in the Local Records Act included \"all parts,\nboards, departments, bureaus and commissions of any county, municipal corporation or political\nsubdivision.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 4 (quoting 50 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998)).\nAttorney General Ryan stated that the municipalities and fire protection districts that participated\nin Du-Comm were municipal corporations and thus agencies subject to the Local Records Act.\nIll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 5. Given that \"Du-Comm was not created as a separate legal\nentity,\" and no statutory authority existed for the creation of such a separate governmental\nentity, 24 Attorney General Ryan concluded that \"Du-Comm is a joint operation of its member\nmunicipal corporations[,]\" and therefore \"a part of each of the municipal corporations that\ncreated it.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 6. Attorney General Ryan accordingly opined that\n\n24 This office notes that the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act does not provide for an enterprise zone to\n\nDu-Comm was an \"agency\" subject to the requirements of the Local Records Act. Ill. Att'y Gen.\nOp. No. 99-021, at 7.\nAlthough Attorney General Ryan's analysis of agencies created pursuant to\nintergovernmental agreements in Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021 concerned a different statute, it\nis instructive in this matter given the similarities between the definitions of \"agency\" and \"public\nbody\" and the factors that were considered in determining whether an entity created pursuant to\nan intergovernmental agreement is an \"agency\" under the Local Records Act and the Stukel and\nRocliford factors that are relevant to our determination of whether the Advisory Board is subject\nto OMA.\nUnder the terms of the IGA, the voting members of the Advisory Board are\nappointed by the EDC, a private entity, though representatives of the constituent bodies serve as\nnon-voting members. Advisory Board members do not receive compensation, as was the case\nwith Du-Comm's board of directors and the Council in Stukel. See Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n866. Yet, while the Council in Stukel was self-initiated (Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866), the\nAdvisory Board and Du-Comm's board of directors were created under intergovernmental\nagreements. Better Government Ass'n is also factually distinguishable. In holding that the IHSA\nwas not a public body, the court emphasized that the IHSA \"was not created by a school district\nor any other public body or by any other statute or government resolution. * * * Its authority is\nderived from its board of directors, which is created pursuant to its own constitution.\" (Better\nGovernment Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124,,r37, 89 N.E.3d at 386). Similar to Du-Comm's board of\ndirectors, on the other hand, the Advisory Board is empowered to act only pursuant to the IGA\nand Administration Agreement, which manifest the collective will of the Designating Units of\nGovernment - not the EDC.\nThe duties of the Advisory Board, as set out in the Enterprise Zone's\nAdministration Agreement,25 include implementing and monitoring goals and objectives;\nestablishing operations and management procedures, including appeals processes, and advising\non policies; reporting to the Designating Units of Government and other participating bodies on\nan annual basis as to Zone activities, performance, policies, and procedures; marketing the\nEnterprise Zone; and reporting data to the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic\nOpportunity and Illinois Department of Revenue. These significant, formal responsibilities\naccord with those of Du-Comm's board of directors but contrast sharply with those of the\nCouncil in Stukel, which had no duties assigned by IBHE. See Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866.\nFurther, while the Council in Stukel had no deliberative or investigative function (Stukel, 344 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 866), the Advisory Board has a substantial deliberative function in deciding which\n\n\"DeKalb County Enterprise Zone, Administration Agreement (Nov. 19, 2014), at 2.\n\nMr. Doug Nelson\nMs. Julie A. Tappendorf\nFebruary I 5, 2018\nPage JO\n\ncompanies receive property tax abatements and under what conditions. Thus, the Advisory\nBoard's duties strongly indicate that it is a public body.\nAlthough the EDC argued that the Advisory Board is not supervised by any\npublic body on a day to day basis, the Advisory Board is accountable to the Designating Units of\nGovernment under the !GA and Administration Agreement. Unlike the Council in Stukel, which\nwas not subject to governmental control or otherwise accountable to any public body (Stukel,\n344 Ill. App. 3d at 866), and the IHSA, where \"no public body has control over how the\ngoverning board is established or comprised[,]\" \"[m]embership by individual schools is not\ncompulsory[,]\" and \"[t]he board is not accountable to any particular school district or particular\npublic school[]\" (Better Government Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, 1140, 41, 89 N.E.3d at 386-87), the\nmembership and duties of the Advisory Board are governed by the !GA and Administration\nAgreement. As with Du-Comm and its board of directors, the Advisory Board has no legal\nexistence independent of government resolution; it lacks discretion to act outside of the duties\nestablished by the Designating Units of Government under the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act. See\nIll. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05-010, issued December 16, 2005, at 29 (an entity created pursuant to an\nintergovernmental agreement derives its powers from its constituent bodies and possesses no\ninherent powers). Moreover, as WSPY noted, significant changes to the Advisory Board require\nthe agreement of six out of the seven of those public bodies. The degree of governmental control\nto which the Advisory Board is subject indicates that it is a public body.\nThe Advisory Board does not appear to have a budget of its own. Rather, the\nEDC provides the operating expenses for the Enterprise Zone, including expenses involved in the\nAdvisory Board's meetings and its reporting functions. 26 Similar to the IHSA, which \"does not\nreceive any direct governmental funding\" but which earns revenue pursuant to its relationships\nwith public bodies (Better Government Ass'n, 2017 IL 121124, 1149-53, 89 N.E.3d at 388-89),\nthe Advisory Board's activities are funded by fees charged to companies seeking property tax\nabatement. In contrast, Du-Comm's budget was funded by its constituent bodies, though\nAttorney General Ryan did not address whether its board of directors had a separate budget. The\nabsence of direct public funding for the Advisory Board is not dispositive of the applicability of\nOMA. See Roclford, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 96.\nThe positioning of the Advisory Board, however, is comparable to Du-Comm's\nboard of directors and is unlike the circumstances discussed in Stukel. The Advisory Board is\nessential to the operation of the Enterprise Zone, but it is not housed within one public body and\ninstead serves the interests of the public bodies that joined together under the !GA and\nAdministration Agreement. In Stukel, the court stated that \"each member [of the Council] is part\nof a larger organization or institution, specifically, the university he or she heads, [but] no\n\nmember of the Council is a member of the IBHE.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866. In this case,\nthe Advisory Board manages Enterprise Zone business for the public bodies that comprise it, just\nas Du-Comm's board of directors manages the agency for the public bodies that comprise it.\nUnder section 5 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (5 ILCS 220/5 (West 2016)):\nAny one or more public agencies may contract with any\none or more other public agencies to perform any governmental\nservice, activity or undertaking or to combine, transfer, or exercise\nany powers, functions, privileges, or authority which any of the\npublic agencies entering into the contract is authorized by law to\nperform, provided that such contract shall be approved by the\ngoverning bodies of each party to the contract and except where\nspecifically and expressly prohibited by law.\nThe Advisory Board administers the joint operation of the Enterprise Zone, playing a central role\nin exercising the combined authority of the constituent bodies with respect to economic\ndevelopment.\nLastly, as with Du-Comm's board of directors, the impact of the Advisory Board's\ndecisions is considerable. In Stukel, no allegation was made as to the impact of the Council's\ndecisions on IBHE (Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866). In contrast, the Advisory Board's consent is\nneeded to: (I) terminate an abatement and/or require repayment of previously abated property\ntaxes due to a failure to maintain sufficient employment levels; 27 (2) waive elements of a\nmemorandum of understanding with an applicant due to a hardship; 28 (3) collect a processing fee\nfor Enterprise Zone activities; 29 and (4) transfer an abatement from one taxpayer to another. 30 In\nparticular, the authority to permit certain companies to avoid meeting performance measures\nwhile still retaining property tax abatement is significant. The ability to decide whether a\ncompany retains property tax abatement strongly militates in favor of construing the Advisory\nBoard as a public body.\nHaving reviewed all of the relevant factors, on balance, this office concludes that\nthe Advisory Board is a public body that is subject to the requirements of OMA. Under both the\nRoc/iford and Stukel tests, the Advisory Board's role in deciding property tax abatement issues\n\nfor the constituent bodies under the !GA is too substantial for the Advisory Board to deliberate\nabout public business behind closed doors. Although the Advisory Board was formed by an\nintergovernmental agreement rather than by a single public body, its governmental role is no less\nsignificant. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 99-021, at 6-7 (\"The fact that an association of units of\nlocal government is given a degree of independence in exercising its granted powers does not\nmean that it is not a part of its originating members.\"); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05-010, at\n29 (an entity created pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement \"must comply with whatever\nrequirements and limitations govern\" the participating units of local government). Accordingly,\nfor the reasons set out above, this office requests that the Advisory Board conduct all future\nmeetings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Among other things, the Advisory Board\nshould provide advance notice of its meetings (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2016)), keep written\nminutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2016)), and provide members of the public with an\nopportunity to address Advisory Board members (5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)). This office\nalso requests that each Advisory Board member complete the OMA electronic training\ncurriculum developed and administered by the Public Access Counselor. See 5 ILCS 120/1.05\n(West 2016).\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(312) 814-8413 or the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to\nclose this file.\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n44489 o vio co"}
{"id":1182,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-04-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["44652"],"title":"Northwest Facilities Planning Committee violated OMA for Oct 5 2016 special meeting","filename":"44652, issued April 7, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3332,"summary":"The Village of Fox Lake alleged that the Northwest Facilities Planning Area Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee failed to provide proper notice, agendas, and public access for an October 5, 2016, meeting. The PAC determined that the Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to comply with notice, agenda, and public comment requirements.","plain_summary":"The Village of Fox Lake complained that a local government committee held a meeting without telling the public, providing an agenda, or allowing public comment. The Public Access Bureau of the Illinois Attorney General's office concluded that the committee violated the Open Meetings Act, but the text of the determination is cut off and does not include any order or remedy for future compliance.","holding":"The Northwest Facilities Planning Area Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide proper notice, an agenda, and public access for its October 5, 2016, meeting, according to the Public Access Bureau's conclusion. No further order or remedy is stated in the truncated source.","legal_question":"Whether the Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide notice, an agenda, and public access for a special meeting.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.01","5 ILCS 120/2.02","5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Northwest Facilities Planning Area Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee","requesting_party":"Mr. Thomas G. Gardiner (on behalf of the Village of Fox Lake)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The committee failed to provide public notice, an agenda, and public comment opportunities for a special meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/44652, issued April 7, 2017.pdf","sha256":"3ffaeeecf10d60ab8430b2d28bdd37910d6d75ce327d8a3c6988f37e12d8b591","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","public comment","agenda","open meetings act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nGardiner Koch Weisberg & Wrona\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ntgardiner@gkwwlaw.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nMayor of Round Lake Beach\nChairman, Northwest FP A Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee\n1937 North Municipal Way\nRound Lake Beach, Illinois 60073\nmayorrlbeach@ameritech.net\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2016 PAC 44652\nDear Mr. Gardiner and Mayor Hill:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons explained below, the Public\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Northwest Facilities Planning Area Wholesale Policy\nAdvisory Committee (Committee) violated the requirements of OMA in connection with an\nOctober 5, 20 I 6, gathering.\n\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 21, 2016, Mr. Thomas Gardiner, on behalf of the Village of Fox Lake\n(Fox Lake), submitted this Request for Review alleging that during an October 5, 2016, special\nmeeting, the Committee violated OMA by, among other things, (I) failing to provide an agenda\nand post notice of the meeting at the Committee's principal office; (2) failing to provide media\nnotification; and (3) by not making the meeting open to the public for public comment.\n\n500 South Second Street. Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (217)782-1090 • TTY: (217)785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nI 00 West Randolph Street. Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main. Carbondale. Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn November 4, 2016, this office sent a copy ofthe Request for Review to the\nCommittee and requested a written response addressing: (1) whether the Committee posted an\nagenda and public notice at least 48 hours prior to the October 5, 2016, meeting pursuant to\nsection 2.02(a) ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2014)), and ifso, to provide the office with\ncopies ofthe notice and the agenda and an explanation ofwhen and where they were posted; (2)\nwhether any news medium had filed an annual request for notification ofthe Committee's\nmeetings under section 2.02(b) ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(b) (West 2014)), and ifso, to furnish\nthis office with a copy ofany such notification that was provided for the Committee's October 5,\n2016, meeting; and (3) whether any member ofthe public asked to address the Committee during\nits October 5, 2016, meeting, and ifany individual did so and was denied an opportunity to\ncomment, to explain why and provide a copy ofthe Committee's established and recorded rules\ngoverning public comment. This office also asked for copies ofall minutes from that meeting,\nwhether from open or closed sessions. On November 10, 2016, Mayor Richard H. Hill\nresponded in his capacity as the Chairman ofthe Committee, and the Lakes Region Sanitary\nDistrict, the Yillage ofRound Lake, and the Village ofRound Lake Heights responded as\nwholesaler members of the Committee. They argued that the gathering on October 5, 2016, was\nnot a \"meeting\" as defined in section 1.02 ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2014)). 1 On\nNovember 30, 2016, Fox Lake submitted a reply. On February 13, 2017, the Lakes Region\nSanitary District, the Village ofRound Lake, and the Village ofRound Lake Heights provided a\nsupplemental response.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\"The Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\nof the people's business, and that the intent ofthe Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. I 989). Section 2(a) of OMA provides that \"[a]ll meetings ofpublic bodies\nshall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in accordance with\nSection 2a.\" Section 1.02 ofOMA defines \"meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means ofcontemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority ofa quorum ofthe members ofa public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.]\n'The wholesalers asserted that Fox Lake's Request for Review was unclear as to whether it was\nalleging a meeting of the full Northwest FPA Wholesale Advisory Committee or its subcommittee, the Northwest\nFPA Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee. In its reply, Fox Lake clarified that it was alleging that the October 5,\n2016, meeting held in violation of OMA was of the Northwest FPA Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee.\n\n\fMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7, 2017\nPage 3\n\n!fa gathering of public body members is determined to be a \"meeting,\" then all the requirements\nof OMA apply, including proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West\n2014)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2014)), keeping minutes, and allowing public comment (5 ILCS\n!20/2.06(a), (g) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99-515, effective June 30, 2016).\nOMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings ofpublic officials,\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d\n191, 202 (1980); see also Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 660--61 (N.D. Ill. 1982):\nA \"meeting\" under the Act, has been variously described as a\ngathering \"designed to discuss or reach an accord with regard to\npublic business,\"[citation], or as \"'collective discussion... and\nexchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision.\"' [Citation]\nThird New International Dictionary (1976) defines \"deliberate\" as\nfollows: \"to ponder or think about with measured careful\nconsideration and often with formal discussion before reaching a\ndecision or conclusion.\"\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. The Office of the\nAttorney General has also noted that \"[i]n theory, there is no absolute prohibition against the\nmembers ofa public body attending an 'informational meeting' without triggering the application\nof' OMA, as long as the members do not make \"[d]eliberational statements\" or engage in the\ndiscussion of public business amongst themselves. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, issued July\n14, 1995, at 10-11. In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the \"mere fact that a\nmajority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in a bona fide\npresentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" did not make the\npresentation subject to OMA, but the extensive discussions of public business by members of\ntwo county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA. (Emphasis in\noriginal.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11; see also Nabhani, 552 F. Supp. at 661 (a\ngathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \"no examining or\nweighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a\ndecision, [or] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\").\nThe Committee is a subcommittee of the Northwest Facilities Planning Area\nWholesale Advisory Committee, which was formed in accordance with two contracts: (I) the\nagreement between Lake County and Fox Lake for sanitary sewer treatment service and (2) the\n\n\fMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7, 2017\nPage4\nagreement between Lake County and a group of wholesalers (including the Lakes Region\nSanitary District, the Village of Round Lake, the Village of Round Lake Heights, and six others)\nfor sanitary sewer transport and treatment service. The \"Agreement for Sewage Disposal\"\nentered into between Lake County and Fox Lake describes the Committee as follows:\n1.35. Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee.\nAn advisory body comprised of one representative from\neach of the County, the Village, and each municipality, sanitary\ndistrict, and public utility company that (i) owns local sewers that\nare located within the Northwest Lake FPA; (ii) is served by the\nNorthwest Regional Water Reclamation Facility; and (iii) is a party\nto a current contract for such service with the County\n(\"Wholesalers\"). Representatives (as well as any alternative\nrepresentatives) are to be approved by resolution of the respective\ncorporate authorities of the County, the Village, and each\nWholesaler. Representatives and alternate representatives shall be\neither members of the corporate authorities or administrative\nofficials of the County, the Village, or a Wholesaler. The\nWholesale Policy Advisory Committee is established for the\npurposes of communication and coordination on matters of\nmutual concern regardini sanitary sewerage service throughout\nthe Northwest Lake FPA. 21 (Emphasis added.)\nThe wholesalers pay for the sanitary sewer services, from which separate payments are made to\nLake County and Fox Lake. On November 9, 2016, Lakes Region Sanitary District, the Village\nof Round Lake, and the Village of Round Lake Heights filed a complaint in the Nineteenth\nJudicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois, against Lake County and Fox Lake alleging breach of\ncontract and seeking relief related to the alleged overcharging of wholesalers.\nFox Lake contends that the discussion at the October 5, 2016, gathering\nconcerned the Lake County and Fox Lake contract and was therefore a discussion of public\nbusiness within the purview of the Committee's purposes. Fox Lake also argues that attendees at\nthe October 5, 2016, gathering identified and agreed to items to be included in the agenda for the\nCommittee's October 13, 2016, special meeting.\nThe Committee includes eleven members. Therefore, six members constitute a\nquorum, and a majority of the quorum is four members. The Committee does not dispute that six\n2\n\nLetter from Thomas G. Gardiner to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau, Exhibit 2 (November 30, 2016), at 9.\n\n\fMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7, 2017\nPage 5\n\nCommittee members were present at the October 5, 2016, gathering, but it argues that the matters\ndiscussed were beyond the purview of the Committee. The Committee contends that the\n\"meeting was held solely for the purposes of exchanging information amongst potential\nplaintiffs. Each wholesaler was interested in recovering the Fox Lake/County overcharges, and\neach was independently considering the option oflitigation against Fox Lake and the County.\" 3\nThe wholesalers met in their individual capacities to exchange information among potential\nplaintiffs and to \"collect information and discuss strategy related to the inappropriate conduct of\nFox Lake and the County of Lake.\" 4 The Committee argues that the gathering did not result in\nany official action to be taken by the Committee or any advisory opinion to be shared with the\nCommittee, but rather the gathering resulted in each wholesaler making an independent decision\nregarding whether to pursue legal action against Fox Lake and Lake County. As proof, the\nCommittee points out that the gathering resulted in three of the wholesalers joining a lawsuit\nagainst Fox Lake and Lake County. The Committee denies that there was any agenda-setting or\ndiscussion of matters to be addressed at the October 13, 2016, special meeting. 5\nThe Committee has informed this office that there are no minutes or agenda from\nthe October 5, 2016, gathering. The only evidence provided to this office that references the\nOctober 5, 2016, gathering is two e-mails provided by Fox Lake. In the first e-mail, sent on\nOctober 2, 2016, Kurt Stimpson of the Lakes Region Sanitary District announced an\n\"(i]nformation meeting re: LC/FL Agreement and how it affects our constituents.\" He addressed\nthe e-mail to \"Policy Committee Members\" and began by noting that there had been very limited\ninformation at the Committee meetings regarding the Lake County and Fox Lake agreement\nissue. He wrote:\n(w]e would like to take the opportunity to clarify the issues, as we\nunderstand them, to the Villages and utilities that are tributary to\nthe County system. We are proposing an information session at\nthe District office at 4pm on Wednesday, October 5th. We will\nexplain the events to date, as well as the various documents that\nare being referenced. This will be helpful for many ofus prior to\n3\n\nLetter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau(November I0,2016),at2.\n'Letter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau (November 10,2016), at 2.\n'See letter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public\nAccess Bureau (February 13, 2017). Although Fox Lake alleges that the Committee engaged in agenda-setting for\nthe October 13, 2016, special meeting at the October 5, 2016, gathering, it has presented no evidence to substantiate\nits claim. Based on the limited information provided to this office, we cannot conclude that the Committee\ndiscussed or planned the agenda for the October 13, 2016,special meeting.\n\n\fMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7, 2017\nPage 6\nthe scheduled October 13 th Special Meeting of the NW Policy\nGroup.\nWe recommend you also bring your village\nadministrators/managers for this discussion.16l (Emphasis in\noriginal.)\nThe second e-mail was sent by Mayor Dan MacGillis of the Village of Round\nLake in response to Mr. Stimpson's e-mail. He wrote:\nThank you for offering this information meeting to describe\ncomplicated contracts and accounting principles. I encourage all\npolicy members to attend this meeting along with your\nadministrators. It is our fiduciary responsibility to best understand\nhow our users fees have been misallocated once again. The future\nholds an agreement/settlement between Lake County and Fox\nLake. We must feel satisfied that this is accomplished\nappropriately. l7 l\nAs described in the e-mails, the purposes of the October 5, 2016, gathering were\nto have an information session to prepare members for the October 13, 2016, special meeting, to\nprovide information for general understanding, and to prepare members to assess any proposed\nsettlement between Lake County and Fox Lake. The general topics discussed-the Lake County\nand Fox Lake contract and the alleged misallocation of fees-were within the scope of the\nCommittee's \"purposes of communication and coordination on matters of mutual concern\nregarding sanitary sewerage service throughout the Northwest Lake FPA\" and therefore were\nmatters of public business. Indeed, the Committee discussed the subject of the misallocation of\nfees at its May 11, 2016, July 13, 2016, and September 14, 2016 meetings. 8 The topic was also\nthe focus of the Committee's October 13, 2016, special meeting. 9 Further, although the e-mails\n'Letter from Thomas G. Gardiner to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau, Exhibit I (November 30, 20 I 6), at 2.\n'Letter from Thomas G. Gardiner to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau, Exhibit I (November 30, 2016), at I.\n'Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Meeting, May 11, 2016,\nMinutes 3; Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Meeting, July 13, 2016, Minutes\n3; Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Meeting, September 14, 2016, Minutes 56.\n\"Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Special Meeting, Agenda\n(October 13, 2016); Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Special Meeting,\nOctober 13, 2016, Minutes.\n\n\fMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7, 2017\nPage 7\n\ncharacterized the gathering as an \"information meeting,\" and information sharing, which without\nmore, would not necessarily trigger the requirements of OMA, the Committee did more than\npassively listen to a presentation or a workshop; the attendees \"discuss[ed] strategy related to the\ninappropriate conduct of Fox Lake and the County.\" 10\nThe Committee asserts that its discussion ofthe prospect oflitigation on the\nmisallocation offees, and litigation by individual wholesalers is not the business of the\nCommittee. Notably, the individual who called the gathering indicated in the e-mail cited above\nthat the planned explanation of events and documents would be helpful information for an\nupcoming Committee meeting. Even ifthis office accepts the Committee's assertions regarding\nthe purpose ofthe gathering, its logic is unpersuasive. Under the Committee's reasoning, there\nwas no meeting because the attendees were not deliberating on a course ofaction that could be\ntaken by the Committee, but on a course ofaction that could only be taken by the individual\nwholesalers. However, there is no question that the subject matter discussed was public\nbusiness, as misallocation of fees had been before the Committee in the past and would appear\nbefore the Committee in the future. The Committee appears to be arguing for a narrow\ndefinition ofa meeting that would allow members ofpublic bodies to gather to discuss matters of\npublic business so long as they could claim that no course of action by the public body was\ndiscussed. This office declines to interpret the requirements ofOMA so narrowly. As noted in\nthe case law, a meeting under OMA is a gathering \"designed to discuss or reach an accord with\nregard to public business,\" People ex rel. Difanis, 83 Ill.2d at 210 (emphasis added), or a\n'\"collective discussion... and exchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision,\"' Ill. Att'y\nGen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 125. Finding that public bodies may convene out\nofthe public view to discuss matters ofpublic business at length solely because they did not also\nagree to a course ofaction would be contrary to the spirit ofthe law.\nEven though one outcome ofthe October 5, 2016, gathering was that individual\nwholesalers decided whether to pursue litigation, the underlying subject matter ofthe meeting\nwas still public business. Accordingly, based on the available information, this office concludes\nthat in connection with its October 5, 2016, gathering, the Committee violated section 2.02 of\nOMA by holding a meeting without proper posting ofnotice and an agenda; section 2.01 of\nOMA by failing to hold the meeting at a specified time and place that was open to the public;\nand section 2.06(a) ofOMA by failing to keep minutes ofthe meeting, and section 2.06(g) of\nOMA by failing to allow public comment. Because the Committee does not appear to have\nvoted upon items offinal action at the meeting, no further remedial action is required, but this\noffice cautions the Committee to comply with all ofthe requirements ofOMA when gathering\nfor a meeting where matters ofpublic business will be discussed, including proper posting of\nnotice and an agenda pursuant to section 2.02 ofOMA, holding the meeting at a specified time\nIOLetter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau (November I 0, 2016), at 2.\n\n\fMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7,2017\nPage 8\n\nand place that is convenient and open to the public pursuant to section 2.01 of OMA, and\nkeeping minutes and allowing public comment pursuant to section 2.06 of OMA.\nIn its Request for Review, Fox Lake also asserted that the Committee violates\nOMA at its general meetings by failing to post notice of the meetings at its principal office or on\na website. Although the Request for Review did not allege sufficient facts for this office to\nreview the allegation, we again caution the Committee to follow the notice procedures provided\nin section 2.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2014)).\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n44652 o 2a meeting improper 201 location improper 202 notice improper 206 minutes improper\n206g pub comment improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Robert T. O'Donnell\nO'Donnell Haddad LLC\n14044 Petronella Drive, Suite I\nLibertyville, Illinois 60048\nrodonnell@odonnell-lawfirm.com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"An advisory committee's special meeting notice and agenda","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-44652/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nGardiner Koch Weisberg & Wrona\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ntgardiner@gkwwlaw.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nMayor of Round Lake Beach\nChairman, Northwest FP A Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee\n1937 North Municipal Way\nRound Lake Beach, Illinois 60073\nmayorrlbeach@ameritech.net\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2016 PAC 44652\nDear Mr. Gardiner and Mayor Hill:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons explained below, the Public\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Northwest Facilities Planning Area Wholesale Policy\nAdvisory Committee (Committee) violated the requirements of OMA in connection with an\nOctober 5, 20 I 6, gathering.\n\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 21, 2016, Mr. Thomas Gardiner, on behalf of the Village of Fox Lake\n(Fox Lake), submitted this Request for Review alleging that during an October 5, 2016, special\nmeeting, the Committee violated OMA by, among other things, (I) failing to provide an agenda\nand post notice of the meeting at the Committee's principal office; (2) failing to provide media\nnotification; and (3) by not making the meeting open to the public for public comment.\n\nOn November 4, 2016, this office sent a copy ofthe Request for Review to the\nCommittee and requested a written response addressing: (1) whether the Committee posted an\nagenda and public notice at least 48 hours prior to the October 5, 2016, meeting pursuant to\nsection 2.02(a) ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2014)), and ifso, to provide the office with\ncopies ofthe notice and the agenda and an explanation ofwhen and where they were posted; (2)\nwhether any news medium had filed an annual request for notification ofthe Committee's\nmeetings under section 2.02(b) ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(b) (West 2014)), and ifso, to furnish\nthis office with a copy ofany such notification that was provided for the Committee's October 5,\n2016, meeting; and (3) whether any member ofthe public asked to address the Committee during\nits October 5, 2016, meeting, and ifany individual did so and was denied an opportunity to\ncomment, to explain why and provide a copy ofthe Committee's established and recorded rules\ngoverning public comment. This office also asked for copies ofall minutes from that meeting,\nwhether from open or closed sessions. On November 10, 2016, Mayor Richard H. Hill\nresponded in his capacity as the Chairman ofthe Committee, and the Lakes Region Sanitary\nDistrict, the Yillage ofRound Lake, and the Village ofRound Lake Heights responded as\nwholesaler members of the Committee. They argued that the gathering on October 5, 2016, was\nnot a \"meeting\" as defined in section 1.02 ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2014)). 1 On\nNovember 30, 2016, Fox Lake submitted a reply. On February 13, 2017, the Lakes Region\nSanitary District, the Village ofRound Lake, and the Village ofRound Lake Heights provided a\nsupplemental response.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\"The Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\nof the people's business, and that the intent ofthe Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. I 989). Section 2(a) of OMA provides that \"[a]ll meetings ofpublic bodies\nshall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance with\nSection 2a.\" Section 1.02 ofOMA defines \"meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means ofcontemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority ofa quorum ofthe members ofa public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.]\n'The wholesalers asserted that Fox Lake's Request for Review was unclear as to whether it was\nalleging a meeting of the full Northwest FPA Wholesale Advisory Committee or its subcommittee, the Northwest\nFPA Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee. In its reply, Fox Lake clarified that it was alleging that the October 5,\n2016, meeting held in violation of OMA was of the Northwest FPA Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee.\n\n!fa gathering of public body members is determined to be a \"meeting,\" then all the requirements\nof OMA apply, including proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West\n2014)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2014)), keeping minutes, and allowing public comment (5 ILCS\n!20/2.06(a), (g) (West 2014), as amended by Public Act 99-515, effective June 30, 2016).\nOMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings ofpublic officials,\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d\n191, 202 (1980); see also Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 660--61 (N.D. Ill. 1982):\nA \"meeting\" under the Act, has been variously described as a\ngathering \"designed to discuss or reach an accord with regard to\npublic business,\"[citation], or as \"'collective discussion... and\nexchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision.\"' [Citation]\nThird New International Dictionary (1976) defines \"deliberate\" as\nfollows: \"to ponder or think about with measured careful\nconsideration and often with formal discussion before reaching a\ndecision or conclusion.\"\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. The Office of the\nAttorney General has also noted that \"[i]n theory, there is no absolute prohibition against the\nmembers ofa public body attending an 'informational meeting' without triggering the application\nof' OMA, as long as the members do not make \"[d]eliberational statements\" or engage in the\ndiscussion of public business amongst themselves. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, issued July\n14, 1995, at 10-11. In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the \"mere fact that a\nmajority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in a bona fide\npresentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" did not make the\npresentation subject to OMA, but the extensive discussions of public business by members of\ntwo county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA. (Emphasis in\noriginal.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11; see also Nabhani, 552 F. Supp. at 661 (a\ngathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \"no examining or\nweighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a\ndecision, [or] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\").\nThe Committee is a subcommittee of the Northwest Facilities Planning Area\nWholesale Advisory Committee, which was formed in accordance with two contracts: (I) the\nagreement between Lake County and Fox Lake for sanitary sewer treatment service and (2) the\n\nMr. Thomas G. Gardiner\nThe Honorable Richard Hill\nApril 7, 2017\nPage4\nagreement between Lake County and a group of wholesalers (including the Lakes Region\nSanitary District, the Village of Round Lake, the Village of Round Lake Heights, and six others)\nfor sanitary sewer transport and treatment service. The \"Agreement for Sewage Disposal\"\nentered into between Lake County and Fox Lake describes the Committee as follows:\n1.35. Wholesale Policy Advisory Committee.\nAn advisory body comprised of one representative from\neach of the County, the Village, and each municipality, sanitary\ndistrict, and public utility company that (i) owns local sewers that\nare located within the Northwest Lake FPA; (ii) is served by the\nNorthwest Regional Water Reclamation Facility; and (iii) is a party\nto a current contract for such service with the County\n(\"Wholesalers\"). Representatives (as well as any alternative\nrepresentatives) are to be approved by resolution of the respective\ncorporate authorities of the County, the Village, and each\nWholesaler. Representatives and alternate representatives shall be\neither members of the corporate authorities or administrative\nofficials of the County, the Village, or a Wholesaler. The\nWholesale Policy Advisory Committee is established for the\npurposes of communication and coordination on matters of\nmutual concern regardini sanitary sewerage service throughout\nthe Northwest Lake FPA. 21 (Emphasis added.)\nThe wholesalers pay for the sanitary sewer services, from which separate payments are made to\nLake County and Fox Lake. On November 9, 2016, Lakes Region Sanitary District, the Village\nof Round Lake, and the Village of Round Lake Heights filed a complaint in the Nineteenth\nJudicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois, against Lake County and Fox Lake alleging breach of\ncontract and seeking relief related to the alleged overcharging of wholesalers.\nFox Lake contends that the discussion at the October 5, 2016, gathering\nconcerned the Lake County and Fox Lake contract and was therefore a discussion of public\nbusiness within the purview of the Committee's purposes. Fox Lake also argues that attendees at\nthe October 5, 2016, gathering identified and agreed to items to be included in the agenda for the\nCommittee's October 13, 2016, special meeting.\nThe Committee includes eleven members. Therefore, six members constitute a\nquorum, and a majority of the quorum is four members. The Committee does not dispute that six\n2\n\nLetter from Thomas G. Gardiner to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nCommittee members were present at the October 5, 2016, gathering, but it argues that the matters\ndiscussed were beyond the purview of the Committee. The Committee contends that the\n\"meeting was held solely for the purposes of exchanging information amongst potential\nplaintiffs. Each wholesaler was interested in recovering the Fox Lake/County overcharges, and\neach was independently considering the option oflitigation against Fox Lake and the County.\" 3\nThe wholesalers met in their individual capacities to exchange information among potential\nplaintiffs and to \"collect information and discuss strategy related to the inappropriate conduct of\nFox Lake and the County of Lake.\" 4 The Committee argues that the gathering did not result in\nany official action to be taken by the Committee or any advisory opinion to be shared with the\nCommittee, but rather the gathering resulted in each wholesaler making an independent decision\nregarding whether to pursue legal action against Fox Lake and Lake County. As proof, the\nCommittee points out that the gathering resulted in three of the wholesalers joining a lawsuit\nagainst Fox Lake and Lake County. The Committee denies that there was any agenda-setting or\ndiscussion of matters to be addressed at the October 13, 2016, special meeting. 5\nThe Committee has informed this office that there are no minutes or agenda from\nthe October 5, 2016, gathering. The only evidence provided to this office that references the\nOctober 5, 2016, gathering is two e-mails provided by Fox Lake. In the first e-mail, sent on\nOctober 2, 2016, Kurt Stimpson of the Lakes Region Sanitary District announced an\n\"(i]nformation meeting re: LC/FL Agreement and how it affects our constituents.\" He addressed\nthe e-mail to \"Policy Committee Members\" and began by noting that there had been very limited\ninformation at the Committee meetings regarding the Lake County and Fox Lake agreement\nissue. He wrote:\n(w]e would like to take the opportunity to clarify the issues, as we\nunderstand them, to the Villages and utilities that are tributary to\nthe County system. We are proposing an information session at\nthe District office at 4pm on Wednesday, October 5th. We will\nexplain the events to date, as well as the various documents that\nare being referenced. This will be helpful for many ofus prior to\n3\n\nLetter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau(November I0,2016),at2.\n'Letter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau (November 10,2016), at 2.\n'See letter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public\nAccess Bureau (February 13, 2017). Although Fox Lake alleges that the Committee engaged in agenda-setting for\nthe October 13, 2016, special meeting at the October 5, 2016, gathering, it has presented no evidence to substantiate\nits claim. Based on the limited information provided to this office, we cannot conclude that the Committee\n\nthe scheduled October 13 th Special Meeting of the NW Policy\nGroup.\nWe recommend you also bring your village\nadministrators/managers for this discussion.16l (Emphasis in\noriginal.)\nThe second e-mail was sent by Mayor Dan MacGillis of the Village of Round\nLake in response to Mr. Stimpson's e-mail. He wrote:\nThank you for offering this information meeting to describe\ncomplicated contracts and accounting principles. I encourage all\npolicy members to attend this meeting along with your\nadministrators. It is our fiduciary responsibility to best understand\nhow our users fees have been misallocated once again. The future\nholds an agreement/settlement between Lake County and Fox\nLake. We must feel satisfied that this is accomplished\nappropriately. l7 l\nAs described in the e-mails, the purposes of the October 5, 2016, gathering were\nto have an information session to prepare members for the October 13, 2016, special meeting, to\nprovide information for general understanding, and to prepare members to assess any proposed\nsettlement between Lake County and Fox Lake. The general topics discussed-the Lake County\nand Fox Lake contract and the alleged misallocation of fees-were within the scope of the\nCommittee's \"purposes of communication and coordination on matters of mutual concern\nregarding sanitary sewerage service throughout the Northwest Lake FPA\" and therefore were\nmatters of public business. Indeed, the Committee discussed the subject of the misallocation of\nfees at its May 11, 2016, July 13, 2016, and September 14, 2016 meetings. 8 The topic was also\nthe focus of the Committee's October 13, 2016, special meeting. 9 Further, although the e-mails\n'Letter from Thomas G. Gardiner to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau, Exhibit I (November 30, 20 I 6), at 2.\n'Letter from Thomas G. Gardiner to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\nBureau, Exhibit I (November 30, 2016), at I.\n'Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Meeting, May 11, 2016,\nMinutes 3; Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Meeting, July 13, 2016, Minutes\n3; Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Meeting, September 14, 2016, Minutes 56.\n\"Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Special Meeting, Agenda\n(October 13, 2016); Northwest Lake County Wholesale Sewer Policy Advisory Committee, Special Meeting,\n\ncharacterized the gathering as an \"information meeting,\" and information sharing, which without\nmore, would not necessarily trigger the requirements of OMA, the Committee did more than\npassively listen to a presentation or a workshop; the attendees \"discuss[ed] strategy related to the\ninappropriate conduct of Fox Lake and the County.\" 10\nThe Committee asserts that its discussion ofthe prospect oflitigation on the\nmisallocation offees, and litigation by individual wholesalers is not the business of the\nCommittee. Notably, the individual who called the gathering indicated in the e-mail cited above\nthat the planned explanation of events and documents would be helpful information for an\nupcoming Committee meeting. Even ifthis office accepts the Committee's assertions regarding\nthe purpose ofthe gathering, its logic is unpersuasive. Under the Committee's reasoning, there\nwas no meeting because the attendees were not deliberating on a course ofaction that could be\ntaken by the Committee, but on a course ofaction that could only be taken by the individual\nwholesalers. However, there is no question that the subject matter discussed was public\nbusiness, as misallocation of fees had been before the Committee in the past and would appear\nbefore the Committee in the future. The Committee appears to be arguing for a narrow\ndefinition ofa meeting that would allow members ofpublic bodies to gather to discuss matters of\npublic business so long as they could claim that no course of action by the public body was\ndiscussed. This office declines to interpret the requirements ofOMA so narrowly. As noted in\nthe case law, a meeting under OMA is a gathering \"designed to discuss or reach an accord with\nregard to public business,\" People ex rel. Difanis, 83 Ill.2d at 210 (emphasis added), or a\n'\"collective discussion... and exchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision,\"' Ill. Att'y\nGen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 125. Finding that public bodies may convene out\nofthe public view to discuss matters ofpublic business at length solely because they did not also\nagree to a course ofaction would be contrary to the spirit ofthe law.\nEven though one outcome ofthe October 5, 2016, gathering was that individual\nwholesalers decided whether to pursue litigation, the underlying subject matter ofthe meeting\nwas still public business. Accordingly, based on the available information, this office concludes\nthat in connection with its October 5, 2016, gathering, the Committee violated section 2.02 of\nOMA by holding a meeting without proper posting ofnotice and an agenda; section 2.01 of\nOMA by failing to hold the meeting at a specified time and place that was open to the public;\nand section 2.06(a) ofOMA by failing to keep minutes ofthe meeting, and section 2.06(g) of\nOMA by failing to allow public comment. Because the Committee does not appear to have\nvoted upon items offinal action at the meeting, no further remedial action is required, but this\noffice cautions the Committee to comply with all ofthe requirements ofOMA when gathering\nfor a meeting where matters ofpublic business will be discussed, including proper posting of\nnotice and an agenda pursuant to section 2.02 ofOMA, holding the meeting at a specified time\nIOLetter from Robert T. O'Donnell to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nand place that is convenient and open to the public pursuant to section 2.01 of OMA, and\nkeeping minutes and allowing public comment pursuant to section 2.06 of OMA.\nIn its Request for Review, Fox Lake also asserted that the Committee violates\nOMA at its general meetings by failing to post notice of the meetings at its principal office or on\na website. Although the Request for Review did not allege sufficient facts for this office to\nreview the allegation, we again caution the Committee to follow the notice procedures provided\nin section 2.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02 (West 2014)).\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n44652 o 2a meeting improper 201 location improper 202 notice improper 206 minutes improper\n206g pub comment improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Robert T. O'Donnell\nO'Donnell Haddad LLC\n14044 Petronella Drive, Suite I\nLibertyville, Illinois 60048\nrodonnell@odonnell-lawfirm.com"}
{"id":1183,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-03-28","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["44882"],"title":"North Maine Fire Protection District Board held improper closed meeting under OMA","filename":"44882, issued March 28, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2015,"summary":"The requester alleged that members of the North Maine Fire Protection District Board of Trustees held an improper closed meeting to discuss insurance proposals. The PAC determined that the Board members held an improper meeting in violation of OMA, but noted that no final action was taken.","plain_summary":"This determination letter addresses whether a gathering of two of three Fire Protection District trustees on November 1, 2016 constituted an improper closed 'meeting' under OMA. The Public Access Bureau held that the Board held an improper closed meeting: a quorum of the three-member Board gathered for at least 15 minutes, opened a health-insurance proposal, and discussed it, which meets OMA's definition of 'meeting' regardless of whether a formal vote occurred. Because no final action was taken during that gathering, no remedial action was available, though the Bureau cautioned the Board against future discussions of public business outside properly noticed open meetings. The matter involved the Board of Trustees of the North Maine Fire Protection District and was closed without issuance of a binding opinion.","holding":"A gathering of a quorum of a public body's members to discuss public business, even briefly and without a formal vote, constitutes a 'meeting' under 5 ILCS 120/1.02 and must comply with OMA's open-meeting requirements.","legal_question":"Whether a gathering of a majority of a quorum of the Board of Trustees to discuss public business constituted an improper closed meeting under the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Trustees of the North Maine Fire Protection District","requesting_party":"Mr. Phil Faustrum, President, North Maine Local 2224-IAFF","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The board members met privately to discuss employee insurance coverage and premiums.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_a/44882, issued March 28, 2018.pdf","sha256":"8b17402e3a2f39596a8aff658253fb0187cc123296fb75837cc0d29c64c57d82","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","public business","meeting requirements","fire protection district"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMarch 28, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Phil Faustrum, President\nNorth Maine Local 2224- IAFF\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nloca12224@gmail. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Joseph Miller, III\nOttosen Britz\n\nKelly Cooper Gilbert & DiNolfo, Ltd.\n\n1804 North Naper Boulevard,\n\nSuite 350\n\nNaperville, Illinois 60563\n\njmiller@ottosenbritz.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 44882\nDear Mr. Faustrum and Mr. Miller:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that, based on the available information, the Board of Trustees ( Board) of the\n\nNorth Maine Fire Protection District ( District) held an improper closed meeting on November 1,\n2016.\n\nOn November 3, 2016, Mr. Phil Faustrum submitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that on November 1, 2016, two of the three members of the Board\nmet with Fire Chief Richard Dobrowski without adhering to the requirements of OMA, \" and\nreviewed and discussed insurance proposals related to the employeesl' 1 2017 insurance coverage\nand\n\npremiums.\"'\n\nMr. Faustrum stated that the issue of the employees' insurance coverage was on\n\nthe agenda for the Board' s November 9, 2016, meeting. He alleged that \" the meeting was held\n\nE- mail from Phil Faustrum, President, North Maine Local 2224- IAFF, to Sarah Pratt ( November\n3, 2016).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n\nIllinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West\n\nIllinois,\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001\n\nRandolph\n\nStreet, Chicago,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\n60601 • (\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Phil Faustrum\nMr. Joseph Miller, III\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 2\n\nwithout all the trustees present to review and discuss the proposals [ so] as to skew the results of\n\nthe review of the documents in their scheduled regular open meeting.\" 2\nOn November 8, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to Mr. Faustrum' s allegations.\n\nSpecifically, this office asked the\n\nBoard to explain whether two of its three members met to discuss a matter of public business on\n\nNovember 1, 2016, without providing advance notice to the public or otherwise abiding by\nOMA, and, if so, whether it was necessary to conduct that meeting in accordance with OMA.\nOn November 15, 2016, the Board responded by denying the allegations.\n\nOn November 23,\n\n2016, Mr. Faustrum submitted a reply. On December 7, 2016, the Board submitted an amended\nresponse. On December 15, 2016, Mr. Faustrum submitted a supplemental reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\n\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\nSection 2( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2016)) defines a\n\nmeeting\" subject to the Act as:\n\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means ( such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5 -member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\n\nIf a gathering of members of a public body meets this definition, then all of the requirements of\nOMA apply, including the proper posting of notice and an agenda ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic ( 5 ILCS 102/ 2. 01 ( West 2016)), keeping minutes ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a) ( West 2016)), and\n\nallowing public comment ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)).\n\n2E - mail from Phil Faustrum, President, North Maine Local 2224- IAFF, to Sarah Pratt ( November\n3, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Phil Faustrum\n\nMr. Joseph Miller, III\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 3\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" I11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. \" In theory, there is no\nabsolute prohibition against the members of a public body attending an ' informational meeting'\nwithout triggering the application of' OMA, as long as the members do not make\nd] eliberational statements\" or engage in \" unrecorded discussions\" concerning public business\n\namongst themselves. Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, issued July 14, 1995, at 10- 11. In that\nopinion, the Attorney General concluded that \"[ t] he mere fact that a majority of a quorum of the\nmembers of a public body attend[ ed] and participate[ d] in a bona fide presentation on new\nlegislative developments in an area of public concern within the scope of the public body' s power\nto act\" did not make the presentation subject to OMA, but that the extensive discussions of\n\npublic business amongst members of two county boards during the presentation did trigger the\nrequirements of OMA. ( Emphasis in original.)\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, at 10- 11; see also\n\nNabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 ( N. D. Ill. 1982) ( a gathering does not constitute a\nmeeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons for or against\na course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt to reach\naccord on a specific matter of public business.\").\n\nIn the Board' s initial response to this office, the Board' s attorney, Mr. Joseph\nMiller, explained that the District had solicited bids to administer employee health insurance,\nwhich were due to be received on November\n\n1, 2016.\n\nHe stated that the Board had designated\n\nFire Chief Dobrowski to open the bids. Subsequently, according to Mr. Miller:\n\nT] wo of the trustees walked in separately after the bid opening to\nget a copy of the bid packets. The two trustees were only there to\nreceive the packets which would then be discussed at the\n\nNovember 9, 2016 meeting. Although I am sure the two trustees\nexchanged common pleasantries, no actual District business\n\noccurred on November 1, 2016. 131\nMr. Faustrum replied that the Board's description of the circumstances on\nNovember\n\n1, 2016, was false.\n\nHe explained:\n\nPersonally I was witness to the event. I saw the two\n\nTrustees in the office of the Fire Chief sitting at the table of\napproximately 1 hour. During that hour they had the binders that\ncontained the bids that were solicited for third -party administrative\n3Letter from Joseph Miller, 111, Ottosen Britz Kelly Cooper Gilbert & DiNolfo, Ltd., to Joshua\nJones, Assistant\n\nAttorney General, Public\n\nAccess [\n\nBureau], Office of the Attorney General ( November 15, 2016).\n\n\fMr. Phil Faustrum\nMr. Joseph Miller, III\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 4\n\nservices on the table and open. They were openly conversing\nwithin a distance to the open door that I could hear the\n\nconversation. They were discussing the bids. I was aware that no\nmeeting was posted in accordance to the open meetings act and\n\npassed the office several times and consistently heard the\nconversation. 141\nIn the Board' s amended response, Mr. Miller corrected his previous statement\n\nabout the Board designating Fire Chief Dobrowski to open the bids, stating that instead the\nBoard had solicited proposals for health insurance and that the plan was for the trustees to pick\n\nup the submitted proposals individually. He explained:\nTrustee McLaughlin arrived at the fire station to pick up copies of\nthe proposals at about 3: 45 p.m. At approximately 4: 00 p.m.,\nTrustee Rutzen arrived at the fire station to do the same. While it\nis true that the trustees opened one of the proposal' s [ sic], the\nnature of the conversation did not occur as portrayed in Mr.\nFaustrom' s [ sic] letter.\n\nIt] is important to note that the trustees noticed that one of\nthe packets was open and one was sealed. At that point, the trustees\n\nopened the other proposal packet and realized that they should\nschedule a special meeting to review the proposals. Trustees\nRutzen and McLaughlin asked Chief Dobrowski to contact Trustee\n\nNeal to see if he would be able to attend a special meeting to\ndiscuss the proposals. In addition, Chief Dobrowski called the two\n\nvendors who submitted proposals to see if they could attend the\nspecial meeting. Trustees McLaughlin and Rutzen then left the fire\nstation around 4: 15- 4: 20 p. m.\nIn my opinion, a conversation to attempt to schedule a\nspecial meeting is not a violation of the Illinois Open Meetings\n\nAct. No business was conducted other than scheduling the\nmeeting. Further, the trustees were not in the Chiefs office for an\nhour as indicated by Mr. Faustrom [ sic]. Trustee McLaughlin was\n\n4Letter from Phil Faustrum, President, North Maine Local 2224- IAFF, to Joshua Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access [ Bureau], Office of the Attorney General ( November 23, 2016), at t.\n\n\fMr. Phil Faustrum\n\nMr. Joseph Miller, III\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 5\n\nthere for approximately 30 minutes. Trustee Rutzen was in the\nChiefs office for 15 minutes. 151\nUnder the plain language of the definition of \"meeting\" in OMA, a public body\ndoes not need to conduct business in the form of holding an official vote in order for a meeting to\nbe held. Rather, a discussion of public business among a quorum of a three member board is\nsufficient to trigger the requirements of the Act.\n\nIn this instance, it is undisputed that a quorum\n\nof the Board met on November 1, 2016, for at least 15 minutes and opened a proposal\n\nconcerning a matter of public business. Mr. Faustrum provided firsthand information about what\nhe saw and heard and that time: the two Board members discussing the proposals.\n\nAlthough the\n\nBoard' s attorney claimed that the Board merely attempted to schedule a special meeting during\nthis gathering, he acknowledged that the Board opened the second proposal. In light of the\ndetailed information provided by Mr. Faustrum, it appears that the Board members at least\nbriefly discussed the proposals in some manner during the minimum of 15 minutes that they\nwere gathered together. Accordingly, the available information indicates that the Board held an\nimproper closed meeting on November 1, 2016.\nNonetheless, Mr. Faustrum did not allege, and the evidence received by this office\ndoes not indicate, that the Board took final action during that improper closed meeting.\nTherefore, no remedial action is available here. This office cautions the Board to refrain from\n\ndiscussions of public business outside of properly noticed open meetings in the future.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 312) 814- 8413.\n\nOSH A M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic\n\nAccess\n\nBureau\n\n44882 o 2a meeting improper fd\n\n5Letter from Joseph Miller, 111, Ottosen Britz Kelly Cooper Gilbert & DiNolfo, Ltd., to Joshua\nJones, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access [ Bureau], Office of the Attorney General ( December 7, 2016), at\n1- 2.\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Private discussion of employee insurance coverage","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-44882/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMarch 28, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Phil Faustrum, President\nNorth Maine Local 2224- IAFF\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nloca12224@gmail. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Joseph Miller, III\nOttosen Britz\n\nKelly Cooper Gilbert & DiNolfo, Ltd.\n\n1804 North Naper Boulevard,\n\nSuite 350\n\nNaperville, Illinois 60563\n\njmiller@ottosenbritz.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 44882\nDear Mr. Faustrum and Mr. Miller:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that, based on the available information, the Board of Trustees (Board) of the\n\nNorth Maine Fire Protection District (District) held an improper closed meeting on November 1,\n2016.\n\nOn November 3, 2016, Mr. Phil Faustrum submitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that on November 1, 2016, two of the three members of the Board\nmet with Fire Chief Richard Dobrowski without adhering to the requirements of OMA, \" and\nreviewed and discussed insurance proposals related to the employeesl' 1 2017 insurance coverage\nand\n\npremiums.\"'\n\nMr. Faustrum stated that the issue of the employees' insurance coverage was on\n\nthe agenda for the Board's November 9, 2016, meeting. He alleged that \" the meeting was held\n\nE- mail from Phil Faustrum, President, North Maine Local 2224- IAFF, to Sarah Pratt (November\n3, 2016).\n\nwithout all the trustees present to review and discuss the proposals [ so] as to skew the results of\n\nthe review of the documents in their scheduled regular open meeting.\" 2\nOn November 8, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to Mr. Faustrum's allegations.\n\nSpecifically, this office asked the\n\nBoard to explain whether two of its three members met to discuss a matter of public business on\n\nNovember 1, 2016, without providing advance notice to the public or otherwise abiding by\nOMA, and, if so, whether it was necessary to conduct that meeting in accordance with OMA.\nOn November 15, 2016, the Board responded by denying the allegations.\n\nOn November 23,\n\n2016, Mr. Faustrum submitted a reply. On December 7, 2016, the Board submitted an amended\nresponse. On December 15, 2016, Mr. Faustrum submitted a supplemental reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\n\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2016)) defines a\n\nmeeting\" subject to the Act as:\n\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5 -member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\n\nIf a gathering of members of a public body meets this definition, then all of the requirements of\nOMA apply, including the proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic (5 ILCS 102/ 2. 01 (West 2016)), keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a) (West 2016)), and\n\nallowing public comment (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)).\n\n2E - mail from Phil Faustrum, President, North Maine Local 2224- IAFF, to Sarah Pratt (November\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" I11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. \" In theory, there is no\nabsolute prohibition against the members of a public body attending an ' informational meeting'\nwithout triggering the application of' OMA, as long as the members do not make\nd] eliberational statements\" or engage in \" unrecorded discussions\" concerning public business\n\namongst themselves. Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, issued July 14, 1995, at 10- 11. In that\nopinion, the Attorney General concluded that \"[ t] he mere fact that a majority of a quorum of the\nmembers of a public body attend[ ed] and participate[ d] in a bona fide presentation on new\nlegislative developments in an area of public concern within the scope of the public body's power\nto act\" did not make the presentation subject to OMA, but that the extensive discussions of\n\npublic business amongst members of two county boards during the presentation did trigger the\nrequirements of OMA. (Emphasis in original.)\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, at 10- 11; see also\n\nNabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 (N. D. Ill. 1982) (a gathering does not constitute a\nmeeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons for or against\na course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt to reach\naccord on a specific matter of public business.\").\n\nIn the Board's initial response to this office, the Board's attorney, Mr. Joseph\nMiller, explained that the District had solicited bids to administer employee health insurance,\nwhich were due to be received on November\n\n1, 2016.\n\nHe stated that the Board had designated\n\nFire Chief Dobrowski to open the bids. Subsequently, according to Mr. Miller:\n\nT] wo of the trustees walked in separately after the bid opening to\nget a copy of the bid packets. The two trustees were only there to\nreceive the packets which would then be discussed at the\n\nNovember 9, 2016 meeting. Although I am sure the two trustees\nexchanged common pleasantries, no actual District business\n\noccurred on November 1, 2016. 131\nMr. Faustrum replied that the Board's description of the circumstances on\nNovember\n\n1, 2016, was false.\n\nHe explained:\n\nPersonally I was witness to the event. I saw the two\n\nTrustees in the office of the Fire Chief sitting at the table of\napproximately 1 hour. During that hour they had the binders that\ncontained the bids that were solicited for third -party administrative\n3 Letter from Joseph Miller, 111, Ottosen Britz Kelly Cooper Gilbert & DiNolfo, Ltd., to Joshua\n\nservices on the table and open. They were openly conversing\nwithin a distance to the open door that I could hear the\n\nconversation. They were discussing the bids. I was aware that no\nmeeting was posted in accordance to the open meetings act and\n\npassed the office several times and consistently heard the\nconversation. 141\nIn the Board's amended response, Mr. Miller corrected his previous statement\n\nabout the Board designating Fire Chief Dobrowski to open the bids, stating that instead the\nBoard had solicited proposals for health insurance and that the plan was for the trustees to pick\n\nup the submitted proposals individually. He explained:\nTrustee McLaughlin arrived at the fire station to pick up copies of\nthe proposals at about 3: 45 p.m. At approximately 4: 00 p.m.,\nTrustee Rutzen arrived at the fire station to do the same. While it\nis true that the trustees opened one of the proposal's [ sic], the\nnature of the conversation did not occur as portrayed in Mr.\nFaustrom's [ sic] letter.\n\nIt] is important to note that the trustees noticed that one of\nthe packets was open and one was sealed. At that point, the trustees\n\nopened the other proposal packet and realized that they should\nschedule a special meeting to review the proposals. Trustees\nRutzen and McLaughlin asked Chief Dobrowski to contact Trustee\n\nNeal to see if he would be able to attend a special meeting to\ndiscuss the proposals. In addition, Chief Dobrowski called the two\n\nvendors who submitted proposals to see if they could attend the\nspecial meeting. Trustees McLaughlin and Rutzen then left the fire\nstation around 4: 15- 4: 20 p. m.\nIn my opinion, a conversation to attempt to schedule a\nspecial meeting is not a violation of the Illinois Open Meetings\n\nAct. No business was conducted other than scheduling the\nmeeting. Further, the trustees were not in the Chiefs office for an\nhour as indicated by Mr. Faustrom [ sic]. Trustee McLaughlin was\n\n4 Letter from Phil Faustrum, President, North Maine Local 2224- IAFF, to Joshua Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access [ Bureau], Office of the Attorney General (November 23, 2016), at t.\n\nthere for approximately 30 minutes. Trustee Rutzen was in the\nChiefs office for 15 minutes. 151\nUnder the plain language of the definition of \"meeting\" in OMA, a public body\ndoes not need to conduct business in the form of holding an official vote in order for a meeting to\nbe held. Rather, a discussion of public business among a quorum of a three member board is\nsufficient to trigger the requirements of the Act.\n\nIn this instance, it is undisputed that a quorum\n\nof the Board met on November 1, 2016, for at least 15 minutes and opened a proposal\n\nconcerning a matter of public business. Mr. Faustrum provided firsthand information about what\nhe saw and heard and that time: the two Board members discussing the proposals.\n\nAlthough the\n\nBoard's attorney claimed that the Board merely attempted to schedule a special meeting during\nthis gathering, he acknowledged that the Board opened the second proposal. In light of the\ndetailed information provided by Mr. Faustrum, it appears that the Board members at least\nbriefly discussed the proposals in some manner during the minimum of 15 minutes that they\nwere gathered together. Accordingly, the available information indicates that the Board held an\nimproper closed meeting on November 1, 2016.\nNonetheless, Mr. Faustrum did not allege, and the evidence received by this office\ndoes not indicate, that the Board took final action during that improper closed meeting.\nTherefore, no remedial action is available here. This office cautions the Board to refrain from\n\ndiscussions of public business outside of properly noticed open meetings in the future.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (312) 814- 8413.\n\nOSH A M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic\n\nAccess\n\nBureau\n\n44882 o 2a meeting improper fd\n\n5 Letter from Joseph Miller, 111, Ottosen Britz Kelly Cooper Gilbert & DiNolfo, Ltd., to Joshua\nJones, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access [ Bureau], Office of the Attorney General (December 7, 2016), at\n1- 2."}
{"id":1184,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-04-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["45191"],"title":"Fulton County Board Health Committee did not violate OMA on meeting notice or public comment","filename":"45191, issued April 6, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3308,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Fulton County Board Health Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment time and failing to follow meeting procedures. The PAC determined that the Committee did not violate OMA regarding meeting procedures and found insufficient information to conclude that public comment was improperly restricted.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Fulton County Board Health Committee did not allow some members of the public to speak for the full five minutes during meetings and that the meeting room was too small. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau reviewed the complaint and concluded that the Committee did not violate the Open Meetings Act's requirement for a convenient and open meeting place. However, based on the available information, the Bureau was unable to determine whether the Committee had improperly restricted public comment.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the Fulton County Board Health Committee did not violate OMA section 2.01 and that there was insufficient evidence to find a violation of section 2.06(g) regarding public comment.","legal_question":"Did the Fulton County Board Health Committee violate OMA by failing to follow meeting procedures or by improperly restricting public comment time?","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.01","5 ILCS 120/2.06(g)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Fulton County Board Health Committee","requesting_party":"Ms. [Name Redacted]","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The dispute concerned the application of public comment rules and meeting procedures during two committee meetings.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.01/Convenience-and-openness-of-meeting-times-and-places/45191, issued April 6, 2017.pdf","sha256":"58f9e68305616a810463750b837dc4eb0db273c94424678e4bd2473bcb12cba2","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","county board","meeting rules","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Garry Hensley, Chairman\nFulton County Board Health Committee\n100 North Main Street\nLewistown, Illinois 61542\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 45191\n\nDear Ms.\n\nand Mr. Hensley:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Fulton County Board Health Committee ( Committee) did not\nviolate section 2. 01 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 ( West 2014)) in connection with its October 31,\n2016, and November 14, 2016, meetings. This office also is unable to conclude, from the\n\navailable information, that the Board violated OMA by improperly restricting public comment in\nviolation of section 2. 06( g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2.06( g) ( West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016).\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn November 29, 2016, Ms.\n\nsubmitted this Request for Review\n\nalleging that during its October 31, 2016, meeting, the Committee did not allow a member of the\npublic to speak for the full five minutes permitted under the Committee's rules for public\n\ncomment. Specifically, she alleged that three individuals notified the Committee before the\n\nmeeting of their intent to speak and they completed a sign- up sheet upon arriving at the meeting.\nThey were permitted to speak for five minutes. According to Ms.\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\na fourth individual\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main,\n\nCarbondale, Illinois 62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMs.\n\nMr. Garry Hensley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 2\n\nwho had not notified the Committee of her interest in making public remarks before the meeting\nand who did not complete the sign- up sheet at the meeting was not permitted to speak for the full\n\nfive minutes. Ms.\n\nalso alleged that during the Committee's November 14, 2016, meeting,\n\nshe and another member of the public were not permitted to speak for the full five minutes\n\nbecause they did not notify the Committee before the meeting of their intent to speak and were\nnot offered a sign- up sheet at the meeting.\n\nFinally, Ms.\n\ncontended that the room in the\n\nClayberg Nursing Home where the Committee held the October 31, 2016, and November 14,\n\n2016, meetings was too small to comfortably accommodate the members of the public in\nattendance.\n\nOn December 8, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCommittee and requested a written response to the allegations therein, together with a copy of\nthe Committee' s established and recorded rules regarding public comment. This office also\nasked for an explanation in response to Ms.\ns allegations that the Committee restricted\nmembers of the public from addressing the Committee for the full five minutes permitted under\n\nthe rules, including the Committee' s basis for any restriction.\nThis office also asked for clarification regarding where the Committee held its\nmeetings on October 31, 2016, and November 14, 2016, and asked the Committee to identify ( 1)\nthe capacity of the room( s), ( 2) the number of people who attended those meetings, ( 3) the\n\nnumber of people the Committee expected to attend, ( 4) whether any members of the public were\n\nrestricted from viewing and/ or hearing the meetings and, if so, to describe any measures that\nwere taken to accommodate them. This office also asked for copies of the agendas, minutes, and\nany open session recordings from the October 31, 2016, and November 14, 2016, meetings. On\n\nJanuary 9, 2017, this office received the Committee' s response letter and the requested agendas\n\nand minutes. On February 1, 2017, Ms.\n\nreplied. On February 27, 2017, in response to an\n\ninquiry by the Public Access Bureau, the Committee explained that it did not record the open\nsessions of its public meetings. On March 24, 2017, at the request of this office, the Committee\n\nprovided its rules for public comment and additional information regarding the meetings at issue.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2.01 of OMA: Meeting Accessibility\nSection 2. 01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 ( West 2014)) provides that \"[ a] II\nmeetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are\nconvenient and open to the public.\" \"\nBy its plain terms, section 2. 01 requires a venue that is not\n\nonly ' open,' but 'convenient,' to the public.\" Gerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 Ill. App. 3d\n352, 359 ( 4th Dist. 2003). Thus, \" an open meeting in an inconvenient place violates the Act.\"\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 359.\n\n\fMs.\n\nMr. Garry Hensley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 3\n\nIn addressing the meaning of \"convenient\" for purposes of section 2. 01 of OMA,\n\nthe Gerwin court stated that \"[ a] meeting can be open in the sense that no one is prohibited from\nattending it, but it can be held in such an ill-suited, unaccommodating, unadvantageous place that\nmembers of the public, as a practical matter, would be deterred from attending it.\" Gerwin, 345\nIll. App. 3d at 361. Still, the court found that \"[ i] t would be unreasonable to suppose the\nlegislature intended * * *\n\nthat public bodies hold their meetings ' at such locations as are\n\nsufficient to accommodate all interested members of the public, such that they may see and hear\nall\n\nproceedings\n\nin reasonable\n\ncomfort and\n\nsafety.\"' (\n\nEmphasis in original.) Gerwin, 345 I11.\n\nApp. 3d at 361. Accordingly, the court construed section 2. 01 as requiring \" not 'absolute\naccessibility'\n\nbut ' reasonable accessibility.\"'\n\nGerwin, 345 I11. App. 3d at 362, quoting State ex\n\nreL Badke v. Village Board of the Village ofGreendale, 173 Wis. 2d 553, 579, 494 N. W. 2d 408,\n418 ( Wis. 1993).\n\nIn its response to this office, the Committee explained that its meetings are held in\n\nthe day room at the Clayberg Nursing Home. The Committee contends that the day room is 16\nfeet by 24 feet and has sufficient capacity to hold the members of the Committee, the Clayberg\nstaff who are required to attend the meeting, as well as members of the public. The Committee\nstated that approximately eight to fifteen people attend the Committee meetings, though the\n\nCommittee does not count attendance. The Committee asserts that at no time are people barred\nfrom attending the meetings. The Committee also asserts that individuals who prefer to stand\n\nnear the doorway have no difficulty hearing or viewing the meeting, as they would be only\nfifteen feet from the Committee members. Ms.\n\ncounters that the room where the\n\nCommittee meets was once suitable for the few who attended the meetings, but is \" now getting\ncrowded.\"'\n\nShe contends that there are a number of pieces of furniture and an aviary in the\n\nroom, which limit the available space for meeting attendees. She asserts that there were an\n\ninsufficient number of chairs for the November meeting attendees, forcing some people to stand.\nShe believes that failing to provide enough chairs for the public will discourage individuals from\nattending the Committee meetings.\n\nAlthough all members of the public who wished to attend may not have been able\nto sit during the November meeting, the Committee contends that all members of the public were\nable to listen to and participate in the proceedings. Ms.\n\ndoes not allege otherwise in her\n\nRequest for Review. If attendance at the Committee meetings increases in the future, the day\n\nroom may become inconvenient, but based on the available information, the room currently is\nreasonably accessible. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Committee satisfied the\nrequirements of section 2. 01 of OMA in connection with its October 31, 2016, and November\n\n14, 2016, meetings. However, we strongly encourage the Committee to be mindful of its need to\nanticipate instances in which accommodations may be necessary to meet its obligation to provide\nadequate facilities for its meetings and to plan accordingly.\nE- mail from\n\nGeneral ( November 29, 2016), at 2.\n\nto Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney\n\n\fMs.\n\nMr. Garry Hensley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 4\n\nSection 2.06( g) of OMA: Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016) provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" The Attorney General has concluded that section 2. 06( g) of OMA \" requires that all\npublic bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for members of the public to address\npublic officials at open meetings.\" See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued\n\nSeptember 30, 2014, at 5; see also I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 4,\n2014, at 4 (\" The plain language of section 2. 06( g) of OMA provides that individuals are entitled\nto address a public body subject only to a public body's established and recorded rules.\").\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that, under the First Amendment to the U. S.\n\nConstitution, public bodies may promulgate reasonable \" time, place, and manner\" restrictions\nthat are narrowly -tailored and serve a significant governmental interest. See I.A. Rana\n\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 923 ( N.D. Ill. 2009). For example, a\n\npublic body may adopt reasonable rules governing public comment in order to maintain decorum\nand ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently. Timmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465\n\nW. D. Mich. 2008); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules\nmust tend to accommodate, rather than to unreasonably restrict, the right to address public\n\nofficials. See LA. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at\n\n459.\n\nProvided that it is reasonable in time and scope, a rule that promotes order and\n\ndecorum by requiring members of the public to sign up before addressing public officials does\nnot violate OMA. 111. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 39640, issued June 22, 2016, at 3 ( finding\nthat it was not impermissible to require prospective commenters to sign up at the start of a\nmeeting). In contrast, the enforcement of an advance sign- up rule violates OMA if the rule\nrestricts the ability to address public officials to a greater degree than is necessary to promote a\n\nsignificant governmental interest. See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, at 6 ( rule\nrequiring members of the public to sign up to comment five days in advance of meetings —\n\nbefore the public body was required to post its agenda — imposed an unreasonable restriction on\npublic comment); I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 34760, issued October 8, 2015, at 3 ( rule\nrequiring members of the public to sign up to comment seven days in advance of meetings was\nunreasonable).\n\nIn response to this office' s request for a copy of the Committee' s established and\nrecorded\n\nrules\n\nregarding\n\npublic comment, the\n\nCommittee provided a December 9, 2014,\n\n\fMs.\n\nMr. Garry Hensley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 5\n\nresolution regarding the Fulton County Board Rules of Order for the 2014- 2016 term. Section\n\n7( a) of the Rules provides the following regarding Public Remarks:\nMembers of the Public who wish to address the Board must\nprovide the Chairperson with prior written notice of their intent to\n\nspeak. The written notice shall identify the name and address of\nthe speaker, as well as a short statement indicating the speaker' s\ntopic. Each citizen is limited to five ( 5) minutes. Citizen' s\n\nremarks shall not exceed thirty ( 30) minutes per meeting. IZI\nThe same language was included on the agendas and minutes for the October 31, 2016, and\nNovember 14, 2016, Committee meetings. 3\nThe Committee' s rule that individuals \" must provide the Chairperson with prior\n\nwritten notice of their intent to speak\" does not specify how far in advance prospective speakers\nare required to give notice. In its response to this office, the Committee explained that those\n\ncitizens who inform the Committee before the meeting that they would like to speak are posted\non the agenda and those citizens who appear at the meeting without having provided advance\n\nnotice of their interest in speaking are \" normally\" asked to sign a sheet at the meeting and are\n\ngiven the opportunity to speak for up to five minutes.4 When there is no sign-up sheet, the\n2Rules of Order, Fulton County Board, Fulton County, Illinois, 2014- 2016 Term. Although not\nraised in the Request for Review, the provisions of the Committee' s public comment rules requiring prospective\nspeakers to provide their comment topics and addresses are potentially unreasonable. Requiring a member of the\n\npublic to set forth the topic of his or her comment in writing in advance of a meeting may create a chilling effect on\nspeech at public meetings. A person may be reluctant to put comments in writing, especially if the comments may\n\nbe controversial, although controversial statements are no less protected from govemment censorship under the First\nAmendment to the U. S. Constitution. ( U. S. Const., amend.\nfreedom of speech)).\n\nI (\" Congress shall make no law * * *\n\nabridging the\n\nIn addition, the requirement could be enforced to restrict the content of speech by precluding\n\ncomments a person may wish to make after reviewing the resolutions or other information disseminated by the\n\nCommittee during the meeting. Similarly, it is unclear how requiring a speaker to submit his or her address before\naddressing the Committee advances any significant governmental interest, such as promoting order and decorum at\nmeetings. A sign- up sheet set out just prior to the meeting asking for the names of individuals who wish to address\n\nthe Committee, or simply requiring prospective speakers to notify the Committee' s office shortly before the meeting\ncould accomplish the goal of running a timely and orderly meeting in a much less restrictive manner. See 111. Att'y\nGen. PAC Rev. Ltr. 37503, issued April 8, 2016.\n\n3Fulton County Board — Health Committee, Meeting, Agenda Item 5 ( October 31, 2016); Fulton\nCounty Board — Health Committee, Meeting, October 31, 2016, Minutes 1; Fulton County Board — Health\nCommittee, Meeting, Agenda Item 5 ( November 14, 2016); Fulton County Board — Health Committee, Meeting,\nNovember\n\n14, 2016, Minutes\n\n1.\n\nLetter from Garry Hensley, Fulton County Health Committee Chairman, to Laura Harter,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( December 15, 2016).\n\n\fMs.\n\nMr. Garry Hensley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 6\n\nindividuals are still permitted to speak and \" that has never been a problem. i5 The Committee did\nnot specify whether those individuals who do not sign up in advance, but are nevertheless\n\nallowed to speak, are limited in the length of time they may address the Committee.\n\nThe Committee' s explanation for how the advance sign- up rule works in practice\ndoes not clarify when individuals must sign up to speak, but rather appears to indicate that the\n\nCommittee does not enforce its established and recorded advance sign- up rule. The facts here\nare conflicting and do not provide clarification regarding how the Committee enforces its rule.\nRegarding the October 31, 2016, meeting, Ms.\ncontends that a speaker who had not\nsigned up to speak in advance of the meeting or on the meeting sign- up sheet was allowed to\nspeak, but told to \" make [ her comments] fast\" and Ms.\nbelieves that the speaker was not\ngiven five full minutes to address the Committee.\" The Committee argues that the individual\nwho asked to speak was permitted to address the Committee, but her comments were about her\nunion steward not representing her in a fashion that suited her. The Committee contends that\n\nChairman Hensley intervened during the individual's comments not because she did not sign up\nin advance, but because the Committee could not address her issue; it was one only her union\n\ncould address The available information does not demonstrate that this point of clarification\n\neffectively prohibited or was intended to prohibit the speaker from addressing the Committee.\nRegarding the November 14, 2016, meeting, Ms.\nasserts that she and another individual\n\ndid not sign up for public comment before the meeting and that unlike the October meeting, there\nwas no sign- up sheet for prospective speakers.\n\nShe and the other prospective speaker were told\n\nby Chairman Hensley that they would be permitted to speak briefly. Ms.\n\ncontends that\n\nthey were not allowed a full five minutes to address the Committee. The Committee disputes\n\nthat the two individuals were restricted in their speaking times. The Committee contends that\n\nChairman Hensley used the timer on his cellphone to monitor the speaking times and that each\nspeaker was permitted a full five minutes. In light of these conflicting versions, this office does\nnot have sufficient evidence to conclude that the Committee improperly restricted public\ncomment at its October 31, 2016, and November 14, 2016, meetings.\n\nThis office notes, however, that the Committee' s rule as to when exactly a person\nmust sign up to participate in public comment is vague, and it appears to be enforced\n\ninconsistently, if at all. Such a lack of clarity undermines the purpose of having rules for public\ncomment, as individuals are not aware of what they may be required to do to exercise their\nstatutory right to address the Committee. If the Committee chooses to restrict public comment\n\nbased on an advance sign up requirement, we suggest that the Committee clarify its rules for\npublic comment to make clear when and how individuals must sign up to address the Committee\n\n5Letter from Garry Hensley, Fulton County Health Committee Chairman, to Laura Harter,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( December 15, 2016).\n\n6E -mail from\n\nGeneral ( November 29, 2016), at 1.\n\nto Sarah Pratt, Public Access Counselor, Office of the Attorney\n\n\fs.\n\nMr. Garry Hensley\nApril\n\n6, 2017\n\nPage 7\n\nand to explain any limits placed on individuals who do not sign up in advance. Although this\noffice makes no finding as to what period for advance sign up is a reasonable rule under OMA,\nwe reiterate that such a rule should promote order and decorum and not restrict the ability to\naddress public officials to a greater degree than is necessary to promote a significant\ngovernmental\n\ninterest.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic\n\nAccess\n\nBureau\n\n45191 o 201 location proper 206g pub comment proper county\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. John D. Young\nFulton County Board Executive Assistant\nP. O. Box 226\n100 North Main, Room 100\nLewistown, Illinois 61542\n\njyoung@fultonco. org\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Justin G. Jochums\n\nFulton County State' s Attorney\nOffice of the Fulton County State' s Attorney\n100 North Main Street\nLewistown, Illinois 61542\n\njjochums@9thjudicial. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A county board","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-45191/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Garry Hensley, Chairman\nFulton County Board Health Committee\n100 North Main Street\nLewistown, Illinois 61542\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 45191\n\nDear Ms.\n\nand Mr. Hensley:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Fulton County Board Health Committee (Committee) did not\nviolate section 2. 01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 (West 2014)) in connection with its October 31,\n2016, and November 14, 2016, meetings. This office also is unable to conclude, from the\n\navailable information, that the Board violated OMA by improperly restricting public comment in\nviolation of section 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2.06(g) (West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016).\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn November 29, 2016, Ms.\n\nsubmitted this Request for Review\n\nalleging that during its October 31, 2016, meeting, the Committee did not allow a member of the\npublic to speak for the full five minutes permitted under the Committee's rules for public\n\ncomment. Specifically, she alleged that three individuals notified the Committee before the\n\nmeeting of their intent to speak and they completed a sign- up sheet upon arriving at the meeting.\nThey were permitted to speak for five minutes. According to Ms.\n\nwho had not notified the Committee of her interest in making public remarks before the meeting\nand who did not complete the sign- up sheet at the meeting was not permitted to speak for the full\n\nfive minutes. Ms.\n\nalso alleged that during the Committee's November 14, 2016, meeting,\n\nshe and another member of the public were not permitted to speak for the full five minutes\n\nbecause they did not notify the Committee before the meeting of their intent to speak and were\nnot offered a sign- up sheet at the meeting.\n\nFinally, Ms.\n\ncontended that the room in the\n\nClayberg Nursing Home where the Committee held the October 31, 2016, and November 14,\n\n2016, meetings was too small to comfortably accommodate the members of the public in\nattendance.\n\nOn December 8, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCommittee and requested a written response to the allegations therein, together with a copy of\nthe Committee's established and recorded rules regarding public comment. This office also\nasked for an explanation in response to Ms.\ns allegations that the Committee restricted\nmembers of the public from addressing the Committee for the full five minutes permitted under\n\nthe rules, including the Committee's basis for any restriction.\nThis office also asked for clarification regarding where the Committee held its\nmeetings on October 31, 2016, and November 14, 2016, and asked the Committee to identify (1)\nthe capacity of the room(s), (2) the number of people who attended those meetings, (3) the\n\nnumber of people the Committee expected to attend, (4) whether any members of the public were\n\nrestricted from viewing and/ or hearing the meetings and, if so, to describe any measures that\nwere taken to accommodate them. This office also asked for copies of the agendas, minutes, and\nany open session recordings from the October 31, 2016, and November 14, 2016, meetings. On\n\nJanuary 9, 2017, this office received the Committee's response letter and the requested agendas\n\nand minutes. On February 1, 2017, Ms.\n\nreplied. On February 27, 2017, in response to an\n\ninquiry by the Public Access Bureau, the Committee explained that it did not record the open\nsessions of its public meetings. On March 24, 2017, at the request of this office, the Committee\n\nprovided its rules for public comment and additional information regarding the meetings at issue.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2.01 of OMA: Meeting Accessibility\nSection 2. 01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 (West 2014)) provides that \"[ a] II\nmeetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are\nconvenient and open to the public.\" \"\nBy its plain terms, section 2. 01 requires a venue that is not\n\nonly ' open,' but 'convenient,' to the public.\" Gerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 Ill. App. 3d\n352, 359 (4th Dist. 2003). Thus, \" an open meeting in an inconvenient place violates the Act.\"\n\nIn addressing the meaning of \"convenient\" for purposes of section 2. 01 of OMA,\n\nthe Gerwin court stated that \"[ a] meeting can be open in the sense that no one is prohibited from\nattending it, but it can be held in such an ill-suited, unaccommodating, unadvantageous place that\nmembers of the public, as a practical matter, would be deterred from attending it.\" Gerwin, 345\nIll. App. 3d at 361. Still, the court found that \"[ i] t would be unreasonable to suppose the\nlegislature intended * * *\n\nthat public bodies hold their meetings ' at such locations as are\n\nsufficient to accommodate all interested members of the public, such that they may see and hear\nall\n\nproceedings\n\nin reasonable\n\ncomfort and\n\nsafety.\"' (Emphasis in original.) Gerwin, 345 I11.\n\nApp. 3d at 361. Accordingly, the court construed section 2. 01 as requiring \" not 'absolute\naccessibility'\n\nbut ' reasonable accessibility.\"'\n\nGerwin, 345 I11. App. 3d at 362, quoting State ex\n\nreL Badke v. Village Board of the Village ofGreendale, 173 Wis. 2d 553, 579, 494 N. W. 2d 408,\n418 (Wis. 1993).\n\nIn its response to this office, the Committee explained that its meetings are held in\n\nthe day room at the Clayberg Nursing Home. The Committee contends that the day room is 16\nfeet by 24 feet and has sufficient capacity to hold the members of the Committee, the Clayberg\nstaff who are required to attend the meeting, as well as members of the public. The Committee\nstated that approximately eight to fifteen people attend the Committee meetings, though the\n\nCommittee does not count attendance. The Committee asserts that at no time are people barred\nfrom attending the meetings. The Committee also asserts that individuals who prefer to stand\n\nnear the doorway have no difficulty hearing or viewing the meeting, as they would be only\nfifteen feet from the Committee members. Ms.\n\ncounters that the room where the\n\nCommittee meets was once suitable for the few who attended the meetings, but is \" now getting\ncrowded.\"'\n\nShe contends that there are a number of pieces of furniture and an aviary in the\n\nroom, which limit the available space for meeting attendees. She asserts that there were an\n\ninsufficient number of chairs for the November meeting attendees, forcing some people to stand.\nShe believes that failing to provide enough chairs for the public will discourage individuals from\nattending the Committee meetings.\n\nAlthough all members of the public who wished to attend may not have been able\nto sit during the November meeting, the Committee contends that all members of the public were\nable to listen to and participate in the proceedings. Ms.\n\ndoes not allege otherwise in her\n\nRequest for Review. If attendance at the Committee meetings increases in the future, the day\n\nroom may become inconvenient, but based on the available information, the room currently is\nreasonably accessible. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Committee satisfied the\nrequirements of section 2. 01 of OMA in connection with its October 31, 2016, and November\n\n14, 2016, meetings. However, we strongly encourage the Committee to be mindful of its need to\nanticipate instances in which accommodations may be necessary to meet its obligation to provide\n\nSection 2.06(g) of OMA: Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016) provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" The Attorney General has concluded that section 2. 06(g) of OMA \" requires that all\npublic bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for members of the public to address\npublic officials at open meetings.\" See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued\n\nSeptember 30, 2014, at 5; see also I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 4,\n2014, at 4 (\" The plain language of section 2. 06(g) of OMA provides that individuals are entitled\nto address a public body subject only to a public body's established and recorded rules.\").\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that, under the First Amendment to the U. S.\n\nConstitution, public bodies may promulgate reasonable \" time, place, and manner\" restrictions\nthat are narrowly -tailored and serve a significant governmental interest. See I.A. Rana\n\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2009). For example, a\n\npublic body may adopt reasonable rules governing public comment in order to maintain decorum\nand ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently. Timmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465\n\nW. D. Mich. 2008); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules\nmust tend to accommodate, rather than to unreasonably restrict, the right to address public\n\nofficials. See LA. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at\n\n459.\n\nProvided that it is reasonable in time and scope, a rule that promotes order and\n\ndecorum by requiring members of the public to sign up before addressing public officials does\nnot violate OMA. 111. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 39640, issued June 22, 2016, at 3 (finding\nthat it was not impermissible to require prospective commenters to sign up at the start of a\nmeeting). In contrast, the enforcement of an advance sign- up rule violates OMA if the rule\nrestricts the ability to address public officials to a greater degree than is necessary to promote a\n\nsignificant governmental interest. See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, at 6 (rule\nrequiring members of the public to sign up to comment five days in advance of meetings —\n\nbefore the public body was required to post its agenda — imposed an unreasonable restriction on\npublic comment); I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 34760, issued October 8, 2015, at 3 (rule\nrequiring members of the public to sign up to comment seven days in advance of meetings was\nunreasonable).\n\nIn response to this office's request for a copy of the Committee's established and\nrecorded\n\nresolution regarding the Fulton County Board Rules of Order for the 2014- 2016 term. Section\n\n7(a) of the Rules provides the following regarding Public Remarks:\nMembers of the Public who wish to address the Board must\nprovide the Chairperson with prior written notice of their intent to\n\nspeak. The written notice shall identify the name and address of\nthe speaker, as well as a short statement indicating the speaker's\ntopic. Each citizen is limited to five (5) minutes. Citizen's\n\nremarks shall not exceed thirty (30) minutes per meeting. IZI\nThe same language was included on the agendas and minutes for the October 31, 2016, and\nNovember 14, 2016, Committee meetings. 3\nThe Committee's rule that individuals \" must provide the Chairperson with prior\n\nwritten notice of their intent to speak\" does not specify how far in advance prospective speakers\nare required to give notice. In its response to this office, the Committee explained that those\n\ncitizens who inform the Committee before the meeting that they would like to speak are posted\non the agenda and those citizens who appear at the meeting without having provided advance\n\nnotice of their interest in speaking are \" normally\" asked to sign a sheet at the meeting and are\n\ngiven the opportunity to speak for up to five minutes.4 When there is no sign-up sheet, the\n2 Rules of Order, Fulton County Board, Fulton County, Illinois, 2014- 2016 Term. Although not\nraised in the Request for Review, the provisions of the Committee's public comment rules requiring prospective\nspeakers to provide their comment topics and addresses are potentially unreasonable. Requiring a member of the\n\npublic to set forth the topic of his or her comment in writing in advance of a meeting may create a chilling effect on\nspeech at public meetings. A person may be reluctant to put comments in writing, especially if the comments may\n\nbe controversial, although controversial statements are no less protected from govemment censorship under the First\nAmendment to the U. S. Constitution. (U. S. Const., amend.\nfreedom of speech)).\n\nI (\" Congress shall make no law * * *\n\nabridging the\n\nIn addition, the requirement could be enforced to restrict the content of speech by precluding\n\ncomments a person may wish to make after reviewing the resolutions or other information disseminated by the\n\nCommittee during the meeting. Similarly, it is unclear how requiring a speaker to submit his or her address before\naddressing the Committee advances any significant governmental interest, such as promoting order and decorum at\nmeetings. A sign- up sheet set out just prior to the meeting asking for the names of individuals who wish to address\n\nthe Committee, or simply requiring prospective speakers to notify the Committee's office shortly before the meeting\ncould accomplish the goal of running a timely and orderly meeting in a much less restrictive manner. See 111. Att'y\nGen. PAC Rev. Ltr. 37503, issued April 8, 2016.\n\n3 Fulton County Board — Health Committee, Meeting, Agenda Item 5 (October 31, 2016); Fulton\nCounty Board — Health Committee, Meeting, October 31, 2016, Minutes 1; Fulton County Board — Health\nCommittee, Meeting, Agenda Item 5 (November 14, 2016); Fulton County Board — Health Committee, Meeting,\nNovember\n\nindividuals are still permitted to speak and \" that has never been a problem. i5 The Committee did\nnot specify whether those individuals who do not sign up in advance, but are nevertheless\n\nallowed to speak, are limited in the length of time they may address the Committee.\n\nThe Committee's explanation for how the advance sign- up rule works in practice\ndoes not clarify when individuals must sign up to speak, but rather appears to indicate that the\n\nCommittee does not enforce its established and recorded advance sign- up rule. The facts here\nare conflicting and do not provide clarification regarding how the Committee enforces its rule.\nRegarding the October 31, 2016, meeting, Ms.\ncontends that a speaker who had not\nsigned up to speak in advance of the meeting or on the meeting sign- up sheet was allowed to\nspeak, but told to \" make [ her comments] fast\" and Ms.\nbelieves that the speaker was not\ngiven five full minutes to address the Committee.\" The Committee argues that the individual\nwho asked to speak was permitted to address the Committee, but her comments were about her\nunion steward not representing her in a fashion that suited her. The Committee contends that\n\nChairman Hensley intervened during the individual's comments not because she did not sign up\nin advance, but because the Committee could not address her issue; it was one only her union\n\ncould address The available information does not demonstrate that this point of clarification\n\neffectively prohibited or was intended to prohibit the speaker from addressing the Committee.\nRegarding the November 14, 2016, meeting, Ms.\nasserts that she and another individual\n\ndid not sign up for public comment before the meeting and that unlike the October meeting, there\nwas no sign- up sheet for prospective speakers.\n\nShe and the other prospective speaker were told\n\nby Chairman Hensley that they would be permitted to speak briefly. Ms.\n\ncontends that\n\nthey were not allowed a full five minutes to address the Committee. The Committee disputes\n\nthat the two individuals were restricted in their speaking times. The Committee contends that\n\nChairman Hensley used the timer on his cellphone to monitor the speaking times and that each\nspeaker was permitted a full five minutes. In light of these conflicting versions, this office does\nnot have sufficient evidence to conclude that the Committee improperly restricted public\ncomment at its October 31, 2016, and November 14, 2016, meetings.\n\nThis office notes, however, that the Committee's rule as to when exactly a person\nmust sign up to participate in public comment is vague, and it appears to be enforced\n\ninconsistently, if at all. Such a lack of clarity undermines the purpose of having rules for public\ncomment, as individuals are not aware of what they may be required to do to exercise their\nstatutory right to address the Committee. If the Committee chooses to restrict public comment\n\nbased on an advance sign up requirement, we suggest that the Committee clarify its rules for\npublic comment to make clear when and how individuals must sign up to address the Committee\n\n5 Letter from Garry Hensley, Fulton County Health Committee Chairman, to Laura Harter,\n\nand to explain any limits placed on individuals who do not sign up in advance. Although this\noffice makes no finding as to what period for advance sign up is a reasonable rule under OMA,\nwe reiterate that such a rule should promote order and decorum and not restrict the ability to\naddress public officials to a greater degree than is necessary to promote a significant\ngovernmental\n\ninterest.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic\n\nAccess\n\nBureau\n\n45191 o 201 location proper 206g pub comment proper county\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. John D. Young\nFulton County Board Executive Assistant\nP. O. Box 226\n100 North Main, Room 100\nLewistown, Illinois 61542\n\njyoung@fultonco. org\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Justin G. Jochums\n\nFulton County State's Attorney\nOffice of the Fulton County State's Attorney\n100 North Main Street\nLewistown, Illinois 61542\n\njjochums@9thjudicial. org"}
{"id":1185,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-06-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["45219"],"title":"City of DeKalb did not violate OMA over unvoted separation agreement","filename":"45219, issued June 1, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1298,"summary":"A requester alleged that the City of DeKalb violated the Open Meetings Act by taking final action on an employee separation agreement without proper notice or in a closed session. The PAC determined that the agreement was handled administratively by staff rather than by the City Council, and thus no OMA violation occurred.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the City of DeKalb approved an employee's separation agreement behind closed doors without telling the public. The Attorney General's office investigated and found that the City Council never actually voted on the agreement; instead, city staff handled it as a routine administrative matter. Because no public meeting action was required, the City did not break the law.","holding":"The City of DeKalb did not violate the Open Meetings Act because the separation agreement was executed administratively and did not require formal City Council action.","legal_question":"Whether the City of DeKalb violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide notice of or conduct a public vote on an employee separation agreement.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of DeKalb","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The investigation concerned whether a separation agreement was improperly approved by the City Council in a closed session or without public notice.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_e/Taking-final-action-openly/45219, issued June 1, 2017.pdf","sha256":"139c71206fd0b5d256f2d6ce5f02b3a6dae3be446671925b41a81f11d1fa68bd","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","separation agreement","public notice","final action"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\nSTATE\n\nGENERAL\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJune 1, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Dean Frieders\n\nCity Attorney\n\nCity of DeKalb\n200 South Fourth Street\nDeKalb, Illinois 60115\ndean@frieders. com\nRE:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 45219\n\nand Mr. Frieders:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons stated below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the City of DeKalb ( City) City Council ( City Council) did not violate\nOMA in connection with an employee' s separation agreement.\nOn November 29, 2016,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review\n\nstating that the City entered into a separation agreement with a specific employee on October 27,\n2016, but the City Council did not provide advance notice that it would take final action to\napprove that agreement at its October 10, 2016, or October 24, 2016, meetings. This office\n\nconstrued the Request for Review as alleging that the City Council either ( 1) took final action on\nthe agreement outside of an open meeting, or ( 2) failed to provide advance notice if it approved\nthe agreement at one of its October 2016 meetings.\n\nOn December 12, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCity and asked it to provide a written response clarifying whether the City Council approved the\nemployee' s separation agreement, or whether the matter was handled administratively without\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: (\n\n618)\n\n529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Dean Frieders\nJune 1, 2017\nPage 2\n\nCity Council approval. If the City Council did approve the agreement, we asked the City to\nfurnish copies of any relevant meeting minutes or other documentation of that final action as\nwell as any advance notice that was provided for it. On December 15, 2016, the City provided a\nresponse, which included confidential information that this office is prohibited from disclosing in\nthis determination. See 5 ILCS 120/3.5(c) (West 2015 Sup�7, 2017, this office\nforwarded a copy of the City's non-confidential response to- she replied on April 17,\n2017. On April 20, 2017, the City issued a supplemental response to which\nreplied\non April 30, 2017.\n\n■■■■■\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \"to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014). Section 2.02(a) of\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"[a]n agenda for each regular meeting\nshall be posted at the principal office of the public body and at the location where the meeting is\nto be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the meeting.\" Section 2.02(c) of OMA\n(5 ILCS 120/2.02(c) (West 2014)) further requires that the agenda \"set forth the general subject\nmatter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting.\" In\naddition, \"[n]o final action may be taken at a closed meeting. Final action shall be preceded by a\npublic recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other information that will inform\nthe public of the business being conducted.\" 5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West 2015 Supp.), as amended by\nPublic Acts 99-64;, effective July 28, 2016; 99-646, effective July 28, 2016; 99-687).\nThe non-confidential portion of the City's response to this office acknowledged\nthat on October 27, 2016, the City entered into a separation agreement with the employee\nidentified in the Request for Review. The response stated that City Council approval was\nunnecessary becailse the \"agreement and all expenditures contemplated therein were within\nbudgeted expenses and staff spending authority[.] * * * As that action was taken within staff\nauthority, no public recitation� is applicable and no violation of the Open Meetings\nAct occurred.\" 1 In her reply,-again asserted that the City Council violated OMA,\nciting as support t!J.is office's determination in 2015 PAC 34124. �lso contended\nthat the content ofthe separation agreement violated City policies and exceeded the city\nmanager's spending authority.2 The City then issued a supplemental response reiterating that the\n1\n\nLetter fromAaron Stevens, ManagementAnalyst, City of DeKalb, to Steve Silverman, Bureau\nChief, PublicAccess Bureau (December 15, 2016).\n2\n\nThe PublicAccess Counselor's authority is limited to resolving disputes concerning OMA and the\nFreedomoflnformationAct(5 ILCS 14011 et seq. (West2014)). See 15 ILCS20517(c)(West2014). To the extent\nalleges that the City's administrative staff exceeded its spending authority and/or that the City\ntha\nviolated its internal policies in connection with the agreement, those allegations are not subject to review by the\nPublicAccess Counselor. This office's authority is limited to resolving disputes concerning OMA and the Freedom\nof InformationAct (5_1LCS 14011 et seq. (West2014)). See 15 ILCS205l7(c) (West2014).\n\n\fMr. Dean Frieders,\nJune I, 2017\nPage 3\n\nagreement did not require City Council approval and denying that the City violated its own\npolicies, adding that this office does not have jurisdiction to review whether the City complied\nasserted that the City Council was\nwith its own policies. In her supplemental reply\nrequired to approve the agreement under OMA because it involved an appropriation that had not\nbeen previously made\nand that created potential legal liability for the City.\n·,\nAs noted above, OMA generally requires public bodies to conduct public business\nopenly and to take final action openly. See 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014); 5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West\n2015 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 99-642, effective July 28, 2016; 99-646, effective July\n28, 2016; 99-687). OMA does not, however, require a public body to take final action on\nseparation agreenients or any other particular matters. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n25456, issued August 7, 2013, at I (\"[T]he requirement that a public body take final action\nopenly does not govern whether a public body takes final action or the type of final action that is\ntaken.\"); Ill. Att'y.Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 13733, issued June 20,201 I, at 2 (\"While OMA does\nnot govern the types of matters subject to action by a public body, it does govern the procedure\nfor a public body taking final action on any matter under its consideration.\").\nThe determination cited by\nin support of her allegation that the City\nCouncil violated OMA is distinguishable from the underlying facts of this Request for Review.\nIn 2015 PAC 34124, the Public Access Bureau concluded that the City Council violated section\n2(e) of OMA by approving, at least tacitly, a settlement agreement in closed session. Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 34124, issued June 5,2015, at 6. In this matter, there is no indication\nthat the City Council voted to approve or otherwise took final action on the employee's\nseparation agreerrient in closed session. Rather,the available information indicates that the\nCity's administrative staff unilaterally entered into the separation agreement pursuant to its\nspending authority. Accordingly, the available information provides no basis for this office to\nconclude that the City Council violated OMA by failing to take final action openly or by failing\nto provide advance notice of final action concerning the separation agreement.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the isst1ance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(312) 814-6756. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\n45219 o no via mun\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A separation agreement approved by a city council","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-45219/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\nSTATE\n\nGENERAL\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJune 1, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Dean Frieders\n\nCity Attorney\n\nCity of DeKalb\n200 South Fourth Street\nDeKalb, Illinois 60115\ndean@frieders. com\nRE:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 45219\n\nand Mr. Frieders:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015\n\nSupp.)).\n\nFor the reasons stated below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the City of DeKalb (City) City Council (City Council) did not violate\nOMA in connection with an employee's separation agreement.\nOn November 29, 2016,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review\n\nstating that the City entered into a separation agreement with a specific employee on October 27,\n2016, but the City Council did not provide advance notice that it would take final action to\napprove that agreement at its October 10, 2016, or October 24, 2016, meetings. This office\n\nconstrued the Request for Review as alleging that the City Council either (1) took final action on\nthe agreement outside of an open meeting, or (2) failed to provide advance notice if it approved\nthe agreement at one of its October 2016 meetings.\n\nOn December 12, 2016, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCity and asked it to provide a written response clarifying whether the City Council approved the\nemployee's separation agreement, or whether the matter was handled administratively without\n\nCity Council approval. If the City Council did approve the agreement, we asked the City to\nfurnish copies of any relevant meeting minutes or other documentation of that final action as\nwell as any advance notice that was provided for it. On December 15, 2016, the City provided a\nresponse, which included confidential information that this office is prohibited from disclosing in\nthis determination. See 5 ILCS 120/3.5(c) (West 2015 Sup�7, 2017, this office\nforwarded a copy of the City's non-confidential response to- she replied on April 17,\n2017. On April 20, 2017, the City issued a supplemental response to which\nreplied\non April 30, 2017.\n\n■■■■■\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \"to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014). Section 2.02(a) of\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2014)) provides that \"[a]n agenda for each regular meeting\nshall be posted at the principal office of the public body and at the location where the meeting is\nto be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the meeting.\" Section 2.02(c) of OMA\n(5 ILCS 120/2.02(c) (West 2014)) further requires that the agenda \"set forth the general subject\nmatter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting.\" In\naddition, \"[n]o final action may be taken at a closed meeting. Final action shall be preceded by a\npublic recital of the nature of the matter being considered and other information that will inform\nthe public of the business being conducted.\" 5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West 2015 Supp.), as amended by\nPublic Acts 99-64;, effective July 28, 2016; 99-646, effective July 28, 2016; 99-687).\nThe non-confidential portion of the City's response to this office acknowledged\nthat on October 27, 2016, the City entered into a separation agreement with the employee\nidentified in the Request for Review. The response stated that City Council approval was\nunnecessary becailse the \"agreement and all expenditures contemplated therein were within\nbudgeted expenses and staff spending authority[.] * * * As that action was taken within staff\nauthority, no public recitation� is applicable and no violation of the Open Meetings\nAct occurred.\" 1 In her reply,-again asserted that the City Council violated OMA,\nciting as support t!J.is office's determination in 2015 PAC 34124. �lso contended\nthat the content ofthe separation agreement violated City policies and exceeded the city\nmanager's spending authority.2 The City then issued a supplemental response reiterating that the\n1\n\nLetter fromAaron Stevens, ManagementAnalyst, City of DeKalb, to Steve Silverman, Bureau\nChief, PublicAccess Bureau (December 15, 2016).\n2\n\nThe PublicAccess Counselor's authority is limited to resolving disputes concerning OMA and the\nFreedomoflnformationAct(5 ILCS 14011 et seq. (West2014)). See 15 ILCS20517(c)(West2014). To the extent\nalleges that the City's administrative staff exceeded its spending authority and/or that the City\ntha\nviolated its internal policies in connection with the agreement, those allegations are not subject to review by the\nPublicAccess Counselor. This office's authority is limited to resolving disputes concerning OMA and the Freedom\nof InformationAct (5_1LCS 14011 et seq. (West2014)). See 15 ILCS205l7(c) (West2014).\n\nMr. Dean Frieders,\nJune I, 2017\nPage 3\n\nagreement did not require City Council approval and denying that the City violated its own\npolicies, adding that this office does not have jurisdiction to review whether the City complied\nasserted that the City Council was\nwith its own policies. In her supplemental reply\nrequired to approve the agreement under OMA because it involved an appropriation that had not\nbeen previously made\nand that created potential legal liability for the City.\n·,\nAs noted above, OMA generally requires public bodies to conduct public business\nopenly and to take final action openly. See 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2014); 5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West\n2015 Supp.), as amended by Public Acts 99-642, effective July 28, 2016; 99-646, effective July\n28, 2016; 99-687). OMA does not, however, require a public body to take final action on\nseparation agreenients or any other particular matters. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n25456, issued August 7, 2013, at I (\"[T]he requirement that a public body take final action\nopenly does not govern whether a public body takes final action or the type of final action that is\ntaken.\"); Ill. Att'y.Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 13733, issued June 20,201 I, at 2 (\"While OMA does\nnot govern the types of matters subject to action by a public body, it does govern the procedure\nfor a public body taking final action on any matter under its consideration.\").\nThe determination cited by\nin support of her allegation that the City\nCouncil violated OMA is distinguishable from the underlying facts of this Request for Review.\nIn 2015 PAC 34124, the Public Access Bureau concluded that the City Council violated section\n2(e) of OMA by approving, at least tacitly, a settlement agreement in closed session. Ill. Att'y\nGen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 34124, issued June 5,2015, at 6. In this matter, there is no indication\nthat the City Council voted to approve or otherwise took final action on the employee's\nseparation agreerrient in closed session. Rather,the available information indicates that the\nCity's administrative staff unilaterally entered into the separation agreement pursuant to its\nspending authority. Accordingly, the available information provides no basis for this office to\nconclude that the City Council violated OMA by failing to take final action openly or by failing\nto provide advance notice of final action concerning the separation agreement.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the isst1ance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(312) 814-6756. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\n45219 o no via mun\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau"}
{"id":1186,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-03-16","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["45349"],"title":"Town of Normal violated OMA by limiting public comment to once every 45 days","filename":"45349, issued March 16, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3092,"summary":"A requester challenged the Town of Normal's policy limiting public comment to once every 45 days, and the PAC determined this rule impermissibly restricts the public's right to address officials.","plain_summary":"The Town of Normal had a rule that prevented people from speaking at town council meetings if they had already spoken within the previous 45 days. The Attorney General's office ruled that this policy was illegal because it unfairly restricted the public's right to participate in government meetings. The Town was advised to change its rules to allow for more frequent public comment.","holding":"The Town of Normal violated the Open Meetings Act by enforcing a rule that prohibited members of the public from addressing the Council more than once every forty-five days.","legal_question":"Does a public body's rule limiting public comment to once every 45 days violate the Open Meetings Act's requirement to allow public comment at meetings?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Town of Normal","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The Town of Normal's policy restricting the frequency with which members of the public could provide public comment at council meetings.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/unreasonable-rules/45349, issued March 16, 2017.pdf","sha256":"b457f07bf1953f1e5f17040dd57500fb62d56bf6273c9ff7b072c6f77d3611aa","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","town council","meeting rules","right to speak"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMarch 16, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Brian Day\nCorporation Counsel\nTown of Normal\n\n11 Uptown Circle\nNormal, Illinois\n\n61761\n\nbday@normal. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 45349\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Day:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nSupp.)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015\n\nBureau concludes that that the Town of Normal' s ( Town) rules governing public comment\nimpermissibly restrict the right of members of the public to address public officials at public\nmeetings, and that the Normal Town Council ( Council) violated OMA by prohibiting members\n\nof the public from addressing it more often than once every forty- five days.\nOn December 6, 2016,\n\nfiled this Request for Review alleging\n\nthat the Town' s rules for public comment violated OMA in a number of ways.\n\nIn particular, he\n\nstated that the Town implemented a rule limiting members of the public to one opportunity in a\nforty- five day period to address public officials at public meetings. He alleged that two\nindividuals were denied the opportunity to address the Council at a December 6, 2016, meeting'\nbecause they had previously commented within the last forty- five days. He also stated that he\nAs explained by the Council, the Council met on December 5, 2016, not December 6, 2016, and\nthe reference to December 6, 2016 appears to be in error.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529. 6400 •\n\nTTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Brian Day\nMarch 16, 2017\nPage 2\n\nwould have addressed the Council about a proposed tax incentive at that meeting, but did not do\nso because he wanted to continent at a hearing to be held on December 19, 2016.\nOn December 14, 2016, this office transmitted a copy of the Request for Review\nto the Town mayor via e- mail, and requested that the Council furnish a written response to the\n\nallegations together with copies of the records relating to the meeting at issue and the Town' s\npublic comment rules. This office re -transmitted the Request for Review to the Town\n\ncorporation counsel on January 23, 2017. On February 2, 2017, this office received the Council' s\nwritten response. This office forwarded a copy of the Council' s response to\n\non\n\nFebruary 10, 2017; he replied on February 17, 2017.\nDETERMINATION\n\nPurpose of Section 2. 06( g)\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2014)) provides: \" Any\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\nand recorded by the public\nbody.\" ( Emphasis added.)\n\nSection 2. 06( g) was added to OMA by Public Act 96- 1473, and was effective as\nof January 1, 2011. The Council asserts that the language of 2. 06( g) is unambiguous, and that\nn] othing in the text of this statute limits the authority of a public body to enact rules. i2 The\nCouncil argues, in effect, that a public body may regulate public comment in any manner so long\n\nas it has established and recorded rules. Under this argument, even a rule that categorically\nprohibits a member of the public from addressing public officials at certain public meetings\nwould be acceptable.\n\nA \"statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in\n\nconnection with every other section.\" Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL\n\n111928, ¶ 48, 975 N.E. 2d 583, 596 ( 2012). Section 2. 06( g) is part of OMA. The intent of\nOMA, as well as the general policy of the State, is that the public \" be given advance notice of\nand the right to attend all meetings at which any business of the public body is discussed or acted\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2014);\n\nsee\n\nalso\n\n735 ILCS 110/ 5 ( West 2014) (\"[ I] t is\n\ndeclared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that the constitutional rights of citizens\nand organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government must be\nencouraged\nand safeguarded with great diligence.\").\nOMA therefore requires, among other\n\nthings, proper posting of a notice and an agenda for every public meeting ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02\nWest 2014)) and holding those meetings at specified times and places that are convenient and\nto the public ( 5 ILCS 102/ 2. 01( West 2014)).\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA cannot reasonably\n\nopen\n\nLetter from Brian Day, Corporation Counsel, Town of Normal, to Public Access Counselor,\nOffice of the Attomey General (\n\nJanuary 30, 2017), at 7.\n\n\fMr. Brian Day\nMarch 16, 2017\nPage 3\n\nbe construed as granting members of the public a statutory right to address public officials on the\n\none hand while permitting public bodies to unconditionally abridge that right. Such an\ninterpretation would render section 2. 06( g) meaningless and yield absurd results that are\ninconsistent with OMA' s clear purpose of allowing members of the public to attend every public\n\nmeeting and contrary to the public policy— articulated in section 5 of the Citizen Participation\nAct— that encourages public participation\n\nin government\n\naffairs.\n\nSee People v. Hunter, 2013 IL\n\n114100, ¶ 13, 986 N. E. 2d 1185, 1189 ( 2013) ( a reviewing body \" presumes that the legislature did\nnot\n\nintend to create\n\nabsurd,\n\ninconvenient,\n\nor unjust\n\nresults.\");\n\nSylvester v. Industrial Comm' n,\n\n197 I11. 2d 225, 232 ( 2001) ( a reviewing body \" must construe the statute so that each word,\nclause, and sentence, if possible, is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous\ncitation], avoiding an interpretation which would render any portion of the statute meaningless\nor void.\").\n\nThe Council also asserts that the legislative history of Public Act 96- 1473\nsupports its broad interpretation of the scope of permissible rulemaking. It points to a Senate\namendment of the original bill that removed a provision that public comment is to be allowed at\n\neach public meeting, as well as statements during legislative debate that it claims demonstrate\nthe intent was to provide public bodies with \" the unfettered ability to create comment rules. i3\nThat history does not provide persuasive support for the Council' s assertion that the General\n\nAssembly intended to allow a public body to promulgate any rules under OMA, no matter how\nmuch they restricted the statutory right to address public officials. As described above, the\namendment\n\nto OMA must be read together with the purposes and other sections of OMA.\n\nFurther, the amendment' s own language, which provided members of the public with a statutory\n\nright to address public officials that had not existed previously, must also have meaning. See\nPeople v. Woodward, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 444 ( 1997) ( a reviewing body \" must consider the language\nof an amended\n\nstatute\n\nin light of the need for amendment\n\nand\n\nthe purpose it serves.\").\n\nIf public\n\nbodies have unlimited discretion to impose restrictive rules under section 2. 06( g) of OMA, the\nright to address public officials articulated by that provision would be no right at all. The\n\nGeneral Assembly could not have intended such a result.\nThe Attorney General has opined that \" public bodies may generally promulgate\nreasonable ' time, place and manner' regulations that are necessary to further a significant\ngovernmental\ninterest. * * * [ T] he primary purpose of adopting rules governing public comment\npursuant to section 2. 06( g) of OMA is to accommodate the speaker' s statutory right to address\n\nthe public body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain order and decorum at public\nmeetings.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5- 6. Because\nsection 2. 06( g) is intended to ensure that members of the public have an opportunity to address\npublic officials at open meetings, this office has previously determined that rules adopted under\n2. 06( g) are invalid when they do not reasonably \" accommodate a speaker' s statutory right to\n\n3Letter from Brian Day, Corporation Counsel, Town of Normal, to Public Access Counselor,\nOffice of the\n\nAttorney General ( January 30, 2017),\n\nat 8.\n\n\fMr. Brian Day\nMarch 16, 2017\nPage 4\n\naddress the public body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain order and decorum at\npublic meetings.\" See I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. 14- 012, at 6 ( rule requiring members of the\n\npublic to provide five working days' advance notice of public comment unreasonably restricted\ntheir statutory right). Likewise, this office reviews the rule at issue here in terms of its\nreasonableness and the Council' s asserted significant governmental interest.\n\nThe 45 -Day Rule\n\nIn relevant part, the Town' s rules governing public comment at Council and other\n\nTown meetings state: \" Individuals shall be limited to address a public body no more than one\ntime in a in a forty- five day agenda period.\" Town of Normal Resolution No. 4612 ( adopted\nApril 18, 2011) ( 45 -day rule). The Council holds regular meetings twice a month. In practice,\n\nthe 45 -day rule often means that an individual may address the Council no more frequently than\nevery third regular meeting.\n\nThe 45 -day rule exceeds the scope of permissible rulemaking authorized by\nsection 2. 06( g). The Council' s response to this office asserts that the 45 -day rule is viewpoint\n\nneutral and that it furthers the significant public interest of \"conserving time and ensuring that\nothers have the ability to speak. i4 That response does not explain why this restriction is\nnecessary to protect the significant governmental interest of conducting Council meetings in an\n\nefficient manner. Further, this office reviewed the minutes and recording of the December 5,\n2016, meeting at issue here; only one person addressed the Council even though the Council\nextensively discussed a tax incentive proposal that appeared to be of significant public interest.\n\nThere is no indication that the Council has been inundated with requests to address it at public\nmeetings, or that the 45 -day rule is necessary to advance a significant governmental interest such\n\nas conserving time so other members of the public have an adequate opportunity to address the\nCouncil.\n\nIn addition, it is likely that discussion of certain issues by the Council will\ncontinue across consecutive meetings. Moreover, multiple issues of public interest could be\n\ndiscussed over those same consecutive meetings. By limiting an individual' s right to address the\nCouncil in consecutive meetings, the 45 -day rule forces a member of the public to choose a\nmeeting at which to address the Council and risk forfeiting the right to address the Council on\n\nsubsequent occasions about that issue or another issue. Therefore, the 45 -day rule could have a\nchilling effect on participation by the public in the public comment period and does not\nadequately accommodate the statutory right of \"any person\" to address the Council.\n\nalleged that two individuals wanted to address the Council at a meeting and were\ntetter from Brian Day, Corporation Counsel, Town of Normal, to Public Access Counselor,\n\nOffice of the Attorney General (\n\nJanuary 30, 2017), at 11.\n\n\fMr. Brian Day\nMarch 16, 2017\nPage 5\n\nprohibited from doing so by the 45 -day rule; the Council has not disputed this allegation. 5\nAccordingly, this office concludes that the 45 -day rule impermissibly restricts public comment\nand the Council violated section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\nAdditional Complaints about Public Comment Rules\n\nIn addition to the 45 -day rule,\n\nRequest for Review alleged that the\n\nCouncil' s public comment rules violated OMA in five other ways, by: ( 1) stating that the rules\npermit\" rather than \" allow\" a person to speak; ( 2) requiring two hours' advance notice of intent\n\nto speak; ( 3) restricting public comment to topics on the agenda; ( 4) limiting speaking time to a\ntotal of ten minutes; and ( 5) requiring citizens to provide their address and affiliation.\n\nThe\n\nPublic Access Bureau generally reviews a particular rule governing public comment only if there\nis an allegation that a citizen has been prohibited from speaking at a meeting because of that rule,\nas opposed to evaluating the propriety of all rules absent a specific complaint that the rules\n\nprevented a citizen from addressing officials at a meeting. In this instance\nothers were prohibited from speaking because of the 45 -day rule, which this office has\n\nand the\n\naddressed. This office will not address whether the word \" permit\" is proper in the Council' s\nrules, nor will we review whether ten minutes allows sufficient time for public comment, since\n\nthere has been no allegation that a person was prohibited from addressing the Council by this\nrule. We emphasize that a determination by this office that one of a public body' s rules for\npublic comment violates OMA cannot be extrapolated to mean that other rules that were not\nspecifically addressed would pass muster.\n\nDespite the statement above, the Public Access Bureau is charged with providing\nadvice and education with respect to OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7 et seg ( West 2014). In addition,\nthe Council' s response in this case states that some of\ncomplaints have been\n\npreviously addressed by this office. Accordingly, we will provide some additional guidance with\nrespect to advance registration, confining discussion to agenda items, and the requirement for\nspeakers to provide their home addresses.\n\nThe Council' s response states the 2 hour notification requirement was worked out\nthrough this office in a previous Request for Review, 2013 PAC 25965. This statement is\n\ninaccurate. In that case an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau contacted\nCorporation Counsel for the Town of Normal and suggested that the Council' s public comment\n\npolicy be revised, in an effort to informally resolve the matter. There is no record that this office\nreviewed or approved any changes that the Council may have made in response to that Request\n5The Council asserted in its response to this office that\n\nwould not have been\n\nprohibited from speaking at the December 19, 2016, hearing if he had chosen to address the Council on December 5,\n2016, because the subsequent hearing was not a meeting falling within the scope of the Town' s public comment\nrules.\n\n\fMr. Brian Day\nMarch 16, 2017\nPage 6\n\nfor Review. Moreover, any rule enacted by the Council requiring any advance sign-up or\nnotification to speak would still be subject to a request for review by any person who was denied\nthe right to speak under that rule. The Public Access Bureau does not approve public comment\n\nrules in advance; rather this office reviews the specific facts of each allegation of an OMA\nviolation\n\nthat we receive.\n\nNext, the Council' s response states that the Town' s authority to confine topics to\n\nbe discussed while addressing the Council to matters \" germane to the meeting agenda of the\nTown Council meetingi6 was affirmed in 2016 PAC 37631 ( I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n37631, issued December 28, 2015). That letter concluded that the Council did not violate OMA\n\nwhen it refused to let a citizen comment on a matter that was not related to any subject on the\nmeeting agenda. The Council should be aware, however, that since that time the position of the\n\nPublic Access Bureau has evolved. In I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 38037, issued August\n1, 2016, this office determined that because a public body may discuss matters not listed on a\nmeeting agenda, it would be unreasonable to limit the public' s ability to comment to agenda\nitems:\n\nOMA does not preclude members of a public body from \" the\nconsideration\n\nof\n\nitems not specifically set forth in the agenda,\" ( 5\n\nILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2014)), as long as the public body does\nnot take final action on items not listed on the agenda. Given that\nthe public body itself is able to discuss matters that are not\nspecifically listed on the agenda, a rule that would prohibit\n\nmembers of the public from addressing matters that are not listed\non the agenda would impermissibly restrict the right to public\n\ncomment as outlined in section 2. 06( g). I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 38037, at 3.\n\nFinally, the rules for addressing the Council provide that individuals are asked to\nclearly state their name, address, and whether or not they represent an organization.\n\nPlease be\n\naware that in binding opinion 14- 009, the Attorney General concluded that requiring speakers to\nstate their home addresses prior to addressing public bodies violates section 2. 06( g) of OMA ( I11.\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7).\nIn accordance with the conclusions of this letter, this office requests that the\n\nCouncil vote to amend the Town's public comment rules to remove the 45 -day rule.7 The\nCouncil may also wish to re- examine all of its rules governing public comment. As explained in\n6http:// www. normal. org/ 854/ Addressing- the- Council ( last visited March 15, 2017)\nThe Council has informed this office that it intends to consider such an amendment to its public\ncomment\n\nrules at its March\n\n20, 2017, regular\nmeeting.\n\n\fMr. Brian Day\nMarch 16, 2017\nPage 7\n\nthis letter, the rules should accommodate a speaker' s statutory right to address the Council while\nensuring that a public body can maintain order and decorum at its meetings.\nreasonable and necessary to further a significant governmental interest.\n\nRules must be\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 217) 782- 9078 or nolson@atg. state. il. us.\nVery truly yours,\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\n\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n45349 o 206g pub\n\ncomment\n\nimproper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A town council's policy limiting public comment frequency","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-45349/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMarch 16, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Brian Day\nCorporation Counsel\nTown of Normal\n\n11 Uptown Circle\nNormal, Illinois\n\n61761\n\nbday@normal. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2016 PAC 45349\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Day:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nSupp.)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015\n\nBureau concludes that that the Town of Normal's (Town) rules governing public comment\nimpermissibly restrict the right of members of the public to address public officials at public\nmeetings, and that the Normal Town Council (Council) violated OMA by prohibiting members\n\nof the public from addressing it more often than once every forty- five days.\nOn December 6, 2016,\n\nfiled this Request for Review alleging\n\nthat the Town's rules for public comment violated OMA in a number of ways.\n\nIn particular, he\n\nstated that the Town implemented a rule limiting members of the public to one opportunity in a\nforty- five day period to address public officials at public meetings. He alleged that two\nindividuals were denied the opportunity to address the Council at a December 6, 2016, meeting'\nbecause they had previously commented within the last forty- five days. He also stated that he\nAs explained by the Council, the Council met on December 5, 2016, not December 6, 2016, and\nthe reference to December 6, 2016 appears to be in error.\n\nwould have addressed the Council about a proposed tax incentive at that meeting, but did not do\nso because he wanted to continent at a hearing to be held on December 19, 2016.\nOn December 14, 2016, this office transmitted a copy of the Request for Review\nto the Town mayor via e- mail, and requested that the Council furnish a written response to the\n\nallegations together with copies of the records relating to the meeting at issue and the Town's\npublic comment rules. This office re -transmitted the Request for Review to the Town\n\ncorporation counsel on January 23, 2017. On February 2, 2017, this office received the Council's\nwritten response. This office forwarded a copy of the Council's response to\n\non\n\nFebruary 10, 2017; he replied on February 17, 2017.\nDETERMINATION\n\nPurpose of Section 2. 06(g)\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2014)) provides: \" Any\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\nand recorded by the public\nbody.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\nSection 2. 06(g) was added to OMA by Public Act 96- 1473, and was effective as\nof January 1, 2011. The Council asserts that the language of 2. 06(g) is unambiguous, and that\nn] othing in the text of this statute limits the authority of a public body to enact rules. i2 The\nCouncil argues, in effect, that a public body may regulate public comment in any manner so long\n\nas it has established and recorded rules. Under this argument, even a rule that categorically\nprohibits a member of the public from addressing public officials at certain public meetings\nwould be acceptable.\n\nA \"statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in\n\nconnection with every other section.\" Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL\n\n111928, ¶ 48, 975 N.E. 2d 583, 596 (2012). Section 2. 06(g) is part of OMA. The intent of\nOMA, as well as the general policy of the State, is that the public \" be given advance notice of\nand the right to attend all meetings at which any business of the public body is discussed or acted\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2014);\n\nsee\n\nalso\n\n735 ILCS 110/ 5 (West 2014) (\"[ I] t is\n\ndeclared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that the constitutional rights of citizens\nand organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government must be\nencouraged\nand safeguarded with great diligence.\").\nOMA therefore requires, among other\n\nthings, proper posting of a notice and an agenda for every public meeting (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02\nWest 2014)) and holding those meetings at specified times and places that are convenient and\n\nbe construed as granting members of the public a statutory right to address public officials on the\n\none hand while permitting public bodies to unconditionally abridge that right. Such an\ninterpretation would render section 2. 06(g) meaningless and yield absurd results that are\ninconsistent with OMA's clear purpose of allowing members of the public to attend every public\n\nmeeting and contrary to the public policy— articulated in section 5 of the Citizen Participation\nAct— that encourages public participation\n\nin government\n\naffairs.\n\nSee People v. Hunter, 2013 IL\n\n114100, ¶ 13, 986 N. E. 2d 1185, 1189 (2013) (a reviewing body \" presumes that the legislature did\nnot\n\nintend to create\n\nabsurd,\n\ninconvenient,\n\nor unjust\n\nresults.\");\n\nSylvester v. Industrial Comm' n,\n\n197 I11. 2d 225, 232 (2001) (a reviewing body \" must construe the statute so that each word,\nclause, and sentence, if possible, is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous\ncitation], avoiding an interpretation which would render any portion of the statute meaningless\nor void.\").\n\nThe Council also asserts that the legislative history of Public Act 96- 1473\nsupports its broad interpretation of the scope of permissible rulemaking. It points to a Senate\namendment of the original bill that removed a provision that public comment is to be allowed at\n\neach public meeting, as well as statements during legislative debate that it claims demonstrate\nthe intent was to provide public bodies with \" the unfettered ability to create comment rules. i3\nThat history does not provide persuasive support for the Council's assertion that the General\n\nAssembly intended to allow a public body to promulgate any rules under OMA, no matter how\nmuch they restricted the statutory right to address public officials. As described above, the\namendment\n\nto OMA must be read together with the purposes and other sections of OMA.\n\nFurther, the amendment's own language, which provided members of the public with a statutory\n\nright to address public officials that had not existed previously, must also have meaning. See\nPeople v. Woodward, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 444 (1997) (a reviewing body \" must consider the language\nof an amended\n\nstatute\n\nin light of the need for amendment\n\nand\n\nthe purpose it serves.\").\n\nIf public\n\nbodies have unlimited discretion to impose restrictive rules under section 2. 06(g) of OMA, the\nright to address public officials articulated by that provision would be no right at all. The\n\nGeneral Assembly could not have intended such a result.\nThe Attorney General has opined that \" public bodies may generally promulgate\nreasonable ' time, place and manner' regulations that are necessary to further a significant\ngovernmental\ninterest. * * * [ T] he primary purpose of adopting rules governing public comment\npursuant to section 2. 06(g) of OMA is to accommodate the speaker's statutory right to address\n\nthe public body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain order and decorum at public\nmeetings.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5- 6. Because\nsection 2. 06(g) is intended to ensure that members of the public have an opportunity to address\npublic officials at open meetings, this office has previously determined that rules adopted under\n2. 06(g) are invalid when they do not reasonably \" accommodate a speaker's statutory right to\n\naddress the public body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain order and decorum at\npublic meetings.\" See I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. 14- 012, at 6 (rule requiring members of the\n\npublic to provide five working days' advance notice of public comment unreasonably restricted\ntheir statutory right). Likewise, this office reviews the rule at issue here in terms of its\nreasonableness and the Council's asserted significant governmental interest.\n\nThe 45 -Day Rule\n\nIn relevant part, the Town's rules governing public comment at Council and other\n\nTown meetings state: \" Individuals shall be limited to address a public body no more than one\ntime in a in a forty- five day agenda period.\" Town of Normal Resolution No. 4612 (adopted\nApril 18, 2011) (45 -day rule). The Council holds regular meetings twice a month. In practice,\n\nthe 45 -day rule often means that an individual may address the Council no more frequently than\nevery third regular meeting.\n\nThe 45 -day rule exceeds the scope of permissible rulemaking authorized by\nsection 2. 06(g). The Council's response to this office asserts that the 45 -day rule is viewpoint\n\nneutral and that it furthers the significant public interest of \"conserving time and ensuring that\nothers have the ability to speak. i4 That response does not explain why this restriction is\nnecessary to protect the significant governmental interest of conducting Council meetings in an\n\nefficient manner. Further, this office reviewed the minutes and recording of the December 5,\n2016, meeting at issue here; only one person addressed the Council even though the Council\nextensively discussed a tax incentive proposal that appeared to be of significant public interest.\n\nThere is no indication that the Council has been inundated with requests to address it at public\nmeetings, or that the 45 -day rule is necessary to advance a significant governmental interest such\n\nas conserving time so other members of the public have an adequate opportunity to address the\nCouncil.\n\nIn addition, it is likely that discussion of certain issues by the Council will\ncontinue across consecutive meetings. Moreover, multiple issues of public interest could be\n\ndiscussed over those same consecutive meetings. By limiting an individual's right to address the\nCouncil in consecutive meetings, the 45 -day rule forces a member of the public to choose a\nmeeting at which to address the Council and risk forfeiting the right to address the Council on\n\nsubsequent occasions about that issue or another issue. Therefore, the 45 -day rule could have a\n\nprohibited from doing so by the 45 -day rule; the Council has not disputed this allegation. 5\nAccordingly, this office concludes that the 45 -day rule impermissibly restricts public comment\nand the Council violated section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\nAdditional Complaints about Public Comment Rules\n\nIn addition to the 45 -day rule,\n\nRequest for Review alleged that the\n\nCouncil's public comment rules violated OMA in five other ways, by: (1) stating that the rules\npermit\" rather than \" allow\" a person to speak; (2) requiring two hours' advance notice of intent\n\nto speak; (3) restricting public comment to topics on the agenda; (4) limiting speaking time to a\ntotal of ten minutes; and (5) requiring citizens to provide their address and affiliation.\n\nThe\n\nPublic Access Bureau generally reviews a particular rule governing public comment only if there\nis an allegation that a citizen has been prohibited from speaking at a meeting because of that rule,\nas opposed to evaluating the propriety of all rules absent a specific complaint that the rules\n\nprevented a citizen from addressing officials at a meeting. In this instance\nothers were prohibited from speaking because of the 45 -day rule, which this office has\n\nand the\n\naddressed. This office will not address whether the word \" permit\" is proper in the Council's\nrules, nor will we review whether ten minutes allows sufficient time for public comment, since\n\nthere has been no allegation that a person was prohibited from addressing the Council by this\nrule. We emphasize that a determination by this office that one of a public body's rules for\npublic comment violates OMA cannot be extrapolated to mean that other rules that were not\nspecifically addressed would pass muster.\n\nDespite the statement above, the Public Access Bureau is charged with providing\nadvice and education with respect to OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7 et seg (West 2014). In addition,\nthe Council's response in this case states that some of\ncomplaints have been\n\npreviously addressed by this office. Accordingly, we will provide some additional guidance with\nrespect to advance registration, confining discussion to agenda items, and the requirement for\nspeakers to provide their home addresses.\n\nThe Council's response states the 2 hour notification requirement was worked out\nthrough this office in a previous Request for Review, 2013 PAC 25965. This statement is\n\ninaccurate. In that case an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau contacted\nCorporation Counsel for the Town of Normal and suggested that the Council's public comment\n\npolicy be revised, in an effort to informally resolve the matter. There is no record that this office\nreviewed or approved any changes that the Council may have made in response to that Request\n5 The Council asserted in its response to this office that\n\nwould not have been\n\nprohibited from speaking at the December 19, 2016, hearing if he had chosen to address the Council on December 5,\n2016, because the subsequent hearing was not a meeting falling within the scope of the Town's public comment\n\nfor Review. Moreover, any rule enacted by the Council requiring any advance sign-up or\nnotification to speak would still be subject to a request for review by any person who was denied\nthe right to speak under that rule. The Public Access Bureau does not approve public comment\n\nrules in advance; rather this office reviews the specific facts of each allegation of an OMA\nviolation\n\nthat we receive.\n\nNext, the Council's response states that the Town's authority to confine topics to\n\nbe discussed while addressing the Council to matters \" germane to the meeting agenda of the\nTown Council meetingi6 was affirmed in 2016 PAC 37631 (I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n37631, issued December 28, 2015). That letter concluded that the Council did not violate OMA\n\nwhen it refused to let a citizen comment on a matter that was not related to any subject on the\nmeeting agenda. The Council should be aware, however, that since that time the position of the\n\nPublic Access Bureau has evolved. In I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 38037, issued August\n1, 2016, this office determined that because a public body may discuss matters not listed on a\nmeeting agenda, it would be unreasonable to limit the public's ability to comment to agenda\nitems:\n\nOMA does not preclude members of a public body from \" the\nconsideration\n\nof\n\nitems not specifically set forth in the agenda,\" (5\n\nILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2014)), as long as the public body does\nnot take final action on items not listed on the agenda. Given that\nthe public body itself is able to discuss matters that are not\nspecifically listed on the agenda, a rule that would prohibit\n\nmembers of the public from addressing matters that are not listed\non the agenda would impermissibly restrict the right to public\n\ncomment as outlined in section 2. 06(g). I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 38037, at 3.\n\nFinally, the rules for addressing the Council provide that individuals are asked to\nclearly state their name, address, and whether or not they represent an organization.\n\nPlease be\n\naware that in binding opinion 14- 009, the Attorney General concluded that requiring speakers to\nstate their home addresses prior to addressing public bodies violates section 2. 06(g) of OMA (I11.\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7).\nIn accordance with the conclusions of this letter, this office requests that the\n\nCouncil vote to amend the Town's public comment rules to remove the 45 -day rule.7 The\nCouncil may also wish to re- examine all of its rules governing public comment. As explained in\n6http:// www. normal. org/ 854/ Addressing- the- Council (last visited March 15, 2017)\nThe Council has informed this office that it intends to consider such an amendment to its public\n\nthis letter, the rules should accommodate a speaker's statutory right to address the Council while\nensuring that a public body can maintain order and decorum at its meetings.\nreasonable and necessary to further a significant governmental interest.\n\nRules must be\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (217) 782- 9078 or nolson@atg. state. il. us.\nVery truly yours,\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\n\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n45349 o 206g pub\n\ncomment\n\nimproper mun"}
{"id":1187,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-04-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["45537"],"title":"Norridge School District 80 task force is not a public body under OMA","filename":"45537, issued April 6, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2082,"summary":"The requester alleged that a Superintendent's Task Force meeting in Norridge School District 80 violated the Open Meetings Act by being held privately. The PAC determined that the Task Force does not meet the definition of a 'public body' under the Act and therefore is not subject to its requirements.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school district task force held a private meeting that should have been open to the public. The Attorney General's office investigated and found that this specific task force is not a 'public body' under the law. Because it is not a public body, the group is not required to follow the Open Meetings Act rules regarding public access.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the Superintendent's Task Force is not a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Superintendent's Task Force of Norridge School District 80 constitutes a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Norridge School District 80","requesting_party":"Mr. Adam Chudzik","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body definition","subject_description":"The determination addresses whether a school district's Superintendent's Task Force is a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-public-body/advisory-bodies/45537, issued April 6, 2017.pdf","sha256":"8c2edcfdfe36a7f4dcb413c7f59fb9ef673787a6cd4ad5df0ab0ee11a26acca0","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","school district","open meetings act","task force"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Adam Chudzik\n\nNorwood Park Watchdog\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nDr. Paul O' Malley, Superintendent\nNorridge School District 80\nAdministration Office\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\npomalley@norridge80. net\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 45537\n\nDear Mr. Chudzik and Dr. O' Malley:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015\n\nSupp.)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the requirements of OMA did not apply to a December 20, 2016,\ngathering of the Superintendent' s Task Force ( Task Force) in Norridge School District 80\nDistrict).\n\nOn December 21, 2016, Mr. Adam Chudzik filed this Request for Review\nquestioning the Task Force' s holding of a private meeting on December 20, 2016. He stated that\n\nthe District posted a timeline of its Ad Hoc Deficit Reduction Planning Committee ( Ad Hoc\nCommittee) meetings, which included a Task Force meeting on that date that was described as\ninvite only.\" On January 3, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nDistrict and asked it to provide this office with copies of any recordings, written minutes, or\nother documentation of the Task Force' s December 20, 2016, meeting for this office' s review,\ntogether with a written response addressing whether the Task Force is a public body for purposes\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n100 West\nRandolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: (\n\n618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Adam Chudzik\n\nDr. Paul O' Malley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 2\n\nof OMA. This office also sought clarification as to whether notice was posted for the meeting\nand whether it was open to the public. On February 3, 2017, the District submitted a written\nresponse. Mr. Chudzik did not reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIn order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\n\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2014). Section 1. 02 of\n\nOMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2014)) defines \" public body\" as including:\nall legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the\nState, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\n\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but limited to\ncommittees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in\n\npart by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue[.]\n\nAn \" advisory body,\" for purposes of OMA, is an entity that has defined\n\nresponsibilities and is a formal part of the structure of the public body that it advises. Board of\nRegents ofthe Regency University System v. Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d 968, 977- 78 ( 4th Dist.\n\n1997). In contrast, OMA \" is not intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely\n\ninformal advisory committees who discuss internal\" affairs of a public body. Pope v. Parkinson,\n\n48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800 ( 4th Dist. 1977). Factors to consider in determining whether a group\nconstitutes an advisory body under OMA include:\n\nwho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\n\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; the entity's\n\nassigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity' s bylaws or\nauthorizing statute; whether its role is solely advisory or whether it\n\nalso has a deliberative or investigative function; whether the entity\nis subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any\npublic body; whether the group has a budget; its place within the\nlarger organization or institution of which it is a part; and the\n\nimpact of decisions or recommendations that the group makes.\nUniversity Professionals ofIllinois v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856,\n865 ( 1st Dist. 2003).\n\n\fMr. Adam Chudzik\n\nDr. Paul O' Malley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 3\n\nSimilarly, courts have considered three primary factors in determining whether a group is a\nsubsidiary body\" of a public\n\nbody under OMA: \"( 1) whether the entity has a legal existence\n\nindependent of government resolution; ( 2) the nature of functions performed by the entity; and\n\n3) the degree of governmental control over the entity.\" Hopf v. Topcorp, Inc., 256 I11. App. 3d\n\n887, 892 ( 1st Dist. 1993).\n\nIn its response to this office, the District explained the distinction between the Ad\nHoc Committee and the Task Force:\n\nThe Ad Hoc Committee was created by the School District' s Board\nof Education and was designed to address the feasibility of and\nproposal for an operating tax rate referendum to be placed on the\nballot for the November 2016 General Election. It was also\n\ndesigned to help the Board come up with a way to present to the\npublic the idea that the School District had to raise revenue from\nlocal sources. The Ad Hoc Committee' s members were appointed\n\nby the Board. To assist the Committee in carrying out its function,\nthe Board engaged a consultant who prepared a survey that was\ncirculated to the public to determine support for various options to\nreduce spending and generate revenue for the School District.\n\nAgendas for all meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee were properly\nposted and minutes maintained.\n\nThe Ad Hoc Committee presented\n\nthe results of the survey to the Board, and the Board then had a\nreferendum placed on the ballot for the November 2016 General\nElection. The referendum failed.\"\n\nAccording to the District, after the referendum failed, the Superintendent\nexercised discretion to create his own task force, independent of the Ad Hoc Committee, to assist\n\nhim in developing a set of options that the Committee could consider for a ballot measure in\nupcoming elections. The Task Force developed three recommendations to submit to the\n\nSuperintendent, who then decided to submit them to the Ad Hoc Committee as his own\nrecommendations.\n\nThe District described the Task Force as follows:\n\nThe Task Force was a purely internal body in that it was the\nbrainchild of the Superintendent and not the Board; the\n\nSuperintendent created the Task Force to help him come up with a\nset of options to be presented to the Ad Hoc Committee and the\n\nLetter from John\nM. Izzo, Hauser\nIzzo, LLC, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n3, 2017),\n1-\n\nPublic Access Bureau (\n\nFebruary\n\nat\n\n2.\n\n\fMr. Adam Chudzik\n\nDr. Paul O' Malley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 4\n\nBoard as the Board considered revenue generating/ deficit\nreduction measures that would ultimately go on the ballot; the\n\nSuperintendent served as the head of the Task Force; the\n\nSuperintendent had the final say so on who would be invited to\nserve on the Task Force; the Task Force meetings took place\nseparate and apart from the Ad Hoc Committee meetings and the\n\nBoard' s meetings; the Board did not make a special appropriation\nof monies to fund the Task Force or to compensate the\nSuperintendent or any Task Force activities; no member of the\n\nBoard served on the Task Force; only one member of the Ad Hoc\nCommittee served on the Task Force and that member did not\nparticipate in the vote on the recommendations to present to the\n\nSuperintendent; the Task Force' s recommendations were presented\nto the Superintendent; neither the Superintendent nor the Board\n\nwas bound by any recommendation that the Task Force made; no\nminutes were kept of Task Force meetings; no resolutions were\n\nadopted by the Task Force; and no member of the Task Force was\n\npaid for their service other than the consultant who had already\n\nbeen employed by the School District prior to the formation of the\n\nTask Force. ( Emphasis in original). 121\n\nThe District also contended that the Task Force was not part of the Board' s internal structure, and\ntherefore not a subsidiary body of the Board within the meaning of OMA. The District\nexplained that the Task Force was not a standing committee of the Board or a special committee\n\ncreated by the Board, but rather a Superintendent Committee that was created by the\nSuperintendent pursuant to Board Policy 2: 150. 3 Superintendent Committees report to the\n\nSuperintendent and the Board policies do not mandate any particulars of such committees, such\nas required structure, staff, or officers. The District explained that \" the Superintendent is free to\n\ncreate and abolish his committees as he chooses, and the creation of Superintendent Committees\n\nis not required by any provision of the Illinois School Code pertaining to school board\n\norganization. i4\n\n2Letter from John M. Inc),Hauser Izzo, LLC, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau ( February 3, 2017), at 3.\n\nNorridge School District 80, Policy 2: 150, Committees (adopted March 15, 2016) (\" The\n\nSuperintendent creates Superintendent committees as deemed necessary and makes all appointments.\nSuperintendent committees report to the Superintendent.\").\n\nLetter from John M. lzzo, Hauser Izzo, LLC, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau (\nFebruary 3, 2017), at 4.\n\n\fr.Adam Chudzik\n\nDr. Paul O'Malley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 5\n\nAfter careful review of the relevant information in light of the relevant factors,\nthis office concludes that the Task Force is not a public body under OMA. Even though the Task\n\nForce meetings were posted on the District' s website on a list titled \" Ad Hoc Deficit Planning\n\nCommittee Timeline,i5 which suggests that the Task Force was part of the Ad Hoc Committee,\non balance, the facts show that the Task Force was an internal group formed to assist the\nSuperintendent rather than any public body. Although the Superintendent sought input from the\n\nBoard on Task Force members, the Superintendent made the final determination regarding whom\n\nto appoint. No members of the Board were invited to or attended the Task Force meetings. The\nTask Force did not have any bylaws or an authorizing statute, and had no deliberative or\n\ninvestigative functions. Further, it was not accountable to any public body, as its role was to\nassist the Superintendent in carrying out his duties, not to provide any service to a public body\nsubject to OMA such as the Ad Hoc Committee or the Board. The Task Force did not have a\n\nbudget and its existence was purely at the discretion of the Superintendent. It was not part of the\nformal structure of the Ad Hoc Committee or the Board, nor was it created by those bodies.\nWhether to accept or reject any of the Task Force' s recommendations was within the discretion\n\nof the Superintendent, and the recommendations had no binding authority on the Ad Hoc\nCommittee or the Board. Although one Task Force member was paid by the District as a\nconsultant before the creation of the Task Force and one member of the Ad Hoc Committee was\n\nalso a member of the Task Force, those facts alone are insufficient to support a finding that the\n\nTask Force is a public body. Accordingly, based on the available information, this office\nconcludes that the Task Force is not an advisory or subsidiary body of the Board, and therefore is\nnot a \" public body\" subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me at ( 217) 524- 7958.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n5See News and Info Regarding District 80' s Referendum, Norridge School District 80\n\nhttp:// www.norridge80. org/ referendum/ index. asp ( last visited March 31, 2017);\nhttp:// www. norridge80. org/ referendum/ Ad_ Hoc Deficit Planning_ Committee Timeline. pdf( last visited March 31,\n2017).\n\n\fMr. Adam Chudzik\n\nDr. Paul O' Malley\nApril 6, 2017\nPage 6\n\n45537 o not a pb sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John M Izzo\nHauser Izzo, LLC\n\n19730 Governors Highway, Suite 10\nFlossmoor, Illinois 60422\n\njizzo@hauserizzo. com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Superintendent's task force as a public body","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-45537/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nApril 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Adam Chudzik\n\nNorwood Park Watchdog\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nDr. Paul O' Malley, Superintendent\nNorridge School District 80\nAdministration Office\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\npomalley@norridge80. net\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 45537\n\nDear Mr. Chudzik and Dr. O' Malley:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015\n\nSupp.)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the requirements of OMA did not apply to a December 20, 2016,\ngathering of the Superintendent's Task Force (Task Force) in Norridge School District 80\nDistrict).\n\nOn December 21, 2016, Mr. Adam Chudzik filed this Request for Review\nquestioning the Task Force's holding of a private meeting on December 20, 2016. He stated that\n\nthe District posted a timeline of its Ad Hoc Deficit Reduction Planning Committee (Ad Hoc\nCommittee) meetings, which included a Task Force meeting on that date that was described as\ninvite only.\" On January 3, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nDistrict and asked it to provide this office with copies of any recordings, written minutes, or\nother documentation of the Task Force's December 20, 2016, meeting for this office's review,\ntogether with a written response addressing whether the Task Force is a public body for purposes\n\nof OMA. This office also sought clarification as to whether notice was posted for the meeting\nand whether it was open to the public. On February 3, 2017, the District submitted a written\nresponse. Mr. Chudzik did not reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIn order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\n\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2014). Section 1. 02 of\n\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2014)) defines \" public body\" as including:\nall legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the\nState, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\n\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but limited to\ncommittees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in\n\npart by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue[.]\n\nAn \" advisory body,\" for purposes of OMA, is an entity that has defined\n\nresponsibilities and is a formal part of the structure of the public body that it advises. Board of\nRegents ofthe Regency University System v. Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d 968, 977- 78 (4th Dist.\n\n1997). In contrast, OMA \" is not intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely\n\ninformal advisory committees who discuss internal\" affairs of a public body. Pope v. Parkinson,\n\n48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800 (4th Dist. 1977). Factors to consider in determining whether a group\nconstitutes an advisory body under OMA include:\n\nwho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\n\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; the entity's\n\nassigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity's bylaws or\nauthorizing statute; whether its role is solely advisory or whether it\n\nalso has a deliberative or investigative function; whether the entity\nis subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any\npublic body; whether the group has a budget; its place within the\n\nSimilarly, courts have considered three primary factors in determining whether a group is a\nsubsidiary body\" of a public\n\nbody under OMA: \"(1) whether the entity has a legal existence\n\nindependent of government resolution; (2) the nature of functions performed by the entity; and\n\n3) the degree of governmental control over the entity.\" Hopf v. Topcorp, Inc., 256 I11. App. 3d\n\n887, 892 (1st Dist. 1993).\n\nIn its response to this office, the District explained the distinction between the Ad\nHoc Committee and the Task Force:\n\nThe Ad Hoc Committee was created by the School District's Board\nof Education and was designed to address the feasibility of and\nproposal for an operating tax rate referendum to be placed on the\nballot for the November 2016 General Election. It was also\n\ndesigned to help the Board come up with a way to present to the\npublic the idea that the School District had to raise revenue from\nlocal sources. The Ad Hoc Committee's members were appointed\n\nby the Board. To assist the Committee in carrying out its function,\nthe Board engaged a consultant who prepared a survey that was\ncirculated to the public to determine support for various options to\nreduce spending and generate revenue for the School District.\n\nAgendas for all meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee were properly\nposted and minutes maintained.\n\nThe Ad Hoc Committee presented\n\nthe results of the survey to the Board, and the Board then had a\nreferendum placed on the ballot for the November 2016 General\nElection. The referendum failed.\"\n\nAccording to the District, after the referendum failed, the Superintendent\nexercised discretion to create his own task force, independent of the Ad Hoc Committee, to assist\n\nhim in developing a set of options that the Committee could consider for a ballot measure in\nupcoming elections. The Task Force developed three recommendations to submit to the\n\nSuperintendent, who then decided to submit them to the Ad Hoc Committee as his own\nrecommendations.\n\nThe District described the Task Force as follows:\n\nThe Task Force was a purely internal body in that it was the\nbrainchild of the Superintendent and not the Board; the\n\nSuperintendent created the Task Force to help him come up with a\nset of options to be presented to the Ad Hoc Committee and the\n\nLetter from John\nM. Izzo, Hauser\nIzzo, LLC, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n3, 2017),\n\nBoard as the Board considered revenue generating/ deficit\nreduction measures that would ultimately go on the ballot; the\n\nSuperintendent served as the head of the Task Force; the\n\nSuperintendent had the final say so on who would be invited to\nserve on the Task Force; the Task Force meetings took place\nseparate and apart from the Ad Hoc Committee meetings and the\n\nBoard's meetings; the Board did not make a special appropriation\nof monies to fund the Task Force or to compensate the\nSuperintendent or any Task Force activities; no member of the\n\nBoard served on the Task Force; only one member of the Ad Hoc\nCommittee served on the Task Force and that member did not\nparticipate in the vote on the recommendations to present to the\n\nSuperintendent; the Task Force's recommendations were presented\nto the Superintendent; neither the Superintendent nor the Board\n\nwas bound by any recommendation that the Task Force made; no\nminutes were kept of Task Force meetings; no resolutions were\n\nadopted by the Task Force; and no member of the Task Force was\n\npaid for their service other than the consultant who had already\n\nbeen employed by the School District prior to the formation of the\n\nTask Force. (Emphasis in original). 121\n\nThe District also contended that the Task Force was not part of the Board's internal structure, and\ntherefore not a subsidiary body of the Board within the meaning of OMA. The District\nexplained that the Task Force was not a standing committee of the Board or a special committee\n\ncreated by the Board, but rather a Superintendent Committee that was created by the\nSuperintendent pursuant to Board Policy 2: 150. 3 Superintendent Committees report to the\n\nSuperintendent and the Board policies do not mandate any particulars of such committees, such\nas required structure, staff, or officers. The District explained that \" the Superintendent is free to\n\ncreate and abolish his committees as he chooses, and the creation of Superintendent Committees\n\nis not required by any provision of the Illinois School Code pertaining to school board\n\norganization. i4\n\n2 Letter from John M. Inc),Hauser Izzo, LLC, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau (February 3, 2017), at 3.\n\nNorridge School District 80, Policy 2: 150, Committees (adopted March 15, 2016) (\" The\n\nSuperintendent creates Superintendent committees as deemed necessary and makes all appointments.\nSuperintendent committees report to the Superintendent.\").\n\nLetter from John M. lzzo, Hauser Izzo, LLC, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nAfter careful review of the relevant information in light of the relevant factors,\nthis office concludes that the Task Force is not a public body under OMA. Even though the Task\n\nForce meetings were posted on the District's website on a list titled \" Ad Hoc Deficit Planning\n\nCommittee Timeline,i5 which suggests that the Task Force was part of the Ad Hoc Committee,\non balance, the facts show that the Task Force was an internal group formed to assist the\nSuperintendent rather than any public body. Although the Superintendent sought input from the\n\nBoard on Task Force members, the Superintendent made the final determination regarding whom\n\nto appoint. No members of the Board were invited to or attended the Task Force meetings. The\nTask Force did not have any bylaws or an authorizing statute, and had no deliberative or\n\ninvestigative functions. Further, it was not accountable to any public body, as its role was to\nassist the Superintendent in carrying out his duties, not to provide any service to a public body\nsubject to OMA such as the Ad Hoc Committee or the Board. The Task Force did not have a\n\nbudget and its existence was purely at the discretion of the Superintendent. It was not part of the\nformal structure of the Ad Hoc Committee or the Board, nor was it created by those bodies.\nWhether to accept or reject any of the Task Force's recommendations was within the discretion\n\nof the Superintendent, and the recommendations had no binding authority on the Ad Hoc\nCommittee or the Board. Although one Task Force member was paid by the District as a\nconsultant before the creation of the Task Force and one member of the Ad Hoc Committee was\n\nalso a member of the Task Force, those facts alone are insufficient to support a finding that the\n\nTask Force is a public body. Accordingly, based on the available information, this office\nconcludes that the Task Force is not an advisory or subsidiary body of the Board, and therefore is\nnot a \" public body\" subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me at (217) 524- 7958.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n5 See News and Info Regarding District 80's Referendum, Norridge School District 80\n\nhttp:// www.norridge80. org/ referendum/ index. asp (last visited March 31, 2017);\nhttp:// www. norridge80. org/ referendum/ Ad_ Hoc Deficit Planning_ Committee Timeline. pdf(last visited March 31,\n\n45537 o not a pb sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John M Izzo\nHauser Izzo, LLC\n\n19730 Governors Highway, Suite 10\nFlossmoor, Illinois 60422\n\njizzo@hauserizzo. com"}
{"id":1189,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-08-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["46079"],"title":"Village of Princeville did not violate OMA by failing to set fixed schedule for as-needed committee meetings","filename":"46079, issued August 8, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":753,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Village of Princeville violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide specified times and places for committee meetings. The PAC determined that because the committees do not meet on a regular schedule, the Village's practice of providing notice 48 hours in advance of meetings held at the Village Hall complies with the Act.","plain_summary":"This determination addresses whether the Village of Princeville violated Section 2.01 of the Open Meetings Act by failing to state specified times and places for committee meetings. The Public Access Counselor concluded there was no violation, finding the request for review unfounded. The reasoning explains that the specific scheduling requirements of Sections 2.02(a) and 2.03 apply only to 'regular' meetings scheduled at the start of the calendar or fiscal year, and because the Village's committees do not meet on a regular schedule, no such schedule was required; the Village's practice of holding committee meetings at a specified place (Village Hall) with 48 hours' notice satisfied the general convenience requirement of Section 2.01 and the notice requirements of Section 2.02(b). The public body reviewed was the Village of Princeville, and the underlying matter concerned committee meeting scheduling and notice practices.","holding":"The specific meeting-schedule requirements of Sections 2.02(a) and 2.03 of OMA apply only to regular meetings and do not require a public body whose committees meet on an as-needed basis to publish a fixed schedule, so long as notice and place requirements under Sections 2.01 and 2.02(b) are otherwise met.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide a fixed schedule of meeting times for committees that meet only on an as-needed basis.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.01"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Princeville","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The requester challenged the lack of a published schedule for village committee meetings.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_a/Posting-annual-schedule-of-regular-meetings/46079, issued August 8, 2017.pdf","sha256":"67c3ad2d862be36929bceec274ab75e4f3e0612863a817ccc852a85e25687f6e","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","open meetings act","committee meetings","public schedule"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nAHORNEY GENERAL\n\nAugust 8, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 46079\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has received your Request for Review alleging a\npossible violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 lLCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2016)) by the\nVillage of Princeville (Village). Our review of the information you have furnished, however,\nprovides no basis for the Public Access Counselor to conclude that the Village has violated\nOMA.\nPursuant to section 3.5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/3.5(a) (West 2016)), \"[a] person\nwho believes that a violation of this Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for\nreview with the Public Access Counselor[,]\" which \"must include a summary of the facts\nsupporting the allegation.\" Your Request for Review indicates that you submitted a Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016)) request to the Village on January\n16, 2017, seeking copies of its committees' meeting times. In response, the Village provided you\nwith a record indicating that meetings for each of the committees are scheduled as needed and\nheld in the board room of the Princeville Village Hall, and that notice and an agenda are posted\nat least 48 hours prior to committee meetings. You allege that the Village violated section 2.01\nof OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016)) by failing to provide specified times and places for\ncommittee meetings.\nSection 2.0lofOMA provides, in pertinent part: \"All meetings required by the\nAct to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient and open to the\npublic.\" This is a general requirement aimed at ensuring members of the public have the\nopportunity to attend open meetings. Section 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2016))\nrequires that \"[e]very public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at\nthe beginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times, and places of\nsuch meetings[.]\" (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, section 2.03 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.03\n\n500 South Second Street. Springfield. Illinois 62706 • (217)782- I 090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nI 00 West Randolph Street. Chicago. Illinois, 6060 I • (312) 8 I 4-3000 • TTY: (3 I 2) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\nI (\\(\\1 c-�· !.A'-:- f'-.-k---1-1-\n\n111; __ ;~ £\"I(\\(\\\\ • (£ 1 0\\ �'\\(\\ L \"\"\" - \"T\"TU.\n\n,,, Io, \"\"'\" ,- .,,. ... _ ,- ____ ,,. , en ,.,,,,.,. ,- • • .-\n\n\fAugust 8, 2017\nPage 2\n\nWest 2014)) states that \"[ i] n addition to the notice required by Section 2. 02, each body subject\nto this Act must, at the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year, prepare and make available a\nschedule of all its regular meetings for such calendar or fiscal year, listing the times and places\nof such meetings.\" (\nEmphasis added.) The plain language of these statutory provisions applies\nto \" regular\" meeting, not special, reconvened, rescheduled, or emergency meetings, which are\n\notherwise mentioned in OMA and, by their nature, cannot be scheduled at the beginning of the\ncalendar or fiscal year.\n\nIn a telephone conversation with an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\nAccess Bureau on February 3, 2017, the Village Treasurer, Sue Hofer, confirmed that the Village\ncommittees do not meet regularly and that most committee business is addressed during regular\n\nVillage Board meetings. Because the Village committees do not meet regularly during the fiscal\nor calendar year, there is no schedule of regular meetings to make available to the public.\n\nThe\n\nVillage' s FOIA response indicated that committee meetings, when held, are held at a specified\n\nplace — the Village Hall. Further, the record provided to you by the Village indicates that 48\nhours' notice of committee meetings is provided as required by sections 2. 02( a) and 2. 02( b) of\nOMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( b) ( West 2016)).\n\nTherefore, this office concludes that your request for\n\nreview is unfounded.\n\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me at (312) 814- 5383 or the Chicago\naddress on the first page of this letter.\n\nThis letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nS. PIYA MUKHERJEE\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access\n\n46079 o unf mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sue Hofer\nVillage Treasurer/ Interim Village Clerk\nVillage of Princeville\n206 North Walnut Avenue\nPost Office Box 200\nPrinceville,\n\nIllinois\n\n61559\n\nvillageprinceville@frontier.\n\ncom\n\nBureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A village's committee meeting schedule","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-46079/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nAHORNEY GENERAL\n\nAugust 8, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 46079\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has received your Request for Review alleging a\npossible violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 lLCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2016)) by the\nVillage of Princeville (Village). Our review of the information you have furnished, however,\nprovides no basis for the Public Access Counselor to conclude that the Village has violated\nOMA.\nPursuant to section 3.5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/3.5(a) (West 2016)), \"[a] person\nwho believes that a violation of this Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for\nreview with the Public Access Counselor[,]\" which \"must include a summary of the facts\nsupporting the allegation.\" Your Request for Review indicates that you submitted a Freedom of\nInformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016)) request to the Village on January\n16, 2017, seeking copies of its committees' meeting times. In response, the Village provided you\nwith a record indicating that meetings for each of the committees are scheduled as needed and\nheld in the board room of the Princeville Village Hall, and that notice and an agenda are posted\nat least 48 hours prior to committee meetings. You allege that the Village violated section 2.01\nof OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016)) by failing to provide specified times and places for\ncommittee meetings.\nSection 2.0lofOMA provides, in pertinent part: \"All meetings required by the\nAct to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient and open to the\npublic.\" This is a general requirement aimed at ensuring members of the public have the\nopportunity to attend open meetings. Section 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2016))\nrequires that \"[e]very public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at\nthe beginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times, and places of\nsuch meetings[.]\" (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, section 2.03 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.03\n\nWest 2014)) states that \"[ i] n addition to the notice required by Section 2. 02, each body subject\nto this Act must, at the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year, prepare and make available a\nschedule of all its regular meetings for such calendar or fiscal year, listing the times and places\nof such meetings.\" (Emphasis added.) The plain language of these statutory provisions applies\nto \" regular\" meeting, not special, reconvened, rescheduled, or emergency meetings, which are\n\notherwise mentioned in OMA and, by their nature, cannot be scheduled at the beginning of the\ncalendar or fiscal year.\n\nIn a telephone conversation with an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\nAccess Bureau on February 3, 2017, the Village Treasurer, Sue Hofer, confirmed that the Village\ncommittees do not meet regularly and that most committee business is addressed during regular\n\nVillage Board meetings. Because the Village committees do not meet regularly during the fiscal\nor calendar year, there is no schedule of regular meetings to make available to the public.\n\nThe\n\nVillage's FOIA response indicated that committee meetings, when held, are held at a specified\n\nplace — the Village Hall. Further, the record provided to you by the Village indicates that 48\nhours' notice of committee meetings is provided as required by sections 2. 02(a) and 2. 02(b) of\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(b) (West 2016)).\n\nTherefore, this office concludes that your request for\n\nreview is unfounded.\n\nIf you have any questions, you may contact me at (312) 814- 5383 or the Chicago\naddress on the first page of this letter.\n\nThis letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nS. PIYA MUKHERJEE\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access\n\n46079 o unf mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Sue Hofer\nVillage Treasurer/ Interim Village Clerk\nVillage of Princeville\n206 North Walnut Avenue\nPost Office Box 200\nPrinceville,\n\nIllinois\n\n61559\n\nvillageprinceville@frontier.\n\ncom\n\nBureau"}
{"id":1190,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-04-10","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["46149"],"title":"Rockford School Board did not violate OMA by removing disruptive speaker","filename":"46149, issued April 10, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2128,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Rockford Public School District No. 205 Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act by improperly interrupting and silencing a speaker during the public comment portion of a meeting. The PAC determined that the Board's actions were based on the speaker's disruptive conduct rather than the content of his remarks, and thus found no violation.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board unfairly silenced her father during a public meeting by cutting off his microphone and having security approach him. The Attorney General's office reviewed the evidence and determined that the board acted because the man was being disruptive, not because they disagreed with what he was saying. Therefore, the board did not break the law regarding public comment rules.","holding":"The Public Access Counselor concluded that the Board did not violate the Open Meetings Act because the speaker's removal was based on disruptive behavior rather than the content of his speech.","legal_question":"Whether the Board of Education violated section 2.06(g) of the Open Meetings Act by improperly restricting public comment and silencing a speaker.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Rockford Public School District No. 205 Board of Education","requesting_party":"Ms. [Name redacted]","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The regulation of public comment and decorum during a school board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/Maintaining-order-and-decorum/46149, issued April 10, 2018.pdf","sha256":"ace9d682079cdfe6b4fe290e02608c6c8cf1c0590920a922beb66e9bcc614269","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","school board","disruptive behavior","meeting decorum"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE\n\nOF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 10, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas\n\nJ. Lester\n\nHINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP\n100 Park Avenue\nRockford, Illinois 61101- 1389\n\nHester@hinshawlaw.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46149\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Lester:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access\nBureau is unable to conclude that the Rockford Public School District ( District) No. 205 Board\n\nof Education ( Board) violated OMA by improperly restricting public comment during its January\n24, 2017, Board meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn January 30, 2017,\nsubmitted this Request for Review\nalleging that the Board interrupted her father,\nand improperly prevented him\nfrom addressing it during the public comment portion of the January 24, 2017, meeting.\nSpecifically, she alleged that the Board President, Kenneth J. Scrivano, repeatedly interrupted\nand asked security staff to turn off\nmicrophone before his allotted speaking\n\ntime had expired.\nalso alleged that a District security office intimidated\ninto abandoning the remainder of his speaking time by approaching and standing near\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield. Illinois 62701 • (\n100 West Randolph\n\nStreet. Chicago,\n\nIllinois, 60601 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main. Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Thomas J. Lester\nApril 10, 2018\nPage 2\n\nOn February 23, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and requested a written response to the allegations therein, together with a copy of the\n\nBoard' s established and recorded rules regarding public comment. This office also asked for an\nexplanation in response to\n\nallegations that the Board restricted members of the\n\npublic from addressing the Board for the full two minutes permitted under its rules, including the\nBoard' s basis for any restriction.\n\nOn March 13, 2017, this office received the Board' s response\n\nletter and the requested agendas and public comment rules. On March 31, 2017,\nreplied.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA: Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)), provides that \"[ ably\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" The Attorney General has concluded that section 2. 06( g) of\nOMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for members of\n\nthe public to address public officials at open meetings.\" See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No.\n14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009,\nissued September 4, 2014, at 4 (\" The plain language of section 2. 06( g) of OMA provides that\n\nindividuals are entitled to address a public body subject only to a public body' s established and\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the nature of rules that a public\nbody may permissibly adopt, there are legitimate reasons for having rules to maintain decorum at\nrecorded\n\npublic\n\nrules.\").\n\nmeetings \"\n\nto assure that the meetings can be efficiently\n\nconducted.\"\n\nTirnmon v. Wood,\n\n633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 ( W.D. Mich. 2008).\nNotwithstanding the legitimate interest in establishing rules governing decorum,\nin order to withstand constitutional muster, any restrictions on public comment that are content -\n\nbased must be narrowly drawn to serve the purpose of preserving decorum. See I.A. Rana\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 ( N. D. III. 2009). As the Ninth\nCircuit has explained:\n\nAn ordinance that governs the decorum of a city council meeting is\nnot facially overbroad if it only permits a presiding officer to eject\nan attendee for actually disturbing or impeding a meeting.\nHowever, actually disturbing or impeding a meeting means actual\ndisruption of the meeting; a municipality cannot merely define\n\ndisturbance in any way it chooses, e. g., it may not deem any\nviolation of its rules of decorum to be a disturbance. ( Internal\ncitations\n\nand\n\nellipses omitted.) (\n\nCity gfCosta Mesa,\n\nEmphasis in original.)\n\n718 F. 3d 800, 811 ( 9th Cir. 2013).\n\nAcosta v.\n\n\fMr. Thomas J. Lester\nApril 10, 2018\nPage 3\n\nIn Acosta, the court struck down as overbroad a city ordinance that provided for the removal of\npersonal,\nany person who commits disorderly, insolent, or disruptive behavior, including * * *\nimpertinent, profane, insolent, or slanderous remarks.\" Acosta, 718 F. 3d at 811. The court held\nthat the ordinance was unconstitutional because it permitted individuals to be ejected for the\nproscribed types of remarks even if those remarks did not disrupt meetings.\n\nAcosta, 718 F. 3d at\n\n813.\n\nIn response to this office' s request for a copy of the Board' s established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Board submitted Rockford Public School District\nNo. 205 Board of Education Policy 2: 230, \" Public Participation at Board of Education Meetings\nand Petitions to the Board\" ( Board Policy 2: 230). Board Policy 2: 230' lists a number of\nguidelines for speakers, including:\n1.\n\nAddress the Board only at the appropriate time as\n\nindicated on the agenda and when recognized by the Board\nPresident.\n\n2. Identify himself/ herself by name and address ( optional).\n\nOrdinarily, comments shall be limited to 2 minutes. However, at\nthe start of the public participation portion of the meeting, the\n\nBoard President may shorten public comment to conserve time and\n\ngive the maximum number of individuals an opportunity to speak.\n3. Conduct oneself with respect and civility toward others\nand otherwise abide by Board policy 8: 30, Visitors to and Conduct\n\non School Property [Zl\nThe Board also provided a copy of Rockford Public School District No. 205 School Board Policy\n8: 30, \" Visitors to and Conduct on School Property\", which prohibits \" disrupt[ ing] * * *\nany\n\nschool activity or function,\" and \" threaten[ ing], harass[ ing] or intimidat[ ion] [ of] a staff member,\n\na School Board member, sports official or coach, or any other person.\" 3\n\nReview by this office is limited to the OMA violation alleged in the Request for Review. This\n\noffice makes no finding with respect to the propriety of the Board' s policies concerning public comment, and this\nletter should not be construed as approval or endorsement of those policies.\n\n2Rockford Public School District 205 School Board Policy 2: 230, \" Public Participation at Board of\nEducation Meetings and Petitions to the Board.\"\n\n3Rockford Public School District 205 School Board Policy 8: 30, \" Visitors to and Conduct on\nSchool\n\nProperty\n\n\fMr. Thomas J. Lester\nApril 10, 2018\nPage 4\n\nThe Board' s response to this office asserted that \"[ a] ny interruption of\nwas\n\ndone for the purpose\n\nof\n\nrestoring a level of decorum\n\nat\n\nthe meeting. i4 The Board asserted\n\nthat\naddressed members of the public assembled at the meeting, rather than the Board,\nand that his arm motions and movement away from the podium was \" causing a dangerous\nenvironment\nat the\nmeeting which put all of those in attendance in jeopardy. i5 The Board further\nstated:\n\nAt no point in time did the Board President tell [\nhis\ncomments were over, but for security reasons, a security officer did\nwalk up behind the podium, but did not touch or say anything to\nchose to finish his comments and walk away.\nNo threats were made to\nby anyone connected with the\nBoard or the School District.161\nIn reply,\nargued that the Board first interrupted\npublic\ncomment when he referenced payments allegedly made by the District to a company owned by\nthe Superintendent' s wife.\nstated that the Board president referenced a rule\nprohibiting comments mentioning an individual, and that the interruption was improper because,\n\nthe Board President did not ask a question, nor did he stop\n\nmaintain a level of decorum.\" 7\npart of\n\nfor the purpose to\n\nfurther disputed the Board' s characterization of any\n\ncomments as indecorous or compromising the safety of the room.\nThis office has reviewed a video recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nBoard' s January 24, 2017, Board meeting. 8\n\nwas called and walked up to a podium set\n\nin front of the Board members seated on a stage, and he spoke about the need for improved\n\nsafety and further investment of public funds towards education. After approximately 40\nseconds,\nbegan to discuss the business dealings and personal ties of a particular board\nmember, raising his voice and pointing at the Board. During this portion of\ns public\ncomment, a Board member interrupted him, told\n\nthe rules prohibited him from\n\n4Letter from Thomas J. Lester, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, to S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Counselor ( March 13, 2017), at 2.\n\n5Letter from Thomas J. Lester, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, to S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Counselor ( March 13, 2017), at 2.\n6Letter from Thomas J. Lester, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, to S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Counselor ( March 13, 2017), at 2.\nLetter from\n\nto S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nBureau ( March 31, 2017), at 2.\n\n8Rockford Public School District 205 Board. Meeting, January 24, 2017, available at\nhttps:// www. youtu. be. com/ watch? v= OLQL7MWK4NM ( last visited\n\nNovember 8, 2017), 8: 40- 10: 01.\n\n\fMr. Thomas\n\nJ. Lester\n\nApril 10, 2018\nPage 5\n\nreferencing individual members, and told\nto comply with the rules or he would be\nasked to sit down.\nproceeded to speak and stated that the Board was corrupt.\nThroughout the remainder of\n\npublic comment, he spoke in a raised voice but did not\n\nuse profanity. However, he walked around the podium, turned away from the podium at times to\naddress the audience, and approached the Board members while pointing and vigorously\n\ngesturing with his hands. After approximately 90 seconds, a Board member interrupted\nstated, \" you are done,\" and called for the next speaker. While\ncontinued to\nspeak, an individual ( presumably the security officer) approached\n\nBoard member requested that the microphone be turned off.9\n\nfrom behind as the\n\nstopped speaking and\n\nwalked away from the podium with more than 20 seconds of his allotted time remaining.\nIn contrast to the explanation provided in the Board' s written response to this\n\noffice, the video recording shows that the Board' s first interruption of\n\npublic\n\ncomment was because of the content of his comment — his reference to an individual — and not to\n\nmaintain decorum at the meeting. Notably, the Board' s rules do not expressly prohibit\nreferencing individual persons.\n\nHowever, after this interruption,\n\nwas allowed to\n\ncontinue his comment, and was only interrupted again when he began moving around the\nmeeting room, continued to raise his voice, and finally, walked in front of the podium toward the\nBoard while repeatedly thrusting his finger in the direction of the Board. Although there is no\nindication that\nintended to threaten or intimidate the Board, based on this office's\nreview of the video recording, his animated conduct disrupted the decorum of the meeting to the\nextent that the Board' s interruption of his public comment was not unreasonable. The facts here\nare distinguishable from the Acosta case in which the court struck down an ordinance because it\npermitted individuals to be ejected for the proscribed types of remarks even if those remarks did\n\nnot disrupt meetings. Here,\nappeared disruptive.\n\ndemonstrative actions and conduct, not his remarks,\n\nTherefore, based on the available information, this office cannot conclude\n\nthat the Board violated section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\nIn accordance with the conclusions of this letter, this office requests that the\n\nBoard review its rules governing public comment to ensure they are appropriately and narrowly\ntailored to regulate only those governmental interests relating to decorum and efficiency. The\nPublic Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does not require the\n\nissuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have any questions,\nplease contact me at the Chicago office.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nS. PIYA MUKHERJEE\nRockford Public School District 205 Board, Meeting, January 24, 2017, available at\nhttps:// www. youtu. be. com/ watch? v= OLQL7MWK4NM ( last visited November 8, 2017), 9: 56- 10: 01.\n\n\fMr. Thomas J. Lester\n\nApril 10, 2018\nPage 6\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n46149 o 206g pub\n\ncomment\n\nproper\n\nsd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school board's regulation of public comment","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-46149/","full_text":"FFICE\n\nOF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 10, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Thomas\n\nJ. Lester\n\nHINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP\n100 Park Avenue\nRockford, Illinois 61101- 1389\n\nHester@hinshawlaw.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46149\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Lester:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access\nBureau is unable to conclude that the Rockford Public School District (District) No. 205 Board\n\nof Education (Board) violated OMA by improperly restricting public comment during its January\n24, 2017, Board meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn January 30, 2017,\nsubmitted this Request for Review\nalleging that the Board interrupted her father,\nand improperly prevented him\nfrom addressing it during the public comment portion of the January 24, 2017, meeting.\nSpecifically, she alleged that the Board President, Kenneth J. Scrivano, repeatedly interrupted\nand asked security staff to turn off\nmicrophone before his allotted speaking\n\ntime had expired.\nalso alleged that a District security office intimidated\ninto abandoning the remainder of his speaking time by approaching and standing near\n\nOn February 23, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and requested a written response to the allegations therein, together with a copy of the\n\nBoard's established and recorded rules regarding public comment. This office also asked for an\nexplanation in response to\n\nallegations that the Board restricted members of the\n\npublic from addressing the Board for the full two minutes permitted under its rules, including the\nBoard's basis for any restriction.\n\nOn March 13, 2017, this office received the Board's response\n\nletter and the requested agendas and public comment rules. On March 31, 2017,\nreplied.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA: Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)), provides that \"[ ably\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" The Attorney General has concluded that section 2. 06(g) of\nOMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity for members of\n\nthe public to address public officials at open meetings.\" See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No.\n14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009,\nissued September 4, 2014, at 4 (\" The plain language of section 2. 06(g) of OMA provides that\n\nindividuals are entitled to address a public body subject only to a public body's established and\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the nature of rules that a public\nbody may permissibly adopt, there are legitimate reasons for having rules to maintain decorum at\nrecorded\n\npublic\n\nrules.\").\n\nmeetings \"\n\nto assure that the meetings can be efficiently\n\nconducted.\"\n\nTirnmon v. Wood,\n\n633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (W.D. Mich. 2008).\nNotwithstanding the legitimate interest in establishing rules governing decorum,\nin order to withstand constitutional muster, any restrictions on public comment that are content -\n\nbased must be narrowly drawn to serve the purpose of preserving decorum. See I.A. Rana\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N. D. III. 2009). As the Ninth\nCircuit has explained:\n\nAn ordinance that governs the decorum of a city council meeting is\nnot facially overbroad if it only permits a presiding officer to eject\nan attendee for actually disturbing or impeding a meeting.\nHowever, actually disturbing or impeding a meeting means actual\ndisruption of the meeting; a municipality cannot merely define\n\ndisturbance in any way it chooses, e. g., it may not deem any\nviolation of its rules of decorum to be a disturbance. (Internal\ncitations\n\nIn Acosta, the court struck down as overbroad a city ordinance that provided for the removal of\npersonal,\nany person who commits disorderly, insolent, or disruptive behavior, including * * *\nimpertinent, profane, insolent, or slanderous remarks.\" Acosta, 718 F. 3d at 811. The court held\nthat the ordinance was unconstitutional because it permitted individuals to be ejected for the\nproscribed types of remarks even if those remarks did not disrupt meetings.\n\nAcosta, 718 F. 3d at\n\n813.\n\nIn response to this office's request for a copy of the Board's established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Board submitted Rockford Public School District\nNo. 205 Board of Education Policy 2: 230, \" Public Participation at Board of Education Meetings\nand Petitions to the Board\" (Board Policy 2: 230). Board Policy 2: 230' lists a number of\nguidelines for speakers, including:\n1.\n\nAddress the Board only at the appropriate time as\n\nindicated on the agenda and when recognized by the Board\nPresident.\n\n2. Identify himself/ herself by name and address (optional).\n\nOrdinarily, comments shall be limited to 2 minutes. However, at\nthe start of the public participation portion of the meeting, the\n\nBoard President may shorten public comment to conserve time and\n\ngive the maximum number of individuals an opportunity to speak.\n3. Conduct oneself with respect and civility toward others\nand otherwise abide by Board policy 8: 30, Visitors to and Conduct\n\non School Property [Zl\nThe Board also provided a copy of Rockford Public School District No. 205 School Board Policy\n8: 30, \" Visitors to and Conduct on School Property\", which prohibits \" disrupt[ ing] * * *\nany\n\nschool activity or function,\" and \" threaten[ ing], harass[ ing] or intimidat[ ion] [ of] a staff member,\n\na School Board member, sports official or coach, or any other person.\" 3\n\nReview by this office is limited to the OMA violation alleged in the Request for Review. This\n\noffice makes no finding with respect to the propriety of the Board's policies concerning public comment, and this\nletter should not be construed as approval or endorsement of those policies.\n\n2 Rockford Public School District 205 School Board Policy 2: 230, \" Public Participation at Board of\nEducation Meetings and Petitions to the Board.\"\n\n3 Rockford Public School District 205 School Board Policy 8: 30, \" Visitors to and Conduct on\n\nThe Board's response to this office asserted that \"[ a] ny interruption of\nwas\n\ndone for the purpose\n\nof\n\nrestoring a level of decorum\n\nat\n\nthe meeting. i4 The Board asserted\n\nthat\naddressed members of the public assembled at the meeting, rather than the Board,\nand that his arm motions and movement away from the podium was \" causing a dangerous\nenvironment\nat the\nmeeting which put all of those in attendance in jeopardy. i5 The Board further\nstated:\n\nAt no point in time did the Board President tell [\nhis\ncomments were over, but for security reasons, a security officer did\nwalk up behind the podium, but did not touch or say anything to\nchose to finish his comments and walk away.\nNo threats were made to\nby anyone connected with the\nBoard or the School District.161\nIn reply,\nargued that the Board first interrupted\npublic\ncomment when he referenced payments allegedly made by the District to a company owned by\nthe Superintendent's wife.\nstated that the Board president referenced a rule\nprohibiting comments mentioning an individual, and that the interruption was improper because,\n\nthe Board President did not ask a question, nor did he stop\n\nmaintain a level of decorum.\" 7\npart of\n\nfor the purpose to\n\nfurther disputed the Board's characterization of any\n\ncomments as indecorous or compromising the safety of the room.\nThis office has reviewed a video recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nBoard's January 24, 2017, Board meeting. 8\n\nwas called and walked up to a podium set\n\nin front of the Board members seated on a stage, and he spoke about the need for improved\n\nsafety and further investment of public funds towards education. After approximately 40\nseconds,\nbegan to discuss the business dealings and personal ties of a particular board\nmember, raising his voice and pointing at the Board. During this portion of\ns public\ncomment, a Board member interrupted him, told\n\nthe rules prohibited him from\n\n4 Letter from Thomas J. Lester, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, to S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Counselor (March 13, 2017), at 2.\n\n5 Letter from Thomas J. Lester, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, to S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Counselor (March 13, 2017), at 2.\n6 Letter from Thomas J. Lester, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, to S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Counselor (March 13, 2017), at 2.\nLetter from\n\nto S. Piya Mukherjee, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access\n\nreferencing individual members, and told\nto comply with the rules or he would be\nasked to sit down.\nproceeded to speak and stated that the Board was corrupt.\nThroughout the remainder of\n\npublic comment, he spoke in a raised voice but did not\n\nuse profanity. However, he walked around the podium, turned away from the podium at times to\naddress the audience, and approached the Board members while pointing and vigorously\n\ngesturing with his hands. After approximately 90 seconds, a Board member interrupted\nstated, \" you are done,\" and called for the next speaker. While\ncontinued to\nspeak, an individual (presumably the security officer) approached\n\nBoard member requested that the microphone be turned off.9\n\nfrom behind as the\n\nstopped speaking and\n\nwalked away from the podium with more than 20 seconds of his allotted time remaining.\nIn contrast to the explanation provided in the Board's written response to this\n\noffice, the video recording shows that the Board's first interruption of\n\npublic\n\ncomment was because of the content of his comment — his reference to an individual — and not to\n\nmaintain decorum at the meeting. Notably, the Board's rules do not expressly prohibit\nreferencing individual persons.\n\nHowever, after this interruption,\n\nwas allowed to\n\ncontinue his comment, and was only interrupted again when he began moving around the\nmeeting room, continued to raise his voice, and finally, walked in front of the podium toward the\nBoard while repeatedly thrusting his finger in the direction of the Board. Although there is no\nindication that\nintended to threaten or intimidate the Board, based on this office's\nreview of the video recording, his animated conduct disrupted the decorum of the meeting to the\nextent that the Board's interruption of his public comment was not unreasonable. The facts here\nare distinguishable from the Acosta case in which the court struck down an ordinance because it\npermitted individuals to be ejected for the proscribed types of remarks even if those remarks did\n\nnot disrupt meetings. Here,\nappeared disruptive.\n\ndemonstrative actions and conduct, not his remarks,\n\nTherefore, based on the available information, this office cannot conclude\n\nthat the Board violated section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\nIn accordance with the conclusions of this letter, this office requests that the\n\nBoard review its rules governing public comment to ensure they are appropriately and narrowly\ntailored to regulate only those governmental interests relating to decorum and efficiency. The\nPublic Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does not require the\n\nissuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have any questions,\nplease contact me at the Chicago office.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nS. PIYA MUKHERJEE\nRockford Public School District 205 Board, Meeting, January 24, 2017, available at\nhttps:// www. youtu. be. com/ watch? v= OLQL7MWK4NM (last visited November 8, 2017), 9: 56- 10: 01.\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n46149 o 206g pub\n\ncomment\n\nproper\n\nsd"}
{"id":1191,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-02-22","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["46182"],"title":"PAC declines to review complaint against Midland School Board for untimely meeting minutes posting","filename":"46182, issued February 22, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1706,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Midland Community Unit School District #7 failed to timely post meeting minutes to its website as required by the Open Meetings Act. The PAC determined that the Request for Review was not submitted within the 60-day statutory timeframe and closed the matter without further action.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board failed to post meeting minutes on its website within the 10-day deadline required by law. The Attorney General's office found that the complaint was filed too late to be considered. Because the requester waited too long to report the issue, the PAC closed the case without taking further action.","holding":"The PAC declined to review the complaint because the requester failed to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the alleged violation and did not submit the Request for Review within the required 60-day period.","legal_question":"Whether a Request for Review regarding the failure to post meeting minutes on a public body's website was submitted within the 60-day period required by section 3.5(a) of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Midland Community Unit School District #7 Board of Education","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Closed - untimely filing","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The timely posting of approved open meeting minutes on a public body's website.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/3.5/3.5_a/Reasonable-diligence-if-did-not-discover-violation-within-60-days/46182, issued February 22, 2017.pdf","sha256":"268d927e4ada253fa5ca7072d90e048b04070e0fa46dacdd5dc04716ff4f9ab6","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting minutes","website posting","timeliness","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nFebruary 22, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46182\nDear\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has received your Request for Review alleging\nviolations of the Open Meetings Act ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. ( West 2014)) by the Midland\nCommunity Unit School District # 7 ( District) Board of Education ( Board). For the reasons\ndiscussed below, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.\nYour Request for Review alleged that the Board did not post the minutes of its\nAugust 15, 2016, and September 19, 2016, meetings on the District's website within 10 days of\n\napproving the minutes. You stated that the minutes for the August 15, 2016, meeting were\n\napproved on September 19, 2016, and the minutes for the September 19, 2016, meeting were\napproved on October 17, 2016. Your Request for Review alleged that the minutes for both\n\nmeetings were posted on the District' s website sometime between November 30, 2016, and early\nDecember 2016.\n\nSection 2. 06( 1)) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 14012. 06( b) ( West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016) states:\n\nA public body shall approve the minutes of its open\n\nmeeting within 30 days after that meeting or at the public body' s\nsecond subsequent regular meeting, whichever is later. The\nminutes of meetings open to the public shall be available for public\n\ninspection within 10 days after the approval of such minutes by the\n\npublic body. Beginning July 1, 2006, at the time it complies with\n\nthe other requirements of this subsection, a public body that has a\n\nwebsite that thefull-time staff of the public body maintains shall\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782. 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Mind' s, 60601 • ( 312) 814-3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax(( 312) 814- 3806\n1001\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fFebruary 22, 2017\nPage 2\n\npost the minutes ofa regular meeting of its governing body open\nto the public on the public body' s website within 10 days after the\napproval of the minutes by the public body. ( Emphasis added.)\n\nSection 3. 5( a of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2015 Supp.)) further provides:\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\n\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later 60 days after the alleged OMA violation. If\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 -\n\nday period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\n\ndiligence, the request for review may be made within 60 days of\n\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation. The changes made\n\nby this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly apply to\nviolations alleged to have occurred at meetings held on or after the\n\neffective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General\nAssembly. ( Emphasis added.)\n\nOn February 7, 2017, this office sent you a letter asking you to explain why you\nsubmitted your Request for Review more than 60 days after the alleged violations occurred.\n\nSpecifically, this office requested that you clarify when and how you discovered the alleged\n\nviolations. On February 16, 2017, you responded to this office by stating that you checked the\nBoard' s website \"\n\naround\n\nDec. 7, 2016 and found that the minutes had been posted. * * *\n\nAfter\n\nreading the minutes[,] I determined, that the minutes had been approved in a timely manner but\nhad not been posted as required. 60 days from that time would have been Feb. 7, 2017 as I\n\nunderstood the wording in OMA.\" 1\nSection 3. 5( a) of OMA permits a person using reasonable diligence who discovers\nan alleged violation of OMA after the 60 -day period has expired to submit a Request for Review\nwithin 60 days of the date that the violation was discovered. A person who discovers an alleged\nviolation of OMA within the 60 -day period of when the violation occurred does not have 60 days\n\nfrom the date the violation was discovered to submit a Request for Review. Rather, the plain\nlanguage of section 3. 5( a) of OMA requires a person to submit a Request for Review not later\nthan 60 days after the date the violation occurred. Further, a person who discovers a violation of\n\nE- mail from\n\nto Matt Hartman, [ Assistant\n\nAttorney General], [ Public Access Bureau]\n\n\fFebruary 22, 2017\nPage 3\n\nOMA more than 60 days after a violation occurred, but did not utilize reasonable diligence in\n\ndiscovering the violation, may not submit a Request for Review.\n\nYour Request for Review, which was sent by e- mail on January 31, 2017, alleged\nthat the Board violated section 2.06( 6) of OMA by failing to post the minutes for the August 15,\n2016, and September 19, 2016, meetings on the District' s website within 10 days of approving\nthose minutes. You asserted that you discovered these alleged violations of OMA on December\n\n7, 2016. To determine whether your Request for Review was submitted timely, we must first\ndetermine when the Board violated OMA. You stated the minutes for the August 15, 2016,\nmeeting were approved on September 19, 2016; thus the Board had to post the minutes to the\nDistrict' s website within 10 days of that date - September 29, 2016. If the minutes were not\nposted on the website on September 30, 2016, the Board would have violated section 2. 06( b) of\n\nOMA. Likewise, when the Board approved the minutes for the September 19, 2016, meeting on\nOctober 17, 2017, the Board would have violated OMA on October 28, 2017, if the minutes were\n\nnot posted by that date.\n\nDecember 7, 2016, the day you state that you discovered the alleged violations,\nwas the 40th day after the Board allegedly violated OMA by failing to post the minutes of the\nSeptember 19, 2016, meeting Because you discovered the Board' s alleged failure to post the\nminutes of its September 19, 2016, meeting on its website within 60 days of the date of the\nviolation, you only had until December 27, 2016, the 60th day after the alleged violation\noccurred, to submit a Request for Review to the Public Access Counselor.\n\nYou submitted your\n\nRequest for Review on January 31, 2017. Because your Request for Review was not timely, the\nPublic Access Counselor does not have authority to review your allegation concerning the\nminutes of the September 19, 2016, meeting.\nIn contrast, December 7, 2016, is 68 days after the Board allegedly violated OMA\n\nbylfailingto post minutes of the August 15, 2016, meeting within 10 days of approving those\nminutes on September 19, 2016. As discussed above, section 3. 5( a) of OMA allows a person\nwho, using reasonable diligence, discovers an alleged violation of OMA after the 60 -day period\nbut not more than two years after the alleged violation occurred, to submit a Request for Review\nwithin 60 days of the date the violation was discovered.\n\nWhether your Request for Review of\n\nthe Board' s failure to post the,minutes of the August 15, 2016, meeting was timely hinges on\nwhether you exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the violation. \" Reasonable diligence\"\n\nis defined as \" a fair degree of diligence expected from someone of ordinary prudence under\ncircumstances like those at issue.\" Black' s Law Dictionary ( 10th ed. 2014), available at\nWestlaw BLACKS.\n\nYour Request for Review stated that you checked the Board' s website on\nNovember 30, 2016, and December 7, 2016, to see if the minutes had been posted. You asserted\nthat before you saw the August 15, 2016, minutes you \" did not know * * *\nif the problem was\n\n\fFebruary 22, 2017\nPage 4\n\nposting the minutes\n\nor * * *\n\napproving the minutes[.]\" 2\n\nHowever, in a February 16, 2016, e- mail\n\nto this office, you stated that you attended the September 19, 2016, meeting in which the minutes\nfor; the August 15, 2016, meeting were approved. Therefore, you knew or should have known\n\nthat the problem was that the minutes allegedly had not been timely posted to the District's\nwebsite. Likewise, you either knew or should have known that the Board had 10 days from\n\nSeptember 19, 2016, to post the minutes. A person of ordinary prudence who attended the\nmeeting in which the minutes were approved would have known that the minutes had to be\nposted on the website before September 30, 2016, and would have submitted a Request for\n\nReview within 60 days of that date if the minutes were not posted. You did not do so.\n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that you did not exercise reasonable diligence in discovering\nthe' Board' s violation of section 2. 06( b) of OMA, and therefore the office is unable to review\n\nyour Request for Review because it was not timely submitted under section 3. 5( a) of OMA. This\n\noffice does, however, encourage the Board to review its procedures for timely posting meeting\nminutes to its website to ensure compliance with the requirements of OMA.\n\nAccordingly, this office will take no further action in this matter, and this file is\nclosed. If you have any quest ons, please contact me at ( 217) 782- 9054.\nVetruly yours,\n\nMATT HALAN\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n46182 o no fi war sd\ncc:\n\nMr. Bill Wrenn\nSuperintendent\n\nMidland Community Unit School District # 7\n901 Hilltop Drive\nSparland, Illinois 61565\n\n2E -mail from\n\nFebruary 16, 2017).\n\nto Matt Hartman, [ Assistant Attorney General], [ Public Access Bureau]\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Posting of approved open meeting minutes on a school board's website","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-46182/","full_text":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nFebruary 22, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46182\nDear\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has received your Request for Review alleging\nviolations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 1 et seq. (West 2014)) by the Midland\nCommunity Unit School District # 7 (District) Board of Education (Board). For the reasons\ndiscussed below, this office has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.\nYour Request for Review alleged that the Board did not post the minutes of its\nAugust 15, 2016, and September 19, 2016, meetings on the District's website within 10 days of\n\napproving the minutes. You stated that the minutes for the August 15, 2016, meeting were\n\napproved on September 19, 2016, and the minutes for the September 19, 2016, meeting were\napproved on October 17, 2016. Your Request for Review alleged that the minutes for both\n\nmeetings were posted on the District's website sometime between November 30, 2016, and early\nDecember 2016.\n\nSection 2. 06(1)) of OMA (5 ILCS 14012. 06(b) (West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016) states:\n\nA public body shall approve the minutes of its open\n\nmeeting within 30 days after that meeting or at the public body's\nsecond subsequent regular meeting, whichever is later. The\nminutes of meetings open to the public shall be available for public\n\ninspection within 10 days after the approval of such minutes by the\n\npublic body. Beginning July 1, 2006, at the time it complies with\n\nthe other requirements of this subsection, a public body that has a\n\nwebsite that thefull-time staff of the public body maintains shall\n\npost the minutes ofa regular meeting of its governing body open\nto the public on the public body's website within 10 days after the\napproval of the minutes by the public body. (Emphasis added.)\n\nSection 3. 5(a of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2015 Supp.)) further provides:\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\n\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later 60 days after the alleged OMA violation. If\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 -\n\nday period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\n\ndiligence, the request for review may be made within 60 days of\n\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation. The changes made\n\nby this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly apply to\nviolations alleged to have occurred at meetings held on or after the\n\neffective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General\nAssembly. (Emphasis added.)\n\nOn February 7, 2017, this office sent you a letter asking you to explain why you\nsubmitted your Request for Review more than 60 days after the alleged violations occurred.\n\nSpecifically, this office requested that you clarify when and how you discovered the alleged\n\nviolations. On February 16, 2017, you responded to this office by stating that you checked the\nBoard's website \"\n\naround\n\nDec. 7, 2016 and found that the minutes had been posted. * * *\n\nAfter\n\nreading the minutes[,] I determined, that the minutes had been approved in a timely manner but\nhad not been posted as required. 60 days from that time would have been Feb. 7, 2017 as I\n\nunderstood the wording in OMA.\" 1\nSection 3. 5(a) of OMA permits a person using reasonable diligence who discovers\nan alleged violation of OMA after the 60 -day period has expired to submit a Request for Review\nwithin 60 days of the date that the violation was discovered. A person who discovers an alleged\nviolation of OMA within the 60 -day period of when the violation occurred does not have 60 days\n\nfrom the date the violation was discovered to submit a Request for Review. Rather, the plain\nlanguage of section 3. 5(a) of OMA requires a person to submit a Request for Review not later\nthan 60 days after the date the violation occurred. Further, a person who discovers a violation of\n\nOMA more than 60 days after a violation occurred, but did not utilize reasonable diligence in\n\ndiscovering the violation, may not submit a Request for Review.\n\nYour Request for Review, which was sent by e- mail on January 31, 2017, alleged\nthat the Board violated section 2.06(6) of OMA by failing to post the minutes for the August 15,\n2016, and September 19, 2016, meetings on the District's website within 10 days of approving\nthose minutes. You asserted that you discovered these alleged violations of OMA on December\n\n7, 2016. To determine whether your Request for Review was submitted timely, we must first\ndetermine when the Board violated OMA. You stated the minutes for the August 15, 2016,\nmeeting were approved on September 19, 2016; thus the Board had to post the minutes to the\nDistrict's website within 10 days of that date - September 29, 2016. If the minutes were not\nposted on the website on September 30, 2016, the Board would have violated section 2. 06(b) of\n\nOMA. Likewise, when the Board approved the minutes for the September 19, 2016, meeting on\nOctober 17, 2017, the Board would have violated OMA on October 28, 2017, if the minutes were\n\nnot posted by that date.\n\nDecember 7, 2016, the day you state that you discovered the alleged violations,\nwas the 40th day after the Board allegedly violated OMA by failing to post the minutes of the\nSeptember 19, 2016, meeting Because you discovered the Board's alleged failure to post the\nminutes of its September 19, 2016, meeting on its website within 60 days of the date of the\nviolation, you only had until December 27, 2016, the 60th day after the alleged violation\noccurred, to submit a Request for Review to the Public Access Counselor.\n\nYou submitted your\n\nRequest for Review on January 31, 2017. Because your Request for Review was not timely, the\nPublic Access Counselor does not have authority to review your allegation concerning the\nminutes of the September 19, 2016, meeting.\nIn contrast, December 7, 2016, is 68 days after the Board allegedly violated OMA\n\nbylfailingto post minutes of the August 15, 2016, meeting within 10 days of approving those\nminutes on September 19, 2016. As discussed above, section 3. 5(a) of OMA allows a person\nwho, using reasonable diligence, discovers an alleged violation of OMA after the 60 -day period\nbut not more than two years after the alleged violation occurred, to submit a Request for Review\nwithin 60 days of the date the violation was discovered.\n\nWhether your Request for Review of\n\nthe Board's failure to post the,minutes of the August 15, 2016, meeting was timely hinges on\nwhether you exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the violation. \" Reasonable diligence\"\n\nis defined as \" a fair degree of diligence expected from someone of ordinary prudence under\ncircumstances like those at issue.\" Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), available at\nWestlaw BLACKS.\n\nYour Request for Review stated that you checked the Board's website on\nNovember 30, 2016, and December 7, 2016, to see if the minutes had been posted. You asserted\n\nposting the minutes\n\nor * * *\n\napproving the minutes[.]\" 2\n\nHowever, in a February 16, 2016, e- mail\n\nto this office, you stated that you attended the September 19, 2016, meeting in which the minutes\nfor; the August 15, 2016, meeting were approved. Therefore, you knew or should have known\n\nthat the problem was that the minutes allegedly had not been timely posted to the District's\nwebsite. Likewise, you either knew or should have known that the Board had 10 days from\n\nSeptember 19, 2016, to post the minutes. A person of ordinary prudence who attended the\nmeeting in which the minutes were approved would have known that the minutes had to be\nposted on the website before September 30, 2016, and would have submitted a Request for\n\nReview within 60 days of that date if the minutes were not posted. You did not do so.\n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that you did not exercise reasonable diligence in discovering\nthe' Board's violation of section 2. 06(b) of OMA, and therefore the office is unable to review\n\nyour Request for Review because it was not timely submitted under section 3. 5(a) of OMA. This\n\noffice does, however, encourage the Board to review its procedures for timely posting meeting\nminutes to its website to ensure compliance with the requirements of OMA.\n\nAccordingly, this office will take no further action in this matter, and this file is\nclosed. If you have any quest ons, please contact me at (217) 782- 9054.\nVetruly yours,\n\nMATT HALAN\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n46182 o no fi war sd\ncc:\n\nMr. Bill Wrenn\nSuperintendent\n\nMidland Community Unit School District # 7\n901 Hilltop Drive\nSparland, Illinois 61565\n\n2E -mail from\n\nFebruary 16, 2017).\n\nto Matt Hartman, [ Assistant Attorney General], [ Public Access Bureau]"}
{"id":1192,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-10-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["46638"],"title":"Oak Grove School Board improperly discussed kindergarten policy in closed session under litigation exception","filename":"46638, issued October 6, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2043,"summary":"The PAC determined that the Board of Education of Oak Grove School District 68 violated the Open Meetings Act by discussing the merits of kindergarten programming in a closed session under the guise of pending litigation.","plain_summary":"A school board held a closed-door meeting to discuss kindergarten programming, claiming it was related to potential litigation. The Attorney General's office found this was a violation because the litigation exception only allows for discussing legal strategy, not the actual merits of the school policy. The Board was ordered to release the portions of the meeting minutes that discussed the policy itself.","holding":"The Board of Education improperly discussed matters in closed session that did not fall within the scope of the litigation exception under section 2(c)(11) of the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether a public body may discuss the merits of a policy decision in a closed session under the litigation exception (5 ILCS 120/2(c)(11)) when no actual litigation strategy is being deliberated.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(11)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(11)"],"public_body":"Board of Education of Oak Grove School District 68","requesting_party":"Ms. Ja","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The Board improperly used the litigation exception to discuss the merits of kindergarten programming in a closed session.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_c/2_c_11/Scope-strategies,-posture,-theories,-consequences-of-the-litigation-itself/46638, issued October 6, 2017.pdf","sha256":"4e43a597d95e2ea1d471a8907f789e7ac481965be34e38990a9302a35c91e907","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","school board","litigation exception","meeting minutes","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nOctober 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. James A. Petrungaro\nScariano, Himes and Petrarca CHTD.\n\nTwo Prudential Plaza, Suite 3100\n180 North Stetson\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njpetrungaro@edlawyer. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46638\nDear\n\nand Mr. Petrungaro:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS\n\n120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education of Oak Grove School District 68 ( Board) violated\n\nOMA during its February 28, 2017, meeting by improperly discussing in closed session certain\nmatters that were not authorized by the exception for pending, probable, or imminent litigation'\nunder which the Board closed the meeting to the public.\n\nIn her Request for Review,\n\ndescribed the following at the Board's\n\nFebruary 28, 2017, meeting:\n\nWhen Board member Amy Franz and Ken LaCross asked\n\nfor clarification on what the kindergarten day would look like\nunder one of the proposed options, Board Vice President, Lane\n\nHasler, stated the Board needed to go into Executive session to\n\nfurther discuss Kindergarten programming. This was following\nseveral public comments and a discussion ( with opposing views)\nSection 2( c)( I I) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c)( I I) ( West 2016).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n100 West\nRandolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East\nMain, Carbondale, Illinois\n\n62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: (\n\n618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618)\n\n529- 6416\n\n\fMs. James A. Petrungaro\nOctober 6, 2017\nPage 2\n\nfrom the Board regarding the agenda item \" 2017- 18 Kindergarten\nStructure\" ( link to agenda is below for your reference). The item\nwas\n\nmotioned to be tabled \" until after\n\nExecutive[]\"\n\nand the\n\nremaining agenda items were discussed. The Board then went into\nclosed [ session] and upon coming out motioned for a \" Special\"\n\nmeeting the following week for the agenda item referenced above\n\nand adjourned the meeting. 121\nWe construed the Request for Review as alleging that the Board' s closed session discussion was\nnot authorized by any of the exceptions to the general requirement that public bodies conduct\npublic business openly. See 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a), ( c) ( West 2016).\n\nOn March 8, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board\n\nand asked it to provide copies of the verbatim recording and any minutes of the closed session\nportion of the February 28, 2017, meeting. We also asked the Board to provide a written\n\nresponse to\n\nallegation that identifies the specific exception in section 2( c) of OMA\n\nthat the Board publicly cited as authorizing discussion of kindergarten programming in closed\nsession. On March 24, 2017, counsel for the Board furnished the recording, draft minutes, and a\nwritten response, a portion of which was provided confidentially. On April 4, 2017, this office\n\nsent\n\na copy of the Board' s response with confidential information redacted; 3 she did\n\nnot reply. On July 17, 2017, counsel for the Board furnished this office with the subsequently\napproved open and closed session minutes of the February 28, 2017, meeting.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\n\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). Section 2( a) of OMA\nprovides that \"[ a] ll meetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in\nsubsection (\n\nc)\n\nand\n\nclosed\n\nin accordance\n\nwith\n\nSection 2a.\"\n\nThose \" exceptions * * *\n\nare in\n\nderogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and therefore, the exceptions\nare\n\nto be\n\nstrictly\n\nconstrued,\n\nextending only to subjects clearly\n\nwithin\n\ntheir scope.\"\n\n5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2( b) ( West 2016); see also Henry v. Anderson, 356 Ill. App. 3d 952, 957 ( 4th Dist. 2005)\nstrictly construing section 2( c)( 11)).\n\n2017).\n\n2E -mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( March 1,\n\n3Section 3. 5( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( c) ( West 2016)) pennits a public body to provide the\nPublic Access Counselor with a copy of its response with confidential information redacted for forwarding to the\n\nrequester.\n\n\fMs. James A. Petrungaro\nOctober 6, 2017\nPage 3\n\nSection 2( e)( 11) permits a public body to enter closed session to discuss litigation\nw] hen an action against, affecting or on behalf of the particular public body has been filed and\nis pending before a court or administrative tribunal\" or when such litigation is \" probable or\nimminent[.]\" Section 2( c)( 11) requires that \" when the public body finds that an action is\nprobable\n\nor\n\nimminent * * *\n\nthe basis for the finding shall be recorded and entered into the\nminutes of the closed meeting.\" In Henry, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 953, the Illinois Appellate Court\n\nanalyzed this exception in considering whether a school board violated OMA by announcing that\nit was closing a meeting to discuss \" potential\" litigation without making a finding that litigation\nwas \" probable\" or \" imminent.\"\n\nDuring the meeting, the school board approved an agenda that\n\nreferred to an executive session for \"potential litigation,\" but then cited \" a contested litigation\n\nmatter\" in the subsequent motion to enter closed session. ( Emphasis in original.) Henry, 356 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 954. The court characterized the section 2( c)( 11) exception as \" a forked path[:]\"\n\nIf the litigation has been filed and is pending, the public body need\nonly announce that in the proposed closed meeting, it will discuss\nlitigation that has been filed and is pending. If the litigation has\nnot yet been filed, the public body must ( 1) find that the litigation\nis probable or imminent and ( 2) record and enter into the minutes\n\nthe basis for that finding. Evidently, the legislature intended to\n\nprevent public bodies from using the distant possibility of\nlitigation as a pretext for closing their meetings to the public\nHenry, 356 I11. App. 3d at 956- 57.\nIn order for a public body to find litigation is probable or imminent, \" there must\n\nbe reasonable grounds to believe that a lawsuit is more likely than not to be instituted or that\n\nsuch an occurrence is close at hand\"; such a determination must be made \" by examining the\nsurrounding\n\ncircumstances\n\nin light of logic, experience, and\n\n026, issued December 23, 1983, at 10.\n\nreason.\"\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 83-\n\nThe Board' s response to this office documented that on January 17, 2017, two\n\nindividuals— at least one of whom is licensed as an attorney in Illinois— sent an e- mail\nrequesting a meeting with the Board president and the District superintendent \" to discuss the\n\nmerits of 'legal arguments' in connection with an issue that has resulted in lawsuits or threats of\nlawsuits against other school districts; the e- mail indicated that the Board could also face a legal\n\nchallenge if the issue was not resolved. 4 The Board' s response stated that this \" threat of a legal\nchallenge\" prompted the Board president to ask the District superintendent to obtain a legal\n\nLetter from James A. Petrungaro, On Behalf of the Board of' Education, Oak Grove School\n\nDistrict 68, to Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois, Public Access Bureau, Steve Silverman, Bureau\n\nChief (March 24, 2017), at 2.\n\n\fMs. James A. Petrungaro\nOctober 6, 2017\nPage 4\n\nopinion\n\nfrom the Board' s attorney.\n\n5\n\nAccording to the response, the Board president and District\n\nsuperintendent subsequently met with the two individuals, who \" stressed during the meeting that\n\nthey wanted to meet with the Board President and Superintendent privately on the possibility of a\nlegal challenge or lawsuit in order to afford the Board of Education an opportunity to consider\nthe seriousness of their position without first publicly announcing an imminent lawsuit Board of\nEducation[. j'\n\n6 After that discussion, the response stated, the Board held a special meeting in\n\nwhich it entered closed session to discuss probable or imminent litigation pursuant to section\n\n2( c)( 11) of OMA, and discussed kindergarten programming in open session later than night\nduring its regular meeting.\n\nThe minutes of the Board's February 28, 2017, meeting show that that the Board\n\nalso discussed kindergarten programming in open session during that meeting, and then entered\nclosed session to discuss probable or imminent litigation and other unrelated matters. Because\n\nthe District provided additional information confidentially concerning its belief that litigation\nwas probable or imminent, section 3. 5( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( c) ( West 2016)) precludes\nthis office from discussing that reasoning in this determination. Based on the available\n\ninformation, however, it appears that at the time of its February 28, 2017, meeting, the Board had\na reasonable basis to believe that litigation was more likely than not to ensue if the Board did not\nresolve the issue that was the subject of the closed session discussion. Therefore, this office\n\ncannot conclude that the District violated OMA by improperly entering closed session pursuant\nto section 2( e)( 11) of OMA.\n\nHowever, the scope of section 2( c)( 11) is limited to \" the strategies, posture,\n\ntheories, and consequences of the litigation itself.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 83- 026, at 14.\nE] ven if there are reasonable grounds to believe that litigation is probable or imminent, it is not\n\npermissible for a public body to use the closed session to discuss taking an action or to make a\n\ndecision on the underlying issue that is likely to be the subject of the litigation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen.\nPub. Acc. Op. No. 12- 013, issued November 5, 2012, at 4. The litigation exception does not\n\nallow a public body to conduct deliberations on the merits of a matter under consideration\n\nbecause of the possibility that it may become a party to a judicial proceeding, \" regardless of how\nsensitive\n\nor controversial\n\nthe subject matter\nmay be.\"\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 83- 026, at 12.\n\nThis office has reviewed the verbatim recording and minutes of the Board' s\nFebruary 28, 2017, closed session. Although discrete portions of the closed session discussion\n5Letter from James A. Petrungaro, On Behalf of the Board of Education, Oak Grove School\nDistrict 68, to Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois, Public Access Bureau, Steve Silverman, Bureau\n\nChief (March 24, 2017), at 2.\n\n6Letter from James A. Petrungaro, On Behalf of the Board of Education, Oak Grove School\nDistrict 68, to Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois, Public Access Bureau, Steve Silverman, Bureau\n\nChief (March 24, 2017), at 2.\n\n\fMs. James A. Petrungaro\nOctober 6, 2017\nPage 5\n\ndirectly concerned litigation matters such as the likelihood of litigation and the potential\n\nconsequences of litigation, much of the discussion involved how to address the underlying issue.\nAs described above, the scope of section 2( c)( 11) extends is limited to issues such as litigation\nstrategy that relate to the pending, probable, or imminent litigation itself— the exception does not\n\nauthorize a public body to deliberate on the merits of the underlying matter. Accordingly, this\noffice concludes that the Board' s closed session discussion exceeded the scope of the section\n\n2( c)( 11) exception. To remedy this violation, this office requests that the Board disclose to\nand make publicly available the portions of the closed session minutes that concern the\nmerits of the underlying matter.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have questions, please contact me at ( 312)\n814- 6756 or ssilverman@atg. state. il.us. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau Chief\n\nPublic Access Bureau\n46638 o 2c11 improper sd\n\nAttachment\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Closed-session discussion of kindergarten programming","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-46638/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nOctober 6, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. James A. Petrungaro\nScariano, Himes and Petrarca CHTD.\n\nTwo Prudential Plaza, Suite 3100\n180 North Stetson\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njpetrungaro@edlawyer. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46638\nDear\n\nand Mr. Petrungaro:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education of Oak Grove School District 68 (Board) violated\n\nOMA during its February 28, 2017, meeting by improperly discussing in closed session certain\nmatters that were not authorized by the exception for pending, probable, or imminent litigation'\nunder which the Board closed the meeting to the public.\n\nIn her Request for Review,\n\ndescribed the following at the Board's\n\nFebruary 28, 2017, meeting:\n\nWhen Board member Amy Franz and Ken LaCross asked\n\nfor clarification on what the kindergarten day would look like\nunder one of the proposed options, Board Vice President, Lane\n\nHasler, stated the Board needed to go into Executive session to\n\nfurther discuss Kindergarten programming. This was following\nseveral public comments and a discussion (with opposing views)\nSection 2(c)(I I) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c)(I I) (West 2016).\n\nfrom the Board regarding the agenda item \" 2017- 18 Kindergarten\nStructure\" (link to agenda is below for your reference). The item\nwas\n\nmotioned to be tabled \" until after\n\nExecutive[]\"\n\nand the\n\nremaining agenda items were discussed. The Board then went into\nclosed [ session] and upon coming out motioned for a \" Special\"\n\nmeeting the following week for the agenda item referenced above\n\nand adjourned the meeting. 121\nWe construed the Request for Review as alleging that the Board's closed session discussion was\nnot authorized by any of the exceptions to the general requirement that public bodies conduct\npublic business openly. See 5 ILCS 120/ 2(a), (c) (West 2016).\n\nOn March 8, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board\n\nand asked it to provide copies of the verbatim recording and any minutes of the closed session\nportion of the February 28, 2017, meeting. We also asked the Board to provide a written\n\nresponse to\n\nallegation that identifies the specific exception in section 2(c) of OMA\n\nthat the Board publicly cited as authorizing discussion of kindergarten programming in closed\nsession. On March 24, 2017, counsel for the Board furnished the recording, draft minutes, and a\nwritten response, a portion of which was provided confidentially. On April 4, 2017, this office\n\nsent\n\na copy of the Board's response with confidential information redacted; 3 she did\n\nnot reply. On July 17, 2017, counsel for the Board furnished this office with the subsequently\napproved open and closed session minutes of the February 28, 2017, meeting.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\n\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). Section 2(a) of OMA\nprovides that \"[ a] ll meetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in\nsubsection (c)\n\nand\n\nclosed\n\nin accordance\n\nwith\n\nSection 2a.\"\n\nThose \" exceptions * * *\n\nare in\n\nderogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and therefore, the exceptions\nare\n\nto be\n\nstrictly\n\nconstrued,\n\nextending only to subjects clearly\n\nwithin\n\ntheir scope.\"\n\n5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2(b) (West 2016); see also Henry v. Anderson, 356 Ill. App. 3d 952, 957 (4th Dist. 2005)\nstrictly construing section 2(c)(11)).\n\n2017).\n\n2E -mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (March 1,\n\n3 Section 3. 5(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(c) (West 2016)) pennits a public body to provide the\nPublic Access Counselor with a copy of its response with confidential information redacted for forwarding to the\n\nSection 2(e)(11) permits a public body to enter closed session to discuss litigation\nw] hen an action against, affecting or on behalf of the particular public body has been filed and\nis pending before a court or administrative tribunal\" or when such litigation is \" probable or\nimminent[.]\" Section 2(c)(11) requires that \" when the public body finds that an action is\nprobable\n\nor\n\nimminent * * *\n\nthe basis for the finding shall be recorded and entered into the\nminutes of the closed meeting.\" In Henry, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 953, the Illinois Appellate Court\n\nanalyzed this exception in considering whether a school board violated OMA by announcing that\nit was closing a meeting to discuss \" potential\" litigation without making a finding that litigation\nwas \" probable\" or \" imminent.\"\n\nDuring the meeting, the school board approved an agenda that\n\nreferred to an executive session for \"potential litigation,\" but then cited \" a contested litigation\n\nmatter\" in the subsequent motion to enter closed session. (Emphasis in original.) Henry, 356 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 954. The court characterized the section 2(c)(11) exception as \" a forked path[:]\"\n\nIf the litigation has been filed and is pending, the public body need\nonly announce that in the proposed closed meeting, it will discuss\nlitigation that has been filed and is pending. If the litigation has\nnot yet been filed, the public body must (1) find that the litigation\nis probable or imminent and (2) record and enter into the minutes\n\nthe basis for that finding. Evidently, the legislature intended to\n\nprevent public bodies from using the distant possibility of\nlitigation as a pretext for closing their meetings to the public\nHenry, 356 I11. App. 3d at 956- 57.\nIn order for a public body to find litigation is probable or imminent, \" there must\n\nbe reasonable grounds to believe that a lawsuit is more likely than not to be instituted or that\n\nsuch an occurrence is close at hand\"; such a determination must be made \" by examining the\nsurrounding\n\ncircumstances\n\nin light of logic, experience, and\n\n026, issued December 23, 1983, at 10.\n\nreason.\"\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 83-\n\nThe Board's response to this office documented that on January 17, 2017, two\n\nindividuals— at least one of whom is licensed as an attorney in Illinois— sent an e- mail\nrequesting a meeting with the Board president and the District superintendent \" to discuss the\n\nmerits of 'legal arguments' in connection with an issue that has resulted in lawsuits or threats of\nlawsuits against other school districts; the e- mail indicated that the Board could also face a legal\n\nchallenge if the issue was not resolved. 4 The Board's response stated that this \" threat of a legal\nchallenge\" prompted the Board president to ask the District superintendent to obtain a legal\n\nLetter from James A. Petrungaro, On Behalf of the Board of' Education, Oak Grove School\n\nDistrict 68, to Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois, Public Access Bureau, Steve Silverman, Bureau\n\nopinion\n\nfrom the Board's attorney.\n\n5\n\nAccording to the response, the Board president and District\n\nsuperintendent subsequently met with the two individuals, who \" stressed during the meeting that\n\nthey wanted to meet with the Board President and Superintendent privately on the possibility of a\nlegal challenge or lawsuit in order to afford the Board of Education an opportunity to consider\nthe seriousness of their position without first publicly announcing an imminent lawsuit Board of\nEducation[. j'\n\n6 After that discussion, the response stated, the Board held a special meeting in\n\nwhich it entered closed session to discuss probable or imminent litigation pursuant to section\n\n2(c)(11) of OMA, and discussed kindergarten programming in open session later than night\nduring its regular meeting.\n\nThe minutes of the Board's February 28, 2017, meeting show that that the Board\n\nalso discussed kindergarten programming in open session during that meeting, and then entered\nclosed session to discuss probable or imminent litigation and other unrelated matters. Because\n\nthe District provided additional information confidentially concerning its belief that litigation\nwas probable or imminent, section 3. 5(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(c) (West 2016)) precludes\nthis office from discussing that reasoning in this determination. Based on the available\n\ninformation, however, it appears that at the time of its February 28, 2017, meeting, the Board had\na reasonable basis to believe that litigation was more likely than not to ensue if the Board did not\nresolve the issue that was the subject of the closed session discussion. Therefore, this office\n\ncannot conclude that the District violated OMA by improperly entering closed session pursuant\nto section 2(e)(11) of OMA.\n\nHowever, the scope of section 2(c)(11) is limited to \" the strategies, posture,\n\ntheories, and consequences of the litigation itself.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 83- 026, at 14.\nE] ven if there are reasonable grounds to believe that litigation is probable or imminent, it is not\n\npermissible for a public body to use the closed session to discuss taking an action or to make a\n\ndecision on the underlying issue that is likely to be the subject of the litigation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen.\nPub. Acc. Op. No. 12- 013, issued November 5, 2012, at 4. The litigation exception does not\n\nallow a public body to conduct deliberations on the merits of a matter under consideration\n\nbecause of the possibility that it may become a party to a judicial proceeding, \" regardless of how\nsensitive\n\nor controversial\n\nthe subject matter\nmay be.\"\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 83- 026, at 12.\n\nThis office has reviewed the verbatim recording and minutes of the Board's\nFebruary 28, 2017, closed session. Although discrete portions of the closed session discussion\n5 Letter from James A. Petrungaro, On Behalf of the Board of Education, Oak Grove School\nDistrict 68, to Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois, Public Access Bureau, Steve Silverman, Bureau\n\nChief (March 24, 2017), at 2.\n\n6 Letter from James A. Petrungaro, On Behalf of the Board of Education, Oak Grove School\nDistrict 68, to Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois, Public Access Bureau, Steve Silverman, Bureau\n\ndirectly concerned litigation matters such as the likelihood of litigation and the potential\n\nconsequences of litigation, much of the discussion involved how to address the underlying issue.\nAs described above, the scope of section 2(c)(11) extends is limited to issues such as litigation\nstrategy that relate to the pending, probable, or imminent litigation itself— the exception does not\n\nauthorize a public body to deliberate on the merits of the underlying matter. Accordingly, this\noffice concludes that the Board's closed session discussion exceeded the scope of the section\n\n2(c)(11) exception. To remedy this violation, this office requests that the Board disclose to\nand make publicly available the portions of the closed session minutes that concern the\nmerits of the underlying matter.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have questions, please contact me at (312)\n814- 6756 or ssilverman@atg. state. il.us. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau Chief\n\nPublic Access Bureau\n46638 o 2c11 improper sd\n\nAttachment\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail"}
{"id":1193,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-07-11","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["46770"],"title":"Sleepy Hollow Board violated OMA by exceeding closed-session scope on cell tower lease price","filename":"46770, issued July 11, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2864,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Village of Sleepy Hollow Board of Trustees improperly discussed matters beyond the scope of the real estate lease price exception during several closed sessions. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by discussing topics outside the specific scope of the cited exception.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Village of Sleepy Hollow Board of Trustees held closed-door meetings to discuss a cell tower lease, going beyond the legal limit of only discussing the price of the lease. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau reviewed the meeting records and determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by discussing matters in closed session that exceeded the scope of the real estate lease price exception. The determination does not state that the file was closed or that any advisory was given.","holding":"The Board of Trustees of the Village of Sleepy Hollow violated the Open Meetings Act by discussing matters in closed session that exceeded the scope of the real estate lease price exception.","legal_question":"Did the Board of Trustees violate the Open Meetings Act by discussing matters in closed session that exceeded the scope of the exception for setting the price for the lease of real property?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(6)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(6)"],"public_body":"Board of Trustees of the Village of Sleepy Hollow","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in text)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The Board held closed sessions to discuss a cell tower lease proposal that exceeded the scope of the real estate price setting exception.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_c/2_c_6/46770, issued July 11, 2017.pdf","sha256":"ab8341fcf2347195017d37ee13d82ea2acb5dc6c2ee5f122c2e0be4fc075e62d","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","real estate lease","Open Meetings Act","village board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 11, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Stephan Pickett\nPresident, Board of Trustees\n\nVillage of Sleepy Hollow\n1 Thorobred Lane\n\nSleepy Hollow, Illinois 60118\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46770 •\nDear\n\nand Mr. Pickett:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nconcludes that Board of Trustees ( Board) of the Village of Sleepy Hollow (Village) violated\n\nOMA during its March 21, 2016, September 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and\nFebruary 20, 2017, meetings by discussing in closed session matters outside the scope of the\nexception to the Act' s openness requirements on which the Board relied to close the meetings.\n\nOn March 7, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to this\n\noffice alleging that the Board violated OMA during its March 21, 2016, and September 6, 2016,\nmeetings, as well as during subsequent meetings, by holding closed session discussions\nconcerning leasing Village property that exceeded the scope of section 2( c)( 6) of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n120/ 2( c)( 6) ( West 2016)).\nSpecifically,\nstated that he had recently obtained copies\nof the Board' s March 21, 2016, and September 6, 2016, closed session minutes pursuant to a\n\nFreedom of Information Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2016)) request, and that the\nminutes revealed that the Board had not limited its discussions to the setting of a price for the\nlease of property owned by the Village; rather,\nalleged, the Board had discussed\nvarious aspects of a proposal to lease land for a cell tower besides the lease price, and had\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 •\n100 West Randolph\n1001\n\nStreet, Chicago, Illinois,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\n60601 • (\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618)\n\n529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fThe Honorable Stephan Pickett\n\nJuly 11, 2017\nPage 2\n\ncontinued to hold improper closed sessions concerning the cell tower since the September 6,\n2016, meeting.\n\nOn March 17, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide, for this office' s confidential review, copies of the closed session\nminutes and closed session verbatim recordings from its March 21, 2016, and September 6,\n\n2016, meetings, as well as from any other meetings since September 6, 2016, wherein the\nproposed cell tower was discussed pursuant to section 2( c)( 6) of OMA.\nrequested\n\na written response to\n\nthose materials.\n\nallegations.\n\nThis office also\n\nOn April 7, 2017, this office received\n\nThe written response consisted of a letter from the Village President, Mr.\n\nStephan Pickett, and an unsigned, undated \" Statement in Support of the Village's Response\"\n\nsetting out legal analysis. On April 19, 2017,\nOn May 9, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a reply.\n\nwas sworn in as a Village Trustee.'\n\nOn July 3, 2017, an attorney in the Public Access Bureau contacted\nby e- mail to verify whether he had since received any further closed session materials concerning\nthe proposed cell tower. On July 5, 2017,\nresponded that the Board had voted to\nrelease relevant closed session minutes on July 3, 2017, but that he had not received them.\nDETERMINATION\n\nAs an initial matter, Mr. Merkel' s allegation that the Board violated its own\n\nVillage Code is not subject to review by the Public Access Bureau because this office' s authority\nto resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of FOIA and OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3)\n\nWest 2016). Accordingly, this determination is limited to\n\nOMA allegations.\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). Section 2( a) of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] 11 meetings of public bodies shall be open to the\npublic unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\"\n\nCorrespondingly, section 2a of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2a ( West 2016)) provides:\nA] citation to the specific exception contained in Section 2 of this\n\nAct which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public shall\nbe publicly disclosed at the time of the vote and shall be recorded\n\nand entered into the minutes of the meeting. * * *\nErin Sauder, Sleepy Hollow trustee wants access to executive session records, The Courier -News\n\nJune 19, 2017, 11: 01 PM), http:// www. chicagotribune. com/ suburbs/ elgin- courier- news/ news/ ct- ecn- sleepy- hollowexecutive- session- st- 0621-\n\n20170619- story. html.\n\n\fThe Honorable\n\nStephan Pickett\n\nJuly 11, 2017\nPage 3\n\nOnly topics specified in the vote to close under this Section\nmay be considered during the closed meeting.\nThe exceptions \" are in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and\n\ntherefore, the exceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly within\ntheir scope.\" (\n\nEmphasis added.)\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 2( b) ( West 2016).\n\nSection 2( c)( 6) of OMA allows public bodies to enter into closed session to\n\nconsider \"[ t] he setting of a price for sale or lease of property owned by the public body.\"\nEmphasis added.) The clear and unambiguous language of section 2( c)( 6) of OMA, which must\n\nbe strictly construed, does not allow a public body to discuss the sale or lease of public property\nin closed session other than to set a price. If the General Assembly had intended to allow closed\nmeetings to discuss general issues concerning the sale or lease of public property, it would have\nwritten such an exception into OMA, as have other jurisdictions. See, e.g., section 551. 072 of\nthe Texas Open Meetings\n\nAct ( Tex. Gov' t Code Ann. §\n\n551. 072 ( West 2016) (\" A governmental\n\nbody may conduct a closed meeting to deliberate the purchase, exchange, lease, or value of real\n\nproperty if deliberation in an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on the position of the\ngovernmental\n\nbody in negotiations\n\nwith\n\na\n\nthird person.\")).\n\nIndeed, section 2( c)( 5) of OMA ( 5\n\nILCS 12012( c)( 5) ( West 2016)), which allows a public body to enter closed session to discuss\nt] he purchase or lease of real property for the use of the public body, including meetings held\nfor the purpose\n\ndiscussing whether a particular parcel should be acquired[,]\" directly contrasts\nwith the significantly narrower scope of section 2( c)( 6). While section 2( c)( 5) of OMA allows\nof\n\ngeneral closed session discussions concerning the purchase or lease of real property for the use\nof the public body, neither it, nor section 2( c)( 6), authorizes general discussions regarding the\nsale or lease of public property. See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 15- 003, issued March 19,\n2015, at 5 ( section 2( c)( 6) of OMA does \" not extend to the discussion of general issues\n\nconcerning the disposal of publicly -owned property.\").\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that it discussed the\n\nproposed cell tower in closed session under section 2( c)( 6) of OMA during its March 21, 2016,\nSeptember 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and February 20, 2017, and March 20,\n\n2017, 2 meetings, and it provided this office with copies of the closed session minutes and closed\nsession verbatim recordings from those meetings. The Board stated that \" those portions\" of the\n\nMarch 21, 2016, and September 26, 2016, closed session minutes \" that did not relate specifically\nand exclusively to the price to be set by the Village for the proposed lease\" had been released\nfollowing the Board' s most recent semi- annual review of its closed session minutes on December\n\n2The March 20, 2017, meeting is outside the scope of this Request for Review because it was held\nafter\n\nMarch\n\n7, 2017,\n\nsubmission.\n\n\fThe Honorable Stephan Pickett\n\nJuly 11, 2017\nPage 4\n\n5, 2016, and that the Board would consider whether to disclose the more recent closed session\n\nminutes during its next semi- annual review at the end of June 2017.3\nWith respect to whether the Board' s closed session discussions were authorized\nunder section 2( c)( 6) of OMA, the Board asserted:\n\nThe record of the executive session held on March 21, 2016\n\nshows that not only was pricing for the proposed lease specifically\ndiscussed, but also many of the factors that may affect such pricing\nwere presented. The meeting was attended by the prospective\n\nlessee. During the closed session, the Board was informed of the\ntotal cost of the project, collocations anticipated for the tower, and\n\nthe offer of the applicant for pricing on the rent, the rent escalator\n\nand the collocation fees, all factors which could go into the pricing\ndecision.\n\nAfter the March 21, 2016 closed session, the Board of\n\nTrustees conducted five ( 5) subsequent closed sessions for\n\ndiscussion of setting a price for such lease[.] 141\nThe Board did not provide further information concerning those five subsequent closed sessions.\nInstead, the Board cited Board of Education School District 67 v. Sikorski, 214 I11. App. 3d 945\n1st Dist. 1991) for the proposition that \" it is improper to declare a public body' s decision null\n\nand void when its initial decision, although reached during an improper executive session, has\nbeen subsequently ratified by additional public meetings. i5 In Sikorski, the Illinois Appellate\nCourt held that a board had held an unauthorized closed session discussion in which it voted to\n\ndelay a property sale, but the court declined to void the ensuing sales contract because the\nboard' s \" subsequent actions, taken during public meetings, ratified and cured\" the board' s\n\nimproper closed session decision to delay the sale. Sikorski, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 952.\nAnalogizing this matter to Sikorski, the Board depicted its open session\ndiscussions concerning the proposed cell tower as follows:\n\n3Letter from Stephan Pickett, Village President, Village of Sleepy Hollow, to Joshua Jones\nSupervising Attorney, Office of the Attorney General ( April 4, 2017), at 1.\nStatement in Support of the Village' s Response ( undated), at 1.\nStatement\n\nin Support of the Village' s Response (\n\nundated),\n\nat\n\n2.\n\n\fThe Honorable Stephan Pickett\n\nJuly 11, 2017\nPage 5\n\nThe March 21, 2016 meeting * * *\n\nincluded a wide-ranging\n\npresentation of elements of the proposed lease, and the applicant\nwas allowed to be present. This was so as to inform the Board\nmembers of the various elements of a lease agreement which might\n\naffect its decision regarding setting its price for any such lease.\nThat [ meeting] occurred one year before final action was taken by\nthe Board of Trustees on the price of the lease, and approval of an\n\nOption and Lease Agreement with the applicant.\n\nAfter the March 21, 2016, meeting, the Board] had not less than\n10 open sessions at which the matter of a lease for purposes of\n\nerecting a telecommunication\n\ntower was discussed, as well. Prior\n\nto the March, 2016 date, there had been one open session\n\nNovember 4, 2015) conducted as a special meeting for the sole\npurpose of allowing comment on the proposal to lease a site for a\ntelecommunications tower on public property ( the Village hall\n\nsite), including pricing of the lease. Finally, there were five ( 5)\nadditional meetings of the Board at which citizens commented ( in\n\ngeneral) on the proposal to lease a site for a telecommunications\n\ntower on public property in the Village. l61\nThe Board argued that \" subsequent meetings\n\nof the\n\nBoard * * *\n\nserved to cure any violation\" of\n\nOMA with respect to any improper closed session discussions concerning the cell tower, and\nthus that \"[ t] he final\nof space * * *\n\naction\n\ntaken by the * * *\n\nBoard * * *\n\nto set a price for and to approve a lease\n\nfor a telecommunications tower on Village property should not be undone.\" 7\nIn reply,\n\nquestioned whether the response this office received was\n\ntruly from the Board or instead from Village President Pickett8 with assistance from an attorney,\nas\n\ntwo trustees had told him they were unaware of the matter.\n\nAdditionally, he stated:\nPresident Pickett and the author of the Statement [ in Support of the Village's Response] seem to\nsuggest they can speak in executive session in violation of the Open Meetings Act and make it\n6Statement in Support of the Village' s Response ( undated), at 1.\nStatement in Support of the Village' s Response ( undated), at 2.\n\nBFor purposes of this determination, Village President Pickett represented the Board; the extent to\nwhich Village President Pickett had the backing of the rest of the Board in doing so is beyond the scope of this\noffice' s review.\n\n\fThe Honorable Stephan Pickett\n\nJuly 11, 2017\nPage 6\n\nright by sharing some of the information later in open session. This is clearly not the intent of the\nOpen Meetings Act.\" 9\nThis office' s review of the closed session materials showed that the Board\n\nexceeded the scope of section 2( c)( 6) to varying degrees during the closed session portions of its\nMarch 21, 2016, September 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and February 20, 2017,\nmeetings. During closed session on March 21, 2016, representatives of National Wireless\nVentures, LLC ( National) -\n\nthe company proposing to lease land from the Village for a cell\n\ntower - stated the price the company could offer for the lease, but a lengthy discussion of\nlogistics lacking a direct relation to the lease price ensued. The portions of the discussion\n\nconcerning pricing did not so much concern the setting of a price as they did hearing National' s\noffer. The September 6, 2016, closed session contained scarce discussion of the price for the\n\nlease, but significant discussion of other matters pertaining to the cell tower. Similarly, the\nJanuary 16, 2017, closed session involved substantial discussion concerning the cell tower but\nlittle to no discussion pertaining to setting a lease price. In contrast, the Board did work on\nsetting a price in closed session on February 6, 2017, such as by discussing comparables and the\npricing structure acceptable for the Village. However, the discussion strayed into siting logistics\nand matters tangential to the lease proposal at hand. Finally, during closed session on February\n20, 2017, the Board touched on pricing but also discussed unrelated considerations pertaining to\nthe cell tower. By failing to limit its closed session discussions on these five dates to the topic\nauthorized by section 2( c)( 6) of OMA, the Board violated section 2( a) of OMA.\n\nUnlike in Sikorski, here there is no allegation that the Board improperly took final\naction in closed session. Accordingly, the Board' s claim of having ratified and cured its\nimproper closed session discussions is misplaced, but at the same time there is no cause for this\n\noffice to conclude that any agreement between the Village and National is void. Rather, as\n\nalluded to in his reply, no subsequent open session discussion can fully remedy improper\nclosed session discussions, because the public misses out on deliberations to which it should\n\nhave had access at the time. Nonetheless, the remedy that is available, and that this office\nrequests, is for the Board to provide\nwith10 and publicly disclose the portions of its\nMarch 21, 2016, September 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and February 20, 2017,\nclosed session minutes and closed session verbatim recordings that do not specifically involve\n\n9E -mail from\n\nto Joshua Jones ( April 19, 2017).\n\n1° This office notes that section 2. 06( e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( e) ( West 2016)) provides that\na] ccess to verbatim recordings shall\n\nbe provided to duly elected\n\nofficials[,]\"\n\nand section 2. 06( f) of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 06( f) ( West 2016)) likewise provides that \" duly elected officials * * *\n\nshall be provided access to minutes of\n\nmeetings closed to the public.\" Thus,\nOMA\n\nregardless of the\n\nBoard' s violations\n\nis entitled to access to the Board' s closed session materials under\nhere.\n\n\fThe Honorable Stephan Pickett\n\nJuly 11, 2017\nPage 7\n\nthe setting of a price for the lease of land for the cell tower. This office also cautions the Board\nto conduct its future meetings in full compliance with OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions,\nplease contact me at ( 312) 814- 8413.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic\n\n46770 o 2c6 improper\n\nmun\n\nAccess\n\nBureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Closed-session discussion of a cell tower lease proposal","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-46770/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 11, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Stephan Pickett\nPresident, Board of Trustees\n\nVillage of Sleepy Hollow\n1 Thorobred Lane\n\nSleepy Hollow, Illinois 60118\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46770 •\nDear\n\nand Mr. Pickett:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nconcludes that Board of Trustees (Board) of the Village of Sleepy Hollow (Village) violated\n\nOMA during its March 21, 2016, September 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and\nFebruary 20, 2017, meetings by discussing in closed session matters outside the scope of the\nexception to the Act's openness requirements on which the Board relied to close the meetings.\n\nOn March 7, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to this\n\noffice alleging that the Board violated OMA during its March 21, 2016, and September 6, 2016,\nmeetings, as well as during subsequent meetings, by holding closed session discussions\nconcerning leasing Village property that exceeded the scope of section 2(c)(6) of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/ 2(c)(6) (West 2016)).\nSpecifically,\nstated that he had recently obtained copies\nof the Board's March 21, 2016, and September 6, 2016, closed session minutes pursuant to a\n\nFreedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2016)) request, and that the\nminutes revealed that the Board had not limited its discussions to the setting of a price for the\nlease of property owned by the Village; rather,\nalleged, the Board had discussed\nvarious aspects of a proposal to lease land for a cell tower besides the lease price, and had\n\ncontinued to hold improper closed sessions concerning the cell tower since the September 6,\n2016, meeting.\n\nOn March 17, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide, for this office's confidential review, copies of the closed session\nminutes and closed session verbatim recordings from its March 21, 2016, and September 6,\n\n2016, meetings, as well as from any other meetings since September 6, 2016, wherein the\nproposed cell tower was discussed pursuant to section 2(c)(6) of OMA.\nrequested\n\na written response to\n\nthose materials.\n\nallegations.\n\nThis office also\n\nOn April 7, 2017, this office received\n\nThe written response consisted of a letter from the Village President, Mr.\n\nStephan Pickett, and an unsigned, undated \" Statement in Support of the Village's Response\"\n\nsetting out legal analysis. On April 19, 2017,\nOn May 9, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a reply.\n\nwas sworn in as a Village Trustee.'\n\nOn July 3, 2017, an attorney in the Public Access Bureau contacted\nby e- mail to verify whether he had since received any further closed session materials concerning\nthe proposed cell tower. On July 5, 2017,\nresponded that the Board had voted to\nrelease relevant closed session minutes on July 3, 2017, but that he had not received them.\nDETERMINATION\n\nAs an initial matter, Mr. Merkel's allegation that the Board violated its own\n\nVillage Code is not subject to review by the Public Access Bureau because this office's authority\nto resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of FOIA and OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3)\n\nWest 2016). Accordingly, this determination is limited to\n\nOMA allegations.\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). Section 2(a) of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] 11 meetings of public bodies shall be open to the\npublic unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\"\n\nCorrespondingly, section 2a of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2a (West 2016)) provides:\nA] citation to the specific exception contained in Section 2 of this\n\nAct which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public shall\nbe publicly disclosed at the time of the vote and shall be recorded\n\nand entered into the minutes of the meeting. * * *\nErin Sauder, Sleepy Hollow trustee wants access to executive session records, The Courier -News\n\nJune 19, 2017, 11: 01 PM), http:// www. chicagotribune. com/ suburbs/ elgin- courier- news/ news/ ct- ecn- sleepy- hollowexecutive- session- st- 0621-\n\nOnly topics specified in the vote to close under this Section\nmay be considered during the closed meeting.\nThe exceptions \" are in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and\n\ntherefore, the exceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly within\ntheir scope.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 2(b) (West 2016).\n\nSection 2(c)(6) of OMA allows public bodies to enter into closed session to\n\nconsider \"[ t] he setting of a price for sale or lease of property owned by the public body.\"\nEmphasis added.) The clear and unambiguous language of section 2(c)(6) of OMA, which must\n\nbe strictly construed, does not allow a public body to discuss the sale or lease of public property\nin closed session other than to set a price. If the General Assembly had intended to allow closed\nmeetings to discuss general issues concerning the sale or lease of public property, it would have\nwritten such an exception into OMA, as have other jurisdictions. See, e.g., section 551. 072 of\nthe Texas Open Meetings\n\nAct (Tex. Gov' t Code Ann. §\n\n551. 072 (West 2016) (\" A governmental\n\nbody may conduct a closed meeting to deliberate the purchase, exchange, lease, or value of real\n\nproperty if deliberation in an open meeting would have a detrimental effect on the position of the\ngovernmental\n\nbody in negotiations\n\nwith\n\na\n\nthird person.\")).\n\nIndeed, section 2(c)(5) of OMA (5\n\nILCS 12012(c)(5) (West 2016)), which allows a public body to enter closed session to discuss\nt] he purchase or lease of real property for the use of the public body, including meetings held\nfor the purpose\n\ndiscussing whether a particular parcel should be acquired[,]\" directly contrasts\nwith the significantly narrower scope of section 2(c)(6). While section 2(c)(5) of OMA allows\nof\n\ngeneral closed session discussions concerning the purchase or lease of real property for the use\nof the public body, neither it, nor section 2(c)(6), authorizes general discussions regarding the\nsale or lease of public property. See I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 15- 003, issued March 19,\n2015, at 5 (section 2(c)(6) of OMA does \" not extend to the discussion of general issues\n\nconcerning the disposal of publicly -owned property.\").\nIn its response to this office, the Board acknowledged that it discussed the\n\nproposed cell tower in closed session under section 2(c)(6) of OMA during its March 21, 2016,\nSeptember 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and February 20, 2017, and March 20,\n\n2017, 2 meetings, and it provided this office with copies of the closed session minutes and closed\nsession verbatim recordings from those meetings. The Board stated that \" those portions\" of the\n\nMarch 21, 2016, and September 26, 2016, closed session minutes \" that did not relate specifically\nand exclusively to the price to be set by the Village for the proposed lease\" had been released\nfollowing the Board's most recent semi- annual review of its closed session minutes on December\n\n2 The March 20, 2017, meeting is outside the scope of this Request for Review because it was held\n\n5, 2016, and that the Board would consider whether to disclose the more recent closed session\n\nminutes during its next semi- annual review at the end of June 2017.3\nWith respect to whether the Board's closed session discussions were authorized\nunder section 2(c)(6) of OMA, the Board asserted:\n\nThe record of the executive session held on March 21, 2016\n\nshows that not only was pricing for the proposed lease specifically\ndiscussed, but also many of the factors that may affect such pricing\nwere presented. The meeting was attended by the prospective\n\nlessee. During the closed session, the Board was informed of the\ntotal cost of the project, collocations anticipated for the tower, and\n\nthe offer of the applicant for pricing on the rent, the rent escalator\n\nand the collocation fees, all factors which could go into the pricing\ndecision.\n\nAfter the March 21, 2016 closed session, the Board of\n\nTrustees conducted five (5) subsequent closed sessions for\n\ndiscussion of setting a price for such lease[.] 141\nThe Board did not provide further information concerning those five subsequent closed sessions.\nInstead, the Board cited Board of Education School District 67 v. Sikorski, 214 I11. App. 3d 945\n1st Dist. 1991) for the proposition that \" it is improper to declare a public body's decision null\n\nand void when its initial decision, although reached during an improper executive session, has\nbeen subsequently ratified by additional public meetings. i5 In Sikorski, the Illinois Appellate\nCourt held that a board had held an unauthorized closed session discussion in which it voted to\n\ndelay a property sale, but the court declined to void the ensuing sales contract because the\nboard's \" subsequent actions, taken during public meetings, ratified and cured\" the board's\n\nimproper closed session decision to delay the sale. Sikorski, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 952.\nAnalogizing this matter to Sikorski, the Board depicted its open session\ndiscussions concerning the proposed cell tower as follows:\n\n3 Letter from Stephan Pickett, Village President, Village of Sleepy Hollow, to Joshua Jones\nSupervising Attorney, Office of the Attorney General (April 4, 2017), at 1.\n\nThe March 21, 2016 meeting * * *\n\nincluded a wide-ranging\n\npresentation of elements of the proposed lease, and the applicant\nwas allowed to be present. This was so as to inform the Board\nmembers of the various elements of a lease agreement which might\n\naffect its decision regarding setting its price for any such lease.\nThat [ meeting] occurred one year before final action was taken by\nthe Board of Trustees on the price of the lease, and approval of an\n\nOption and Lease Agreement with the applicant.\n\nAfter the March 21, 2016, meeting, the Board] had not less than\n10 open sessions at which the matter of a lease for purposes of\n\nerecting a telecommunication\n\ntower was discussed, as well. Prior\n\nto the March, 2016 date, there had been one open session\n\nNovember 4, 2015) conducted as a special meeting for the sole\npurpose of allowing comment on the proposal to lease a site for a\ntelecommunications tower on public property (the Village hall\n\nsite), including pricing of the lease. Finally, there were five (5)\nadditional meetings of the Board at which citizens commented (in\n\ngeneral) on the proposal to lease a site for a telecommunications\n\ntower on public property in the Village. l61\nThe Board argued that \" subsequent meetings\n\nof the\n\nBoard * * *\n\nserved to cure any violation\" of\n\nOMA with respect to any improper closed session discussions concerning the cell tower, and\nthus that \"[ t] he final\nof space * * *\n\naction\n\ntaken by the * * *\n\nBoard * * *\n\nto set a price for and to approve a lease\n\nfor a telecommunications tower on Village property should not be undone.\" 7\nIn reply,\n\nquestioned whether the response this office received was\n\ntruly from the Board or instead from Village President Pickett8 with assistance from an attorney,\nas\n\ntwo trustees had told him they were unaware of the matter.\n\nAdditionally, he stated:\nPresident Pickett and the author of the Statement [ in Support of the Village's Response] seem to\nsuggest they can speak in executive session in violation of the Open Meetings Act and make it\n6 Statement in Support of the Village's Response (undated), at 1.\nStatement in Support of the Village's Response (undated), at 2.\n\nBFor purposes of this determination, Village President Pickett represented the Board; the extent to\nwhich Village President Pickett had the backing of the rest of the Board in doing so is beyond the scope of this\n\nright by sharing some of the information later in open session. This is clearly not the intent of the\nOpen Meetings Act.\" 9\nThis office's review of the closed session materials showed that the Board\n\nexceeded the scope of section 2(c)(6) to varying degrees during the closed session portions of its\nMarch 21, 2016, September 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and February 20, 2017,\nmeetings. During closed session on March 21, 2016, representatives of National Wireless\nVentures, LLC (National) -\n\nthe company proposing to lease land from the Village for a cell\n\ntower - stated the price the company could offer for the lease, but a lengthy discussion of\nlogistics lacking a direct relation to the lease price ensued. The portions of the discussion\n\nconcerning pricing did not so much concern the setting of a price as they did hearing National's\noffer. The September 6, 2016, closed session contained scarce discussion of the price for the\n\nlease, but significant discussion of other matters pertaining to the cell tower. Similarly, the\nJanuary 16, 2017, closed session involved substantial discussion concerning the cell tower but\nlittle to no discussion pertaining to setting a lease price. In contrast, the Board did work on\nsetting a price in closed session on February 6, 2017, such as by discussing comparables and the\npricing structure acceptable for the Village. However, the discussion strayed into siting logistics\nand matters tangential to the lease proposal at hand. Finally, during closed session on February\n20, 2017, the Board touched on pricing but also discussed unrelated considerations pertaining to\nthe cell tower. By failing to limit its closed session discussions on these five dates to the topic\nauthorized by section 2(c)(6) of OMA, the Board violated section 2(a) of OMA.\n\nUnlike in Sikorski, here there is no allegation that the Board improperly took final\naction in closed session. Accordingly, the Board's claim of having ratified and cured its\nimproper closed session discussions is misplaced, but at the same time there is no cause for this\n\noffice to conclude that any agreement between the Village and National is void. Rather, as\n\nalluded to in his reply, no subsequent open session discussion can fully remedy improper\nclosed session discussions, because the public misses out on deliberations to which it should\n\nhave had access at the time. Nonetheless, the remedy that is available, and that this office\nrequests, is for the Board to provide\nwith10 and publicly disclose the portions of its\nMarch 21, 2016, September 6, 2016, January 16, 2017, February 6, 2017, and February 20, 2017,\nclosed session minutes and closed session verbatim recordings that do not specifically involve\n\n9E -mail from\n\nto Joshua Jones (April 19, 2017).\n\n1° This office notes that section 2. 06(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(e) (West 2016)) provides that\na] ccess to verbatim recordings shall\n\nbe provided to duly elected\n\nofficials[,]\"\n\nand section 2. 06(f) of OMA (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 06(f) (West 2016)) likewise provides that \" duly elected officials * * *\n\nshall be provided access to minutes of\n\nmeetings closed to the public.\" Thus,\n\nthe setting of a price for the lease of land for the cell tower. This office also cautions the Board\nto conduct its future meetings in full compliance with OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions,\nplease contact me at (312) 814- 8413.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic\n\n46770 o 2c6 improper\n\nmun\n\nAccess\n\nBureau"}
{"id":1194,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-05-23","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["46954"],"title":"Township of Schaumburg Board violated OMA by failing to approve December 2016 minutes","filename":"46954, issued May 23, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1420,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Township of Schaumburg Board of Trustees failed to timely approve meeting minutes from a December 2016 Committee of the Whole meeting. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to approve the minutes in a timely manner.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a local township board hadn't approved the minutes from a meeting held months earlier. The Attorney General's office reviewed the case and agreed that the board failed to follow the law requiring timely approval of meeting minutes. The board was found to be in violation of the Open Meetings Act.","holding":"The Township of Schaumburg Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to approve the minutes of its December 14, 2016, meeting in a timely manner.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to approve meeting minutes in a timely manner.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Township of Schaumburg Board of Trustees","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting minutes","subject_description":"The failure of the Township Board to approve minutes from a Committee of the Whole meeting in a timely fashion.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_b/46954, issued May 23, 2017.pdf","sha256":"4eefd7371823570f64fa050141e899238cee670231b43eeff40e089341bf3f30","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting minutes","open meetings act","township board","timely approval"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Minutes","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMay 23, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Melissa M. Wolf\nStorino, Ramello & Durkin\n9501 West Devon Avenue\nRosemont, Illinois 60018\nmelissa@srd- law. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46954\nDear\n\nand Ms. Wolf:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015 Supp.)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Township of Schaumburg Board of Trustees ( Board) violated\nOMA by failing to approve the minutes of its December 14, 2016, Committee of the Whole\nmeeting in a timely manner.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn March 20, 2017, this office received\n\nRequest for Review\n\nalleging that meeting minutes of the Committee of the Whole' s December 14, 2016, meeting had\nnot been approved. He contended that although the Committee of the Whole had not met since\nDecember 14, 2016, the Board had since met and should have approved the minutes.'\n\nAlthough\n\nstyled his Request for Review as being under both the Freedom of'\n\nInformation Act, ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2014)), and OMA, no FOIA violation was alleged therefore\nthis office treated the Request for Review as an OMA matter only.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785- 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001\n\nEast Main,\n\nCarbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • ( 618)\n\n529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618)\n\n529- 6416\n\n\fMs. Melissa M. Wolf\n\nMay 23, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn April 4, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nTownship Supervisor and requested that the Committee of the Whole or its representative\nprovide a written response to\nallegation that the neither the Committee of the\n\nWhole nor the Board approved the minutes of the December 14, 2016, Committee of the Whole\n\nmeeting in a timely fashion. We asked the Committee of the Whole whether it held a meeting on\nDecember 14, 2016, and to provide the dates of all subsequent meetings the Committee has held,\nas well as the dates of all Board meetings held since December 14, 2016. We also asked that the\n\nCommittee of the Whole' s response: ( 1) address whether the Committee of the Whole is a\nseparate public body from the Board; ( 2) provide a list of the members of the Committee of the\nWhole and the Board; and ( 3) explain whether a quorum of the Committee of the Whole\nmembers were present at any of the Board' s meetings held since December 14, 2016. We asked\nthe Committee of the Whole to provide copies of the minutes and the agenda for the Committee\n\nof the Whole' s December 14, 2016, meeting, and copies of all minutes and agendas for all\n\nsubsequent Committee of the Whole and Board meetings. On April 13, 2017, the Township of\nSchaumburg ( Township) responded on behalf of the Committee of the Whole.\n\ndid\n\nnot reply. On May 9, 2017, the Township provided a supplemental response stating that the\n\nCommittee of the Whole held a special meeting on April 25, 2017, during which it approved the\nDecember 14, 2016, meeting minutes. 2\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( b) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( 13) ( West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016) provides, in part, that:\nA public body shall approve the minutes of its open\n\nmeeting within 30 days after that meeting or at the public body' s\nsecond subsequent regular meeting, whichever is later. The\nminutes of meetings open to the public shall be available for public\n\ninspection within 10 days after the approval of such minutes by the\npublic body.\nIn its response to this office, the Township explained that the Committee of the\nWhole has not held a meeting since December 14, 2016; it cancelled meetings scheduled for\n\nJanuary 18, 2017, February 15, 2017, March 15, 2017, and April 18, 2017. The next meeting of\nthe Committee of the Whole was scheduled for May 17, 2017. The Township argued that it had\nnot violated OMA by not yet approving the December 14, 2016, meeting minutes because the\nCommittee of the Whole has not held its second subsequent meeting since December 14, 2016.\n\n2E - mail from Melissa Wolf to Laura Harter (\nMay 9, 2017).\n\n\fMs. Melissa M. Wolf\n\nMay 23, 2017\nPage 3\n\nThe Township also explained that the Board has held its regular Board meetings\n\non January 25, 2017, February 22, 2017, and March 22, 2017. The Township explained that the\nmembers of the Committee of the Whole are the same as the members of the Board, but it argued\nthat the two public bodies are separate and that the Board has never approved minutes from\n\nCommittee of the Whole meetings. The Township asserted that the public bodies meet on\n\ndifferent days of the month and maintain separate duties and responsibilities. The Township\nexplained that the Committee of the Whole serves as a forum for information gathering and\n\ndiscussion of Township issues, but it does not take final action on Township matters.\nContrary to the Township' s assertions, committees of the whole are not separate\n\npublic bodies from boards, but rather, provide a different meeting format for boards. See Black' s\nLaw Dictionary ( 10th ed. 2014), committee, available at Westlaw BLACKS (\" A deliberative\nassembly may resolve itself into a committee of the whole so that it can take advantage of the\n\ngreater procedural flexibility that a committee enjoys, usu. presided over by some chair other\nthan the assembly' s regular chair.\").\n\nHere, the Township explained that the two groups have the\n\nsame members, but the Committee of the Whole does not take final action on Township matters.\nThese facts support a finding that rather than acting as an independent public body, the\nCommittee of the Whole functions as the Board operating under relaxed rules. Because the\n\nBoard and the Committee of the Whole are essentially the same entity, section 2.06(b) of OMA\nrequired the Board to approve minutes of the Committee of the Whole' s December 14, 2016,\n\nmeeting minutes within 30 days of that meeting or at the Board's second subsequent meeting,\n\nheld on February 22, 2017. It did not do so. Therefore, this office concludes that the Board\nviolated section 2. 06( 6) of OMA.\n\nBecause the Committee of the Whole approved the December 14, 2016, meeting\nminutes at its April 25, 2017, special meeting, no remedial action is necessary. Nonetheless, this\noffice reminds the Board to adhere to the requirements outlined in section 2.06(b) of OMA for\napproving meeting minutes in a timely fashion.\nIn his Request for Review,\nalso alleges that the Committee of the\nWhole' s cancellation of its meetings is a violation of OMA. The Public Access Counselor' s\nauthority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of\nInformation Act ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2014)).\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West 2014).\n\nSection 3. 5( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2015 Supp.)) provides that \"[ a] person who\nbelieves that a violation of this Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for review\nwith\n\nthe Public Access\n\nCounselor[,]\"\n\nand that the submission \" must include a summary of the\n\nfacts supporting the allegation.\" Neither FOIA nor OMA restrict a public body' s ability to cancel\nits meetings. Therefore,\nallegations regarding the Committee of the Whole's\nmeeting cancellations\n\nare not\n\nsubject\n\nto review by this office.\n\n\fMs. Melissa M. Wolf\n\nMay 23, 2017\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n46954 o 206 minutes improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Mary Wroblewski, Supervisor\nTownship of Schaumburg\n1 Illinois Boulevard\n\nHoffman Estates, Illinois 60169- 3314\nmwroblewski@schaumburgtownship. org\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A township board's failure to approve meeting minutes","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-46954/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMay 23, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Melissa M. Wolf\nStorino, Ramello & Durkin\n9501 West Devon Avenue\nRosemont, Illinois 60018\nmelissa@srd- law. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 46954\nDear\n\nand Ms. Wolf:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015 Supp.)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that the Township of Schaumburg Board of Trustees (Board) violated\nOMA by failing to approve the minutes of its December 14, 2016, Committee of the Whole\nmeeting in a timely manner.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn March 20, 2017, this office received\n\nRequest for Review\n\nalleging that meeting minutes of the Committee of the Whole's December 14, 2016, meeting had\nnot been approved. He contended that although the Committee of the Whole had not met since\nDecember 14, 2016, the Board had since met and should have approved the minutes.'\n\nAlthough\n\nstyled his Request for Review as being under both the Freedom of'\n\nInformation Act, (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2014)), and OMA, no FOIA violation was alleged therefore\nthis office treated the Request for Review as an OMA matter only.\n\nOn April 4, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nTownship Supervisor and requested that the Committee of the Whole or its representative\nprovide a written response to\nallegation that the neither the Committee of the\n\nWhole nor the Board approved the minutes of the December 14, 2016, Committee of the Whole\n\nmeeting in a timely fashion. We asked the Committee of the Whole whether it held a meeting on\nDecember 14, 2016, and to provide the dates of all subsequent meetings the Committee has held,\nas well as the dates of all Board meetings held since December 14, 2016. We also asked that the\n\nCommittee of the Whole's response: (1) address whether the Committee of the Whole is a\nseparate public body from the Board; (2) provide a list of the members of the Committee of the\nWhole and the Board; and (3) explain whether a quorum of the Committee of the Whole\nmembers were present at any of the Board's meetings held since December 14, 2016. We asked\nthe Committee of the Whole to provide copies of the minutes and the agenda for the Committee\n\nof the Whole's December 14, 2016, meeting, and copies of all minutes and agendas for all\n\nsubsequent Committee of the Whole and Board meetings. On April 13, 2017, the Township of\nSchaumburg (Township) responded on behalf of the Committee of the Whole.\n\ndid\n\nnot reply. On May 9, 2017, the Township provided a supplemental response stating that the\n\nCommittee of the Whole held a special meeting on April 25, 2017, during which it approved the\nDecember 14, 2016, meeting minutes. 2\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(13) (West 2014), as amended by Public\nAct 99- 515, effective June 30, 2016) provides, in part, that:\nA public body shall approve the minutes of its open\n\nmeeting within 30 days after that meeting or at the public body's\nsecond subsequent regular meeting, whichever is later. The\nminutes of meetings open to the public shall be available for public\n\ninspection within 10 days after the approval of such minutes by the\npublic body.\nIn its response to this office, the Township explained that the Committee of the\nWhole has not held a meeting since December 14, 2016; it cancelled meetings scheduled for\n\nJanuary 18, 2017, February 15, 2017, March 15, 2017, and April 18, 2017. The next meeting of\n\nThe Township also explained that the Board has held its regular Board meetings\n\non January 25, 2017, February 22, 2017, and March 22, 2017. The Township explained that the\nmembers of the Committee of the Whole are the same as the members of the Board, but it argued\nthat the two public bodies are separate and that the Board has never approved minutes from\n\nCommittee of the Whole meetings. The Township asserted that the public bodies meet on\n\ndifferent days of the month and maintain separate duties and responsibilities. The Township\nexplained that the Committee of the Whole serves as a forum for information gathering and\n\ndiscussion of Township issues, but it does not take final action on Township matters.\nContrary to the Township's assertions, committees of the whole are not separate\n\npublic bodies from boards, but rather, provide a different meeting format for boards. See Black's\nLaw Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), committee, available at Westlaw BLACKS (\" A deliberative\nassembly may resolve itself into a committee of the whole so that it can take advantage of the\n\ngreater procedural flexibility that a committee enjoys, usu. presided over by some chair other\nthan the assembly's regular chair.\").\n\nHere, the Township explained that the two groups have the\n\nsame members, but the Committee of the Whole does not take final action on Township matters.\nThese facts support a finding that rather than acting as an independent public body, the\nCommittee of the Whole functions as the Board operating under relaxed rules. Because the\n\nBoard and the Committee of the Whole are essentially the same entity, section 2.06(b) of OMA\nrequired the Board to approve minutes of the Committee of the Whole's December 14, 2016,\n\nmeeting minutes within 30 days of that meeting or at the Board's second subsequent meeting,\n\nheld on February 22, 2017. It did not do so. Therefore, this office concludes that the Board\nviolated section 2. 06(6) of OMA.\n\nBecause the Committee of the Whole approved the December 14, 2016, meeting\nminutes at its April 25, 2017, special meeting, no remedial action is necessary. Nonetheless, this\noffice reminds the Board to adhere to the requirements outlined in section 2.06(b) of OMA for\napproving meeting minutes in a timely fashion.\nIn his Request for Review,\nalso alleges that the Committee of the\nWhole's cancellation of its meetings is a violation of OMA. The Public Access Counselor's\nauthority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of\nInformation Act (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2014)).\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2014).\n\nSection 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2015 Supp.)) provides that \"[ a] person who\nbelieves that a violation of this Act by a public body has occurred may file a request for review\nwith\n\nthe Public Access\n\nCounselor[,]\"\n\nand that the submission \" must include a summary of the\n\nfacts supporting the allegation.\" Neither FOIA nor OMA restrict a public body's ability to cancel\nits meetings. Therefore,\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n46954 o 206 minutes improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Mary Wroblewski, Supervisor\nTownship of Schaumburg\n1 Illinois Boulevard\n\nHoffman Estates, Illinois 60169- 3314\nmwroblewski@schaumburgtownship. org"}
{"id":1195,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-10-26","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["47357"],"title":"Coles County Board violated OMA by failing to post agenda 48 hours in advance","filename":"47357, issued October 26, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2206,"summary":"The PAC determined that the Coles County Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide adequate notice of final actions on its agenda and failing to post the agenda in a location continuously available to the public for 48 hours prior to the meeting.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Coles County Board did not properly post its meeting agenda or make it available to the public 48 hours in advance. The Attorney General's office agreed, finding that the Board failed to follow legal requirements for public notice and agenda transparency. The Board was advised to take corrective action by revoting on the matters that were not properly noticed.","holding":"The Coles County Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to properly post its meeting agenda and by failing to include the general subject matter of final actions on that agenda.","legal_question":"Did the public body violate the Open Meetings Act by failing to post an agenda 48 hours in advance and by failing to list the general subject matter of final actions on the agenda?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Coles County Board","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The Coles County Board failed to provide sufficient public notice of its meeting agenda and the specific items upon which it took final action.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_c/Duty-to-make-notice-and-agenda-continuously-available/47357, issued October 26, 2017.pdf","sha256":"10711ed5fb596875fc8dc8077e0872340c6c14f08b95c39f4a0e893f432b822b","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","agenda","Open Meetings Act","public transparency"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nOctober 26, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Elaine Karpus- Komada\nAdministrative\n\nAssistant\n\nColes County Board\n651 Jackson Avenue, Room 326\nCharleston, Illinois 61920\n\nekomada@co. coles.il.us\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 47357\nDear\n\nand Ms. Karpus- Komada:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nconcludes that the Coles County Board ( Board) did not set out on the agenda for its April 11,\n2017, regular meeting the general subject matter of several items on which it took final action.\nThis office also concludes that the Board failed to post the agenda for the meeting in a place\nwhere it was continuously available to the public for at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting.\nOn April 12, 2017,\n\nsubmitted this Request for Review\n\nalleging that the Board failed to post the agenda for its April 11, 2017, regular meeting both on\nits website and at the meeting location at least 48 hours before the meeting began. Specifically,\nhe alleged that \"[ t]he agenda link [on the County' s website] for that meeting was not functioning\nuntil\n\na\n\nfew hours prior to the meeting[,]\"\n\nand that \"[ t]here was no agenda posted at the location of\n\nthe meeting, the courthouse, that was available for view for 48 continuous hours prior to the\n\nmeeting. The only notice posted was a statement that the board meeting was on the second floor.\n\n500 South Second\n\nIllinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001\n\nStreet, Springfield,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMs. Elaine Karpus- Komada\nOctober 26, 2017\nPage 2\n\nNo agenda was posted.\" 1\n\nalso alleged that the agenda did not provide the public\n\nwith sufficient notice for the Board' s votes on the six items listed under the heading \" Committee\nReports.\" 2\n\nOn April 21, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board\nand requested that it provide a detailed response to\n\ns allegations, together with\n\ncopies of the notice, agenda, and meeting minutes for the April 11, 2017, meeting. On April 24,\n2017, the Board responded, providing copies of the agenda and minutes and an e- mail from its\nInformation Technology ( IT) Department stating that the agenda was posted on the County' s\nwebsite on April 5, 2017, but acknowledging that the link to the agenda was not working during\na portion of the 48 hours preceding the meeting. On May 10, 2017,\nsubmitted a\nreply stating that the Board' s acknowledgement that the link to the agenda was not working\n\nvalidated his claim about the website posting. He also noted that the Board had not addressed his\nallegation concerning the sufficiency of the notice for the \" Committee Reports\" action items.\nOn August 17, 2017, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau\nasked the Board whether it wished to provide a written response addressing\n\nallegations. Later that same day, the Board provided the following:\nThe notice of meeting was sent February 22, 2017 and put on the\nCounty' s website. The Agenda was sent April 5, 2017 and put on\nthe website. Coles County has a full time IT person that updates\nthe website daily. The Agenda was also displayed on the County\n\nBoard Office' s door across the hall from the County Board meeting\nroom on April 5, 201721\n\nOn August 21, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Board' s supplemental response to\ndid not submit a further reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\n\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \" given\n\nE- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau] ( April 12, 2017).\n\n2Coles County Board, Agenda Item ( unnumbered), Committee Reports ( April 11, 2017).\n3E -mail from Elaine Karpus- Komada, Administrative Assistant, Coles County Board, to\nChristopher Boggs ( August 17, 2017).\n\n\fMs. Elaine Karpus- Komada\nOctober 26, 2017\nPage 3\n\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\nPosting of Meeting Agenda\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2.02( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where the\n\nmeeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthe meeting. A public body that has a website that the full- time\n\nstaff of the public body maintains shall also post on its website the\nagenda of any regular meetings of the governing body of that\npublic body.\nSection 2. 02( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)) further provides:\n\nThe public body conducting a public meeting shall ensure that at\nleast one copy of any requested notice and agenda for the meeting\n\nis continuously available for public review during the entire 48hour period preceding the meeting. Posting of the notice and\nagenda on a website that is maintained by the public body satisfies\n\nthe requirement for continuous posting under this subsection ( c).\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThe Board' s August 17, 2017, response to this office asserted that the agenda was\n\ndisplayed on the Board's office door across the hall from the Board meeting room six days before\nthe meeting. However, the Board did not address\n\ns allegation that the agenda was\n\nnot \" available for view for 48 continuous hours prior to the meeting.\" The Board's response\nindicated that the agenda was posted in an internal area of the building where the Board has its\nprincipal office and where the meeting was to be held. Presumably, the building is not open 24\nhours a day. In light of that and the Board' s acknowledgment that the link to the agenda on the\n\nCounty's website was not working during a portion of the 48 hours preceding the meeting, the\navailable information indicates that the agenda for the Board' s April 11, 2017, regular meeting\nwas not continuously available for public review during the entire 48- hour period preceding the\nmeeting. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated sections 2. 02( a) and 2. 02( c)\n\nof OMA. The website posting violation appears to have resulted from an unintentional technical\nerror or malfunction, but this office recommends that the Board physically post its future\nmeeting agendas in locations to which the public has unrestricted\n\naccess,\n\nsuch\n\nas\n\nthe front door\n\n\fMs. Elaine Karpus- Komada\nOctober 26, 2017\nPage 4\n\nof the building or an adjacent window facing outside, to ensure at least one copy of the agenda\nremains continuously available. See, e. g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29886, issued\nSeptember 16, 2014, at 2- 3 ( determining that a public body \" should post meeting notices in a\nlocation where they may be continuously viewable from the outside of [the meeting location],\nsuch as on or near the front door or facing outward from a window.\").\nNotice of Final Action\n\nSection 2.02( c) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ny agenda required under this Section\nshall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject\nof\n\nfinal action\n\nat\n\nthe meeting.\" (\n\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThe Senate debate on House Bill No. 4687, which was enacted as Public Act 97-\n\n827, effective January 1, 2013, added section 2. 02( c) of OMA, indicates that the General\nAssembly intended this provision to ensure that agendas provide sufficiently descriptive advance\nnotice of the matters upon which a public body anticipates taking final action:\nT]here was just no real requirement as to how specific they\nneeded to be to the public of what they were going to discuss that\nwould be final action. And this just says that you have to have a\n\ngeneral notice if you' re going to have and take final action, as\nto generally what' s going to be discussed so that — that people who\nfollow their units of local government know what they' re going to\nbe acting upon. Remarks of Sen. Dillard, May 16, 2012, Senate\nDebate on House Bill No. 4687, at 47.\n\nWhile OMA does not define the term \" general subject matter,\" the Public Access Bureau has\n\npreviously determined that the General Assembly' s use of the term \" general subject matter\"\nsignifies that a meeting agenda must setforth the main element( s), rather than the specific\nbody intends to take final action.\" ( Emphasis added.)\n\ndetails, of an item on which the public\n\nI11.\n\nAtt' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr 46368, issued April 13, 2017, at 3.\nalleged that the action items. under the \" Committee Reports\" section\nof the agenda did not provide the public with sufficient advance notice of the final actions to be\ntaken, and the Board's responses to this office did not address that allegation. Nonetheless, this\noffice's review of the agenda provided in the Board's initial response indicated that four of the six\nagenda\nitems — \"Res. for Participation of Elected Officials in IMRF' ; \" Resolution to Borrow\nFunds\"; \"\n\nTax Sale Resolutions ( 2)\" and \" Resolution of Indemnity\" 4 — did identify the general\ntoles\n\nCounty Board, Agenda, Committee Reports 1, 2, 3, 4 ( April 11, 2017).\n\n\fMs. Elaine Karpus-Komada\nOctober 26, 2017\nPage 5\n\nsubject matter of the Board's final actions. Pursuant to these agenda items, the Board voted to\n1) approve the participation of elected officials in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, which\n\nis a public pension system commonly known by its acronym \" IMRF,\" 5 ( 2) authorize the County\nTreasurer to transfer funds from other County funds to the County general fund as a loan and to\nissue anticipation warrants,' ( 3) indemnify the former Coles County State' s Attorney for the\n\nlawful actions taken by his office during his tenure,' and ( 4) approve a resolution selling two\nproperties that the County acquired an interest in due to delinquent taxes. 8 While greater detail\n\nmay have been helpful to interested members of the public, these agenda items did identify the\ngeneral subject matters of the Board' s final actions. Accordingly, this office is unable to\nconclude that the Board violated the advance notice requirement of section 2. 02( c) of OMA with\nrespect to those agenda items.\nHowever, the remaining two referenced agenda items — \"Res. re: Dial -A -Ride\n\nGrant\" and \" County Bridge Fund Petitioni9 —were simply too vague to provide the public with\nadequate advance notice of any final action to be taken. Pursuant to these agenda items, the\n\nBoard approved\na resolution authorizing the County to provide public transportation within\n1\"\ncounty limits,\n\nand appropriated\n\nfunds towards\n\na proposed\n\nbridge/ drainage project.'\n\nWhile the\n\nBoard was not required to provide specific details concerning each of these action items, the\nnotice provided did not adequately set forth the main elements of the final actions taken. These\nagenda items were simply too vague to provide the public with advance notice of the Board' s\ndisbursement of County funds towards transportation service and a construction project.\nAccordingly, this office concludes that the Board did not provide sufficient notice under section\n2. 02( c) of OMA with respect to those three agenda items.\n\nTo remedy these violations, this office requests that the Board reconsider and\n\nrevote on the two matters for which it failed to provide sufficient advance notice after posting an\nagenda that adequately informs the public of the general nature of each final action.\n\ntoles County Board, Regular Meeting, April 11, 2017, Minutes 3482, 3550.\n6Coles County Board, Regular Meeting, April I I, 2017, Minutes 3483, 3551.\nColes County Board, Regular Meeting, April 11, 2017, Minutes 3483, 3554.\n\ntoles County Board, Regular Meeting, April 11, 2017, Minutes 3483, 3552- 53.\ntoles County Board, Agenda, Committee Reports 5, 6 ( April 11, 2017).\n10Coles County Board, Regular Meeting, April 11, 2017, Minutes 3483, 3555.\nColes County Board, Regular Meeting, April 11, 2017, Minutes 3484, 3556.\n\n\fMs. Elaine Karpus- Komada\nOctober 26, 2017\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 217) 785- 7438 or at the Springfield address on the first page\nof this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nR. BOGGS\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n47357\n\no 202a notice improper 202c\n\nnotice\n\nproper\n\nimproper co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A county board's meeting agenda and final action items","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-47357/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nOctober 26, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Elaine Karpus- Komada\nAdministrative\n\nAssistant\n\nColes County Board\n651 Jackson Avenue, Room 326\nCharleston, Illinois 61920\n\nekomada@co. coles.il.us\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 47357\nDear\n\nand Ms. Karpus- Komada:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nconcludes that the Coles County Board (Board) did not set out on the agenda for its April 11,\n2017, regular meeting the general subject matter of several items on which it took final action.\nThis office also concludes that the Board failed to post the agenda for the meeting in a place\nwhere it was continuously available to the public for at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting.\nOn April 12, 2017,\n\nsubmitted this Request for Review\n\nalleging that the Board failed to post the agenda for its April 11, 2017, regular meeting both on\nits website and at the meeting location at least 48 hours before the meeting began. Specifically,\nhe alleged that \"[ t]he agenda link [on the County's website] for that meeting was not functioning\nuntil\n\na\n\nfew hours prior to the meeting[,]\"\n\nand that \"[ t]here was no agenda posted at the location of\n\nthe meeting, the courthouse, that was available for view for 48 continuous hours prior to the\n\nmeeting. The only notice posted was a statement that the board meeting was on the second floor.\n\n500 South Second\n\nIllinois 62701 • (217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: (312) 814- 3806\n\n1001\n\nStreet, Springfield,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529- 6400 • TTY: (618) 529- 6403 • Fax: (618) 529- 6416\n\nNo agenda was posted.\" 1\n\nalso alleged that the agenda did not provide the public\n\nwith sufficient notice for the Board's votes on the six items listed under the heading \" Committee\nReports.\" 2\n\nOn April 21, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board\nand requested that it provide a detailed response to\n\ns allegations, together with\n\ncopies of the notice, agenda, and meeting minutes for the April 11, 2017, meeting. On April 24,\n2017, the Board responded, providing copies of the agenda and minutes and an e- mail from its\nInformation Technology (IT) Department stating that the agenda was posted on the County's\nwebsite on April 5, 2017, but acknowledging that the link to the agenda was not working during\na portion of the 48 hours preceding the meeting. On May 10, 2017,\nsubmitted a\nreply stating that the Board's acknowledgement that the link to the agenda was not working\n\nvalidated his claim about the website posting. He also noted that the Board had not addressed his\nallegation concerning the sufficiency of the notice for the \" Committee Reports\" action items.\nOn August 17, 2017, an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau\nasked the Board whether it wished to provide a written response addressing\n\nallegations. Later that same day, the Board provided the following:\nThe notice of meeting was sent February 22, 2017 and put on the\nCounty's website. The Agenda was sent April 5, 2017 and put on\nthe website. Coles County has a full time IT person that updates\nthe website daily. The Agenda was also displayed on the County\n\nBoard Office's door across the hall from the County Board meeting\nroom on April 5, 201721\n\nOn August 21, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's supplemental response to\ndid not submit a further reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\n\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \" given\n\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\nPosting of Meeting Agenda\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2.02(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where the\n\nmeeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthe meeting. A public body that has a website that the full- time\n\nstaff of the public body maintains shall also post on its website the\nagenda of any regular meetings of the governing body of that\npublic body.\nSection 2. 02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)) further provides:\n\nThe public body conducting a public meeting shall ensure that at\nleast one copy of any requested notice and agenda for the meeting\n\nis continuously available for public review during the entire 48hour period preceding the meeting. Posting of the notice and\nagenda on a website that is maintained by the public body satisfies\n\nthe requirement for continuous posting under this subsection (c).\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThe Board's August 17, 2017, response to this office asserted that the agenda was\n\ndisplayed on the Board's office door across the hall from the Board meeting room six days before\nthe meeting. However, the Board did not address\n\ns allegation that the agenda was\n\nnot \" available for view for 48 continuous hours prior to the meeting.\" The Board's response\nindicated that the agenda was posted in an internal area of the building where the Board has its\nprincipal office and where the meeting was to be held. Presumably, the building is not open 24\nhours a day. In light of that and the Board's acknowledgment that the link to the agenda on the\n\nCounty's website was not working during a portion of the 48 hours preceding the meeting, the\navailable information indicates that the agenda for the Board's April 11, 2017, regular meeting\nwas not continuously available for public review during the entire 48- hour period preceding the\nmeeting. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated sections 2. 02(a) and 2. 02(c)\n\nof OMA. The website posting violation appears to have resulted from an unintentional technical\nerror or malfunction, but this office recommends that the Board physically post its future\n\nof the building or an adjacent window facing outside, to ensure at least one copy of the agenda\nremains continuously available. See, e. g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29886, issued\nSeptember 16, 2014, at 2- 3 (determining that a public body \" should post meeting notices in a\nlocation where they may be continuously viewable from the outside of [the meeting location],\nsuch as on or near the front door or facing outward from a window.\").\nNotice of Final Action\n\nSection 2.02(c) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ny agenda required under this Section\nshall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject\nof\n\nfinal action\n\nat\n\nthe meeting.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\nThe Senate debate on House Bill No. 4687, which was enacted as Public Act 97-\n\n827, effective January 1, 2013, added section 2. 02(c) of OMA, indicates that the General\nAssembly intended this provision to ensure that agendas provide sufficiently descriptive advance\nnotice of the matters upon which a public body anticipates taking final action:\nT]here was just no real requirement as to how specific they\nneeded to be to the public of what they were going to discuss that\nwould be final action. And this just says that you have to have a\n\ngeneral notice if you' re going to have and take final action, as\nto generally what's going to be discussed so that — that people who\nfollow their units of local government know what they' re going to\nbe acting upon. Remarks of Sen. Dillard, May 16, 2012, Senate\nDebate on House Bill No. 4687, at 47.\n\nWhile OMA does not define the term \" general subject matter,\" the Public Access Bureau has\n\npreviously determined that the General Assembly's use of the term \" general subject matter\"\nsignifies that a meeting agenda must setforth the main element(s), rather than the specific\nbody intends to take final action.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\ndetails, of an item on which the public\n\nI11.\n\nAtt' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr 46368, issued April 13, 2017, at 3.\nalleged that the action items. under the \" Committee Reports\" section\nof the agenda did not provide the public with sufficient advance notice of the final actions to be\ntaken, and the Board's responses to this office did not address that allegation. Nonetheless, this\noffice's review of the agenda provided in the Board's initial response indicated that four of the six\nagenda\n\nsubject matter of the Board's final actions. Pursuant to these agenda items, the Board voted to\n1) approve the participation of elected officials in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, which\n\nis a public pension system commonly known by its acronym \" IMRF,\" 5 (2) authorize the County\nTreasurer to transfer funds from other County funds to the County general fund as a loan and to\nissue anticipation warrants,' (3) indemnify the former Coles County State's Attorney for the\n\nlawful actions taken by his office during his tenure,' and (4) approve a resolution selling two\nproperties that the County acquired an interest in due to delinquent taxes. 8 While greater detail\n\nmay have been helpful to interested members of the public, these agenda items did identify the\ngeneral subject matters of the Board's final actions. Accordingly, this office is unable to\nconclude that the Board violated the advance notice requirement of section 2. 02(c) of OMA with\nrespect to those agenda items.\nHowever, the remaining two referenced agenda items — \"Res. re: Dial -A -Ride\n\nGrant\" and \" County Bridge Fund Petitioni9 —were simply too vague to provide the public with\nadequate advance notice of any final action to be taken. Pursuant to these agenda items, the\n\nBoard approved\na resolution authorizing the County to provide public transportation within\n1\"\ncounty limits,\n\nand appropriated\n\nfunds towards\n\na proposed\n\nbridge/ drainage project.'\n\nWhile the\n\nBoard was not required to provide specific details concerning each of these action items, the\nnotice provided did not adequately set forth the main elements of the final actions taken. These\nagenda items were simply too vague to provide the public with advance notice of the Board's\ndisbursement of County funds towards transportation service and a construction project.\nAccordingly, this office concludes that the Board did not provide sufficient notice under section\n2. 02(c) of OMA with respect to those three agenda items.\n\nTo remedy these violations, this office requests that the Board reconsider and\n\nrevote on the two matters for which it failed to provide sufficient advance notice after posting an\nagenda that adequately informs the public of the general nature of each final action.\n\ntoles County Board, Regular Meeting, April 11, 2017, Minutes 3482, 3550.\n6 Coles County Board, Regular Meeting, April I I, 2017, Minutes 3483, 3551.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (217) 785- 7438 or at the Springfield address on the first page\nof this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nR. BOGGS\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n47357\n\no 202a notice improper 202c\n\nnotice\n\nproper\n\nimproper co"}
{"id":1196,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-07-14","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["47429"],"title":"Parkland College Board violated OMA by failing to provide 48 hours' notice for non-emergency meeting","filename":"47429, issued July 14, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2772,"summary":"The requester alleged that Parkland College improperly held an emergency meeting and discussed non-emergency topics in closed session. The PAC determined the college violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide 48 hours' notice for a non-emergency meeting, but found the closed session discussions were legally authorized.","plain_summary":"Parkland College held an 'emergency' meeting without giving the public the required 48 hours' notice. The Attorney General's office found that the situation did not qualify as a true emergency, meaning the college broke the law by not providing proper notice. However, the office also ruled that the topics discussed during the meeting's private session were legally allowed to be discussed behind closed doors.","holding":"The Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide 48 hours' advance notice of a meeting in the absence of a bona fide emergency.","legal_question":"Did the public body violate the Open Meetings Act by holding an emergency meeting without a bona fide emergency and by discussing personnel and litigation matters in closed session?","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02","5 ILCS 120/2.05"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1)","5 ILCS 120/2(c)(11)"],"public_body":"Parkland College Board of Trustees","requesting_party":"Mr. John Kraft","pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The board held an emergency meeting to discuss personnel issues and potential litigation regarding a newly elected trustee.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_a/emergency-meetings/47429, issued July 14, 2017.pdf","sha256":"4506941e911d7e2b8db83bf316dbdff7bed25acf634f42f1f5c97a5f56c49a55","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["emergency meeting","meeting notice","closed session","personnel issues","litigation"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 14, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Lorna\n\nK. Geiler\n\nMeyer Capel\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nlgeiler@meyercapel. com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2015 PAC 47429\nDear Mr. Kraft and Ms. Geiler:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Parkland College ( College) Board of Trustees ( Board) violated OMA\n\nby failing to provide the public with at least 48 hours advance notice of a meeting in the absence\nof a bona fide emergency.\n\nHowever, this office also concludes that the Board' s closed session\n\ndiscussion during the meeting was authorized by exceptions to the general requirement that\npublic bodies conduct public business openly.\nOn April 18, 2017, Mr. John Kraft submitted a Request for Review stating that\nthe Board held an emergency meeting on April 17, 2017, in which it discussed in closed session\npersonnel issues'\n\nand \"' potential litigation'\n\nrelated to an alleged conflict of interest on the part\n\nof a College professor, Ms. Rochelle Harden, who had recently been elected as a Board trustee.\nMr. Kraft disputed that those topics were \" legitimate emergencies\" I and questioned whether\nOMA authorized the Board to discuss the matter in closed session.\n\nE- mail from John Kraft to AG PAC [ Attorney General Public Access Counselor] ( April 18,\n2017).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 •\n100 West\n1001\n\nRandolph\n\nStreet,\n\nChicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nTTY: (\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n312)\n\n814- 3374 •\n\nTTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nMr. Lorna K. Geiler\n\nJuly 14, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn April 24, 2017, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\n\nReview to the Board and asked it to provide a copy of the April 17, 2017, meeting minutes ( draft\nform, if necessary) and the verbatim recording of the closed session discussion together with a\ndetailed explanation of the applicability of the specific exceptions in section 2( c) of OMA ( 5\nILCS 120/ 2( c) ( West 2016)) that the Board cited as its bases for closing the meeting. This office\nalso asked the Board to provide a copy of any notice and agenda that was posted for the April 17,\n2017, meeting and a written response clarifying when the notice and agenda was posted. If the\n\nnotice and agenda was not posted at least 48 hours before the April 17, 2017, meeting\ncommenced, we asked the Board to provide a detailed explanation of how the meeting was held\nin the event of a \" bona fide emergency.\"\n\n2 On May 1, 2017, this office received those materials\n\nfrom the Board; on May 18, 2017, Mr. Kraft replied to the Board's written response.\nANALYSIS\n\nEmergency Meeting\nOMA provides that it is the \" public policy of this State that its citizens shall be\ngiven advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public\n\nbody is discussed or acted upon in anyway.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). Section 2. 02( a) of\nOMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ p] ublic notice of any special meeting\nexcept a meeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of any rescheduled regular\n\nmeeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting[.]\"\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThe Board' s response to this office stated that the Board posted an agenda for the\n\nApril 17, 2017, meeting at about 10: 34 a. m. on April 17, 2017. The Board stated it was justified\n\nin holding an emergency meeting because earlier that day, Professor Harden had responded to\nthe Board' s concerns that it is illegal to simultaneously serve as a College employee and a Board\ntrustee by advising that she would neither resign her faculty position nor decline to serve as a\n\ntrustee. The Board further asserted that that it needed to expeditiously discuss whether to\nterminate Professor Harden or to file a lawsuit, partly because the College as a whole and\nindividual Board members potentially could have faced criminal penalties if there was a\nviolation of one of the statutes that, according to the counsel for the Board, prohibited Professor\nHarden from holding both positions:\n\n2Letter from Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral, to the Honorable Dana Trimble, Chair, Parkland College, Board\n\nof Trustees (\n\nApril\n\n24, 2017),\n\nat\n\n2.\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nMr. Lorna K. Geiler\n\nJuly 14, 2017\nPage 3\n\nThe Board and the College had to determine what action needed to\n\nbe taken to address this dilemma and if it needed to be taken before\nthe April 26th meeting when Ms. Harden was sworn in as Trustee.\nThe applicable statutes and case law seemed clear that\n\nsimultaneous service was illegal and the Board was faced with a\nnumber of issues that needed prompt attention. * * *\n\nSince there was concern that could impact each Trustee\n\nindividually, they needed to have the opportunity to question\ncounsel and obtain guidance with the highest Board participation\n\npossible. The only day on which all Board members could\nparticipate was April 17, 2017. Even that involved a Trustee\n\nrushing from the airport after returning to Champaign to make the\n\nmeeting, albeit slightly late.131\nThe Board added that the prospect of Professor Harden simultaneously serving as a professor and\nBoard member raised liability concerns and questions about whether certain actions taken by the\n\nBoard could be void or voidable. In his reply, Mr. Kraft disputed that an emergency meeting\nwas necessary. He asserted that the Board could have simply addressed the issue at its April 26,\n2016, meeting, or scheduled and provided proper notice for a special meeting:\nThe college had ample time to figure out a course of action\n\nfrom the moment they knew this Professor had submitted her\n\npetitions to be place[ d] on the ballot. Now they claim it was an\nemergency because she would not bend to their demands, even\nthough there were 9 days between the so- called emergency\nmeeting and the swearing in of the newly elected trustees. This left\n\nplenty of time to have a Special meeting — if it was even required\nat all J41\nIt is undisputed that the Board did not provide at least 48 hours advance notice of\n\nits April 17, 2017, meeting as required by section 2. 02( a) of OMA unless the meeting is \" held in\n3Letter from Lorna K. Geiler, Meyer Capel, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Office of the\nAttorney General ( April 28, 2017), at 2.\n\n4E -mail from John Kraft to Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Attorney General] ( May 18,\n2017).\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nMr. Lorna K. Geiler\n\nJuly 14, 2017\nPage 4\n\nthe event of a bona fide emergency.\" OMA does not define the phrase bona fide emergency, and\nno Illinois appellate court has addressed the issue of what constitutes a bona fide emergency, for\npurposes of section 2. 02( a). An \" emergency\" is defined as \" an unforeseen combination of\ncircumstances\n\nor\n\nthe resulting\n\nstate\n\nthat calls for immediate\n\naction.\" (\n\nEmphasis added.)\n\nWebster' s Third New International Dictionary, 741 ( 1993).\nBased on this definition, the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that\nunanticipated circumstances requiring immediate action that would justify providing less than\n48 hours' notice[ ]\"\nare necessary for a meeting to qualify as one held in the event of a bona fide\nemergency. ( Emphasis added.) Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 23656, issued May 31, 2013,\nat 4. In that matter, this office rejected a public body' s assertion that an account deficit that could\n\nhave resulted in the public body failing to meet payroll constituted a \" bona fide emergency\"\n\nunder section 2. 02( a), partly because the \" situation that precipitated\" the meeting \" was clearly\nforeseeable.\"\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 23656, at 4; see also River Road Neighborhood\n\nAss' n v. South Texas Sports, 720 S. W. 2d 551, 557 ( Tex. App. 1986) (\"\n\nThe mere necessity for\n\nquick action does not constitute an emergency where the situation calling for such action is one\nwhich reasonably should have been anticipated.\").\nThe Board's response to this office appears to assert that the need for a meeting to\naddress how to respond to Professor Harden serving as both a trustee and a professor could not\nhave been anticipated until she advised the Board in an April 17, 2017, e- mail that she rejected\n\nits legal concerns. However, that outcome was clearly possible, if not likely, because a week\nearlier, in a news media article, it was reported that Professor Harden had publicly rejected \" the\nargument that state law bars her from being both a faculty member and trustee at the same\n\nI think it's completely resolved,' Harden said of the legal questions surrounding her\nserving as a Parkland trustee. ' Obviously, if they intend to take it to court, I'm certainly ready for\nthat fight. But I consider it as much as resolved, and a non -issue entirely.\"' 5 Professor Harden\nacknowledged in another news media article6 that she subsequently met with the College about\ncollege[ ]\": \"'\n\nits concerns on April 12, 2017, and the Board' s response to this office contended that \"[ u] ntil\nreceipt of her April 17, 2017 email, the Board and the College administration were all hopeful\nthat she would make an appropriate decision.\"\n\nStill, Professor Harden' s subsequent decision to\n\nrefuse to either resign as a professor or agree to give up her newly elected position on the Board\ncannot reasonably be construed as unforeseen in light of her previous public comments.\n5Jim Meadows, Parkland College' s First African- American Trustee Faces Questions Due To\n\nFaculty Position, WILL/Illinois Public Media (April 10, 2017), https:// will.illinois. edu/ news/ story/parklandcolleges- first- african- american- trustee- faces- questions- due- to- her\n\n6Tom Kacich, UPDATED: Harden troubled by board' s decision ( April 18, 2017, 8: 49 AM),\nhttp:// www. news - gazette. com/ news/ IocalI2017- 04- 18/ updated- harden- troub led -boards -decision. html\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nMr. Lorna K. Geiler\n\nJuly 14, 2017\nPage 5\n\nMoreover, the Board has not demonstrated that its apparent scheduling conflicts\ntransformed the matter into a \" bona -fide emergency\" for purposes of section 2. 02( a) of OMA.\n\nThe Board asserts, without explanation, that April 17, 2017, was the only day all Board members\ncould participate in a meeting between the time Professor Harden advised that she intended to\nserve as both a trustee and a professor and when she was scheduled to be sworn in as a trustee. It\n\nis unclear whether it was actually not possible for the Board to meet at another time during that\nnine -day period after providing the public with 48 hours advance notice of the meeting or\nwhether it simply would have been inconvenient for one or more trustees. In the absence of\nevidence that Professor Harden' s potential conflict of interest was an unforeseen circumstance\n\nthat had to be addressed immediately because the Board had no viable alternative that would\n\nhave enabled it to hold a meeting for which 48 hours advance notice could have been provided,\nthis office is unable to conclude that the April 17, 2017, meeting was held in the event of a bona\n\nfide emergency. Accordingly, the Board violated section 2. 02( a) of OMA by failing to provide\nsufficient advance notice for that meeting. This violation, however, did not significantly deprive\nthe public of an opportunity to observe the Board conduct public business because —as discussed\n\nbelow —the purpose of the meeting was to consider in closed session a matter that the Board was\n\npermitted to discuss in closed session under the exceptions that it cited to close the meeting.\nTherefore, no remedial action is required.\nSections 2( c)( 1) and 2( c)( 11) of OMA\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). Section 2( a) of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings of public bodies shall be open to the\n\npublic unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\" Those\nexceptions * * *\n\nare in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and\n\ntherefore, the exceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly within\ntheir scope.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 2( b) ( West 2016).\n\nThe minutes of the Board' s April 17, 2017, meeting indicate that the Board\nentered\n\nclosed\n\nsession\n\npursuant\n\nto the section\n\n2( c)( 1)\n\nand\n\n2( c)( 11) (\n\n5 LCS 120/ 2( c)( 1), (\n\nc)( 11)\n\nWest 2016)) exceptions to OMA's general requirement that public bodies openly conduct public\nbusiness. Section 2( c)( 1) permits a public body to close a meeting to discuss \"[ t] he appointment,\nemployment, compensation, discipline, performance, or dismissal of specific employees of the\nbody or legal counsel for the public body[;]\" section 2( c)( 11) applies to: \" Litigation,\n\npublic\n\nwhen an action against, affecting or on behalf of the particular public body has been filed and is\npending before a court or administrative tribunal, or when the public body finds that an action is\nprobable or imminent, in which case the basis for the finding shall be recorded and entered into\nthe minutes of the closed meeting.\" The requirement that a public body document the basis for\nfinding litigation is probable\n\nor\n\nimminent is \" intended to prevent public bodies from using the\n\n\fr.John Kraft\n\nMr. Lorna K. Geiler\n\nJuly 14, 2017\nPage 6\n\ndistant possibility of litigation as a pretext for closing their meetings to the public. Henry, 356 Ill.\nApp. 3d 952, 957 ( 4th Dist. 2005).\n\nFurther, the scope of section 2( c)( 11) is limited to the\n\nstrategies, posture, theories, and consequences of the litigation itself.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No.\n83- 026, issued December 23, 1983, at 13- 14; 111. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 007, issued\nSeptember\n\n13, 2016, at 5.\n\nThe Board' s response to this office asserted: \" The meeting itself was properly\nclosed because the Board was required to consider whether or not it would direct Administration\n\nto terminate Ms. Harden, or alternatively whether or not it would bring litigation against Ms.\n\nHarden.\" 7 Based on this office' s review of the verbatim recording of the closed session, portions\nof the discussion pertained to the performance of individual employees, including whether to\nterminate Professor Harden. The remaining portions of the discussion focused on whether or not\nto file a lawsuit and the potential consequences of doing so. It is clear that this was not discussed\n\nas a remote possibility but rather as the primary option under consideration by the Board.\nIndeed, the Board filed a complaint for declaratory judgment the day after Ms. Harden was\n\nsworn -in as a trustee. 8 Because the closed session directly concerned both the performance and\npossible termination of a specific employee and imminent litigation, this office concludes that\nthe Board' s discussion was within the scope of the section 2( c)( 1) and 2( c)( 11) exceptions under\n\nwhich it closed the meeting.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 782- 9054. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau\n\nChief\n\nPublic Access Bureau\n47429 o 202 notice improper 2cl proper 2c11 proper univ\n\nLetter from Lorna K. Geller, Meyer Capel, to Steve Silverman,\n\nBureau Chief, Office of the\n\nAttorney General ( April 28, 2017), at 3.\n\n8Tom Kacich, New Parkland trustee denies conflict of interest in court filing ( May 27, 2017, 7: 00\nAM), http:// www.news- gazette. com/ news/ local/ 2017- 05- 27/ new-parkland-trustee- denies- conflict-interest-courtfiling. html\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Emergency board meeting on personnel and litigation","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-47429/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 14, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Lorna\n\nK. Geiler\n\nMeyer Capel\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nlgeiler@meyercapel. com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2015 PAC 47429\nDear Mr. Kraft and Ms. Geiler:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Parkland College (College) Board of Trustees (Board) violated OMA\n\nby failing to provide the public with at least 48 hours advance notice of a meeting in the absence\nof a bona fide emergency.\n\nHowever, this office also concludes that the Board's closed session\n\ndiscussion during the meeting was authorized by exceptions to the general requirement that\npublic bodies conduct public business openly.\nOn April 18, 2017, Mr. John Kraft submitted a Request for Review stating that\nthe Board held an emergency meeting on April 17, 2017, in which it discussed in closed session\npersonnel issues'\n\nand \"' potential litigation'\n\nrelated to an alleged conflict of interest on the part\n\nof a College professor, Ms. Rochelle Harden, who had recently been elected as a Board trustee.\nMr. Kraft disputed that those topics were \" legitimate emergencies\" I and questioned whether\nOMA authorized the Board to discuss the matter in closed session.\n\nE- mail from John Kraft to AG PAC [ Attorney General Public Access Counselor] (April 18,\n2017).\n\nOn April 24, 2017, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\n\nReview to the Board and asked it to provide a copy of the April 17, 2017, meeting minutes (draft\nform, if necessary) and the verbatim recording of the closed session discussion together with a\ndetailed explanation of the applicability of the specific exceptions in section 2(c) of OMA (5\nILCS 120/ 2(c) (West 2016)) that the Board cited as its bases for closing the meeting. This office\nalso asked the Board to provide a copy of any notice and agenda that was posted for the April 17,\n2017, meeting and a written response clarifying when the notice and agenda was posted. If the\n\nnotice and agenda was not posted at least 48 hours before the April 17, 2017, meeting\ncommenced, we asked the Board to provide a detailed explanation of how the meeting was held\nin the event of a \" bona fide emergency.\"\n\n2 On May 1, 2017, this office received those materials\n\nfrom the Board; on May 18, 2017, Mr. Kraft replied to the Board's written response.\nANALYSIS\n\nEmergency Meeting\nOMA provides that it is the \" public policy of this State that its citizens shall be\ngiven advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public\n\nbody is discussed or acted upon in anyway.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). Section 2. 02(a) of\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ p] ublic notice of any special meeting\nexcept a meeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of any rescheduled regular\n\nmeeting, or of any reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting[.]\"\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThe Board's response to this office stated that the Board posted an agenda for the\n\nApril 17, 2017, meeting at about 10: 34 a. m. on April 17, 2017. The Board stated it was justified\n\nin holding an emergency meeting because earlier that day, Professor Harden had responded to\nthe Board's concerns that it is illegal to simultaneously serve as a College employee and a Board\ntrustee by advising that she would neither resign her faculty position nor decline to serve as a\n\ntrustee. The Board further asserted that that it needed to expeditiously discuss whether to\nterminate Professor Harden or to file a lawsuit, partly because the College as a whole and\nindividual Board members potentially could have faced criminal penalties if there was a\nviolation of one of the statutes that, according to the counsel for the Board, prohibited Professor\nHarden from holding both positions:\n\n2 Letter from Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral, to the Honorable Dana Trimble, Chair, Parkland College, Board\n\nThe Board and the College had to determine what action needed to\n\nbe taken to address this dilemma and if it needed to be taken before\nthe April 26th meeting when Ms. Harden was sworn in as Trustee.\nThe applicable statutes and case law seemed clear that\n\nsimultaneous service was illegal and the Board was faced with a\nnumber of issues that needed prompt attention. * * *\n\nSince there was concern that could impact each Trustee\n\nindividually, they needed to have the opportunity to question\ncounsel and obtain guidance with the highest Board participation\n\npossible. The only day on which all Board members could\nparticipate was April 17, 2017. Even that involved a Trustee\n\nrushing from the airport after returning to Champaign to make the\n\nmeeting, albeit slightly late.131\nThe Board added that the prospect of Professor Harden simultaneously serving as a professor and\nBoard member raised liability concerns and questions about whether certain actions taken by the\n\nBoard could be void or voidable. In his reply, Mr. Kraft disputed that an emergency meeting\nwas necessary. He asserted that the Board could have simply addressed the issue at its April 26,\n2016, meeting, or scheduled and provided proper notice for a special meeting:\nThe college had ample time to figure out a course of action\n\nfrom the moment they knew this Professor had submitted her\n\npetitions to be place[ d] on the ballot. Now they claim it was an\nemergency because she would not bend to their demands, even\nthough there were 9 days between the so- called emergency\nmeeting and the swearing in of the newly elected trustees. This left\n\nplenty of time to have a Special meeting — if it was even required\nat all J41\nIt is undisputed that the Board did not provide at least 48 hours advance notice of\n\nits April 17, 2017, meeting as required by section 2. 02(a) of OMA unless the meeting is \" held in\n3 Letter from Lorna K. Geiler, Meyer Capel, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Office of the\nAttorney General (April 28, 2017), at 2.\n\n4E -mail from John Kraft to Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Attorney General] (May 18,\n\nthe event of a bona fide emergency.\" OMA does not define the phrase bona fide emergency, and\nno Illinois appellate court has addressed the issue of what constitutes a bona fide emergency, for\npurposes of section 2. 02(a). An \" emergency\" is defined as \" an unforeseen combination of\ncircumstances\n\nor\n\nthe resulting\n\nstate\n\nthat calls for immediate\n\naction.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\nWebster's Third New International Dictionary, 741 (1993).\nBased on this definition, the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that\nunanticipated circumstances requiring immediate action that would justify providing less than\n48 hours' notice[ ]\"\nare necessary for a meeting to qualify as one held in the event of a bona fide\nemergency. (Emphasis added.) Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 23656, issued May 31, 2013,\nat 4. In that matter, this office rejected a public body's assertion that an account deficit that could\n\nhave resulted in the public body failing to meet payroll constituted a \" bona fide emergency\"\n\nunder section 2. 02(a), partly because the \" situation that precipitated\" the meeting \" was clearly\nforeseeable.\"\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 23656, at 4; see also River Road Neighborhood\n\nAss' n v. South Texas Sports, 720 S. W. 2d 551, 557 (Tex. App. 1986) (\"\n\nThe mere necessity for\n\nquick action does not constitute an emergency where the situation calling for such action is one\nwhich reasonably should have been anticipated.\").\nThe Board's response to this office appears to assert that the need for a meeting to\naddress how to respond to Professor Harden serving as both a trustee and a professor could not\nhave been anticipated until she advised the Board in an April 17, 2017, e- mail that she rejected\n\nits legal concerns. However, that outcome was clearly possible, if not likely, because a week\nearlier, in a news media article, it was reported that Professor Harden had publicly rejected \" the\nargument that state law bars her from being both a faculty member and trustee at the same\n\nI think it's completely resolved,' Harden said of the legal questions surrounding her\nserving as a Parkland trustee. ' Obviously, if they intend to take it to court, I'm certainly ready for\nthat fight. But I consider it as much as resolved, and a non -issue entirely.\"' 5 Professor Harden\nacknowledged in another news media article6 that she subsequently met with the College about\ncollege[ ]\": \"'\n\nits concerns on April 12, 2017, and the Board's response to this office contended that \"[ u] ntil\nreceipt of her April 17, 2017 email, the Board and the College administration were all hopeful\nthat she would make an appropriate decision.\"\n\nStill, Professor Harden's subsequent decision to\n\nrefuse to either resign as a professor or agree to give up her newly elected position on the Board\ncannot reasonably be construed as unforeseen in light of her previous public comments.\n5 Jim Meadows, Parkland College's First African- American Trustee Faces Questions Due To\n\nFaculty Position, WILL/Illinois Public Media (April 10, 2017), https:// will.illinois. edu/ news/ story/parklandcolleges- first- african- american- trustee- faces- questions- due- to- her\n\n6 Tom Kacich, UPDATED: Harden troubled by board's decision (April 18, 2017, 8: 49 AM),\nhttp:// www. news - gazette. com/ news/ IocalI2017- 04- 18/ updated- harden- troub led -boards -decision. html\n\nMoreover, the Board has not demonstrated that its apparent scheduling conflicts\ntransformed the matter into a \" bona -fide emergency\" for purposes of section 2. 02(a) of OMA.\n\nThe Board asserts, without explanation, that April 17, 2017, was the only day all Board members\ncould participate in a meeting between the time Professor Harden advised that she intended to\nserve as both a trustee and a professor and when she was scheduled to be sworn in as a trustee. It\n\nis unclear whether it was actually not possible for the Board to meet at another time during that\nnine -day period after providing the public with 48 hours advance notice of the meeting or\nwhether it simply would have been inconvenient for one or more trustees. In the absence of\nevidence that Professor Harden's potential conflict of interest was an unforeseen circumstance\n\nthat had to be addressed immediately because the Board had no viable alternative that would\n\nhave enabled it to hold a meeting for which 48 hours advance notice could have been provided,\nthis office is unable to conclude that the April 17, 2017, meeting was held in the event of a bona\n\nfide emergency. Accordingly, the Board violated section 2. 02(a) of OMA by failing to provide\nsufficient advance notice for that meeting. This violation, however, did not significantly deprive\nthe public of an opportunity to observe the Board conduct public business because —as discussed\n\nbelow —the purpose of the meeting was to consider in closed session a matter that the Board was\n\npermitted to discuss in closed session under the exceptions that it cited to close the meeting.\nTherefore, no remedial action is required.\nSections 2(c)(1) and 2(c)(11) of OMA\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). Section 2(a) of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings of public bodies shall be open to the\n\npublic unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\" Those\nexceptions * * *\n\nare in derogation of the requirement that public bodies meet in the open, and\n\ntherefore, the exceptions are to be strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly within\ntheir scope.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 2(b) (West 2016).\n\nThe minutes of the Board's April 17, 2017, meeting indicate that the Board\nentered\n\nclosed\n\nsession\n\npursuant\n\nto the section\n\n2(c)(1)\n\nand\n\n2(c)(11) (5 LCS 120/ 2(c)(1), (c)(11)\n\nWest 2016)) exceptions to OMA's general requirement that public bodies openly conduct public\nbusiness. Section 2(c)(1) permits a public body to close a meeting to discuss \"[ t] he appointment,\nemployment, compensation, discipline, performance, or dismissal of specific employees of the\nbody or legal counsel for the public body[;]\" section 2(c)(11) applies to: \" Litigation,\n\npublic\n\nwhen an action against, affecting or on behalf of the particular public body has been filed and is\npending before a court or administrative tribunal, or when the public body finds that an action is\nprobable or imminent, in which case the basis for the finding shall be recorded and entered into\nthe minutes of the closed meeting.\" The requirement that a public body document the basis for\n\ndistant possibility of litigation as a pretext for closing their meetings to the public. Henry, 356 Ill.\nApp. 3d 952, 957 (4th Dist. 2005).\n\nFurther, the scope of section 2(c)(11) is limited to the\n\nstrategies, posture, theories, and consequences of the litigation itself.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No.\n83- 026, issued December 23, 1983, at 13- 14; 111. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 007, issued\nSeptember\n\n13, 2016, at 5.\n\nThe Board's response to this office asserted: \" The meeting itself was properly\nclosed because the Board was required to consider whether or not it would direct Administration\n\nto terminate Ms. Harden, or alternatively whether or not it would bring litigation against Ms.\n\nHarden.\" 7 Based on this office's review of the verbatim recording of the closed session, portions\nof the discussion pertained to the performance of individual employees, including whether to\nterminate Professor Harden. The remaining portions of the discussion focused on whether or not\nto file a lawsuit and the potential consequences of doing so. It is clear that this was not discussed\n\nas a remote possibility but rather as the primary option under consideration by the Board.\nIndeed, the Board filed a complaint for declaratory judgment the day after Ms. Harden was\n\nsworn -in as a trustee. 8 Because the closed session directly concerned both the performance and\npossible termination of a specific employee and imminent litigation, this office concludes that\nthe Board's discussion was within the scope of the section 2(c)(1) and 2(c)(11) exceptions under\n\nwhich it closed the meeting.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 782- 9054. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE SILVERMAN\nBureau\n\nChief\n\nPublic Access Bureau\n47429 o 202 notice improper 2cl proper 2c11 proper univ\n\nLetter from Lorna K. Geller, Meyer Capel, to Steve Silverman,\n\nBureau Chief, Office of the\n\nAttorney General (April 28, 2017), at 3.\n\n8 Tom Kacich, New Parkland trustee denies conflict of interest in court filing (May 27, 2017, 7: 00\nAM), http:// www.news- gazette. com/ news/ local/ 2017- 05- 27/ new-parkland-trustee- denies- conflict-interest-courtfiling. html"}
{"id":1197,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-05-26","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["47489","47491"],"title":"Decatur Township Cemetery Board failed to provide accessible meeting notice","filename":"47489 47491, issued May 26, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1583,"summary":"The PAC investigated allegations that the Decatur Township Cemetery Board failed to provide proper advance notice and agenda access for its April 18, 2017, meeting. The PAC determined the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide accessible public notice, but found no violation regarding website posting requirements.","plain_summary":"A reporter alleged that a local cemetery board held a meeting without properly posting the agenda where the public could actually see it. The Attorney General's office agreed that the board failed to provide proper notice because the building where the agenda was posted was locked. However, the office also clarified that the board was not required to post the agenda on a website since it did not maintain one.","holding":"The Decatur Township Cemetery Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide accessible advance notice of its meeting.","legal_question":"Did the public body violate the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide accessible advance notice and an agenda for a public meeting?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Decatur Township Cemetery Board","requesting_party":"Ryan Vincent Voyles (Herald & Review)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The accessibility and timing of public notice and agenda posting for a township cemetery board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_c/Duty-to-make-notice-and-agenda-continuously-available/47489 47491, issued May 26, 2017.pdf","sha256":"2cdb3bc2699ee0b0d1c9021a54be59a5f65e7ff511f02080937cfa197ed0ba71","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","agenda","Open Meetings Act","public access"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMay 26, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ryan Vincent Voyles\nStaff Writer\nHerald & Review\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nrvoyles@herald- review. com\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jeffrey R. Jurgens\n\nSorling Northrup\n1 North Old State Capitol\nPlaza, Suite 200\nP. O. Box 5131\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62705\njfiurgens@sorlinglaw. com\n\nRE: OMA Requests for Review — 2017 PAC 47489; 2017 PAC 47491\nDear Mr. Voyles,\n\nand Mr. Jurgens:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nSupp.)). For the reasons below, the Public Access Bureau\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2015\n\nconcludes that the Decatur Township ( Township) Cemetery Board ( Board) violated OMA by\n\nfailing to provide advance notice for its April 18, 2017, meeting.\nOn April 19, 2017, the Public Access Bureau received a Request for Review from\n\nRyan Voyles, on behalf of the Herald & Review, alleging the Board met on April 18, 2017,\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001\n\nEast Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 •\n\nTTY: (\n\n618) 529. 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Ryan Vincent Voyles\nMr. Jeffrey R. Jurgens\nMay 26, 2017\nPage 2\n\nwithout making the agenda for the meeting available for public review for the entire 48- hour\nperiod before the meeting. Specifically, Mr. Voyles alleged that the agenda was posted on\n\nbulletin boards inside the Township building on the afternoon of Sunday, April 16, 2017, but the\ninside of the Township building was not accessible until the moming of April 17, 2017. Mr.\nVoyles also alleged that the meeting agenda was not posted on the Township' s website or social\nmedia accounts before the meeting. Mr. Voyles enclosed photographs of the agenda through\nglass doors of the Township building with his Request for Review. On April 19, 2017, the\n\nPublic Access Bureau received a second Request for Review concerning the Board' s April 18,\n\n2017, meeting from\n\nalleged that the agenda for the meeting was\n\nnot continuously available for the full 48 hours before the meeting because the Township\n\nbuilding was locked until Monday morning.\n\nalso alleged that the Board should have\n\nposted notice of the meeting in the newspaper or on the Township' s Facebook page.\nOn April 24, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Requests for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to Mr. Voyles and\ns allegation that the agenda for the\nApril 18, 2017, meeting was not continuously available for public review for the 48 hours before\nthe meeting. We also asked the Board to clarify whether it has a website that its full-time staff\n\nmaintains. On May 8, 2017, counsel for the Board provided a written response. On May 11,\n2017, this office sent a copy of the Board's response to Mr. Voyles and\nthey did not\nreply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \" given\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\n\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2014); see also Gosnell v. Hogan, 179\nIll. App. 3d 161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989) (\"\nthe intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be\ntaken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\")\nTo that end, section 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2014)) provides,\n\nin pertinent part, that \"[ a] n agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal office\nof the public body and at the location where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance\nof the\n\nholding of the meeting[,]\" and that \"[ a] public body that has a website that the full- time\n\nstaff of the public body maintains shall also post on its website the agenda of any regular\nmeetings of the governing body of that public body.\" Section 2. 02( b) of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n\n140/ 2. 02( b) ( West 2014)) adds that \" a public body that has a website that the full- time staff of\n\nthe public body maintains shall post notice on its website of all meetings of the governing body\nof the public\n\nbody.\"\n\nSection 2. 02( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2014)) further requires\n\n\fMr. Ryan Vincent Voyles\n\nMr. Jeffrey R. Jurgens\nMay 26, 2017\nPage 3\n\nthat \" at least one copy any requested notice and agenda for the meeting is continuously available\nfor public review during the entire 48- hour period preceding the meeting.\"\nThe Board's response stated that a copy of the agenda for the April 18, 2017,\nmeeting was posted at the Township building in a glass case \" behind glass doors that are locked\n\nafter hours.\" I The Board stated that although the agenda was visible through the locked glass\ndoors, it \" was difficult to read[.]\"\n\n2 The Board stated that it has since changed how it posts\n\nagendas at the Township building so that now the agendas are posted directly on the glass doors.\nThe Board also stated that it held another meeting on April 25, 2017, where the Board discussed\nand took action on items that were on the agenda for the April 18, 2017, meeting.\nBased on the photographs of the agenda enclosed with Mr. Voyles' Request for\n\nReview and the Board' s admission that the agenda for the meeting was difficult to read through\nthe doors of the Township building, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 02( c)\n\nof OMA by holding a meeting on April 18, 2017, without making the agenda for the meeting\ncontinuously available for public review for the entire 48- hour period before the meeting.\n\nBecause the Board has confirmed that it held another meeting on April 25, 2017, where the items\non the agenda for the April 18, 2017, meeting were reconsidered and for which an agenda was\nproperly posted and available for continuous review by the public at least 48 hours before the\n\nmeeting commenced, this office concludes that no further action by the Board is necessary to\nremedy its violation of section 2. 02( c) of OMA.\nWith respect to\n\ns allegation that the Board should have published\n\nnotice of the April 18, 2017, meeting in the newspaper, OMA only requires that a change in the\nschedule of regular meetings be published in the newspaper. See, 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 03 ( West 2014).\n\nOMA does not require the Board to publish notice of its regular meeting in a newspaper.\nalso appears to allege that posting the agenda at the Township building was not\nconvenient. As noted above, section 2. 02( a) of OMA requires that a copy of the agenda be\nposted at the principal office of the public body and at the location of the meeting. The Board\nstated that its principal office and the location of the meeting is the Township building. Thus,\nthe Board was not required to post the agenda for the meeting at any other location.\nMr. Voyles and\n\nalso alleged that the Board was required to post notice\n\nof its April 18, 2017, meeting on the Township' s website or the Board' s social media accounts.\nLetter from Jeffrey R. Jurgens, Sorling Northrup, to Matt Hartman, Assistant Attorney General,\nPublic Access Bureau ( May 8, 2017).\n\n2Letter from Jeffrey R. Jurgens, Sorling Northrup, to Matt Hartman, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau ( May 8, 2017).\n\n\fr.Ryan Vincent Voyles\n\nMr. Jeffrey R. Jurgens\nMay 26, 2017\nPage 4\n\nThe Board responded by stating that it does not maintain a separate website from the Township' s\nwebsite and that the Board is not the governing body of the Township. Because sections 2. 02( a)\n\nand 2. 02( b) of OMA require a public body that has a website maintained by its own staff to post\nnotice and an agenda of all regular meetings of the governing body of the public body and\nbecause the Board does not have a website, this office concludes that the Board did not violate\n\nOMA by failing to post a copy of the notice and agenda for the April 18, 2017, meeting on the\nTownship' s website. In addition, OMA does not require a public body to post notice of its\nmeetings to its social media accounts because those accounts are not websites under the control\n\nof and maintained by the public body. See, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 21667, issued\nOctober 31, 2012.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of these matters does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 782- 9054 or the Springfield address on the first page. This letter serves to close these files.\nVery truly yours,\n\nH\n\nTM\n\nAssistant Attorney General,\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n47489 47491 o 202c notice improper cern\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Notice and agenda posting for a cemetery board meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-47489/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMay 26, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Ryan Vincent Voyles\nStaff Writer\nHerald & Review\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nrvoyles@herald- review. com\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jeffrey R. Jurgens\n\nSorling Northrup\n1 North Old State Capitol\nPlaza, Suite 200\nP. O. Box 5131\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62705\njfiurgens@sorlinglaw. com\n\nRE: OMA Requests for Review — 2017 PAC 47489; 2017 PAC 47491\nDear Mr. Voyles,\n\nand Mr. Jurgens:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nSupp.)). For the reasons below, the Public Access Bureau\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2015\n\nconcludes that the Decatur Township (Township) Cemetery Board (Board) violated OMA by\n\nfailing to provide advance notice for its April 18, 2017, meeting.\nOn April 19, 2017, the Public Access Bureau received a Request for Review from\n\nRyan Voyles, on behalf of the Herald & Review, alleging the Board met on April 18, 2017,\n\nwithout making the agenda for the meeting available for public review for the entire 48- hour\nperiod before the meeting. Specifically, Mr. Voyles alleged that the agenda was posted on\n\nbulletin boards inside the Township building on the afternoon of Sunday, April 16, 2017, but the\ninside of the Township building was not accessible until the moming of April 17, 2017. Mr.\nVoyles also alleged that the meeting agenda was not posted on the Township's website or social\nmedia accounts before the meeting. Mr. Voyles enclosed photographs of the agenda through\nglass doors of the Township building with his Request for Review. On April 19, 2017, the\n\nPublic Access Bureau received a second Request for Review concerning the Board's April 18,\n\n2017, meeting from\n\nalleged that the agenda for the meeting was\n\nnot continuously available for the full 48 hours before the meeting because the Township\n\nbuilding was locked until Monday morning.\n\nalso alleged that the Board should have\n\nposted notice of the meeting in the newspaper or on the Township's Facebook page.\nOn April 24, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Requests for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to Mr. Voyles and\ns allegation that the agenda for the\nApril 18, 2017, meeting was not continuously available for public review for the 48 hours before\nthe meeting. We also asked the Board to clarify whether it has a website that its full-time staff\n\nmaintains. On May 8, 2017, counsel for the Board provided a written response. On May 11,\n2017, this office sent a copy of the Board's response to Mr. Voyles and\nthey did not\nreply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \" given\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\n\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2014); see also Gosnell v. Hogan, 179\nIll. App. 3d 161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989) (\"\nthe intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be\ntaken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\")\nTo that end, section 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2014)) provides,\n\nin pertinent part, that \"[ a] n agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal office\nof the public body and at the location where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance\nof the\n\nholding of the meeting[,]\" and that \"[ a] public body that has a website that the full- time\n\nstaff of the public body maintains shall also post on its website the agenda of any regular\nmeetings of the governing body of that public body.\" Section 2. 02(b) of OMA (5 ILCS\n\n140/ 2. 02(b) (West 2014)) adds that \" a public body that has a website that the full- time staff of\n\nthe public body maintains shall post notice on its website of all meetings of the governing body\n\nthat \" at least one copy any requested notice and agenda for the meeting is continuously available\nfor public review during the entire 48- hour period preceding the meeting.\"\nThe Board's response stated that a copy of the agenda for the April 18, 2017,\nmeeting was posted at the Township building in a glass case \" behind glass doors that are locked\n\nafter hours.\" I The Board stated that although the agenda was visible through the locked glass\ndoors, it \" was difficult to read[.]\"\n\n2 The Board stated that it has since changed how it posts\n\nagendas at the Township building so that now the agendas are posted directly on the glass doors.\nThe Board also stated that it held another meeting on April 25, 2017, where the Board discussed\nand took action on items that were on the agenda for the April 18, 2017, meeting.\nBased on the photographs of the agenda enclosed with Mr. Voyles' Request for\n\nReview and the Board's admission that the agenda for the meeting was difficult to read through\nthe doors of the Township building, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 02(c)\n\nof OMA by holding a meeting on April 18, 2017, without making the agenda for the meeting\ncontinuously available for public review for the entire 48- hour period before the meeting.\n\nBecause the Board has confirmed that it held another meeting on April 25, 2017, where the items\non the agenda for the April 18, 2017, meeting were reconsidered and for which an agenda was\nproperly posted and available for continuous review by the public at least 48 hours before the\n\nmeeting commenced, this office concludes that no further action by the Board is necessary to\nremedy its violation of section 2. 02(c) of OMA.\nWith respect to\n\ns allegation that the Board should have published\n\nnotice of the April 18, 2017, meeting in the newspaper, OMA only requires that a change in the\nschedule of regular meetings be published in the newspaper. See, 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 03 (West 2014).\n\nOMA does not require the Board to publish notice of its regular meeting in a newspaper.\nalso appears to allege that posting the agenda at the Township building was not\nconvenient. As noted above, section 2. 02(a) of OMA requires that a copy of the agenda be\nposted at the principal office of the public body and at the location of the meeting. The Board\nstated that its principal office and the location of the meeting is the Township building. Thus,\nthe Board was not required to post the agenda for the meeting at any other location.\nMr. Voyles and\n\nalso alleged that the Board was required to post notice\n\nof its April 18, 2017, meeting on the Township's website or the Board's social media accounts.\nLetter from Jeffrey R. Jurgens, Sorling Northrup, to Matt Hartman, Assistant Attorney General,\nPublic Access Bureau (May 8, 2017).\n\n2 Letter from Jeffrey R. Jurgens, Sorling Northrup, to Matt Hartman, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nThe Board responded by stating that it does not maintain a separate website from the Township's\nwebsite and that the Board is not the governing body of the Township. Because sections 2. 02(a)\n\nand 2. 02(b) of OMA require a public body that has a website maintained by its own staff to post\nnotice and an agenda of all regular meetings of the governing body of the public body and\nbecause the Board does not have a website, this office concludes that the Board did not violate\n\nOMA by failing to post a copy of the notice and agenda for the April 18, 2017, meeting on the\nTownship's website. In addition, OMA does not require a public body to post notice of its\nmeetings to its social media accounts because those accounts are not websites under the control\n\nof and maintained by the public body. See, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 21667, issued\nOctober 31, 2012.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of these matters does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 782- 9054 or the Springfield address on the first page. This letter serves to close these files.\nVery truly yours,\n\nH\n\nTM\n\nAssistant Attorney General,\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n47489 47491 o 202c notice improper cern"}
{"id":1198,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-08-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["47674"],"title":"NIU Board of Trustees Executive Committee did not violate OMA at joint sessions","filename":"47674, issued August 18, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2236,"summary":"A requester alleged that a majority of a quorum of the Northern Illinois University Board of Trustees' Executive Committee met in violation of the Open Meetings Act during joint sessions with other university-affiliated boards. The PAC determined that the attendance of two committee members at these sessions did not constitute a violation of OMA.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau that two members of the Northern Illinois University Board of Trustees' Executive Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by meeting privately with members of the NIU Foundation and Alumni Association. The Bureau investigated and found that although the two members constituted a majority of a quorum of the Executive Committee, the joint sessions were informational only—no public business was discussed or deliberated. Therefore, the Bureau concluded that no violation occurred and the case was closed.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau concluded that the attendance of two members of the Executive Committee at joint sessions did not violate the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether the attendance of two members of the Executive Committee of the Northern Illinois University Board of Trustees at joint sessions with other university boards constituted a meeting of a majority of a quorum in violation of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Northern Illinois University Board of Trustees","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The matter concerned whether joint sessions between university board members and affiliated foundation/alumni association members constituted an improperly held public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/47674, issued August 18, 2017.pdf","sha256":"19e67592baa65bdc939d982cc91aae5bc3f6bc903f4bb41dde521e770df166f0","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["Open Meetings Act","quorum","university board","public meeting"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nAugust 18, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Gregory A. Brady\nActing Vice President and General Counsel\nNorthern Illinois University\nOffice of the General Counsel\nAltgeld Hall 330\nDeKalb, Illinois 60115-2828\ngbrady@niu.edu\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 47674\nDear\n\nand Mr. Brady:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that the attendance of two members of the Executive Committee (Executive\nCommittee) of the Board of Trustees (Board) of Northern Illinois University (NIU) at joint\nsessions with members of the NIU Foundation and members of the NIU Alumni Association did\nnot violate OMA.\nOn May I, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that a majority of a quorum of the Executive Committee met in\nviolation of OMA when two of its members met with two members of the NIU Foundation\nBoard and two members of the NIU Alumni Association Board. Although\ndid not\nprovide this office with the dates of those joint sessions, he alleged that he learned ab\n�sessions at a March 9,2017, Board meeting. As part of his Request for Review\n-provided this office with a link to the Bylaws of the Board (Bylaws), a link to audio of the\n\n500 South Second Street. Springfield. Illinois 62706 • (217)782-1090 • TTY: (217)785 -2771 • Fax: (2 I 7) 782-7046\nI 00 West Randolph Street. Chicago. Illinois, 6060 I • (3 I 2) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\nI 001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (6 I 8) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Gregory A. Brady\nAugust 18,2017\nPage 2\n\nMarch 9,2017, Board meeting, and a copy of the section of the Bylaws pertaining to the\nExecu!Ive\n. Comm1ttee.\n.\nI\nOn May 25, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nExecutive Committee and asked it to provide a detailed written response to-­\nRequest for Review. On June 6,2017, Mr. Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice�\nGeneral Counsel of Northern Illinois University, submitted a written response on behalf of NIU.\nMr. Brady explained:\nAt no time during any of these sessions was there business\nbefore the Executive Committee. No Executive Committee was\nscheduled, and no matters within the purview of the Executive\nCommittee were discussed at these sessions. The participants\nwatched informational presentations by University and Foundation\nadministrators. The participants spoke generally about challenges\nfacing higher education in Illinois, and they were thanked for their\nleadership and commitment. * * * No Final Action was ever taken\nby the NIU Board Chair and Vice Chair at these joint\ninformational sessions. r2 J\nMr. Brady also explained that five joint sessions occurred:\nDate\n7/12/16\n\n8/18/16\n\nNIU Board Attendees\nMark Strauss (then-NIU Board\nChair) [and voting member of the\nExecutive Committee]; John Butler\n(then-NIU Board Vice Chair) [and\nvoting member of the Executive\nCommittee].\nMark Strauss and John Butler.\n\n11/17/16 Mark Strauss and John Butler.\n\n1\n\nE-mail from\n\nDiscussion\nInformational discussion on the priorities of\nthe University and the activities of the NIU\nFoundation and NIU Alumni Association in\nsupport of those priorities.\n\nPresentation on branding by Interim Vice\nPresident for Marketing and Communications\nand the Director of University Marketing.\nPresentation on recruitment by former Vice\nPresident for Student Affairs and Enrollment\nManagement and former Director of\n\nto Public Access (May I, 2017).\n\n'Letter from Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois\nUniversity, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney\nGeneral, at 3-4 (June 6, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Gregory A. Brady\nAugust 18, 2017\nPage 3\n\n2/17/17\n\n5/28/17\n\nAdmissions.\nJohn Butler (NIU Board Chair) [and Presentation on the new NIU marketing\ncampaign presented by Interim Vice President\nvoting member of the Executive\nCommittee], and Wheeler Coleman for Marketing and Communications and the\n(NIU Board Vice Chair) [and voting Director of University Marketing.\nmember of the Executive\nCommittee] appeared after the\npresentation to thank participants.\nPresentation on a new Foundation campaign\nNo members of the Board or\npresented by NIU Foundation President. 3\nExecutive Committee attended.\n\nO�this office forwarded a copy ofNIU's response to\nOn June 13, 201,-submitted his reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2.01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2.0l (West 2016)) provides that \"[a]ll\nmeetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are\nconvenient and open to the public.\" (Emphasis added.) In order for the requirements of OMA to\napply, a gathering must constitute a \"meeting\" as defined by section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2014)):\n\"Meeting\" means any gathering, whether in person or by\nvideo or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means (such\nas, without limitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant\nmessaging),' or other means of contemporaneous interactive\ncommunication, of a majority of a quorum of the members of a\npublic body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\n(Emphasis added.)\nThis office has listened to the audio recording of the March 9,2017, Board\nmeeting. During that meeting, the Chair of the NIU Foundation Board spoke about members of\nthe Board meeting with members of the NIU Foundation Board and NIU Alumni Association\nBoard, focusing their discussions on four strategies: recruitment, capital projects, corporate\n\n3\n\nLetter from Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois\nUniversity, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney\nGeneral, at 3 (June 6, 20 I 7).\n\n\fMr. Gregory A. Brady\nAugust 18, 2017\nPage 4\nrelationships, and raising unrestricted revenue. 4 The Board Chair explained that the Board Chair\nand Vice Chair had been meeting with two members of each of the other boards and stated that\nthe joint meetings were useful to raise awareness of what the other groups were doing. 5 He also\nclarified that because of the requirements of OMA, the Board was being mindful that no more\nthan two members of Board could meet for any purpose that concerns University business. 6•\n--ontends that because the Board Chair and Vice Chair, who attended those meetings,\nare also on the Executive Committee, an Executive Committee meeting was held in violation of\nOMA.\nThe Bylaws pertaining to the Executive Committee provide that \"[t]he Executive\nCommittee shall be comprised of the Board Chair, the Board Vice Chair, the Board Secretary\nand a Member of the Board elected by the Board. The President shall be a nonvoting member of\nthe Committee.\" 7 The Bylaws further provide that instead of meeting regularly, \"[t]he Executive\nCommittee shall meet upon the re uest of the Board Chair, the President, or any two of the\nmembers of the Committee. \" 8\nas not alleged that any such meeting was\ncontends that because the Executive Committee is comprised\nrequested. Rather,\nof four voting members, a majority of a quorum consists of two members of the Executive\nCommittee, and two members of the Executive Committee attended the joint sessions.\nAccordingly, a majority of a quorum of the Executive Board attended the joint sessions.\nHowever, the requirements of OMA are not automatically triggered merely because a majority of\na quorum attends a gathering. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, issued July 14, I 995, at 9-10\n(\"The Act does not, however, apply to every gathering of a majority of a quorum of a public\nbody.\").\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" 1974 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 7. \"In theory, there is\nno absolute prohibition against the members of a public body attending an 'informational\n'Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, Meeting, March 9, 2017, audio available at\nhttp://niu.edu/board/meetings/2017/index.shtml, at approximately 57:20.\n'Board of Trustees ofNorthern Illinois University, Meeting, March 9, 2017, audio available at\nhttp://niu.edu/board/meetings/2017/index.shtml, at approximately I: 18:36.\n6\n\nBoard of Trustees ofNorthem Illinois University, Meeting, March 9, 2017, audio available at\nhttp://niu.edu/board/meetings/2017/index.shtml, at approximately I: 18:36.\n'Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI,§ l .B.\n'Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI, § l .C.\n\n\fMr. Gregory A. Brady\nAugust 18, 20 I 7\nPage 5\n\nmeeting' without triggering the application of\" OMA, as long as the members do not make\n\"[d]eliberational statements\" or engage in \"unrecorded discussions\" amongst themselves. Ill.\nAtt'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11. In that opinion the Attorney General concluded that the\n\"mere fact that a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in\na bona fide presentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" did not\nmake the presentation subject to OMA, but the extensive discussions of public business by\nmembers of two county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA.\n(Emphasis in original.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11; see also Nabhani v. Coglianese,\n552 F. Supp. 657,661 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (a gathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of\nOMA when there is \"no examining or weighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no\nexchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [and] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter\nof [public] business.\")\nMr. Brady explained in the response submitted on behalf of NIU that:\nThe joint sessions * * * were the idea of the Chair of the NIU\nFoundation Board, JeffYordon. The purpose of these sessions was\nto identify priorities of the University and specifically how the\nNIU Foundation and the NIU Alumni Association (both separate\nlegal entities from Northern Illinois University) can help with\nthose priorities. With this idea, the NIU Foundation extended\ninvitations to representatives of the NIU Board of Trustees and the\nNIU Alumni Association to attend the sessions.191\nThe Bylaws provide that the purpose of the Executive Committee is \"to act on\nbehalf of the Board and to discuss and offer counsel on University operations as needed.\" 10\n(Emphasis added.) \"The Executive Committee shall meet upon the request of the Board Chair,\nthe President, or any two of the members of the Committee.\" 11 The Bylaws further provide that\nthe powers and duties of the Executive Committee are to \"discuss and act upon all matters\npertaining to the Board • * * between meetings of the Board except policy changes. The\nExecutive Committee will only take action on routine matters that require Board action between\n\n'Letter from Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois\nUniversity, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney\nGeneral, at 2 (June 6, 2017).\n\"Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI,§ I .A.\n11 Board of Trustees ofNorthern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI, §1.C.\n\n\fMr. Gregory A. Brady\nAugust 18, 2017\nPage 6\n\nregular Board meetings or on other matters when specifically requested to do so by the full\nBoard.\" 12\nThe available information indicates that the purpose of the joint sessions was to\nshare information regarding the challenges facing higher education in Illinois and at NIU and, in\nparticular, to find ways for the NIU Foundation and NIU Alumni Association to help NIU.\nThere is no indication that during the joint sessions the two members of the Executive\nCommittee engaged in deliberative discussion of University operations, took action on routine\nmatters that require Board action between regular Board meetings, or otherwise attempted to\nreach an accord on any specific matter within the purview of the Executive Committee. Further,\nthere is no indication that any of the individuals empowered to request a meeting of the\nExecutive Committee did so. Thus, it does not appear that the Board members who attended the\nmeetings in question did so in their capacities as members of the Executive Committee.\nAccordingly, based on the available information, this office is unable to conclude that the joint\nsessions attended by two members of the Executive Committee constituted a \"meeting\" of the\nExecutive Committee subject to the requirements of OMA. 13\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me at (312) 814-5201 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of the first page of\nthis letter.\n\n1\nome\nPublic Access Bur\n\n47674 o 2.01 proper univ\n\"Board of Trustees ofNorthern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI, §1.D.\n13 This office notes that the Board has recently amended its Bylaws to increase the membership of\nthe Executive Committee to five voting members, with the President as a non-voting member. Letter from Gregory\nA. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois University, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, at 4-5 (June 6, 2017); Board of\nTrustees of Northern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI, § I .B., available at\n. http://www.niu.edu/board/bylaws/index.shtml#B6 (last viewed August I 0, 2017). Because a majority of a quorum\nof the Executive Committee is now three, the attendance of two members of the Executive Committee at a gathering\nwould not ordinarily violate OMA.\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Joint sessions of a university board with affiliated foundation members","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-47674/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nAugust 18, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Gregory A. Brady\nActing Vice President and General Counsel\nNorthern Illinois University\nOffice of the General Counsel\nAltgeld Hall 330\nDeKalb, Illinois 60115-2828\ngbrady@niu.edu\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 47674\nDear\n\nand Mr. Brady:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that the attendance of two members of the Executive Committee (Executive\nCommittee) of the Board of Trustees (Board) of Northern Illinois University (NIU) at joint\nsessions with members of the NIU Foundation and members of the NIU Alumni Association did\nnot violate OMA.\nOn May I, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that a majority of a quorum of the Executive Committee met in\nviolation of OMA when two of its members met with two members of the NIU Foundation\nBoard and two members of the NIU Alumni Association Board. Although\ndid not\nprovide this office with the dates of those joint sessions, he alleged that he learned ab\n�sessions at a March 9,2017, Board meeting. As part of his Request for Review\n-provided this office with a link to the Bylaws of the Board (Bylaws), a link to audio of the\n\nMarch 9,2017, Board meeting, and a copy of the section of the Bylaws pertaining to the\nExecu!Ive\n. Comm1ttee.\n.\nI\nOn May 25, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nExecutive Committee and asked it to provide a detailed written response to-­\nRequest for Review. On June 6,2017, Mr. Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice�\nGeneral Counsel of Northern Illinois University, submitted a written response on behalf of NIU.\nMr. Brady explained:\nAt no time during any of these sessions was there business\nbefore the Executive Committee. No Executive Committee was\nscheduled, and no matters within the purview of the Executive\nCommittee were discussed at these sessions. The participants\nwatched informational presentations by University and Foundation\nadministrators. The participants spoke generally about challenges\nfacing higher education in Illinois, and they were thanked for their\nleadership and commitment. * * * No Final Action was ever taken\nby the NIU Board Chair and Vice Chair at these joint\ninformational sessions. r2 J\nMr. Brady also explained that five joint sessions occurred:\nDate\n7/12/16\n\n8/18/16\n\nNIU Board Attendees\nMark Strauss (then-NIU Board\nChair) [and voting member of the\nExecutive Committee]; John Butler\n(then-NIU Board Vice Chair) [and\nvoting member of the Executive\nCommittee].\nMark Strauss and John Butler.\n\n11/17/16 Mark Strauss and John Butler.\n\n1\n\nE-mail from\n\nDiscussion\nInformational discussion on the priorities of\nthe University and the activities of the NIU\nFoundation and NIU Alumni Association in\nsupport of those priorities.\n\nPresentation on branding by Interim Vice\nPresident for Marketing and Communications\nand the Director of University Marketing.\nPresentation on recruitment by former Vice\nPresident for Student Affairs and Enrollment\nManagement and former Director of\n\nto Public Access (May I, 2017).\n\n'Letter from Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois\nUniversity, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney\n\n2/17/17\n\n5/28/17\n\nAdmissions.\nJohn Butler (NIU Board Chair) [and Presentation on the new NIU marketing\ncampaign presented by Interim Vice President\nvoting member of the Executive\nCommittee], and Wheeler Coleman for Marketing and Communications and the\n(NIU Board Vice Chair) [and voting Director of University Marketing.\nmember of the Executive\nCommittee] appeared after the\npresentation to thank participants.\nPresentation on a new Foundation campaign\nNo members of the Board or\npresented by NIU Foundation President. 3\nExecutive Committee attended.\n\nO�this office forwarded a copy ofNIU's response to\nOn June 13, 201,-submitted his reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2.01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2.0l (West 2016)) provides that \"[a]ll\nmeetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are\nconvenient and open to the public.\" (Emphasis added.) In order for the requirements of OMA to\napply, a gathering must constitute a \"meeting\" as defined by section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/1.02 (West 2014)):\n\"Meeting\" means any gathering, whether in person or by\nvideo or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means (such\nas, without limitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant\nmessaging),' or other means of contemporaneous interactive\ncommunication, of a majority of a quorum of the members of a\npublic body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\n(Emphasis added.)\nThis office has listened to the audio recording of the March 9,2017, Board\nmeeting. During that meeting, the Chair of the NIU Foundation Board spoke about members of\nthe Board meeting with members of the NIU Foundation Board and NIU Alumni Association\nBoard, focusing their discussions on four strategies: recruitment, capital projects, corporate\n\n3\n\nLetter from Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois\nUniversity, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney\n\nrelationships, and raising unrestricted revenue. 4 The Board Chair explained that the Board Chair\nand Vice Chair had been meeting with two members of each of the other boards and stated that\nthe joint meetings were useful to raise awareness of what the other groups were doing. 5 He also\nclarified that because of the requirements of OMA, the Board was being mindful that no more\nthan two members of Board could meet for any purpose that concerns University business. 6•\n--ontends that because the Board Chair and Vice Chair, who attended those meetings,\nare also on the Executive Committee, an Executive Committee meeting was held in violation of\nOMA.\nThe Bylaws pertaining to the Executive Committee provide that \"[t]he Executive\nCommittee shall be comprised of the Board Chair, the Board Vice Chair, the Board Secretary\nand a Member of the Board elected by the Board. The President shall be a nonvoting member of\nthe Committee.\" 7 The Bylaws further provide that instead of meeting regularly, \"[t]he Executive\nCommittee shall meet upon the re uest of the Board Chair, the President, or any two of the\nmembers of the Committee. \" 8\nas not alleged that any such meeting was\ncontends that because the Executive Committee is comprised\nrequested. Rather,\nof four voting members, a majority of a quorum consists of two members of the Executive\nCommittee, and two members of the Executive Committee attended the joint sessions.\nAccordingly, a majority of a quorum of the Executive Board attended the joint sessions.\nHowever, the requirements of OMA are not automatically triggered merely because a majority of\na quorum attends a gathering. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, issued July 14, I 995, at 9-10\n(\"The Act does not, however, apply to every gathering of a majority of a quorum of a public\nbody.\").\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" 1974 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 7. \"In theory, there is\nno absolute prohibition against the members of a public body attending an 'informational\n'Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, Meeting, March 9, 2017, audio available at\nhttp://niu.edu/board/meetings/2017/index.shtml, at approximately 57:20.\n'Board of Trustees ofNorthern Illinois University, Meeting, March 9, 2017, audio available at\nhttp://niu.edu/board/meetings/2017/index.shtml, at approximately I: 18:36.\n6\n\nBoard of Trustees ofNorthem Illinois University, Meeting, March 9, 2017, audio available at\nhttp://niu.edu/board/meetings/2017/index.shtml, at approximately I: 18:36.\n'Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI,§ l.B.\n'Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI, § l.C.\n\nMr. Gregory A. Brady\nAugust 18, 20 I 7\nPage 5\n\nmeeting' without triggering the application of\" OMA, as long as the members do not make\n\"[d]eliberational statements\" or engage in \"unrecorded discussions\" amongst themselves. Ill.\nAtt'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11. In that opinion the Attorney General concluded that the\n\"mere fact that a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in\na bona fide presentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" did not\nmake the presentation subject to OMA, but the extensive discussions of public business by\nmembers of two county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA.\n(Emphasis in original.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11; see also Nabhani v. Coglianese,\n552 F. Supp. 657,661 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (a gathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of\nOMA when there is \"no examining or weighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no\nexchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [and] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter\nof [public] business.\")\nMr. Brady explained in the response submitted on behalf of NIU that:\nThe joint sessions * * * were the idea of the Chair of the NIU\nFoundation Board, JeffYordon. The purpose of these sessions was\nto identify priorities of the University and specifically how the\nNIU Foundation and the NIU Alumni Association (both separate\nlegal entities from Northern Illinois University) can help with\nthose priorities. With this idea, the NIU Foundation extended\ninvitations to representatives of the NIU Board of Trustees and the\nNIU Alumni Association to attend the sessions.191\nThe Bylaws provide that the purpose of the Executive Committee is \"to act on\nbehalf of the Board and to discuss and offer counsel on University operations as needed.\" 10\n(Emphasis added.) \"The Executive Committee shall meet upon the request of the Board Chair,\nthe President, or any two of the members of the Committee.\" 11 The Bylaws further provide that\nthe powers and duties of the Executive Committee are to \"discuss and act upon all matters\npertaining to the Board • * * between meetings of the Board except policy changes. The\nExecutive Committee will only take action on routine matters that require Board action between\n\n'Letter from Gregory A. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois\nUniversity, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney\n\nregular Board meetings or on other matters when specifically requested to do so by the full\nBoard.\" 12\nThe available information indicates that the purpose of the joint sessions was to\nshare information regarding the challenges facing higher education in Illinois and at NIU and, in\nparticular, to find ways for the NIU Foundation and NIU Alumni Association to help NIU.\nThere is no indication that during the joint sessions the two members of the Executive\nCommittee engaged in deliberative discussion of University operations, took action on routine\nmatters that require Board action between regular Board meetings, or otherwise attempted to\nreach an accord on any specific matter within the purview of the Executive Committee. Further,\nthere is no indication that any of the individuals empowered to request a meeting of the\nExecutive Committee did so. Thus, it does not appear that the Board members who attended the\nmeetings in question did so in their capacities as members of the Executive Committee.\nAccordingly, based on the available information, this office is unable to conclude that the joint\nsessions attended by two members of the Executive Committee constituted a \"meeting\" of the\nExecutive Committee subject to the requirements of OMA. 13\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me at (312) 814-5201 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of the first page of\nthis letter.\n\n1\nome\nPublic Access Bur\n\n47674 o 2.01 proper univ\n\"Board of Trustees ofNorthern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI, §1.D.\n13 This office notes that the Board has recently amended its Bylaws to increase the membership of\nthe Executive Committee to five voting members, with the President as a non-voting member. Letter from Gregory\nA. Brady, Acting Vice President and General Counsel, Northern Illinois University, to Edie Steinberg, Assistant\nAttorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, at 4-5 (June 6, 2017); Board of\nTrustees of Northern Illinois University, Bylaws, Article VI, § I.B., available at\n. http://www.niu.edu/board/bylaws/index.shtml#B6 (last viewed August I 0, 2017). Because a majority of a quorum\nof the Executive Committee is now three, the attendance of two members of the Executive Committee at a gathering\nwould not ordinarily violate OMA."}
{"id":1199,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-07-05","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["47809"],"title":"Glen Ellyn School Board D41 did not violate OMA by changing meeting location","filename":"47809, issued July 5, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1445,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Glen Ellyn School District 41 Board violated the Open Meetings Act by moving a meeting location without proper notice; the PAC determined the Board complied with OMA requirements.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board meeting was moved to a different location without proper public notice. The Attorney General's office investigated and found that the board followed the law by announcing the change during the meeting and taking a vote to reconvene elsewhere. Consequently, the PAC closed the case, finding no violation occurred.","holding":"The Board of Education of Glen Ellyn School District 41 did not violate the notice or openness requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by reconvening a meeting at a different location without providing additional public notice beyond an announcement made during the original meeting.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Education of Glen Ellyn School District 41","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The complaint concerned the adequacy of public notice provided when a school board meeting was moved to a different location.","ocr_status":"reocr_tesseract","ocr_quality":91.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_a/Posting-agendas-for-regular-and-special-meetings,-contents-of-discussion/47809, issued July 5, 2017.pdf","sha256":"782b9e8c1a65b287220dd9703fd554f912ccc6991f3f6e25af847c49e59b42f5","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","school board","reconvened meeting","public meeting"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\n!Lisa Madigan\nA' TORNEY GENERAL\n\nJuly 5, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nI\nMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nI\nPartner,\nFranczek Radelet P.C.\n'\n300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400\nChicago,\nIllinois 60606\n'\njtf@franczek.com\nI\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 47809\n\nDear- and Mr. Faulkner:\nI\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nI\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\ncohcludesthat the Board of Education of Glen Ellyn School District 41 (Board) did not violate\nthJ notice or openness requirements of OMA in connection with its May I, 2017, meeting.\nOn May 10,2017,\nan�submittedthe\nabove-captioned Request for Review alleging that during the Board's May I, 2017, regular\nmJeting, \"the meeting was moved, without notice, to a different location.\" 1\nOn May I 6, 20 I7, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board\nand asked it to provide this office with copies of the May I, 2017, meeting agenda, minutes, and\nop�n session recording (if one was made), together with a written response to the allegation that\nthJ meeting was moved without notice. On May 25, 2017, the Board provided those materials\nand a written response stating that it did provide proper notice of the location change. On June 5,\n20:17,_ submitted a reply alleging that no vote was taken to suspend and reconvenethe\nI\n\nI\n2017).\n\n'Request for Review from-and--to Public Access Counselor (May 10,\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (877) 844-5461 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nJOO West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n60 l South University Avenue, Suite 102, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (877) 675-9339 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n-�-\n\n\fMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nJuly 5, 2017\nP�ge 2\nmeeting, and therefore that the Board's actions after the meeting recommenced are void. On\nJuhe 9, 2017, the Board responded by stating that a vote to suspend and reconvene the meeting\nwJs not necessary under OMA but was in fact taken, enclosing an affidavit from the Board's\nRJcording Secretary, Ms. Nancy Mogk, and a copy of the \"Board Motion Sheet\" she used to\ntrqck votes. On June 13, 2017,-eplied by questioning why the Board held such a vote\nif it was unnecessary.\nI\n\nANALYSIS\n\nI\n\n\"The Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n�\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nonenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\nI� I, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n1\n\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is\nI\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq.\n(West 2016)). See 15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West 2016). Accordingly, this office is not authorized\nto lreview alleged violations of other statutes or a public body's own governing documents.\nI\n\nUnder section 2.01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016)), \"(a]ll meetings\nre4uired by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient\nand open to the public.\" Section 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2016)) adds that\n\"[J]n agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal office of the public body\nand at the location where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthb meeting.\" Section 2.02(a) further provides:\nI\n\nPublic notice of any special meeting except • • • any reconvened\nmeeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting[.] • •\n• The requirement of public notice of reconvened meetings does\nnot apply to any case where the meeting was open to the public\nand (I) it is to be reconvened within 24 hours, or (2) an\nannouncement of the time and place of the reconvened meeting\nwas made at the original meeting and there is no change in the\nagenda.\nIn its response to this office, the Board explained that its May I, 20 I7, meeting\nwas held at the District Office until the building lost power at approximately 9: 15 p.m.; at around\n9:32 p.m., the Board adopted a motion to suspend and reconvene the meeting at an elementary\nschool one mile away. The meeting then recommenced at approximately 9:58 p.m. With respect\nto !the notice provided to the public, the Board stated:\nI\n\n\fMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nJuly 5, 2017\nP�ge 3\nAs those present at the meeting moved to Churchill School, a sign\nwas posted at the front entrance of the District Office which read:\n\"Due to power outage, the meeting has been moved to Churchill\nSchool, 240 Geneva Road, Glen Ellyn.\" Additionally, a custodian\nremained at the District Office to direct anyone who came to the\nbuilding to attend the meeting to go to Churchill School. To the\nbest of the District's knowledge, no one came to the District Office\nwhile the custodian was on duty after the meeting was relocated to\nChurchill School. Finally, as the meeting was being moved, a pop\nup alert was posted on the District's website, a posting was made to\nthe District's Facebook page and an e-News notice was sent to\nDistrict subscribers, all of which contained notice of the move to\nChurchill School.\n\nI\n\n• • • To the best of the District's knowledge, virtually all, if not all,\npeople present at the meeting at the District Office moved to\nChurchill School. At approximately 12 midnight, the District's\nDirector of Communications left Churchill School and returned to\nthe District Office to relieve the custodian whose shift was ending.\nThe Director of Communications remained in her car in the\nparking lot near the front entrance to the District Office until the\nmeeting at Churchill adjourned at approximately 1 :44 a.m. on May\n2, 2017. No one came to the District Office while the Director of\nCommunications was present[.]121\n\nThe Board's response demonstrates that the Board took appropriate measures to\nnotify the public as to the unexpected location change. The members of the public in attendance\nat the meeting at the District Office were notified of the move when it was announced in open\nsession. Additionally, it is uncontested that the Board posted a sign notifying the public of the\nlotation to which the meeting was moved, assigned a staff member to stay at the District Office\narid direct any members of the public who arrived to the new meeting location, and gave notice\nofi the move on the District's website and Facebook page.\nI\n\n1\n\n[\n\n-eplied to the Board's response to this office by alleging that no vote was\nm de to suspe�onvene the meeting because the meeting minutes only document that a\nmbtion on that matter was made and seconded. He stated: \"The result is that all actions taken by\nth� Board following the 'reconvening' are void and * * * by moving meeting locations, without\n2\nI\nLetter from Todd Faulkner, Franczek Radelet, to Joshua M. Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nI\nAccess Bureau (May 25, 2017), at 2.\n\n\fMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nJuly 5, 2017\nI\nPage 4\n\nnotice and without voting on the motion to 'suspend and reconvene' the Board was not acting in a\nmiumer consistent with the requirements of' OMA. 3 However, OMA does not govern\npai-liamentary procedure, and under the plain language of section 2.02(a) of OMA, a meeting can\nb� reconvened without further notice as long as an announcement of the time and place of the\nrebonvened meeting is made at the original meeting and there is no change in the agenda. In any\neVent, Ms. Mogk's affidavit establishes that a vote was, in fact, taken to suspend and reconvene\nth� meeting, despite the omission from the minutes. Because the available information\nd�monstrates that the Board took sufficient steps to notify the public of the change in location\ndJring its May 1, 2017, meeting, and otherwise conducted the meeting openly, this office\ncdncludes that the Board did not violate those requirements of OMA.\nI\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nI\nn9t require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\nI\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n4 t09 o 202 notice proper sd\n\nLetter from-and- to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access\nB reau, Office of the Attorney General (June 5, 2017).\n3\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\n!Lisa Madigan\nA' TORNEY GENERAL\n\nJuly 5, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nI\nMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nI\nPartner,\nFranczek Radelet P.C.\n'\n300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400\nChicago,\nIllinois 60606\n'\njtf@franczek.com\nI\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 47809\n\nDear- and Mr. Faulkner:\nI\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nI\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\ncohcludesthat the Board of Education of Glen Ellyn School District 41 (Board) did not violate\nthJ notice or openness requirements of OMA in connection with its May I, 2017, meeting.\nOn May 10,2017,\nan�submittedthe\nabove-captioned Request for Review alleging that during the Board's May I, 2017, regular\nmJeting, \"the meeting was moved, without notice, to a different location.\" 1\nOn May I 6, 20 I7, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board\nand asked it to provide this office with copies of the May I, 2017, meeting agenda, minutes, and\nop�n session recording (if one was made), together with a written response to the allegation that\nthJ meeting was moved without notice. On May 25, 2017, the Board provided those materials\nand a written response stating that it did provide proper notice of the location change. On June 5,\n20:17,_ submitted a reply alleging that no vote was taken to suspend and reconvenethe\nI\n\nI\n2017).\n\n'Request for Review from-and--to Public Access Counselor (May 10,\n\nnotice and without voting on the motion to 'suspend and reconvene' the Board was not acting in a\nmiumer consistent with the requirements of' OMA. 3 However, OMA does not govern\npai-liamentary procedure, and under the plain language of section 2.02(a) of OMA, a meeting can\nb� reconvened without further notice as long as an announcement of the time and place of the\nrebonvened meeting is made at the original meeting and there is no change in the agenda. In any\neVent, Ms. Mogk's affidavit establishes that a vote was, in fact, taken to suspend and reconvene\nth� meeting, despite the omission from the minutes. Because the available information\nd�monstrates that the Board took sufficient steps to notify the public of the change in location\ndJring its May 1, 2017, meeting, and otherwise conducted the meeting openly, this office\ncdncludes that the Board did not violate those requirements of OMA.\nI\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nI\nn9t require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\nI\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n4 t09 o 202 notice proper sd\n\nLetter from-and- to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access\nB reau, Office of the Attorney General (June 5, 2017).\n3","plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Notice of a school board meeting's relocated location","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-47809/","full_text":"Via electronic mail\nMr. J. Todd Faulkner\n\nOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nNP TORNEY GENERAL\n\nJuly 5, 2017\n\nPartner, Franczek Radelet P.C.\n\n300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400 _\nChicago, Illinois 60606\njtf@franczek. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 47809\n\nDear po and Mr. Faulkner:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the Board of Education of Glen Ellyn School District 41 (Board) did not violate\nthe notice or openness requirements of OMA in connection with its May 1, 2017, meeting.\n\nOn May 10, 2017, a: submitted the\nabove-captioned Request for Review alleging that during the Board's May 1, 2017, regular\n\nmeeting, \"the meeting was moved, without notice, to a different location.\n\nwl\n\nOn May 16, 2017, this office sent a copy of thé Request for Review to the Board\n\nand asked it to provide this office with copies of the May 1, 2017, meeting agenda, minutes, and\nopen session recording (if one was made), together with a written response to the allegation that\nthe meeting was moved without notice. On May 25, 2017, the Board provided those materials\n\nand a written response stating that it did provide proper notice of the location change. On June 5,\n\n20\n\n20)\n\n17,\n\n‘Request for Review from aR an ae: Public Access Counselor (May 10,\n\n7).\n\nsubmitted a reply alleging that no vote was taken to suspend and reconvene the\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, INinois 62706 * (217) 782-1090 * TTY: (877) 844-5461 * Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 * (312) 814-3000 * TTY: (800) 964-3013 * Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\n“601 South University Avenue, Suite 102, Carbondale, Illinois 6290! © (618) 529-6400 © TTY: (877) 675-9339 « Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\nMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nJuly 5, 2017\nPage 2\n\nmeeting, and therefore that the Board's actions after the meeting recommenced are void. On\nJune 9, 2017, the Board responded by stating that a vote to suspend and reconvene the meeting\nwas not necessary under OMA but was in fact taken, enclosing an affidavit from the Board's\nRecording Secretary, Ms. Nancy Mogk, and a copy of the \"Board Motion Sheet\" she used to\ntrack votes. On June 13, 2017, EE eplied by questioning why the Board held such a vote\nif it was unnecessary.\n\nANALYSIS\n\n| \"The Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\nofthe people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161, 171 (Sth Dist. 1989).\n\nAS an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 er seq.\n(West 2016)). See 15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West 2016). Accordingly, this office is not authorized\ntoireview alleged violations of other statutes or a public body's own governing documents.\n\n|\n\nUnder section 2.01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016)), \"[aJ!] meetings\nrequired by this Act to be public shal! be held at specified times and places which are convenient\nand open to the public.\" Section 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2016)) adds that\n\"[a]n agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the principal office of the public body\nand at the location where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthe meeting.” Section 2.02(a) further provides:\n\nPublic notice of any special meeting except * * * any reconvened\nmeeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting[.] * *\n* The requirement of public notice of reconvened meetings does\nnot apply to any case where the meeting was open to the public\nand (1) it is to be reconvened within 24 hours, or (2) an\nannouncement of the time and place of the reconvened meeting\nwas made at the original meeting and there is no change in the\nagenda.\n\nIn its response to this office, the Board explained that its May 1, 2017, meeting\nwas held at the District Office until the building lost power at approximately 9:15 p.m.; at around\n9:32 p.m., the Board adopted a motion to suspend and reconvene the meeting at an elementary\nschool one mile away. The meeting then recommenced at approximately 9:58 p.m. With respect\nto'the notice provided to the public, the Board stated:\n\nMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nJuly 5, 2017\nPage 3\n\nAs those present at the meeting moved to Churchill School, a sign\nwas posted at the front entrance of the District Office which read:\n\"Due to power outage, the meeting has been moved to Churchill\nSchool, 240 Geneva Road, Glen Ellyn.\" Additionally, a custodian\nremained at the District Office to direct anyone who came to the\nbuilding to attend the meeting to go to Churchill School. To the\nbest of the District's knowledge, no one came to the District Office\nwhile the custodian was on duty after the meeting was relocated to\nChurchill School. Finally, as the meeting was being moved, a pop\nup alert was posted on the District's website, a posting was made to\nthe District's Facebook page and an e-News notice was sent to\nDistrict subscribers, all of which contained notice of the move to\nChurchill School.\n\n* * * To the best of the District's knowledge, virtually all, if not all,\npeople present at the meeting at the District Office moved to\nChurchill School. At approximately 12 midnight, the District's\nDirector of Communications left Churchill School and returned to\nthe District Office to relieve the custodian whose shift was ending,\nThe Director of Communications remained in her car in the\nparking lot near the front entrance to the District Office until the\nmeeting at Churchill adjourned at approximately 1:44 a.m. on May\n2, 2017. No one came to the District Office while the Director of\nCommunications was present{[.}!?!\n\nThe Board's response demonstrates that the Board took appropriate measures to\n\nnotify the public as to the unexpected location change. The members of the public in attendance\n\nat the meeting at the District Office were notified of the move when it was announced in open\nsession. Additionally, it is uncontested that the Board posted a sign notifying the public of the\nlocation to which the meeting was moved, assigned a staff member to stay at the District Office\n\nof|\n\nand direct any members of the public who arrived to the new meeting location, and gave notice\n\nthe move on the District's website and Facebook page.\n\n<<: to the Board's response to this office by alleging that no vote was\n\nmade to suspend and reconvene the meeting because the meeting minutes only document that a\nmotion on that matter was made and seconded. He stated: \"The result is that all actions taken by\n\nthe Board following the 'reconvening' are void and * * * by moving meeting locations, without\n\n*Letter from Todd Faulkner, Franczek Radelet, to Joshua M. Jones, Supervising Attomey, Public\n\nAccess Bureau (May 25, 2017), at 2.\n\nMr. J. Todd Faulkner\nJuly 5, 2017\nPage 4\n\nnotice and without voting on the motion to 'suspend and reconvene’ the Board was not acting ina\nmanner consistent with the requirements of\" OMA. However, OMA does not govern\nparliamentary procedure, and under the plain language of section 2.02(a) of OMA, a meeting can\nbe reconvened without further notice as long as an announcement of the time and place of the\nreconvened meeting is made at the original meeting and there is no change in the agenda. In any\nevent, Ms. Mogk's affidavit establishes that a vote was, in fact, taken to suspend and reconvene\nthe meeting, despite the omission from the minutes. Because the available information\ndemonstrates that the Board took sufficient steps to notify the public of the change in location\nduring its May |, 2017, meeting, and otherwise conducted the meeting openly, this office\nconcludes that the Board did not violate those requirements of OMA.\n\n| The Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n47809 0 202 notice proper sd\n\n>Letter from iiiend PY to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access\nBureau, Office of the Attorney General (June 5, 2017)."}
{"id":1200,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-06-16","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["48032"],"title":"Village of Wheeling did not violate Open Meetings Act on compensation disclosure","filename":"48032, issued June 16, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":836,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Village of Wheeling violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to properly post employee compensation packages, but the PAC determined the Village complied with the law.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Village of Wheeling's posted employee compensation information did not match the payroll reports submitted to the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund. The Attorney General's office investigated and found that the differences were due to how budgeted versus actual compensation is calculated, and concluded the Village followed the law. Consequently, the case was closed with no further action taken.","holding":"The PAC determined that no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred because the Village's compensation disclosures met the statutory requirements.","legal_question":"Did the Village of Wheeling violate section 7.3(b) of the Open Meetings Act regarding the posting of employee compensation packages?","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/7.3"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Wheeling","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"compensation disclosure","subject_description":"The requester alleged a discrepancy between the Village's posted employee compensation packages and the payroll records submitted to the IMRF.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/7.3/48032, issued June 16, 2017.pdf","sha256":"30f48bf109a13816b441301c6d39ca8877c33e69c04b23c0f4b7a065335593fc","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["compensation","IMRF","transparency","payroll records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Personnel & Student Records","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nST ATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 16, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review-2017 PAC 48032\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(b) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(b) (West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth below, the Public\nAccess Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.\nOn May 24, 2017, you submitted a Request for Review to this office alleging that\nthe Village of Wheeling (Village) violated section 7.3(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/7.3(b) (West\n2014)), which provides, in pertinent part: \"At least 6 days before an employer participating in\nthe Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund approves an employee's total compensation package that\nis equal to or in excess of$ 150,000 per year, the employer must post on its website the total\ncompensation package for that employee.\"\nThe information that you submitted with your OMA Request for Review indicates\nthat on May 14, 2017, you had submitted a Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1\net seq. (West 2014 )) request to the Village seeking \"electronic copies of each payroll record the\nVillage submitted to IMRF for year 2016 as well as their corresponding certifications.\" 1 Atler\nreceiving the Village's response, you e-mailed the Village pointing out that the income\ninformation in the IMRF reports you received was different from the compensation information\nposted on the \"transparency page\" 2 of Village website. Although FOIA does not compel public\nbodies to interpret or advise requesters as to the meaning of public records (See 5 ILCS 140/3.3\n(West 2014)), the Village responded to you on May 24, 2017, by explaining that the reports\nreflect different amounts because the requirements are different. The Village reports to the\n1\n\nE-mail from\n\nto foia (May 14, 2017).\n\n2 Transparency Portal, Village of Wheeling, Illinois, http://www.wheelingil.gov/53 7/TransparencyPortal (last visited June 2, 2017).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield. Illinois 62701 • (2 I 7) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 ,. (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main. Carbondale. lllinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6401 • Fa,c /61ln ~'.N-6416\n\n\fJune 16, 2017\nPage 2\n\nIMRF reflect \"pensionable\" earnings actually paid to an employee, while the IMRF infonnation\nposted on the website reflects the total compensation expected to be paid. Your Request for\nReview states that you believe the Village \"has given a false presentation of material fact when\nthey allege incomes that vary by as much as $38,000 in what they report to the public when they\nallege compliance with Public Act 97-069[ 3] on the 'transparency page' of their website.\" 4 Your\nRequest for Review does not allege that the Village failed to post the information required by\nsection 7.3(b) of OMA; rather, you are questioning the accuracy of the information.\nSection 7.3(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120.7.3(c) (West 2014)) defines \"total\ncompensation package\" as \"payment by the employer to the employee for salary, health\ninsurance, a housing allowance, a vehicle allowance, a clothing allowance, bonuses, loans,\nvacation days granted, and sick days granted.\" This office's review of the salary and benefits\nspreadsheet on the Village's website indicated that it appears to disclose the total compensation\npackage for each Village employee, including salary, vehicle allowance, stipend, health\ninsurance, vacation days, and sick days. The fact that payroll records the Village submitted to\nthe IMRF, which include different or additional information, may reflect different amounts does\nnot implicate the requirements of section 7.3(b) of OMA. Therefore, this office concludes that\nyou have not set forth facts sufficient to allege a violation of OMA.\nIn an attempt to resolve this matter, however, this office asked the Village to\nfurther explain why the figures are different. In a June 14, 2017, telephone conversation with an\nAssistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau, an attorney from the law finn retained\nto represent the Village explained that the compensation packages disclosed on the website\nreflects employees' budgeted compensation for the year and that this budgeted compensation was\nposted at least six days before its approval. The \"pensionable income\" that was reported to\nIMRF reflects actual compensation earned by employees on a monthly basis including unused\nvacation and sick days that an employee may decide to \"sell\" back to the Village. Because the\nfacts you have alleged do not indicate that the Village has violated section 7.3 or any other\nprovision of OMA, this office has determined that no further action is warranted.\n\n3 Public Act 97-609, effective January I, 2012, added section 7.3 to OMA.\n4 E-mail from\n\nto [A]ttomey [G]eneral {May 24, 2017).\n\n\fJune 16, 2017\nPage 3\n\nIf you have any questions, please contact the Public Access Bureau at the Chicago\naddress at the bottom of the first page of this letter. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48032 o no fi war mun\n\n•\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Discrepancy between posted compensation and IMRF payroll records","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-48032/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nST ATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJune 16, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review-2017 PAC 48032\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(b) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.S(b) (West 2015 Supp.)). For the reasons set forth below, the Public\nAccess Bureau has determined that no further action is warranted in this matter.\nOn May 24, 2017, you submitted a Request for Review to this office alleging that\nthe Village of Wheeling (Village) violated section 7.3(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/7.3(b) (West\n2014)), which provides, in pertinent part: \"At least 6 days before an employer participating in\nthe Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund approves an employee's total compensation package that\nis equal to or in excess of$ 150,000 per year, the employer must post on its website the total\ncompensation package for that employee.\"\nThe information that you submitted with your OMA Request for Review indicates\nthat on May 14, 2017, you had submitted a Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1\net seq. (West 2014)) request to the Village seeking \"electronic copies of each payroll record the\nVillage submitted to IMRF for year 2016 as well as their corresponding certifications.\" 1 Atler\nreceiving the Village's response, you e-mailed the Village pointing out that the income\ninformation in the IMRF reports you received was different from the compensation information\nposted on the \"transparency page\" 2 of Village website. Although FOIA does not compel public\nbodies to interpret or advise requesters as to the meaning of public records (See 5 ILCS 140/3.3\n(West 2014)), the Village responded to you on May 24, 2017, by explaining that the reports\nreflect different amounts because the requirements are different. The Village reports to the\n1\n\nE-mail from\n\nto foia (May 14, 2017).\n\n2 Transparency Portal, Village of Wheeling, Illinois, http://www.wheelingil.gov/53 7/TransparencyPortal (last visited June 2, 2017).\n\nIMRF reflect \"pensionable\" earnings actually paid to an employee, while the IMRF infonnation\nposted on the website reflects the total compensation expected to be paid. Your Request for\nReview states that you believe the Village \"has given a false presentation of material fact when\nthey allege incomes that vary by as much as $38,000 in what they report to the public when they\nallege compliance with Public Act 97-069[ 3] on the 'transparency page' of their website.\" 4 Your\nRequest for Review does not allege that the Village failed to post the information required by\nsection 7.3(b) of OMA; rather, you are questioning the accuracy of the information.\nSection 7.3(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120.7.3(c) (West 2014)) defines \"total\ncompensation package\" as \"payment by the employer to the employee for salary, health\ninsurance, a housing allowance, a vehicle allowance, a clothing allowance, bonuses, loans,\nvacation days granted, and sick days granted.\" This office's review of the salary and benefits\nspreadsheet on the Village's website indicated that it appears to disclose the total compensation\npackage for each Village employee, including salary, vehicle allowance, stipend, health\ninsurance, vacation days, and sick days. The fact that payroll records the Village submitted to\nthe IMRF, which include different or additional information, may reflect different amounts does\nnot implicate the requirements of section 7.3(b) of OMA. Therefore, this office concludes that\nyou have not set forth facts sufficient to allege a violation of OMA.\nIn an attempt to resolve this matter, however, this office asked the Village to\nfurther explain why the figures are different. In a June 14, 2017, telephone conversation with an\nAssistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau, an attorney from the law finn retained\nto represent the Village explained that the compensation packages disclosed on the website\nreflects employees' budgeted compensation for the year and that this budgeted compensation was\nposted at least six days before its approval. The \"pensionable income\" that was reported to\nIMRF reflects actual compensation earned by employees on a monthly basis including unused\nvacation and sick days that an employee may decide to \"sell\" back to the Village. Because the\nfacts you have alleged do not indicate that the Village has violated section 7.3 or any other\n\nIf you have any questions, please contact the Public Access Bureau at the Chicago\naddress at the bottom of the first page of this letter. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48032 o no fi war mun\n\n•"}
{"id":1202,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-09-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["48046"],"title":"Nauvoo-Colusa school board violated OMA by locking building where agenda was posted","filename":"48046, issued September 20, 2017__1.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3618,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Nauvoo-Colusa Community Unit School District No. 325 Board of Education failed to post a meeting agenda at the meeting location as required by OMA. The PAC determined that the Board failed to properly post the notice at the physical location but complied with website posting requirements.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board did not make its meeting agenda publicly accessible at the building where the meeting was held. The Attorney General's office investigated and found that while the agenda was physically posted inside the principal's office, the building was locked, so it was not continuously available for public review, which violated the Open Meetings Act. The board was not required to post the agenda on its website because the website was maintained by part-time staff, and therefore did not violate the Act regarding the website.","holding":"The Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to ensure the agenda for its May 15, 2017, meeting was continuously available for public review at the meeting location during the 48-hour period before the meeting.","legal_question":"Whether the Board of Education violated section 2.02 of the Open Meetings Act by failing to post a meeting agenda at the physical location of the meeting.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Education of Nauvoo-Colusa Community Unit School District No. 325","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The failure to post a meeting agenda at the physical location of a school board meeting as required by the Open Meetings Act.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_c/Duty-to-make-notice-and-agenda-continuously-available/48046, issued September 20, 2017.pdf","sha256":"33bd8f0ce0c4dd1cb27475254bf76564ef8719b5e19ebe4e10a19f212a206feb","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","agenda","school board","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSeptember 20, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Steven\n\nM. Richart\n\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer,\n\nRodick &\n\nKohn LLP\n\n3030 Salt Creek Lane, Suite 202\nArlington\n\nHeights,\n\nsrichart@hlerk.\n\nIllinois\n\n60005\n\ncom\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 48046\nDear\n\nand Mr. Richart:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education ( Board) of Nauvoo- Colusa Community Unit\n\nSchool District No. 325 ( District) did not properly post notice of its May 15, 2017, meeting at the\n\nlocation of the meeting, but did not violate OMA in connection with posting notice on the\nDistrict' s website.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn May 24, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that the Board did not post the agenda for its May 15, 2017,\nmeeting \"\n\nat\n\nany publicly\n\naccessible\n\nlocation 48 -hours prior to the meeting. i'\n\nstated\n\nthat he visited the school building where the meeting was to be held on May 15, 2017, and found\n\nOMA — Request for review by Public Access Counselor ( PAC) submitted by\nMay 24, 2017).\n\n500 South\n\nSecond Street, Springfield,\n\n100 West Randolph\n1001\n\nStreet, Chicago,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nIllinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 • .\n\n1TY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 2\n\nno agenda posted at the entry doors of the school. He further stated that when he complained to\nthe District about the lack of a properly posted agenda in advance of the meeting, the District\ninformed him that the agenda had been posted in the principal' s office on May 13, 2017.\n\nalleged that the agenda was not publicly accessible at that location because May 13th fell\non a Saturday, and the building was locked. He also alleged that the agenda was not posted on\nthe District' s website until the afternoon of May 15, 2017. In addition,\nalleged that\nnot all members of the Board had completed the requisite OMA training. Further, he alleged, in\npertinent\n\npart:\n\nThe Superintendent participates in the meeting as a member of the\nSchool Board, although he is not. He sits at the table with other\n\nmembers of the Board, and speaks privately with the School Board\n\nPresident in a low voice, not audible to the public. It is my\ncontention that he should not be seated with the Board, and that all\n\ncomments he makes should be during public comment portions of\nthe meeting, or when specifically giving a report specified on the\n\nmeeting agenda. 121\nOn June 1, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide a written response to\n\nallegations. This office also\n\nasked the Board whether the District' s website was maintained by a full- time District staff\nmember and asked for copies of the agenda and minutes.\n\nthe requested materials.\nto\n\nOn June 16, 2017, this office received\n\nOn June 19, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Board' s response\n\nhe replied on June 26, 2017.\n\nmaintained that the agenda \" was not\n\nposted 48 hours in advance in a publicly available location. i3 He also reiterated his claim that\nthe Board President and superintendent improperly engaged in private conversations during the\nmeeting. On August 10, 2017, this office asked the Board to provide a supplemental response\n\nclarifying each Board member' s start date and the dates on which each of the members had\ncompleted the OMA training. This office also requested copies of any certificates of completion.\nOn August 22, 2017, the Board provided the requested\n\nsupplemental\n\nresponse.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is the \" public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). \" The Open Meetings Act provides that\n\n20MA — Request for review by Public Access Counselor ( PAC) submitted by\nMay 24, 2017).\n3Letter from\n\nto Teresa Lim, Assistant\n\nAttorney General ( June 26, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 3\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179111. App. 3d 161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\nOMA Training\nAs a preliminary matter, section 1. 05( b) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 05( b) ( West\n2016)) contains the requirements\n\nfor members of public bodies to complete the electronic OMA\n\ntraining program developed by the Public Access Counselor. It provides, in pertinent part:\nExcept as otherwise provided in this Section, each elected\n\nor appointed member of a public body subject to this Act who\nbecomes such a member after the effective date of this amendatory\nAct of the 97th General Assembly shall successfully complete the\nelectronic training curriculum developed and administered by the\nPublic Access Counselor. For these members, the training must be\ncompleted not later than the 90th day after the date the member:\n1)\n\ntakes the oath of office, if the member is required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person' s duties\n\nas a member of the public body; or\n2)\n\notherwise assumes responsibilities as a member of\n\nthe public body, if the member is not required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person' s duties\n\nas a member of the governmental body.\nEach member successfully completing the electronic\n\ntraining curriculum shall file a copy of the certificate of completion\nwith the public body.\n\nThe failure of one or more members of a public body to\ncomplete the training required by this Section does not affect the\n\nvalidity of an action taken by the public body.\nAn elected or appointed member of a public body subject to\nthis Act who has successfully completed the training required\nunder\n\nthis subsection (\n\nb) and filed a copy of the certificate\n\nof\n\n\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 4\n\ncompletion with the public body is not required to subsequently\ncomplete the training required under this subsection ( b).\nIn addition, section 1. 05( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 05( c) ( West 2016)) permits elected school\n\nboard members to complete certain alternative training courses to satisfy the OMA training\nrequirement:\n\nAn elected school board member may satisfy the training\nrequirements of this Section by participating in a course of training\n\nsponsored or conducted by an organization created under Article\n23 of the School Code. The course of training shall include, but not\nbe limited to, instruction in:\n1)\n\nthe general background\n\nof the legal requirements\n\nfor open meetings;\n2)\n\nthe applicability of this Act to public bodies;\n\n3)\n\nprocedures and requirements\n\nregarding quorums,\n\nnotice, and record- keeping under this Act;\n4)\n\nprocedures and requirements for holding an open\nmeeting and for holding a closed meeting under this\nAct; and\n\n5)\n\npenalties and other consequences for failing to\ncomply with this Act.\n\nIf an organization\n\ncreated\n\nunder Article\n\n23 of the School\n\nCode provides a course of training under this subsection ( c), it\nmust provide a certificate of course completion to each school\n\nboard member who successfully completes that course of training.\nIn response to this office's question about whether members of the Board had\n\nsatisfied the OMA training requirements, the Board stated that \" most of the Board members had\nundergone Professional Development Leadership Training, PERA [ Performance Evaluation\n\nReform Act] Training and other IASB [ Illinois Association of School Boards] trainings during\nOMA was discussed[,]\" and that they had mistakenly believed that those trainings fulfilled\n\nwhich\n\nthe OMA training requirement.4 The response further stated that \"[ u] pon discovering that the\nE- mail from Steven M. Richart, Attorney, Hodges Loizzi Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn LLP, to\nTeresa Lim ( August\n\n21, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 5\n\nprevious trainings did not cover OMA certification, all Board members promptly took the\n\ntraining and became OMA-compliant. i5 The Board provided the start dates of each of the Board\nmembers and the dates on which they had completed the electronic OMA training curriculum.\nAdditionally, the Board provided copies of the members' certificates of completion of the\ncurriculum. This office has compared the start dates with the training completion dates and\ndetermined that five members had not completed the OMA training within 90 days of taking the\noath of office or otherwise assuming responsibilities as a Board member. At this time, however,\nthe OMA certificates of completion indicate that all members have completed the required OMA\n\ntraining. OMA provides no penalty for the failure to complete training within the statutory\ntimeframe.\n\nPosting of Agenda\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where\nthe meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the\n\nholding of the meeting. A public body that has a website that the\nfull-time staff of the public body maintains shall also post on its\nwebsite the agenda of any regular meetings of the governing body\nof that public body. ( Emphasis added.)\nSection 2. 02( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)) further provides:\n\nThe public body conducting a public meeting shall ensure that at\n\nleast one copy of any requested notice and agenda for the meeting\nis continuously available for public review during the entire 48hour period preceding the meeting. Posting of the notice and\nagenda on a website that is maintained by the public body satisfies\n\nthe requirement for continuous posting under this subsection ( c).\nEmphasis added.)\n\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that on May 13, 2017, at 2: 45pm,\nthe District' s secretary had posted the agenda outside the principal' s office, which is in the same\n\n5E -mail from Steven M. Richart, Attorney, Hodges Loizzi Eisenhammer Rodick & Kohn LLP, to\nTeresa Lim ( August 21, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 6\n\nbuilding where the meeting was held. Addressing the accessibility of the posting, the Board\nasserted, in pertinent part:\n\ncorrectly asserts that the agenda, despite being\nphysically posted, wasn' t publicly available during the full 48\nhours prior to the meeting because it was inside a locked building.\nIt is an interesting question whether the District complied with the\nrequirements\n\nof Section 2. 02( c) in this instance, as Section 2. 02( c)\n\nstates, \" The public body conducting a public meeting shall ensure\n\nthat at least one copy of any requested notice or agenda for the\nmeeting is continuously available for public review during the\nentire 48- hour period preceding the meeting.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c)\nemphasis added).\n\nIn this case, no one requested the agenda until\n\nthe morning of the meeting, at which time the agenda was\n\npromptly posted. 161\nAdditionally, according to the Board, a part- time consultant maintains the\nDistrict' s website, so the Board has no duty to post agendas on the District' s website. The Board\nstated that the agenda was nonetheless posted on the District' s website on the date of the meeting\nin this instance. Under the plain language of section 2. 02( a), only public bodies that have a\nwebsite maintained by a full- time staff member are required to post an agenda on their website\n\n48 hours in advance of a meeting. This office has not received evidence contradicting the\nBoard' s assertion that a part- time consultant maintains the District' s website. Accordingly, this\noffice concludes that the Board was not required to post the May 15, 2017, meeting agenda on\n\nthe District' s website 48 hours before the meeting.\nThe Board acknowledged, however, that the agenda was not continuously\navailable during the 48 hours preceding the meeting because the building in which the agenda\n\nwas posted was locked. While OMA does not specify where exactly at the location of a meeting\nan agenda must be posted, the public policy underlying OMA is to provide \" advance notice of\nand the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\n\nIn order to ensure a full 48 hours of public notice\n\nbefore meetings, this office has stated that a public body \" should post meeting notices in a\nlocation where they may be continuously viewable from the outside of [the building where the\n\nmeeting is being held], such as on or near the front door or facing outward from a window.\" See,\ne. g., I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29886, issued September 16, 2014, at 2- 3. Under the\n\nLetter from Steven M. Richart, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick &\nLim, Assistant Attorney General, Public\n\nKohn, LLP, to Teresa\n\nAccess Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( June 16, 2017), at 2.\n\n\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 7\n\nplain language of section 2. 02( c), a public body may also satisfy the \" continuously available\"\nrequirement by posting a copy of the notice and agenda on its website.\n\nby\n\nAlthough the Board asserted that the agenda was promptly posted once requested\nin compliance with section 2. 02( c), which refers to \" any requested notice or\n\nagenda\" ( emphasis added), the meaning of the term \" requested\" is ambiguous in the context of\nthe requirement that an agenda be posted at least 48 hours in advance of a meeting.\n\nHowever,\n\nthe House debate on House Bill No. 4687, which added section 2. 02( c) to OMA as part of Public\n\nAct 97- 827, effective January 1, 2013, indicates that the General Assembly intended this\nprovision to apply to all meetings for which 48 hours advance notice is required.' In discussing\nthe bill, State Representative Sandy Pihos noted, in pertinent part: \" House Bill 4687, what that\n\ndoes is it requires a full 48- hour posting for a public meeting, and that has mitigated some of the\nopposition.\" (\n\nEmphasis added.)\n\nRemarks of Rep. Pihos, March 8, 2012, House Debate on\n\nHouse Bill No. 4687, at 69. Further, Representative Pihos confirmed the intent that a public\n\nbody would not violate the \" continuously available\" requirement if it posted the notice and\nagenda on its website and the internes went down due to circumstances beyond the public body' s\ncontrol. See Remarks of Rep. Pihos, March 8, 2012, House Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at\n70.\n\nThe addition of section 2. 02( c) to OMA came less than three years after the court\n\nin In re Foxfeld Subdivision, 396 Ill. App. 3d 989, 993 ( 2d Dist. 2009) analyzed the claim that a\nvillage board violated OMA by posting the agenda for a meeting inside the village hall, which\nwas only open for seven hours per day. The court favorably cited a decision in which the Texas\nSupreme Court held that although notice for a meeting \" was not continuously available[,]\"\nhaving \" an ' open door' policy\" would be cost prohibitive for many municipalities. See Foxfeld,\n396111. App. 3d at 993 ( quoting City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S. W. 2d\n762, 768 ( Tex. 1991)).\nThe court in Foxfield concluded: \"\nBased on a plain reading of our Open\nMeetings Act, it is clear that the legislature does not require that an agenda be posted in a\n\nspecific place so that it is publicly accessible for 48 continuous hours before the meeting.\"\nFoxfield, 396111. App. 3d at 994. Given the manner in which the phrases \" continuously\navailable\" and \" entire 48- hour period\" in section 2. 02( c) of OMA mirror the phrases\n\ncontinuously available\" and \" 48 continuous hours\" in Foxfield, it appears that the General\nAssembly intended the addition of section 2. 02( c) to correct Foxfreld' s conclusion on agenda\naccessibility. See, e. g., Collins v. Board of Trustees of Firemen' s Annuity & Benefit Fund of\nChicago, 155 III. 2d 103,\n\n111 (\n\n1993) (\" An amendment that contradicts a recent interpretation of\n\na statute is an indication that such interpretation was incorrect and that the amendment was\nenacted to clarify the legislature' s original intent.\").\n\nSection 2. 02( a) provides exceptions from the 48- hour advance notice requirement for meetings\nheld in the event of a bona fide emergency, rescheduled\n\nregular meetings,\n\nand reconvened meetings.\n\n\fMr. Steven M. Richart\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 8\n\nIn contrast, the Board did not point to any authority for the claim that the\ncontinuously available\" requirement was not triggered until\nrequested the agenda\nfor the meeting. Further, the Board did not support its claim that it complied with section 2. 02( c)\nby posting the agenda on its website upon\nrequest. Because the public policy and\nlegislative history behind section 2. 02( c) of OMA indicate that the General Assembly intended\nfor the public to be able to view the agenda for an open meeting for a full 48 hours in advance of\nthe meeting, this office concludes that the Board failed to provide sufficient advance notice of its\nMay 15, 2017, meeting.\nNevertheless,\nentry doors * * *\n\nthe Board stated that it \" will post its agendas on the windows of the\n\nto ensure the public has continuous access to the agenda during the 48 hours\n\nprior to each meeting, whether or not such agenda is requested. i8 Although it is not required to\npost its meeting agendas on the District website 48 hours prior to its meetings, the Board also\nstated that it plans to do so. In light of these measures, this office has determined that no\nadditional remedial action is required.\n\nSuperintendent' s Participation\n\nin Meetings\n\nSection 1. 2 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 2 ( West 2016)) defines a \" meeting\" as any\ngathering, whether in person or by video or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means *\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of a majority of a quorum of\nSection\nthe members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\"\n2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be\npermitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by\n\nthe public body.\"\nIn this case,\n\nallegation that the school superintendent improperly\n\nengaged in private conversation with the Board president during the May 15, 2017, meeting does\nnot set forth facts from which this office can conclude that the Board violated the requirements\n\nof OMA. 9 No provision of OMA prohibits a private conversation between a Board member and\nthe superintendent or one- on- one communications\n\ninvolving less than a majority of a quorum of\n\nthe Board. See Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 30157, issued July 7, 2014, at 2 ( the\nallegation that Board members individually communicated with each other or with the Board' s\nattorney [ during an open meeting] does not set forth facts from which this office could conclude\nBLetter from\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn, LLP, to Teresa\nLim, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( June 16, 2017), at 2.\n\n9The Public Access Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of\nOMA and the Freedom of Information Act ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2016)). See 15 ILCS 20517( c)( 3) ( West\n2016).\n\n\fMr. Steven\n\nM. Richart\n\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 9\n\nthat a majority of a quorum of the Board engaged in private, contemporaneous, interactive\ncommunications\"\n\nsuch that this office could conclude that an improper private meeting was\n\nheld). Similarly, no provision of OMA requires that members of a school board be seated\nseparately from the school superintendent.\n\nWhile\n\ncontended that all comments made\n\nby the superintendent should be made during the public comment period of a meeting or when\nproviding a report as listed on an agenda, OMA does not contain such a requirement. Section\n2. 06( g) requires that members of the public be given an opportunity to address public officials\n\nduring a meeting, but does not prohibit an individual from making private comments to a public\nofficial. Nonetheless, the Board president may wish to consider whether private discussions with\nthe superintendent during open meetings contravene the spirit of OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA\n\nLIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48046\n\no\n\n105 training incomplete 202a proper improper sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A school board’s failure to post a meeting agenda","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-48046/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSeptember 20, 2017\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Steven\n\nM. Richart\n\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer,\n\nRodick &\n\nKohn LLP\n\n3030 Salt Creek Lane, Suite 202\nArlington\n\nHeights,\n\nsrichart@hlerk.\n\nIllinois\n\n60005\n\ncom\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 48046\nDear\n\nand Mr. Richart:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education (Board) of Nauvoo- Colusa Community Unit\n\nSchool District No. 325 (District) did not properly post notice of its May 15, 2017, meeting at the\n\nlocation of the meeting, but did not violate OMA in connection with posting notice on the\nDistrict's website.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn May 24, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that the Board did not post the agenda for its May 15, 2017,\nmeeting \"\n\nat\n\nany publicly\n\naccessible\n\nlocation 48 -hours prior to the meeting. i'\n\nstated\n\nthat he visited the school building where the meeting was to be held on May 15, 2017, and found\n\nOMA — Request for review by Public Access Counselor (PAC) submitted by\nMay 24, 2017).\n\n500 South\n\nSecond Street, Springfield,\n\n100 West Randolph\n1001\n\nStreet, Chicago,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62701 • (217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: (217) 782- 7046\n\nno agenda posted at the entry doors of the school. He further stated that when he complained to\nthe District about the lack of a properly posted agenda in advance of the meeting, the District\ninformed him that the agenda had been posted in the principal's office on May 13, 2017.\n\nalleged that the agenda was not publicly accessible at that location because May 13th fell\non a Saturday, and the building was locked. He also alleged that the agenda was not posted on\nthe District's website until the afternoon of May 15, 2017. In addition,\nalleged that\nnot all members of the Board had completed the requisite OMA training. Further, he alleged, in\npertinent\n\npart:\n\nThe Superintendent participates in the meeting as a member of the\nSchool Board, although he is not. He sits at the table with other\n\nmembers of the Board, and speaks privately with the School Board\n\nPresident in a low voice, not audible to the public. It is my\ncontention that he should not be seated with the Board, and that all\n\ncomments he makes should be during public comment portions of\nthe meeting, or when specifically giving a report specified on the\n\nmeeting agenda. 121\nOn June 1, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide a written response to\n\nallegations. This office also\n\nasked the Board whether the District's website was maintained by a full- time District staff\nmember and asked for copies of the agenda and minutes.\n\nthe requested materials.\nto\n\nOn June 16, 2017, this office received\n\nOn June 19, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's response\n\nhe replied on June 26, 2017.\n\nmaintained that the agenda \" was not\n\nposted 48 hours in advance in a publicly available location. i3 He also reiterated his claim that\nthe Board President and superintendent improperly engaged in private conversations during the\nmeeting. On August 10, 2017, this office asked the Board to provide a supplemental response\n\nclarifying each Board member's start date and the dates on which each of the members had\ncompleted the OMA training. This office also requested copies of any certificates of completion.\nOn August 22, 2017, the Board provided the requested\n\nsupplemental\n\nresponse.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is the \" public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). \" The Open Meetings Act provides that\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179111. App. 3d 161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\nOMA Training\nAs a preliminary matter, section 1. 05(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 05(b) (West\n2016)) contains the requirements\n\nfor members of public bodies to complete the electronic OMA\n\ntraining program developed by the Public Access Counselor. It provides, in pertinent part:\nExcept as otherwise provided in this Section, each elected\n\nor appointed member of a public body subject to this Act who\nbecomes such a member after the effective date of this amendatory\nAct of the 97th General Assembly shall successfully complete the\nelectronic training curriculum developed and administered by the\nPublic Access Counselor. For these members, the training must be\ncompleted not later than the 90th day after the date the member:\n1)\n\ntakes the oath of office, if the member is required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person's duties\n\nas a member of the public body; or\n2)\n\notherwise assumes responsibilities as a member of\n\nthe public body, if the member is not required to\ntake an oath of office to assume the person's duties\n\nas a member of the governmental body.\nEach member successfully completing the electronic\n\ntraining curriculum shall file a copy of the certificate of completion\nwith the public body.\n\nThe failure of one or more members of a public body to\ncomplete the training required by this Section does not affect the\n\nvalidity of an action taken by the public body.\n\ncompletion with the public body is not required to subsequently\ncomplete the training required under this subsection (b).\nIn addition, section 1. 05(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 05(c) (West 2016)) permits elected school\n\nboard members to complete certain alternative training courses to satisfy the OMA training\nrequirement:\n\nAn elected school board member may satisfy the training\nrequirements of this Section by participating in a course of training\n\nsponsored or conducted by an organization created under Article\n23 of the School Code. The course of training shall include, but not\nbe limited to, instruction in:\n1)\n\nthe general background\n\nof the legal requirements\n\nfor open meetings;\n2)\n\nthe applicability of this Act to public bodies;\n\n3)\n\nprocedures and requirements\n\nregarding quorums,\n\nnotice, and record- keeping under this Act;\n4)\n\nprocedures and requirements for holding an open\nmeeting and for holding a closed meeting under this\nAct; and\n\n5)\n\npenalties and other consequences for failing to\ncomply with this Act.\n\nIf an organization\n\ncreated\n\nunder Article\n\n23 of the School\n\nCode provides a course of training under this subsection (c), it\nmust provide a certificate of course completion to each school\n\nboard member who successfully completes that course of training.\nIn response to this office's question about whether members of the Board had\n\nsatisfied the OMA training requirements, the Board stated that \" most of the Board members had\nundergone Professional Development Leadership Training, PERA [ Performance Evaluation\n\nReform Act] Training and other IASB [ Illinois Association of School Boards] trainings during\nOMA was discussed[,]\" and that they had mistakenly believed that those trainings fulfilled\n\nwhich\n\nthe OMA training requirement.4 The response further stated that \"[ u] pon discovering that the\n\nprevious trainings did not cover OMA certification, all Board members promptly took the\n\ntraining and became OMA-compliant. i5 The Board provided the start dates of each of the Board\nmembers and the dates on which they had completed the electronic OMA training curriculum.\nAdditionally, the Board provided copies of the members' certificates of completion of the\ncurriculum. This office has compared the start dates with the training completion dates and\ndetermined that five members had not completed the OMA training within 90 days of taking the\noath of office or otherwise assuming responsibilities as a Board member. At this time, however,\nthe OMA certificates of completion indicate that all members have completed the required OMA\n\ntraining. OMA provides no penalty for the failure to complete training within the statutory\ntimeframe.\n\nPosting of Agenda\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where\nthe meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the\n\nholding of the meeting. A public body that has a website that the\nfull-time staff of the public body maintains shall also post on its\nwebsite the agenda of any regular meetings of the governing body\nof that public body. (Emphasis added.)\nSection 2. 02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)) further provides:\n\nThe public body conducting a public meeting shall ensure that at\n\nleast one copy of any requested notice and agenda for the meeting\nis continuously available for public review during the entire 48hour period preceding the meeting. Posting of the notice and\nagenda on a website that is maintained by the public body satisfies\n\nthe requirement for continuous posting under this subsection (c).\nEmphasis added.)\n\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that on May 13, 2017, at 2: 45pm,\nthe District's secretary had posted the agenda outside the principal's office, which is in the same\n\nbuilding where the meeting was held. Addressing the accessibility of the posting, the Board\nasserted, in pertinent part:\n\ncorrectly asserts that the agenda, despite being\nphysically posted, wasn' t publicly available during the full 48\nhours prior to the meeting because it was inside a locked building.\nIt is an interesting question whether the District complied with the\nrequirements\n\nof Section 2. 02(c) in this instance, as Section 2. 02(c)\n\nstates, \" The public body conducting a public meeting shall ensure\n\nthat at least one copy of any requested notice or agenda for the\nmeeting is continuously available for public review during the\nentire 48- hour period preceding the meeting.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c)\nemphasis added).\n\nIn this case, no one requested the agenda until\n\nthe morning of the meeting, at which time the agenda was\n\npromptly posted. 161\nAdditionally, according to the Board, a part- time consultant maintains the\nDistrict's website, so the Board has no duty to post agendas on the District's website. The Board\nstated that the agenda was nonetheless posted on the District's website on the date of the meeting\nin this instance. Under the plain language of section 2. 02(a), only public bodies that have a\nwebsite maintained by a full- time staff member are required to post an agenda on their website\n\n48 hours in advance of a meeting. This office has not received evidence contradicting the\nBoard's assertion that a part- time consultant maintains the District's website. Accordingly, this\noffice concludes that the Board was not required to post the May 15, 2017, meeting agenda on\n\nthe District's website 48 hours before the meeting.\nThe Board acknowledged, however, that the agenda was not continuously\navailable during the 48 hours preceding the meeting because the building in which the agenda\n\nwas posted was locked. While OMA does not specify where exactly at the location of a meeting\nan agenda must be posted, the public policy underlying OMA is to provide \" advance notice of\nand the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\n\nIn order to ensure a full 48 hours of public notice\n\nbefore meetings, this office has stated that a public body \" should post meeting notices in a\nlocation where they may be continuously viewable from the outside of [the building where the\n\nmeeting is being held], such as on or near the front door or facing outward from a window.\" See,\ne. g., I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 29886, issued September 16, 2014, at 2- 3. Under the\n\nplain language of section 2. 02(c), a public body may also satisfy the \" continuously available\"\nrequirement by posting a copy of the notice and agenda on its website.\n\nby\n\nAlthough the Board asserted that the agenda was promptly posted once requested\nin compliance with section 2. 02(c), which refers to \" any requested notice or\n\nagenda\" (emphasis added), the meaning of the term \" requested\" is ambiguous in the context of\nthe requirement that an agenda be posted at least 48 hours in advance of a meeting.\n\nHowever,\n\nthe House debate on House Bill No. 4687, which added section 2. 02(c) to OMA as part of Public\n\nAct 97- 827, effective January 1, 2013, indicates that the General Assembly intended this\nprovision to apply to all meetings for which 48 hours advance notice is required.' In discussing\nthe bill, State Representative Sandy Pihos noted, in pertinent part: \" House Bill 4687, what that\n\ndoes is it requires a full 48- hour posting for a public meeting, and that has mitigated some of the\nopposition.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\nRemarks of Rep. Pihos, March 8, 2012, House Debate on\n\nHouse Bill No. 4687, at 69. Further, Representative Pihos confirmed the intent that a public\n\nbody would not violate the \" continuously available\" requirement if it posted the notice and\nagenda on its website and the internes went down due to circumstances beyond the public body's\ncontrol. See Remarks of Rep. Pihos, March 8, 2012, House Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at\n70.\n\nThe addition of section 2. 02(c) to OMA came less than three years after the court\n\nin In re Foxfeld Subdivision, 396 Ill. App. 3d 989, 993 (2d Dist. 2009) analyzed the claim that a\nvillage board violated OMA by posting the agenda for a meeting inside the village hall, which\nwas only open for seven hours per day. The court favorably cited a decision in which the Texas\nSupreme Court held that although notice for a meeting \" was not continuously available[,]\"\nhaving \" an ' open door' policy\" would be cost prohibitive for many municipalities. See Foxfeld,\n396111. App. 3d at 993 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S. W. 2d\n762, 768 (Tex. 1991)).\nThe court in Foxfield concluded: \"\nBased on a plain reading of our Open\nMeetings Act, it is clear that the legislature does not require that an agenda be posted in a\n\nspecific place so that it is publicly accessible for 48 continuous hours before the meeting.\"\nFoxfield, 396111. App. 3d at 994. Given the manner in which the phrases \" continuously\navailable\" and \" entire 48- hour period\" in section 2. 02(c) of OMA mirror the phrases\n\ncontinuously available\" and \" 48 continuous hours\" in Foxfield, it appears that the General\nAssembly intended the addition of section 2. 02(c) to correct Foxfreld's conclusion on agenda\naccessibility. See, e. g., Collins v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of\nChicago, 155 III. 2d 103,\n\n111 (1993) (\" An amendment that contradicts a recent interpretation of\n\na statute is an indication that such interpretation was incorrect and that the amendment was\nenacted to clarify the legislature's original intent.\").\n\nSection 2. 02(a) provides exceptions from the 48- hour advance notice requirement for meetings\n\nIn contrast, the Board did not point to any authority for the claim that the\ncontinuously available\" requirement was not triggered until\nrequested the agenda\nfor the meeting. Further, the Board did not support its claim that it complied with section 2. 02(c)\nby posting the agenda on its website upon\nrequest. Because the public policy and\nlegislative history behind section 2. 02(c) of OMA indicate that the General Assembly intended\nfor the public to be able to view the agenda for an open meeting for a full 48 hours in advance of\nthe meeting, this office concludes that the Board failed to provide sufficient advance notice of its\nMay 15, 2017, meeting.\nNevertheless,\nentry doors * * *\n\nthe Board stated that it \" will post its agendas on the windows of the\n\nto ensure the public has continuous access to the agenda during the 48 hours\n\nprior to each meeting, whether or not such agenda is requested. i8 Although it is not required to\npost its meeting agendas on the District website 48 hours prior to its meetings, the Board also\nstated that it plans to do so. In light of these measures, this office has determined that no\nadditional remedial action is required.\n\nSuperintendent's Participation\n\nin Meetings\n\nSection 1. 2 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 2 (West 2016)) defines a \" meeting\" as any\ngathering, whether in person or by video or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means *\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of a majority of a quorum of\nSection\nthe members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\"\n2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be\npermitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by\n\nthe public body.\"\nIn this case,\n\nallegation that the school superintendent improperly\n\nengaged in private conversation with the Board president during the May 15, 2017, meeting does\nnot set forth facts from which this office can conclude that the Board violated the requirements\n\nof OMA. 9 No provision of OMA prohibits a private conversation between a Board member and\nthe superintendent or one- on- one communications\n\ninvolving less than a majority of a quorum of\n\nthe Board. See Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 30157, issued July 7, 2014, at 2 (the\nallegation that Board members individually communicated with each other or with the Board's\nattorney [ during an open meeting] does not set forth facts from which this office could conclude\nBLetter from\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn, LLP, to Teresa\nLim, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (June 16, 2017), at 2.\n\n9 The Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of\nOMA and the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2016)). See 15 ILCS 20517(c)(3) (West\n\nthat a majority of a quorum of the Board engaged in private, contemporaneous, interactive\ncommunications\"\n\nsuch that this office could conclude that an improper private meeting was\n\nheld). Similarly, no provision of OMA requires that members of a school board be seated\nseparately from the school superintendent.\n\nWhile\n\ncontended that all comments made\n\nby the superintendent should be made during the public comment period of a meeting or when\nproviding a report as listed on an agenda, OMA does not contain such a requirement. Section\n2. 06(g) requires that members of the public be given an opportunity to address public officials\n\nduring a meeting, but does not prohibit an individual from making private comments to a public\nofficial. Nonetheless, the Board president may wish to consider whether private discussions with\nthe superintendent during open meetings contravene the spirit of OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA\n\nLIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48046\n\no\n\n105 training incomplete 202a proper improper sd"}
{"id":1203,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-06-22","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["48078"],"title":"Swansea Board failed to recite matter before termination vote, cured by later meeting","filename":"48078, issued June 22, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1171,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Village of Swansea Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide a public recital of the matter before voting to terminate an employee's employment. The PAC determined that while the initial vote was procedurally deficient, the Board cured the violation by holding a subsequent meeting with a proper public recital.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Village of Swansea Board of Trustees voted to fire an employee without first telling the public what they were voting on, which is required by law. The Attorney General's office agreed that the Board failed to follow the rules during the first meeting. However, because the Board later held another meeting where they properly announced the vote before taking it, the issue was considered resolved.","holding":"The Board of Trustees of the Village of Swansea violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide an adequate public recital before taking final action, but the violation was cured by subsequent remedial action.","legal_question":"Whether the Board of Trustees violated section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered prior to taking final action on an employment termination.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(e)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Trustees of the Village of Swansea","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in text)","pac_outcome":"Violation found but cured by remedial action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The Board of Trustees failed to provide a public recital of the nature of the matter being considered before voting to terminate an employee's employment.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_e/Public-recital-requirement/48078, issued June 22, 2017.pdf","sha256":"fbb9308479b7f6a9fc80d8b1df78be955c16bf21a3d251c68ba4e1614e95fc1d","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["open meetings act","final action","public recital","employment termination","remedial action"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nS' L'ATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n479' ORNEY GENERAL.\n\nJune 22, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jerry Warchol\nKurowski Shultz LLC\n1405 North Green Mount Road, Suite 400\nO' Fallon, Illinois 62269\njwarchol@kslfllc.com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 48078\nDear\n\nand Mr. Warchol:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Board of Trustees of the Village of Swansea ( Board) did not provide an\n\nadequate public recital of the business being conducted prior to voting to terminate\nemployment during its May 24, 2017, meeting, but that the Board has since taken the\napplicable remedial action by making a proper public recital before voting to terminate\nemployment during its June 5, 2017, meeting.\nOn May 28, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\n\nAccess Bureau alleging that during the Board' s May 24, 2017, meeting, the Board took final\n\naction with respect to her employment without first informing the public what it would be voting\non. This office construed\nRequest for Review as alleging a potential violation of\nsection 2( e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2( e) ( West 2016)), which provides: \" No final action may be\ntaken at a closed meeting. Final action shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the\n\nmatter being considered and other information that will inform the public of the business being\nconducted.\"\n\n601\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (\n\n100 West Randolph\n\nIllinois\n\n60601 • (\n\nSouth\n\nUniversity Avenue,\n\nStreet, Chicago,\nSuite\n\n102,\n\nCarbondale, Illinois\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n312) 814- 3000 •\n62901 • (\n\nTTY: ( 877) 844- 5461 •\nTTY: ( 800) 964- 3013 •\n\n618) 529- 6400 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\nTTY: ( 877) 675- 9339 •\n\nFax: (\n\n618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Jerry Warchol\nJune 22, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn May 31, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with copies of the May 24; 2017, meeting agenda,\nminutes, and closed session verbatim recording for this office's confidential review, together\nwith a written response to the allegation that the Board did not adequately recite the nature of the\n\nmatter being considered in open session before voting to terminate\n\nemployment.\n\nOn June 7, 2017, the Board' s outside counsel furnished this office with those materials. In its\nwritten response, the Board stated that it was \" willing to accept\nposition that the\nmotion made at the May 24, 2017 meeting, which purported to result in her termination, was\ninadequate under Section\n\n2( e)\n\nof the\n\nOpen Meetings Act.\"'\n\nThus, \" to ensure compliance with the\n\nOpen Meetings Act,\" 2 the Board listed an item on its June 5, 2017, meeting agenda for a \" Motion\nregarding termination of employment of\ni3 and then re -voted on terminating\nemployment during that meeting after reciting in open session that it was about to do\nso.\nOn June 16, 2017,\nreplied,\nin pertinent part: \"[\nI] t is still my stance that they\nviolated the act on May 24, 2017 and have since rectified that on June 5, 2017. That does not\ntake away from the fact that they violated the law\n\ni4\n\npreviously.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nU] nder section 2( e) of the Open Meetings Act, a public recital must take place\nat the open meeting before the matter is voted upon; the recital must announce the nature of the\nmatter under consideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular transaction or issue,\n\nbut need not provide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\" Board of Education of\nSpringfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois, 2017 IL 120343,\nN. E. 2d (\n\n2017).\n\nIn her Request for Review,\nalleged that during the Board' s May 24,\n2017, meeting: \" The board went into executive session. Upon returning to the meeting,\nmade\nsaid\n\na motion\n\npublicly * * *\n\nto act\n\non\n\nwhat was\n\ndiscussed in executive\n\nsession. * * *\n\nThey never\n\nwhat they were voting on. i5 The minutes of the Board's May 24, 2017,\n\nLetter from Jerome S. Warchol, Jr., to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau,\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General ( June 7, 20I[ 7]), at 2.\n\nLetter from Jerome S. Warchol, Jr., to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau,\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General ( June 7, 201[ 7]), at 2.\n\nemployment of\n\nVillage of Swansea Board of Trustees, Agenda Item X( A), Motion regarding termination of\nJune 5, 2017).\n\n4E -mail from\n\nto Joshua Jones ( June 16, 2017).\n\n5E - mail from\n\nto\n\nPublic Access Counselor ( May 28, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Jerry Warchol\nJune 22, 2017\nPage 3\n\nmeeting confirm that upon returning to open session, a \" roll call of aye from all Trustees\nsupported the Mayor proceeding as directed in executive session. i6 As the Board has\nacknowledged,\n\nthis public recital prior to the vote to terminate\n\nemployment\n\nwas\n\ninsufficient, because the Board merely referenced its confidential closed session discussion\nrather than announcing the nature of the matter under consideration.\n\nMay 24, 2017, vote to terminate\n\nAccordingly, the Board' s\n\nemployment did not meet the requirements of\n\nsection 2( e) of OMA.\n\nNonetheless, a public body can ratify and cure an action taken with insufficient\n\ntransparency by subsequently revisiting the matter in open session and holding a proper vote.\nSee Board ofEducation School District No. 67 v. Sikorski, 214 Ill. App. 3d 945, 952 ( 1st Dist.\n1991) ( board violated OMA by holding a closed session that was not authorized by any of the\n\nAct' s exceptions, but \" ratified and cured\" the decision made during the unauthorized closed\nsession by subsequently discussing and voting on the matter in open session); see also Lindsey v.\nBoard of Education of City of Chicago,\n\n127 III. App. 3d 413, 422 ( 1st Dist. 1984) (\"\n\nAny prior\n\nviolation of the Open Meetings Act by defendants cannot prevent the Board from calling a\nsubsequent meeting, noticed in full compliance with the requirements of the Act, and there\nAccordingly, because the Board made a proper recital under section\ntaking identical action.\").\n2( e) of OMA prior to its vote to terminate\nemployment on June 5, 2017, no further\nremedial action is required.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n48078 o 2e final action improper mun\n\n6Village of Swansea Board of Trustees, Meeting, May 24, 2017, Minutes\n\n1.\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A board's public recital before a termination vote","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-48078/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nS' L'ATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n479' ORNEY GENERAL.\n\nJune 22, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jerry Warchol\nKurowski Shultz LLC\n1405 North Green Mount Road, Suite 400\nO' Fallon, Illinois 62269\njwarchol@kslfllc.com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 48078\nDear\n\nand Mr. Warchol:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Board of Trustees of the Village of Swansea (Board) did not provide an\n\nadequate public recital of the business being conducted prior to voting to terminate\nemployment during its May 24, 2017, meeting, but that the Board has since taken the\napplicable remedial action by making a proper public recital before voting to terminate\nemployment during its June 5, 2017, meeting.\nOn May 28, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\n\nAccess Bureau alleging that during the Board's May 24, 2017, meeting, the Board took final\n\naction with respect to her employment without first informing the public what it would be voting\non. This office construed\nRequest for Review as alleging a potential violation of\nsection 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(e) (West 2016)), which provides: \" No final action may be\ntaken at a closed meeting. Final action shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the\n\nmatter being considered and other information that will inform the public of the business being\nconducted.\"\n\n601\n\nOn May 31, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with copies of the May 24; 2017, meeting agenda,\nminutes, and closed session verbatim recording for this office's confidential review, together\nwith a written response to the allegation that the Board did not adequately recite the nature of the\n\nmatter being considered in open session before voting to terminate\n\nemployment.\n\nOn June 7, 2017, the Board's outside counsel furnished this office with those materials. In its\nwritten response, the Board stated that it was \" willing to accept\nposition that the\nmotion made at the May 24, 2017 meeting, which purported to result in her termination, was\ninadequate under Section\n\n2(e)\n\nof the\n\nOpen Meetings Act.\"'\n\nThus, \" to ensure compliance with the\n\nOpen Meetings Act,\" 2 the Board listed an item on its June 5, 2017, meeting agenda for a \" Motion\nregarding termination of employment of\ni3 and then re -voted on terminating\nemployment during that meeting after reciting in open session that it was about to do\nso.\nOn June 16, 2017,\nreplied,\nin pertinent part: \"[\nI] t is still my stance that they\nviolated the act on May 24, 2017 and have since rectified that on June 5, 2017. That does not\ntake away from the fact that they violated the law\n\ni4\n\npreviously.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nU] nder section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act, a public recital must take place\nat the open meeting before the matter is voted upon; the recital must announce the nature of the\nmatter under consideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular transaction or issue,\n\nbut need not provide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\" Board of Education of\nSpringfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois, 2017 IL 120343,\nN. E. 2d (2017).\n\nIn her Request for Review,\nalleged that during the Board's May 24,\n2017, meeting: \" The board went into executive session. Upon returning to the meeting,\nmade\nsaid\n\na motion\n\npublicly * * *\n\nto act\n\non\n\nwhat was\n\ndiscussed in executive\n\nsession. * * *\n\nThey never\n\nwhat they were voting on. i5 The minutes of the Board's May 24, 2017,\n\nLetter from Jerome S. Warchol, Jr., to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau,\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General (June 7, 20I[ 7]), at 2.\n\nLetter from Jerome S. Warchol, Jr., to Joshua Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau,\nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General (June 7, 201[ 7]), at 2.\n\nemployment of\n\nVillage of Swansea Board of Trustees, Agenda Item X(A), Motion regarding termination of\nJune 5, 2017).\n\nmeeting confirm that upon returning to open session, a \" roll call of aye from all Trustees\nsupported the Mayor proceeding as directed in executive session. i6 As the Board has\nacknowledged,\n\nthis public recital prior to the vote to terminate\n\nemployment\n\nwas\n\ninsufficient, because the Board merely referenced its confidential closed session discussion\nrather than announcing the nature of the matter under consideration.\n\nMay 24, 2017, vote to terminate\n\nAccordingly, the Board's\n\nemployment did not meet the requirements of\n\nsection 2(e) of OMA.\n\nNonetheless, a public body can ratify and cure an action taken with insufficient\n\ntransparency by subsequently revisiting the matter in open session and holding a proper vote.\nSee Board ofEducation School District No. 67 v. Sikorski, 214 Ill. App. 3d 945, 952 (1st Dist.\n1991) (board violated OMA by holding a closed session that was not authorized by any of the\n\nAct's exceptions, but \" ratified and cured\" the decision made during the unauthorized closed\nsession by subsequently discussing and voting on the matter in open session); see also Lindsey v.\nBoard of Education of City of Chicago,\n\n127 III. App. 3d 413, 422 (1st Dist. 1984) (\"\n\nAny prior\n\nviolation of the Open Meetings Act by defendants cannot prevent the Board from calling a\nsubsequent meeting, noticed in full compliance with the requirements of the Act, and there\nAccordingly, because the Board made a proper recital under section\ntaking identical action.\").\n2(e) of OMA prior to its vote to terminate\nemployment on June 5, 2017, no further\nremedial action is required.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n48078 o 2e final action improper mun\n\n6 Village of Swansea Board of Trustees, Meeting, May 24, 2017, Minutes\n\n1."}
{"id":1204,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-07-10","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["48412"],"title":"Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee not a public body under OMA","filename":"48412, issued July 10, 2020.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3814,"summary":"The Citizen Advocacy Center alleged that the Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee of Cicero School District 99 violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide public comment, but the PAC determined the Committee is not a 'public body' subject to OMA.","plain_summary":"A parent advocacy group alleged that a school district's Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by not allowing public comment at two 2017 meetings. The PAC determined that the Committee did not meet the criteria for an advisory body under the Act because it operates autonomously under its own authorizing statute rather than as part of the district's formal governance structure. Because the Committee is not a public body subject to the Act, the PAC did not need to decide whether those specific meetings violated the Open Meetings Act.","holding":"","legal_question":"Whether the Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee of Cicero School District 99 constitutes a 'public body' subject to the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee of Cicero School District 99","requesting_party":"Mr. Benjamin Silver, Citizen Advocacy Center","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body definition","subject_description":"The determination addresses whether a school district's bilingual parent advisory committee is subject to the Open Meetings Act.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-public-body/advisory-bodies/48412, issued July 10, 2020.pdf","sha256":"b1a1707d66113e72df51c8ff2d8903c32bb03165025d1af763f2b4f88ca03ae5","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","advisory committee","Open Meetings Act","public comment"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n. •,\n\n• •..\n\n.\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nA'fTORNEY GENERAL\nJuly 10, 2020\n\nVia electronic mail\nML Benjamin Silver\nCommµnity Lawyer\nCitizen Advocacy Center\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nbsil'ver@citizenadvocacycenter.org\nVia electronic rriciil\nDt: Rodolro··Hetnandez\n's-upetfritenderit •\nCicero School District 99\nf\n51 fo Wes;t 24-t Street\nCicero, Illinois 60804\nrhernandez@cicd99.edu\n\ni\nI\n\n·,r·\nI\n\n• ..:·RE:· OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 48412\n\n.. '.• .•\n\nDear Mr. Silver and Dr. Hernandez:\n• .: This determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the· ·open M�etings\nAct\n• •\n1\n(OMA)(5 ILCS 120/3.S(e)(West 2018)).\nI\n\nOn June 20, 2017, Mr. Benjamin Silver, on behalf of the Citizen Advocacy\nCenter, submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau alleging possible violations\nof OMA by the Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee(Committee) of Cicero School District 99\n(School District). Specifically, he alleged that the Committee is an advisory body of the School\nDistrict, and that the Committee failed to provide an 9pportunity for public comment at it� April\n'\nI\n\n1n issuing this letter, we recognize that it is coming long after the OMA dispute took place.\nBecause it raises a legal question that may reoccur, however, this letter is intended to provide guidance to the public\nbody and requester.\n1\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (877) 844-5461 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (800) 964-3013 • Fax: (312) 814-3806 I\n601 South University Ave., Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (877) 675-9339 • Fax: (618) 529-6416 •\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 2\n21, 2017, and May 12, 2017, meetings in violation of section 2.06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/2.06(g) (West 2016)).\nOn July 3, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of Mr. Silver's Request for Review\nto the School District and asked it to respond in writing to Mr. Silver's allegations. In particular,\nthis office asked the School District to explain whether any members of the public attempted to\nprovide public comment at the meetings in question and whether the Committee permitted those\nindividuals to address the Committee during its meetings. If the School District did not 6onsider\nthe Committee to be a \"public body\" as defined in section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West\n2016)), this office asked it to explain in detail the Committee's purpose and duties, as well as its\nrelationship to the School District. Additionally, 'this office asked the School District to provide\ncopies of any recordings, written minutes, and other written documentation, if any, of the\nCommittee's April 21, 2017, and May 12, 2017, meetings. On July 31, 2017, this office �eceived\nthe requested materials. On August 1, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the School r;>istrict's\nwritten response to Mr. Silver; he replied on August 10, 2017.\n•\n\nI\n\n1\n\nDETERMINATION\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken. openly\nand that'their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2016).\n1\n\nl.\n\nSection 1.02 of OMA defines a \"public body\" as:\n[A]ll l<,:::gislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\n.\n\n.\n\n1\n\nI\n\nAn \"advisory body,\" for purposes of\nOMA, is an entity that has defined responsibilities and\nis a\nI\n.\nformal part of the structure of the public body that it advises. Board ofRegents ofRegency\nUniversity System V. Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d 968, 977-78 (4th Dist. 1997). In contrast, OMA\n\"is not .intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely informal advisory comm\\ttees\nwho discuss internal\" affairs of a public body. Pope v. Parkinson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800 (4th\nDist. 1977). Factors to consider in determining whether a group constitutes an advisory b9dy\nunder OMA include:\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 3\n\nwho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; the entity's\nassigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity's bylaws or\nauthorizing statute; whether its role is solely advisory or whether it\n• also has a deliberative or investigative function; whether the entity\nis subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any\npublic body; whether the group has a budget; its place within the\nlarger organization or institution of which it is a part; and the\nimpact of decisions or recommendations that the group makes.\nUniversity Professionals of Illinois v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856,\n865 (1st Dist. 2003).\n\n.1\n\n1\n\nIn Stukel, the plaintiff alleged that a group of presidents and chancellors of public\nuniversities (Council), which made recommendations to the Illinois Board of Higher Edtication\n(IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE meetings to discuss issues related to\nfunding for public education. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 857-58. The court held that the 1Couni:il\nwas not an advisory body of IBHE in part because it was not incorporated into the formaf\norganizational structure of IBHE, a factor that the court identified as a \"primary consideration in\ndetermining whether an organization is a public body under the Meetings Act.\" Stukel, 3'44 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 865. The court explained that \"the Council was formed by the presidents and\nchancellors of the various state universities to express its views to the IBHE. Granted, it� role is\nadvisory hut that role is one that the Council [and not IBHE] created.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n866. The court also noted that the plaintiffs complaint did not allege that the group had a\n\"deliberative or investigative function in relation to the IBHE or that the Council is subject to\ngovernment control. It'does not appear that the Council is otherwise accountable to any public\nbody. It does not appear to have a budget[.]\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866. Further, \"no\nmember of the Councp is a member of the IBHE.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866; see also Pope\nv. Parkinson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800 (4th Dist. 1997) (committee of four faculty members and\nfour students that advised director of sports stadium and chancellor was not an advisory body\nbecause OMA \"is not intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely informal;\nadvisory committees who discuss internal University affairs.\"); People ex rel. Cooper v. c;arlson,\n28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (2d Dist. 1975) (OMA does not apply to voluntary \"technical staff'\nmeetings of \"department heads or employees who seek to improve with dispatch their\nperformance or function of assisting in the conduct of the people's business.\").\n1\n\n.\n\nI\n\n:\n\nConversely, in Reynard, the appellate court concluded that the Athletic Coµncil of\nIllinois State University (ISU) was an advisory body subject to FOIA. Reynard, 292 IIL App. 3d\nat 979. The Athletic Council serves \"as an advisory body to the athletic director, with priinary\nadvisory responsibility to the president. It gives advice on the development of budgets and\n\n\fI\n\nMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 4\n\nI'\n\npolicies governing the intercollegiate athletic program.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 9�1. The\nAthletic Council \"exists to provide. faculty input to the decision-making bodies at ISU.\" •\nReynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 972. The athletic director \"is free to reject its advice and there have\nbeen occasions when he has done so. The Council deals only with internal ISU matters,i it has no\nbudget, and none of its members are paid.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 972. In concluding that\nthe Athletic Council was an advisory body subject to the requirements of OMA, howevc;r, the\ncourt emphasized that the Council is \"part of the formal organizational structure of ISU and its\nduties and responsibilities are set forth in the supplement [to the bylaws of the ISU Senate]. The\nbroad scope of the Council's responsibilities as set forth in the supplement contrasts shaJply with\nthe limited duties of the committee in Pope [v. Parkinson}.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 978.\nIn its response to this office, the School District asserted that the two medtings in\nquestion \"were the second and third days of a parent workshop presented by Victoria Infante of\nFamily Bridges.\"2 According to the School District, \"parents participated in activities aJd the\npresenter asked them questions regarding the topics\" that wete presented during those t'Yo days. 3\nThe School District contended that no parents attempted to provide public comment at t�e\nmeetings. The School District asserted, in pertinent part:\nIsabel Ramirez, BPAC's Parent Outreach Liaison, was\npresent at both the April 21, 2017 and May 12, 2017 meetings and\nshe stated that she was not aware of any members of the public\nwho attempted to provide public comment and were not allowed to\ndo so. * * * Ms. Ramirez stated that during the workshops parents\nwere encouraged to share their experiences, an parents were able\nto respond to the presenter's questions, and she was not aware of\nany members of the public who tried to make a comment on\nanything other than the presentation itself. [4l\nI\n\nThe School District further denied Mr. Silver's claim that the Committee is a \"public body\" under\nOMA. The School District stated that the Committee was established pursuant to section 5/14C10 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/14C-10 (West 2016)), which provides: \"Each schoolI district\nshall, accordingly, establish a parent advisory committee which affords parents the opportunity\nI\nI\n\n2Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n3 Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\n\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assi_stant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n\n4\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 5\n\neffectively to express their views and which ensures that [transitional bilingual educatioh\nprograms] are planned, operated, and evaluated with the involvement of, and in consultation\nwith, parents of children served by the programs.\" Applying the Stukel factors, the Schdol\nDistrict argued that the Committee did not meet the characteristics of a public body:\ni\nI\n\n(1)\nWho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure\nThe School District asserted that it does not appoint members of the Committee,\nand members are not paid. The School District stated that the Committee's membership \\s.\ninstead governed by section 5/14C-10 of the School Code, which provides: \"Such com1ittees\nshall be composed of parents of children enrolled in transitional bilingual education programs,\ntransitional bilingual education teachers, counselors, and representatives from communiiy\ngroups; provided, however, that a majority of each committee shall be parents of childreh\nenrolled in the transitional bilingual education· program.\" According to the School Distdct,\n\"[p]arents of District students enrolled in transitional bilingual education programs that attend\nthe BPAC meetings are considered members of BPAC. General members are not appointed and\nanyone can attend the BPAC meetings.\"5 The School District stated that the Committee mainly\nis comprised of program parents and guardians, but also \"includes transitional bilingual\neducation teachers, counselors and community leaders. 116\n1\n\n(2)\nThe entity's assigned duties, inciuding duties reflected in the ehtity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute\nThe Sch'.ool District contended that the Committee \"does not have any assigned\nduties frorp the District and it operates autonomously.\" 7 The School District directed this office\nto section 5/14C-10 of the School Code, emphasizing that the provision provides: \"Once,\nestablished, these committees shall autonomously carry out their affairs, including the election of\nofficers and the establishment of internal• ruies, guidelines, and procedures.\" 105 ILCS 5/14C-10\n..\n(West 2016).\n1\n\n:\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99,.IDel Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n5\n\nI\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n6\n\n7Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 6\n\n(3)\nWhether the entity's role is solely advisory or whether it also has a·\ndeliberative or investigative function\n!\nI\nI\n\nThe School District argued that the Committee's function \"is solely advisory.\" 8\nThe School District acknowledged that the Committee provides feedback and suggestions to the\nSchool District concerning its transitional bilingual education program, but argued that the\nCommittee \"does not make any decisions regarding the programs and there is no guarantee that\nthe District will implement any of BPAC's recommendations.\"9 The School District further\nasserted that it did not have a formal process for reviewing the Committee's recommendations.\n·1\n\n(4)\nWhether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise\n!\naccountable to any public body\n\nThe School District contended that the Committee is not subject to its control and\nthat it \"merely facilitates the transmission of information regarding the bilingual progratjls to\nparents and community members. 1110 According to the School District, the Committee meets\nmonthly and provides parents of children in transitional bilingual education programs th� chance\nto \"learn about the curriculum, attend workshops, participate in conferences, and to• provide\nfeedback regarding these programs to the District.\"11\n1\n\n(5)\n\nWhether the group has a budget\n\nThe School District stated that the Committee does not have a budget.\n(6)\nwhich it is a part\n\nThe entity's place within the larger organization or institution of\n;\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n8\n\nI\n\nI\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n9\n\nLeti:er from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n10\n\n. I\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99,'.Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n11\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 7\n\nI\n\nI\n\n:\nThe School Districtcontended that the Committee is \"separate from the overall\norganization of the District.\" 12 In particular, the School District emphasized that the Coipmittee\nconducts its affairs autonomously pursuant to the School Code.\n.\n(7)\n\nI\nThe impact of decisions or recommendations that the group makes\n\nThe School District contended that the Committee \"does not directly mall any\ndecisions regarding the District's bilingual program.\" 13 The School District reiterated th�t\n. although the Committee makes suggestions to the School District about its bilingual programs, it\nmay decline\nto adopt those suggestions.\ni\n,\n\nIn his reply, Mr. Silver argued that the Committee \"is neither informal or an\ninternal administrative entity\" in contrast to the entities examined in Stukel, Pope, and Cbrlson. 14\nHe contended that the Committee was similar to the group of presidents and chancellors I\nexamined in Stukel in only three of the discussed factors. Specifically; he acknowledged that the\nCommittee lacked a budget, did not pay its members, and did not include members ofth� higher\nbody, but contended that the council in Reynard likewise did not meet those factors. Mrl Silver\ndisputed the School District's claim that the Committee is separate from the School Dist�ict's\nformal organizational structure. He argued that the Committee \"is defined by state statute and is\na formal, �tanding advisory committee t� a school board that has a Transitional Bilingua)\nEducation program. State statute and administrative rules establishing the BPAC descriipe\nconcrete duties of a BPAC and mandates that the school board receive input from the B�AC.\" 15\nMr. Silver cited section 228.30(c)(4) of title 23 of the Administrative Code (23 Ill. Adm.: Code\n§228.30(c)(4) (2014), amended at 38 Ill. Reg. 19757, effective September 29, 2014), which\nprovides that school districts with transitional bilingual education programs are to establish a\nparent advisory committee that \"shall participate in the planning, operation, and evaluatibn of\nprograms.\" That provision further provides, in pertinent part:\n:\nI\nA) The committee shall:\nI\n\n1\n\n12 Letter\n\nfrom Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99/I Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah\n. Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 20 I '7).\nI\nI\n13 Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99;1 Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 20 I J).\nI\n14\n.\nLetter from Benjamin J. Silver, Community Lawyer, Citizen Advocacy Center, to Leah Bartelt,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (August I 0, 2017), at l\n.\n\nI\n\n!\n\n15 Letter from Benjamin J. Silver, Community Lawyer, Citizen Advocacy Center, to Leah Bartelt,\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (August I 0, 2017), at 6\n\n1\n\n•\n\nI\n\ni\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 8\n\ni)\n\nmeet at least four times per year;\n\nii)\nmaintain on file with the school district minutes of\nthese meetings;\niii)\nreview the district's annual program application to\nthe State Superintendent of Education; and\niv)\nautonomously carry out their affairs, including the\nelection of officers and the establishment of internal rules,\nguidelines, andproce.dures. (Section 14C-10 of the School\nCode). (Emphasis in original.)\nIn addition, Mr. Silver argued that the Committee advises the School District Board of Education\n(Board) on policy matters and asserted: \"This fact is highly pertinent to the analysis of (:)MA\napplication, because the Open Meetings Act's declaration that public bodies conduct their\nbusiness openly refers to the policymaking function of public bodies.\" 16\n,\n\n.\n\nI\n\nI\n\nAfter reviewing the information provided by Mr. Silver and the School District,\nand in light of the relevant factors, this office concludes that the Committee is not a \"public\nbody\" under OMA. Although the Committee was formally established pursuantto an\nauthorizing statute, the statute also expressly provides that \"[o]nee established, these committees\nshall autonomously carry out their affairs[.]\" 17 The statute's implementing regulations similarly\nstate that the committees are to conduct their affairs autonomously. Thus, the Committe¢ is not\nsubject to the same oversight as, for example, the Board's standing committees, which are\nspecifically creations of the Board and report directly to the Board. The available information\n•\nsuggests that the Committee serves a limited role within the School District's formal\norganizational structure as a liaison between the School District and pa]ients or legal guaidians of\nchildren who are enrolled in its transitional bilingual educational program. See, for example, Ill.\nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 35973, issued August 21, 2015, at 4 (concluding that a college's\nParalegal Advisory Committee was not a \"public body\" subject to OMA because it functi.oned\nindependently and had \"only a limited function within the College's formal organizational\nstructure as a liaison between the educational program and professionals working in the l�gal\nfield.\"). Indeed, the School Code and regulations require that the majority of committee\nmembers be parents or guardians; the committee also selects its own officers. Although the\n1\n\n1\n\n16Letter from Benjamin J. Silver, Community Lawyer, Citizen Advocacy Center, to Leah,Bartelt,\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (August 10, 2017), at 6.\n1\n17105 ILCS 5/14C-10 (West 2016).\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 9\n\nI\n\nI\n\nregulations require that the Committee meet at least four times a year and maintain meeting\nminutes with the School District, the Committee's duties appear solely advisory. In particu,iar,\nthe Committee provides a forum in which parents can \"express their views and which ensures\nthat such programs are planned, operated, and evaluated with the involvement of, and in /\nconsultation with, parents of children served by the programs.\" 18 While the Committee is tasked\nwith reviewing the School District's annual program application to the State Superintenderit of\nEducation, it is not subject to specific reporting requirements to suggest it is accountable tJ the\nS�h�ol District or Board:· F�rther, any �o�mittee feedback or r�comn:iendations are non -/\n_ .\nbmdmg on the School District; the specific impact of the Committee's mput on School District\ndecisions is unclear. Additionally, based on this office's review of the April 21, 2017, an� May·\n12, 2017, meeting agendas and minutes, it appears that a substantial function of the Com�ittee is\nto provide parents and guardians with resources and educational opportunities related to its\nbilingual program, such as workshops and conferences, rather than to advise the School District\non policy matters. Because the Committee lacks the key features of an advisory body, thi1s office\nconcludes that the Committee is not a \"public body\" subject to the requirements of OMA./\nBecause this determination concludes that the Committee is not a \"public body\"\nsubject to OMA, this office need not address whether the Committee violated section2.06(g) of\nI\nOMA.\n\nI\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter./ If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of t�is letter.\nI\n\nI\n\n· Very truly yours,\n\nI\n\nTERESA LIM\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48412 o not a pb sd\n\nI\n\nI\n\n'\n\nI\nI\n\nI\n\n18\n\n105 ILCS 5!14C-I0 (West 2016).\n\n\fMr. Benjamin Silver\nDr. Rodolfo Hernandez\nJuly 10, 2020\nPage 10\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Emily Witt\nAttorney for Cicero School District 99\nDel Galdo Law Group, LLC\n5110 West 24th Street\nCicero, Illinois 60804\nwitt@dlglawgroup.com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":"A community group asked the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau to review whether a school district's Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee violated the Open Meetings Act by not allowing public comment at two meetings in 2017. The source document presents the School District's arguments that the committee is not a 'public body' under the Act and includes legal analysis, but the text cuts off before stating any final conclusion or determination by the Attorney General's office.","card_headline":"A bilingual parent advisory committee's OMA status","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-48412/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n. •,\n\n• •..\n\n.\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nA'fTORNEY GENERAL\nJuly 10, 2020\n\nVia electronic mail\nML Benjamin Silver\nCommµnity Lawyer\nCitizen Advocacy Center\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nbsil'ver@citizenadvocacycenter.org\nVia electronic rriciil\nDt: Rodolro··Hetnandez\n's-upetfritenderit •\nCicero School District 99\nf\n51 fo Wes;t 24-t Street\nCicero, Illinois 60804\nrhernandez@cicd99.edu\n\ni\nI\n\n·,r·\nI\n\n•..:·RE:· OMA Request for Review- 2017 PAC 48412\n\n.. '.•.•\n\nDear Mr. Silver and Dr. Hernandez:\n•.: This determination is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the· ·open M�etings\nAct\n• •\n1\n(OMA)(5 ILCS 120/3.S(e)(West 2018)).\nI\n\nOn June 20, 2017, Mr. Benjamin Silver, on behalf of the Citizen Advocacy\nCenter, submitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau alleging possible violations\nof OMA by the Bilingual Parent Advisory Committee(Committee) of Cicero School District 99\n(School District). Specifically, he alleged that the Committee is an advisory body of the School\nDistrict, and that the Committee failed to provide an 9pportunity for public comment at it� April\n'\nI\n\n1n issuing this letter, we recognize that it is coming long after the OMA dispute took place.\nBecause it raises a legal question that may reoccur, however, this letter is intended to provide guidance to the public\nbody and requester.\n1\n\n21, 2017, and May 12, 2017, meetings in violation of section 2.06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/2.06(g) (West 2016)).\nOn July 3, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of Mr. Silver's Request for Review\nto the School District and asked it to respond in writing to Mr. Silver's allegations. In particular,\nthis office asked the School District to explain whether any members of the public attempted to\nprovide public comment at the meetings in question and whether the Committee permitted those\nindividuals to address the Committee during its meetings. If the School District did not 6onsider\nthe Committee to be a \"public body\" as defined in section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West\n2016)), this office asked it to explain in detail the Committee's purpose and duties, as well as its\nrelationship to the School District. Additionally, 'this office asked the School District to provide\ncopies of any recordings, written minutes, and other written documentation, if any, of the\nCommittee's April 21, 2017, and May 12, 2017, meetings. On July 31, 2017, this office �eceived\nthe requested materials. On August 1, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the School r;>istrict's\nwritten response to Mr. Silver; he replied on August 10, 2017.\n•\n\nI\n\n1\n\nDETERMINATION\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of [OMA] to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken. openly\nand that'their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2016).\n1\n\nl.\n\nSection 1.02 of OMA defines a \"public body\" as:\n[A]ll l<,:::gislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns,\nschool districts and all other municipal corporations, boards,\nbureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited\nto committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or\nin part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the\nGeneral Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.\n.\n\n.\n\n1\n\nI\n\nAn \"advisory body,\" for purposes of\nOMA, is an entity that has defined responsibilities and\nis a\nI\n.\nformal part of the structure of the public body that it advises. Board ofRegents ofRegency\nUniversity System V. Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d 968, 977-78 (4th Dist. 1997). In contrast, OMA\n\"is not.intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely informal advisory comm\\ttees\nwho discuss internal\" affairs of a public body. Pope v. Parkinson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800 (4th\nDist. 1977). Factors to consider in determining whether a group constitutes an advisory b9dy\n\nwho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; the entity's\nassigned duties, including duties reflected in the entity's bylaws or\nauthorizing statute; whether its role is solely advisory or whether it\n• also has a deliberative or investigative function; whether the entity\nis subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any\npublic body; whether the group has a budget; its place within the\nlarger organization or institution of which it is a part; and the\nimpact of decisions or recommendations that the group makes.\nUniversity Professionals of Illinois v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856,\n865 (1st Dist. 2003).\n\n.1\n\n1\n\nIn Stukel, the plaintiff alleged that a group of presidents and chancellors of public\nuniversities (Council), which made recommendations to the Illinois Board of Higher Edtication\n(IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE meetings to discuss issues related to\nfunding for public education. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 857-58. The court held that the 1 Couni:il\nwas not an advisory body of IBHE in part because it was not incorporated into the formaf\norganizational structure of IBHE, a factor that the court identified as a \"primary consideration in\ndetermining whether an organization is a public body under the Meetings Act.\" Stukel, 3'44 Ill.\nApp. 3d at 865. The court explained that \"the Council was formed by the presidents and\nchancellors of the various state universities to express its views to the IBHE. Granted, it� role is\nadvisory hut that role is one that the Council [and not IBHE] created.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at\n866. The court also noted that the plaintiffs complaint did not allege that the group had a\n\"deliberative or investigative function in relation to the IBHE or that the Council is subject to\ngovernment control. It'does not appear that the Council is otherwise accountable to any public\nbody. It does not appear to have a budget[.]\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866. Further, \"no\nmember of the Councp is a member of the IBHE.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866; see also Pope\nv. Parkinson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800 (4th Dist. 1997) (committee of four faculty members and\nfour students that advised director of sports stadium and chancellor was not an advisory body\nbecause OMA \"is not intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely informal;\nadvisory committees who discuss internal University affairs.\"); People ex rel. Cooper v. c;arlson,\n28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (2d Dist. 1975) (OMA does not apply to voluntary \"technical staff'\nmeetings of \"department heads or employees who seek to improve with dispatch their\nperformance or function of assisting in the conduct of the people's business.\").\n1\n\n.\n\nI\n\n:\n\nConversely, in Reynard, the appellate court concluded that the Athletic Coµncil of\nIllinois State University (ISU) was an advisory body subject to FOIA. Reynard, 292 IIL App. 3d\nat 979. The Athletic Council serves \"as an advisory body to the athletic director, with priinary\nadvisory responsibility to the president. It gives advice on the development of budgets and\n\nI'\n\npolicies governing the intercollegiate athletic program.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 9�1. The\nAthletic Council \"exists to provide. faculty input to the decision-making bodies at ISU.\" •\nReynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 972. The athletic director \"is free to reject its advice and there have\nbeen occasions when he has done so. The Council deals only with internal ISU matters,i it has no\nbudget, and none of its members are paid.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 972. In concluding that\nthe Athletic Council was an advisory body subject to the requirements of OMA, howevc;r, the\ncourt emphasized that the Council is \"part of the formal organizational structure of ISU and its\nduties and responsibilities are set forth in the supplement [to the bylaws of the ISU Senate]. The\nbroad scope of the Council's responsibilities as set forth in the supplement contrasts shaJply with\nthe limited duties of the committee in Pope [v. Parkinson}.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 978.\nIn its response to this office, the School District asserted that the two medtings in\nquestion \"were the second and third days of a parent workshop presented by Victoria Infante of\nFamily Bridges.\"2 According to the School District, \"parents participated in activities aJd the\npresenter asked them questions regarding the topics\" that wete presented during those t'Yo days. 3\nThe School District contended that no parents attempted to provide public comment at t�e\nmeetings. The School District asserted, in pertinent part:\nIsabel Ramirez, BPAC's Parent Outreach Liaison, was\npresent at both the April 21, 2017 and May 12, 2017 meetings and\nshe stated that she was not aware of any members of the public\nwho attempted to provide public comment and were not allowed to\ndo so. * * * Ms. Ramirez stated that during the workshops parents\nwere encouraged to share their experiences, an parents were able\nto respond to the presenter's questions, and she was not aware of\nany members of the public who tried to make a comment on\nanything other than the presentation itself. [4l\nI\n\nThe School District further denied Mr. Silver's claim that the Committee is a \"public body\" under\nOMA. The School District stated that the Committee was established pursuant to section 5/14C10 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/14C-10 (West 2016)), which provides: \"Each schoolI district\nshall, accordingly, establish a parent advisory committee which affords parents the opportunity\nI\nI\n\n2 Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n3 Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\n\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assi_stant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n\n4\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n\neffectively to express their views and which ensures that [transitional bilingual educatioh\nprograms] are planned, operated, and evaluated with the involvement of, and in consultation\nwith, parents of children served by the programs.\" Applying the Stukel factors, the Schdol\nDistrict argued that the Committee did not meet the characteristics of a public body:\ni\nI\n\n(1)\nWho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure\nThe School District asserted that it does not appoint members of the Committee,\nand members are not paid. The School District stated that the Committee's membership \\s.\ninstead governed by section 5/14C-10 of the School Code, which provides: \"Such com1ittees\nshall be composed of parents of children enrolled in transitional bilingual education programs,\ntransitional bilingual education teachers, counselors, and representatives from communiiy\ngroups; provided, however, that a majority of each committee shall be parents of childreh\nenrolled in the transitional bilingual education· program.\" According to the School Distdct,\n\"[p]arents of District students enrolled in transitional bilingual education programs that attend\nthe BPAC meetings are considered members of BPAC. General members are not appointed and\nanyone can attend the BPAC meetings.\"5 The School District stated that the Committee mainly\nis comprised of program parents and guardians, but also \"includes transitional bilingual\neducation teachers, counselors and community leaders. 116\n1\n\n(2)\nThe entity's assigned duties, inciuding duties reflected in the ehtity's\nbylaws or authorizing statute\nThe Sch'.ool District contended that the Committee \"does not have any assigned\nduties frorp the District and it operates autonomously.\" 7 The School District directed this office\nto section 5/14C-10 of the School Code, emphasizing that the provision provides: \"Once,\nestablished, these committees shall autonomously carry out their affairs, including the election of\nofficers and the establishment of internal• ruies, guidelines, and procedures.\" 105 ILCS 5/14C-10\n..\n(West 2016).\n1\n\n:\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99,.IDel Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n5\n\nI\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n6\n\n7 Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n\n(3)\nWhether the entity's role is solely advisory or whether it also has a·\ndeliberative or investigative function\n!\nI\nI\n\nThe School District argued that the Committee's function \"is solely advisory.\" 8\nThe School District acknowledged that the Committee provides feedback and suggestions to the\nSchool District concerning its transitional bilingual education program, but argued that the\nCommittee \"does not make any decisions regarding the programs and there is no guarantee that\nthe District will implement any of BPAC's recommendations.\"9 The School District further\nasserted that it did not have a formal process for reviewing the Committee's recommendations.\n·1\n\n(4)\nWhether the entity is subject to government control or otherwise\n!\naccountable to any public body\n\nThe School District contended that the Committee is not subject to its control and\nthat it \"merely facilitates the transmission of information regarding the bilingual progratjls to\nparents and community members. 1110 According to the School District, the Committee meets\nmonthly and provides parents of children in transitional bilingual education programs th� chance\nto \"learn about the curriculum, attend workshops, participate in conferences, and to• provide\nfeedback regarding these programs to the District.\"11\n1\n\n(5)\n\nWhether the group has a budget\n\nThe School District stated that the Committee does not have a budget.\n(6)\nwhich it is a part\n\nThe entity's place within the larger organization or institution of\n;\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n8\n\nI\n\nI\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del Galdo\nLaw Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n9\n\nLeti:er from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99, Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n10\n\n. I\n\nLetter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99,'.Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 2017).\n\nI\n\nI\n\n:\nThe School Districtcontended that the Committee is \"separate from the overall\norganization of the District.\" 12 In particular, the School District emphasized that the Coipmittee\nconducts its affairs autonomously pursuant to the School Code.\n.\n(7)\n\nI\nThe impact of decisions or recommendations that the group makes\n\nThe School District contended that the Committee \"does not directly mall any\ndecisions regarding the District's bilingual program.\" 13 The School District reiterated th�t\n. although the Committee makes suggestions to the School District about its bilingual programs, it\nmay decline\nto adopt those suggestions.\ni\n,\n\nIn his reply, Mr. Silver argued that the Committee \"is neither informal or an\ninternal administrative entity\" in contrast to the entities examined in Stukel, Pope, and Cbrlson. 14\nHe contended that the Committee was similar to the group of presidents and chancellors I\nexamined in Stukel in only three of the discussed factors. Specifically; he acknowledged that the\nCommittee lacked a budget, did not pay its members, and did not include members ofth� higher\nbody, but contended that the council in Reynard likewise did not meet those factors. Mrl Silver\ndisputed the School District's claim that the Committee is separate from the School Dist�ict's\nformal organizational structure. He argued that the Committee \"is defined by state statute and is\na formal, �tanding advisory committee t� a school board that has a Transitional Bilingua)\nEducation program. State statute and administrative rules establishing the BPAC descriipe\nconcrete duties of a BPAC and mandates that the school board receive input from the B�AC.\" 15\nMr. Silver cited section 228.30(c)(4) of title 23 of the Administrative Code (23 Ill. Adm.: Code\n§228.30(c)(4) (2014), amended at 38 Ill. Reg. 19757, effective September 29, 2014), which\nprovides that school districts with transitional bilingual education programs are to establish a\nparent advisory committee that \"shall participate in the planning, operation, and evaluatibn of\nprograms.\" That provision further provides, in pertinent part:\n:\nI\nA) The committee shall:\nI\n\n1\n\n12 Letter\n\nfrom Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99/I Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah\n. Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 20 I '7).\nI\nI\n13 Letter from Emily Witt, Attorney for Board of Education of Cicero School District 99;1 Del\nGaldo Law Group, LCC, to Leah Bartelt, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 13, 20 I J).\nI\n14\n.\nLetter from Benjamin J. Silver, Community Lawyer, Citizen Advocacy Center, to Leah Bartelt,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (August I 0, 2017), at l\n.\n\nI\n\n!\n\n15 Letter from Benjamin J. Silver, Community Lawyer, Citizen Advocacy Center, to Leah Bartelt,\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (August I 0, 2017), at 6\n\ni)\n\nmeet at least four times per year;\n\nii)\nmaintain on file with the school district minutes of\nthese meetings;\niii)\nreview the district's annual program application to\nthe State Superintendent of Education; and\niv)\nautonomously carry out their affairs, including the\nelection of officers and the establishment of internal rules,\nguidelines, andproce.dures. (Section 14C-10 of the School\nCode). (Emphasis in original.)\nIn addition, Mr. Silver argued that the Committee advises the School District Board of Education\n(Board) on policy matters and asserted: \"This fact is highly pertinent to the analysis of (:)MA\napplication, because the Open Meetings Act's declaration that public bodies conduct their\nbusiness openly refers to the policymaking function of public bodies.\" 16\n,\n\n.\n\nI\n\nI\n\nAfter reviewing the information provided by Mr. Silver and the School District,\nand in light of the relevant factors, this office concludes that the Committee is not a \"public\nbody\" under OMA. Although the Committee was formally established pursuantto an\nauthorizing statute, the statute also expressly provides that \"[o]nee established, these committees\nshall autonomously carry out their affairs[.]\" 17 The statute's implementing regulations similarly\nstate that the committees are to conduct their affairs autonomously. Thus, the Committe¢ is not\nsubject to the same oversight as, for example, the Board's standing committees, which are\nspecifically creations of the Board and report directly to the Board. The available information\n•\nsuggests that the Committee serves a limited role within the School District's formal\norganizational structure as a liaison between the School District and pa]ients or legal guaidians of\nchildren who are enrolled in its transitional bilingual educational program. See, for example, Ill.\nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 35973, issued August 21, 2015, at 4 (concluding that a college's\nParalegal Advisory Committee was not a \"public body\" subject to OMA because it functi.oned\nindependently and had \"only a limited function within the College's formal organizational\nstructure as a liaison between the educational program and professionals working in the l�gal\nfield.\"). Indeed, the School Code and regulations require that the majority of committee\nmembers be parents or guardians; the committee also selects its own officers. Although the\n1\n\n1\n\n16 Letter from Benjamin J. Silver, Community Lawyer, Citizen Advocacy Center, to Leah,Bartelt,\n\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (August 10, 2017), at 6.\n\nI\n\nI\n\nregulations require that the Committee meet at least four times a year and maintain meeting\nminutes with the School District, the Committee's duties appear solely advisory. In particu,iar,\nthe Committee provides a forum in which parents can \"express their views and which ensures\nthat such programs are planned, operated, and evaluated with the involvement of, and in /\nconsultation with, parents of children served by the programs.\" 18 While the Committee is tasked\nwith reviewing the School District's annual program application to the State Superintenderit of\nEducation, it is not subject to specific reporting requirements to suggest it is accountable tJ the\nS�h�ol District or Board:· F�rther, any �o�mittee feedback or r�comn:iendations are non -/\n_.\nbmdmg on the School District; the specific impact of the Committee's mput on School District\ndecisions is unclear. Additionally, based on this office's review of the April 21, 2017, an� May·\n12, 2017, meeting agendas and minutes, it appears that a substantial function of the Com�ittee is\nto provide parents and guardians with resources and educational opportunities related to its\nbilingual program, such as workshops and conferences, rather than to advise the School District\non policy matters. Because the Committee lacks the key features of an advisory body, thi1s office\nconcludes that the Committee is not a \"public body\" subject to the requirements of OMA./\nBecause this determination concludes that the Committee is not a \"public body\"\nsubject to OMA, this office need not address whether the Committee violated section2.06(g) of\nI\nOMA.\n\nI\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter./ If you\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of t�is letter.\nI\n\nI\n\n· Very truly yours,\n\nI\n\nTERESA LIM\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48412 o not a pb sd\n\nI\n\nI\n\n'\n\nI\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Emily Witt\nAttorney for Cicero School District 99\nDel Galdo Law Group, LLC\n5110 West 24th Street\nCicero, Illinois 60804\nwitt@dlglawgroup.com"}
{"id":1206,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-12-05","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["48602"],"title":"Village of Chatham Board of Trustees violated OMA by failing to provide proper meeting notice","filename":"48602, issued December 5, 2017__1.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1414,"summary":"The PAC investigated a complaint that the Village of Chatham Board of Trustees failed to provide proper public notice when amending its annual meeting schedule. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide the required 10-day notice in a local newspaper and failing to update its posted schedule.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Village of Chatham changed its meeting schedule without following the legal requirements for public notice. The Attorney General's office agreed, finding that the Village failed to publish the required notice in a newspaper and did not update its posted schedule as mandated by law. Because the Village has since corrected its procedures, the PAC closed the case without further action.","holding":"The Board of Trustees of the Village of Chatham violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide proper notice of changes to its regular meeting schedule.","legal_question":"Did the Village of Chatham Board of Trustees violate section 2.03 of the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide proper notice of changes to its regular meeting schedule?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.03"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Trustees of the Village of Chatham","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in text)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The failure of a public body to provide proper public notice when amending its annual schedule of regular meetings.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.03/48602, issued December 5, 2017.pdf","sha256":"4f15f1073a97cf244db3437cb86384c1e92ad5f190a84cb4c7e5eb01da24c0b4","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","Open Meetings Act","public notice","meeting schedule"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nNITORNEI\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember 5, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Gregory E. Moredock\nSorling Northrup, Attorneys\n1 North Old State Capitol Plaza, Suite 200\nP. O. Box 5131\nSpringfield, Illinois 62705\ngemoredock@sorlinglaw.\n\nRE:\n\nDear\n\ncom\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 48602\n\nand Mr. Moredock:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the Board of Trustees ( Board) of the Village of Chatham ( Village) failed to\n\nprovide proper notice of a change to its regular meeting schedule in advance of its May 9, 2017,\nand June 13, 2017, regular meetings.\n\nOn July 6, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that although\nthe Board amended its annual schedule of regular meetings on February 28, 2017, adding regular\nmeetings on May 9, 2017, and June 13, 2017, it failed to provide at least 10 days' notice of the\nchange in a local newspaper and failed to update its posted regular meetings schedule in\naccordance\n\nwith\n\nsection\n\n2. 03\n\nof\n\nOMA ( 5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 03 ( West 2016)).\n\nstated that\n\nOrdinance No. 17- 101 added regular meetings for the second Tuesday of each month. He also\nstated that the Board had subsequently published notice of the schedule change in the Chatham\nVillage of Chatham, Ordinance No. 17- 10: An Ordinance Amending the Village Code\nEstablishing Two Regular Village Board Meetings Per Month and the Time for the Committee of the Whole\nMeetings ( Feb. 28, 2017).\n\n601\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 877) 844- 5461 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago,\n\nIllinois\n\n60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 800) 964- 3013 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\nUniversity Avenue, Suite 102, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\nSouth\n\n62901 • (\n\n618)\n\n529- 6400 •\n\nTTY: ( 877) 675- 9339 •\n\nFax: ( 618)\n\n529- 6416 •®—\n\n\fMr. Gregory E. Moredock\nDecember 5, 2017\nPage 2\n\nClarion on June 22, 2017. Additionally,\nalleged that the Village had committed\nforgery by adding the June 13, 2017, meeting to the Village' s online event calendar after the\nmeeting had occurred.\n\nOn July 11, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with copies of any notices and minutes of the May 9,\n2017, and June 13, 2017, meetings, together with a written explanation of where and when notice\n\nof the changes to the Board' s regular meeting schedule was posted. On July 19, 2017, the Board\nprovided a written response. On July 31, 2017,\nsubmitted a reply, reiterating his\nclaims. On August 7, 2017, the Board submitted a response to\nreply. On August 14,\n2017,\ninformed this office that he had nothing further to add.\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder section 1 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016)), it is \" the public policy of\nthis State that its citizens shall be given advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at\n\nwhich any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way.\"\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes is\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1\net\nseq. ( West 2016)). See 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West 2016). The provision of the Criminal Code\nof 2012 pertaining to forgery that\ncited ( 720 ILCS 5/ 17- 3 ( West 2016)) is outside the\nscope of OMA and FOIA. Therefore, this office is not authorized to review that allegation.\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\n\npart: \" Every public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at the\nbeginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times, and places of\nsuch meetings.\" Section 2. 02( b) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( b) ( West 2016)) adds:\n\nA] public body that has a website that the full- time staff of the\npublic body maintains shall post notice on its website of all\n\nmeetings of the governing body of the public body. Any notice of\nan annual schedule of meetings shall remain on the website until a\n\nnew public notice of the schedule of regular meetings is approved.\nFurthermore, section 2. 03 of OMA provides, in pertinent part:\n\nE] ach body subject to this Act must, at the beginning of each\ncalendar\n\nor\n\nfiscal\n\nyear, prepare\n\nand\n\nmake\n\navailable\n\na\n\nschedule of\n\n\fMr. Gregory E. Moredock\nDecember 5, 2017\nPage 3\n\nall its regular meetings for such calendar or fiscal year, listing the\ntimes and places of such meetings.\n\nIf a change is made in regular meeting dates, at least 10\ndays' notice of such change shall be given by publication in a\n\nnewspaper of general circulation in the area in which such body\nfunctions. * * *\n\nNotice of such change shall also be posted at the\n\nprincipal office of the public body[.]\n\nIn its July 19, 2017, response to this office, the Board acknowledged that the\npassage of Ordinance 17- 10 on February 28, 2017, changed the Board' s regular meeting dates.\nWhile the Board previously held only Committee of the Whole meetings on the second Tuesday\n\nof each month, it would begin holding regular meetings on those dates, including May 9, 2017,\nand June 13, 2017. After the latter meeting, the Board asserted, it realized that it had not\nprovided notice of the change to its annual schedule of regular meetings. The Board stated that it\nthen published notice of the change and posted revised schedules at Village Hall and on the\n\nVillage' s website. Yet, because it had posted agendas for the May 9, 2017, and June 13, 2017,\nmeetings at Village Hall and on the Village' s website at least 48 hours in advance of the meetings\n\nin accordance with sections 2. 02( a) and 2. 02( b) of OMA, the Board claimed, the meetings were\n\nnot \"' illegal\"' as\n\nhad alleged. 2\n\nreplied that the Board nonetheless had failed to\n\nprovide 10 days' notice of the addition of the May 9, 2017, and June 13, 2017, regular meetings\nin a newspaper, and also had failed to post the revised meeting schedule at Village Hall and on\nthe Village' s website in a timely manner. The Board responded that it had taken steps to remedy\nthe errors.\n\nIt is undisputed that the Board did not, at least 10 days in advance of its May 9,\n2017, and June 13, 2017, meetings, publish notice that it had revised its regular meeting schedule\nto add new regular meetings on those dates. It is also undisputed that the Board did not post the\nrevised regular meetings schedule at Village Hall or on its website until after those two meetings\n\nwere held. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated the regular meeting\nschedule requirements of sections 2. 02 and 2. 03 of OMA. Because it is also undisputed that the\n\nBoard properly posted agendas for both meetings3 and because the Board has taken steps to\ncorrect its errors, no further remedial action is required under the circumstances of this matter.\nThis office cautions the Board to follow all of the requirements of OMA in the future.\n\n2Letter from Gregory E. Moredock, Sorting Northrup, Attorneys, to Joshua M. Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( July 19, 2017), at 2.\n\n3This office has not received information indicating that any member of the public who would\nhave attended missed either meeting\n\nas a result of the\n\nlack\n\nof a revised\n\nregular\n\nmeetings schedule.\n\n\fMr. Gregory E. Moredock\nDecember 5, 2017\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n312) 814- 8413 or the Chicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to\nclose this matter.\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n48602\n\no\n\n203\n\nnotice\n\nimproper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Failure to provide notice of amended meeting schedule","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-48602/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nNITORNEI\n\nGENERAL\n\nDecember 5, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Gregory E. Moredock\nSorling Northrup, Attorneys\n1 North Old State Capitol Plaza, Suite 200\nP. O. Box 5131\nSpringfield, Illinois 62705\ngemoredock@sorlinglaw.\n\nRE:\n\nDear\n\ncom\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 48602\n\nand Mr. Moredock:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\nconcludes that the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Village of Chatham (Village) failed to\n\nprovide proper notice of a change to its regular meeting schedule in advance of its May 9, 2017,\nand June 13, 2017, regular meetings.\n\nOn July 6, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that although\nthe Board amended its annual schedule of regular meetings on February 28, 2017, adding regular\nmeetings on May 9, 2017, and June 13, 2017, it failed to provide at least 10 days' notice of the\nchange in a local newspaper and failed to update its posted regular meetings schedule in\naccordance\n\nwith\n\nsection\n\n2. 03\n\nof\n\nOMA (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 03 (West 2016)).\n\nstated that\n\nOrdinance No. 17- 101 added regular meetings for the second Tuesday of each month. He also\nstated that the Board had subsequently published notice of the schedule change in the Chatham\nVillage of Chatham, Ordinance No. 17- 10: An Ordinance Amending the Village Code\nEstablishing Two Regular Village Board Meetings Per Month and the Time for the Committee of the Whole\nMeetings (Feb. 28, 2017).\n\n601\n\nClarion on June 22, 2017. Additionally,\nalleged that the Village had committed\nforgery by adding the June 13, 2017, meeting to the Village's online event calendar after the\nmeeting had occurred.\n\nOn July 11, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with copies of any notices and minutes of the May 9,\n2017, and June 13, 2017, meetings, together with a written explanation of where and when notice\n\nof the changes to the Board's regular meeting schedule was posted. On July 19, 2017, the Board\nprovided a written response. On July 31, 2017,\nsubmitted a reply, reiterating his\nclaims. On August 7, 2017, the Board submitted a response to\nreply. On August 14,\n2017,\ninformed this office that he had nothing further to add.\nDETERMINATION\n\nUnder section 1 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016)), it is \" the public policy of\nthis State that its citizens shall be given advance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at\n\nwhich any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in any way.\"\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 1\net\nseq. (West 2016)). See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2016). The provision of the Criminal Code\nof 2012 pertaining to forgery that\ncited (720 ILCS 5/ 17- 3 (West 2016)) is outside the\nscope of OMA and FOIA. Therefore, this office is not authorized to review that allegation.\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\n\npart: \" Every public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at the\nbeginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times, and places of\nsuch meetings.\" Section 2. 02(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(b) (West 2016)) adds:\n\nA] public body that has a website that the full- time staff of the\npublic body maintains shall post notice on its website of all\n\nmeetings of the governing body of the public body. Any notice of\nan annual schedule of meetings shall remain on the website until a\n\nnew public notice of the schedule of regular meetings is approved.\nFurthermore, section 2. 03 of OMA provides, in pertinent part:\n\nE] ach body subject to this Act must, at the beginning of each\ncalendar\n\nor\n\nfiscal\n\nyear, prepare\n\nall its regular meetings for such calendar or fiscal year, listing the\ntimes and places of such meetings.\n\nIf a change is made in regular meeting dates, at least 10\ndays' notice of such change shall be given by publication in a\n\nnewspaper of general circulation in the area in which such body\nfunctions. * * *\n\nNotice of such change shall also be posted at the\n\nprincipal office of the public body[.]\n\nIn its July 19, 2017, response to this office, the Board acknowledged that the\npassage of Ordinance 17- 10 on February 28, 2017, changed the Board's regular meeting dates.\nWhile the Board previously held only Committee of the Whole meetings on the second Tuesday\n\nof each month, it would begin holding regular meetings on those dates, including May 9, 2017,\nand June 13, 2017. After the latter meeting, the Board asserted, it realized that it had not\nprovided notice of the change to its annual schedule of regular meetings. The Board stated that it\nthen published notice of the change and posted revised schedules at Village Hall and on the\n\nVillage's website. Yet, because it had posted agendas for the May 9, 2017, and June 13, 2017,\nmeetings at Village Hall and on the Village's website at least 48 hours in advance of the meetings\n\nin accordance with sections 2. 02(a) and 2. 02(b) of OMA, the Board claimed, the meetings were\n\nnot \"' illegal\"' as\n\nhad alleged. 2\n\nreplied that the Board nonetheless had failed to\n\nprovide 10 days' notice of the addition of the May 9, 2017, and June 13, 2017, regular meetings\nin a newspaper, and also had failed to post the revised meeting schedule at Village Hall and on\nthe Village's website in a timely manner. The Board responded that it had taken steps to remedy\nthe errors.\n\nIt is undisputed that the Board did not, at least 10 days in advance of its May 9,\n2017, and June 13, 2017, meetings, publish notice that it had revised its regular meeting schedule\nto add new regular meetings on those dates. It is also undisputed that the Board did not post the\nrevised regular meetings schedule at Village Hall or on its website until after those two meetings\n\nwere held. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated the regular meeting\nschedule requirements of sections 2. 02 and 2. 03 of OMA. Because it is also undisputed that the\n\nBoard properly posted agendas for both meetings3 and because the Board has taken steps to\ncorrect its errors, no further remedial action is required under the circumstances of this matter.\nThis office cautions the Board to follow all of the requirements of OMA in the future.\n\n2 Letter from Gregory E. Moredock, Sorting Northrup, Attorneys, to Joshua M. Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (July 19, 2017), at 2.\n\n3 This office has not received information indicating that any member of the public who would\nhave attended missed either meeting\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n312) 814- 8413 or the Chicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to\nclose this matter.\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n48602\n\no\n\n203\n\nnotice\n\nimproper mun"}
{"id":1207,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-12-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["48812"],"title":"Greenup Village Board violated OMA by converting committee meeting into unnoticed full Board meeting","filename":"48812, issued December 6, 2019.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2291,"summary":"The requester alleged that a Village Committee meeting was an illegal Board meeting because a quorum of the Board was present and deliberated on economic incentive agreements. The PAC determined that the Board violated OMA by failing to properly record the meeting as a Board meeting and failing to maintain adequate minutes.","plain_summary":"This determination letter addresses whether attendance and participation by non-Committee Village Board members at a properly noticed Committee meeting converted it into an unnoticed full Board meeting under OMA. The Attorney General's Public Access Bureau concluded that the Greenup Village Board violated the Open Meetings Act because five of six Board members deliberated on public business at the May 30, 2017 Committee for Economic Development meeting, effectively transforming it into a Board meeting for which no separate notice was given. The reasoning relied on section 1.02's definition of 'meeting' and the principle that OMA applies when a majority of a quorum engages in contemporaneous, interactive deliberation on public business, even during a committee gathering, particularly where the discussion appears to have informed action taken at a subsequent Board meeting. Separate allegations concerning off-agenda discussion and exclusion of the public were found time-barred under the 60-day filing requirement and were not reviewed. Because no final action was alleged to have occurred during the meeting itself, no remedy was available, though the Bureau also urged more detailed meeting minutes going forward.","holding":"A public body violates OMA when a majority of a quorum of its members participates in deliberation on public business during a properly noticed committee meeting, thereby converting it into an unnoticed meeting of the full body.","legal_question":"Whether a committee meeting attended by a quorum of the Village Board constituted an improperly noticed meeting of the Board in violation of OMA requirements for notice and minutes.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Greenup Village Board","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The matter concerns whether a committee meeting attended by a quorum of the Village Board required the notice and minute-taking procedures applicable to a full Board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_a/48812, issued December 6, 2019.pdf","sha256":"c663bafc51008d7c5fc0697dc214b263debe2e3dabb65c2528c7eff5e10d8acd","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["quorum","meeting minutes","open meetings act","public notice"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 6, 2 19\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Stacey Carl\n\nVillage Preident, Village of Greenup\n115 East Cumberland Street\nP. O. Box 246\n\nGreenup, Illinois 62428\nc/ o clerk@villageofgreenup.\n\ncom\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 48812\nDear\n\nand President Carl:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct ( OMA),( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2018)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Greenup Village Board ( Board) violated the requirements of OMA in\nconnection with the May 30, 2017, meeting of the Board' s Committee for Economic\nDevelopment ( Committee).\n\nOn July 20, 2017,\n\nsubmitted this Request for Review alleging, in\n\npertinent part,' that the Committee's May 30, 2017, meeting turned out to be an illegal Board\n\nmeeting when all but one of the Board members participated in the discussion concerning the\n\neconomic incentive agreements he was seeking. On July 31, 2017, this office sent a copy of the\n\nRequest for Review to the Board and asked it to provide a detailed written response to\n\nIn a January 11, 2018, telephone conversation with an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\n\nAccess\nBureau,\nCommittee meeting.\n\nconfirmed that he is contesting only the circumstances surrounding the May 30, 2017,\n\n500' South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • ( 217) 782- 1094 • TTY: ( 877) 844- 5461 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100South\nWest Randolph Ave.,\nStreet,Carbondale,\nChicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: (800) 964- 3013 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n601\n\nUniversity\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 877) 675- 9339 • Fax: ( 618)\n529- 6416\n\n\fThe Honorable Stacey Carl\nDecember, 6, 2019\nPage 2\n\nallegations, together with copies of the notice, agenda, and minutes of the May 30,\n\n2017, meeting.\n\nOn August 3, 2017, Village President Stacey Carl, on behalf of the Board,\nprovided a copy of the notice for the Committee meeting, a \" Committee Meeting Attendance &\n\nReporting of Meeting\" document, and a written response. Village President Carl explained that,\n\nin addition to the three Committee members, he and tv10 other Board members attended the open\nmeeting, but he did not clarify the extent to which the non -Committee members participated in\n\nany discussion or deliberation. Rather, Village President Carl stated:\n\nDiscussion was made as to the properties for which an economic\n\nincentive agreement was requested primary focusing on the Old\nAmoco filling station property. There was also a discussion of the\nterminology of the statute in which economic incentive agreements\n\ncould be provided and the meaning of the terms \" vacant\" and\nunder utilized[.]\"\n\n121\n\nOn August 9, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a reply, again alleging that the May\n\n30, 2017, meeting was improper because of the attendance of and deliberation by a majority of a\n\nquorum of Board members.\n\nwere vague and inadequate.\n\nalso alleged that the May 30, 2017, meeting minutes\n\nOn August 10, 2017, Village President Carl responded to\n\nreply,\n\nasserting that the non -Committee members attended the meeting as Village citizens, not in their\nofficial capacities as Board members, but that the Boarii was \" not aware of a prohibition against\n\nother\n\nBoard members attending a committee\nmeeting.\"\n\nVillage President Carl also asserted that\n\nall discussions fell within the agenda topic of requested economic incentives but did not further\n\nelaborate which Board or Committee members engaged in discussions. On August 21, 2017,\n\nreplied and enclosed a letter from\nwho attended the meeting with\nhim. Both\nand\nacknowledged that Board member Mike Oakley did not\n\nparticipate in the deliberations during the meeting.\nand\nalleged that they were excluded from the latter half of the meeting, and\n\nalso both\ncontested\n\nVillage\nPresident Carl' s assertion that the discussion during the meeting adhered to the item on\nthe agenda.\n\nLetter from Stacey Carl, Village President, to Christopher R. Boggs, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau,\n\nOffice of Attorney General ( August 3, 20171, at 2.\n\nLetter from Stacey Carl,General\nVillage( President,\nto Christopher R. Boggs, Assistant Attorney General,\nAugust 10,\n\nPublic Access Bureau, Office of\n\nAttorney\n\n2017), at 1.\n\n\fThe Honorable Stacey Carl\nDecember 6, 2019\nPage 3\n\nOn August 23, 2017, Village President Carl provided a final response, again\nasserting that no members of the public were excluded from any part of the May 30, 2017,\n\nmeeting. Village President Carl also stated that \"[ t]he purpose of' the meeting was twofold. First\nit was primarily to discuss incentive agreements requested by\nA second purpose of\n\nthe meeting was to discuss formation of a Tax Increment Financing district after an inquiry had\nbeen made. Discussion had concluded insofar as Mr. Schrock' s incentive agreements. i4\n\nIn an August 25, 2017, e- mail to an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\n\nAccess Bureau,\n\nstated that he had no further reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly\nand that their deliberations be conducted open19.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\nAs an initial matter, section 3. 5( a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2016))\n\nprovides, in pertinent part:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\n\npublic body has occurred may file a regtiest for review with the\n\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\n\nGeneral not later than 60 days after the alleged violation. If facts\nconcerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 -day\n\nperiod, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2 years\nafter the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\nmay be made within 60 days of\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\ndiligence, the request for review\n\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation.\n\nUnder the plain language of this provision, a Request for Review must be submitted within 60\n\ndays after an alleged violation unless facts concerning the violation were not discovered during\n\nthat time period. In this instance, more than 60 days had elapsed after the May 30, 2017,\nmeeting before\nalleged, in his August 21, 2017, reply to the Boards supplemental\nresponse, that the discussion during the meeting exceeded the scope of the item on the agenda\nLetter from Stacey Carl, Village President, to Mr. Christopher R. Boggs, Assistant Attorney\n\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau, Office of\nAttorney General ( Augus 23, 2017),\n\nat\n\n1.\n\n\fThe Honorable Stacey Carl\nDecember 6, 2019\nPage 4\n\nand that a portion of the meeting was improperly close u to the public. There is no indication,\n\nhowever, that\n\nwas unaware of the relevan facts pertaining to these allegations at the\n\ntime of the meeting, as he was in attendance. Therefor,\n\nallegations concerning\n\ndiscussion outside of agenda items and exclusion of 11.4 public from part of the meeting were\nraised outside of FOIA' s time limitations and are not subject to review by this office.\n\nAdditionally, this office notes that the Public Access Counselor's authority to\n\nresolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of OM+ and the Freedom of Information Act ( 5\nILCS 140/ 1\nseq. ( West 2018)).\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West 2018). Accordingly, this\net\n\ndetermination is limited to reviewing whether the Boarii violated OMA in connection with the\nCommittee' s May 30, 2017, meeting.\n\nSection 2( a) of OMA\n\nSection 2( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2016)) defines a\nmeeting as:\n\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means ( such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public busines$[.]\n\nThe requirements of OMA are not automatically triggered when a majority of a\nquorum ora quorum of a public body attends a gathering. See University Professionals of\n\nIllinois v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856, 868 ( 1st Dist. 20Q3) ( OMA is not \" triggered every time\n\npublic\n\nofficials\n\nmeet and converse\").\n\nRather, the Office of the Attorney General has stated that\n\nwhether a gathering falls within the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend\n\nupon the peculiar facts in each situation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974,\nat 126. A gathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no\nexamining or weighing of reasons for or against a coursof action, no exchange of facts\n\npreliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt to reach accgrd on a specific matter of [public]\n\nbusiness.\" Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 ( N.D. Ill. 1982).\n\nThe Board is comprised of six members, including Village President Carl; a\nmajority of the members— four members— comprise a quorum, and three members comprise a\nmajority of d quorum.\n\nTherefore, when\n\nat\n\nleast three Board members engage in\n\n\fThe Honorable Stacey Carl\nDecember 6, 2019\nPage 5\n\ncontemporaneous, interactive communications concern ng Board business, those discussions\nmay constitute Board meetings subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of OMA.\n\nThere is no dispute that that the Committee provided proper notice of its meeting\n\nto discuss various requests for economic incentives.\n\nhowever, contended that the\n\nattendance of the Village President and two non -Committee Board members converted the\n\notherwise properly - noticed Committee meeting into a full Board meeting, for which notice was\n\nnot provided. Although there is no prohibition on non -Committee Board members simply\nattending the Committee meeting, here non- members participated in the meeting discussion.\n\nand\n\nconceded that Mr. Oakley did not take part in deliberations during the\n\nmeeting, and it is not entirely clear the extent to which the Village President and the non -\n\nCommittee Board members did participate in the discussion. The available information\n\nindicates, however, that five of six Board members deliberated about public business at the May\n30, 2017, meeting, turning the meeting into one of the full Board, rather than just a committee\n\nmeeting. This conclusion is supported by the fact that on June 5, 2017, the Board took action on\n\nthe item discussed at the May 30, 2017, meeting. Given the short time span, it appears likely that\ninformation exchanged at the May 30, 2019, meeting informed the action on the economic\n\nincentive agreements at the Board' s June 5, 2017, meeting. The requirements of OMA apply to\ngatherings in which members of a public body obtain information in anticipation of taking action\nat a subsequent meeting. I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 49828, issued June 20, 2018, at 5\n\npublic body violated OMA by gathering in private to r view bills upon which action was taken\n\nat ensuing meeting). Based on the available information, this office concludes that the Board\nviolated the' requirements of OMA in connection with the May 30, 2017, Committee meeting by\n\nengaging in deliberations among five of six Board members without having notified the public\nthat a Board meeting would occur.\ni\n\n1 Because it has not been alleged that final action was taken during the meeting in\nquestion, no' remedy is available at this time. The Board should be mindful that the participation\n\nof non -committee Board members at committee meetings creates the possibility of transforming\nthe gathering into a Board meeting in violation of OMA, if the meeting has not also been noticed\nas a Board meeting.\n\nFinally, although\n\ndid not expressly request review of the sufficiency\n\nof the May 30, 2017, meeting minutes, the Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that\none -sentence general statements in minutes merely noting the topic( s) of discussion are\n\ninsufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 2.06( a( 3) of OMA (5 ILCS 12012. 06( a)( 3)\n\nWest 2016)). 5 See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18824, issued February 6, 2013, at 2; Ill.\nSection 2, 06( a)( 3) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a)( 3) ( West 2016)) requires, in pertinent part, that\n\nminutestaken.\"\ninclude\n\" a summary of discussion on all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided, and a record of any\n( Emphasis\nvotes\n\nadded.)\n\n\fThe Honorable Stacey Carl\nDecember 6, 2019\nPage 6\n\nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18307, issued July 2, 2012, at 4. In this office' s capacity of\nproviding advice and education to both the public and public officials, 6 this office urges the\n\nBoard to summarize in its minutes the arguments and points made concerning any proposals\ndeliberated during meetings, as well as any outcomes.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 217) 785- 7438 or at the Springfield address on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLCHSTOPHER R. BOGGS\nSupervisini Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n48812 0 2a meeting improper mun\n\n6See 15 ILCS 205/ 7( a), ( b), ( c) ( West 2018).\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A committee meeting with a quorum of the village board","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-48812/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKWAME RAOUL\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 6, 2 19\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Stacey Carl\n\nVillage Preident, Village of Greenup\n115 East Cumberland Street\nP. O. Box 246\n\nGreenup, Illinois 62428\nc/ o clerk@villageofgreenup.\n\ncom\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 48812\nDear\n\nand President Carl:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct (OMA),(5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2018)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Greenup Village Board (Board) violated the requirements of OMA in\nconnection with the May 30, 2017, meeting of the Board's Committee for Economic\nDevelopment (Committee).\n\nOn July 20, 2017,\n\nsubmitted this Request for Review alleging, in\n\npertinent part,' that the Committee's May 30, 2017, meeting turned out to be an illegal Board\n\nmeeting when all but one of the Board members participated in the discussion concerning the\n\neconomic incentive agreements he was seeking. On July 31, 2017, this office sent a copy of the\n\nRequest for Review to the Board and asked it to provide a detailed written response to\n\nIn a January 11, 2018, telephone conversation with an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\n\nAccess\nBureau,\nCommittee meeting.\n\nconfirmed that he is contesting only the circumstances surrounding the May 30, 2017,\n\nThe Honorable Stacey Carl\nDecember, 6, 2019\nPage 2\n\nallegations, together with copies of the notice, agenda, and minutes of the May 30,\n\n2017, meeting.\n\nOn August 3, 2017, Village President Stacey Carl, on behalf of the Board,\nprovided a copy of the notice for the Committee meeting, a \" Committee Meeting Attendance &\n\nReporting of Meeting\" document, and a written response. Village President Carl explained that,\n\nin addition to the three Committee members, he and tv10 other Board members attended the open\nmeeting, but he did not clarify the extent to which the non -Committee members participated in\n\nany discussion or deliberation. Rather, Village President Carl stated:\n\nDiscussion was made as to the properties for which an economic\n\nincentive agreement was requested primary focusing on the Old\nAmoco filling station property. There was also a discussion of the\nterminology of the statute in which economic incentive agreements\n\ncould be provided and the meaning of the terms \" vacant\" and\nunder utilized[.]\"\n\n121\n\nOn August 9, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a reply, again alleging that the May\n\n30, 2017, meeting was improper because of the attendance of and deliberation by a majority of a\n\nquorum of Board members.\n\nwere vague and inadequate.\n\nalso alleged that the May 30, 2017, meeting minutes\n\nOn August 10, 2017, Village President Carl responded to\n\nreply,\n\nasserting that the non -Committee members attended the meeting as Village citizens, not in their\nofficial capacities as Board members, but that the Boarii was \" not aware of a prohibition against\n\nother\n\nBoard members attending a committee\nmeeting.\"\n\nVillage President Carl also asserted that\n\nall discussions fell within the agenda topic of requested economic incentives but did not further\n\nelaborate which Board or Committee members engaged in discussions. On August 21, 2017,\n\nreplied and enclosed a letter from\nwho attended the meeting with\nhim. Both\nand\nacknowledged that Board member Mike Oakley did not\n\nparticipate in the deliberations during the meeting.\nand\nalleged that they were excluded from the latter half of the meeting, and\n\nalso both\ncontested\n\nVillage\nPresident Carl's assertion that the discussion during the meeting adhered to the item on\nthe agenda.\n\nLetter from Stacey Carl, Village President, to Christopher R. Boggs, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nPublic Access Bureau,\n\nOffice of Attorney General (August 3, 20171, at 2.\n\nLetter from Stacey Carl,General\nVillage(President,\n\nOn August 23, 2017, Village President Carl provided a final response, again\nasserting that no members of the public were excluded from any part of the May 30, 2017,\n\nmeeting. Village President Carl also stated that \"[ t]he purpose of' the meeting was twofold. First\nit was primarily to discuss incentive agreements requested by\nA second purpose of\n\nthe meeting was to discuss formation of a Tax Increment Financing district after an inquiry had\nbeen made. Discussion had concluded insofar as Mr. Schrock's incentive agreements. i4\n\nIn an August 25, 2017, e- mail to an Assistant Attorney General in the Public\n\nAccess Bureau,\n\nstated that he had no further reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly\nand that their deliberations be conducted open19.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\nAs an initial matter, section 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2016))\n\nprovides, in pertinent part:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\n\npublic body has occurred may file a regtiest for review with the\n\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\n\nGeneral not later than 60 days after the alleged violation. If facts\nconcerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 -day\n\nperiod, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2 years\nafter the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\nmay be made within 60 days of\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\ndiligence, the request for review\n\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation.\n\nUnder the plain language of this provision, a Request for Review must be submitted within 60\n\ndays after an alleged violation unless facts concerning the violation were not discovered during\n\nthat time period. In this instance, more than 60 days had elapsed after the May 30, 2017,\nmeeting before\nalleged, in his August 21, 2017, reply to the Boards supplemental\nresponse, that the discussion during the meeting exceeded the scope of the item on the agenda\nLetter from Stacey Carl, Village President, to Mr. Christopher R. Boggs, Assistant Attorney\n\nand that a portion of the meeting was improperly close u to the public. There is no indication,\n\nhowever, that\n\nwas unaware of the relevan facts pertaining to these allegations at the\n\ntime of the meeting, as he was in attendance. Therefor,\n\nallegations concerning\n\ndiscussion outside of agenda items and exclusion of 11.4 public from part of the meeting were\nraised outside of FOIA's time limitations and are not subject to review by this office.\n\nAdditionally, this office notes that the Public Access Counselor's authority to\n\nresolve disputes is limited to alleged violations of OM+ and the Freedom of Information Act (5\nILCS 140/ 1\nseq. (West 2018)).\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2018). Accordingly, this\net\n\ndetermination is limited to reviewing whether the Boarii violated OMA in connection with the\nCommittee's May 30, 2017, meeting.\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2016)) defines a\nmeeting as:\n\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public busines$[.]\n\nThe requirements of OMA are not automatically triggered when a majority of a\nquorum ora quorum of a public body attends a gathering. See University Professionals of\n\nIllinois v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856, 868 (1st Dist. 20Q3) (OMA is not \" triggered every time\n\npublic\n\nofficials\n\nmeet and converse\").\n\nRather, the Office of the Attorney General has stated that\n\nwhether a gathering falls within the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend\n\nupon the peculiar facts in each situation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974,\nat 126. A gathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no\nexamining or weighing of reasons for or against a coursof action, no exchange of facts\n\npreliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt to reach accgrd on a specific matter of [public]\n\nbusiness.\" Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 (N.D. Ill. 1982).\n\nThe Board is comprised of six members, including Village President Carl; a\n\ncontemporaneous, interactive communications concern ng Board business, those discussions\nmay constitute Board meetings subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of OMA.\n\nThere is no dispute that that the Committee provided proper notice of its meeting\n\nto discuss various requests for economic incentives.\n\nhowever, contended that the\n\nattendance of the Village President and two non -Committee Board members converted the\n\notherwise properly - noticed Committee meeting into a full Board meeting, for which notice was\n\nnot provided. Although there is no prohibition on non -Committee Board members simply\nattending the Committee meeting, here non- members participated in the meeting discussion.\n\nand\n\nconceded that Mr. Oakley did not take part in deliberations during the\n\nmeeting, and it is not entirely clear the extent to which the Village President and the non -\n\nCommittee Board members did participate in the discussion. The available information\n\nindicates, however, that five of six Board members deliberated about public business at the May\n30, 2017, meeting, turning the meeting into one of the full Board, rather than just a committee\n\nmeeting. This conclusion is supported by the fact that on June 5, 2017, the Board took action on\n\nthe item discussed at the May 30, 2017, meeting. Given the short time span, it appears likely that\ninformation exchanged at the May 30, 2019, meeting informed the action on the economic\n\nincentive agreements at the Board's June 5, 2017, meeting. The requirements of OMA apply to\ngatherings in which members of a public body obtain information in anticipation of taking action\nat a subsequent meeting. I11. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 49828, issued June 20, 2018, at 5\n\npublic body violated OMA by gathering in private to r view bills upon which action was taken\n\nat ensuing meeting). Based on the available information, this office concludes that the Board\nviolated the' requirements of OMA in connection with the May 30, 2017, Committee meeting by\n\nengaging in deliberations among five of six Board members without having notified the public\nthat a Board meeting would occur.\ni\n\n1 Because it has not been alleged that final action was taken during the meeting in\nquestion, no' remedy is available at this time. The Board should be mindful that the participation\n\nof non -committee Board members at committee meetings creates the possibility of transforming\nthe gathering into a Board meeting in violation of OMA, if the meeting has not also been noticed\nas a Board meeting.\n\nFinally, although\n\ndid not expressly request review of the sufficiency\n\nof the May 30, 2017, meeting minutes, the Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that\none -sentence general statements in minutes merely noting the topic(s) of discussion are\n\ninsufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 2.06(a(3) of OMA (5 ILCS 12012. 06(a)(3)\n\nWest 2016)). 5 See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18824, issued February 6, 2013, at 2; Ill.\nSection 2, 06(a)(3) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a)(3) (West 2016)) requires, in pertinent part, that\n\nminutestaken.\"\ninclude\n\" a summary of discussion on all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided, and a record of any\n\nAtt'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 18307, issued July 2, 2012, at 4. In this office's capacity of\nproviding advice and education to both the public and public officials, 6 this office urges the\n\nBoard to summarize in its minutes the arguments and points made concerning any proposals\ndeliberated during meetings, as well as any outcomes.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this file. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (217) 785- 7438 or at the Springfield address on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLCHSTOPHER R. BOGGS\nSupervisini Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n48812 0 2a meeting improper mun\n\n6 See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(a), (b), (c) (West 2018)."}
{"id":1208,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-12-07","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["48860","49185"],"title":"Rich Twp. HS District 227 Board not found violating OMA over quorum rule","filename":"48860 49185, issued December 7, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1481,"summary":"The PAC reviewed allegations that the Rich Township High School District No. 227 Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act during three meetings in July 2017, ultimately finding insufficient evidence to conclude a violation occurred.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Rich Township High School District Board held meetings that did not follow proper Open Meetings Act procedures. The Attorney General's office reviewed the claims but determined they could not conclude that the Board broke the law. This means the case is closed without a finding of wrongdoing.","holding":"The Public Access Bureau is unable to conclude that the special meetings of the Board of Education violated the requirements of the Open Meetings Act.","legal_question":"Whether the Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act by holding meetings without a quorum of members physically present.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.01"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Rich Township High School District No. 227 Board of Education","requesting_party":"Christopher L. Petrarca","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The legality of school board meetings held without a physical quorum of members present.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.01/Physical-presence-of-quorum-exceptions/48860 49185, issued December 7, 2017.pdf","sha256":"f6320cca1ffedd56d7eca17c7cb4faa7f5b4c93a39bb58c6b82415d75b689a97","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["quorum","school board","meeting requirements","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Christopher L. Petrarca\nHauser Izzo, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ncpetrarca@hauserizzo.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Randy Alexander\nPresident, Board of Education\nRich Township High School District No. 227\n20550 South Cicero\nMatteson, Illinois 60443\nralexander@rich227.org\nRE: OMA Requests for Review- 2017 PAC 48860; 2017 PAC 49185\nDear� Mr. Petrarca, and Mr. Alexander:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3 .5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). This office has consolidated these Requests for\nReview because they contain closely-related allegations concerning the same meetings. For the\nreasons discussed below, the Public Access Bureau is unable to conclude that the special\nmeetings of certain members of the Rich Township High School District No. 227 Board of\nEducation (Board) on July 15, 2017, July 18, 2017, and July 22, 2017, violated the requirements\nof OMA.\n\n500 South Second StreeL Springfield. Illinois 62701 • (217)782-1090 • TTY: (217)785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nI 00 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax' (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main. Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\f\fMr. Christopher L. Petrarca\n\nThe Honorable Randy Alexander\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 3\n\nbodies to participate through audio or video conference.\n\nReading section 2. 01 in its entirety, it is\n\nunclear whether the sentence requiring a quorum of members to be \" physically present at the\nlocation of an open meeting[ ]\"\n\nis intended to apply to all meetings of public bodies, or only\nthose in which members participate by audio or video conferences. Therefore, the meaning of\nthat sentence is ambiguous.\n\nIn determining the meaning of a statute, a court will not read language in\nisolation, but must consider it in the context of the entire statute.\" Slepicka v. Illinois Dept. of\nPublic Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 14, 21 N. E. 3d 368, 373 ( 2014). When the meaning of statutory\nlanguage is ambiguous, a reviewing body may consider the statute' s purpose, the policy\nconsiderations that led to its passage, and \" the statute' s context, reading the provision at issue in\nlight of the entire section in which it appears and the Act of which that section is a part.\" In re\nMarriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶ 20, 986 N.E. 2d 1139, 1144- 45 ( 2012).\n\nThe provision that \"[ a] quorum of members of a public body must be physically\npresent at the location of an open meeting\" was added to section 2. 01 of OMA by Public Act 941058, effective January 1, 2007. Prior to the passage of Public Act 94- 1058, the following\n\nlanguage constituted the entirety of section 2. 01 of OMA: \" All meetings required by this Act\nto be public shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient and open to\n\nthe public. No meeting required by this Act to be public shall be held on a legal holiday\nthe regular meeting\n\nday falls on that holiday.\" ( Emphasis added.) Public Act 94- 1058\nadded the following language to section 2. 01 as the second and third paragraphs:\nunless\n\nA quorum of members of a public body must be physically\npresent at the location of an open meeting. If, however, an open\nmeeting of a public body ( except one with jurisdiction limited to a\nspecific geographic area that is less than statewide) is held\n\nsimultaneously at one of its offices and one or more other locations\n\nin a public building, which may include other of its offices,\nthrough an interactive video conference and the public body\nprovides public notice and public access as required under this Act\n\nfor all locations, then members physically present in those\nlocations all count\n\ntowards determining\n\na quorum. * * *\n\nThe\n\nrequirement that a quorum be physically present at the location of\n\nan open meeting shall not apply, however, to State advisory boards\nor bodies that do not have authority to make binding\nrecommendations or determinations or to take any other\nsubstantive\n\naction.\n\n\fMr. Christopher L. Petrarca\n\nThe Honorable Randy Alexander\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 4\n\nA quorum of members of a public body that is not a public\n\nbody with statewide jurisdiction must be physically present at the\nlocation of a closed meeting. Other members who are not\nphysically present at a closed meeting of such a public body may\nparticipate in the meeting by means of a video or audio conference.\nPublic Act 94- 1058 also added\n\nsection\n\n7 to OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 7 ( West 2006)).\n\nSection 7 sets\n\nforth the rules governing remote meetingattendance by members who are unable to be\nphysically present at the meeting location. Moreover, Public Act 94- 1058 expanded the\n\ndefinition of \"meeting\" in section 1. 02 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2006)) to include\ngatherings that occur \" by video or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means ( such as,\n\nwithout limitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging), or other means of\ncontemporaneous interactive communication[.]\"\n\nAccordingly, in the context of section 2. 01 of OMA and the statute as a whole, the\nrequirement that a quorum be physically present is tied to circumstances in which one or more\n\nmembers participate in the meeting despite not being physically present at the meeting location.\nThe legislative history behind Public Act 94- 1058 provides further support for the\n\nconclusion that the language \"[ a] quorum, of members of a public body must be physically\npresent\n\nat the\n\nlocation\n\nof an open\n\npertains to instances involving remote\nparticipation. During the House debate on Senate Bill No. 585, which added that language to\nmeeting[ ]\"\n\nOMA as part of Public Act 94- 1058, House sponsor Robert F. Flider explained the legislation as\nfollows:\n\nWhat this legislation does is it updates [ OMA] and specifies rules\nwith regard to electronic communications. It expands the definition\n\nof a' meeting to include the presence whether by telephone calls,\nvideo or audio conference, or other electronic means. And it also\n\nspecifies that a quorum of members of a public body must be\nphysically present at an open meeting in the case of electronic\nThe bottom line of this is that it updates the\nOpen Meetings Act to deal with electronic communications. It\n\ncommunications. * * *\n\ndoes not change whatsoever the quorum requirements of\nOMA/.\" (\n\nEmphasis added.) Remarks of Rep. Flider, May 1,\n\n2006, House Debate on Senate Bill No. 585, at 9.\n\nTherefore, Representative Flider clarified that the requirement that a quorum be \" physically\n\npresent\" pertains\n\nonly to instances involving electronic meeting participation.\n\n\fMr. Christopher L. Petrarca\n\nThe Honorable Randy Alexander\nDecember 7, 2017\nPage 5\n\nIn this instance, the Requests for Review solely asserted that the Board violated\n\nsection 2. 01 of OMA by holding meetings without having a quorum physically present, and the\nBoard has acknowledged that a majority of a quorum, not a full quorum, of Board members\ngathered to discuss public business on those dates. Because there is no indication that Board\nmembers participated in those meetings by audio or video conference, the requirement in section\n\n2. 01 of OMA that a quorum of the members of the public body be \" physically present\" is\ninapplicable here. In addition, the Board members complied with OMA's requirements for\nadvance notice and the opportunity for the public to attend when a majority of a quorum of a\npublic body gather to discuss public business. Accordingly, this office is unable to conclude that\nthe Board violated OMA in connection with the three meetings in question.\nThis determination, however, cannot be construed as approval of the Board' s\nmeetings conducted without a quorum of members of the public body present, nor does it address\n\nthe ability of just a majority of a quorum, as opposed to a full quorum, even to discuss issues.\n\nRather, this office' s determination is limited to interpreting the requirements of OMA. See 15\n\nILCS 205/ 7 et seq. ( West 2016). The quorum requirements for the Board are set by its formal\npolicies, the School Code, and rules of parliamentary procedure. Similarly, other public bodies\nmay formulate requirements with respect to quorum requirements and meeting attendance.\nOMA is silent on quorum requirements except for the circumstances described above.\nThe Public Access Counselor had determined that resolution of these matters does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close these matters.\nVery truly yours,\n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48860 49185\n\no no\n\nvio sd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"School board meetings without a physical quorum","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-48860/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 7, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Christopher L. Petrarca\nHauser Izzo, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ncpetrarca@hauserizzo.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Randy Alexander\nPresident, Board of Education\nRich Township High School District No. 227\n20550 South Cicero\nMatteson, Illinois 60443\nralexander@rich227.org\nRE: OMA Requests for Review- 2017 PAC 48860; 2017 PAC 49185\nDear� Mr. Petrarca, and Mr. Alexander:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). This office has consolidated these Requests for\nReview because they contain closely-related allegations concerning the same meetings. For the\nreasons discussed below, the Public Access Bureau is unable to conclude that the special\nmeetings of certain members of the Rich Township High School District No. 227 Board of\nEducation (Board) on July 15, 2017, July 18, 2017, and July 22, 2017, violated the requirements\nof OMA.\n\n500 South Second StreeL Springfield. Illinois 62701 • (217)782-1090 • TTY: (217)785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nI 00 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax' (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main. Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\nbodies to participate through audio or video conference.\n\nReading section 2. 01 in its entirety, it is\n\nunclear whether the sentence requiring a quorum of members to be \" physically present at the\nlocation of an open meeting[ ]\"\n\nis intended to apply to all meetings of public bodies, or only\nthose in which members participate by audio or video conferences. Therefore, the meaning of\nthat sentence is ambiguous.\n\nIn determining the meaning of a statute, a court will not read language in\nisolation, but must consider it in the context of the entire statute.\" Slepicka v. Illinois Dept. of\nPublic Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 14, 21 N. E. 3d 368, 373 (2014). When the meaning of statutory\nlanguage is ambiguous, a reviewing body may consider the statute's purpose, the policy\nconsiderations that led to its passage, and \" the statute's context, reading the provision at issue in\nlight of the entire section in which it appears and the Act of which that section is a part.\" In re\nMarriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶ 20, 986 N.E. 2d 1139, 1144- 45 (2012).\n\nThe provision that \"[ a] quorum of members of a public body must be physically\npresent at the location of an open meeting\" was added to section 2. 01 of OMA by Public Act 941058, effective January 1, 2007. Prior to the passage of Public Act 94- 1058, the following\n\nlanguage constituted the entirety of section 2. 01 of OMA: \" All meetings required by this Act\nto be public shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient and open to\n\nthe public. No meeting required by this Act to be public shall be held on a legal holiday\nthe regular meeting\n\nday falls on that holiday.\" (Emphasis added.) Public Act 94- 1058\nadded the following language to section 2. 01 as the second and third paragraphs:\nunless\n\nA quorum of members of a public body must be physically\npresent at the location of an open meeting. If, however, an open\nmeeting of a public body (except one with jurisdiction limited to a\nspecific geographic area that is less than statewide) is held\n\nsimultaneously at one of its offices and one or more other locations\n\nin a public building, which may include other of its offices,\nthrough an interactive video conference and the public body\nprovides public notice and public access as required under this Act\n\nfor all locations, then members physically present in those\nlocations all count\n\ntowards determining\n\na quorum. * * *\n\nThe\n\nrequirement that a quorum be physically present at the location of\n\nan open meeting shall not apply, however, to State advisory boards\n\nA quorum of members of a public body that is not a public\n\nbody with statewide jurisdiction must be physically present at the\nlocation of a closed meeting. Other members who are not\nphysically present at a closed meeting of such a public body may\nparticipate in the meeting by means of a video or audio conference.\nPublic Act 94- 1058 also added\n\nsection\n\n7 to OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 7 (West 2006)).\n\nSection 7 sets\n\nforth the rules governing remote meetingattendance by members who are unable to be\nphysically present at the meeting location. Moreover, Public Act 94- 1058 expanded the\n\ndefinition of \"meeting\" in section 1. 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2006)) to include\ngatherings that occur \" by video or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means (such as,\n\nwithout limitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging), or other means of\ncontemporaneous interactive communication[.]\"\n\nAccordingly, in the context of section 2. 01 of OMA and the statute as a whole, the\nrequirement that a quorum be physically present is tied to circumstances in which one or more\n\nmembers participate in the meeting despite not being physically present at the meeting location.\nThe legislative history behind Public Act 94- 1058 provides further support for the\n\nconclusion that the language \"[ a] quorum, of members of a public body must be physically\npresent\n\nat the\n\nlocation\n\nof an open\n\npertains to instances involving remote\nparticipation. During the House debate on Senate Bill No. 585, which added that language to\nmeeting[ ]\"\n\nOMA as part of Public Act 94- 1058, House sponsor Robert F. Flider explained the legislation as\nfollows:\n\nWhat this legislation does is it updates [ OMA] and specifies rules\nwith regard to electronic communications. It expands the definition\n\nof a' meeting to include the presence whether by telephone calls,\nvideo or audio conference, or other electronic means. And it also\n\nspecifies that a quorum of members of a public body must be\nphysically present at an open meeting in the case of electronic\nThe bottom line of this is that it updates the\nOpen Meetings Act to deal with electronic communications. It\n\ncommunications. * * *\n\ndoes not change whatsoever the quorum requirements of\nOMA/.\" (Emphasis added.) Remarks of Rep. Flider, May 1,\n\n2006, House Debate on Senate Bill No. 585, at 9.\n\nTherefore, Representative Flider clarified that the requirement that a quorum be \" physically\n\nIn this instance, the Requests for Review solely asserted that the Board violated\n\nsection 2. 01 of OMA by holding meetings without having a quorum physically present, and the\nBoard has acknowledged that a majority of a quorum, not a full quorum, of Board members\ngathered to discuss public business on those dates. Because there is no indication that Board\nmembers participated in those meetings by audio or video conference, the requirement in section\n\n2. 01 of OMA that a quorum of the members of the public body be \" physically present\" is\ninapplicable here. In addition, the Board members complied with OMA's requirements for\nadvance notice and the opportunity for the public to attend when a majority of a quorum of a\npublic body gather to discuss public business. Accordingly, this office is unable to conclude that\nthe Board violated OMA in connection with the three meetings in question.\nThis determination, however, cannot be construed as approval of the Board's\nmeetings conducted without a quorum of members of the public body present, nor does it address\n\nthe ability of just a majority of a quorum, as opposed to a full quorum, even to discuss issues.\n\nRather, this office's determination is limited to interpreting the requirements of OMA. See 15\n\nILCS 205/ 7 et seq. (West 2016). The quorum requirements for the Board are set by its formal\npolicies, the School Code, and rules of parliamentary procedure. Similarly, other public bodies\nmay formulate requirements with respect to quorum requirements and meeting attendance.\nOMA is silent on quorum requirements except for the circumstances described above.\nThe Public Access Counselor had determined that resolution of these matters does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nSpringfield address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close these matters.\nVery truly yours,\n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n48860 49185\n\no no\n\nvio sd"}
{"id":1209,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-09-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49174"],"title":"Atlanta Public Library District Board did not violate OMA public recital requirement on Treasurer's Report","filename":"49174, issued September 20, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1397,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Atlanta Public Library District Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide a sufficient public recital of the matter before voting to approve the Treasurer's Report. The PAC determined that the Board's motion was sufficient to inform the public of the business being conducted.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a library board didn't explain clearly enough what they were voting on when they approved a Treasurer's Report during a meeting. The Attorney General's office reviewed the meeting recording and decided the board provided enough information to the public. The board was not required to explain the specific details of the report, so no violation occurred.","holding":"The Atlanta Public Library District Board did not violate the Open Meetings Act's public recital requirement when approving the Treasurer's Report.","legal_question":"Whether the Board's motion to approve the Treasurer's Report satisfied the public recital requirement of section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(e)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Atlanta Public Library District Board of Trustees","requesting_party":"Mr. John Kraft (Edgar County Watchdogs)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The adequacy of the public recital provided by the Board before voting to approve the Treasurer's Report.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_e/Public-recital-requirement/49174, issued September 20, 2017.pdf","sha256":"f8681e23c01e571917b5137f3290c2092b2358f4c8ec4cbf7b008b7d40e16baf","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public recital","meeting procedure","voting","library board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSeptember 20, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Randy Brooks\nPresident, Board of Trustees\n\nAtlanta Public Library\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\napldinformation@gmail.\n\ncom\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49174\nDear Mr. Kraft and Mr. Brooks:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS\n\n120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Atlanta Public Library District Board of Trustees ( Board) did not\nviolate OMA' s public recital requirement in connection with its vote to approve the Treasurer' s\n\nReport at its August 10, 2017, meeting.\nOn August 11, 2017, Mr. John Kraft, on behalf of the Edgar County Watchdogs,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau alleging that during its August 10,\n2017, meeting, the Board violated section 2( e) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( e) ( West 2016)) by taking\nfinal action without sufficiently informing the public what it was voting on. Mr. Kraft provided\na link to a video recording of the meeting and pointed to the 18 minute mark,' at which time the\nBoard passed a motion to approve the Treasurer's Report. Mr. Kraft stated:\nEdgar County Watchdogs, Atlanta IL Public Library District 8 102017, YouTube, 18: 00 ( Aug.\n11, 2017), https:// www.youtube. com/ watch? v= 8xbLC7m49BM.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n\nIllinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph\n\nIllinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (\n\nFax: ( 312)\n\n1001\n\nStreet, Chicago,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TFY: (\n\n312)\n\n814- 3374 •\n\n618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618)\n\n814- 3806\n\n529- 6416\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\n\nThe Honorable Randy Brooks\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 2\n\nThe reason it was important for the public to know which\nbills were paid and which checks were written is because one of\n\nthe library board trustees has a direct conflict of interest in receipt\nof $1000 per month from the library for a lease on real estate he\npersonally owns. The public was wrongly deprived of that\n\ninformation at this meeting. ( Emphasis omitted.)121\nOn August 18, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Board and asked it to provide this office with copies of the agenda and open session minutes\n\nof the meeting, together with a written response to Mr. Kraft' s allegations. On August 31, 2017,\nthe Board provided this office with a copy of the open session minutes and a written response\n\nasserting that it did not deprive the public of any information. On September 7, 2017, this office\nsent a copy of the Board' s response to Mr. Kraft; he did not reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\n\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\nSection 2( e) of OMA provides that \"[ n] o final action may be taken at a closed\n\nmeeting. Final action shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being\nconsidered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\n\nIn Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois,\n2017 IL 120343, ¶ 64, 77 N. E. 3d 625, 636 ( 2017), the Illinois Supreme Court held that \" under\nsection 2( e) of the Open Meetings Act, a public recital must take place at the open meeting\nbefore the matter is voted upon; the recital must announce the nature of the matter under\n\nconsideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular transaction or issue, but need not\nprovide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\"\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that at the August 10, 2017,\nmeeting:\n\n2E -mail\n\nfrom John Kraft to AG PAC ( August\n\n11,\n\n2017).\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\n\nThe Honorable Randy Brooks\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 3\n\nT] he action taken was not to pay bills as Mr. Kraft assumes, but\nrather to receive the Treasurer's monthly report that specifies\n\nwhich bills were paid during the previous month. That report is\neleven pages long, and we do not believe we were required to read\nit aloud in its entirety, especially since a printed copy was available\n\nto anyone who asked for it. 131\nThe Board also asserted that a copy of the Treasurer' s Report was made available to the public\nduring the meeting and that in the future the Board will post the entire Trustee packet with each\nmeeting agenda posted on its website. Further, the Board stated:\nT] he specific item to which Mr. Kraft refers ---the $ 1, 000 in rent\n\nthe Library pays for use of space in another building— is covered\n\nby a lease under which the Library has been making payments for\nnearly a year. Those payments are noted on the check register that\nis part of the Treasurer' s report and thus is attached to the minutes\n\nof every monthly meeting[.] 141\nThis office has reviewed the video recording of the August 10, 2017, meeting, as\nwell as the minutes and Treasurer' s Report provided by the Board. During the meeting, after the\n\nBoard President, Randy Brooks, referenced the Treasurer' s Report, Mr. Kraft said: \" If you're\npaying the bills, can we get a list of the bills that you're paying, and in particular if you're paying\n\nrent, can we get the dollar amount and who you're writing it to.\" 5 Board President Brooks asked\nwhether there was a motion to accept the Treasurer' s Report, and a motion was made. Mr. Kirk\n\nAllen, who also represents the Edgar County Watchdogs, then asked if the vote on Treasurer' s\nReport is how the Board pays bills, or approves the payment of bills. The Board appeared\nunclear\n\nabout\n\nhow to respond,\n\nwith\n\nBoard members stating both \" yes\"\n\n6\nand \"\n\nno\"\n\nafter a\n\ndelay.\n\nDespite objections by Mr. Kraft and Mr. Allen, the Board voted to approve the Treasurer' s\nReport without providing additional information to the public.\n\n3Letter from Randy Brooks, President, Atlanta Public Library District, to Marie Hollister,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( August 31, 2017), at I.\n\n4Letter from Randy Brooks, President, Atlanta Public Library District, to Marie Hollister,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( August 31, 2017), at 1.\n\n5Edgar County Watchdogs, Atlanta IL Public Library District 8 10 2017, YouTube, 18: 10 ( Aug.\n11, 2017), https:// www. youtube. com/ watch? v= 8xbLC7m49BM.\n\n6Edgar County Watchdogs, Atlanta IL Public Library District 8 10 2017, YouTube,\n11, 2017), https:// www. youtube. com/ watch? v= 8xbLC7m49BM.\n\n18: 40 ( Aug.\n\n\fr.\nJohn Kraft\n\nThe Honorable Randy Brooks\nSeptember 20, 2017\nPage 4\n\nThe Treasurer' s Report that the Board voted to approve at its August 10, 2017,\n\nmeeting reflects account balances and various deposits and payments along with the dates of\nthose transactions during July 2017. As indicated in the Board's response, the Board' s vote to\napprove the Treasurer' s Report was not a vote to pay bills, but to accept a report of bills already\npaid and other transactions. Thus the Board' s motion to approve the Treasurer' s Report\n\nadequately informed the public of the nature of the matter being considered and the business\nbeing conducted within the meaning of section 2( e) of OMA. The Board was not required to\nexplain the specific content of the Treasurer' s Report or its significance. Accordingly, this office\nconcludes that the Board did not violate section 2( e) of OMA during its August 10, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Please contact me at ( 312) 793- 0865 or the\nChicago address listed on the first page of this letter if you have questions. This correspondence\nserves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nMARIE HOLLISTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49174\n\no\n\n2e public recital proper lib\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A library board's public recital before voting on a treasurer's report","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49174/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nSeptember 20, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Randy Brooks\nPresident, Board of Trustees\n\nAtlanta Public Library\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\napldinformation@gmail.\n\ncom\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49174\nDear Mr. Kraft and Mr. Brooks:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Atlanta Public Library District Board of Trustees (Board) did not\nviolate OMA's public recital requirement in connection with its vote to approve the Treasurer's\n\nReport at its August 10, 2017, meeting.\nOn August 11, 2017, Mr. John Kraft, on behalf of the Edgar County Watchdogs,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau alleging that during its August 10,\n2017, meeting, the Board violated section 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(e) (West 2016)) by taking\nfinal action without sufficiently informing the public what it was voting on. Mr. Kraft provided\na link to a video recording of the meeting and pointed to the 18 minute mark,' at which time the\nBoard passed a motion to approve the Treasurer's Report. Mr. Kraft stated:\nEdgar County Watchdogs, Atlanta IL Public Library District 8 102017, YouTube, 18: 00 (Aug.\n11, 2017), https:// www.youtube. com/ watch? v= 8xbLC7m49BM.\n\nThe reason it was important for the public to know which\nbills were paid and which checks were written is because one of\n\nthe library board trustees has a direct conflict of interest in receipt\nof $1000 per month from the library for a lease on real estate he\npersonally owns. The public was wrongly deprived of that\n\ninformation at this meeting. (Emphasis omitted.)121\nOn August 18, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Board and asked it to provide this office with copies of the agenda and open session minutes\n\nof the meeting, together with a written response to Mr. Kraft's allegations. On August 31, 2017,\nthe Board provided this office with a copy of the open session minutes and a written response\n\nasserting that it did not deprive the public of any information. On September 7, 2017, this office\nsent a copy of the Board's response to Mr. Kraft; he did not reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\n\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\nSection 2(e) of OMA provides that \"[ n] o final action may be taken at a closed\n\nmeeting. Final action shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being\nconsidered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\n\nIn Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois,\n2017 IL 120343, ¶ 64, 77 N. E. 3d 625, 636 (2017), the Illinois Supreme Court held that \" under\nsection 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act, a public recital must take place at the open meeting\nbefore the matter is voted upon; the recital must announce the nature of the matter under\n\nconsideration, with sufficient detail to identify the particular transaction or issue, but need not\nprovide an explanation of its terms or its significance.\"\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that at the August 10, 2017,\nmeeting:\n\nT] he action taken was not to pay bills as Mr. Kraft assumes, but\nrather to receive the Treasurer's monthly report that specifies\n\nwhich bills were paid during the previous month. That report is\neleven pages long, and we do not believe we were required to read\nit aloud in its entirety, especially since a printed copy was available\n\nto anyone who asked for it. 131\nThe Board also asserted that a copy of the Treasurer's Report was made available to the public\nduring the meeting and that in the future the Board will post the entire Trustee packet with each\nmeeting agenda posted on its website. Further, the Board stated:\nT] he specific item to which Mr. Kraft refers ---the $ 1, 000 in rent\n\nthe Library pays for use of space in another building— is covered\n\nby a lease under which the Library has been making payments for\nnearly a year. Those payments are noted on the check register that\nis part of the Treasurer's report and thus is attached to the minutes\n\nof every monthly meeting[.] 141\nThis office has reviewed the video recording of the August 10, 2017, meeting, as\nwell as the minutes and Treasurer's Report provided by the Board. During the meeting, after the\n\nBoard President, Randy Brooks, referenced the Treasurer's Report, Mr. Kraft said: \" If you're\npaying the bills, can we get a list of the bills that you're paying, and in particular if you're paying\n\nrent, can we get the dollar amount and who you're writing it to.\" 5 Board President Brooks asked\nwhether there was a motion to accept the Treasurer's Report, and a motion was made. Mr. Kirk\n\nAllen, who also represents the Edgar County Watchdogs, then asked if the vote on Treasurer's\nReport is how the Board pays bills, or approves the payment of bills. The Board appeared\nunclear\n\nabout\n\nhow to respond,\n\nwith\n\nBoard members stating both \" yes\"\n\n6\nand \"\n\nno\"\n\nafter a\n\ndelay.\n\nDespite objections by Mr. Kraft and Mr. Allen, the Board voted to approve the Treasurer's\nReport without providing additional information to the public.\n\n3 Letter from Randy Brooks, President, Atlanta Public Library District, to Marie Hollister,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (August 31, 2017), at I.\n\n4 Letter from Randy Brooks, President, Atlanta Public Library District, to Marie Hollister,\nAssistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (August 31, 2017), at 1.\n\n5 Edgar County Watchdogs, Atlanta IL Public Library District 8 10 2017, YouTube, 18: 10 (Aug.\n11, 2017), https:// www. youtube. com/ watch? v= 8xbLC7m49BM.\n\nThe Treasurer's Report that the Board voted to approve at its August 10, 2017,\n\nmeeting reflects account balances and various deposits and payments along with the dates of\nthose transactions during July 2017. As indicated in the Board's response, the Board's vote to\napprove the Treasurer's Report was not a vote to pay bills, but to accept a report of bills already\npaid and other transactions. Thus the Board's motion to approve the Treasurer's Report\n\nadequately informed the public of the nature of the matter being considered and the business\nbeing conducted within the meaning of section 2(e) of OMA. The Board was not required to\nexplain the specific content of the Treasurer's Report or its significance. Accordingly, this office\nconcludes that the Board did not violate section 2(e) of OMA during its August 10, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Please contact me at (312) 793- 0865 or the\nChicago address listed on the first page of this letter if you have questions. This correspondence\nserves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nMARIE HOLLISTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49174\n\no\n\n2e public recital proper lib"}
{"id":1210,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-07-19","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49391"],"title":"Winnebago County Board violated Open Meetings Act by prohibiting public comment","filename":"49391, issued July 19, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2264,"summary":"A citizen alleged that the Winnebago County Board violated the Open Meetings Act by preventing him from speaking during a public comment session due to a procedural dispute over a required form. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Act by improperly denying the individual the opportunity to address the Board.","plain_summary":"A citizen was blocked from speaking at a Winnebago County Board meeting on August 24, 2017, after the Board acknowledged he had submitted the required form but attributed the denial to an 'oversight to a training gap' and inadvertently missing the second date on the form. The Illinois Attorney General's office reviewed the complaint and concluded that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting the citizen from addressing the Board. The decision also questioned the reasonableness of the Board's advance sign-up rule, suggesting it may unnecessarily restrict public comment.","holding":"The Winnebago County Board violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during its August 24, 2017, meeting.","legal_question":"Whether the Winnebago County Board violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during a public meeting.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Winnebago County Board","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in text)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public comment","subject_description":"The dispute concerned the right of a member of the public to address the County Board during a public meeting despite a disagreement over the submission of a required speaker form.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/unreasonable-rules/49391, issued July 19, 2018.pdf","sha256":"d32c8e66fd61281afd0a738a8d3e6b806bda6f62c0031f519ca4db3bb0b822f2","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","Open Meetings Act","right to speak","county board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 19, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julia Halsted\n\nDeputy County Administrator\nWinnebago County\n404 Elm Street, Room 533\nRockford,\n\nIllinois\n\n61101\n\njhalsted@WinCoIL. us\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49391\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Halsted:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS\n\n120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Board of Trustees ( Board) of the County of Winnebago ( County) violated OMA by\nprohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during its August 24, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nOn August 25, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\nthis office alleging that he was not permitted to address the Board during the public comment\nportion of the August 24, 2017, meeting. Specifically,\nalleged that the County\nAdministrator informed him that he would not be allowed to address the Board because he failed\nto submit a form that the Board requires members of the public to fill out in advance of meetings\n\nin order to speak. Along with his Request for Review,\n\nincluded a copy of a\n\ncompleted form requesting to address the Board at its August 10, 2017, and August 24, 2017,\nmeetings, which he contends he properly submitted to the Board.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 (\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMs. Julia Halsted\n\nJuly 19, 2018\nPage 2\n\nOn August 30, 2017, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\nReview to the Board Chairman, who serves as the presiding officer of the Board, and asked that\nthe Board, or its representative, provide a written response to the allegations in this Request for\n\nReview. This office also requested a copy of the Board's rules governing public comment during\nmeetings, together with copies of the agenda and the minutes of the August 24, 2017, meeting\nfor our review\n\nOn November 8, 2017, the Deputy County Administrator provided the Public\nAccess Bureau with these materials. On November 9, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the\nBoard' s written response to\nhe replied on November 16, 2017.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)), provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" See III. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued\nSeptember 30, 2014, at 5 ( all public bodies subject to the Act are required to provide an\n\nopportunity for members of the public to address public officials at open meetings); see also 111.\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No'. 14- 009, issued September 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language\nof section 2. 06( g) of OMA, public comment must be permitted in accordance with the public\nbody' s established and recorded rules.\n\nIn response to this office' s request for a copy of the Board' s established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment in a separate Request for Review, the Board submitted\n\na copy of section 2- 65 of the Winnebago County Code of Ordinances, which addresses the\nLimitation of Debate\" as follows:\nA. No Member shall speak a total of more than twice on the\n\nsame question, unless permitted to do so by the Chair.\nB. No Member shall speak longer than three ( 3) minutes upon\n\nrecognition, unless permitted to do so by the Chair. Any\nMember called to order shall immediately cease speaking,\nunless\n\npermitted\n\nto explain.\n\nC. Non -Members may address the Board if written request is\nsubmitted to the County Board office by noon on the day\nof the County Board meeting for which recognition is\nsought.\n\nThe\n\nwritten\n\nrequest\n\nmust\n\nidentify the name of the\n\n\fMs. Julia Halsted\n\nJuly 19, 2018\nPage 3\n\nspeaker, specify the subject matter the speaker will\naddress, and indicate the speaker' s interest in the subject.\nComments shall be limited to three ( 3) minutes. Speakers\n\nmay not address zoning matter[ s] which are pending before\n\nthe ZBA, Zoning Committee or the County Board.\nPersonnel matters or pending or threatened litigation may\nnot be addressed in open session. An individual may speak\na maximum of three times per calendar year on the same\n\ntopic. This prohibition shall include the repetition of the\n\nsame topic in a statement on what is purported to be a\ndifferent topic. Personal attacks or inappropriate language\nof any sort will not be tolerated.\nD. Each person from the public will be limited to three ( 3)\nminutes.\n\nE. A maximum of twenty- one ( 21) minutes shall be allowed\n\nfor non- members to speak at each meeting. If a particular\nitem is deemed by the Chair to be controversial, the Chair\nshall strive to allow all sides an equal amount of time\n\nwithin which to speak at each meeting, subject to the\n\ntwenty- one ( 21) minute time limit. The Chair shall\ndetermine the sequential order in which non- members will\nbe allowed to address the Board. 01 ( Emphasis added.)\n\nIn this Request for Review, the Board acknowledged that\nsubmitted the required form but was nonetheless denied the opportunity to address the Board\n\nbecause of an \" oversight to a training gap in accepting submissions and reviewing forms for\ninclusion on the agenda. i2\n\nused one form to request to speak at two separate\n\nmeetings, and the Board stated that because the form was designed to be filled out for the \" next\n\nCounty Board Meeting\" the form should not have been accepted. 3 The Board acknowledged,\nLetter from David J. Kurlinkus, Chief of Staff and Civil Bureau, Winnebago County State' s\n\nAttorney' s Office, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General ( November 20, 2017), Exhibit A, Winnebago\nCounty Ordinance, ch. 2, div. 3, § 2- 65 ( approved December 5, 2016).\n\nLetter from Julia Halsted, Deputy County Administrator, County of Winnebago, to Assistant\nAttorney General Shannon Bamaby, Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( November 8, 2017).\nAttorney\n\nGeneral\n\nLetter from Julia Halsted, Deputy County Administrator, County of Winnebago, to Assistant\n\nShannon\n\nBamaby, Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( November\n\n8, 2017).\n\n\fMs. Julia Halsted\n\nJuly 19, 2018\nPage 4\n\nhowever, that it inadvertently missed the second date when preparing the \" public speaker\nagenda,\" thus violating its own rule for public comment.\n\nThe Board' s admission that it should have allowed\nAugust 24, 2017, meeting resolves the specific issue raised by\n\nto speak at its\nin this Request\n\nfor Review. The mission of the Public Access Bureau, however, is \" to provide advice and\neducation with respect to the interpretation and implementation\" of OMA. 15 ILCS 205/ 7( a)\n\nWest 2016). Even assuming that, by using one form to sign up for two meetings,\nhad not complied with the Board's rule, the reasonableness of this limitation on public\ncomment is questionable.\n\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\n\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that public bodies may promulgate reasonable\ntime, place, and manner\" restrictions that are narrowly -tailored and necessary to further a\n\nsignificant govemmental interest. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F. Supp.\n2d 912, 922 ( N. D. I11. 2009). For example, a public body may adopt reasonable rules governing\n\npublic comment in order to maintain decorum and ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently.\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 ( W.D. Mich. 2008); see also III. Att' y Gen. Pub.\nAcc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than to\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 459.\n\nThe Attorney General has determined that an advance sign up rule that is enforced\nto prevent a member of the public from addressing a public body violates OMA if it is not\nreasonably necessary to promote a significant governmental interest. III. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc.\n\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6. In that binding opinion, the Attorney General\nconcluded that a rule requiring members of the public to sign up to speak five days before a\nmeeting violated section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\n\nHere, the Board' s rules require members of the public to do more than merely\nnotify the Board that they intend to participate in public comment. Rather than requiring the\n\npublic to indicate they wish to speak immediately before or during the meeting, or by sending the\nCounty Administrator an e- mail or letter, or telephoning the County Administrator' s office on the\nday of the meeting, the Board' s rules require a person who wishes to address the Board to obtain\n\nand fill out a particular form, available at the County Board's Office, and submit it to the County\nAdministrator before noon on the day of a meeting. Also, the Board' s advance sign- up form\nrequires citizens to submit, in addition to their names, the subject matter that they intend to\naddress along with the speaker' s interest in that subject. Requiring a member ofthe, public to set\n\nforth the subject matter of his or her comment in writing in advance of a meeting may create a\nchilling effect\n\non speech\n\nat public\n\nmeetings.\n\nA person\n\nmay be reluctant to put comments\n\nin\n\n\fMs. Julia Halsted\n\nJuly 19, 2018\nPage 5\n\nwriting, especially if the comments may be controversial, although controversial statements are\n\nno less protected from govemment censorship under the First Amendment to the U. S.\nConstitution. 4\n\nIt is not apparent how use of the advance sign- up form is necessary to promote\norder and decorum at meetings, or to further any other significant governmental interest,\nalthough this office did not ask the Board to explain the rationale behind its rule in this case.\nAlthough the Board' s practice is to add names of persons who wish to address it to the agenda on\n\nthe day of the meeting, OMA does not require it to do so. Further, because the Board is not\n\nrequired to answer questions during public comment, no preparation is needed by Board\nmembers in order to listen to the public during the meeting. A sign- up sheet set out just prior to\nthe meeting asking for the names of individuals who wish to address the Board could accomplish\nthe same goal of running a timely and orderly meeting in a much less restrictive manner, and\n\nwould prevent the sort of errors that blocked\n\nfrom addressing the Board during\n\nthe public comment portion of the August 24, 2017, meeting. Moreover, the Board allows only\n\n21 minutes total during each meeting for public comment. The Board could simply ask if\nanyone wished to comment at that time. Even if a person decided during the course of a meeting\n\nthat he or she wanted to address the Board, it is unclear how the meeting would be disrupted if\nthe Board allowed that person to comment if time permitted.\n\nSection 1 of the Board' s rules, along with the required form, tend to restrict rather\nthan accommodate the statutory right of members of the public to address the Board. This office\n\nsuggests that the Board review and amend the County ordinances governing public comment in\nlight of the conclusions expressed here. As explained in this letter, the rules should\n\naccommodate a speaker' s statutory right to address the Board while ensuring that a public body\n\ncan maintain order and decorum at its meetings. Rules must be reasonable and necessary to\nfurther a significant governmental interest.\n\nLastly, this office emphasizes that the Public Access Bureau generally reviews a\nparticular rule governing public comment only if there is an allegation that a member of the\n\npublic has been prohibited from speaking at a meeting because of that rule, as opposed to\nevaluating the propriety of all rules absent a specific complaint that the rules prevented a citizen\n\nfrom addressing officials at a meeting. Accordingly, it is important to note that a determination\nby this office concerning one of a public body' s rules for public comment cannot be extrapolated\nto mean that other rules that were not specifically addressed would pass muster.\n\n4U. S. Const., amend. 1 (\"\n\nCongress shall make\n\nno\n\nlaw * * *\n\nabridging\n\nthe\n\nfreedom of speech.\").\n\n\fMs. Julia Halsted\n\nJuly 19, 2018\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me by mail at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter, by phone at\n312) 550- 4480, or by e- mail at sbarnaby@atg. state. il.us. Thank you.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49391 o 206g improper pub comment county\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Frank Haney\nChairman\n\nWinnebago County Board\n404 Elm Street, Room 533\n\nRockford, Illinois 61 101\nBoardOffice@WinCoIL. us\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A county board's denial of public comment over a speaker form","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49391/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJuly 19, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Julia Halsted\n\nDeputy County Administrator\nWinnebago County\n404 Elm Street, Room 533\nRockford,\n\nIllinois\n\n61101\n\njhalsted@WinCoIL. us\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49391\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Halsted:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Board of Trustees (Board) of the County of Winnebago (County) violated OMA by\nprohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during its August 24, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nOn August 25, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\nthis office alleging that he was not permitted to address the Board during the public comment\nportion of the August 24, 2017, meeting. Specifically,\nalleged that the County\nAdministrator informed him that he would not be allowed to address the Board because he failed\nto submit a form that the Board requires members of the public to fill out in advance of meetings\n\nin order to speak. Along with his Request for Review,\n\nincluded a copy of a\n\ncompleted form requesting to address the Board at its August 10, 2017, and August 24, 2017,\nmeetings, which he contends he properly submitted to the Board.\n\nOn August 30, 2017, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for\nReview to the Board Chairman, who serves as the presiding officer of the Board, and asked that\nthe Board, or its representative, provide a written response to the allegations in this Request for\n\nReview. This office also requested a copy of the Board's rules governing public comment during\nmeetings, together with copies of the agenda and the minutes of the August 24, 2017, meeting\nfor our review\n\nOn November 8, 2017, the Deputy County Administrator provided the Public\nAccess Bureau with these materials. On November 9, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the\nBoard's written response to\nhe replied on November 16, 2017.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)), provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" See III. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued\nSeptember 30, 2014, at 5 (all public bodies subject to the Act are required to provide an\n\nopportunity for members of the public to address public officials at open meetings); see also 111.\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No'. 14- 009, issued September 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language\nof section 2. 06(g) of OMA, public comment must be permitted in accordance with the public\nbody's established and recorded rules.\n\nIn response to this office's request for a copy of the Board's established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment in a separate Request for Review, the Board submitted\n\na copy of section 2- 65 of the Winnebago County Code of Ordinances, which addresses the\nLimitation of Debate\" as follows:\nA. No Member shall speak a total of more than twice on the\n\nsame question, unless permitted to do so by the Chair.\nB. No Member shall speak longer than three (3) minutes upon\n\nrecognition, unless permitted to do so by the Chair. Any\nMember called to order shall immediately cease speaking,\nunless\n\npermitted\n\nto explain.\n\nC. Non -Members may address the Board if written request is\nsubmitted to the County Board office by noon on the day\nof the County Board meeting for which recognition is\nsought.\n\nspeaker, specify the subject matter the speaker will\naddress, and indicate the speaker's interest in the subject.\nComments shall be limited to three (3) minutes. Speakers\n\nmay not address zoning matter[ s] which are pending before\n\nthe ZBA, Zoning Committee or the County Board.\nPersonnel matters or pending or threatened litigation may\nnot be addressed in open session. An individual may speak\na maximum of three times per calendar year on the same\n\ntopic. This prohibition shall include the repetition of the\n\nsame topic in a statement on what is purported to be a\ndifferent topic. Personal attacks or inappropriate language\nof any sort will not be tolerated.\nD. Each person from the public will be limited to three (3)\nminutes.\n\nE. A maximum of twenty- one (21) minutes shall be allowed\n\nfor non- members to speak at each meeting. If a particular\nitem is deemed by the Chair to be controversial, the Chair\nshall strive to allow all sides an equal amount of time\n\nwithin which to speak at each meeting, subject to the\n\ntwenty- one (21) minute time limit. The Chair shall\ndetermine the sequential order in which non- members will\nbe allowed to address the Board. 01 (Emphasis added.)\n\nIn this Request for Review, the Board acknowledged that\nsubmitted the required form but was nonetheless denied the opportunity to address the Board\n\nbecause of an \" oversight to a training gap in accepting submissions and reviewing forms for\ninclusion on the agenda. i2\n\nused one form to request to speak at two separate\n\nmeetings, and the Board stated that because the form was designed to be filled out for the \" next\n\nCounty Board Meeting\" the form should not have been accepted. 3 The Board acknowledged,\nLetter from David J. Kurlinkus, Chief of Staff and Civil Bureau, Winnebago County State's\n\nAttorney's Office, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General (November 20, 2017), Exhibit A, Winnebago\nCounty Ordinance, ch. 2, div. 3, § 2- 65 (approved December 5, 2016).\n\nLetter from Julia Halsted, Deputy County Administrator, County of Winnebago, to Assistant\nAttorney General Shannon Bamaby, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (November 8, 2017).\nAttorney\n\nhowever, that it inadvertently missed the second date when preparing the \" public speaker\nagenda,\" thus violating its own rule for public comment.\n\nThe Board's admission that it should have allowed\nAugust 24, 2017, meeting resolves the specific issue raised by\n\nto speak at its\nin this Request\n\nfor Review. The mission of the Public Access Bureau, however, is \" to provide advice and\neducation with respect to the interpretation and implementation\" of OMA. 15 ILCS 205/ 7(a)\n\nWest 2016). Even assuming that, by using one form to sign up for two meetings,\nhad not complied with the Board's rule, the reasonableness of this limitation on public\ncomment is questionable.\n\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\n\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that public bodies may promulgate reasonable\ntime, place, and manner\" restrictions that are narrowly -tailored and necessary to further a\n\nsignificant govemmental interest. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F. Supp.\n2d 912, 922 (N. D. I11. 2009). For example, a public body may adopt reasonable rules governing\n\npublic comment in order to maintain decorum and ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently.\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (W.D. Mich. 2008); see also III. Att' y Gen. Pub.\nAcc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than to\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 459.\n\nThe Attorney General has determined that an advance sign up rule that is enforced\nto prevent a member of the public from addressing a public body violates OMA if it is not\nreasonably necessary to promote a significant governmental interest. III. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc.\n\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6. In that binding opinion, the Attorney General\nconcluded that a rule requiring members of the public to sign up to speak five days before a\nmeeting violated section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\n\nHere, the Board's rules require members of the public to do more than merely\nnotify the Board that they intend to participate in public comment. Rather than requiring the\n\npublic to indicate they wish to speak immediately before or during the meeting, or by sending the\nCounty Administrator an e- mail or letter, or telephoning the County Administrator's office on the\nday of the meeting, the Board's rules require a person who wishes to address the Board to obtain\n\nand fill out a particular form, available at the County Board's Office, and submit it to the County\nAdministrator before noon on the day of a meeting. Also, the Board's advance sign- up form\nrequires citizens to submit, in addition to their names, the subject matter that they intend to\naddress along with the speaker's interest in that subject. Requiring a member ofthe, public to set\n\nforth the subject matter of his or her comment in writing in advance of a meeting may create a\nchilling effect\n\non speech\n\nwriting, especially if the comments may be controversial, although controversial statements are\n\nno less protected from govemment censorship under the First Amendment to the U. S.\nConstitution. 4\n\nIt is not apparent how use of the advance sign- up form is necessary to promote\norder and decorum at meetings, or to further any other significant governmental interest,\nalthough this office did not ask the Board to explain the rationale behind its rule in this case.\nAlthough the Board's practice is to add names of persons who wish to address it to the agenda on\n\nthe day of the meeting, OMA does not require it to do so. Further, because the Board is not\n\nrequired to answer questions during public comment, no preparation is needed by Board\nmembers in order to listen to the public during the meeting. A sign- up sheet set out just prior to\nthe meeting asking for the names of individuals who wish to address the Board could accomplish\nthe same goal of running a timely and orderly meeting in a much less restrictive manner, and\n\nwould prevent the sort of errors that blocked\n\nfrom addressing the Board during\n\nthe public comment portion of the August 24, 2017, meeting. Moreover, the Board allows only\n\n21 minutes total during each meeting for public comment. The Board could simply ask if\nanyone wished to comment at that time. Even if a person decided during the course of a meeting\n\nthat he or she wanted to address the Board, it is unclear how the meeting would be disrupted if\nthe Board allowed that person to comment if time permitted.\n\nSection 1 of the Board's rules, along with the required form, tend to restrict rather\nthan accommodate the statutory right of members of the public to address the Board. This office\n\nsuggests that the Board review and amend the County ordinances governing public comment in\nlight of the conclusions expressed here. As explained in this letter, the rules should\n\naccommodate a speaker's statutory right to address the Board while ensuring that a public body\n\ncan maintain order and decorum at its meetings. Rules must be reasonable and necessary to\nfurther a significant governmental interest.\n\nLastly, this office emphasizes that the Public Access Bureau generally reviews a\nparticular rule governing public comment only if there is an allegation that a member of the\n\npublic has been prohibited from speaking at a meeting because of that rule, as opposed to\nevaluating the propriety of all rules absent a specific complaint that the rules prevented a citizen\n\nfrom addressing officials at a meeting. Accordingly, it is important to note that a determination\nby this office concerning one of a public body's rules for public comment cannot be extrapolated\nto mean that other rules that were not specifically addressed would pass muster.\n\n4U. S. Const., amend. 1 (\"\n\nCongress shall make\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me by mail at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter, by phone at\n312) 550- 4480, or by e- mail at sbarnaby@atg. state. il.us. Thank you.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49391 o 206g improper pub comment county\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Frank Haney\nChairman\n\nWinnebago County Board\n404 Elm Street, Room 533\n\nRockford, Illinois 61 101\nBoardOffice@WinCoIL. us"}
{"id":1211,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-10-03","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49436"],"title":"PAC unable to confirm village water/sewer committee violated OMA over private culvert inspection","filename":"49436, issued October 3, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1403,"summary":"A citizen alleged that a Village of Clifton committee held an improper meeting at his residence without notice or minutes, but the PAC was unable to conclude that a violation occurred based on the evidence provided.","plain_summary":"A resident complained that village committee members met at his home to discuss public business without following open meeting rules like posting an agenda or taking minutes. The Attorney General's office investigated but could not confirm that a formal meeting took place. They advised the village to have members visit sites individually in the future to avoid accidentally triggering open meeting requirements.","holding":"The PAC was unable to conclude that the Village of Clifton's water/sewer committee violated the Open Meetings Act regarding the alleged gathering.","legal_question":"Whether a gathering of two committee members at a private residence to inspect a culvert constituted a 'meeting' under the Open Meetings Act requiring notice and minutes.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Clifton","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in text)","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The alleged occurrence of an unannounced meeting of a village committee at a private residence to discuss public business.","ocr_status":"reocr_tesseract","ocr_quality":96.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_a/49436, issued October 3, 2017.pdf","sha256":"c5cbe5c1be0bcd74f0d63f5483406066f7dbf0e1409149e12b448b301c5225df","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["open meetings act","quorum","public business","meeting notice"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nOctober 3, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nV a electronic mail\nThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\nVillage President\nVillage\n\nof Clifton\n\n350 East Fourth Avenue\nC ifton, Illinois 60927\nandrew. winkel@cliftonillinois. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49436\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Winkel:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude that the water/ sewer committee ( Committee) of the Board of\nTrustees ( Board) of the Village of Clifton (Village) violated the requirements of OMA in\n\nconnection with a gathering at\n\nresidence on August 8, 2017.\n\nOn August 28, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\nAccess Bureau alleging that despite two out of the three members of the Committee holding a\nmeeting at his home on August 8, 2017, regarding a culvert on a Village easement, the\nCommittee did not provide 48 hours' advance notice, did not post an agenda, and did not take\nminutes of the meeting.\n\nOn September 7, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to\nallegations by addressing whether the two\nCommittee members deliberated about the public business of their Committee at or near\n\nproperty on August 8, 2017. This also asked to confidentially review any\ndocumentation of the Committee members' visit on that date, such as notes or recommendations.\n\n500 South Second\n\nStreet,\n\n100 West Randolph\n1001\n\nFact\n\nMain\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701 • (\n\nStreet, Chicago,\nCarhnnAale\n\nIllinois, 60601 • (\nIllinnic\n\n67001 • !\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n6141\n\nC90.\n\nAfro •\n\nQl<\n\nL ,\n\niLicn < in\n\nLAIL\n\n\fThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\nOctober 3, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn September 14, 2017, the Board responded by denying the allegations. On September 22,\n2017, this office forwarded a copy of the response to\n\nhe did not reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\nSection 2( a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2016)) defines a\n\nmeeting\" subject to the Act as:\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means ( such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous\n\ninteractive communication,\n\nof\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5 - member\n\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\n\nIf a gathering of members of a public body meets this definition, then all of the requirements of\nOMA apply, including the proper posting of notice and an agenda ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic ( 5 ILCS 102/ 2. 01 ( West 2016)), keeping minutes ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a) ( West 2016)), and\nallowing public comment ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)).\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\n\n1974 I11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. \" In theory, there\nis no absolute prohibition against the members of a public body attending an ' informational\nsituation.\"\n\nmeeting' without triggering the application of\" OMA, as long as the members do not make\n\nd] eliberational statements\" or engage in \" unrecorded discussions\" concerning public business\namongst themselves. Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, issued July 14, 1995, at 10- 11. In that\nopinion, the Attorney General concluded that \"[ t] he mere fact that a majority of a quorum of the\nmembers of a public body attend[ ed] and participate[ d] in a bona fide presentation on new\n\nlegislative developments in an area of public concern within the scope of the public body' s power\nto act\" did not make the presentation subject to OMA, but that the extensive discussions of\npublic\n\nbusiness\n\namongst\n\nmembers\n\nof two\n\ncounty boards\n\nduring the presentation did trigger the\n\n\fThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\nOctober 3, 2017\nPage 3\n\nrequirements of OMA. ( Emphasis in original.)\n\nI11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, at 10- 11; see also\n\nNabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 ( N. D. Ill. 1982) ( a gathering does not constitute a\nmeeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons for or against\n\na course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt to reach\naccord on a specific matter of public business.\").\n\nIn its September 14, 2017, response to this office, the Board explained that\n\nTrustee Randy Gigl, Chairman of the Committee, scheduled a visit to\n\ns residence\n\nthrough text message for August 8, 2017. The Board stated that \"[ t] he purpose of the visit was to\nZook at a collapsed culvert beneath\n\ndriveway.\"'\n\nOn August 8, 2017, the Board stated,\n\nTrustee Gigl and another Committee member, Paul Hess, \" measured the culvert and reviewed the\n\nphysical damage to the culvert. Neither Gigl nor Hess had notes to supply. Both Hess and Gigl\nthe total time they visited\nestimated\nwas no more than ten minutes[.]\"\n2 Further, the\nBoard explained that the culvert was \" discussed during a public meeting of the [ Committee] on\nAugusti10, 2017. The August 8 visit served to prepare both trustees for their committee meeting\n\nby giving them a recent look at the situation. i3 In an email sent on September 27, 2017, the\nBoard clarified that, due to the size of the Village ( approximately 1, 500 residents), it only has\none full-time and two part-time maintenance employees. It stated that while it asks for its\nmaintenance employee' s advice, \" it is not unusual for trustees to visit the site of issues to observe\n\nthe situation first hand, especially to help make sense of specifics that may not be clear from\nphotographs\n\nor reports. * * *\n\nThey schedule a visit, observe the situation, then deliberate during\n\na public meeting. i4\nThe information available to this office indicates that the visit on August 8, 2017,\nwas intended to be informational for the Committee members. This office has not received facts\n\ndemonstrating that deliberative discussions of public business occurred at\nproperty on that date. It appears that the two Committee members were at\nresidence to gather information in order to then deliberate at the public meeting two days later.\nAccordingly, this office is unable to conclude that the August 8, 2017, visit constituted a meeting\nof the Committee subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\nLetter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\n\nthe Attorney General ( September 14, 2017).\nLetter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\n\nthe Attorney General ( September 14, 2017).\nLetter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\nthe Attorney General ( September 14, 2017).\nEmail from Andrew Winkel to Marie Hollister ( September 27, 2017).\n\n\fThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\nOctober 3, 2017\nPage 4\n\nThis office cautions, however, that if a majority of a quorum of the members of a\npublic body, such as a committee of the Board, engages in a deliberative discussion of public\nbusiness while visiting a site such as\nproperty on August 8, 2017, that event would\n\nbecome a meeting, triggering the requirements of OMA. Deliberative discussions of public\nbusiness have the potential to arise during such a gathering even if they are not anticipated.\nTherefore, if Committee members must conduct property inspections before meetings, they may\nw sh to consider doing so individually rather than in groups of two or three.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 312) 793- 0865.\nVery truly yours,\n\nMARIE HOLLISTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49436\n\no\n\n2a meeting\n\nproper\n\nmun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nOctober 3, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nV a electronic mail\nThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\nVillage President\nVillage\n\nof Clifton\n\n350 East Fourth Avenue\nC ifton, Illinois 60927\nandrew. winkel@cliftonillinois. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49436\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Winkel:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude that the water/ sewer committee (Committee) of the Board of\nTrustees (Board) of the Village of Clifton (Village) violated the requirements of OMA in\n\nconnection with a gathering at\n\nresidence on August 8, 2017.\n\nOn August 28, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the Public\nAccess Bureau alleging that despite two out of the three members of the Committee holding a\nmeeting at his home on August 8, 2017, regarding a culvert on a Village easement, the\nCommittee did not provide 48 hours' advance notice, did not post an agenda, and did not take\nminutes of the meeting.\n\nOn September 7, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to\nallegations by addressing whether the two\nCommittee members deliberated about the public business of their Committee at or near\n\nproperty on August 8, 2017. This also asked to confidentially review any\ndocumentation of the Committee members' visit on that date, such as notes or recommendations.\n\n500 South Second\n\nStreet,\n\n100 West Randolph\n1001\n\nFact\n\nMain\n\nSpringfield, Illinois 62701 • (Street, Chicago,\nCarhnnAale\n\nIllinois, 60601 • (Illinnic\n\n67001 • !\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: (312) 814- 3806\n\n6141\n\nC90.\n\nOn September 14, 2017, the Board responded by denying the allegations. On September 22,\n2017, this office forwarded a copy of the response to\n\nhe did not reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2016)) defines a\n\nmeeting\" subject to the Act as:\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous\n\ninteractive communication,\n\nof\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5 - member\n\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\n\nIf a gathering of members of a public body meets this definition, then all of the requirements of\nOMA apply, including the proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic (5 ILCS 102/ 2. 01 (West 2016)), keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a) (West 2016)), and\nallowing public comment (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)).\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\n\n1974 I11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. \" In theory, there\nis no absolute prohibition against the members of a public body attending an ' informational\nsituation.\"\n\nmeeting' without triggering the application of\" OMA, as long as the members do not make\n\nd] eliberational statements\" or engage in \" unrecorded discussions\" concerning public business\namongst themselves. Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, issued July 14, 1995, at 10- 11. In that\nopinion, the Attorney General concluded that \"[ t] he mere fact that a majority of a quorum of the\nmembers of a public body attend[ ed] and participate[ d] in a bona fide presentation on new\n\nlegislative developments in an area of public concern within the scope of the public body's power\nto act\" did not make the presentation subject to OMA, but that the extensive discussions of\npublic\n\nbusiness\n\nrequirements of OMA. (Emphasis in original.)\n\nI11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, at 10- 11; see also\n\nNabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 (N. D. Ill. 1982) (a gathering does not constitute a\nmeeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons for or against\n\na course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt to reach\naccord on a specific matter of public business.\").\n\nIn its September 14, 2017, response to this office, the Board explained that\n\nTrustee Randy Gigl, Chairman of the Committee, scheduled a visit to\n\ns residence\n\nthrough text message for August 8, 2017. The Board stated that \"[ t] he purpose of the visit was to\nZook at a collapsed culvert beneath\n\ndriveway.\"'\n\nOn August 8, 2017, the Board stated,\n\nTrustee Gigl and another Committee member, Paul Hess, \" measured the culvert and reviewed the\n\nphysical damage to the culvert. Neither Gigl nor Hess had notes to supply. Both Hess and Gigl\nthe total time they visited\nestimated\nwas no more than ten minutes[.]\"\n2 Further, the\nBoard explained that the culvert was \" discussed during a public meeting of the [ Committee] on\nAugusti10, 2017. The August 8 visit served to prepare both trustees for their committee meeting\n\nby giving them a recent look at the situation. i3 In an email sent on September 27, 2017, the\nBoard clarified that, due to the size of the Village (approximately 1, 500 residents), it only has\none full-time and two part-time maintenance employees. It stated that while it asks for its\nmaintenance employee's advice, \" it is not unusual for trustees to visit the site of issues to observe\n\nthe situation first hand, especially to help make sense of specifics that may not be clear from\nphotographs\n\nor reports. * * *\n\nThey schedule a visit, observe the situation, then deliberate during\n\na public meeting. i4\nThe information available to this office indicates that the visit on August 8, 2017,\nwas intended to be informational for the Committee members. This office has not received facts\n\ndemonstrating that deliberative discussions of public business occurred at\nproperty on that date. It appears that the two Committee members were at\nresidence to gather information in order to then deliberate at the public meeting two days later.\nAccordingly, this office is unable to conclude that the August 8, 2017, visit constituted a meeting\nof the Committee subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\nLetter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\n\nthe Attorney General (September 14, 2017).\nLetter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\n\nthe Attorney General (September 14, 2017).\nLetter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\n\nThis office cautions, however, that if a majority of a quorum of the members of a\npublic body, such as a committee of the Board, engages in a deliberative discussion of public\nbusiness while visiting a site such as\nproperty on August 8, 2017, that event would\n\nbecome a meeting, triggering the requirements of OMA. Deliberative discussions of public\nbusiness have the potential to arise during such a gathering even if they are not anticipated.\nTherefore, if Committee members must conduct property inspections before meetings, they may\nw sh to consider doing so individually rather than in groups of two or three.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (312) 793- 0865.\nVery truly yours,\n\nMARIE HOLLISTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49436\n\no\n\n2a meeting\n\nproper\n\nmun","plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A village committee's gathering at a private residence","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49436/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nOctober 3, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\nVillage President\n\nVillage of Clifton\n\n350 East Fourth Avenue\n\nClifton, INinois 60927\n\nandrew. winkel@cliftonillinois.com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 49436\n\nDea and Mr. Winkel:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau is unable to conclude that the water/sewer committee (Committee) of the Board of\n\nTrustees (Board) of the Village of Clifton ™ violated the requirements of OMA in\n\nconnection with a gathering at residence on August 8, 2017.\n\nOn August 28, 2017, submitted a Request for Review to the Public\nAccess Bureau alleging that despite two out of the three members of the Committee holding a\nmeeting at his home on August 8, 2017, regarding a culvert on a Village easement, the\nCommittee did not provide 48 hours’ advance notice, did not post an agenda, and did not take\nminutes of the meeting.\n\nOn September 7, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to JM allegations by addressing whether the two\nCommittee members deliberated about the public business of their Committee at or near\nproperty on August 8, 2017. This also asked to confidentially review any\ndocumentation of the Committee members' visit on that date, such as notes or recommendations.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Ilinois 62701 » (217) 782-1090 * TTY: (217) 785 -2771 + Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 + (312) 814-3000 * TTY: (312) 814-3374 + Fax: (312) 814-3806\n\n1001 Bact Main farhandale Ulinnic &70N1 « (£19) <90 LANN 2 TTY: (£10 £90 LAD? « Caw: (£1901 290 LALL\n\nThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\n\nOctober 3, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn September 14, 2017, the Board responded by denying the allegations. On September 22,\n2017, this office forwarded a copy of the response tof he did not reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \"to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2016).\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2016)) provides that \"[a]!l meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines a\n\"meeting\" subject to the Act as:\n\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\n\nIfja gathering of members of a public body meets this definition, then all of the requirements of\nOMA apply, including the proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic (5 ILCS 102/2.01 (West 2016)), keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/2.06(a) (West 2016)), and\nallowing public comment (5 ILCS 120/2.06(g) (West 2016)).\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \"whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.” 1974 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. \"In theory, there\nsino absolute prohibition against the members of a public body attending an ‘informational\nmeeting’ without triggering the application of’ OMA, as long as the members do not make\n\"{d]eliberational statements\" or engage in \"unrecorded discussions\" concerning public business\namongst themselves. Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, issued July 14, 1995, at 10-11. In that\nopinion, the Attorney General concluded that \"[t]he mere fact that a majority of a quorum of the\nmembers of a public body attend[ed] and participate[d] in a bona fide presentation on new\nlegislative developments in an area of public concern within the scope of the public body's power\nto act\" did not make the presentation subject to OMA, but that the extensive discussions of\npublic business amongst members of two county boards during the presentation did trigger the\n\ni\n\n| ‘ ecmumae aw Winkel\n\nOctober 3, 2017\nPage 3\n\nrequirements of OMA. (Emphasis in original.) Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004, at 10-11; see also\nNabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (a gathering does not constitute a\nmeeting for purposes of OMA when there is \"no examining or weighing of reasons for or against\na course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [and] no attempt to reach\naccord on a specific matter of public business.\").\n\nIn its September 14, 2017, response to this office, the Board explained that\nTrustee Randy Gig], Chairman of the Committee, scheduled a visit to Pe : residence\nthrough text message for August 8.2017. The Board stated that \"[t]he purpose of the visit was to\nlook at a collapsed culvert beneath] driveway.\"’ On August 8, 2017, the Board stated,\nTrustee Gigl and another Committee member, Paul Hess, \"measured the culvert and reviewed the\nphysical damage to the culvert. Neither Gig] nor Hess had notes to supply. Both Hess and Gigl\nestimated the total time they visited 7 was no more than ten minutes[.]\"” Further, the\nBoard explained that the culvert was \"discussed during a public meeting of the [Committee] on\nAugust 10, 2017. The August 8 visit served to prepare both trustees for their committee meeting\nby giving them a recent look at the situation.’ In an email sent on September 27, 2017, the\nBoard clarified that, due to the size of the Village (approximately 1,500 residents), it only has\none full-time and two part-time maintenance employees. It stated that while it asks for its\nmaintenance employee's advice, “it is not unusual for trustees to visit the site of issues to observe\nthe situation first hand, especially to help make sense of specifics that may not be clear from\nphotographs or reports. * * * They schedule a visit, observe the situation, then deliberate during\na public meeting.\"*\n\nThe information available to this office indicates that the visit on August 8, 2017,\nwas intended to be informational for the Committee members. This office has not received facts\ndemonstrating that deliberative discussions of public business occurred at\nproperty on that date. It appears that the two Committee members were at\nresidence to gather information in order to then deliberate at the public meeting two days later.\nAccordingly, this office is unable to conclude that the August 8, 2017, visit constituted a meeting\nof the Committee subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\n\"Letter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\nhe Attorney General (September 14, 2017).\n\nond\n\n\"Letter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\nthe Attorney General (September 14, 2017).\n\n>Letter from Andrew Winkel, Village President, Village of Clifton, to Marie Hollister, Office of\nthe Attorney General (September 14, 2017).\n\n“Email from Andrew Winkel to Marie Hollister (September 27, 2017).\n\nThe Honorable Andrew Winkel\nOctober 3, 2017\nPage 4\n\nThis office cautions, however, that if a majority of a quorum of the members of a\npublic body, such as a committee of the Board, engages in a deliberative discussion of public\nbusiness while visiting a site such as property on August 8, 2017, that event would\nbecome a meeting, triggering the requirements of OMA. Deliberative discussions of public\nbusiness have the potential to arise during such a gathering even if they are not anticipated.\nTherefore, if Committee members must conduct property inspections before meetings, they may\nwish to consider doing so individually rather than in groups of two or three.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (312) 793-0865.\n\nVery truly yours\n\nMARIE HOLLISTER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49436 o 2a meeting proper mun"}
{"id":1212,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-02-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49476"],"title":"Washington County Hospital Board violated OMA by discussing mere possibility of litigation in closed session","filename":"49476, issued February 1, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2208,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Washington County Hospital Board provided insufficient notice for a closed session and held unauthorized discussions; the PAC found the notice sufficient but determined the Board improperly discussed potential litigation in closed session.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a hospital board held an illegal closed-door meeting. The Attorney General's office found that while the board properly announced the closed session by citing the correct legal exceptions, it held an unauthorized discussion during that closed session. The discussion concerned potential litigation after a Medicare audit, but the board did not make a finding that litigation was probable or imminent, as required by the Open Meetings Act exception.","holding":"The Board held an unauthorized discussion during the closed session because it did not make a finding that litigation was probable or imminent, as required by the section 2(c)(11) exception.","legal_question":"Whether the Board of Directors of Washington County Hospital violated the Open Meetings Act by discussing the mere possibility of litigation during a closed session under the 5 ILCS 120/2(c)(11) exception.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(a)","5 ILCS 120/2(c)(11)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(11)"],"public_body":"Board of Directors of Washington County Hospital","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The Board held a closed session to discuss potential litigation that did not meet the legal standard of being probable or imminent.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.9,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2a/Citing-the-section/49476, issued February 1, 2018.pdf","sha256":"e7a199d6ce15761442c94b19a86c22f89eccb6fb8443edc36012c2b868190193","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","litigation","Open Meetings Act","hospital board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 1, 2018\n\nVia electronic marl\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Nancy M. Newby, PhD, CEO\n\nWashington County Hospital\n705 South Grand Avenue\nNashville, Illinois 62263\n\nnnewby@washingtoncountyhospital. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49476\n\nDear\n\nand Dr. Newby:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Directors ( Board) of Washington County Hospital ( Hospital)\n\nprovided sufficient information to the public before adjourning to closed session during its July\n25, 2017, meeting, but held an unauthorized discussion during that closed session.\n\nOn August 31, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging,\nin pertinent part, that the Board went into closed session on July 25, 2017, after referencing\nmerely \" Open Meetings Public Act 88- 621 Sections 2( C)( 11)( 17)( 21).\"\n\nI He alleged that the\n\nBoard provided insufficient information to the public before entering closed session and\nquestioned whether the Board held unauthorized discussions during that closed session.\n\nE- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor, Attorney General Office ( August 31,\n\n2017).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 •\n100 West\n1001\n\nRandolph\n\nStreet, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n312)\n\n814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nTTY: (\n\nFax: ( 312)\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618)\n\n312)\n\n814- 3374 •\n\n529- 6403 •\n\n814- 3806\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fDr. Nancy M. Newby\nFebruary 1, 2018\nPage 2\n\nOn September 7, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with copies of the agenda, minutes, and closed session\n\nverbatim recording from the Board' s July 25, 2017, meeting for this office' s confidential review,\ntogether with a written response to the allegation that the Board failed to make a proper public\n\ndisclosure under section 2a of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2a ( West 2016)) before adjourning to closed\nsession. On October 4, 2017, this office received those materials from the Hospital' s chief\n\nexecutive officer, Dr. Nancy M. Newby.\n\nOn October 24, 2017, this office sent a follow- up letter to Dr. Newby asking the\nBoard to address whether it limited its July 25, 2017, closed session discussion concerning legal\nmatters to topics within the scope of the section 2( c)( 11) exception ( 5 ILCS 12012( c)( 11) ( West\n2016)).\n\nOn October 31, 2017, the Board' s attorney responded.\n\ndid not submit a reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d\n161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\nAs an initial matter, to the extent that\nalleged that the Board improperly\ntook final action in approving the minutes of its June 27, 2017, Board and Executive Committee\nclosed sessions, this office determined that no further action was warranted. Section 2. 02( c) of\n\nOMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny agenda required under this Section\nshall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of\nfinal action at the meeting.\" Additionally, section 2( e) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( e) ( West 2016))\nprovides that \"[ f]inal action shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being\n\nconsidered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\nacknowledged that the agenda for the meeting listed the minutes at issue2 and that the\nBoard announced in open session that it was voting to approve those minutes before doing so.\nThe Board was not required to divulge the contents of its closed session discussions in order to\napprove the minutes of those closed sessions; it was sufficient for the Board to state that it was\n\napproving the closed session minutes from June. 3 Because the Board listed the general subject\n\n2See Washington County Hospital Board of Directors, Agenda Item VIII. A., Meeting( s) Minutes\nrefer\n\nto VII. A.), ( July 25, 2017).\n\nSee 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( 1) (\n\nWest 2016) (\" Minutes of meetings closed to the public shall be available\n\nonly after the public body determines that it is no longer necessary to protect the public interest or the privacy of an\nindividual by keeping them confidential[.]\").\n\n\fDr. Nancy M. Newby\nFebruary 1, 2018\nPage 3\n\nmatter of the June closed session minutes on the agenda and publicly recited sufficient\ninformation to approve those minutes, no further action was warranted on that issue.\nClosed Session Procedure\nSection 2a of OMA provides, in pertinent part, that \" a citation to the specific\n\nexception contained in Section 2 of this Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the\n\npublic shall be publicly disclosed at the time of the vote and shall be recorded and entered into\nthe minutes of the meeting.\"\n\nappeared to allege that the Board should have provided additional\ninformation to the public before entering closed session.\n\nDr. Newby responded that \" prior to\n\ngoing into closed session, the Chairman reads topics to be discussed from the agenda along with\nreferences from OMA as listed on the agenda.\"^\n\nAlthough no Illinois reviewing court appears to have analyzed whether a public\n\nbody may simply cite the number( s) of the applicable exception( s) in section 2( c) of OMA ( 5\nILCS 120/ 2( c) ( West 2016)) before adjourning to closed session, Illinois reviewing courts have\nto the language\n\ngenerally calling attention to\nan exception is sufficient to meet the requirement that the public body cite the ' specific exception\ncontained in [ s] ection 2 of [the] Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public.\"'\napproved\n\nof mere\n\nreferences\n\nof\n\nthe exceptions. \"[\n\nWyman v. Schweighart, 385 III. App. 3d 1099, 1106 ( 4th Dist. 2008) ( reference to \" land\nacquisition\"\n\nsufficient to invoke the section 2( c)( 5) exception ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c)( 5) ( West 2006)),\n\nwhich stated: \" The purchase or lease of real property for the use of the public body, including\nmeetings\nheld for the purpose of discussing whether a particular parcel should be acquired.\"); see\nalso Henry v. Anderson, 356111. App. 3d 952, 955 ( 4th Dist. 2005) ( public body' s public\ndisclosure that it would discuss an \" employee matter\" and \" reclassification of employment\" in\n\nclosed session was sufficient to identify the section 2( c)( 1) exception ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c)( 1) ( West\n2002)),\n\nto \"[ t] he * * *\n\nof specific employees of the public body,\nincluding hearing testimony on a complaint lodged against an employee to determine its\nwhich\n\napplied\n\nemployment * * *\n\nvalidity.\").\n\nIn this instance, while it appears that the public could have benefitted from further\n\ninformation concerning the Board' s reasons for entering closed session, this office is unable to\nconclude that the Board failed to provide \" a citation to the specific exception contained in\n\nSection 2 of this Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public\" when it cited the\n\nsection numbers of the specific statutory exceptions under which it was adjourning to closed\ntetter from Nancy M. Newby, PhD, CEO, Washington County Hospital, to [ Joshua] Jones\nOctober\n\n4, 2017).\n\n\fDr. Nancy M. Newby\nFebruary 1, 2018\nPage 4\n\nsession. 5 According to the minutes, the Board publicly cited four specific exceptions to the\nrequirement that public bodies discuss public business openly: sections 2( c)( 1), 2( c)( 11),\n2( c)( 17), and 2( c)( 21) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c)( 1), ( c)( 11), ( c)( 17), ( c)( 21) ( West 2016)). 6\nBecause OMA required only a citation to the specific exceptions that authorized the Board to\n\nenter closed session on July 25, 2017, and because the Board cited the numbers of the specific\nexceptions it claimed were applicable, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Board did\nnot violate section 2a of OMA.\nClosed Session Discussion\nSection 2( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016)) provides that all meetings of\n\na public body shall be open to the public unless the subject of the meeting falls within one of the\nexceptions set out in section 2( c) of OMA.\n\nSection 2( c)( 11)\n\nprovides an exception for:\n\nLitigation, when an action against, affecting or on behalf of\nthe particular public body has been filed and is pending before a\ncourt or administrative tribunal, or when the public body finds that\nan action is probable or imminent, in which case the basis for the\n\nfinding shall be recorded and entered into the minutes of the closed\nmeeting.\n\nThe section 2( c) exceptions are to be \" strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly\nwithin their scope.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 2( b) ( West 2016)).\n\nIn response to this office' s inquiry about whether the portion of the closed session\ndiscussion\n\nheld pursuant\n\nto the section 2( c)( 11) exception\n\nstayed within the scope of that\n\nexception, the Board Chairman, Matt Bierman, asserted that it did, stating that the discussion\n\nconcerned \" advice from Eric Trelz, our attorney, related to potential litigation after a Medicare\naudit found inappropriate/ falsified documentation on Cardiac Rehabilitation patients.\"\nEmphasis added.)\n\nSection 2( c)( 11) of OMA permits public bodies to discuss \" probable or imminent\"\nlitigation in closed session, but \" there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a lawsuit is\nlikely than not to be instituted or that such an occurrence is close at hand[,]\" and such a\n\nmore\n\nThis office notes that the reference to \" Public Act 88- 621\"\n\nwas outdated, as OMA has been\n\namended by numerous public acts since then; the Board could simply refer to the \" Open Meetings Act.\"\n\n6Washington County Hospital Board of Directors, Meeting, July 25, 2017, Minutes 4.\nLetter from Matt Bierman, Board Chairman, Washington County Hospital, to Joshua M. Jones,\nSupervising Attorney PAC, Office of Attorney General ( undated).\n\n\fDr. Nancy M. Newby\n\nFebruary 1, 2018\nPage 5\n\ndetermination must be made \" by examining the surrounding circumstances in light of logic,\nexperience,\nand reason.\"\n1983 111. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 26, issued December 23, 1983, at 10. In\nHenry v. Anderson, 356 I11. App. 3d at 956- 57, the Illinois Appellate Court strictly construed the\nsection 2( c)( 11) exception, stating:\nIf the litigation has not yet been filed, the public body must ( 1) find\nthat the litigation is probable or imminent and ( 2) record and enter\n\ninto the minutes the basis for that finding. Evidently, the\nlegislature intended to prevent public bodies from using the distant\npossibility of litigation as pretext for closing their meetings to the\npublic.\n\nFurthermore, in III. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 007, issued September 13, 2016, the\nAttorney General analyzed the section 2( c)( 11) exception at length in concluding:\nT] he section 2( c)( 11) exception does not permit a public body to\nenter closed session to discuss the possibility of litigation merely\nbecause it has taken action that generated public opposition, such\nas a backdoor referendum\n\neffort.\n\nIn the absence of reasonable,\n\nspecifically identified grounds to believe that litigation was close\nat hand or more likely than not to ensure, the mere possibility that\na lawsuit might be filed does not constitute \" probable\" or\nimminent\"\n\nlitigation within the scope of section 2( c)( 11)\n\nof OMA.\n\nIII. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 007, at 8.\n\nIn this instance, the closed session minutes do not contain a finding that litigation\nby section 2( c)( 11). Instead, the closed\nsession minutes and verbatim recording clearly show that the Board discussed at most the\nwas probable\n\nor\n\nimminent,\n\nas\n\nis expressly\n\nrequired\n\npossibility of litigation. Accordingly, the Board violated section 2( a) of OMA by holding an\nimproper closed session discussion on July 25, 2017, pursuant to the section 2( c)( 11) exception.\n\nTo remedy this violation, this office asks the Board to vote to disclose the\nportions of the July 25, 2017, closed session minutes and closed session verbatim recording that\n\ndocument the Board' s discussion of possible litigation, and then provide\nthose\n\nmaterials.\n\nwith copies of\n\n\fDr. Nancy M. Newby\n\nFebruary 1, 2018\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. Please contact\n\nme at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter if you have any questions.\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49476\n\no\n\n2a proper 2c11 improper\n\nco\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Closed-session discussion of potential litigation","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49476/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 1, 2018\n\nVia electronic marl\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Nancy M. Newby, PhD, CEO\n\nWashington County Hospital\n705 South Grand Avenue\nNashville, Illinois 62263\n\nnnewby@washingtoncountyhospital. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 49476\n\nDear\n\nand Dr. Newby:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\n\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Directors (Board) of Washington County Hospital (Hospital)\n\nprovided sufficient information to the public before adjourning to closed session during its July\n25, 2017, meeting, but held an unauthorized discussion during that closed session.\n\nOn August 31, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging,\nin pertinent part, that the Board went into closed session on July 25, 2017, after referencing\nmerely \" Open Meetings Public Act 88- 621 Sections 2(C)(11)(17)(21).\"\n\nI He alleged that the\n\nBoard provided insufficient information to the public before entering closed session and\nquestioned whether the Board held unauthorized discussions during that closed session.\n\nE- mail from\n\nto Public Access Counselor, Attorney General Office (August 31,\n\n2017).\n\nOn September 7, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with copies of the agenda, minutes, and closed session\n\nverbatim recording from the Board's July 25, 2017, meeting for this office's confidential review,\ntogether with a written response to the allegation that the Board failed to make a proper public\n\ndisclosure under section 2a of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2a (West 2016)) before adjourning to closed\nsession. On October 4, 2017, this office received those materials from the Hospital's chief\n\nexecutive officer, Dr. Nancy M. Newby.\n\nOn October 24, 2017, this office sent a follow- up letter to Dr. Newby asking the\nBoard to address whether it limited its July 25, 2017, closed session discussion concerning legal\nmatters to topics within the scope of the section 2(c)(11) exception (5 ILCS 12012(c)(11) (West\n2016)).\n\nOn October 31, 2017, the Board's attorney responded.\n\ndid not submit a reply.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n\nAs an initial matter, to the extent that\nalleged that the Board improperly\ntook final action in approving the minutes of its June 27, 2017, Board and Executive Committee\nclosed sessions, this office determined that no further action was warranted. Section 2. 02(c) of\n\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny agenda required under this Section\nshall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of\nfinal action at the meeting.\" Additionally, section 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(e) (West 2016))\nprovides that \"[ f]inal action shall be preceded by a public recital of the nature of the matter being\n\nconsidered and other information that will inform the public of the business being conducted.\"\nacknowledged that the agenda for the meeting listed the minutes at issue2 and that the\nBoard announced in open session that it was voting to approve those minutes before doing so.\nThe Board was not required to divulge the contents of its closed session discussions in order to\napprove the minutes of those closed sessions; it was sufficient for the Board to state that it was\n\napproving the closed session minutes from June. 3 Because the Board listed the general subject\n\n2 See Washington County Hospital Board of Directors, Agenda Item VIII. A., Meeting(s) Minutes\nrefer\n\nto VII. A.), (July 25, 2017).\n\nSee 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(1) (West 2016) (\" Minutes of meetings closed to the public shall be available\n\nonly after the public body determines that it is no longer necessary to protect the public interest or the privacy of an\n\nmatter of the June closed session minutes on the agenda and publicly recited sufficient\ninformation to approve those minutes, no further action was warranted on that issue.\nClosed Session Procedure\nSection 2a of OMA provides, in pertinent part, that \" a citation to the specific\n\nexception contained in Section 2 of this Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the\n\npublic shall be publicly disclosed at the time of the vote and shall be recorded and entered into\nthe minutes of the meeting.\"\n\nappeared to allege that the Board should have provided additional\ninformation to the public before entering closed session.\n\nDr. Newby responded that \" prior to\n\ngoing into closed session, the Chairman reads topics to be discussed from the agenda along with\nreferences from OMA as listed on the agenda.\"^\n\nAlthough no Illinois reviewing court appears to have analyzed whether a public\n\nbody may simply cite the number(s) of the applicable exception(s) in section 2(c) of OMA (5\nILCS 120/ 2(c) (West 2016)) before adjourning to closed session, Illinois reviewing courts have\nto the language\n\ngenerally calling attention to\nan exception is sufficient to meet the requirement that the public body cite the ' specific exception\ncontained in [ s] ection 2 of [the] Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public.\"'\napproved\n\nof mere\n\nreferences\n\nof\n\nthe exceptions. \"[\n\nWyman v. Schweighart, 385 III. App. 3d 1099, 1106 (4th Dist. 2008) (reference to \" land\nacquisition\"\n\nsufficient to invoke the section 2(c)(5) exception (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c)(5) (West 2006)),\n\nwhich stated: \" The purchase or lease of real property for the use of the public body, including\nmeetings\nheld for the purpose of discussing whether a particular parcel should be acquired.\"); see\nalso Henry v. Anderson, 356111. App. 3d 952, 955 (4th Dist. 2005) (public body's public\ndisclosure that it would discuss an \" employee matter\" and \" reclassification of employment\" in\n\nclosed session was sufficient to identify the section 2(c)(1) exception (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c)(1) (West\n2002)),\n\nto \"[ t] he * * *\n\nof specific employees of the public body,\nincluding hearing testimony on a complaint lodged against an employee to determine its\nwhich\n\napplied\n\nemployment * * *\n\nvalidity.\").\n\nIn this instance, while it appears that the public could have benefitted from further\n\ninformation concerning the Board's reasons for entering closed session, this office is unable to\nconclude that the Board failed to provide \" a citation to the specific exception contained in\n\nSection 2 of this Act which authorizes the closing of the meeting to the public\" when it cited the\n\nsection numbers of the specific statutory exceptions under which it was adjourning to closed\n\nsession. 5 According to the minutes, the Board publicly cited four specific exceptions to the\nrequirement that public bodies discuss public business openly: sections 2(c)(1), 2(c)(11),\n2(c)(17), and 2(c)(21) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c)(1), (c)(11), (c)(17), (c)(21) (West 2016)). 6\nBecause OMA required only a citation to the specific exceptions that authorized the Board to\n\nenter closed session on July 25, 2017, and because the Board cited the numbers of the specific\nexceptions it claimed were applicable, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Board did\nnot violate section 2a of OMA.\nClosed Session Discussion\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016)) provides that all meetings of\n\na public body shall be open to the public unless the subject of the meeting falls within one of the\nexceptions set out in section 2(c) of OMA.\n\nSection 2(c)(11)\n\nprovides an exception for:\n\nLitigation, when an action against, affecting or on behalf of\nthe particular public body has been filed and is pending before a\ncourt or administrative tribunal, or when the public body finds that\nan action is probable or imminent, in which case the basis for the\n\nfinding shall be recorded and entered into the minutes of the closed\nmeeting.\n\nThe section 2(c) exceptions are to be \" strictly construed, extending only to subjects clearly\nwithin their scope.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 2(b) (West 2016)).\n\nIn response to this office's inquiry about whether the portion of the closed session\ndiscussion\n\nheld pursuant\n\nto the section 2(c)(11) exception\n\nstayed within the scope of that\n\nexception, the Board Chairman, Matt Bierman, asserted that it did, stating that the discussion\n\nconcerned \" advice from Eric Trelz, our attorney, related to potential litigation after a Medicare\naudit found inappropriate/ falsified documentation on Cardiac Rehabilitation patients.\"\nEmphasis added.)\n\nSection 2(c)(11) of OMA permits public bodies to discuss \" probable or imminent\"\nlitigation in closed session, but \" there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a lawsuit is\nlikely than not to be instituted or that such an occurrence is close at hand[,]\" and such a\n\nmore\n\nThis office notes that the reference to \" Public Act 88- 621\"\n\nwas outdated, as OMA has been\n\namended by numerous public acts since then; the Board could simply refer to the \" Open Meetings Act.\"\n\ndetermination must be made \" by examining the surrounding circumstances in light of logic,\nexperience,\nand reason.\"\n1983 111. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 26, issued December 23, 1983, at 10. In\nHenry v. Anderson, 356 I11. App. 3d at 956- 57, the Illinois Appellate Court strictly construed the\nsection 2(c)(11) exception, stating:\nIf the litigation has not yet been filed, the public body must (1) find\nthat the litigation is probable or imminent and (2) record and enter\n\ninto the minutes the basis for that finding. Evidently, the\nlegislature intended to prevent public bodies from using the distant\npossibility of litigation as pretext for closing their meetings to the\npublic.\n\nFurthermore, in III. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 007, issued September 13, 2016, the\nAttorney General analyzed the section 2(c)(11) exception at length in concluding:\nT] he section 2(c)(11) exception does not permit a public body to\nenter closed session to discuss the possibility of litigation merely\nbecause it has taken action that generated public opposition, such\nas a backdoor referendum\n\neffort.\n\nIn the absence of reasonable,\n\nspecifically identified grounds to believe that litigation was close\nat hand or more likely than not to ensure, the mere possibility that\na lawsuit might be filed does not constitute \" probable\" or\nimminent\"\n\nlitigation within the scope of section 2(c)(11)\n\nof OMA.\n\nIII. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 16- 007, at 8.\n\nIn this instance, the closed session minutes do not contain a finding that litigation\nby section 2(c)(11). Instead, the closed\nsession minutes and verbatim recording clearly show that the Board discussed at most the\nwas probable\n\nor\n\nimminent,\n\nas\n\nis expressly\n\nrequired\n\npossibility of litigation. Accordingly, the Board violated section 2(a) of OMA by holding an\nimproper closed session discussion on July 25, 2017, pursuant to the section 2(c)(11) exception.\n\nTo remedy this violation, this office asks the Board to vote to disclose the\nportions of the July 25, 2017, closed session minutes and closed session verbatim recording that\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. Please contact\n\nme at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter if you have any questions.\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49476\n\no\n\n2a proper 2c11 improper\n\nco"}
{"id":1213,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-12-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49497"],"title":"City of Naperville did not violate OMA because evaluation committee is not a public body","filename":"49497, issued December 20, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3014,"summary":"The requester alleged that a City of Naperville committee formed to evaluate redevelopment proposals was a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act, but the PAC determined the committee did not meet the criteria for a public body.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a city committee evaluating redevelopment bids held private meetings in violation of the Open Meetings Act. The Attorney General's office investigated and determined that this specific committee was not a 'public body' under the law. Consequently, the committee was not required to follow open meeting rules, and no violation occurred.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the Evaluation Committee is not a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act, and therefore the City did not violate the Act.","legal_question":"Whether a committee formed to evaluate Requests for Qualifications for city-owned property constitutes a 'public body' subject to the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Naperville","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public body definition","subject_description":"The determination addresses whether an ad-hoc committee evaluating redevelopment RFQs is a public body subject to OMA requirements.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-public-body/advisory-bodies/49497, issued December 20, 2017.pdf","sha256":"5bb8755a6c099dcba7478cd9e7f88e1617035bc169e246d98f5a4ad50d7d2f4e","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public body","Open Meetings Act","advisory committee","redevelopment"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Public Body Definition","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 20, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nSenior Assistant City Attorney\nCity of Naperville\n400 South Eagle Street\nNaperville, Illinois 60540\nlordp@naperville.il.us\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2017 PAC 49497\nDear-and Ms. Lord:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.S(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 JLCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons explained below, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that a committee formed to evaluate Requests for Qualifications (RFQ)\nconcerning potential redevelopment of City-owned property (Evaluation Committee) is not a\npublic body subject to the requirements of OMA, therefore the City of Naperville (City) City\nCouncil did not violate OMA.\n\nBACKGROUND\nOn September I, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\nthis office alleging that the City formed the Evaluation Committee, the Evaluation Committee is\na subsidiary body of the Naperville City Council (City Council) subject to the requirements of\nOMA, and that the Evaluation Committee held meetings to score the RFQs concerning the\npotential redevelopment of certain City-owned property without complying with the\nrequirements of OMA.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nIO0 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 6060 I • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\nI 00 I East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 6290 I • (618) 529-6400 • TrY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nDecember 20, 2017\nPage 2\n\nOn September 14, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nCity Council and asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the Evaluation Committee's\npurpose and duties, and its relationship to the City Council. We also asked the City Council to\nclarify how the Evaluation Committee made recommendations to the City Council; to explain\nhow the City Council used the Evaluation Committee's recommendations in the process of\nmaking decisions about the development of the property in question; to describe how members\nof the Evaluation Committee were appointed; to identify the members of the Evaluation\nCommittee and the positions they hold; and to indicate whether the Evaluation Committee had a\nbudget and whether its members were paid for their service. In addition, we asked the City\nCouncil to clarify whether the Evaluation Committee meetings were open to the public and\nwhether advance notice was provided, and to furnish any recordings, written minutes, or other\nwritten documentation of those meetings.\nThe City provided its response and those materials on September 26, 2017. The\nCity's response acknowledged that Evaluation Committee meetings were not open to the public\nand that advance notice was not provided, but maintained that the Evaluation Committee was not\n� dy.\" On September 27,2017, this office forwarded a copy of the City's response to\n-he replied on October 6, 2017.\nDETERMINATION\nThe issue for determination in this matter is whether the Evaluation Committee is\na \"public body\" subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (2016). Section 1.02 of OMA\n(5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines a \"public body\" as:\n[A]ll legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated\ntowns, school districts and all other municipal corporations,\nboards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\nsubsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not\nlimited to committees and subcommittees which are supported in\nwhole or in part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue,\nexcept the General Assembly and committees or commissions\nthereof. (Emphasis added.)\n\n\fMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nDecember 20, 2017\nPage 3\nontends that the Evaluation Committee is an advisory body or\nsubsidiary body of the City. He argues that members of the Evaluation Committee were\nappointed by the Mayor, had an investigatory function to consider developers of City-owned\nproperty, and had the sole authority to provide the City Council with a recommendation for the\ndevelopment company, which he states the City Council unhesitatingly adopted.\nCiting People ex rel. Cooper v. Carlson. 28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (2d Dist. 1979),\nPope v. Parkinson, 48111. App. 3d 797,800 (4th Dist. 1977), and University Professionals of\nIllinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App.3d 856,865 (1st\nDist. 2003), the City's response to this office asserted that the Evaluation Committee was not a\ncommittee of the City Council. Instead, the City described it as an ad hoc committee formed by\nCity staff solely to evaluate responses to the RFQ in question (5th Avenue RFQ), to interview\nthose who responded to the 5th Avenue RFQ, and to provide its scoring recommendations to the\nCity. The City asserted that unlike the selection of members for various boards and committees\nof the City Council, which is codified in the City Code, the members of the Evaluation\nCommittee were not appointed by the mayor for a specified term with the consent of the City\nCouncil. On the contrary, the City contends that the members of the Evaluation Committee were\nchosen by City staff with \"input as to individuals who might be selected to participate from the\ncommunity provided by Mayor and City Manager's Office.\" 1 The City indicated that the\nCommittee was mostly comprised of area property owners, community stakeholders, and City\nstaff experts, but did acknowledge that one City Council member served on the Evaluation\nCommittee as a non-scoring liaison between the City Council and the Evaluation Committee.\nAccording to the City, the Evaluation Committee members were unpaid and the\nEvaluation Committee had no budget, was not created by ordinance, resolution, or City Council\naction, and was not assigned any duties by the City Council. In fact, the City contends that\n\"several City Council members expressed surprise and a total lack of awareness of even the\nexistence of such a committee during a City Council meeting[.]\" 2 The City further stated that the\nEvaluation Committee \"served the Procurement Division of the City's Finance Department and\ndid not have a relationship to the City Council except that its scoring recommendations with\nrespect to the RFQ were provided to the City Council. \"3 Lastly, the City argued that neither the\n1\n\nLetter from Patricia Johnson Lord, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Naperville, to Shannon\n\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (September\n26, 2017) at 2.\n2 Letter from Patricia Johnson Lord, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Naperville, to Shannon\n\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (September\n26, 2017) at 2 n.2.\n3 Letter from Patricia Johnson Lord, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Naperville, to Shannon\n\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (September\n26, 2017) at 3.\n\n\f�ord\nDecember 20, 2017\nPage 4\n\nCity nor the City Council are bound by any information or recommendation that the Evaluation\nCommittee made.\nIn his reply, -disputed the City's interpretation of Carlson, Pope, and\nStuckel and, citing Board of Regents v. Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d 968, 977-78 (4th Dist. 1997)\nargued, the following:\n[T]he Committee on 5th Avenue [Evaluation Committee] was not\nan internal committee focused on internal administrative matters,\nbut was a formal committee appointed by the Mayor. The\n[Evaluation] Committee had specific assigned duties [citations]\nwhich were in fact substantial, requiring a kick-off meeting and\ntraining session [citations], similar to other boards and\ncommissions. The [Evaluation] Committee had rules [citations],\nincluding mention of attendance, confidentiality, and conflict of\ninterest. Members of the [Evaluation] Committee signed an\nagreement to be bound by the rules of the [Evaluation] Committee\n[citations]. Ad hoc or internal committees with a sole function of\nadvising on internal matters do not have similar formalities. l4l\nAs described above, the definition of a \"public body\" includes an \"advisory body\"\nof the City Council and a \"subsidiary body\" of the City Council, such as a committee or\nsubcommittee. In analyzing whether entities are advisory bodies, the Illinois Appellate Court\nhas distinguished those that function independently and informal groups with limited duties from\nentities with defined responsibilities that are part of a public body's formal structure.\nIn University Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of\nTeachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856,865 (1st Dist. 2003), the plaintiff alleged that a group of\npresidents and chancellors of public universities (the Council), which made recommendations to\nthe Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE\nmeetings to discuss issues related to funding for public education. Stukel, 344 Ill. App.3d at 858.\nThe court identified the following factors as relevant to the determination of whether an entity is\nan advisory body, for purposes of FOIA:\n[W]ho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; the entity's\nassigned duties,including duties reflected in the entity's bylaws or\nauthorizing statute; whether its role is solely advisory or whether it\nalso has a deliberative or investigative function; whether the entity\n'Letter fro�o Shannon Barnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access\nBureau, Office of the lllinois Attorney General (October 6,2017) at 7.\n\n\fMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nDecember 20, 2017\nPage 5\n\nis subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any\npublic body; whether the group has a budget; its place within the\nlarger organization or institution of which it is a part; and the\nimpact of decisions or recommendations that the group makes.\nStukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 865.\nIn Stukel, the court held that the group was not an advisory body of IBHE in part\nbecause it was not incorporated into the formal organizational structure of IBHE, a factor that the\ncourt identified as a \"primary consideration in determining whether an organization is a public\nbody under the Meetings Act.\" (Emphasis added.) Stukel, 344 111. App. 3d at 865. The court\nexplained that \"the Council was formed by the presidents and chancellors of the various state\nuniversities to express its views to the IBHE. Granted, its role is advisory but that role is one\nthat the Council [and not IBHE] created.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866; see also People ex rel.\nCooper v. Carlson, 28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (2d Dist. 1979) (OMA does not apply to voluntary\n\"technical staff' meetings of \"department heads or employees who seek to improve with dispatch\ntheir performance or function of assisting in the conduct of the people's business.\").\nLikewise, in Pope v. Parkinson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 797 (4th Dist. 1997), a student\nreporter for a University of Illinois newspaper, alleged that the University of lllinois (University)\nAssembly Hall Advisory Committee (Committee), which consisted of four faculty members and\nfour students that were appointed by the chancellor of the University, and that advised the\ndirector of the assembly hall and, on occasion, the chancellor, violated OMA by refusing to open\nits meetings to the public. The court, however, held that the Committee was not an advisory\nbody of the University because it was not appointed by, or accountable to, any public body.\nPope, 48 Ill. App. 3d at 799. Specifically, the court stated:\n[T]he Committee is an internal committee within the University\nwhose sole function is to advise University administrators on\nmatters pertaining to internal university affairs. No statute creates\nthe Committee or defines the limits of its authority. The\nCommittee's unpaid members are not 'officially' appointed by the\nchancellor, although they are informally appointed by the\nchancellor to an annual term and can be dismissed by the\nchancellor at any time. In the event of such a dismissal, the public\ntax burden will be neither increased nor decreased.\nPope, 48 lll.App.3d at 799.\nThe Pope, court further stated that OMA is:\n[N]ot intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely\ninfonnal advisory committees who discuss internal University\n\n\fMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nDecember 20, 201 7\nPage 6\n\naffairs. A public administrator like the Assembly Hall Director\nshould be permitted to sample public opinion or to engage in\nreasonable inquiry regarding the acceptability of Assembly Hall\nprograms. Similarly, the Chancellor should be able to appoint an\nadvisory committee to assist him in his oversight of the Director's\nstewardship\" Pope, 48 lll.App.3d at 800-0 I.\nConversely, in Board of Regents of Regency University System v. Reynard, 292\nIll. App. 3d 968 (4th Dist. 1997), the appellate court concluded that the Athletic Council of\nlllinois State University (]SU) was an advisory body subject to FOIA. The Athletic Council\nserved \"as an advisory body to the athletic director, with primary advisory responsibility to the\npresident. It gives advice on the development of budgets and policies governing the\nintercollegiate athletic program.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 971. The Athletic Council \"exists\nto provide faculty input to the decision-making bodies at !SU.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 972.\nThe athletic director \"is free to reject its advice and there have been occasions when he has done\nso. The Council deals only with internal !SU matters, it has no budget, and none of its members\nare paid.\" Reynard, 292 111. App. 3d at 972. In concluding that the Athletic Council was an\nadvisory body subject to the requirements of OMA, however, the court emphasized that the\nCouncil is \"part of the formal organizational structure of ISU and its duties and responsibilities\nare set forth in the supplement [to the bylaws of the ISU Senate]. The broad scope of the\nCouncil's responsibilities as set forth in the supplement contrasts sharply with the limited duties\nof the committee in Pope [v. Parkinson}.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 978.\nAfter careful review of the arguments provided by-and the City, and\nbased on our analysis of the factors set out in Stukel, this office concludes that the Evaluation\nCommittee is more analogous to the informal advisory committee in Pope, the self-created group\nof university presidents in Stukel, and the group of department heads that held technical staff\nmeetings in Carlson than to the Athletic Council in Reynard.\nThe available evidence indicates that Evaluation Committee was an ad hoc\ncommittee that functioned independently of the City Council, and which was not a part of the\nCity Council's formal organizational structure, a primary consideration in determining whether\nan entity is an advisory body subject to OMA. Instead, as discussed above, the Evaluation\nCommittee was a mixture of City staff experts, community stakeholders, property owners who\nwere informally appointed by the mayor, and one non-scoring City Council member that acted\nonly as a liaison between the City Council and the Evaluation Committee. The City Council\nappears to have had no control over the Evaluation Committee and, in fact, some City Council\nmembers were unaware of its existence. The members of the Evaluation Committee were unpaid\nfor their service on the committee, had no budget, and appeared to have rendered advice to the\nCity's Finance Department on one specific internal City matter, which the City then submitted to\nthe City Council.\n\n\fMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nDecember 20, 2017\nPage 7\nFurther, the available evidence indicates that the duties of the Evaluation\nCommittee's members were not prescribed by any by-laws or rules or regulations of the City\nCouncil, and were not found in any statute. Based on the records provided by the City for our\nreview, the information and documents necessary to fulfill the limited role of the Evaluation\nCommittee were generally set forth in letters from the City's project manager.\nLastly, the available evidence demonstrates that any decision about moving\nforward with the potential redevelopment of the City-owned property would be made by the City\nin conjunction with the City Council. Neither the City nor the City Council were bound by any\ninformation or recommendation which the Evaluation Committee made. It is clear from our\nreview of the applicable minutes of the City Council meetings that the Evaluation Committee's\nrecommendations certainly may have enhanced the efficiency and knowledge of the City Council\nconcerning the performance of the members' duties in awarding the 5th Avenue RFQ, but the\nrecommendations did not appear to have a significant impact on the decisions made by the City\nCouncil. On the contrary, the City Council voted at the August 15, 2017, meeting to postpone\nthe awarding of the 5 th Avenue RFQ as recommended by the Evaluation Committee, and instead,\ndecided to hold a City Council workshop on August 28, 2017-which was open to the public­\nconcerning the 5th Avenue RFQ and the process that was used to evaluate the applicants. The\nCity Council further discussed the matter at its September 5, 2017, and October 3, 2017, open\nmeetings which appears to have included lengthy public comments, discussions by members of\nthe City Council, and presentations by team members of the company recommended by the\nEvaluation Committee for�uncil members and the public. Therefore, we\nrespectfully disagree with�haracterization of the Evaluation Committee as having a\n\"direct role in the legislative function\" of the City Council.\nFor the reasons stated above, the Evaluation Committee lacks the features of an\n\"advisory body\" subject to OMA. Accordingly, we conclude that the Evaluation Committee is\nnot a public body subject to OMA, and therefore, the conduct of its meetings did not violate\nOMA.\n\n5 Letter from-to Shannon Barnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access\n\nBureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (October 6, 2017) at 5.\n\n\fMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nDecember 20, 2017\nPage 8\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance ofa binding opinion. If you have questions, you may contact me by\nphone at (3 I 2) 550-4480, by e-mail at sbamaby@atg.state.il.us, or by mail at the address listed\non the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49497 o not a pb mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"An ad-hoc committee evaluating redevelopment RFQs","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49497/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nDecember 20, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nSenior Assistant City Attorney\nCity of Naperville\n400 South Eagle Street\nNaperville, Illinois 60540\nlordp@naperville.il.us\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2017 PAC 49497\nDear-and Ms. Lord:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.S(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 JLCS 120/3.S(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons explained below, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that a committee formed to evaluate Requests for Qualifications (RFQ)\nconcerning potential redevelopment of City-owned property (Evaluation Committee) is not a\npublic body subject to the requirements of OMA, therefore the City of Naperville (City) City\nCouncil did not violate OMA.\n\nBACKGROUND\nOn September I, 2017,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\nthis office alleging that the City formed the Evaluation Committee, the Evaluation Committee is\na subsidiary body of the Naperville City Council (City Council) subject to the requirements of\nOMA, and that the Evaluation Committee held meetings to score the RFQs concerning the\npotential redevelopment of certain City-owned property without complying with the\nrequirements of OMA.\n\nOn September 14, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nCity Council and asked it to provide a detailed explanation of the Evaluation Committee's\npurpose and duties, and its relationship to the City Council. We also asked the City Council to\nclarify how the Evaluation Committee made recommendations to the City Council; to explain\nhow the City Council used the Evaluation Committee's recommendations in the process of\nmaking decisions about the development of the property in question; to describe how members\nof the Evaluation Committee were appointed; to identify the members of the Evaluation\nCommittee and the positions they hold; and to indicate whether the Evaluation Committee had a\nbudget and whether its members were paid for their service. In addition, we asked the City\nCouncil to clarify whether the Evaluation Committee meetings were open to the public and\nwhether advance notice was provided, and to furnish any recordings, written minutes, or other\nwritten documentation of those meetings.\nThe City provided its response and those materials on September 26, 2017. The\nCity's response acknowledged that Evaluation Committee meetings were not open to the public\nand that advance notice was not provided, but maintained that the Evaluation Committee was not\n� dy.\" On September 27,2017, this office forwarded a copy of the City's response to\n-he replied on October 6, 2017.\nDETERMINATION\nThe issue for determination in this matter is whether the Evaluation Committee is\na \"public body\" subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\"In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and\ndeclares that it is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/1 (2016). Section 1.02 of OMA\n(5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines a \"public body\" as:\n[A]ll legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of\nthe State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated\ntowns, school districts and all other municipal corporations,\nboards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any\n\nontends that the Evaluation Committee is an advisory body or\nsubsidiary body of the City. He argues that members of the Evaluation Committee were\nappointed by the Mayor, had an investigatory function to consider developers of City-owned\nproperty, and had the sole authority to provide the City Council with a recommendation for the\ndevelopment company, which he states the City Council unhesitatingly adopted.\nCiting People ex rel. Cooper v. Carlson. 28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (2d Dist. 1979),\nPope v. Parkinson, 48111. App. 3d 797,800 (4th Dist. 1977), and University Professionals of\nIllinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App.3d 856,865 (1st\nDist. 2003), the City's response to this office asserted that the Evaluation Committee was not a\ncommittee of the City Council. Instead, the City described it as an ad hoc committee formed by\nCity staff solely to evaluate responses to the RFQ in question (5th Avenue RFQ), to interview\nthose who responded to the 5th Avenue RFQ, and to provide its scoring recommendations to the\nCity. The City asserted that unlike the selection of members for various boards and committees\nof the City Council, which is codified in the City Code, the members of the Evaluation\nCommittee were not appointed by the mayor for a specified term with the consent of the City\nCouncil. On the contrary, the City contends that the members of the Evaluation Committee were\nchosen by City staff with \"input as to individuals who might be selected to participate from the\ncommunity provided by Mayor and City Manager's Office.\" 1 The City indicated that the\nCommittee was mostly comprised of area property owners, community stakeholders, and City\nstaff experts, but did acknowledge that one City Council member served on the Evaluation\nCommittee as a non-scoring liaison between the City Council and the Evaluation Committee.\nAccording to the City, the Evaluation Committee members were unpaid and the\nEvaluation Committee had no budget, was not created by ordinance, resolution, or City Council\naction, and was not assigned any duties by the City Council. In fact, the City contends that\n\"several City Council members expressed surprise and a total lack of awareness of even the\nexistence of such a committee during a City Council meeting[.]\" 2 The City further stated that the\nEvaluation Committee \"served the Procurement Division of the City's Finance Department and\ndid not have a relationship to the City Council except that its scoring recommendations with\nrespect to the RFQ were provided to the City Council. \"3 Lastly, the City argued that neither the\n1\n\nLetter from Patricia Johnson Lord, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Naperville, to Shannon\n\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (September\n26, 2017) at 2.\n2 Letter from Patricia Johnson Lord, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Naperville, to Shannon\n\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (September\n26, 2017) at 2 n.2.\n3 Letter from Patricia Johnson Lord, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Naperville, to Shannon\n\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney [General], Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (September\n\nCity nor the City Council are bound by any information or recommendation that the Evaluation\nCommittee made.\nIn his reply, -disputed the City's interpretation of Carlson, Pope, and\nStuckel and, citing Board of Regents v. Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d 968, 977-78 (4th Dist. 1997)\nargued, the following:\n[T]he Committee on 5th Avenue [Evaluation Committee] was not\nan internal committee focused on internal administrative matters,\nbut was a formal committee appointed by the Mayor. The\n[Evaluation] Committee had specific assigned duties [citations]\nwhich were in fact substantial, requiring a kick-off meeting and\ntraining session [citations], similar to other boards and\ncommissions. The [Evaluation] Committee had rules [citations],\nincluding mention of attendance, confidentiality, and conflict of\ninterest. Members of the [Evaluation] Committee signed an\nagreement to be bound by the rules of the [Evaluation] Committee\n[citations]. Ad hoc or internal committees with a sole function of\nadvising on internal matters do not have similar formalities. l4l\nAs described above, the definition of a \"public body\" includes an \"advisory body\"\nof the City Council and a \"subsidiary body\" of the City Council, such as a committee or\nsubcommittee. In analyzing whether entities are advisory bodies, the Illinois Appellate Court\nhas distinguished those that function independently and informal groups with limited duties from\nentities with defined responsibilities that are part of a public body's formal structure.\nIn University Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 of the Illinois Federation of\nTeachers v. Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d 856,865 (1st Dist. 2003), the plaintiff alleged that a group of\npresidents and chancellors of public universities (the Council), which made recommendations to\nthe Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), violated OMA by meeting privately before IBHE\nmeetings to discuss issues related to funding for public education. Stukel, 344 Ill. App.3d at 858.\nThe court identified the following factors as relevant to the determination of whether an entity is\nan advisory body, for purposes of FOIA:\n[W]ho appoints the members of the entity, the formality of their\nappointment, and whether they are paid for their tenure; the entity's\n\nis subject to government control or otherwise accountable to any\npublic body; whether the group has a budget; its place within the\nlarger organization or institution of which it is a part; and the\nimpact of decisions or recommendations that the group makes.\nStukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 865.\nIn Stukel, the court held that the group was not an advisory body of IBHE in part\nbecause it was not incorporated into the formal organizational structure of IBHE, a factor that the\ncourt identified as a \"primary consideration in determining whether an organization is a public\nbody under the Meetings Act.\" (Emphasis added.) Stukel, 344 111. App. 3d at 865. The court\nexplained that \"the Council was formed by the presidents and chancellors of the various state\nuniversities to express its views to the IBHE. Granted, its role is advisory but that role is one\nthat the Council [and not IBHE] created.\" Stukel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 866; see also People ex rel.\nCooper v. Carlson, 28 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572 (2d Dist. 1979) (OMA does not apply to voluntary\n\"technical staff' meetings of \"department heads or employees who seek to improve with dispatch\ntheir performance or function of assisting in the conduct of the people's business.\").\nLikewise, in Pope v. Parkinson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 797 (4th Dist. 1997), a student\nreporter for a University of Illinois newspaper, alleged that the University of lllinois (University)\nAssembly Hall Advisory Committee (Committee), which consisted of four faculty members and\nfour students that were appointed by the chancellor of the University, and that advised the\ndirector of the assembly hall and, on occasion, the chancellor, violated OMA by refusing to open\nits meetings to the public. The court, however, held that the Committee was not an advisory\nbody of the University because it was not appointed by, or accountable to, any public body.\nPope, 48 Ill. App. 3d at 799. Specifically, the court stated:\n[T]he Committee is an internal committee within the University\nwhose sole function is to advise University administrators on\nmatters pertaining to internal university affairs. No statute creates\nthe Committee or defines the limits of its authority. The\nCommittee's unpaid members are not 'officially' appointed by the\nchancellor, although they are informally appointed by the\nchancellor to an annual term and can be dismissed by the\nchancellor at any time. In the event of such a dismissal, the public\ntax burden will be neither increased nor decreased.\nPope, 48 lll.App.3d at 799.\nThe Pope, court further stated that OMA is:\n[N]ot intended to open to the public the deliberations of merely\ninfonnal advisory committees who discuss internal University\n\nMs. Patricia Johnson Lord\nDecember 20, 201 7\nPage 6\n\naffairs. A public administrator like the Assembly Hall Director\nshould be permitted to sample public opinion or to engage in\nreasonable inquiry regarding the acceptability of Assembly Hall\nprograms. Similarly, the Chancellor should be able to appoint an\nadvisory committee to assist him in his oversight of the Director's\nstewardship\" Pope, 48 lll.App.3d at 800-0 I.\nConversely, in Board of Regents of Regency University System v. Reynard, 292\nIll. App. 3d 968 (4th Dist. 1997), the appellate court concluded that the Athletic Council of\nlllinois State University (]SU) was an advisory body subject to FOIA. The Athletic Council\nserved \"as an advisory body to the athletic director, with primary advisory responsibility to the\npresident. It gives advice on the development of budgets and policies governing the\nintercollegiate athletic program.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 971. The Athletic Council \"exists\nto provide faculty input to the decision-making bodies at !SU.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 972.\nThe athletic director \"is free to reject its advice and there have been occasions when he has done\nso. The Council deals only with internal !SU matters, it has no budget, and none of its members\nare paid.\" Reynard, 292 111. App. 3d at 972. In concluding that the Athletic Council was an\nadvisory body subject to the requirements of OMA, however, the court emphasized that the\nCouncil is \"part of the formal organizational structure of ISU and its duties and responsibilities\nare set forth in the supplement [to the bylaws of the ISU Senate]. The broad scope of the\nCouncil's responsibilities as set forth in the supplement contrasts sharply with the limited duties\nof the committee in Pope [v. Parkinson}.\" Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 978.\nAfter careful review of the arguments provided by-and the City, and\nbased on our analysis of the factors set out in Stukel, this office concludes that the Evaluation\nCommittee is more analogous to the informal advisory committee in Pope, the self-created group\nof university presidents in Stukel, and the group of department heads that held technical staff\nmeetings in Carlson than to the Athletic Council in Reynard.\nThe available evidence indicates that Evaluation Committee was an ad hoc\ncommittee that functioned independently of the City Council, and which was not a part of the\nCity Council's formal organizational structure, a primary consideration in determining whether\nan entity is an advisory body subject to OMA. Instead, as discussed above, the Evaluation\nCommittee was a mixture of City staff experts, community stakeholders, property owners who\nwere informally appointed by the mayor, and one non-scoring City Council member that acted\nonly as a liaison between the City Council and the Evaluation Committee. The City Council\nappears to have had no control over the Evaluation Committee and, in fact, some City Council\nmembers were unaware of its existence. The members of the Evaluation Committee were unpaid\nfor their service on the committee, had no budget, and appeared to have rendered advice to the\nCity's Finance Department on one specific internal City matter, which the City then submitted to\n\nFurther, the available evidence indicates that the duties of the Evaluation\nCommittee's members were not prescribed by any by-laws or rules or regulations of the City\nCouncil, and were not found in any statute. Based on the records provided by the City for our\nreview, the information and documents necessary to fulfill the limited role of the Evaluation\nCommittee were generally set forth in letters from the City's project manager.\nLastly, the available evidence demonstrates that any decision about moving\nforward with the potential redevelopment of the City-owned property would be made by the City\nin conjunction with the City Council. Neither the City nor the City Council were bound by any\ninformation or recommendation which the Evaluation Committee made. It is clear from our\nreview of the applicable minutes of the City Council meetings that the Evaluation Committee's\nrecommendations certainly may have enhanced the efficiency and knowledge of the City Council\nconcerning the performance of the members' duties in awarding the 5th Avenue RFQ, but the\nrecommendations did not appear to have a significant impact on the decisions made by the City\nCouncil. On the contrary, the City Council voted at the August 15, 2017, meeting to postpone\nthe awarding of the 5 th Avenue RFQ as recommended by the Evaluation Committee, and instead,\ndecided to hold a City Council workshop on August 28, 2017-which was open to the public­\nconcerning the 5th Avenue RFQ and the process that was used to evaluate the applicants. The\nCity Council further discussed the matter at its September 5, 2017, and October 3, 2017, open\nmeetings which appears to have included lengthy public comments, discussions by members of\nthe City Council, and presentations by team members of the company recommended by the\nEvaluation Committee for�uncil members and the public. Therefore, we\nrespectfully disagree with�haracterization of the Evaluation Committee as having a\n\"direct role in the legislative function\" of the City Council.\nFor the reasons stated above, the Evaluation Committee lacks the features of an\n\"advisory body\" subject to OMA. Accordingly, we conclude that the Evaluation Committee is\nnot a public body subject to OMA, and therefore, the conduct of its meetings did not violate\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance ofa binding opinion. If you have questions, you may contact me by\nphone at (3 I 2) 550-4480, by e-mail at sbamaby@atg.state.il.us, or by mail at the address listed\non the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49497 o not a pb mun"}
{"id":1214,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-01-31","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49820"],"title":"Village of Wheeling did not violate OMA by restricting public comment at 2017 meetings","filename":"49820, issued January 31, 2019.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3502,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Village of Wheeling's Liquor Control Commission and Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment during their September 18, 2017, meetings. The PAC determined that the public bodies did not violate the Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Village of Wheeling improperly restricted public comments during two meetings in 2017. The Attorney General's office reviewed the complaint and concluded that the Village did not break the law. This means the case is closed with no further action required.","holding":"The Village of Wheeling did not violate the Open Meetings Act regarding the conduct of its public meetings.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Wheeling violated the Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment during its September 18, 2017, meetings.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Wheeling","requesting_party":"Mr. Kevin DuJan","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The complaint concerned the rules and restrictions applied to public comment during Village of Wheeling board meetings.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/Reasonable-rules/49820, issued January 31, 2019.pdf","sha256":"20f18164c2120aa773c80758fb8c6f341984997dd965420ee5fe9cd80fffbfe7","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","open meetings act","village board","meeting rules"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKwame Raoul\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJanuary 31, 2019\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kevin DuJan\n\nStory Time Digital Media\nstorytimewithmeganfox@gmail.\n\nVia electronic\n\ncom\n\nmail\n\nThe Honorable Patrick Horcher\nPresident, Board of Trustees\n\nVillage of Wheeling\n2 Community Boulevard\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nphorcher@wheelingil.\n\ngov\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nVillage Attorney\nKlein, Thorpe and Jenkins, LTD.\n20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1660\n\nChicago, Illinois 60606\nmamilluzzi@ktjlaw.\n\ncom\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 49820\nDear Mr. DuJan, Mr. Horcher, and Ms. Milluzzi:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS\n\nthat the Village of Wheeling ( Village) Liquor Control Commission ( Commission) and the\nVillage Board of Trustees ( Board) did not violate OMA in connection with their September 18,\n2017, meetings.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n100 West Randolph\n\nIllinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nStreet, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 •\n\nTTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Kevin DuJan\nThe Honorable\n\nPatrick Horcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 2\n\nOn September 26, 2017, Mr. Kevin DuJan filed this Request for Review alleging\nthat the Commission and Board violated OMA at their September 18, 2017, meetings.\n\nSpecifically, he asserted that the Village president and the Village attorney improperly restricted\nMr. DuJan and another member of the public, Ms. Deborah Wilson, from addressing the Board\n\nby repeatedly interrupting their public comments. He also alleged that the Commission\nimproperly restricted Ms. Wilson' s ability to comment at this meeting based on the topic that she\nwished to address and attempted to do the same to him. Mr. DuJan' s Request for Review also\n\ncontends that the Village' s rules for public comment do not comply with section 2. 06( g) of OMA\n5 ILCS/ 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)).\nOn October 13, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Village and requested that it provide a copy of any established and recorded Village rules\ngoveming public comment during meetings, and copies of the agenda, open session minutes, and\n\nany audio or video recordings of the September 18, 2017, Commission and Board meetings\nalong with a written response to the allegations in this Request for Review.\nOn October 24, 2017, this office received a written response with links to the\nVillage Code ( Code) and video recordings of the Board and Commission meetings at issue. This\noffice also received the public comment sign -in sheets for both the Board and Commission\n\nmeetings as well as a copy of the draft meeting minutes for the Commission meeting.' On '\nOctober 25, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Village' s written response to Mr. DuJan; he\ndid not reply. On June 29, 2018, Mr. DuJan informed this office that he had not received a copy\n\nof the written response by the Village and indicated that he would like a chance to reply. On that\ndate, this office forwarded a copy of the Village' s written response to Mr. DuJan; he did not\nreply.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn September 18, 2017, the Commission, a held a special meeting that began at\n6: 30 p. m., the substance of which was to discuss a particular request for a liquor license. The\nmembers of the Commission consist of the Village President and the members of the Board. 2\n\nAlthough the written response indicated that agendas for the September 18, 2017, Commission\n\nand Board meetings, and the meeting minutes for the Village's meeting accompanied the written response, this office\ndid not receive paper copies of those materials. Instead, in an October 24, 2017, e- mail from counsel for the Village,\n\nlinks to the Village' s website were those materials could be retrieved was provided. See e- mail from Mallory A.\nMilluzzi, Associate Attorney, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd. to [ Shannon] Bamaby, [ Assistant Attorney General],\nPublic Access Bureau], [ Office of the Illinois Attorney General] ( October 24, 2017).\nWheeling\n\nMunicipal\n\nCode § 4. 32. 030( a) ( amended April 19, 2010).\n\n\fMr. Kevin DuJan\nThe Honorable Patrick Horcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 3\n\nHowever, according to chapter 4. 32 of the Code, when acting in this capacity, the Commission\nmembers have very limited authority. Specifically, section 4. 32. 030( 6) of the Code provides,\nw] hen sitting as the liquor control commission, the members of the corporate authorities may\nexercise no authority other than the liquor control powers in accordance with this Chapter [ which\n\nexclusively deal with licenses for alcoholic liquors].\" 3 The Board held its regular meeting\nimmediately following the Commission' s special meeting.\n\nIt is undisputed that the Village has established and recorded rules governing\npublic comment for both the Commission and the Board, and that both the Commission and the\n\nBoard provided an opportunity for public comment during their meetings. Therefore, this office\nreviews the rules that were enforced during the September 18, 2017, meetings in terms of their\nreasonableness and the asserted significant governmental\n\ninterest.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA provides: \" Any person shall be permitted an opportunity\n\nto address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public body.\"\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of rules that a public body may adopt,\npublic bodies may generally promulgate reasonable \" time, place and manner\" regulations that are\n\nnecessary to further a significant governmental interest. See, e. g,. I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v.\nCity of Aurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 ( N. D. 111. 2009) ( examining whether the application of\ncity council' s rules for public comment violated plaintiffs' rights). \" City Councils have\nlegitimate reasons for having rules to maintain decorum at public meetings[ ]\" and \" to assure that\n\nthe meetings can be efficiently conducted.\"\n\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 ( W. D.\n\nMich. 2008).\n\nPublic Comment at the Commission Meeting\nIn relevant part, the Village' s rules governing public comment at Commission\nmeetings\n\nstates:\n\nMembers of the general public may address all village\ncommittees, commissions, boards, and any and all other subsidiary\n\nboards established by the village board or Village Municipal Code\nwith concerns or comments regarding issues relevant to that\nspecific board, committee or commission' s agenda or topics that\n\nWheeling Municipal\n\nCode § 4. 32. 030( b) ( amended April\n\n19, 2010).\n\n\fMr. Kevin\n\nDuJan\n\nThe Honorable\n\nPatrick\n\nHorcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 4\n\nthe specific board, committee, or commission has the authority,\npursuant to the Village Code, to address. The chairperson or his or\n\nher designee shall strictly restrain comments to matters that are\nrelevant to the board' s, committee' s, or commission' s business and\n\nshall not permit repetitious comments or arguments. 141\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThis office has reviewed a recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nCommission' s September 18, 2017, meeting. 5 The recording of the meeting shows that Ms.\nWilson addressed the Commission with concerns about renewing a funeral home' s liquor license.\nMs. Wilson then began to address her disagreement\n\nof Police and Fire Commissioners.\n\nwith an appointment to the Village' s Board\n\nDuring this portion of her public comment, she was\n\ninterrupted by the Village's president, Mr. Patrick Horcher. Mr. Horcher informed Ms. Wilson\nthat this topic was not relevant to the business of the Commission because it did not have\n\nauthority over the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners but that she would have the\nopportunity to speak about this topic before the Board at its meeting, which Mr. Horcher stated\nwould begin in approximately five minutes. Ms. Wilson disagreed with Mr. Horcher' s authority\nto limit her speech and she attempted to argue that she was permitted to speak about any topic\nwhen the Village Attorney interrupted her and explained that the above- cited rule prohibited her\ncomment on that topic.\n\nMs. Wilson then left the podium.\n\nNext, Mr. DuJan was called and walked up to a podium set in front of the\nCommission members.\n\nMr. DuJan provides Mr. Horcher with a book, which he stated contained\n\ninformation about the law firm with which the Village Attorney is affiliated, he then began\naddressing the Commission about his perceived failings of the Village Attorney and his dislike of\nthis law firm. During Mr. DuJan' s public comment, Mr. Horcher, the Village Attorney, and Mr.\nDuJan repeatedly spoke over one another. Mr. Horcher and Village Attorney informed Mr.\nDuJan that the topic was not relevant to the business of the Commission but that he could\n\naddress the matter at the Board meeting, and they indicated that they were attempting to enforce\nthe Village' s public comment rules. Mr. DuJan continued his public comment stating that the\nCommission was violating OMA because OMA permitted him to speak about anything he\nwanted, and he continued to cite his concerns about the law firm.\n\nMr. DuJan then completes his\n\ncomments and leaves the podium to return to his seat.\n\nWheeling Municipal Code §2. 03.060( b) ( amended May 15, 2017), available at\nhttps:// library.municode.com/ il/ wheeling/codes/ code_of ordinances\n\n5Wheeling Liquor Control Commission, Meeting, September 18, 2017, availab/ e at\nhttp:// www. wheelingil.\n\ngov/\n\n659/ Board- Meeting- Video- 9- 18- 2017.\n\n\fMr. Kevin DuJan\nThe Honorable Patrick Horcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 5\n\nThe Village' s response to this office asserted that the relevancy rule imposed upon\nMr. DuJan and Ms. Wilson at the September 18, 2017, Commission meeting was reasonable and\nserved a significant governmental interest. Specifically, the Village stated:\nHere, the Village' s rules and regulations\n\nare content\n\nand\n\nviewpoint neutral and serve the significant government interest of\n\nmaintaining civility and decorum.\n\nThe significant interest of effectively conducting a meeting\n\nis particularly true for a subsidiary body. A Commission like the\nLiquor Control Commission has extremely limited authority and a\nlimited, narrow purpose. Allowing public comment on any and all\ntopics at Liquor Commission meetings would, and does, interfere\n\nwith the orderly and effective action of the Village Board meeting.\nIn fact, at the September 18, 2017 Liquor Control Commission\n\nmeeting, Chairperson Horcher pointed out that the actual business\nof the Liquor Commission would take less time than the public\n\ncomment portion. Additionally, as repeatedly told to Mr. DuJan\nand Ms. Wilson, they were able to talk about those topics, namely\nthe qualification of Village attorneys and appointments to the\nBOFPC [ Board of Police and Fire Commissioners],\n\nat the Village\n\nBoard meeting that immediately followed the Liquor Control\nCommission meeting. The Village Attorney indicated to Mr.\nDuJan that he would be able to make all of his comments about the\n\nVillage Attorney and the law firm representing the Village when\nthe Village Board meeting began in less than five minutes. Thus,\nspeakers have ample alternative means of communication. 161\nIn his Request for Review, Mr. DuJan contends that OMA requires a public body to allow\nmembers\n\nof the public\n\nto \" speak\n\nabout whatever\n\nthey want to speak about[ ]\" 7 during the public\n\ncomment portion of a meeting.\n\nLetter from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Village Attorney, Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, LTD., to Shannon\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( October 24, 2017).\nE- mail from Kevin Milan, Story Time Digital Media to Public Access Counselor (September 26,\n2017).\n\n\fMr. Kevin DuJan\nThe Honorable Patrick Horcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 6\n\nThis office has previously determined that a rule which limits members of the\npublic to only provide comments related to subjects listed on the agenda exceeded the scope of\n\npermissible rulemaking authorized by section 2. 06( g). See, e. g., 111. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev.\nLtr. 38037, issued August 1, 2016; 111. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45349, issued March 16,\n2017.\n\nThese determinations,\n\nhowever, do not support the contention that participants have\n\ncomplete freedom during the public comment portion of an open meeting to provide comment on\nany issue that one wishes. Instead, this office emphasized that under section 2. 02( a) of OMA\n\n5 ILCS/ 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)), the public body itself is able to discuss matters concerning\nthe business of the public body that are not specifically listed on the agenda, and therefore, it\nwould be unreasonable to prohibit members of the public from doing so. 111. Att' y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 38037, issued August 1, 2016, at 3; III. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45349,\nissued March 16, 2017, at 6.\n\nMoreover, courts have consistently recognized an important governmental interest\n\nin limiting comments to matters directly relevant to that public body' s business. See, e.g.,\nScroggins v. City of Topeka, Kan., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1373 ( D. Kan. 1998) ( city council did not\nviolate first amendment to the United States Constitution by restricting personal comments about\nan appointee to a mayoral commission that were not directly relevant to the business of the\n\npublic body). Requiring a public body to permit public comment on matters unrelated to its\npublic business would impede the public body' s ability to run efficient meetings. See Rowe v.\nCity of Cocoa, Fla., 358 F. 3d 800, 803 ( 11th Cir. 2004) (\" a city council meeting is not open for\nendless public commentary speech but instead is simply a limited platform to discuss the topic at\nhand.\").\n\nAs the Commission has described in its response, the Commission has very\nlimited authority and purpose, which is restricted solely to matters related to licenses for\n\nalcoholic liquors. The Commission does not have the authority to discuss, or make decisions,\nregarding neither the appointment of the Village attorney nor the appointment of\ncommissioners to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. In this case, the video\n\nrecording shows that the Commission restricted Ms. Wilson and Mr. DuJan' s comments only\nwhen they spoke about topics that were not relevant to the business of the Commission, in any\nway. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Commission did not violate OMA by\nenforcing section 2. 03. 060( b) of the Code to limit public comment to matters that were\ngermane\n\nto matters\n\nthat the Commission has the authority\n\nto consider.\n\n\fMr. Kevin DuJan\nThe Honorable\n\nPatrick\n\nHorcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 7\n\nPublic Comment at Board Meeting\nSection 2. 03. 060( a) of the Code contains the pertinent Village rule governing\npublic comment at Board meetings, and provides:\n\na)\n\nCitizen Concerns and Comments at Village Board\n\nMeetings. Members of the general public may address the\nboard with concerns or comments regarding issues relevant\nto village business. Issues relevant to village business are\ndefined to mean\n\ninformation\n\nabout village\n\nevents;\n\nissues\n\nthat\n\nthe public body has the authority to address; items listed on\nthe agenda; and items or issues previously voted on by the\nvillage board or that the village board has the authority to\nconsider or vote on in the future. The village president or his\n\ndesignee shall strictly restrain comments to matters that are\nrelevant to village business and shall not permit repetitious\ncomments or arguments. Members of the general public who\n\nwish to address the board must sign the request to speak form\n\nprior to the commencement of the public meeting. The\npersons submitting a petition, concern or other comment shall\n\nbe allottedfive minutes to present their points. The manager\n\nor corporate authorities may respond for the village.\nEmphasis\n\nadded.)\n\nThis office has reviewed a recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nBoard' s September 18, 2017, meeting. 8 Summarized, the recording of the meeting shows that\nMs. Wilson addressed the Board concerning an alleged home invasion in 2013. Ms. Wilson\n\nbegins to discuss a private physician that allegedly has personal ties with particular board\nmembers, Mr. Horcher can be heard briefly interrupting Ms. Wilson asking that she keep her\npublic comments relevant to Village business. After approximately five minutes, an alarm can\nbe heard at which point Mr. Horcher informs Ms. Wilson that her five minutes to address the\n\nBoard had expired. Ms. Wilson continued speaking while Mr. Horcher reminded her several\n\ntimes that the five- minute bell had rung. Ms. Wilson finished her comments and left the\npodium. Next, Mr. DuJan addressed the Board about certain aspects of previous Board\n\nmeetings that Mr. DuJan believed violated the constitution, ancient Greek mythology, his\n\nperceived failings of the Village Attomey, and his dislike of that law firm. At no point was\n8Wheeling Liquor Control Commission, Meeting, September 18, 2017, available at\nhttp:// www. wheelingil. gov/ 659/ Board- Meeting- Video- 9- 18- 2017.\n\n\fMr. Kevin DuJan\n\nThe Honorable Patrick Horcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\n\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 8\n\nMr. DuJan interrupted. After approximately five minutes, an alarm can be heard at which\npoint Mr. Horcher informed Mr. DuJan that his five minutes to address the Board had expired.\n\nMr. Horcher asked Mr. DuJan to wrap up his comments, which Mr. DuJan did.\nBased on our review of the recording, this office is unable to conclude that Mr.\n\nHorcher' s brief interruption of Ms. Wilson during the Board' s September 18, 2017, meeting\ndeprived her of an opportunity to fully address the Board. The recording established that Ms.\nWilson was permitted to address the Board and provide public comment, and that the brief\n\ninterruption did not prevent Ms. Wilson from continuing to address the Board until after the\n\nfive- minute bell rang. This office has previously determined that a temporary interruption that\ndoes not preclude a speaker from completing his or her public comment does not constitute an\nimproper restriction on public comment. Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Rev. Ltr. 37496, issued on\nDecember\n\n11, 2015, at 3.\n\nAdditionally, this office' s review of section 2. 03. 060( a) of the Code confirmed\nthat the Board' s established public comment rules limit a person' s comments to five minutes.\n\nThe Attorney General has previously determined that \" a public body may legitimately\nprescribe reasonable time limits for public comment.\" 111. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5. Because the Village's established and recorded rules\npermit the Board to limit a person' s comments to five minutes, and because such a rule appears\ndesigned to advance a significant governmental interest in holding orderly and efficient\nmeetings, this office concludes that Board did not violate section 2. 06( g) of OMA by enforcing\nthe five- minute public comment rule at the September 18, 2017, meeting. Accordingly, the\n\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Board did not violate section 2. 06( g) of OMA during\nits September 18, 2017, meeting.\nAdditional. Complaints\n\nabout Public Comment Rules\n\nAlthough Mr. DuJan' s Request for Review alleges that the entirety of the Village' s\n\nrules governing public comment run afoul of section 2. 06( g), the Public Access Bureau generally\nreviews a particular rule governing public comment only if there is an allegation that a member\nof the public has been prohibited from speaking at a meeting because of that rule, as opposed to\nevaluating the propriety of all rules absent a specific complaint that the rules prevented a\n\nmember of the public from addressing officials at a meeting. Accordingly, this office\n\nemphasizes that a determination by this office that one of a public body' s rules for public\ncomment violates, or does not violate, OMA cannot be extrapolated to mean that other rules that\nwere\n\nnot\n\nspecifically\n\naddressed\n\nwould,\n\nor would\n\nnot, pass\n\nmuster.\n\n\fMr. Kevin DuJan\nThe Honorable Patrick Horcher\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nJanuary 31, 2019\nPage 9\n\nAlso, please note that the Public Access Counselor' s authority is limited to\n\nresolving disputes concerning the Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq.\nWest 2016)) and OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c) ( West 2016). To the extent Mr. DuJan' s Request\nfor Review alleges violations of laws other than FOIA or OMA, the Public Access Counselor\ndoes not have authority to review those allegations.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me by mail at the Chicago addresses listed on the first page of\n\nthis letter, by phone at ( 312) 550- 4480, or by e- mail at sbarnaby@atg. state. il. us.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY f\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49820 o 206g pub comment\n\nproper\n\nmun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Public comment restrictions at a village board meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49820/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKwame Raoul\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJanuary 31, 2019\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kevin DuJan\n\nStory Time Digital Media\nstorytimewithmeganfox@gmail.\n\nVia electronic\n\ncom\n\nmail\n\nThe Honorable Patrick Horcher\nPresident, Board of Trustees\n\nVillage of Wheeling\n2 Community Boulevard\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nphorcher@wheelingil.\n\ngov\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Mallory A. Milluzzi\nVillage Attorney\nKlein, Thorpe and Jenkins, LTD.\n20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1660\n\nChicago, Illinois 60606\nmamilluzzi@ktjlaw.\n\ncom\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 49820\nDear Mr. DuJan, Mr. Horcher, and Ms. Milluzzi:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS\n\nthat the Village of Wheeling (Village) Liquor Control Commission (Commission) and the\nVillage Board of Trustees (Board) did not violate OMA in connection with their September 18,\n2017, meetings.\n\nOn September 26, 2017, Mr. Kevin DuJan filed this Request for Review alleging\nthat the Commission and Board violated OMA at their September 18, 2017, meetings.\n\nSpecifically, he asserted that the Village president and the Village attorney improperly restricted\nMr. DuJan and another member of the public, Ms. Deborah Wilson, from addressing the Board\n\nby repeatedly interrupting their public comments. He also alleged that the Commission\nimproperly restricted Ms. Wilson's ability to comment at this meeting based on the topic that she\nwished to address and attempted to do the same to him. Mr. DuJan's Request for Review also\n\ncontends that the Village's rules for public comment do not comply with section 2. 06(g) of OMA\n5 ILCS/ 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)).\nOn October 13, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Village and requested that it provide a copy of any established and recorded Village rules\ngoveming public comment during meetings, and copies of the agenda, open session minutes, and\n\nany audio or video recordings of the September 18, 2017, Commission and Board meetings\nalong with a written response to the allegations in this Request for Review.\nOn October 24, 2017, this office received a written response with links to the\nVillage Code (Code) and video recordings of the Board and Commission meetings at issue. This\noffice also received the public comment sign -in sheets for both the Board and Commission\n\nmeetings as well as a copy of the draft meeting minutes for the Commission meeting.' On '\nOctober 25, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's written response to Mr. DuJan; he\ndid not reply. On June 29, 2018, Mr. DuJan informed this office that he had not received a copy\n\nof the written response by the Village and indicated that he would like a chance to reply. On that\ndate, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's written response to Mr. DuJan; he did not\nreply.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn September 18, 2017, the Commission, a held a special meeting that began at\n6: 30 p. m., the substance of which was to discuss a particular request for a liquor license. The\nmembers of the Commission consist of the Village President and the members of the Board. 2\n\nAlthough the written response indicated that agendas for the September 18, 2017, Commission\n\nand Board meetings, and the meeting minutes for the Village's meeting accompanied the written response, this office\ndid not receive paper copies of those materials. Instead, in an October 24, 2017, e- mail from counsel for the Village,\n\nlinks to the Village's website were those materials could be retrieved was provided. See e- mail from Mallory A.\nMilluzzi, Associate Attorney, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd. to [ Shannon] Bamaby, [ Assistant Attorney General],\nPublic Access Bureau], [ Office of the Illinois Attorney General] (October 24, 2017).\n\nHowever, according to chapter 4. 32 of the Code, when acting in this capacity, the Commission\nmembers have very limited authority. Specifically, section 4. 32. 030(6) of the Code provides,\nw] hen sitting as the liquor control commission, the members of the corporate authorities may\nexercise no authority other than the liquor control powers in accordance with this Chapter [ which\n\nexclusively deal with licenses for alcoholic liquors].\" 3 The Board held its regular meeting\nimmediately following the Commission's special meeting.\n\nIt is undisputed that the Village has established and recorded rules governing\npublic comment for both the Commission and the Board, and that both the Commission and the\n\nBoard provided an opportunity for public comment during their meetings. Therefore, this office\nreviews the rules that were enforced during the September 18, 2017, meetings in terms of their\nreasonableness and the asserted significant governmental\n\ninterest.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA provides: \" Any person shall be permitted an opportunity\n\nto address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public body.\"\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of rules that a public body may adopt,\npublic bodies may generally promulgate reasonable \" time, place and manner\" regulations that are\n\nnecessary to further a significant governmental interest. See, e. g,. I.A. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v.\nCity of Aurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N. D. 111. 2009) (examining whether the application of\ncity council's rules for public comment violated plaintiffs' rights). \" City Councils have\nlegitimate reasons for having rules to maintain decorum at public meetings[ ]\" and \" to assure that\n\nthe meetings can be efficiently conducted.\"\n\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (W. D.\n\nMich. 2008).\n\nPublic Comment at the Commission Meeting\nIn relevant part, the Village's rules governing public comment at Commission\nmeetings\n\nstates:\n\nMembers of the general public may address all village\ncommittees, commissions, boards, and any and all other subsidiary\n\nboards established by the village board or Village Municipal Code\nwith concerns or comments regarding issues relevant to that\nspecific board, committee or commission's agenda or topics that\n\nWheeling Municipal\n\nCode § 4. 32. 030(b) (amended April\n\n19, 2010).\n\nthe specific board, committee, or commission has the authority,\npursuant to the Village Code, to address. The chairperson or his or\n\nher designee shall strictly restrain comments to matters that are\nrelevant to the board's, committee's, or commission's business and\n\nshall not permit repetitious comments or arguments. 141\nEmphasis added.)\n\nThis office has reviewed a recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nCommission's September 18, 2017, meeting. 5 The recording of the meeting shows that Ms.\nWilson addressed the Commission with concerns about renewing a funeral home's liquor license.\nMs. Wilson then began to address her disagreement\n\nof Police and Fire Commissioners.\n\nwith an appointment to the Village's Board\n\nDuring this portion of her public comment, she was\n\ninterrupted by the Village's president, Mr. Patrick Horcher. Mr. Horcher informed Ms. Wilson\nthat this topic was not relevant to the business of the Commission because it did not have\n\nauthority over the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners but that she would have the\nopportunity to speak about this topic before the Board at its meeting, which Mr. Horcher stated\nwould begin in approximately five minutes. Ms. Wilson disagreed with Mr. Horcher's authority\nto limit her speech and she attempted to argue that she was permitted to speak about any topic\nwhen the Village Attorney interrupted her and explained that the above- cited rule prohibited her\ncomment on that topic.\n\nMs. Wilson then left the podium.\n\nNext, Mr. DuJan was called and walked up to a podium set in front of the\nCommission members.\n\nMr. DuJan provides Mr. Horcher with a book, which he stated contained\n\ninformation about the law firm with which the Village Attorney is affiliated, he then began\naddressing the Commission about his perceived failings of the Village Attorney and his dislike of\nthis law firm. During Mr. DuJan's public comment, Mr. Horcher, the Village Attorney, and Mr.\nDuJan repeatedly spoke over one another. Mr. Horcher and Village Attorney informed Mr.\nDuJan that the topic was not relevant to the business of the Commission but that he could\n\naddress the matter at the Board meeting, and they indicated that they were attempting to enforce\nthe Village's public comment rules. Mr. DuJan continued his public comment stating that the\nCommission was violating OMA because OMA permitted him to speak about anything he\nwanted, and he continued to cite his concerns about the law firm.\n\nMr. DuJan then completes his\n\ncomments and leaves the podium to return to his seat.\n\nWheeling Municipal Code §2. 03.060(b) (amended May 15, 2017), available at\nhttps:// library.municode.com/ il/ wheeling/codes/ code_of ordinances\n\n5 Wheeling Liquor Control Commission, Meeting, September 18, 2017, availab/ e at\n\nThe Village's response to this office asserted that the relevancy rule imposed upon\nMr. DuJan and Ms. Wilson at the September 18, 2017, Commission meeting was reasonable and\nserved a significant governmental interest. Specifically, the Village stated:\nHere, the Village's rules and regulations\n\nare content\n\nand\n\nviewpoint neutral and serve the significant government interest of\n\nmaintaining civility and decorum.\n\nThe significant interest of effectively conducting a meeting\n\nis particularly true for a subsidiary body. A Commission like the\nLiquor Control Commission has extremely limited authority and a\nlimited, narrow purpose. Allowing public comment on any and all\ntopics at Liquor Commission meetings would, and does, interfere\n\nwith the orderly and effective action of the Village Board meeting.\nIn fact, at the September 18, 2017 Liquor Control Commission\n\nmeeting, Chairperson Horcher pointed out that the actual business\nof the Liquor Commission would take less time than the public\n\ncomment portion. Additionally, as repeatedly told to Mr. DuJan\nand Ms. Wilson, they were able to talk about those topics, namely\nthe qualification of Village attorneys and appointments to the\nBOFPC [ Board of Police and Fire Commissioners],\n\nat the Village\n\nBoard meeting that immediately followed the Liquor Control\nCommission meeting. The Village Attorney indicated to Mr.\nDuJan that he would be able to make all of his comments about the\n\nVillage Attorney and the law firm representing the Village when\nthe Village Board meeting began in less than five minutes. Thus,\nspeakers have ample alternative means of communication. 161\nIn his Request for Review, Mr. DuJan contends that OMA requires a public body to allow\nmembers\n\nof the public\n\nto \" speak\n\nabout whatever\n\nthey want to speak about[ ]\" 7 during the public\n\ncomment portion of a meeting.\n\nLetter from Mallory A. Milluzzi, Village Attorney, Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, LTD., to Shannon\nBarnaby, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Attorney General (October 24, 2017).\nE- mail from Kevin Milan, Story Time Digital Media to Public Access Counselor (September 26,\n\nThis office has previously determined that a rule which limits members of the\npublic to only provide comments related to subjects listed on the agenda exceeded the scope of\n\npermissible rulemaking authorized by section 2. 06(g). See, e. g., 111. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev.\nLtr. 38037, issued August 1, 2016; 111. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45349, issued March 16,\n2017.\n\nThese determinations,\n\nhowever, do not support the contention that participants have\n\ncomplete freedom during the public comment portion of an open meeting to provide comment on\nany issue that one wishes. Instead, this office emphasized that under section 2. 02(a) of OMA\n\n5 ILCS/ 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)), the public body itself is able to discuss matters concerning\nthe business of the public body that are not specifically listed on the agenda, and therefore, it\nwould be unreasonable to prohibit members of the public from doing so. 111. Att' y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 38037, issued August 1, 2016, at 3; III. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45349,\nissued March 16, 2017, at 6.\n\nMoreover, courts have consistently recognized an important governmental interest\n\nin limiting comments to matters directly relevant to that public body's business. See, e.g.,\nScroggins v. City of Topeka, Kan., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1373 (D. Kan. 1998) (city council did not\nviolate first amendment to the United States Constitution by restricting personal comments about\nan appointee to a mayoral commission that were not directly relevant to the business of the\n\npublic body). Requiring a public body to permit public comment on matters unrelated to its\npublic business would impede the public body's ability to run efficient meetings. See Rowe v.\nCity of Cocoa, Fla., 358 F. 3d 800, 803 (11th Cir. 2004) (\" a city council meeting is not open for\nendless public commentary speech but instead is simply a limited platform to discuss the topic at\nhand.\").\n\nAs the Commission has described in its response, the Commission has very\nlimited authority and purpose, which is restricted solely to matters related to licenses for\n\nalcoholic liquors. The Commission does not have the authority to discuss, or make decisions,\nregarding neither the appointment of the Village attorney nor the appointment of\ncommissioners to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. In this case, the video\n\nrecording shows that the Commission restricted Ms. Wilson and Mr. DuJan's comments only\nwhen they spoke about topics that were not relevant to the business of the Commission, in any\nway. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Commission did not violate OMA by\nenforcing section 2. 03. 060(b) of the Code to limit public comment to matters that were\ngermane\n\nto matters\n\nthat the Commission has the authority\n\nPublic Comment at Board Meeting\nSection 2. 03. 060(a) of the Code contains the pertinent Village rule governing\npublic comment at Board meetings, and provides:\n\na)\n\nCitizen Concerns and Comments at Village Board\n\nMeetings. Members of the general public may address the\nboard with concerns or comments regarding issues relevant\nto village business. Issues relevant to village business are\ndefined to mean\n\ninformation\n\nabout village\n\nevents;\n\nissues\n\nthat\n\nthe public body has the authority to address; items listed on\nthe agenda; and items or issues previously voted on by the\nvillage board or that the village board has the authority to\nconsider or vote on in the future. The village president or his\n\ndesignee shall strictly restrain comments to matters that are\nrelevant to village business and shall not permit repetitious\ncomments or arguments. Members of the general public who\n\nwish to address the board must sign the request to speak form\n\nprior to the commencement of the public meeting. The\npersons submitting a petition, concern or other comment shall\n\nbe allottedfive minutes to present their points. The manager\n\nor corporate authorities may respond for the village.\nEmphasis\n\nadded.)\n\nThis office has reviewed a recording of the public comment portion of the\n\nBoard's September 18, 2017, meeting. 8 Summarized, the recording of the meeting shows that\nMs. Wilson addressed the Board concerning an alleged home invasion in 2013. Ms. Wilson\n\nbegins to discuss a private physician that allegedly has personal ties with particular board\nmembers, Mr. Horcher can be heard briefly interrupting Ms. Wilson asking that she keep her\npublic comments relevant to Village business. After approximately five minutes, an alarm can\nbe heard at which point Mr. Horcher informs Ms. Wilson that her five minutes to address the\n\nBoard had expired. Ms. Wilson continued speaking while Mr. Horcher reminded her several\n\ntimes that the five- minute bell had rung. Ms. Wilson finished her comments and left the\npodium. Next, Mr. DuJan addressed the Board about certain aspects of previous Board\n\nmeetings that Mr. DuJan believed violated the constitution, ancient Greek mythology, his\n\nperceived failings of the Village Attomey, and his dislike of that law firm. At no point was\n\nMr. DuJan interrupted. After approximately five minutes, an alarm can be heard at which\npoint Mr. Horcher informed Mr. DuJan that his five minutes to address the Board had expired.\n\nMr. Horcher asked Mr. DuJan to wrap up his comments, which Mr. DuJan did.\nBased on our review of the recording, this office is unable to conclude that Mr.\n\nHorcher's brief interruption of Ms. Wilson during the Board's September 18, 2017, meeting\ndeprived her of an opportunity to fully address the Board. The recording established that Ms.\nWilson was permitted to address the Board and provide public comment, and that the brief\n\ninterruption did not prevent Ms. Wilson from continuing to address the Board until after the\n\nfive- minute bell rang. This office has previously determined that a temporary interruption that\ndoes not preclude a speaker from completing his or her public comment does not constitute an\nimproper restriction on public comment. Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Rev. Ltr. 37496, issued on\nDecember\n\n11, 2015, at 3.\n\nAdditionally, this office's review of section 2. 03. 060(a) of the Code confirmed\nthat the Board's established public comment rules limit a person's comments to five minutes.\n\nThe Attorney General has previously determined that \" a public body may legitimately\nprescribe reasonable time limits for public comment.\" 111. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5. Because the Village's established and recorded rules\npermit the Board to limit a person's comments to five minutes, and because such a rule appears\ndesigned to advance a significant governmental interest in holding orderly and efficient\nmeetings, this office concludes that Board did not violate section 2. 06(g) of OMA by enforcing\nthe five- minute public comment rule at the September 18, 2017, meeting. Accordingly, the\n\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Board did not violate section 2. 06(g) of OMA during\nits September 18, 2017, meeting.\nAdditional. Complaints\n\nabout Public Comment Rules\n\nAlthough Mr. DuJan's Request for Review alleges that the entirety of the Village's\n\nrules governing public comment run afoul of section 2. 06(g), the Public Access Bureau generally\nreviews a particular rule governing public comment only if there is an allegation that a member\nof the public has been prohibited from speaking at a meeting because of that rule, as opposed to\nevaluating the propriety of all rules absent a specific complaint that the rules prevented a\n\nmember of the public from addressing officials at a meeting. Accordingly, this office\n\nemphasizes that a determination by this office that one of a public body's rules for public\ncomment violates, or does not violate, OMA cannot be extrapolated to mean that other rules that\nwere\n\nnot\n\nspecifically\n\naddressed\n\nwould,\n\nAlso, please note that the Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to\n\nresolving disputes concerning the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq.\nWest 2016)) and OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c) (West 2016). To the extent Mr. DuJan's Request\nfor Review alleges violations of laws other than FOIA or OMA, the Public Access Counselor\ndoes not have authority to review those allegations.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me by mail at the Chicago addresses listed on the first page of\n\nthis letter, by phone at (312) 550- 4480, or by e- mail at sbarnaby@atg. state. il. us.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nSHANNON BARNABY f\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49820 o 206g pub comment\n\nproper\n\nmun"}
{"id":1215,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-02-20","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49828"],"title":"Maine Township Board violated OMA by failing to notice pre-meeting gatherings","filename":"49828, issued February 20, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3253,"summary":"The PAC determined that Maine Township violated the Open Meetings Act by holding unannounced gatherings that constituted meetings, failing to provide proper notice and minutes, and restricting public access to a board meeting.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that Maine Township held secret gatherings before its official board meetings without proper notice, agendas, or minutes, and that the Township Hall doors were locked during a later meeting. The Attorney General's office found that the 6:30 p.m. gatherings were meetings subject to the Open Meetings Act and that the locked doors temporarily denied a member of the public access, violating the Act. The Board was cautioned to keep the meeting location accessible in the future.","holding":"The Maine Township Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide notice, agendas, and minutes for the 6:30 p.m. gatherings on August 22 and September 26, 2017, which constituted meetings, and also violated section 2.01 when Township Hall doors were locked during the September 26 meeting and temporarily denied public access.","legal_question":"Whether gatherings held by the Maine Township Board of Trustees prior to official meetings constituted 'meetings' under the Open Meetings Act, and whether the Board failed to provide public access to its meetings.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.01","5 ILCS 120/2.02","5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Maine Township Board of Trustees","requesting_party":"Mr. Kirk Allen","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The Township held unannounced gatherings that met the definition of a meeting and failed to ensure public access to a scheduled board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":93.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_a/49828, issued February 20, 2018.pdf","sha256":"926de41d0844f93b225b2b118e1271eb837fe30b15afbf5a4db400116eb6a407","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","public access","open meetings act","meeting minutes","agenda"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kirk Allen\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\nDowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd.\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndanieljdowd@sbcglobal. net\n\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 49828\n\nDear Mr. Allen and Mr. Dowd:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Maine Township ( Township) Board of Trustees ( Board) violated the\nrequirements of OMA in connection with its August 22, 2017, and September 26, 2017, 6: 30\n\np. m. gatherings and its September 26, 2017, 7: 30 p. m. Board meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn September 27, 2017, this office received Mr. Kirk Allen's Request for Review\n\nalleging that the Board held gatherings at 6: 30 p.m. prior to both the August 22, 2017, and\nSeptember 26, 2017, regular Board meetings, that those gatherings were \" meetings\" as defined\n\nby OMA, and therefore the Board violated OMA by: ( 1) failing to provide an agenda and post\nnotice of the meetings either on its website or at the meetings' locations; ( 2) not keeping written\n\nminutes of the meetings; and ( 3) not making the meetings open to the public for public comment.\nMr. Allen also alleged that the schedule of regular meetings posted to the Board' s website did not\nlist the place of the Board meetings, which he asserted was a violation of section 2. 02 of OMA (5\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n\nIllinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785- 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\n\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\nPage 2\n\nILCS 120/ 2. 02 ( West 2016)). He also contended that at the September 26, 2017, 7: 30 p. m.\n\nregular meeting, the doors were locked for a period of time, restricting at least one citizen' s\nability to enter the meeting.\n\nOn October 3, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nTownship supervisor and requested that the Board or its representative provide a written\nresponse to the allegations in the Request for Review and to provide certain records for this\noffice' s review.\n\nOn October 20, 2017, the Board provided an answer and the requested materials.\n\nOn October 24, 2017, Mr. Allen replied. On October 27, 2017, this office requested additional\n\ninformation from the Board. On November 28, 2017, and December 5, 2017, the Board\nprovided the additional information.\nDETERMINATION\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161,\n\n171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\n6: 30 p. m. Gatherings\nSection 2( a) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ll meetings of public bodies shall be open\n\nto the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\"\n\nSection 1. 02 of OMA defines \" meeting\" as:\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means ( such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication\nof[,] * * *\n\nfor a 5 -member public body, a quorum of the members\n\nof a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business.\nAccordingly, for a 5 -member public body, 3 members of\nthe body constitute a quorum and the affirmative vote of 3\n\nmembers is necessary to adopt any motion, resolution, or\nordinance, unless a greater number is otherwise required.\n\nIf a gathering of public body members is determined to be a \" meeting,\" then all the requirements\nof OMA apply, including proper posting of notice and an agenda ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02 ( West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified\n\ntime and place that is convenient and open to the\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\nPage 3\n\npublic ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 ( West 2016)), keeping minutes, and allowing public comment ( 5 ILCS\n120/ 2. 06( a), ( g) ( West 2016)).\nThe full Board is comprised of five members: the supervisor and four trustees.\n\nAccordingly, three Board members constitute a quorum. Therefore, under the specific rule for\n\nfive -member bodies under section 1. 02, contemporaneous, interactive communications involving\nat least three members of the Board which concern \" public business\" would ordinarily constitute\na meeting of the Board which would be subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of\nOMA.\n\nOMA \" is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials,\n\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex reL Difanis v. Barr, 83 I11. 2d\n\n191, 202 ( 1980); see also Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 660- 61 ( N. D. Ill. 1982):\nA \" meeting\" under the Act, has been variously described as a\n\ngathering \" designed to discuss or reach an accord with regard to\npublic business,\"[ citation], or as \"' collective discussion... and\nexchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate\n\ndecision.\"' [ Citation]\n\nThird New International Dictionary ( 1976) defines \" deliberate\" as\nfollows: \" to ponder or think about with measured careful\n\nconsideration and often with formal discussion before reaching a\ndecision or conclusion.\"\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. The Office of the\n\nAttorney General has also noted that \"[ i] n theory, there is no absolute prohibition against the\nmembers of a public body attending an' informational meeting' without triggering the application\nof' OMA, as long as the members do not make \"[ d] eliberational statements\" or engage in the\n\ndiscussion of public business amongst themselves. I11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, issued July\n14, 1995, at 10- 11. In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the \" mere fact that a\nmajority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in a bona fide\npresentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" did not make the\n\npresentation subject to OMA, but the extensive discussions of public business by members of\ntwo county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA. ( Emphasis in\noriginal.) Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, at 10- 11; see also Nabhani, 552 F. Supp. at 661 ( a\ngathering does not constitute\n\na meeting\n\nfor purposes of OMA\n\nwhen\n\nthere is \" no examining\n\nor\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\nPage 4\n\nweighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a\ndecision, [ or] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\").\n\nIt is undisputed that the Board did not hold the 6: 30 p. m. gatherings on August 22,\n2017, and September 26, 2017, in accordance with the requirements of OMA, although the\n\nBoard noted that the regular meeting agenda stated that trustees would meet at 6: 30 p. m. to\nreview bills.\n\nThe Boards\n\nanswer to this office\n\ncontends\n\nthat the gatherings\n\nwere not subject to\n\nthe requirements of OMA because the Board did not discuss public business. It argued in its\n\nanswer that the 6: 30 p. m. gatherings are for the Trustees to individually review the Township' s\n\nbills, and that no deliberation or discussion concerning the bills takes place. The Board\nexplained that the payment of bills is an agenda item at the regular Board meetings, which\n\nconvene at 7: 30 p. m., after the bill review gatherings.\n\nThe Board explained that at the August\n\n22, 2017, meeting, up to four trustees were present, but not all arrived at the same time and one\nor more left the room during the session. The Board also stated that:\n\nq] uestions were asked of staff by at least two trustees and staff\nresponded directly to the trustee who posed the question. No\ndiscussion about the bills took place between the trustees. One\ntrustee raised a question about an employee payroll check and was\n\nreferred by the staff member to the Supervisor.\nand this trustee had a private conversation.\n\nThe Supervisor\n\nWhile the other\n\ntrustees were physically present in the room, they were not part of\n\nthe personal discussion between [ the trustee and Supervisor]. ltl\nThe Board further explained that at the September 26, 2017, meeting, three trustees were present\nfrom time to time, not all arrived at once, and not all remained present for the duration of the\n\nmeeting. The Board also asserted that \" several questions were posed to staff about various bills\nand staff responded directly to the trustee who asked the question. There was no discussion or\n\ndeliberation between trustees on Township business at this gathering.\" 2\nBased on the information provided by the Board, a quorum was present for at\nleast part of both the August 22, 2017, and September 26, 2017, 6: 30 p. m. gatherings.\n\nFurther,\n\nthe topic of the gatherings was unquestionably public business, as the review of bills pertains to\nthe expenditure of the Township' s funds. The Board denies that any deliberation occurred at the\n6: 30 p. m. gatherings, but it states that the trustees sought and received information concerning\nLetter from Daniel .1. Dowd to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\nDecember\n\n5, 2017),\n\nat 1.\n\n2Letter from Daniel J. Dowd to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\nNovember 28, 2017), at 2.\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\n\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\nPage 5\n\nthe bills. It appears that all of the trustees present at the gatherings could hear the questions\n\nraised and the answers provided.\n\nContrary to the Board' s assertion that its members did not\n\nengage in deliberation because there was no discussion, the Attorney General has noted that\nd] eliberation ***\n\nconnotes not only collective discussion, but the collective acquisition and\n\nexchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision.\" III. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued\nMarch 22, 1974, at 125 ( quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of\nSupervisors, 263 Cal.\n\nApp. 2d 41, 47- 48, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 ( Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).\n\nIn the\n\nsame opinion, the Attorney General also quoted Sacramento Newspaper Guild for the\nproposition that,\n\nt] here is rarely any purpose to a nonpublic pre -meeting conference\nexcept to conduct some part of the decisional process behind\n\nclosed doors. Only by embracing the collective inquiry and\ndiscussion stages, as well as the ultimate step of official action, can\nan open meeting regulation frustrate these evasive devices.\nEmphasis added.)\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, at 125 ( quoting\n\nSacramento Newspaper Guild, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 50, 69 Cal.\nRptr. at 487).\n\nBecause the purpose of the 6: 30 p.m. gatherings was to obtain information in\nanticipation of voting on the payment of the bills at the ensuing regular Board meetings, the\ninformation obtained during those gatherings was preliminary to the ultimate decision of whether\n\nto approve the bills. During its 6: 30 p. m. gatherings, the Board engaged in the collective inquiry\n\nphase of deliberation before voting at 7: 30 p.m. on the approval of the Township bills.\nTherefore, the 6: 30 p. m. gatherings constituted meetings subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\nAccordingly, based on the available information, this office concludes that, in\nconnection with its August 22, 2017, and September 26, 2017, gatherings, the Board violated ( 1)\n\nsection 2. 02 of OMA by holding meetings without proper posting of notice and agendas; ( 2)\n\nsection 2. 01 of OMA by failing to hold the meetings at specified times and places that were open\nto the public; ( 3) section 2. 06( a) of OMA by failing to keep minutes of the meetings; and ( 4)\nsection 2. 06( g) of OMA by failing to provide an opportunity for public comment.\n\nBecause the\n\nBoard did not vote upon items of final action at the meetings, no further remedial action is\n\nrequired, but this office cautions the Board to comply with all of the requirements of OMA when\ngathering to deliberate on matters of public business.\nPosting of Meeting Location\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart,\n\nthat \"[ a] n agenda for each regular meeting\n\nshall be posted\n\nat\n\nthe principal\n\noffice\n\nof the\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\nPage 6\n\npublic body and at the location where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the\nholding of the meeting[.]\"\n\nSection 2. 02( a) also describes the annual schedule of regular\n\nEvery public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at the\nbeginning of each calendar year or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times, and places\nmeetings: \"\n\nof such\n\nmeetings.\"\n\nSection 2. 02( b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( b) ( West 2016)) requires\n\np] ublic notice shall be given by posting a copy of the notice at the principal office of the body\n\nholding the meeting or, if no such office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be\nheld.\" Lastly,\n\nsection\n\n2. 02( c)\n\nof\n\nOMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)),\n\nstates, \"[\n\na] ny agenda\n\nrequired under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\n\nordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting.\"\nMr. Allen alleged that his review of the Township website, meeting notices, and\n\nagendas did not locate a schedule of regular Board meetings that included information regarding\nthe location of the meetings.\n\nIn its answer to this office, the Board stated that it did not include\n\nthe location of its meetings on its agendas, but its website did include location information\nposted with the annual schedule of regular Board meetings.\n\nThis office has reviewed the copies of the Township' s website listing the Board\n\nmeeting agendas and confirms that location information was included above the list of the\nschedule of regular Board meetings. As described above, as opposed to the annual schedule of\n\nregular meetings, OMA does not include a requirement that a particular meeting agenda include\nthe location of a meeting. See I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 50231, issued October 30,\n2017, at 2 (\" The plain language of section 2. 02 of OMA[ ] does not require a public body to\n\ninclude the physical address of the location where the meeting will be held on its agenda or\nnotice.\").\n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that the Board did not violate OMA.\nAccess to September 26, 2017, Meeting\nSection 2. 01 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent part,\n\nthat \"[ a] ll meetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places\nwhich\n\nare\n\nconvenient\n\nand open\n\nto the public.\" \" Open\" and \" convenient\" are not synonymous\n\nunder OMA. Gerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 Ill. App 3d 352, 359 ( 4th Dist. 2003). A\nmeeting which is open to the public is a meeting where \" no one is prohibited from attending it[.]\"\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 361. A meeting is not convenient if it is \" held in such an ill-suited,\nunaccommodating, unadvantageous place that members of the public, as a practical matter,\n\nwould be deterred from attending it.\" Gerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 361. The concept of public\nconvenience implies a \" rule of reasonableness, not ' absolute accessibility' but ' reasonable\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 362 ( citations omitted).\naccessibility.\"\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\n\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\nPage 7\n\nThere is no dispute that the doors to the Township Hall were locked for part of the\ntime when the September 26, 2017, Board meeting was taking place. The Board stated in its\nanswer to this office that a part- time Township employee had locked the door for a period of\n\ntime in violation of his employment responsibility. Mr. Allen alleged that the locked doors\ntemporarily prevented a citizen from gaining access to the meeting.\nThis office has reviewed the portion of the recording of the September 26, 2017,\nBoard meeting in which a member of the audience reported that he found the doors to the\nTownship Hall locked at 8: 30 p. m. and he was delayed in entering the meeting. He did not\nindicate how long he had been kept out of the meeting. This office does not have information\n\nthat any other individuals were denied access to the September 26, 2017, Board meeting.\nThis office has found previously that merely holding a meeting in a locked area is\nnot a violation of OMA, provided that measures are taken to ensure members of the public who\n\nwish to attend are able to do so. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 17711, issued March 27,\n\n2012 ( holding meeting in locked area of police station was a reasonable security measure that did\nnot violate the requirements of OMA because members of the public were able to request entry).\nHere, there were no measures in place to admit members of the public to the Town Hall. As one\n\ncitizen was temporarily denied access to the September 26, 2017, Board meeting, this office\nfinds that the Board violated the requirement in section 2. 01 of OMA that public meetings be\n\nopen to the public.\" This office cautions the Board to ensure that the doors to the Township\nHall remain unlocked for the duration of its future meetings.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg. state. il. us. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49828 o 2a meeting improper 201 location improper 202 notice proper improper 206 minutes\nimproper\n\n206g pub comment improper mun\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\nPage 8\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Laura J. Morask\n\nSupervisor, Maine Township\n1700 Ballard Road\nPark Ridge, Illinois 60068- 1006\nlmorask@mainetown. com\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Unannounced pre-meeting gatherings and a blocked board meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":"A citizen complained that Maine Township held secret gatherings before their official board meetings without proper notice, agendas, or minutes. The Attorney General's office agreed, finding that these 6:30 p.m. gatherings were illegal meetings under the Open Meetings Act. The determination did not address the citizen's separate allegation about doors being locked during a regular meeting, and it did not include any caution or remedial language.","human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49828/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 20, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kirk Allen\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\nDowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd.\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\ndanieljdowd@sbcglobal. net\n\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 49828\n\nDear Mr. Allen and Mr. Dowd:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Maine Township (Township) Board of Trustees (Board) violated the\nrequirements of OMA in connection with its August 22, 2017, and September 26, 2017, 6: 30\n\np. m. gatherings and its September 26, 2017, 7: 30 p. m. Board meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn September 27, 2017, this office received Mr. Kirk Allen's Request for Review\n\nalleging that the Board held gatherings at 6: 30 p.m. prior to both the August 22, 2017, and\nSeptember 26, 2017, regular Board meetings, that those gatherings were \" meetings\" as defined\n\nby OMA, and therefore the Board violated OMA by: (1) failing to provide an agenda and post\nnotice of the meetings either on its website or at the meetings' locations; (2) not keeping written\n\nminutes of the meetings; and (3) not making the meetings open to the public for public comment.\nMr. Allen also alleged that the schedule of regular meetings posted to the Board's website did not\nlist the place of the Board meetings, which he asserted was a violation of section 2. 02 of OMA (5\n\nILCS 120/ 2. 02 (West 2016)). He also contended that at the September 26, 2017, 7: 30 p. m.\n\nregular meeting, the doors were locked for a period of time, restricting at least one citizen's\nability to enter the meeting.\n\nOn October 3, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nTownship supervisor and requested that the Board or its representative provide a written\nresponse to the allegations in the Request for Review and to provide certain records for this\noffice's review.\n\nOn October 20, 2017, the Board provided an answer and the requested materials.\n\nOn October 24, 2017, Mr. Allen replied. On October 27, 2017, this office requested additional\n\ninformation from the Board. On November 28, 2017, and December 5, 2017, the Board\nprovided the additional information.\nDETERMINATION\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d\n161,\n\n171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n\n6: 30 p. m. Gatherings\nSection 2(a) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ll meetings of public bodies shall be open\n\nto the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in accordance with Section 2a.\"\n\nSection 1. 02 of OMA defines \" meeting\" as:\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication\nof[,] * * *\n\nfor a 5 -member public body, a quorum of the members\n\nof a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business.\nAccordingly, for a 5 -member public body, 3 members of\nthe body constitute a quorum and the affirmative vote of 3\n\nmembers is necessary to adopt any motion, resolution, or\nordinance, unless a greater number is otherwise required.\n\nIf a gathering of public body members is determined to be a \" meeting,\" then all the requirements\n\npublic (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 (West 2016)), keeping minutes, and allowing public comment (5 ILCS\n120/ 2. 06(a), (g) (West 2016)).\nThe full Board is comprised of five members: the supervisor and four trustees.\n\nAccordingly, three Board members constitute a quorum. Therefore, under the specific rule for\n\nfive -member bodies under section 1. 02, contemporaneous, interactive communications involving\nat least three members of the Board which concern \" public business\" would ordinarily constitute\na meeting of the Board which would be subject to the procedural safeguards and requirements of\nOMA.\n\nOMA \" is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials,\n\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex reL Difanis v. Barr, 83 I11. 2d\n\n191, 202 (1980); see also Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 660- 61 (N. D. Ill. 1982):\nA \" meeting\" under the Act, has been variously described as a\n\ngathering \" designed to discuss or reach an accord with regard to\npublic business,\"[ citation], or as \"' collective discussion... and\nexchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate\n\ndecision.\"' [ Citation]\n\nThird New International Dictionary (1976) defines \" deliberate\" as\nfollows: \" to ponder or think about with measured careful\n\nconsideration and often with formal discussion before reaching a\ndecision or conclusion.\"\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls\nwithin the definition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. The Office of the\n\nAttorney General has also noted that \"[ i] n theory, there is no absolute prohibition against the\nmembers of a public body attending an' informational meeting' without triggering the application\nof' OMA, as long as the members do not make \"[ d] eliberational statements\" or engage in the\n\ndiscussion of public business amongst themselves. I11. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, issued July\n14, 1995, at 10- 11. In that opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the \" mere fact that a\nmajority of a quorum of the members of a public body attend and participate in a bona fide\npresentation on new legislative developments in an area of public concern\" did not make the\n\npresentation subject to OMA, but the extensive discussions of public business by members of\ntwo county boards during the presentation did trigger the requirements of OMA. (Emphasis in\noriginal.) Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. 95- 004, at 10- 11; see also Nabhani, 552 F. Supp. at 661 (a\ngathering does not constitute\n\na meeting\n\nweighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a\ndecision, [ or] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\").\n\nIt is undisputed that the Board did not hold the 6: 30 p. m. gatherings on August 22,\n2017, and September 26, 2017, in accordance with the requirements of OMA, although the\n\nBoard noted that the regular meeting agenda stated that trustees would meet at 6: 30 p. m. to\nreview bills.\n\nThe Boards\n\nanswer to this office\n\ncontends\n\nthat the gatherings\n\nwere not subject to\n\nthe requirements of OMA because the Board did not discuss public business. It argued in its\n\nanswer that the 6: 30 p. m. gatherings are for the Trustees to individually review the Township's\n\nbills, and that no deliberation or discussion concerning the bills takes place. The Board\nexplained that the payment of bills is an agenda item at the regular Board meetings, which\n\nconvene at 7: 30 p. m., after the bill review gatherings.\n\nThe Board explained that at the August\n\n22, 2017, meeting, up to four trustees were present, but not all arrived at the same time and one\nor more left the room during the session. The Board also stated that:\n\nq] uestions were asked of staff by at least two trustees and staff\nresponded directly to the trustee who posed the question. No\ndiscussion about the bills took place between the trustees. One\ntrustee raised a question about an employee payroll check and was\n\nreferred by the staff member to the Supervisor.\nand this trustee had a private conversation.\n\nThe Supervisor\n\nWhile the other\n\ntrustees were physically present in the room, they were not part of\n\nthe personal discussion between [ the trustee and Supervisor]. ltl\nThe Board further explained that at the September 26, 2017, meeting, three trustees were present\nfrom time to time, not all arrived at once, and not all remained present for the duration of the\n\nmeeting. The Board also asserted that \" several questions were posed to staff about various bills\nand staff responded directly to the trustee who asked the question. There was no discussion or\n\ndeliberation between trustees on Township business at this gathering.\" 2\nBased on the information provided by the Board, a quorum was present for at\nleast part of both the August 22, 2017, and September 26, 2017, 6: 30 p. m. gatherings.\n\nFurther,\n\nthe topic of the gatherings was unquestionably public business, as the review of bills pertains to\nthe expenditure of the Township's funds. The Board denies that any deliberation occurred at the\n6: 30 p. m. gatherings, but it states that the trustees sought and received information concerning\nLetter from Daniel.1. Dowd to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\nDecember\n\n5, 2017),\n\nat 1.\n\n2 Letter from Daniel J. Dowd to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n\nthe bills. It appears that all of the trustees present at the gatherings could hear the questions\n\nraised and the answers provided.\n\nContrary to the Board's assertion that its members did not\n\nengage in deliberation because there was no discussion, the Attorney General has noted that\nd] eliberation ***\n\nconnotes not only collective discussion, but the collective acquisition and\n\nexchange of facts preliminary to the ultimate decision.\" III. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued\nMarch 22, 1974, at 125 (quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board of\nSupervisors, 263 Cal.\n\nApp. 2d 41, 47- 48, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).\n\nIn the\n\nsame opinion, the Attorney General also quoted Sacramento Newspaper Guild for the\nproposition that,\n\nt] here is rarely any purpose to a nonpublic pre -meeting conference\nexcept to conduct some part of the decisional process behind\n\nclosed doors. Only by embracing the collective inquiry and\ndiscussion stages, as well as the ultimate step of official action, can\nan open meeting regulation frustrate these evasive devices.\nEmphasis added.)\n\nIll. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, at 125 (quoting\n\nSacramento Newspaper Guild, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 50, 69 Cal.\nRptr. at 487).\n\nBecause the purpose of the 6: 30 p.m. gatherings was to obtain information in\nanticipation of voting on the payment of the bills at the ensuing regular Board meetings, the\ninformation obtained during those gatherings was preliminary to the ultimate decision of whether\n\nto approve the bills. During its 6: 30 p. m. gatherings, the Board engaged in the collective inquiry\n\nphase of deliberation before voting at 7: 30 p.m. on the approval of the Township bills.\nTherefore, the 6: 30 p. m. gatherings constituted meetings subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\nAccordingly, based on the available information, this office concludes that, in\nconnection with its August 22, 2017, and September 26, 2017, gatherings, the Board violated (1)\n\nsection 2. 02 of OMA by holding meetings without proper posting of notice and agendas; (2)\n\nsection 2. 01 of OMA by failing to hold the meetings at specified times and places that were open\nto the public; (3) section 2. 06(a) of OMA by failing to keep minutes of the meetings; and (4)\nsection 2. 06(g) of OMA by failing to provide an opportunity for public comment.\n\nBecause the\n\nBoard did not vote upon items of final action at the meetings, no further remedial action is\n\nrequired, but this office cautions the Board to comply with all of the requirements of OMA when\ngathering to deliberate on matters of public business.\nPosting of Meeting Location\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart,\n\nthat \"[ a] n agenda for each regular meeting\n\nshall be posted\n\npublic body and at the location where the meeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the\nholding of the meeting[.]\"\n\nSection 2. 02(a) also describes the annual schedule of regular\n\nEvery public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at the\nbeginning of each calendar year or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times, and places\nmeetings: \"\n\nof such\n\nmeetings.\"\n\nSection 2. 02(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(b) (West 2016)) requires\n\np] ublic notice shall be given by posting a copy of the notice at the principal office of the body\n\nholding the meeting or, if no such office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be\nheld.\" Lastly,\n\nsection\n\n2. 02(c)\n\nof\n\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)),\n\nstates, \"[\n\na] ny agenda\n\nrequired under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\n\nordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting.\"\nMr. Allen alleged that his review of the Township website, meeting notices, and\n\nagendas did not locate a schedule of regular Board meetings that included information regarding\nthe location of the meetings.\n\nIn its answer to this office, the Board stated that it did not include\n\nthe location of its meetings on its agendas, but its website did include location information\nposted with the annual schedule of regular Board meetings.\n\nThis office has reviewed the copies of the Township's website listing the Board\n\nmeeting agendas and confirms that location information was included above the list of the\nschedule of regular Board meetings. As described above, as opposed to the annual schedule of\n\nregular meetings, OMA does not include a requirement that a particular meeting agenda include\nthe location of a meeting. See I11. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 50231, issued October 30,\n2017, at 2 (\" The plain language of section 2. 02 of OMA[ ] does not require a public body to\n\ninclude the physical address of the location where the meeting will be held on its agenda or\nnotice.\").\n\nAccordingly, this office concludes that the Board did not violate OMA.\nAccess to September 26, 2017, Meeting\nSection 2. 01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 01 (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent part,\n\nthat \"[ a] ll meetings required by this Act to be public shall be held at specified times and places\nwhich\n\nare\n\nconvenient\n\nand open\n\nto the public.\" \" Open\" and \" convenient\" are not synonymous\n\nunder OMA. Gerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 Ill. App 3d 352, 359 (4th Dist. 2003). A\nmeeting which is open to the public is a meeting where \" no one is prohibited from attending it[.]\"\nGerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 361. A meeting is not convenient if it is \" held in such an ill-suited,\nunaccommodating, unadvantageous place that members of the public, as a practical matter,\n\nwould be deterred from attending it.\" Gerwin, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 361. The concept of public\nconvenience implies a \" rule of reasonableness, not ' absolute accessibility' but ' reasonable\n\nThere is no dispute that the doors to the Township Hall were locked for part of the\ntime when the September 26, 2017, Board meeting was taking place. The Board stated in its\nanswer to this office that a part- time Township employee had locked the door for a period of\n\ntime in violation of his employment responsibility. Mr. Allen alleged that the locked doors\ntemporarily prevented a citizen from gaining access to the meeting.\nThis office has reviewed the portion of the recording of the September 26, 2017,\nBoard meeting in which a member of the audience reported that he found the doors to the\nTownship Hall locked at 8: 30 p. m. and he was delayed in entering the meeting. He did not\nindicate how long he had been kept out of the meeting. This office does not have information\n\nthat any other individuals were denied access to the September 26, 2017, Board meeting.\nThis office has found previously that merely holding a meeting in a locked area is\nnot a violation of OMA, provided that measures are taken to ensure members of the public who\n\nwish to attend are able to do so. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 17711, issued March 27,\n\n2012 (holding meeting in locked area of police station was a reasonable security measure that did\nnot violate the requirements of OMA because members of the public were able to request entry).\nHere, there were no measures in place to admit members of the public to the Town Hall. As one\n\ncitizen was temporarily denied access to the September 26, 2017, Board meeting, this office\nfinds that the Board violated the requirement in section 2. 01 of OMA that public meetings be\n\nopen to the public.\" This office cautions the Board to ensure that the doors to the Township\nHall remain unlocked for the duration of its future meetings.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg. state. il. us. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\n\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Laura J. Morask\n\nSupervisor, Maine Township\n1700 Ballard Road\nPark Ridge, Illinois 60068- 1006\nlmorask@mainetown. com"}
{"id":1216,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-11-28","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49854"],"title":"City of Sandwich City Council improperly terminated employee during closed session","filename":"49854, issued November 28, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":3525,"summary":"The PAC determined that the City of Sandwich City Council improperly took final action to terminate an employee during a closed session without a prior open session vote, though it found the closed session discussions themselves were within the scope of permitted exceptions.","plain_summary":"A news reporter alleged that the City of Sandwich City Council improperly terminated an employee during a closed session. The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau determined that the Council improperly took final action when it approved terminating an employee in closed session without first voting in open session after providing an adequate public recital of the matter. The Bureau also found that the Council's closed session discussions on four dates did not exceed the scope of the cited open meetings exceptions.","holding":"The City of Sandwich City Council improperly took final action when it approved terminating an employee in closed session without first voting in open session after providing an adequate public recital of the matter under consideration.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by taking final action to terminate an employee during a closed session without first voting in open session.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2(e)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":["5 ILCS 120/2(c)(1)","5 ILCS 120/2(c)(2)"],"public_body":"City of Sandwich City Council","requesting_party":"Mr. Doug Nelson, WSPY News","pac_outcome":"Improper final action in closed session","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The City Council held closed sessions to discuss and finalize the termination of an employee.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/3.5/3.5_a/Reasonable-diligence-if-did-not-discover-violation-within-60-days/49854, issued November 28, 2017.pdf","sha256":"9439932790e6e59b8a32a0874b07c83c4fe096d54323f6c8565dbcfaaaf2a5e2","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","final action","employee termination","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nNovember 28, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Doug Nelson\nWSPY News\nwspynews@gmail.\n\ncom\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nThe Honorable\n\nRick Olson\n\nMayor\n\nCity of Sandwich\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmayor@sandwich. il. us\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 49854\n\nDear Mr. Nelson and Mr. Olson:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the City of Sandwich City Council ( Council) improperly took final action\nwhen it approved terminating an employee in closed session without first voting in open session\nafter providing an adequate public recital of the matter under consideration. The Public Access\n\nBureau also concludes that the Council' s closed session discussions on May 1, 2017, May 22,\n2017, June 12, 2017, and June 26, 2017, did not exceed the scope of the open meetings\nexceptions the Council cited to close the meetings.\n\nOn September 28, 2017, Mr. Doug Nelson, on behalf of WSPY News, submitted\n\na Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau alleging that during closed sessions sometime\naround May 2017, the Council improperly took final action to terminate an employee and\ndiscussed related topics that were not specified in its votes to close the meetings. On October 3,\n2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Council and asked it to\nprovide this office with copies of the agendas, open and closed session minutes, and verbatim\n\n500 South Second Street,\n100 West\n\nRandolph\n\nIllinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nStreet, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nSpringfield,\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nThe Honorable Rick Olson\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 2\n\nrecordings of the closed sessions of the relevant meetings for this office' s review, together with a\nwritten response to Ms. Nelson's OMA allegations.\nOn October 12, 2017, counsel for the Council provided this office with those\nmaterials and a written response in which it denied Mr. Nelson' s allegations.\n\nThe Council also\n\nexplained that the employee in question was terminated from her duties with the Sandwich\nPolice Department as Records Clerk, but that she was also the Treasurer of the Sandwich Police\nBenevolent Association ( Association),\n\nwhich\n\nis \" not run by the City of Sandwich.\"'\n\nOn October\n\n13, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Council' s response to Mr. Nelson. He replied on October\n\n25, 2017, arguing that discussion of the employee in relation to the Association should not have\noccurred during closed session because the Association is not a public body and because the\nopen meetings exception the Council cited to close the meeting authorizes only the discussion of\na public body' s employees.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\n\nAs an initial matter, although Mr. Nelson alleged that the City violated the Local\nRecords Act ( 50 ILCS 205/ 1 et seq. ( West 2016)) and that the City' s law firm has a conflict of\ninterest, the Public Access Bureau' s authority is limited to alleged violations of OMA and the\nFreedom\n\nof\n\nInformation\n\nAct ( 5 ILCS\n\n140/ 1\n\net\n\nseq. ( West 2016)).\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West\n\n2016). Accordingly, allegations outside the scope of those two statutes are not subject to review\nby the Public Access Bureau.\nReasonable Diligence\n\nSection 3. 5( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\n\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later 60 days after the alleged OMA violation. If\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 day period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\nHollister, Assistant\n\nAttorney General, Public Access Bureau ( October 12, 2017), at 1.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nThe Honorable Rick Olson\n\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 3\n\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\n\ndiligence, the requestfor review may be made within 60 days of\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation. ( Emphasis added.)\nMr. Nelson acknowledged\n\nin his Request for Review that the relevant meetings\n\nmay have been held more than 60 days before he submitted his Request for Review, but he\nargued that he had not learned material facts concerning the alleged violations at the time that\nthey occurred despite using reasonable diligence.\n\nHe stated that WSPY initially had reason to\n\nbelieve that the meetings' executive sessions did not conform to OMA, but that these concerns\n\nwere alleviated when the City' s attorneys \" creat[ ed] the impression\" that \" the termination of the\nemployee and executive sessions in question were a run of the mill employee misconduct\n\ntermination that did not involve unusual factors\" and that WSPY' s concerns were unfounded. 2\nHowever, Mr. Nelson stated, \"[ a] pproximately two months later in July 2017 WSPY became\naware of a termination letter that spelled out many of the allegations WSPY had been aware of in\nMay that were denied by officials[,]\" as the letter indicated that the Council had made the\nemployment termination decision but the Council' s meeting minutes show no open session action\n\non the matter.3\nMr. Nelson provided this office with facts sufficient to demonstrate that, despite\n\nutilizing reasonable diligence, he did not discover that the Council had terminated an employee\n\nwithout taking action during open session until more than 60 days after the alleged violation.\nHaving inquired about the circumstances surrounding the employee' s termination but lacking the\ntermination letter or other information attributing that decision to the Council, it is reasonable\nthat WSPY would not have been aware of material facts concerning the alleged violations by the\nCouncil within 60 days of their occurrence despite using reasonable diligence.\n\nBecause the\n\nRequest for Review appears to have been submitted within the time limits set out in section\n\n3. 5( a) of OMA, this office has authority to review Mr. Nelson' s allegations.\nFinal Action\n\nSection 2( e) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( e) ( West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017) provides: \" No final\n\naction may be taken at a closed meeting. Final action shall be preceded by a public recital of the\n2Letter from Doug Nelson, WSPY, to Attorney General, Public Access Counselor ( September 28,\n2017), at 2.\n\n3Letter from Doug Nelson, WSPY, to Attorney General, Public Access Counselor ( September 28,\n2017), at 2.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nThe Honorable Rick Olson\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 4\n\nnature of the matter being considered and other information that will inform the public of the\nbusiness being conducted.\"\nIn its response to this office, the Council stated that it \"denies Mr. Nelson' s\n\nallegation that it took final action during a closed session to terminate this person' s employment\n\nwith the City of Sandwich as the Records Clerk. i4 The Council provided a timeline of its\nmeetings from May 1, 2017, through July 10, 2017, indicating that during the May 22, 2017,\nmeeting' s closed session, \" the Chief [ of the Sandwich Police Department] advised the Council\n\nthat he was going to terminate the subject employee. He inquired as to whether he had support\nfor his action from the Council.\n\nMembers of the Council expressed their support for the Chiefs\n\ndecision to terminate this individual. i5 The following day, the Council asserted, James W.\nBianchi, Chief of Police, delivered a letter to the employee terminating her employment; she\npromptly appealed.\n\nAfter reviewing the employee' s termination in closed session on June 12,\n\n2017, the Council stated, a motion to uphold the employee' s determination passed unanimously\nduring open session on July 10, 2017. The Council thus claimed that it \" did conclude its appeal\nprocess in open session as required. i6 The Council further argued that no final action could have\n\nbeen taken in closed session, citing Bd. of Educ. of Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 186 v. Attorney\nGen. of Illinois, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 74, 77 N.E. 3d 625, 637 ( 2017).\nIn his reply, Mr. Nelson argued that the Council \" misleadingly stated that Police\nChief Bianchi terminated [ the named\n\nemployee]\"\n\nbecause the termination letter states: \"' Please\n\nbe advised that it has been determined by the City Council, following my recommendation, that\n\nfor the good of the City, your employment with the City of Sandwich is hereby terminated.\"' 7\nEmphasis\n\nadded.)\n\nIn Springfield, a board of education held several closed sessions to discuss\n\nentering into a separation agreement with the district' s superintendent. Springfield, 2017 IL\n120343, ¶ 5, 77 N. E. 3d at 628. During one closed session, the superintendent signed and dated\n\nthe agreement, and during the next closed session, six of seven members of the board signed the\nagreement but did not date it; the board' s attorney explained to the board that it would have to\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\n\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (October 12, 2017) at 1.\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren &\n\nTritt, LLC, to Marie\n\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( October 12, 2017), at 2.\n\n6Letter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( October 12, 2017), at 3.\n\nLetter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General, Public\nAccess [\n\nBureau] ( October 25, 2017),\n\nat\n\n1.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nThe Honorable Rick Olson\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 5\n\npublicly vote on the agreement. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶15, 6, 77 N. E. 3d at 628. A\nreporter then filed a Request for Review with the Public Access Counselor alleging that the\nboard violated OMA by signing the separation agreement without first publicly voting to\napprove it. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 7, 77 N.E. 3d at 628. While that review was pending,\nthe board posted a meeting agenda containing an item for approval of the separation agreement.\n\nSpringfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 8, 77 N.E. 3d at 628. In open session during that meeting, the\nboard recited that it would be voting on approving the separation agreement and then voted to\napprove it; the previously - signed agreement was then dated. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 1811, 77 N. E. 3d at 628.\n\nAfter the Public Access Bureau completed its review of the matter, the\n\nAttorney General issued a binding opinion concluding that the signing of the agreement in closed\nsession by six of the board members constituted improper final action under section 2( e) of\nOMA. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 12, 77 N. E. 3d at 628.\n\nThe school district appealed the binding opinion, however, and after the lower\ncourts sided with the school district, the Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court.\nSpringfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶1113, 18, 77 N.E.3d at 629- 30. The Court held that the school\nboard did not take final action for purposes of section 2( e) when it signed the separation\n\nagreement in closed session because the Board voted to approve that agreement in open session\n\nat a subsequent meeting: \" Under the plain language of section 2( e) of the Open Meetings Act,\nthe public vote is not merely a ratification of a final action taken earlier in a closed session; it is\nthe final action. Without the public vote, no final action has occurred.\" Springfield, 2017 IL\n120343, ¶ 74, 77 N. E. 3d at 637. The Court then cited two cases in which courts found actions\n\ntaken by public bodies to be invalid because the public bodies did not hold votes on the matters\n\nin open session. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 74, 77 N. E. 3d at 637 ( citing Lawrence v.\nWilliams, 2013 IL App ( 1st) 130757, 988 N.E.2d 1039 ( finding electoral board' s written decision\nnull and void because it was not made by a quorum during an open meeting) and Howe v.\nRetirement Board of the Firemen' s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2013 IL App ( 1st) 122446, 996\nN. E.2d 664 ( finding board' s written denial of benefits invalid because the board had circulated\n\nthe decision for signatures privately rather than voting on it in open session)).\nThus, Springfield stands for the proposition that a public body may reach a\npreliminary consensus in closed session but must vote on the matter in open session for valid\nfinal action to occur. Otherwise, section 3( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3( c) ( West 2016)), which\n\nauthorizes a court to \" declar[ e] null and void any final action taken at a closed meeting in\nviolation of' OMA, would not be given effect. See, e. g., People ex rel. Illinois Dept. of\nCorrections v. Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792, ¶ 23, 952 N. E. 2d 624, 631- 32 ( 2011) (\"[\n\nAl statute\n\nshould be read as a whole and construed so as to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence;\nwe must\n\nnot read\n\nAtt' y Gen. PAC\n\nso as to render\nSee also Ill.\nany part superfluous or meaningless.\").\nRev. Ltr. 43604, issued May 31, 2017, at 3 ( public body violated section\n\na statute\n\nReq.\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nThe Honorable Rick Olson\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 6\n\n2( e) of OMA by appointing an interim mayor in closed session without taking final action openly\nafter providing an adequate public recital).\n\nIn this instance, the language of the termination letter evinces that the Council had\napproved the termination of the Records Clerk's employment. Based on his office' s confidential\n\nreview of the Council' s closed session verbatim recordings from May 1, 2017, and May 22,\n2017, the termination required the Council' s approval in order to be finalized and the Board\n\nreached a consensus to terminate the Records Clerk' s employment at its May 22, 2017, meeting.\nUnlike in Spring,field, where the school board planned to vote on the separation agreement in\nopen session at a later date, here the Council finalized the employment termination without\n\nholding a vote in open session. Although the Council appears to argue that it did not take final\naction until it voted to reject an appeal of the termination in open session, it is clear that the\nCouncil' s decision to reject the employee' s appeal was distinct from its decision to terminate her\nemployment— if the employee had not appealed, her termination would have stood without a\n\npublic vote. Thus, the Council invalidly terminated the Records Clerk' s employment in closed\n\nsession without holding a vote in open session after an adequate public recital of the nature of the\nmatter being considered and other information to inform the public of the business being\nconducted as required by section 2( e).\n\nBecause the Council subsequently upheld the termination, however, this office\nwill not ask the Council to revote on the matter. Nevertheless, this office cautions the Council to\n\nrefrain from taking action outside of open meetings.\nSection 2( c)( 1) of OMA\n\nSection 2( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that all\n\nmeetings of a public body shall be open to the public unless the subject of the meeting falls\nwithin one of the exceptions set out in section 2( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c) ( West 2016), as\n\namended by Public Acts 100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31,\n\n2017). Section 2( c)( 1) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c)( 1) ( West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017), the exception on\n\nwhich the Council relied to close the meetings at issue, permits a public body to discuss in closed\nsession \"[ t] he appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, performance, or dismissal of\n\nspecific employees of the public body or legal counsel for the public body, including hearing\ntestimony on a complaint lodged against an employee of the public body or against legal counsel\nfor the public body to determine its validity.\"\nIn its response to this office, the Council denied Mr. Nelson' s allegation that it\ndiscussed topics in closed session\n\nthat were not\n\nspecified\n\nin its votes to close the meetings.\n\nThe\n\n\fMr. Doug Nelson\nThe Honorable Rick Olson\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 7\n\nCouncil' s attorney stated: \" On three occasions, May 1, 2017; May 22, 2017; and June 12, 2017,\n\nthe City Council entered executive session for the purpose of discussing the discipline,\nperformance, or dismissal of a specific employee of the public body. Their motion, each time,\n\nproperly referenced subsection 1 of Section 2( c) of the Open Meetings Act.\" 8\nIn his reply, Mr. Nelson stated that the Records Clerk' s termination letter states\n\nthat her \" termination occurred in part for her job performance in her capacity as Treasurer of the\n9\nAssociation,]\" as she was alleged to have mishandled Association funds.\"\nEmphasizing that\nthe Association is a separate entity from the City, Mr. Nelson alleged that \"[ a] ny discussion of\njob performance under section [ 2( c)( 1)], by the plain meaning of the statute, would require that\nperformance to relate only to work capacity for the public body. i10 He argued that \"[ t] he plain\nmeaning of [section 2( c)( 1)] does not allow a public body to enter executive session and discuss\nthe employee' s role in other organizations that the [ Council] maintains are separate from the\ni11\n\npublic\n\nbody.\nBased on this office's confidential review of the verbatim recordings of the four\n\nrelevant closed sessions, the Council' s discussions stayed within the scope of the section 2( c)( 1)\n\nexception.' 2 This exception authorizes the Council to discuss the \" employment\" and the\ndismissal\" of individual employees, including reasons for dismissal that do not directly concern\nthe employee' s performance of his or her public duties. Because the Council has not voted to\nrelease the recordings to the public, this office cannot reveal the specific contents of the\n\nCouncil' s discussions other than to confirm that any discussion of the employee' s conduct in\nrelation to the Association was discussed with respect to how that conduct impacted her\n\nemployment with the City. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Council did not violate\nsection 2( a) of OMA.\n\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\n\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (October 12, 2017), at 3.\n\n9Letter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General\nOctober 25, 2017), at 1.\n\n1' Letter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General\nOctober 25, 2017), at 1.\n\nLetter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General\nOctober 25, 2017), at 1.\n\n12The June 26, 2017, closed session discussion did not involve the relevant employee here, but was\nproperly held pursuant to section 2( c)( 2) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( c)( 2) ( West 2016), as amended by Public Acts 100201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017), which allows for discussion of: \"[c] ollective\n\nnegotiating matters between the public body and its employees or their representatives, or deliberations concerning\nsalary schedules for one or more classes of employees.\"\n\n\fr.Doug Nelson\nThe Honorable Rick Olson\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 8\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Please contact me at ( 312) 793- 0865 or the\nChicago address listed on the first page of this letter if you have questions. This correspondence\nserves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nMARIE HOLLISTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49854 o 2c1 proper 2e final action improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Cassandra A. Gottschalk\nFoster,\n\nBuick, Conklin, Lundgren &\n\n2040 Aberdeen Court\nSycamore, Illinois 60178\ncgottschalk@fosterbuick.\n\ncom\n\nTritt, LLC\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Closed-session termination of an employee","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49854/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nNovember 28, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Doug Nelson\nWSPY News\nwspynews@gmail.\n\ncom\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nThe Honorable\n\nRick Olson\n\nMayor\n\nCity of Sandwich\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nmayor@sandwich. il. us\nRE:\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 49854\n\nDear Mr. Nelson and Mr. Olson:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the City of Sandwich City Council (Council) improperly took final action\nwhen it approved terminating an employee in closed session without first voting in open session\nafter providing an adequate public recital of the matter under consideration. The Public Access\n\nBureau also concludes that the Council's closed session discussions on May 1, 2017, May 22,\n2017, June 12, 2017, and June 26, 2017, did not exceed the scope of the open meetings\nexceptions the Council cited to close the meetings.\n\nOn September 28, 2017, Mr. Doug Nelson, on behalf of WSPY News, submitted\n\na Request for Review to the Public Access Bureau alleging that during closed sessions sometime\naround May 2017, the Council improperly took final action to terminate an employee and\ndiscussed related topics that were not specified in its votes to close the meetings. On October 3,\n2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Council and asked it to\nprovide this office with copies of the agendas, open and closed session minutes, and verbatim\n\nrecordings of the closed sessions of the relevant meetings for this office's review, together with a\nwritten response to Ms. Nelson's OMA allegations.\nOn October 12, 2017, counsel for the Council provided this office with those\nmaterials and a written response in which it denied Mr. Nelson's allegations.\n\nThe Council also\n\nexplained that the employee in question was terminated from her duties with the Sandwich\nPolice Department as Records Clerk, but that she was also the Treasurer of the Sandwich Police\nBenevolent Association (Association),\n\nwhich\n\nis \" not run by the City of Sandwich.\"'\n\nOn October\n\n13, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Council's response to Mr. Nelson. He replied on October\n\n25, 2017, arguing that discussion of the employee in relation to the Association should not have\noccurred during closed session because the Association is not a public body and because the\nopen meetings exception the Council cited to close the meeting authorizes only the discussion of\na public body's employees.\nDETERMINATION\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\n\nAs an initial matter, although Mr. Nelson alleged that the City violated the Local\nRecords Act (50 ILCS 205/ 1 et seq. (West 2016)) and that the City's law firm has a conflict of\ninterest, the Public Access Bureau's authority is limited to alleged violations of OMA and the\nFreedom\n\nof\n\nInformation\n\nAct (5 ILCS\n\n140/ 1\n\net\n\nseq. (West 2016)).\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West\n\n2016). Accordingly, allegations outside the scope of those two statutes are not subject to review\nby the Public Access Bureau.\nReasonable Diligence\n\nSection 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\n\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later 60 days after the alleged OMA violation. If\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 day period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\n\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\n\ndiligence, the requestfor review may be made within 60 days of\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation. (Emphasis added.)\nMr. Nelson acknowledged\n\nin his Request for Review that the relevant meetings\n\nmay have been held more than 60 days before he submitted his Request for Review, but he\nargued that he had not learned material facts concerning the alleged violations at the time that\nthey occurred despite using reasonable diligence.\n\nHe stated that WSPY initially had reason to\n\nbelieve that the meetings' executive sessions did not conform to OMA, but that these concerns\n\nwere alleviated when the City's attorneys \" creat[ ed] the impression\" that \" the termination of the\nemployee and executive sessions in question were a run of the mill employee misconduct\n\ntermination that did not involve unusual factors\" and that WSPY's concerns were unfounded. 2\nHowever, Mr. Nelson stated, \"[ a] pproximately two months later in July 2017 WSPY became\naware of a termination letter that spelled out many of the allegations WSPY had been aware of in\nMay that were denied by officials[,]\" as the letter indicated that the Council had made the\nemployment termination decision but the Council's meeting minutes show no open session action\n\non the matter.3\nMr. Nelson provided this office with facts sufficient to demonstrate that, despite\n\nutilizing reasonable diligence, he did not discover that the Council had terminated an employee\n\nwithout taking action during open session until more than 60 days after the alleged violation.\nHaving inquired about the circumstances surrounding the employee's termination but lacking the\ntermination letter or other information attributing that decision to the Council, it is reasonable\nthat WSPY would not have been aware of material facts concerning the alleged violations by the\nCouncil within 60 days of their occurrence despite using reasonable diligence.\n\nBecause the\n\nRequest for Review appears to have been submitted within the time limits set out in section\n\n3. 5(a) of OMA, this office has authority to review Mr. Nelson's allegations.\nFinal Action\n\nSection 2(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(e) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017) provides: \" No final\n\naction may be taken at a closed meeting. Final action shall be preceded by a public recital of the\n2 Letter from Doug Nelson, WSPY, to Attorney General, Public Access Counselor (September 28,\n2017), at 2.\n\n3 Letter from Doug Nelson, WSPY, to Attorney General, Public Access Counselor (September 28,\n\nnature of the matter being considered and other information that will inform the public of the\nbusiness being conducted.\"\nIn its response to this office, the Council stated that it \"denies Mr. Nelson's\n\nallegation that it took final action during a closed session to terminate this person's employment\n\nwith the City of Sandwich as the Records Clerk. i4 The Council provided a timeline of its\nmeetings from May 1, 2017, through July 10, 2017, indicating that during the May 22, 2017,\nmeeting's closed session, \" the Chief [ of the Sandwich Police Department] advised the Council\n\nthat he was going to terminate the subject employee. He inquired as to whether he had support\nfor his action from the Council.\n\nMembers of the Council expressed their support for the Chiefs\n\ndecision to terminate this individual. i5 The following day, the Council asserted, James W.\nBianchi, Chief of Police, delivered a letter to the employee terminating her employment; she\npromptly appealed.\n\nAfter reviewing the employee's termination in closed session on June 12,\n\n2017, the Council stated, a motion to uphold the employee's determination passed unanimously\nduring open session on July 10, 2017. The Council thus claimed that it \" did conclude its appeal\nprocess in open session as required. i6 The Council further argued that no final action could have\n\nbeen taken in closed session, citing Bd. of Educ. of Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 186 v. Attorney\nGen. of Illinois, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 74, 77 N.E. 3d 625, 637 (2017).\nIn his reply, Mr. Nelson argued that the Council \" misleadingly stated that Police\nChief Bianchi terminated [ the named\n\nemployee]\"\n\nbecause the termination letter states: \"' Please\n\nbe advised that it has been determined by the City Council, following my recommendation, that\n\nfor the good of the City, your employment with the City of Sandwich is hereby terminated.\"' 7\nEmphasis\n\nadded.)\n\nIn Springfield, a board of education held several closed sessions to discuss\n\nentering into a separation agreement with the district's superintendent. Springfield, 2017 IL\n120343, ¶ 5, 77 N. E. 3d at 628. During one closed session, the superintendent signed and dated\n\nthe agreement, and during the next closed session, six of seven members of the board signed the\nagreement but did not date it; the board's attorney explained to the board that it would have to\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\n\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (October 12, 2017) at 1.\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren &\n\nTritt, LLC, to Marie\n\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (October 12, 2017), at 2.\n\n6 Letter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (October 12, 2017), at 3.\n\nLetter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General, Public\n\npublicly vote on the agreement. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶15, 6, 77 N. E. 3d at 628. A\nreporter then filed a Request for Review with the Public Access Counselor alleging that the\nboard violated OMA by signing the separation agreement without first publicly voting to\napprove it. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 7, 77 N.E. 3d at 628. While that review was pending,\nthe board posted a meeting agenda containing an item for approval of the separation agreement.\n\nSpringfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 8, 77 N.E. 3d at 628. In open session during that meeting, the\nboard recited that it would be voting on approving the separation agreement and then voted to\napprove it; the previously - signed agreement was then dated. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 1811, 77 N. E. 3d at 628.\n\nAfter the Public Access Bureau completed its review of the matter, the\n\nAttorney General issued a binding opinion concluding that the signing of the agreement in closed\nsession by six of the board members constituted improper final action under section 2(e) of\nOMA. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 12, 77 N. E. 3d at 628.\n\nThe school district appealed the binding opinion, however, and after the lower\ncourts sided with the school district, the Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court.\nSpringfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶1113, 18, 77 N.E.3d at 629- 30. The Court held that the school\nboard did not take final action for purposes of section 2(e) when it signed the separation\n\nagreement in closed session because the Board voted to approve that agreement in open session\n\nat a subsequent meeting: \" Under the plain language of section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act,\nthe public vote is not merely a ratification of a final action taken earlier in a closed session; it is\nthe final action. Without the public vote, no final action has occurred.\" Springfield, 2017 IL\n120343, ¶ 74, 77 N. E. 3d at 637. The Court then cited two cases in which courts found actions\n\ntaken by public bodies to be invalid because the public bodies did not hold votes on the matters\n\nin open session. Springfield, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 74, 77 N. E. 3d at 637 (citing Lawrence v.\nWilliams, 2013 IL App (1st) 130757, 988 N.E.2d 1039 (finding electoral board's written decision\nnull and void because it was not made by a quorum during an open meeting) and Howe v.\nRetirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2013 IL App (1st) 122446, 996\nN. E.2d 664 (finding board's written denial of benefits invalid because the board had circulated\n\nthe decision for signatures privately rather than voting on it in open session)).\nThus, Springfield stands for the proposition that a public body may reach a\npreliminary consensus in closed session but must vote on the matter in open session for valid\nfinal action to occur. Otherwise, section 3(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3(c) (West 2016)), which\n\nauthorizes a court to \" declar[ e] null and void any final action taken at a closed meeting in\nviolation of' OMA, would not be given effect. See, e. g., People ex rel. Illinois Dept. of\nCorrections v. Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792, ¶ 23, 952 N. E. 2d 624, 631- 32 (2011) (\"[\n\nAl statute\n\nshould be read as a whole and construed so as to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence;\nwe must\n\nnot read\n\nAtt' y Gen. PAC\n\nso as to render\nSee also Ill.\n\n2(e) of OMA by appointing an interim mayor in closed session without taking final action openly\nafter providing an adequate public recital).\n\nIn this instance, the language of the termination letter evinces that the Council had\napproved the termination of the Records Clerk's employment. Based on his office's confidential\n\nreview of the Council's closed session verbatim recordings from May 1, 2017, and May 22,\n2017, the termination required the Council's approval in order to be finalized and the Board\n\nreached a consensus to terminate the Records Clerk's employment at its May 22, 2017, meeting.\nUnlike in Spring,field, where the school board planned to vote on the separation agreement in\nopen session at a later date, here the Council finalized the employment termination without\n\nholding a vote in open session. Although the Council appears to argue that it did not take final\naction until it voted to reject an appeal of the termination in open session, it is clear that the\nCouncil's decision to reject the employee's appeal was distinct from its decision to terminate her\nemployment— if the employee had not appealed, her termination would have stood without a\n\npublic vote. Thus, the Council invalidly terminated the Records Clerk's employment in closed\n\nsession without holding a vote in open session after an adequate public recital of the nature of the\nmatter being considered and other information to inform the public of the business being\nconducted as required by section 2(e).\n\nBecause the Council subsequently upheld the termination, however, this office\nwill not ask the Council to revote on the matter. Nevertheless, this office cautions the Council to\n\nrefrain from taking action outside of open meetings.\nSection 2(c)(1) of OMA\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that all\n\nmeetings of a public body shall be open to the public unless the subject of the meeting falls\nwithin one of the exceptions set out in section 2(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c) (West 2016), as\n\namended by Public Acts 100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31,\n\n2017). Section 2(c)(1) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c)(1) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017), the exception on\n\nwhich the Council relied to close the meetings at issue, permits a public body to discuss in closed\nsession \"[ t] he appointment, employment, compensation, discipline, performance, or dismissal of\n\nspecific employees of the public body or legal counsel for the public body, including hearing\ntestimony on a complaint lodged against an employee of the public body or against legal counsel\nfor the public body to determine its validity.\"\nIn its response to this office, the Council denied Mr. Nelson's allegation that it\ndiscussed topics in closed session\n\nCouncil's attorney stated: \" On three occasions, May 1, 2017; May 22, 2017; and June 12, 2017,\n\nthe City Council entered executive session for the purpose of discussing the discipline,\nperformance, or dismissal of a specific employee of the public body. Their motion, each time,\n\nproperly referenced subsection 1 of Section 2(c) of the Open Meetings Act.\" 8\nIn his reply, Mr. Nelson stated that the Records Clerk's termination letter states\n\nthat her \" termination occurred in part for her job performance in her capacity as Treasurer of the\n9\nAssociation,]\" as she was alleged to have mishandled Association funds.\"\nEmphasizing that\nthe Association is a separate entity from the City, Mr. Nelson alleged that \"[ a] ny discussion of\njob performance under section [ 2(c)(1)], by the plain meaning of the statute, would require that\nperformance to relate only to work capacity for the public body. i10 He argued that \"[ t] he plain\nmeaning of [section 2(c)(1)] does not allow a public body to enter executive session and discuss\nthe employee's role in other organizations that the [ Council] maintains are separate from the\ni11\n\npublic\n\nbody.\nBased on this office's confidential review of the verbatim recordings of the four\n\nrelevant closed sessions, the Council's discussions stayed within the scope of the section 2(c)(1)\n\nexception.' 2 This exception authorizes the Council to discuss the \" employment\" and the\ndismissal\" of individual employees, including reasons for dismissal that do not directly concern\nthe employee's performance of his or her public duties. Because the Council has not voted to\nrelease the recordings to the public, this office cannot reveal the specific contents of the\n\nCouncil's discussions other than to confirm that any discussion of the employee's conduct in\nrelation to the Association was discussed with respect to how that conduct impacted her\n\nemployment with the City. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Council did not violate\nsection 2(a) of OMA.\n\nLetter from Cassandra A. Gottschalk, Foster, Buick, Conklin, Lundgren & Tritt, LLC, to Marie\n\nHollister, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (October 12, 2017), at 3.\n\n9 Letter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General\nOctober 25, 2017), at 1.\n\n1' Letter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General\nOctober 25, 2017), at 1.\n\nLetter from Doug Nelson, President, WSPY, to Marie Hollister, Illinois Attorney General\nOctober 25, 2017), at 1.\n\n12 The June 26, 2017, closed session discussion did not involve the relevant employee here, but was\nproperly held pursuant to section 2(c)(2) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(c)(2) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts 100201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017), which allows for discussion of: \"[c] ollective\n\nnegotiating matters between the public body and its employees or their representatives, or deliberations concerning\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. Please contact me at (312) 793- 0865 or the\nChicago address listed on the first page of this letter if you have questions. This correspondence\nserves to close this matter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nMARIE HOLLISTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49854 o 2c1 proper 2e final action improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMs. Cassandra A. Gottschalk\nFoster,\n\nBuick, Conklin, Lundgren &\n\n2040 Aberdeen Court\nSycamore, Illinois 60178\ncgottschalk@fosterbuick.\n\ncom\n\nTritt, LLC"}
{"id":1217,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-11-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49874"],"title":"City of Carlinville City Council violated Open Meetings Act by meeting without public notice","filename":"49874, issued November 1, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1378,"summary":"The requester alleged that members of the Carlinville City Council held an unauthorized meeting at a private water company without providing public notice, and the PAC determined that the City Council violated the Open Meetings Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that members of the Carlinville City Council met privately to discuss public business without telling the public, which is against the law. The Attorney General's office investigated and agreed that the Council broke the Open Meetings Act. The PAC ordered the Council to release the minutes of that meeting to the public.","holding":"The City of Carlinville City Council violated the Open Meetings Act by deliberating on public business at a gathering without providing the required advance public notice.","legal_question":"Whether a gathering of a majority of a quorum of the City Council to discuss public business constitutes a meeting under the Open Meetings Act that requires public notice.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Carlinville City Council","requesting_party":"Mr. John Kraft","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The City Council held an unannounced gathering of members to discuss public business regarding a water organization.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2_a/49874, issued November 1, 2017.pdf","sha256":"46deed41d74f971bbbab3e059fd3f11b33760e35827d10bc9ed77e7752b8f558","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["open meetings act","public notice","meeting minutes","quorum"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nA' I' I' ORNEY GENERAL,\n\nNovember\n\n1, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks. com\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Rick Bertinetti\nBertinetti & Cain, Attorneys at Law\n227 East First South Street, P. O. Box 645\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nbertcain@frontiemet.\n\nRE:\n\nnet\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 49874\n\nDear Mr. Kraft and Mr. Bertinetti:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the City of Carlinville City Council ( City Council) violated OMA by holding a\nmeeting on September 25, 2017, without adhering to the requirements of the Act.\nOn September 30, 2017, Mr. John Kraft submitted the above -captioned Request\n\nfor Review alleging that on September 25, 2017, a majority of a quorum of the City Council\nthree of the nine members) deliberated about public business at a private water company in\nJerseyville without providing advance notice or otherwise adhering to the requirements of OMA.\nHe provided a link to a video recording of the gathering.'\nOn October 4, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCity Council and asked it to provide copies of any meeting materials from the alleged meeting in\nJerseyville on September 25, 2017, for this office' s confidential review, together with a written\n\nresponse to the allegation that it held an unauthorized meeting in that instance. On October 9,\nMatt Turley, Proposed Carlinville / Fosterburg / Jersey County Water Organization Meeting\n9/ 25/ 17, YouTube ( Sept. 26, 2017), https:// www.youtube. com/ watch?v= e72aHyD6Tk& feature=youtu.be.\n\n500 South\n\nSpringfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 877) 844- 5461 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago,\n\nIllinois\n\n60601 • (\n\n312)\n\nTTY: ( 800) 964- 3013 •\n\nFax: ( 312)\n\n1001\n\nSecond\n\nStreet,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (\n\n814- 3000 •\n\n618) 529- 6400 •\n\nTTY: (877) 675- 9339 •\n\n814- 3806\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nMr. Rick Bertinetti\n\nNovember\n\n1, 2017\n\nPage 2\n\n2017, the City Council submitted a \" save the date\" e- mail, an agenda, meeting minutes, an\nattendance sheet, and a written response. On October 17, 2017, Mr. Kraft submitted a reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179111. App. 3d\n161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 2( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2016)) defines\nmeeting\" as:\n\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference,\n\ntelephone\n\ncall, electronic\n\nmeans ( such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.]\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls within the\ndefinition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each situation.\"\n\n1974 III. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. A gathering does not\n\nconstitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons\nfor or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt\nto reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\" Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp.\n657, 661 ( N. D. Ill. 1982).\n\nThe City Council consists of nine members; five members constitute a quorum\n\nand three members a majority of a quorum. Therefore, if three members of the City Council\n\nengaged in deliberative discussions of public business during the September 25, 2017, gathering\nat the water company, that gathering would be subject to all of the requirements of OMA.\n\nIt is undisputed that the City Council did not provide advance notice or otherwise\n\nfollow the requirements of OMA in connection with that meeting. In its response to his office,\nthe City Council\n\nstated:\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nMr. Rick Bertinetti\nNovember\n\n1,\n\n2017\n\nPage 3\n\nThe meeting on September 25, 2017, was not held or called\n\nby the City of Carlinville. It was a regional water meeting held for\nthe purpose of eventually establishing a regional water entity that\nwill provide water to its members. The ground floor members are\n\nthe City of Carlinville, FWD ( Fosterburg Water District) and\n\nJCRWC ( Jersey County Rural Water Company).\nCindy Campbell, who is an alderman of the City of\nCarlinville, attended this September 25 meeting as the\n\nrepresentative for the City. She had previously been approved and\nvoted to be the City' s representative by the Carlinville City Council\nat one of its regular meetings. Prior thereto at one of its regular\n\nmeetings, the City Council voted to move forward with the\nregional water concept. Beth Toon, who is an alderman for the\n\nCity of Carlinville, attended this September 25 meeting as an\nobserver ( a guest) and I believe did speak at the meeting by\noffering comments and/ or propounding questions to the group\n\nconducting the meeting. The City of Carlinville' s Mayor, Deanna\n\nDemuzio, was also present at the meeting as an observer and did\n\nnot speak or in any other way participate in the meeting. 121\nMr. Kraft replied that the video of the meeting contradicts the claim that Mayor\n\nDemuzio never spoke; he noted six instances in which she participated in the meeting. Stating\nthat \"[ t] he city has acknowledged that both Aldermen Beth Toon and Cindy Campbell were\n\npresent and did speak about public business\" at the gathering in Jerseyville, Mr. Kraft alleged\nthat \"[ a] majority\n\nCity Council * * *\nwere present AND were discussing the\npublic business of the\nof Carlinville.\" (\nEmphasis\nin\noriginal.) 3\nCity\nof a quorum\n\nof the\n\nThis office' s review of the video of the gathering in Jerseyville on September 25,\n2017, corroborated that Mayor Demuzio and the two other City Council members participated in\n\nthe group' s deliberations. Although the discussion may not have been called or held by the City\nCouncil, the discussion directly concerned the City Council' s public business, as the City\nprovides water service and the parties discussed forming a new entity to handle water service in\nthe region. Because a majority of a quorum of the members of the City Council gathered to\ndiscuss public business on September 25, 2017, without providing advance notice and without\nfollowing the other requirements of OMA, this office concludes that the City Council violated\nZLetter from Rick Bertinetti, City Attorney, to Joshua M. Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\nAccess Bureau, Office of the Attorney General ( October 9, 2017), at 1.\n3E -mail from John Kraft to PAC ( October 17, 2017).\n\n\fr.\nJohn Kraft\nMr. Rick Bertinetti\nNovember\n\n1, 2017\n\nPage 4\n\nOMA on that date. To remedy this violation, this office requests that the City Council make the\nminutes of the meeting publicly available. This office also cautions the City Council to consider\nin advance whether gatherings at which three or more of its members may engage in discussions\nof public business require proper advance notice and adherence to the other requirements\n\nof\n\nOMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n312) 814- 8413 or the Chicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to\nclose\n\nthis\n\nmatter.\n\nVey truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49874\n\no\n\n2a meeting\n\nimproper\n\nmun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"An unannounced council gathering to discuss water business","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49874/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nA' I' I' ORNEY GENERAL,\n\nNovember\n\n1, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks. com\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Rick Bertinetti\nBertinetti & Cain, Attorneys at Law\n227 East First South Street, P. O. Box 645\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nbertcain@frontiemet.\n\nRE:\n\nnet\n\nOMA Request for Review — 2016 PAC 49874\n\nDear Mr. Kraft and Mr. Bertinetti:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the City of Carlinville City Council (City Council) violated OMA by holding a\nmeeting on September 25, 2017, without adhering to the requirements of the Act.\nOn September 30, 2017, Mr. John Kraft submitted the above -captioned Request\n\nfor Review alleging that on September 25, 2017, a majority of a quorum of the City Council\nthree of the nine members) deliberated about public business at a private water company in\nJerseyville without providing advance notice or otherwise adhering to the requirements of OMA.\nHe provided a link to a video recording of the gathering.'\nOn October 4, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nCity Council and asked it to provide copies of any meeting materials from the alleged meeting in\nJerseyville on September 25, 2017, for this office's confidential review, together with a written\n\nresponse to the allegation that it held an unauthorized meeting in that instance. On October 9,\nMatt Turley, Proposed Carlinville / Fosterburg / Jersey County Water Organization Meeting\n9/ 25/ 17, YouTube (Sept. 26, 2017), https:// www.youtube. com/ watch?v= e72aHyD6Tk& feature=youtu.be.\n\n500 South\n\nSpringfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (877) 844- 5461 •\n\nFax: (217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago,\n\nIllinois\n\n60601 • (312)\n\nTTY: (800) 964- 3013 •\n\nFax: (312)\n\n1001\n\nSecond\n\nStreet,\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (814- 3000 •\n\n2017, the City Council submitted a \" save the date\" e- mail, an agenda, meeting minutes, an\nattendance sheet, and a written response. On October 17, 2017, Mr. Kraft submitted a reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179111. App. 3d\n161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ll meetings\nof public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed in\naccordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1. 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2016)) defines\nmeeting\" as:\n\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference,\n\ntelephone\n\ncall, electronic\n\nmeans (such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business[.]\n\nThe Office of the Attorney General has stated that \" whether a gathering falls within the\ndefinition of meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each situation.\"\n\n1974 III. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 126. A gathering does not\n\nconstitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons\nfor or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt\nto reach accord on a specific matter of public business.\" Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp.\n657, 661 (N. D. Ill. 1982).\n\nThe City Council consists of nine members; five members constitute a quorum\n\nand three members a majority of a quorum. Therefore, if three members of the City Council\n\nengaged in deliberative discussions of public business during the September 25, 2017, gathering\nat the water company, that gathering would be subject to all of the requirements of OMA.\n\nIt is undisputed that the City Council did not provide advance notice or otherwise\n\nfollow the requirements of OMA in connection with that meeting. In its response to his office,\n\nThe meeting on September 25, 2017, was not held or called\n\nby the City of Carlinville. It was a regional water meeting held for\nthe purpose of eventually establishing a regional water entity that\nwill provide water to its members. The ground floor members are\n\nthe City of Carlinville, FWD (Fosterburg Water District) and\n\nJCRWC (Jersey County Rural Water Company).\nCindy Campbell, who is an alderman of the City of\nCarlinville, attended this September 25 meeting as the\n\nrepresentative for the City. She had previously been approved and\nvoted to be the City's representative by the Carlinville City Council\nat one of its regular meetings. Prior thereto at one of its regular\n\nmeetings, the City Council voted to move forward with the\nregional water concept. Beth Toon, who is an alderman for the\n\nCity of Carlinville, attended this September 25 meeting as an\nobserver (a guest) and I believe did speak at the meeting by\noffering comments and/ or propounding questions to the group\n\nconducting the meeting. The City of Carlinville's Mayor, Deanna\n\nDemuzio, was also present at the meeting as an observer and did\n\nnot speak or in any other way participate in the meeting. 121\nMr. Kraft replied that the video of the meeting contradicts the claim that Mayor\n\nDemuzio never spoke; he noted six instances in which she participated in the meeting. Stating\nthat \"[ t] he city has acknowledged that both Aldermen Beth Toon and Cindy Campbell were\n\npresent and did speak about public business\" at the gathering in Jerseyville, Mr. Kraft alleged\nthat \"[ a] majority\n\nCity Council * * *\nwere present AND were discussing the\npublic business of the\nof Carlinville.\" (Emphasis\nin\noriginal.) 3\nCity\nof a quorum\n\nof the\n\nThis office's review of the video of the gathering in Jerseyville on September 25,\n2017, corroborated that Mayor Demuzio and the two other City Council members participated in\n\nthe group's deliberations. Although the discussion may not have been called or held by the City\nCouncil, the discussion directly concerned the City Council's public business, as the City\nprovides water service and the parties discussed forming a new entity to handle water service in\nthe region. Because a majority of a quorum of the members of the City Council gathered to\ndiscuss public business on September 25, 2017, without providing advance notice and without\nfollowing the other requirements of OMA, this office concludes that the City Council violated\nZLetter from Rick Bertinetti, City Attorney, to Joshua M. Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public\n\nOMA on that date. To remedy this violation, this office requests that the City Council make the\nminutes of the meeting publicly available. This office also cautions the City Council to consider\nin advance whether gatherings at which three or more of its members may engage in discussions\nof public business require proper advance notice and adherence to the other requirements\n\nof\n\nOMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n312) 814- 8413 or the Chicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter shall serve to\nclose\n\nthis\n\nmatter.\n\nVey truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nSupervising Attorney\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n49874\n\no\n\n2a meeting\n\nimproper\n\nmun"}
{"id":1218,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-01-31","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49878","49981"],"title":"School District 59 board emails not a meeting under Open Meetings Act","filename":"49878 49981, issued January 31, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1846,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Community Consolidated School District 59 Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act by conducting public business via email. The PAC determined that the emails did not constitute a 'meeting' under OMA because they were not exchanged for the purpose of discussing public business.","plain_summary":"A reporter alleged that a school board was illegally conducting public business through private emails. The Attorney General's office reviewed the emails and concluded they did not count as a 'meeting' under the law. Therefore, no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred.","holding":"The Board of Education did not violate the Open Meetings Act because the emails in question did not constitute a meeting.","legal_question":"Whether the exchange of emails between school board members regarding a referendum petition constituted a 'meeting' under section 1.02 of the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/1.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Community Consolidated School District 59 Board of Education","requesting_party":"Mr. Tom Robb (Elk Grove Journal)","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting definition","subject_description":"The use of email by school board members to discuss a referendum petition.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.5,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/meaning-of-public-business/49878 49981, issued January 31, 2018.pdf","sha256":"581044cf393b816b89bd27d1e7877f7997d98396b66ef7a2e2454587eab08e4b","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["email","school board","meeting definition","public business"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Tom Robb\nElk Grove Journal\nPolitical Editor\nJournal & Topics Newspapers\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nnews-eg@joumal-topics.info\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Barbara Somogyi, President\nBoard of Education\nCommunity Consolidated School District 59\n2123 South Arlington Heights Road\nArlington Heights, Illinois 60005\nsomogyi.barbara@ccsd59.org\nRE: OMA Requests for Review - 2017 PAC 49878; 2017 PAC 49981\nDear Mr. Robb,\n\nand Ms. Somogyi:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.S(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). This office has consolidated these Requests for\nReview because they contain closely-related allegations. For the reasons explained below, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Community Consolidated School District 59 Board of\nEducation (Board) did not violate OMA.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Jllinois 62701 • (2 I 7) 782-1090 • TTY: (2 I 7)785-2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\nI00WestRandolphStreet,Chicago,Jllinois60601 • (312)814-3000 • TTY: (312)814-3374 • Fax:(312)814-3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Jllinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (6 I8) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Tom Robb\nThe Honorable Barbara Somogyi\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 2\n\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 2, 2017, Mr. Tom Robb, on behalf of the Elk Grove Journal,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that the Board violated OMA by c�\nbusiness concerning a referendum petition via e-mail. On October 6, 2017, �\nsubmitted a Request for Review with a similar allegation. On October 6, 2017, and October 16,\n2017, this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to the Board and requested a written\nresponse to Mr. Robb's and\nallegations. This office asked the Board to address\nwhether the e-mails among Board members regarding the referendum petition constituted a\n\"meeting\" as defined by OMA and to provide copies of all e-mail correspondence related to the\nreferendum petition, including, but not limited to, correspondence between and among Board\nmembers, and to describe other forms of communications, if any, between Board members\nconcerning the referendum petition. On November 7, 2017, the Board provided the requested\nreplied on November 22,\nmaterials. Mr. Robb replied on November 7, 2017, and\n2017.\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100-201, effective August 18, 2017; 100-465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that \"all\nmeetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed\nin accordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines a\n\"public meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business. (Emphasis added.)\nUnder the definition in section 1.02 of OMA, a \"meeting\"-�\ncommunications through e-mail or other electronic means. Mr. Robb an� alleged\nthat certain Board members held a meeting under OMA by exchanging e-mails concerning the\nfiling of objections to a referendum petition prepared by residents of the school district. The\nreferendum and objections to the referendum arose in the context of a Board budgetary issue.\nOn July I 0, 2017, the Board approved a resolution of intent to issue working cash fund bonds in\n\n\fThe Honorable Barbara Somogyi\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 3\nan amount not to exceed $20 million. In response to the Board's resolution, on August 11, 2017,\ncertain residents of the school district submitted a referendum petition to place the issuance of\nthe bonds on the March 20, 2018, ballot. On August 18, 2017, a different group of citizens filed\nobjections to the validity of the referendum petition. 1 The e-mails provided to this office by the\nBoard reflect Board members' discussions concerning the filing of the objections. Because it is\ndispositive of the issue of whether a \"meeting\" occurred, this office first analyzes the question of\nwhether the e-mail communications concerned public business.\nOMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials,\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d\n191,202 (1980). OMA \"balance[s] the right of the press and the people to view the deliberative\nand decision-making processes of government first-hand with the right of public officials to\nspeak their minds freely and associate with whomever they choose.\" Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 210.\nThe Board argues that the e-mails at issue concerned the process and status of\nindividuals' review of referendum petition signatures, which was not the public business of the\nBoard:\nBoard members that [sic] participated in the email discussions\nwould have no authority to bind the School District or the Board\nwith regards to the objection or petition. The Board and School\nDistrict have no role to play regarding a referendum petition. First,\na school district is prohibited from expending resources in support\nof or against a referendum and there is no indication from these\nemails that the expenditure of School District resources occurred\nor was contemplated. See 10 ILCS 5/9-25.1. Further, while some\ntime ago school boards oversaw objections to petitions, the\nGeneral Assembly has divested that authority from school boards\nand transferred the review of petitions and objections to the county\nelectoral board. See IO ILCS 5/10-9(2.5). Simply stated, objections\nto referendum petitions are not the \"public business\" of school\ndistricts or their boardsY1\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\nPublic Access Bureau (November 7, 2017), at 2.\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\nPublic Access Bureau (November 7, 2017), at 4.\n\n\fMr. Tom Robb\nThe Honorable Barbara Somogyi\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 4\n\nThe Board also argues that the context of the discussions was political and that the Board\nmembers were acting as private citizens exercising their political rights, not as representatives of\nthe Board.\nMr. Robb and\nassert that the discussions concerning the objections\nare pertinent to the Board's business. Mr. Robb contended that Board will likely discuss the\nbond issuance at future meetings and \"that would appear to make the referendum to place a\nquestion on whether to issue those bonds on the March 20, 2018 election ballot relevant school\ndistrict related business. \" 3\nThe e-mails concern the mechanics of filing the objections to the petition for\nreferendum. The Board members provided findings and updates to each other as they checked\nthe validity of signatures. 4 They also discussed the specifics of how to check the petition, the\nlogistics of going to the Cook County Clerk's office to review signatures in the voter database,\nand the timing of delivering the objections to an attorney. 5\nThe petition for a referendum and the objections to that petition are generally\nrelevant to the public business of the Board, as the bond issuance directly affects the Board's\nbudget. There is a distinction, however, between the general topics of the referendum and\nobjections and the specific topic of filing the objections. The discussions in the e-mails at issue\nwere limited to the mechanics of filing the objections. The e-mails did not include conversations\nabout broader subjects that could be considered Board business, such as the Board's budget, the\nimpact of the referendum or the objections, or what measures to take in light of the referendum\nand objections. As the Board explained in its answer, the Board itself could not file objections to\nthe petition. In an e-mail from the school district's Superintendent to the Board President and\nBoard Secretary, the Superintendent provided an attorney's advice regarding the process for\nfiling objections: \"(n]either the District nor the Board as an entity can be an objector, but an\nindividual Board member can, acting in his or her private capacity, take the lead as an objector or\nwork with a group in doing research and development [sic] objections.\" 6\n'E-mail from Tom Robb to Laura Harter (November 7, 2017).\n\n5See CCSD 022, CCSD 023, CCSD 024, CCSD 025, CCSD 026, CCSD 027.\n-\n\n-\n\n4SeeCCSD 007,CCSD 008,CCSD 009;CCSD 010,CCSD 012;CCSD 017,CCSD 019.\n-\n\n6\n\nE-mail from Tom Robb, Reporter, Elk Grove Journal, to Laura Harter, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau (October 13, 2017), attachment at 35 (e-mail from Dr. Art Fessler, Superintendent,\nCommunity Consolidated School District 59, to Sunil Bhave and Barbara Somogyi (August 11, 2017)).\n\n\fMr. Tom Robb\nThe Honorable Barbara Somogyi\nJanuary 31, 2018\nPage 5\nConsistent with the advice the Board members received, there did not appear to be\nan attempt to file objections on behalf of the Board. Rather, Board members were acting as\nprivate citizens in their work on the objections. While the objections were relevant to a matter of\npublic business, preparing the objections for filing was not the public business of the Board, but\nrather the personal, or private, action of the individuals preparing the filing. Although the filing\nof the objections may have aligned with certain Board members' positions regarding the issuance\nof the bonds, the Board members' private actions are not automatically converted into the\nbusiness of the Board solely because the actions could have an impact on the business of the\npublic body. The discussions were akin to political discussions and \"[t]he Open Meetings Act\ndoes not prohibit political discussions between or among members of public bodies[.]\" Barr, 83\nIll. 2d at 209; see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 16557, issued May 23, 2012, at 2-3\n(participation of City Council members at question and answer session involving matters of\npublic business hosted by political party was not a meeting as defined in section 1.02 of OMA);\nIll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 13792, issued July 6,2011, at 2 (attendance of school board\nmembers at campaign-related social gathering was not a meeting subject to OMA). Therefore,\nbased on the available information,the e-mails submitted by the Board for this office's review\ndid not constitute a \"meeting\" of the Board because they were not exchanged for the purpose of\ndiscussing public business. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence from which this office\ncan conclude that the Board violated OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(217) 524-7958 or LHarter@atg.state.il.us. This letter serves to close these files.\nVery truly yours,\n\n49878 49981 o no vio sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nFranczek Radelet\n300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400\nChicago, Illinois 60606\nbpc@franczek.com\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Email correspondence between school board members about a referendum petition","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49878/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\n\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nJanuary 31, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Tom Robb\nElk Grove Journal\nPolitical Editor\nJournal & Topics Newspapers\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nnews-eg@joumal-topics.info\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Barbara Somogyi, President\nBoard of Education\nCommunity Consolidated School District 59\n2123 South Arlington Heights Road\nArlington Heights, Illinois 60005\nsomogyi.barbara@ccsd59.org\nRE: OMA Requests for Review - 2017 PAC 49878; 2017 PAC 49981\nDear Mr. Robb,\n\nand Ms. Somogyi:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3.S(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n(OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). This office has consolidated these Requests for\nReview because they contain closely-related allegations. For the reasons explained below, the\nPublic Access Bureau concludes that the Community Consolidated School District 59 Board of\nEducation (Board) did not violate OMA.\n\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 2, 2017, Mr. Tom Robb, on behalf of the Elk Grove Journal,\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging that the Board violated OMA by c�\nbusiness concerning a referendum petition via e-mail. On October 6, 2017, �\nsubmitted a Request for Review with a similar allegation. On October 6, 2017, and October 16,\n2017, this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to the Board and requested a written\nresponse to Mr. Robb's and\nallegations. This office asked the Board to address\nwhether the e-mails among Board members regarding the referendum petition constituted a\n\"meeting\" as defined by OMA and to provide copies of all e-mail correspondence related to the\nreferendum petition, including, but not limited to, correspondence between and among Board\nmembers, and to describe other forms of communications, if any, between Board members\nconcerning the referendum petition. On November 7, 2017, the Board provided the requested\nreplied on November 22,\nmaterials. Mr. Robb replied on November 7, 2017, and\n2017.\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100-201, effective August 18, 2017; 100-465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that \"all\nmeetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed\nin accordance with Section 2a.\" Section 1.02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)) defines a\n\"public meeting\" as:\n[A]ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5-member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business. (Emphasis added.)\nUnder the definition in section 1.02 of OMA, a \"meeting\"-�\ncommunications through e-mail or other electronic means. Mr. Robb an� alleged\nthat certain Board members held a meeting under OMA by exchanging e-mails concerning the\nfiling of objections to a referendum petition prepared by residents of the school district. The\nreferendum and objections to the referendum arose in the context of a Board budgetary issue.\nOn July I 0, 2017, the Board approved a resolution of intent to issue working cash fund bonds in\n\nan amount not to exceed $20 million. In response to the Board's resolution, on August 11, 2017,\ncertain residents of the school district submitted a referendum petition to place the issuance of\nthe bonds on the March 20, 2018, ballot. On August 18, 2017, a different group of citizens filed\nobjections to the validity of the referendum petition. 1 The e-mails provided to this office by the\nBoard reflect Board members' discussions concerning the filing of the objections. Because it is\ndispositive of the issue of whether a \"meeting\" occurred, this office first analyzes the question of\nwhether the e-mail communications concerned public business.\nOMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public officials,\nor truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is designed to\nprohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be discussed in a\npublic forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d\n191,202 (1980). OMA \"balance[s] the right of the press and the people to view the deliberative\nand decision-making processes of government first-hand with the right of public officials to\nspeak their minds freely and associate with whomever they choose.\" Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 210.\nThe Board argues that the e-mails at issue concerned the process and status of\nindividuals' review of referendum petition signatures, which was not the public business of the\nBoard:\nBoard members that [sic] participated in the email discussions\nwould have no authority to bind the School District or the Board\nwith regards to the objection or petition. The Board and School\nDistrict have no role to play regarding a referendum petition. First,\na school district is prohibited from expending resources in support\nof or against a referendum and there is no indication from these\nemails that the expenditure of School District resources occurred\nor was contemplated. See 10 ILCS 5/9-25.1. Further, while some\ntime ago school boards oversaw objections to petitions, the\nGeneral Assembly has divested that authority from school boards\nand transferred the review of petitions and objections to the county\nelectoral board. See IO ILCS 5/10-9(2.5). Simply stated, objections\nto referendum petitions are not the \"public business\" of school\ndistricts or their boardsY1\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\nPublic Access Bureau (November 7, 2017), at 2.\n'Letter from Brian P. Crowley, Franczek Radelet, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General,\n\nThe Board also argues that the context of the discussions was political and that the Board\nmembers were acting as private citizens exercising their political rights, not as representatives of\nthe Board.\nMr. Robb and\nassert that the discussions concerning the objections\nare pertinent to the Board's business. Mr. Robb contended that Board will likely discuss the\nbond issuance at future meetings and \"that would appear to make the referendum to place a\nquestion on whether to issue those bonds on the March 20, 2018 election ballot relevant school\ndistrict related business. \" 3\nThe e-mails concern the mechanics of filing the objections to the petition for\nreferendum. The Board members provided findings and updates to each other as they checked\nthe validity of signatures. 4 They also discussed the specifics of how to check the petition, the\nlogistics of going to the Cook County Clerk's office to review signatures in the voter database,\nand the timing of delivering the objections to an attorney. 5\nThe petition for a referendum and the objections to that petition are generally\nrelevant to the public business of the Board, as the bond issuance directly affects the Board's\nbudget. There is a distinction, however, between the general topics of the referendum and\nobjections and the specific topic of filing the objections. The discussions in the e-mails at issue\nwere limited to the mechanics of filing the objections. The e-mails did not include conversations\nabout broader subjects that could be considered Board business, such as the Board's budget, the\nimpact of the referendum or the objections, or what measures to take in light of the referendum\nand objections. As the Board explained in its answer, the Board itself could not file objections to\nthe petition. In an e-mail from the school district's Superintendent to the Board President and\nBoard Secretary, the Superintendent provided an attorney's advice regarding the process for\nfiling objections: \"(n]either the District nor the Board as an entity can be an objector, but an\nindividual Board member can, acting in his or her private capacity, take the lead as an objector or\nwork with a group in doing research and development [sic] objections.\" 6\n'E-mail from Tom Robb to Laura Harter (November 7, 2017).\n\n5 See CCSD 022, CCSD 023, CCSD 024, CCSD 025, CCSD 026, CCSD 027.\n-\n\n-\n\n4 SeeCCSD 007,CCSD 008,CCSD 009;CCSD 010,CCSD 012;CCSD 017,CCSD 019.\n-\n\n6\n\nE-mail from Tom Robb, Reporter, Elk Grove Journal, to Laura Harter, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau (October 13, 2017), attachment at 35 (e-mail from Dr. Art Fessler, Superintendent,\nCommunity Consolidated School District 59, to Sunil Bhave and Barbara Somogyi (August 11, 2017)).\n\nConsistent with the advice the Board members received, there did not appear to be\nan attempt to file objections on behalf of the Board. Rather, Board members were acting as\nprivate citizens in their work on the objections. While the objections were relevant to a matter of\npublic business, preparing the objections for filing was not the public business of the Board, but\nrather the personal, or private, action of the individuals preparing the filing. Although the filing\nof the objections may have aligned with certain Board members' positions regarding the issuance\nof the bonds, the Board members' private actions are not automatically converted into the\nbusiness of the Board solely because the actions could have an impact on the business of the\npublic body. The discussions were akin to political discussions and \"[t]he Open Meetings Act\ndoes not prohibit political discussions between or among members of public bodies[.]\" Barr, 83\nIll. 2d at 209; see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 16557, issued May 23, 2012, at 2-3\n(participation of City Council members at question and answer session involving matters of\npublic business hosted by political party was not a meeting as defined in section 1.02 of OMA);\nIll. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 13792, issued July 6,2011, at 2 (attendance of school board\nmembers at campaign-related social gathering was not a meeting subject to OMA). Therefore,\nbased on the available information,the e-mails submitted by the Board for this office's review\ndid not constitute a \"meeting\" of the Board because they were not exchanged for the purpose of\ndiscussing public business. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence from which this office\ncan conclude that the Board violated OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n(217) 524-7958 or LHarter@atg.state.il.us. This letter serves to close these files.\nVery truly yours,\n\n49878 49981 o no vio sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Brian P. Crowley\nFranczek Radelet\n300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3400\nChicago, Illinois 60606\nbpc@franczek.com\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau"}
{"id":1219,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017-11-28","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["49967"],"title":"City of Springfield City Council social gathering not a meeting under OMA","filename":"49967, issued November 28, 2017.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1767,"summary":"A reporter alleged that a gathering of Springfield City Council aldermen at a restaurant for a campaign fundraiser constituted an improper closed meeting under OMA, but the PAC determined the event did not meet the legal definition of a meeting.","plain_summary":"A reporter complained that a group of city aldermen held an illegal private meeting at a restaurant to collect campaign donations. The Attorney General's office investigated and found that while the aldermen were present, they did not conduct official city business or make decisions, so no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the City of Springfield did not violate the Open Meetings Act because the social gathering did not involve deliberative discussion or action on public business.","legal_question":"Whether a social gathering of a majority of a quorum of a public body for the purpose of fundraising constitutes a 'meeting' under the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Springfield City Council","requesting_party":"Mr. Joe Cadotte, ABC Newschannel 20","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The requester alleged that a gathering of aldermen at a restaurant for a campaign fundraiser was an unannounced meeting of the City Council.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/1.02/definition-of-meeting/exclusion-of-purely-social-gatherings/49967, issued November 28, 2017.pdf","sha256":"7c576d22a667d7328185432bb0f018f336f37985a1128c12c49b60e2cc1200b5","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","public meeting","quorum","fundraiser"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nNovember 28, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Joe Cadotte\nReporter\nABC Newschannel 20\njacadotte@sbgtv.com\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Nathan E. Rice\nAssistant Corporation Counsel\nOffice of the Corporation Counsel\nCity of Springfield\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nnathan.rice@springfield.ii. us\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2017 PAC 49967\nDear Mr. Cadotte and Mr. Rice:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that the City Council (Council) of the City of Springfield (City) did not violate\nOMA when eight of the alderman gathered at an event on September 27,2017.\nOn October 5, 2017, Mr. Joe Cadotte, on behalf of ABC Newschannel 20,\nsubmitted a Request for Review questioning whether the Council violated OMA when \"[e]ight of\n10 of Springfield's Aldermen met at Saputo's restaurant in downtovm Springfield on Sept. 27\nwhere they received thousands of dollars in campaign contributions.\" 1 Mr. Cadotte stated that\nthe public was not notified of the meeting, and also alleged that some of the aldermen had not\n\n'E-mail from Joe Cadotte, Reporter, videographer, ABC Newschannel 20, to Public Access\n[Bureau] (October 5, 2017).\n500 South Second Street. Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (217) 782-1090 • TTY: (217) 785 -2771 • Fax: (217) 782-7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (312) 814-3000 • TTY: (312) 814-3374 • Fax: (312) 814-3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale. Illinois 62901 • (618) 529-6400 • TTY: (618) 529-6403 • Fax: (618) 529-6416\n\n\fMr. Joe Codette\nMr. Nathan Rice\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 2\nreported their campaign contributions to the state. 2 As part of his Request for Review, Mr.\nCadotte submitted a copy of a newspaper article which described the September 27, 2017, event\nas a reception where Springfield aldermen ate hors d'oeuvres and collected campaign\ncontributions. The article also identified Alderman Kris Theilen as stating that during the\nreception he was never in a conversation with more than two alderman at a time, and that the\nconversation centered on baseball, Springfield's future, and the need for blue collar jobs. 3\nOn October 16, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Council and asked it to provide a detailed written response addressing the purpose of the\nSeptember 27, 2017, gathering and the nature of discussions that occurred. On October 27,\n2017, Mr. Nathan Rice, Assistant Corporation Council for the City, submitted a written response\non behalf of the Council. Mr. Rice included affidavits from each of the aldermen who attended\nthe September 27, 2017, event: Chuck Redpath, Alderman for Ward I, Hermon Senor, Alderman\nfor Ward Alderman 2, Doris Turner, Alderman for Ward 3, John Fulgenzi, Alderman for Ward 4,\nAndrew Proctor, Alderman for Ward 5, Kris Theilen, Alderman for Ward 8, Jim Donelan,\nAlderman for Ward 9, and Ralph Hanauer, Alderman for Ward I 0. Each aldermen averred that\n(I) he or she attended an informal gathering and political fundraiser at Saputo's Restaurant on\nSeptember 27, 2017; (2) the event, which lasted about an hour, was for social and political\nfundraising purposes; and (3) conversations were social and informational, and at no point during\nthe event did a majority of a quorum of aldermen deliberate or discuss public business. The\nCouncil's response also asserted that \"no public business was acted upon by the attending\nAldermen. \" 4\nOn November 6, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Council's response to\nMr. Cadotte. In a telephone conversation on November 7, 2017, Mr. Mike Truett, the News\nDirector at ABC Newschannel 20, informed an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access\nBureau that ABC Newschannel 20 did not plan to submit a reply.\n\n'Section 7(c)(3) of the Attorney General Act (15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West 2016)) limits the Public\nAccess Counselor's authority to reviewing disputes involving potential violations of OMA and the Freedom of\nInformation (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Therefore, any allegations concerning campaign financing are not\nsubject to review by the Public Access Bureau.\n'Bruce Rushton, Check, please: Aldermen collect campaign money, ILLINOJS TIMES (October 5,\n2017, 12:08 AM), http://illinoistimes.com/article-19222-check,-please.html.\nLetter from Nathan E. Rice, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Springfield, to Edie\nSteinberg, Assistant Attpmey General, Public Access Bureau (October 27, 2017).\n4\n\n\fMr. Joe Codette\nMr. Nathan Rice\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 3\n\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2.01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016), as amended by Public Act\n100-477, effective September 8, 2017) provides that \"[a]ll meetings required by this Act to be\npublic shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient and open to the public.\"\n(Emphasis added.) In addition, section 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2016))\ngenerally requires a public body to provide the public with at least 48 hours advance notice ofits\nmeetings. In order for the requirements of OMA to apply, a gathering must constitute a\n\"meeting\" as defined by section 1.02 ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)):\n\"Meeting\" means any gathering, whether in person or by\nvideo or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means (such\nas, without limitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant\nmessaging), or other means ofcontemporaneous interactive\ncommunication, of a majority of a quorum of the members of a\npublic body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\n(Emphasis added.)\nThe Council consists of IO aldermen and the mayor; a quorum ofthe Council is\nsix members and a majority of a quorum of the Council is four members. Therefore, iffour or\nmore members of the Council gather and engage in contemporaneous, interactive, deliberative\ndiscussions ofpublic business, the procedural safeguards and requirements of OMA would apply\nto that gathering.\nThere is no dispute that a majority ofa quorum ofthe Council attended the event\nat Saputo's restaurant on September 27, 2017. All of the Council members who attended,\nhowever, submitted affidavits denying that they participated in deliberative discussions ofpublic\nbusiness or that a majority ofa quorum ofCouncil members together discussed public business\nduring the event. The requirements ofOMA are not automatically triggered merely because a\nmajority of a quorum attends a gathering. See University Professionals ofIllinois v. Stukel, 344\nIll. App. 3d 856, 868 (1st Dist. 2003) (OMA is not \"triggered every time public officials meet\nand converse\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004,issued July 14, 1995, at 9-10 (\"The Act does not,\nhowever, apply to every gathering ofa majority ofa quorum ofa public body.\"). OMA\n\"balance[s] the right of the press and the people to view the deliberative and decision-making\nprocesses of government first-hand with the right of public officials to speak their minds freely\nand associate with whomever they choose.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191,210\n(1980). Accordingly, in determining whether a gathering ofa majority of a quorum of members\nofa public body constitutes a \"meeting\" subject to OMA, the Illinois Supreme Court has\ninstructed that \"[t]he Act is only addressed to meetings designed to discuss or reach an accord\nwith regard to public business which properly should be deliberated or acted upon in an open\n\n\fMr. Joe Codette\nMr. Nathan Rice\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 4\n\nforum.\" Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 210 (1980). See also Nabhani v. Cog/ianese, 552 F. Supp. 657,661\n(N.D. Ill. 1982) (A gathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is\n\"no examining or weighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts\npreliminary to a decision, [and] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of[public]\nbusiness.\").\nThe Attorney General has noted that \"whether a gathering falls within the\ndefinition of a meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 7. While informal\ngatherings cannot be used to thwart the intent of OMA, \"[t]he Act is not intended to prohibit\nbona fide social gatherings[.] * * * Rather, the Act is designed to prohibit secret deliberation and\naction on business which properly should be discussed in a public forum due to its potential\nimpact on the public.\" Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 202. Accordingly, the Public Access Counselor has\ndetermined in some other instances that public bodies have not violated OMA where members\nattended political or campaign events in their capacity as elected officials or candidates, but did\nnot discuss public business in a deliberative fashion. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n16557, issued May 23, 2012, at 2-3 (participation of City Council members at question and\nanswer session involving matters of public business hosted by political party was not a meeting\nas defined in section 1.02 of OMA); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 13792, issued July 6,\n2011, at 2 (attendance of school board members at campaign-related social gathering was not a\nmeeting subject to OMA).\nIn Barr, the Illinois Supreme Court held that nine public officials, a majority of a\n15-member city council, violated OMA by holding a private meeting during which they\ndiscussed a new ward map, the appointments of public officers for two separate agencies, and a\nhousing development, all items which were set to be discussed in a public meeting later that\nsame night. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 202, 211. Here, by contrast, the available information indicates\nthat the September 27, 2017, event was a social gathering for the purposes of collecting\ncampaign contributions. Although aldermen attending the event may have discussed matters that\nrelate to public business of the City, such as the future of Springfield and the need for blue collar\njobs, there is no indication that during the event four or more members-a majority of a quorum\nof the Council-engaged in deliberative discussions of City business, took action on City\nbusiness, or otherwise attempted to reach an accord on any specific matter within the purview of\nthe Council. Accordingly, this office is unable to conclude that the fund raising event held on\nSeptember 27, 2017, constituted a \"meeting\" of the Council subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\n\fMr. Joe Codette\nMr. Nathan Rice\nNovember 28, 2017\nPage 5\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me at (312) 814-5201 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of the first page of\nthis letter.\n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49967 o 2.01 proper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A city council's campaign fundraiser gathering","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-49967/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nNovember 28, 2017\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Joe Cadotte\nReporter\nABC Newschannel 20\njacadotte@sbgtv.com\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Nathan E. Rice\nAssistant Corporation Counsel\nOffice of the Corporation Counsel\nCity of Springfield\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nnathan.rice@springfield.ii. us\nRE: OMA Request for Review - 2017 PAC 49967\nDear Mr. Cadotte and Mr. Rice:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3.5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/3.5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons that follow, the Public Access\nBureau concludes that the City Council (Council) of the City of Springfield (City) did not violate\nOMA when eight of the alderman gathered at an event on September 27,2017.\nOn October 5, 2017, Mr. Joe Cadotte, on behalf of ABC Newschannel 20,\nsubmitted a Request for Review questioning whether the Council violated OMA when \"[e]ight of\n10 of Springfield's Aldermen met at Saputo's restaurant in downtovm Springfield on Sept. 27\nwhere they received thousands of dollars in campaign contributions.\" 1 Mr. Cadotte stated that\nthe public was not notified of the meeting, and also alleged that some of the aldermen had not\n\n'E-mail from Joe Cadotte, Reporter, videographer, ABC Newschannel 20, to Public Access\n[Bureau] (October 5, 2017).\n\nreported their campaign contributions to the state. 2 As part of his Request for Review, Mr.\nCadotte submitted a copy of a newspaper article which described the September 27, 2017, event\nas a reception where Springfield aldermen ate hors d'oeuvres and collected campaign\ncontributions. The article also identified Alderman Kris Theilen as stating that during the\nreception he was never in a conversation with more than two alderman at a time, and that the\nconversation centered on baseball, Springfield's future, and the need for blue collar jobs. 3\nOn October 16, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\nthe Council and asked it to provide a detailed written response addressing the purpose of the\nSeptember 27, 2017, gathering and the nature of discussions that occurred. On October 27,\n2017, Mr. Nathan Rice, Assistant Corporation Council for the City, submitted a written response\non behalf of the Council. Mr. Rice included affidavits from each of the aldermen who attended\nthe September 27, 2017, event: Chuck Redpath, Alderman for Ward I, Hermon Senor, Alderman\nfor Ward Alderman 2, Doris Turner, Alderman for Ward 3, John Fulgenzi, Alderman for Ward 4,\nAndrew Proctor, Alderman for Ward 5, Kris Theilen, Alderman for Ward 8, Jim Donelan,\nAlderman for Ward 9, and Ralph Hanauer, Alderman for Ward I 0. Each aldermen averred that\n(I) he or she attended an informal gathering and political fundraiser at Saputo's Restaurant on\nSeptember 27, 2017; (2) the event, which lasted about an hour, was for social and political\nfundraising purposes; and (3) conversations were social and informational, and at no point during\nthe event did a majority of a quorum of aldermen deliberate or discuss public business. The\nCouncil's response also asserted that \"no public business was acted upon by the attending\nAldermen. \" 4\nOn November 6, 2017, this office forwarded a copy of the Council's response to\nMr. Cadotte. In a telephone conversation on November 7, 2017, Mr. Mike Truett, the News\nDirector at ABC Newschannel 20, informed an Assistant Attorney General in the Public Access\nBureau that ABC Newschannel 20 did not plan to submit a reply.\n\n'Section 7(c)(3) of the Attorney General Act (15 ILCS 205/7(c)(3) (West 2016)) limits the Public\nAccess Counselor's authority to reviewing disputes involving potential violations of OMA and the Freedom of\nInformation (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Therefore, any allegations concerning campaign financing are not\nsubject to review by the Public Access Bureau.\n'Bruce Rushton, Check, please: Aldermen collect campaign money, ILLINOJS TIMES (October 5,\n\nDETERMINATION\nSection 2.01 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.01 (West 2016), as amended by Public Act\n100-477, effective September 8, 2017) provides that \"[a]ll meetings required by this Act to be\npublic shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient and open to the public.\"\n(Emphasis added.) In addition, section 2.02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2.02(a) (West 2016))\ngenerally requires a public body to provide the public with at least 48 hours advance notice ofits\nmeetings. In order for the requirements of OMA to apply, a gathering must constitute a\n\"meeting\" as defined by section 1.02 ofOMA (5 ILCS 120/1.02 (West 2016)):\n\"Meeting\" means any gathering, whether in person or by\nvideo or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means (such\nas, without limitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant\nmessaging), or other means ofcontemporaneous interactive\ncommunication, of a majority of a quorum of the members of a\npublic body held for the purpose of discussing public business[.]\n(Emphasis added.)\nThe Council consists of IO aldermen and the mayor; a quorum ofthe Council is\nsix members and a majority of a quorum of the Council is four members. Therefore, iffour or\nmore members of the Council gather and engage in contemporaneous, interactive, deliberative\ndiscussions ofpublic business, the procedural safeguards and requirements of OMA would apply\nto that gathering.\nThere is no dispute that a majority ofa quorum ofthe Council attended the event\nat Saputo's restaurant on September 27, 2017. All of the Council members who attended,\nhowever, submitted affidavits denying that they participated in deliberative discussions ofpublic\nbusiness or that a majority ofa quorum ofCouncil members together discussed public business\nduring the event. The requirements ofOMA are not automatically triggered merely because a\nmajority of a quorum attends a gathering. See University Professionals ofIllinois v. Stukel, 344\nIll. App. 3d 856, 868 (1st Dist. 2003) (OMA is not \"triggered every time public officials meet\nand converse\"); Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-004,issued July 14, 1995, at 9-10 (\"The Act does not,\nhowever, apply to every gathering ofa majority ofa quorum ofa public body.\"). OMA\n\"balance[s] the right of the press and the people to view the deliberative and decision-making\nprocesses of government first-hand with the right of public officials to speak their minds freely\nand associate with whomever they choose.\" People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191,210\n(1980). Accordingly, in determining whether a gathering ofa majority of a quorum of members\nofa public body constitutes a \"meeting\" subject to OMA, the Illinois Supreme Court has\ninstructed that \"[t]he Act is only addressed to meetings designed to discuss or reach an accord\nwith regard to public business which properly should be deliberated or acted upon in an open\n\nforum.\" Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 210 (1980). See also Nabhani v. Cog/ianese, 552 F. Supp. 657,661\n(N.D. Ill. 1982) (A gathering does not constitute a meeting for purposes of OMA when there is\n\"no examining or weighing of reasons for or against a course of action, no exchange of facts\npreliminary to a decision, [and] no attempt to reach accord on a specific matter of[public]\nbusiness.\").\nThe Attorney General has noted that \"whether a gathering falls within the\ndefinition of a meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. S-726, issued March 22, 1974, at 7. While informal\ngatherings cannot be used to thwart the intent of OMA, \"[t]he Act is not intended to prohibit\nbona fide social gatherings[.] * * * Rather, the Act is designed to prohibit secret deliberation and\naction on business which properly should be discussed in a public forum due to its potential\nimpact on the public.\" Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 202. Accordingly, the Public Access Counselor has\ndetermined in some other instances that public bodies have not violated OMA where members\nattended political or campaign events in their capacity as elected officials or candidates, but did\nnot discuss public business in a deliberative fashion. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr.\n16557, issued May 23, 2012, at 2-3 (participation of City Council members at question and\nanswer session involving matters of public business hosted by political party was not a meeting\nas defined in section 1.02 of OMA); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 13792, issued July 6,\n2011, at 2 (attendance of school board members at campaign-related social gathering was not a\nmeeting subject to OMA).\nIn Barr, the Illinois Supreme Court held that nine public officials, a majority of a\n15-member city council, violated OMA by holding a private meeting during which they\ndiscussed a new ward map, the appointments of public officers for two separate agencies, and a\nhousing development, all items which were set to be discussed in a public meeting later that\nsame night. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d at 202, 211. Here, by contrast, the available information indicates\nthat the September 27, 2017, event was a social gathering for the purposes of collecting\ncampaign contributions. Although aldermen attending the event may have discussed matters that\nrelate to public business of the City, such as the future of Springfield and the need for blue collar\njobs, there is no indication that during the event four or more members-a majority of a quorum\nof the Council-engaged in deliberative discussions of City business, took action on City\nbusiness, or otherwise attempted to reach an accord on any specific matter within the purview of\nthe Council. Accordingly, this office is unable to conclude that the fund raising event held on\nSeptember 27, 2017, constituted a \"meeting\" of the Council subject to the requirements of OMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions, you\nmay contact me at (312) 814-5201 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of the first page of\nthis letter.\n\nEDIE STEINBERG\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n49967 o 2.01 proper mun"}
{"id":1220,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-05-16","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50091","50285","50414"],"title":"Winnebago County Board violated OMA by limiting public comment to three times per year","filename":"50091 50285 50414, issued May 16, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2948,"summary":"The PAC consolidated three Requests for Review regarding the Winnebago County Board's refusal to allow a citizen to speak during public comment periods because he had already reached a self-imposed limit on the topic of racial issues. The PAC determined that the Board's rule was unreasonably restrictive and violated the Open Meetings Act.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Winnebago County Board stopped him from speaking during public comment periods because he had already spoken about 'racial issues' three times that year. The Attorney General's office found that this rule was unreasonable and violated the Open Meetings Act, which protects the public's right to address government boards. The Board was advised to change its rules to ensure they are fair and not overly restrictive.","holding":"The Winnebago County Board violated the Open Meetings Act by enforcing an unreasonably restrictive rule that prohibited a member of the public from addressing the Board during public comment sessions.","legal_question":"Whether a public body may enforce a rule limiting the number of times a member of the public may speak on a specific topic during public comment sessions under the Open Meetings Act.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Winnebago County Board","requesting_party":"a citizen","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public comment","subject_description":"The Board restricted a citizen's ability to speak during public comment periods based on a limit on the number of times he could address a specific topic.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/unreasonable-rules/50091 50285 50414, issued May 16, 2018.pdf","sha256":"067ee5ac5897e7480f676f4e30213fb07c10ec6a5a796b562cf5f1694991772b","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","Open Meetings Act","board meetings","free speech"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMay 16, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Frank Haney\nChairman\n\nWinnebago County Board\nAdministration Building\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nBoardOffice@WINcoIL. us\nRE: OMA Requests for Review —2017 PAC 50091; 2017 PAC 50285;\n2017 PAC 50414\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Kurlinkus:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nThis office has consolidated three Requests for\n\nReview in this determination because they contain similar allegations. For the reasons explained\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Winnebago County Board ( Board) violated\nthe requirements of OMA during its October 12, 2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9,\n\n2017, meetings by enforcing an unreasonably restrictive rule to prevent\nfrom addressing the Board during the public comment portions of the meetings.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn October 16, 2017, this office received a Request for Review from\n\nalleging that during the public comment period of its October 12, 2017, meeting, the Board\ninformed him that he could not speak about racial issues for the remainder of 2017 because he\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (\n100 West\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785- 2771, •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nRandolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (\n312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nMay 16, 2018\nPage 2\n\nhad previously spoken about racial issues three times in 2017. 1\n\nfurther contended\n\nthat he proceeded to speak about racial issues and the Board interrupted his comments and\n\nprevented him from using all of his allotted three minutes of speaking time. On October 30,\n\n2017, this office received a Request for Review from\n\nalleging that the Board\n\nprevented him from speaking on racial issues during its October 26, 2017, meeting. 2 On\nNovember 10, 2017,\nfiled another Request for Review alleging that the Board\nprevented him from speaking on racial issues during its November 9, 2017, meeting.;\nOn October 20, 2017, November 1, 2017, and November 14, 2017, this office sent\ncopies of the Requests for Review to the Board and requested that it provide a written response\n\nto\n\nallegations. This office asked the Board to provide a copy of its established and\n\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the agenda, the open session minutes, and any audio or\nvideo recordings of the October 12, 2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9, 2017, meetings.\n\nOn November 20, 2017, this office received the requested materials and the Board' s answer. On\nDecember 5, 2017,\nreplied.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \" given\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016); see also Gosnell v. Hogan, 179\nIll. App. 3d 161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989) (\"\nthe intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be\ntaken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\").\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" Under the plain language of section 2. 06( g), a public body must establish and record rules\nand may restrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op.\n\nNo. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014 at 7. Although OMA does not specifically address the\ntypes of rules that a public body may adopt, public bodies may generally promulgate reasonable\ntime, place, and manner regulations that are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental\n\ninterest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. See, e.g., I.A. Rana\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 923 ( N.D. Ill. 2009) ( examining\nwhether the application of city council' s rules for public comment violated plaintiffs' rights).\nRequest for Review 2017 PAC 50091.\n\n2Request for Review 2017 PAC 50285.\nRequest for Review 2017 PAC 50414.\n\n\fMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nMay 16, 2018\nPage 3\n\nPublic bodies] have legitimate reasons for having rules to maintain decorum at public\nmeetings[ ]\"\n\nand \"\n\nto ensure that the meetings can be efficiently\n\nconducted.\"\n\nTimmon v. Wood,\n\n633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 ( W.D. Mich. 2008). For example, a public body may legitimately\nprescribe reasonable time limits for public comment. See Wright v. Anthony, 733 F. 2d 575, 577\n\n8th Cir. 1984) ( finding that because a time limit for speakers at a public hearing served a\nsignificant governmental interest in conserving time and in ensuring that others had an\nopportunity to speak, the time limit did not violate the speaker's rights under the first amendment\nto the United States Constitution). However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No.\n\n14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6 ( rule requiring members of the public to sign up to\ncomment five days in advance of meetings imposed an unreasonable restriction on public\ncomment).\n\nIn response to this office' s request for a copy of the Board' s established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Board submitted a copy of section 2- 65 of the\n\nWinnebago County Code of Ordinances, which addresses the \" Limitation of Debate\" as follows:\nA. No Member shall speak a total of more than twice on the\n\nsame question, unless permitted to do so by the Chair.\nB. No Member shall speak longer than three ( 3) minutes upon\n\nrecognition, unless permitted to do so by the Chair. Any\nMember called to order shall immediately cease speaking,\nunless permitted to explain.\n\nC. Non -Members may address the Board if written request is\nsubmitted to the County Board office by noon on the day of\n\nthe County Board meeting for which recognition is sought.\nThe written request must identify the name of the speaker,\nspecify the subject matter the speaker will address, and\nindicate the speaker' s interest in the subject. Comments\n\nshall be limited to three ( 3) minutes. Speakers may not\naddress zoning matter[ s] which are pending before the\n\nZBA, Zoning Committee or the County Board. Personnel\nmatters or pending or threatened litigation may not be\naddressed in open session. An individual may speak a\nmaximum of three times per calendar year on the same\ntopic. This prohibition shall include the repetition of the\nsame topic in a statement on what is purported to be a\ndifferent topic. Personal attacks or inappropriate language\n\n\fMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nMay 16, 2018\nPage 4\n\nof any sort will not be tolerated.\nD. Each person from the public will be limited to three ( 3)\nminutes.\n\nE. A maximum of twenty- one ( 21) minutes shall be allowed\nfor non- members to speak at each meeting. If a particular\nitem is deemed by the Chair to be controversial, the Chair\nshall strive to allow all sides an equal amount of time\n\nwithin which to speak at each meeting, subject to the\ntwenty- one ( 21) minute time limit. The Chair shall\ndetermine the sequential order in which non- members will\n\nbe allowed to address the Board. t41 ( Emphasis added.)\n\nThe Board explained that the version of the rules in place at the time of\n\ncomments\n\nwas adopted in December 2016. Language similar to section 2- 65C, which is at issue in this\n\nmatter, has been adopted as part of the Winnebago County Code of Ordinances ( Code) every two\nyears since 2014. The Board also provided this office with a copy of section 2- 62 of the Code,\nwhich provides that \"[ t] he Chairman shall preserve order and decorum and shall determine all\nquestions of Order. i5 -\n\nThe Board does not dispute that the Chairman interrupted\n\npublic\n\ncomments at the Board' s October 12, 2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9, 2017, meetings.\n\nThis office has reviewed the recordings of\n\nconfirms that the Chairman interrupted\nthe Code because\n\ncomments on the basis of section 2- 65C of\n\nhad spoken on the topic of race at least three previous times in\n\n2017. At the October 12, 2017, meeting,\nlaw enforcement tactical unit. When\ninterrupted him to state that\n\npublic comments at those meetings and\n\nspent most of his time speaking about a\nstarted to speak about race, the Chairman\nhad spoken more than three times on that topic.\n\nredirected his comments back to the subject of the tactical unit and appeared to indicate\n\nthat although he was not supposed to address the topic of race, the tactical unit was \" harassing\n\nLetter from David J. Kurlinkus, Chief of Staff and Civil Bureau, Winnebago County State' s\nAttorney' s Office, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General ( November 20, 2017), Exhibit A, Winnebago\nCounty Ordinance, ch. 2, div. 3, § 2- 65 ( approved December 5, 2016).\n\nLetter from David J. Kurlinkus, Chief of Staff and Civil Bureau, Winnebago County State' s\nAttorney' s Office, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General ( November 20, 2017), Exhibit E, Winnebago\nCounty Ordinance, ch. 2, div. 3, § 2- 62 ( approved December\n\n5, 2016).\n\n\fMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nMay 16, 2018\nPage 5\n\none kind of people. i6 The Chairman ended\ncomments shortly after that statement,\nbut it is unclear whether he ended the comments because the three minutes permitted by section\n2- 65D had elapsed or because of the content of\ncomments. In any event, although\nthe Chairman did not completely prohibit\nOctober 12, 2017, comments, it appears\nthat the enforcement of section 2- 65C caused\n\nto refrain from fully expressing his\n\nviews and required him to adopt indirect language to make his point. On October 26, 2017,\n\nPublic Participation sign- up sheet indicated that he would be speaking on the \" ju[ s] tice\n\nsystem.\" 7 Less than one minute after he began speaking,\n\nstated that \" Rockford,\n\nIllinois has a race problem, i8 and the Chairman interrupted him by enforcing section 2- 65C.\nchose to end his speech rather than redirect his comments.\n\nOn November 9, 2017,\n\nthe Chairman enforced section 2- 65C approximately 90 seconds after\n\nbegan\n\nspeaking about a newspaper article regarding the racial implications of an economic policy.\nended his speech.\n\nThis office has also reviewed the Public Participation sign- up sheets and video\nrecordings from the other five occasions on which\naddressed the Board in 2017. At\neach meeting, some of\n\ncomments generally concerned the racism he perceived in\n\nRockford, but he also raised specific issues. On March 9, 2017, he spoke about racial\n\ndiscrimination in a public construction project and the racial inequality in school discipline. On\nMarch 23, 2017, he spoke about the high unemployment rate among black children, inequality in\neducation, and the discipline of black children. On April 27, 2017, he spoke of discrimination in\n\nthe justice system, employment, the political system, education, and housing. On August 10,\n2017, and September 7, 2017, he spoke about the racial implications of a school board election\n\nthat had been decided by a card draw.\nThe Board cited section 2- 65C of the Code as authority to restrict\n\ncomments on racial issues. As quoted above, section 2- 65C provides that \"[ apt individual may\nspeak a maximum of three times per calendar year on the same topic. This prohibition shall\n\ninclude the repetition of the same topic in a statement on what is purported to be a different\ntopic.\" The Board asserted that this rule is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction\ndesigned to prevent repetitive content that wastes the Board' s time.\n\n6Winnebago County Board, Meeting, October 12, 2017, Digital Audio Recording ( on file with\nauthor).\n\nLetter from\n\nto Ms. Laura Harter ( October 27, 2017), Winnebago County\n\nBoard Public Participation Sheet ( October 3, 2017).\n\nBWinnebago County Board, Meeting, October 26, 2017, available at\nhttp:// www.ustream. tv/ recorded/ 109292595.\n\n\fMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nMay 16, 2018\nPage 6\n\nThe Board argues that this issue should be resolved based on the reasoning of the\n\nsummary judgement order entered in Castronovo v. County of Winnebago, No. 11- C- 50046\nN.D. 111. November 5, 2012). In Castronovo, a Federal district court examined the Board' s\n\ndecision to prevent an individual from addressing the Board on the topic of a traffic median after\nhe had spoken on the subject at four previous Board meetings. The Castronovo court considered\nwhether the Boards restriction was a proper use of the Chairman' s authority to \" preserve order\nand decorum\" at Board meetings. Winnebago County, Ill., Code ch. 2, div. 3, § 62. The court\nconcluded that the Board's action was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. The\ncourt explained that \"[ a] number of courts have found that the government has a significant\n\ninterest in the orderly and efficient conduct of its business. [ Citations omitted] The rule against\npermitting repetitive speeches is narrowly tailored to meet this interest— it prevents individuals\n\nfrom wasting the Boards time by revisiting issues time and again the Board has already heard\n\nand decided.\" Castronovo, No. 1 1- C- 50046, at 3. ( Emphasis added.) The court concluded that\nthe government has a significant interest in efficient Board meetings and Castronovo's speech\nwas only regulated to the point it was repetitive with several previous speeches while still\nleaving open adequate alternative\n\nmeans\n\nto address the same issue[,]\"\n\nincluding through letters,\n\ntelephone calls, and conversations with Board members. Castronovo, No. 11- C-50046, at 4.\n\nThe Board asserts that, like the speaker in Castronovo,\n\nspoke on the\n\nsame topic at three Board meetings in 2017. However, the court in Castronovo reviewed only\n\nthe Board's application of the section 2- 62 rule regarding the Chairman' s authority to preserve\n\norder and decorum— it did not address section 2- 65C of the Code, which is at issue here and was\nnot adopted until 2014. Nevertheless, even considering the Board's use of section 2- 62 to restrict\n\nspeech, Castronovo is distinguishable from the instant case in two respects. First,\nthe Castronovo court's holding was based not only on the fact that the speaker had commented\non the same topic more than four times, but also that the Board had already addressed the issue\nthat was the subject of the speaker' s comments. Here, there is no indication that the Board has\n\ntaken action or considered any measures to address the various issues that\n\nhas\n\nraised. While in Castronovo the court found that it was an inefficient use of the Board's time to\n\nhear comments more than four times on an issue it had already decided, the same finding cannot\n\nbe made here.\n\nSecond, the topic of the speaker's comments in Castronovo focused on one\n\nspecific issue: \" the median or lane construction near his property.\" Castronovo, No. 11- C- 50046,\nat 1.\nby contrast, sought to comment on a variety of topics within the expansive\nsubject of racial relations. As explained above,\n\ncomments have covered a range of\n\ndifferent topics including education, employment, an election, and the criminal justice system.\nBy restricting all of\ncomments simply because they had a common element, that\n\nbeing \" racial issues,\" the Board prevented him from speaking on specific topics he had not\n\naddressed more than three times\n\npreviously: on October 12, 2017, racial violence;\n\non\n\nOctober 26,\n\n\fMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nMay 16, 2018\nPage 7\n\n2017, the justice system; and on November 9, 2017, economic policies that disadvantaged\nminorities.\n\nDesignating all comments on different subjects that concern race as the \" same\n\ntopic,\" for purposes of section 2- 65C of the Code, is unduly restrictive. Under the Board' s\n\ninterpretation of the rule, an individual would be prohibited from speaking more than three times\non categories such as education, crime, and public health, all of which, like race, include many\nseparate subtopics. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board' s reliance upon section 2-\n\n65C of the Code to restrict\n\ncomments on various social issues simply because they\n\ntouched upon the common element of racial relations was not reasonable.\n\nConsequently, this office concludes that the Board violated the requirements of\n\nOMA by prohibiting\n\nfrom participating in public comment during the October 12,\n\n2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9, 2017, meetings on the basis that he could not speak on\n\nracial issues more than three times in a year. This office requests that the Board amend its rules\ngoverning public comment to ensure that any restrictions on the public' s statutory right to\n\naddress the Board are narrowly tailored to further a significant governmental interest.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg. state. il.us. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50091 50285 50414 0 206g pub comment improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nAssistant State' s Attorney\nWinnebago County State' s Attorney' s Office\n400 West State Street, Suite 619\nRockford, Illinois 61101\ndkurlinkus@wincoil. us\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A county board's limit on public comment frequency per topic","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50091/","full_text":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMay 16, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Frank Haney\nChairman\n\nWinnebago County Board\nAdministration Building\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nBoardOffice@WINcoIL. us\nRE: OMA Requests for Review —2017 PAC 50091; 2017 PAC 50285;\n2017 PAC 50414\n\nDear\n\nand Mr. Kurlinkus:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nThis office has consolidated three Requests for\n\nReview in this determination because they contain similar allegations. For the reasons explained\nbelow, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Winnebago County Board (Board) violated\nthe requirements of OMA during its October 12, 2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9,\n\n2017, meetings by enforcing an unreasonably restrictive rule to prevent\nfrom addressing the Board during the public comment portions of the meetings.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn October 16, 2017, this office received a Request for Review from\n\nalleging that during the public comment period of its October 12, 2017, meeting, the Board\ninformed him that he could not speak about racial issues for the remainder of 2017 because he\n\nhad previously spoken about racial issues three times in 2017. 1\n\nfurther contended\n\nthat he proceeded to speak about racial issues and the Board interrupted his comments and\n\nprevented him from using all of his allotted three minutes of speaking time. On October 30,\n\n2017, this office received a Request for Review from\n\nalleging that the Board\n\nprevented him from speaking on racial issues during its October 26, 2017, meeting. 2 On\nNovember 10, 2017,\nfiled another Request for Review alleging that the Board\nprevented him from speaking on racial issues during its November 9, 2017, meeting.;\nOn October 20, 2017, November 1, 2017, and November 14, 2017, this office sent\ncopies of the Requests for Review to the Board and requested that it provide a written response\n\nto\n\nallegations. This office asked the Board to provide a copy of its established and\n\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the agenda, the open session minutes, and any audio or\nvideo recordings of the October 12, 2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9, 2017, meetings.\n\nOn November 20, 2017, this office received the requested materials and the Board's answer. On\nDecember 5, 2017,\nreplied.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent of OMA is to \" ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nand that their deliberations be conducted openly\" and to ensure that individuals are \" given\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016); see also Gosnell v. Hogan, 179\nIll. App. 3d 161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989) (\"\nthe intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be\ntaken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\").\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA provides that \"[ a] ny person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" Under the plain language of section 2. 06(g), a public body must establish and record rules\nand may restrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op.\n\nNo. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014 at 7. Although OMA does not specifically address the\ntypes of rules that a public body may adopt, public bodies may generally promulgate reasonable\ntime, place, and manner regulations that are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental\n\ninterest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. See, e.g., I.A. Rana\nEnterprises, Inc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (examining\nwhether the application of city council's rules for public comment violated plaintiffs' rights).\n\nPublic bodies] have legitimate reasons for having rules to maintain decorum at public\nmeetings[ ]\"\n\nand \"\n\nto ensure that the meetings can be efficiently\n\nconducted.\"\n\nTimmon v. Wood,\n\n633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (W.D. Mich. 2008). For example, a public body may legitimately\nprescribe reasonable time limits for public comment. See Wright v. Anthony, 733 F. 2d 575, 577\n\n8th Cir. 1984) (finding that because a time limit for speakers at a public hearing served a\nsignificant governmental interest in conserving time and in ensuring that others had an\nopportunity to speak, the time limit did not violate the speaker's rights under the first amendment\nto the United States Constitution). However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No.\n\n14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6 (rule requiring members of the public to sign up to\ncomment five days in advance of meetings imposed an unreasonable restriction on public\ncomment).\n\nIn response to this office's request for a copy of the Board's established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Board submitted a copy of section 2- 65 of the\n\nWinnebago County Code of Ordinances, which addresses the \" Limitation of Debate\" as follows:\nA. No Member shall speak a total of more than twice on the\n\nsame question, unless permitted to do so by the Chair.\nB. No Member shall speak longer than three (3) minutes upon\n\nrecognition, unless permitted to do so by the Chair. Any\nMember called to order shall immediately cease speaking,\nunless permitted to explain.\n\nC. Non -Members may address the Board if written request is\nsubmitted to the County Board office by noon on the day of\n\nthe County Board meeting for which recognition is sought.\nThe written request must identify the name of the speaker,\nspecify the subject matter the speaker will address, and\nindicate the speaker's interest in the subject. Comments\n\nshall be limited to three (3) minutes. Speakers may not\naddress zoning matter[ s] which are pending before the\n\nZBA, Zoning Committee or the County Board. Personnel\nmatters or pending or threatened litigation may not be\n\nof any sort will not be tolerated.\nD. Each person from the public will be limited to three (3)\nminutes.\n\nE. A maximum of twenty- one (21) minutes shall be allowed\nfor non- members to speak at each meeting. If a particular\nitem is deemed by the Chair to be controversial, the Chair\nshall strive to allow all sides an equal amount of time\n\nwithin which to speak at each meeting, subject to the\ntwenty- one (21) minute time limit. The Chair shall\ndetermine the sequential order in which non- members will\n\nbe allowed to address the Board. t41 (Emphasis added.)\n\nThe Board explained that the version of the rules in place at the time of\n\ncomments\n\nwas adopted in December 2016. Language similar to section 2- 65C, which is at issue in this\n\nmatter, has been adopted as part of the Winnebago County Code of Ordinances (Code) every two\nyears since 2014. The Board also provided this office with a copy of section 2- 62 of the Code,\nwhich provides that \"[ t] he Chairman shall preserve order and decorum and shall determine all\nquestions of Order. i5 -\n\nThe Board does not dispute that the Chairman interrupted\n\npublic\n\ncomments at the Board's October 12, 2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9, 2017, meetings.\n\nThis office has reviewed the recordings of\n\nconfirms that the Chairman interrupted\nthe Code because\n\ncomments on the basis of section 2- 65C of\n\nhad spoken on the topic of race at least three previous times in\n\n2017. At the October 12, 2017, meeting,\nlaw enforcement tactical unit. When\ninterrupted him to state that\n\npublic comments at those meetings and\n\nspent most of his time speaking about a\nstarted to speak about race, the Chairman\nhad spoken more than three times on that topic.\n\nredirected his comments back to the subject of the tactical unit and appeared to indicate\n\nthat although he was not supposed to address the topic of race, the tactical unit was \" harassing\n\nLetter from David J. Kurlinkus, Chief of Staff and Civil Bureau, Winnebago County State's\nAttorney's Office, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General (November 20, 2017), Exhibit A, Winnebago\nCounty Ordinance, ch. 2, div. 3, § 2- 65 (approved December 5, 2016).\n\nLetter from David J. Kurlinkus, Chief of Staff and Civil Bureau, Winnebago County State's\nAttorney's Office, to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General (November 20, 2017), Exhibit E, Winnebago\n\none kind of people. i6 The Chairman ended\ncomments shortly after that statement,\nbut it is unclear whether he ended the comments because the three minutes permitted by section\n2- 65D had elapsed or because of the content of\ncomments. In any event, although\nthe Chairman did not completely prohibit\nOctober 12, 2017, comments, it appears\nthat the enforcement of section 2- 65C caused\n\nto refrain from fully expressing his\n\nviews and required him to adopt indirect language to make his point. On October 26, 2017,\n\nPublic Participation sign- up sheet indicated that he would be speaking on the \" ju[ s] tice\n\nsystem.\" 7 Less than one minute after he began speaking,\n\nstated that \" Rockford,\n\nIllinois has a race problem, i8 and the Chairman interrupted him by enforcing section 2- 65C.\nchose to end his speech rather than redirect his comments.\n\nOn November 9, 2017,\n\nthe Chairman enforced section 2- 65C approximately 90 seconds after\n\nbegan\n\nspeaking about a newspaper article regarding the racial implications of an economic policy.\nended his speech.\n\nThis office has also reviewed the Public Participation sign- up sheets and video\nrecordings from the other five occasions on which\naddressed the Board in 2017. At\neach meeting, some of\n\ncomments generally concerned the racism he perceived in\n\nRockford, but he also raised specific issues. On March 9, 2017, he spoke about racial\n\ndiscrimination in a public construction project and the racial inequality in school discipline. On\nMarch 23, 2017, he spoke about the high unemployment rate among black children, inequality in\neducation, and the discipline of black children. On April 27, 2017, he spoke of discrimination in\n\nthe justice system, employment, the political system, education, and housing. On August 10,\n2017, and September 7, 2017, he spoke about the racial implications of a school board election\n\nthat had been decided by a card draw.\nThe Board cited section 2- 65C of the Code as authority to restrict\n\ncomments on racial issues. As quoted above, section 2- 65C provides that \"[ apt individual may\nspeak a maximum of three times per calendar year on the same topic. This prohibition shall\n\ninclude the repetition of the same topic in a statement on what is purported to be a different\ntopic.\" The Board asserted that this rule is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction\ndesigned to prevent repetitive content that wastes the Board's time.\n\n6 Winnebago County Board, Meeting, October 12, 2017, Digital Audio Recording (on file with\nauthor).\n\nThe Board argues that this issue should be resolved based on the reasoning of the\n\nsummary judgement order entered in Castronovo v. County of Winnebago, No. 11- C- 50046\nN.D. 111. November 5, 2012). In Castronovo, a Federal district court examined the Board's\n\ndecision to prevent an individual from addressing the Board on the topic of a traffic median after\nhe had spoken on the subject at four previous Board meetings. The Castronovo court considered\nwhether the Boards restriction was a proper use of the Chairman's authority to \" preserve order\nand decorum\" at Board meetings. Winnebago County, Ill., Code ch. 2, div. 3, § 62. The court\nconcluded that the Board's action was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. The\ncourt explained that \"[ a] number of courts have found that the government has a significant\n\ninterest in the orderly and efficient conduct of its business. [ Citations omitted] The rule against\npermitting repetitive speeches is narrowly tailored to meet this interest— it prevents individuals\n\nfrom wasting the Boards time by revisiting issues time and again the Board has already heard\n\nand decided.\" Castronovo, No. 1 1- C- 50046, at 3. (Emphasis added.) The court concluded that\nthe government has a significant interest in efficient Board meetings and Castronovo's speech\nwas only regulated to the point it was repetitive with several previous speeches while still\nleaving open adequate alternative\n\nmeans\n\nto address the same issue[,]\"\n\nincluding through letters,\n\ntelephone calls, and conversations with Board members. Castronovo, No. 11- C-50046, at 4.\n\nThe Board asserts that, like the speaker in Castronovo,\n\nspoke on the\n\nsame topic at three Board meetings in 2017. However, the court in Castronovo reviewed only\n\nthe Board's application of the section 2- 62 rule regarding the Chairman's authority to preserve\n\norder and decorum— it did not address section 2- 65C of the Code, which is at issue here and was\nnot adopted until 2014. Nevertheless, even considering the Board's use of section 2- 62 to restrict\n\nspeech, Castronovo is distinguishable from the instant case in two respects. First,\nthe Castronovo court's holding was based not only on the fact that the speaker had commented\non the same topic more than four times, but also that the Board had already addressed the issue\nthat was the subject of the speaker's comments. Here, there is no indication that the Board has\n\ntaken action or considered any measures to address the various issues that\n\nhas\n\nraised. While in Castronovo the court found that it was an inefficient use of the Board's time to\n\nhear comments more than four times on an issue it had already decided, the same finding cannot\n\nbe made here.\n\nSecond, the topic of the speaker's comments in Castronovo focused on one\n\nspecific issue: \" the median or lane construction near his property.\" Castronovo, No. 11- C- 50046,\nat 1.\nby contrast, sought to comment on a variety of topics within the expansive\nsubject of racial relations. As explained above,\n\ncomments have covered a range of\n\ndifferent topics including education, employment, an election, and the criminal justice system.\nBy restricting all of\ncomments simply because they had a common element, that\n\nbeing \" racial issues,\" the Board prevented him from speaking on specific topics he had not\n\n2017, the justice system; and on November 9, 2017, economic policies that disadvantaged\nminorities.\n\nDesignating all comments on different subjects that concern race as the \" same\n\ntopic,\" for purposes of section 2- 65C of the Code, is unduly restrictive. Under the Board's\n\ninterpretation of the rule, an individual would be prohibited from speaking more than three times\non categories such as education, crime, and public health, all of which, like race, include many\nseparate subtopics. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board's reliance upon section 2-\n\n65C of the Code to restrict\n\ncomments on various social issues simply because they\n\ntouched upon the common element of racial relations was not reasonable.\n\nConsequently, this office concludes that the Board violated the requirements of\n\nOMA by prohibiting\n\nfrom participating in public comment during the October 12,\n\n2017, October 26, 2017, and November 9, 2017, meetings on the basis that he could not speak on\n\nracial issues more than three times in a year. This office requests that the Board amend its rules\ngoverning public comment to ensure that any restrictions on the public's statutory right to\n\naddress the Board are narrowly tailored to further a significant governmental interest.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg. state. il.us. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50091 50285 50414 0 206g pub comment improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. David J. Kurlinkus\n\nAssistant State's Attorney\nWinnebago County State's Attorney's Office\n400 West State Street, Suite 619\nRockford, Illinois 61101\ndkurlinkus@wincoil. us"}
{"id":1222,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-03-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50150","50207"],"title":"PAC finds insufficient evidence that Fosterburg Water District held a private meeting","filename":"50150 50207, issued March 9, 2018__1.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2332,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Fosterburg Water District held an improper non-public 'board retreat' in violation of the Open Meetings Act; the PAC concluded there was insufficient evidence to determine a violation occurred.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a water district held a private 'retreat' without following public meeting rules like posting agendas or allowing public attendance. The Attorney General's office investigated but found there wasn't enough evidence to prove that the board members actually discussed public business during the event. Consequently, the office closed the case without finding a violation.","holding":"The PAC determined that it lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act regarding the alleged non-public gathering.","legal_question":"Whether a gathering of board members constituted a 'meeting' under the Open Meetings Act requiring public notice and access.","disposition":"insufficient_info","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Fosterburg Water District","requesting_party":"John Kraft","pac_outcome":"Insufficient evidence of violation","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The requester alleged that a board retreat held at a remote location was a meeting that should have been open to the public.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.3,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/3.5/3.5_a/Reasonable-diligence-if-did-not-discover-violation-within-60-days/50150 50207, issued March 9, 2018.pdf","sha256":"79e6eb6c48e7cf2f220d9b7e2e88d462a56b7f8185759cedd9b7c70e73077efa","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["open meetings act","board retreat","public business","meeting notice"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMarch 9, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable\n\nKurt Prenzler\n\nChairman\n\nMadison County Board\n157 North Main Street\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nkprenzler@co. madison. il. us\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Robert L. Jackstadt\n\nTueth Keeney Cooper Mohan Jackstadt P. C.\n101 West Vandalia, Suite 210\nEdwardsville,\n\nIllinois 62025\n\nrjackstadt@tuethkeeney. com\nRE:\n\nOMA Requests for Review — 2017 PAC 50150, 2017 PAC 50207\n\nDear Mr. Kraft, Chairman Prenzler, and Mr. Jackstadt:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude that the Board of Trustees ( Board) of the Fosterburg Water District\n\nDistrict) violated the requirements of OMA in connection with a gathering held on February 35, 2017.\n\nOn October 22, 2017, Mr. John Kraft submitted a Request for Review ( 2017 PAC\n\n50150) to the Public Access Bureau alleging that the Board held a \" Board retreat\" that was not\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n100 West Randolph\n\nIllinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nStreet, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n312) 814- 3000 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nThe Honorable Kurt Prenzler\nMr. Robert L. Jackstadt\nMarch 9, 2018\nPage 2\n\nopen to the public on February 3- 5, 2017, at a location more than 45 miles from the regular\nmeeting location, without ( 1) posting a notice or agenda 48 hours in advance of the meeting date,\n2) permitting members of the public to record or provide comment, or ( 3) taking minutes of the\nmeeting. Mr. Kraft further alleged that hisi Request for Review was timely, despite being filed\nmore than 60 days after the alleged Board retreat, because he became aware that the retreat had\ntaken place when he received the Board' s response to his Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA) ( 5\n\nILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2016)) request for copies of credit card statements on October 18,\n2017.\nOn October 25, 2017, Chairman Prenzler attempted to submit a Request for\n\nReview ( 2017 PAC 50207) to the Public Access Bureau alleging that the Board violated OMA\n\non February 4 and 5, 2017, and that he discovered the violation on October 23, 2017. However,\nChairman Prenzler' s correspondence to this office did not provide any facts supporting his\nallegation, and did not describe the specific sections of OMA that the Chairman believed the\nBoard had violated on those dates. On October 30, 2017, Chairman Prenzler supplemented his\n\nRequest for Review by alleging that the Board held a retreat on February 4- 5, 2017, which was\npaid for with District funds but for which the Board provided no notice to the public and did not\n\napprove meeting minutes. Chairman Prenzler further asserted that he first became aware of the\nBoard retreat when information about it was published on the website of the Edgar County\nWatchdogs on October 23, 2017, and later, by the Alton Telegraph.\nOn November\n\n1 and 3, 2017, this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to\n\nthe Board and asked it to respond to the allegations by addressing whether a majority of a\nquorum of the Board gathered together on the dates in question, and if so, whether the members\n\ndiscussed public business during those gatherings.\n\nOn November 27, 2017, the Board responded\n\nby stating that six members of the Board attended a social event on those dates, and asserting that\nthe Board members in attendance did not discuss public business.\n\nOn November 28, 2017, this\n\noffice forwarded a copy of the response to Mr. Kraft and Chairman Prenzler. Chairman Prenzler\ndid not reply. On December 14, 2017, Mr. Kraft replied by directing this office' s attention to\ncopies of hotel receipts posted on the Edgar County Watchdogs website. On December 28,\n2017, this office forwarded Mr. Kraft' s reply to the Board' s outside counsel and asked it to\nfurnish additional explanation about the Board retreat. The Board responded on January 8, 2018;\nMr. Kraft submitted an additional reply on January 11, 2018.\nBecause these matters concern the same alleged event and raise the same legal\nissues,\n\nwe\n\nhave consolidated\n\nthem for determination.\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nThe Honorable Kurt Prenzler\nMr. Robert L. Jackstadt\nMarch 9, 2018\nPage 3\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nReasonable Diligence\n\nSection 3. 5( a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\n\nGeneral not later 60 days after the alleged OMA violation. If\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 day period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\ndiligence, the request for review may be made within 60 days of\n\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation. ( Emphasis added.)\nMr. Kraft acknowledged in his Request for Review that the Board retreat was held\nmore than 60 days before he submitted his Request for Review, but he asserted that he did not\n\nbecome aware of the gathering only until October 18, 2017, when he reviewed District credit\ncard statements reflecting payment for the retreat. Mr. Kraft argued that he could not have\npreviously discovered that the retreat occurred because the Board did not post a notice or agenda\nfor the retreat and never discussed it in meeting minutes. Chairman Prenzler asserted that he\n\nbecame aware of material facts giving rise to his allegation on October 23, 2017, when he\nreviewed information about the District's payment for the retreat that was published on a website.\nBoth Mr. Kraft and Chairman Prenzler provided this office with facts sufficient to\n\ndemonstrate that, despite utilizing reasonable diligence, they did not discover that at least a\n\nmajority of a quorum of the Board had gathered together in February until they reviewed\nfinancial records in October demonstrating that District credit cards had been used to pay for\n\nexpenses associated with the gathering. Because the available information indicates that the\nBoard did not provide public notice of the gathering, and did not approve and make available to\nthe public the minutes of the gathering, it is reasonable that Mr. Kraft and Chairman Prenzler\nwould not have been aware of the alleged violations by the Board within 60 days of their\n\noccurrence despite using reasonable diligence. Because the Request for Review appears to have\nbeen submitted within the time limits set out in section 3. 5( a) of OMA, this office has authority\nto review\n\nMr. Kraft' s and Chairman Prenzler' s allegations.\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nThe Honorable Kurt Prenzler\nMr. Robert L. Jackstadt\nMarch\n\n9, 2018\n\nPage 4\n\nAllegation\n\nof Undisclosed\n\nMeetings\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\nSection 2( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2( a) ( West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n11- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that \"[ a] ll\nmeetings of public bodies shall be open to .the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed\nin accordance with Section 2a.\"\n\nSection 1: 02 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2016)) defines a\n\nmeeting\" subject to the Act as:\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means ( such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5 - member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\nIf a gathering of members of a public body meets this definition, then all of the requirements of\n\nOMA apply, including the proper posting of notice and an agenda ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic ( 5 ILCS 102/ 2. 01 ( West 2016)), keeping minutes ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a) ( West 2016)), and\n\nallowing public recording ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 05 ( West 2016) and comment ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g)\nWest 2016)).\n\nHowever, OMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public\n\nofficials, or truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is\ndesigned to prohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be\ndiscussed in a public forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v.\nBarr, 83 Ill. 2d 191, 202 ( 1980). OMA \"balance[ s] the right of the press and the people to view\n\nthe deliberative and decision- making processes of government first- hand with the right of public\nofficials to speak their minds freely and associate with whomever they choose.\"\n\nBarr, 83 Ill. 2d\n\nat 210.\n\nMr. Kraft' s Request for Review alleged that statements for a District credit card\n\ndemonstrate that the District paid expenses associated with the February 3- 5, 2017, gatherings,\nand\n\nthat annotations\n\non\n\nthose statements\n\ndescribed the gathering as a \" Board retreat.\"\n\nIn\n\nits\n\n\fMr. John Kraft\nThe Honorable Kurt Prenzler\nMr. Robert L. Jackstadt\n\nMarch 9, 2018\nPage 5\n\nreply, the Board' s outside counsel asserted that the February event was a social gathering\n\nattended by six Board members and spouses, and that the members in attendance did not discuss\npublic business: \" There was no examining or weighing any course of action, no exchange of\nfacts preliminary to a public business- related decisions, and no attempt to reach accord on any\n\nmatter of public business.\" 1 Therefore, the Board argued, the gathering did not constitute a\nmeeting,\" and it was not necessary for the Board to open the gathering to the public and satisfy\nthe other requirements of OMA.\n\nMr. Kraft replied to the Board' s response, arguing that if no public business was\n\ndiscussed during the retreat, it was improper and illegal for the District to use public funds to pay\nfor a purely social outing for Board members and spouses. Mr. Kraft also noted that District\nfunds were used to reserve a separate suite, described on the invoices as \" MTG,\" in addition to\n\nthe rooms assigned to the individuals who attended the gathering. This office asked the Board' s\noutside counsel to supplement its response to the Request for Review with an explanation about\n\nthe use of the hotel room described in Mr. Kraft' s reply. The Board' s outside counsel asserted\nthat the hotel room was labeled \" MTG\" on the receipt because it was not specifically assigned to\nan individual, that the room was used to host the social event, and that no discussions of public\n\nbusiness were held in that room. In reply, Mr. Kraft asserted that the Board' s responses admit it\nused public funds for a nonpublic purpose, and reiterated his argument that the use of funds was\nimproper and illegal.\n\nAlthough the available information indicates that a majority of a quorum of the\n\nBoard gathered together at a hotel on February 3- 5, 2017, and the Board has not contested Mr.\nKraft' s allegation that the District paid the expenses associated with that gathering, the Board' s\noutside counsel asserted that the Board members in attendance did not discuss public business at\n\nthis event, and this office has not received any evidence contradicting that statement. As\ndiscussed above, a gathering of a majority of a quorum of public body members is subject to the\n\nsafeguards of OMA only if the members gather \" for the purpose of discussing public business.\"\nSee, e. g., Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 28092, issued March 6, 2014 ( allegation that\nmembers of public body met at brewery per Facebook post was insufficient to find that an\nimproper meeting was held absent evidence that public business was discussed).\n\nAccordingly,\n\nthis office lacks sufficient evidence to conclude that the Board violated OMA when it held a non-\n\npublic gathering on February 3- 5, 2017.\n\nAssistant\n\nAttorney\n\nLetter from Robert L. Jackstadt, Tueth Keeney Cooper Moran and Jackstadt P. C., to Leah Bartelt,\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau,' Offlce of the Illinois Attorney General ( November 27, 2017).\n\n\fr.John Kraft\nThe Honorable Kurt Prenzler\nMr. Robert L. Jackstadt\nMarch 9, 2018\nPage 6\n\nThis office notes that the Public Access Counselor' s authority is limited to\n\nreviewing alleged violations of the FOIA and OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7)( c) ( West 2016). This\noffice does not have authority to review the District' s alleged use of public funds for the retreat.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me at ( 312) 814- 6437.\nV er} truly yours,\n\nLEAH BARTELT\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n50150 50207 consol\n\no\n\n2a meeting\n\nproper\n\nspd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A board retreat at a remote location","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50150/","full_text":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMarch 9, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. John Kraft\n\njohn@illinoisleaks.com\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable\n\nKurt Prenzler\n\nChairman\n\nMadison County Board\n157 North Main Street\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nkprenzler@co. madison. il. us\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Robert L. Jackstadt\n\nTueth Keeney Cooper Mohan Jackstadt P. C.\n101 West Vandalia, Suite 210\nEdwardsville,\n\nIllinois 62025\n\nrjackstadt@tuethkeeney. com\nRE:\n\nOMA Requests for Review — 2017 PAC 50150, 2017 PAC 50207\n\nDear Mr. Kraft, Chairman Prenzler, and Mr. Jackstadt:\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude that the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Fosterburg Water District\n\nDistrict) violated the requirements of OMA in connection with a gathering held on February 35, 2017.\n\nOn October 22, 2017, Mr. John Kraft submitted a Request for Review (2017 PAC\n\n50150) to the Public Access Bureau alleging that the Board held a \" Board retreat\" that was not\n\nopen to the public on February 3- 5, 2017, at a location more than 45 miles from the regular\nmeeting location, without (1) posting a notice or agenda 48 hours in advance of the meeting date,\n2) permitting members of the public to record or provide comment, or (3) taking minutes of the\nmeeting. Mr. Kraft further alleged that hisi Request for Review was timely, despite being filed\nmore than 60 days after the alleged Board retreat, because he became aware that the retreat had\ntaken place when he received the Board's response to his Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5\n\nILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2016)) request for copies of credit card statements on October 18,\n2017.\nOn October 25, 2017, Chairman Prenzler attempted to submit a Request for\n\nReview (2017 PAC 50207) to the Public Access Bureau alleging that the Board violated OMA\n\non February 4 and 5, 2017, and that he discovered the violation on October 23, 2017. However,\nChairman Prenzler's correspondence to this office did not provide any facts supporting his\nallegation, and did not describe the specific sections of OMA that the Chairman believed the\nBoard had violated on those dates. On October 30, 2017, Chairman Prenzler supplemented his\n\nRequest for Review by alleging that the Board held a retreat on February 4- 5, 2017, which was\npaid for with District funds but for which the Board provided no notice to the public and did not\n\napprove meeting minutes. Chairman Prenzler further asserted that he first became aware of the\nBoard retreat when information about it was published on the website of the Edgar County\nWatchdogs on October 23, 2017, and later, by the Alton Telegraph.\nOn November\n\n1 and 3, 2017, this office sent copies of the Requests for Review to\n\nthe Board and asked it to respond to the allegations by addressing whether a majority of a\nquorum of the Board gathered together on the dates in question, and if so, whether the members\n\ndiscussed public business during those gatherings.\n\nOn November 27, 2017, the Board responded\n\nby stating that six members of the Board attended a social event on those dates, and asserting that\nthe Board members in attendance did not discuss public business.\n\nOn November 28, 2017, this\n\noffice forwarded a copy of the response to Mr. Kraft and Chairman Prenzler. Chairman Prenzler\ndid not reply. On December 14, 2017, Mr. Kraft replied by directing this office's attention to\ncopies of hotel receipts posted on the Edgar County Watchdogs website. On December 28,\n2017, this office forwarded Mr. Kraft's reply to the Board's outside counsel and asked it to\nfurnish additional explanation about the Board retreat. The Board responded on January 8, 2018;\nMr. Kraft submitted an additional reply on January 11, 2018.\nBecause these matters concern the same alleged event and raise the same legal\nissues,\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nReasonable Diligence\n\nSection 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\n\nGeneral not later 60 days after the alleged OMA violation. If\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 day period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\ndiligence, the request for review may be made within 60 days of\n\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. The request for review must\nbe in writing, must be signed by the requester, and must include a\nsummary of the facts supporting the allegation. (Emphasis added.)\nMr. Kraft acknowledged in his Request for Review that the Board retreat was held\nmore than 60 days before he submitted his Request for Review, but he asserted that he did not\n\nbecome aware of the gathering only until October 18, 2017, when he reviewed District credit\ncard statements reflecting payment for the retreat. Mr. Kraft argued that he could not have\npreviously discovered that the retreat occurred because the Board did not post a notice or agenda\nfor the retreat and never discussed it in meeting minutes. Chairman Prenzler asserted that he\n\nbecame aware of material facts giving rise to his allegation on October 23, 2017, when he\nreviewed information about the District's payment for the retreat that was published on a website.\nBoth Mr. Kraft and Chairman Prenzler provided this office with facts sufficient to\n\ndemonstrate that, despite utilizing reasonable diligence, they did not discover that at least a\n\nmajority of a quorum of the Board had gathered together in February until they reviewed\nfinancial records in October demonstrating that District credit cards had been used to pay for\n\nexpenses associated with the gathering. Because the available information indicates that the\nBoard did not provide public notice of the gathering, and did not approve and make available to\nthe public the minutes of the gathering, it is reasonable that Mr. Kraft and Chairman Prenzler\nwould not have been aware of the alleged violations by the Board within 60 days of their\n\noccurrence despite using reasonable diligence. Because the Request for Review appears to have\nbeen submitted within the time limits set out in section 3. 5(a) of OMA, this office has authority\n\nAllegation\n\nof Undisclosed\n\nMeetings\n\nOMA is intended \" to ensure that the actions of public bodies be taken openly and\nthat their deliberations be conducted openly.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2(a) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n11- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100- 465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that \"[ a] ll\nmeetings of public bodies shall be open to.the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed\nin accordance with Section 2a.\"\n\nSection 1: 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2016)) defines a\n\nmeeting\" subject to the Act as:\nA] ny gathering, whether in person or by video or audio\nconference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without\n\nlimitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging),\nor other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of\n\na majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5 - member\npublic body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for\nthe purpose of discussing public business.\nIf a gathering of members of a public body meets this definition, then all of the requirements of\n\nOMA apply, including the proper posting of notice and an agenda (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West\n2016)), holding the meeting at a specified time and place that is convenient and open to the\npublic (5 ILCS 102/ 2. 01 (West 2016)), keeping minutes (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a) (West 2016)), and\n\nallowing public recording (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 05 (West 2016) and comment (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g)\nWest 2016)).\n\nHowever, OMA \"is not intended to prohibit bona fide social gatherings of public\n\nofficials, or truly political meetings at which party business is discussed. Rather, the Act is\ndesigned to prohibit secret deliberation and action on business which properly should be\ndiscussed in a public forum due to its potential impact on the public.\" People ex rel. Difanis v.\nBarr, 83 Ill. 2d 191, 202 (1980). OMA \"balance[ s] the right of the press and the people to view\n\nthe deliberative and decision- making processes of government first- hand with the right of public\nofficials to speak their minds freely and associate with whomever they choose.\"\n\nBarr, 83 Ill. 2d\n\nat 210.\n\nMr. Kraft's Request for Review alleged that statements for a District credit card\n\ndemonstrate that the District paid expenses associated with the February 3- 5, 2017, gatherings,\nand\n\nthat annotations\n\non\n\nthose statements\n\nreply, the Board's outside counsel asserted that the February event was a social gathering\n\nattended by six Board members and spouses, and that the members in attendance did not discuss\npublic business: \" There was no examining or weighing any course of action, no exchange of\nfacts preliminary to a public business- related decisions, and no attempt to reach accord on any\n\nmatter of public business.\" 1 Therefore, the Board argued, the gathering did not constitute a\nmeeting,\" and it was not necessary for the Board to open the gathering to the public and satisfy\nthe other requirements of OMA.\n\nMr. Kraft replied to the Board's response, arguing that if no public business was\n\ndiscussed during the retreat, it was improper and illegal for the District to use public funds to pay\nfor a purely social outing for Board members and spouses. Mr. Kraft also noted that District\nfunds were used to reserve a separate suite, described on the invoices as \" MTG,\" in addition to\n\nthe rooms assigned to the individuals who attended the gathering. This office asked the Board's\noutside counsel to supplement its response to the Request for Review with an explanation about\n\nthe use of the hotel room described in Mr. Kraft's reply. The Board's outside counsel asserted\nthat the hotel room was labeled \" MTG\" on the receipt because it was not specifically assigned to\nan individual, that the room was used to host the social event, and that no discussions of public\n\nbusiness were held in that room. In reply, Mr. Kraft asserted that the Board's responses admit it\nused public funds for a nonpublic purpose, and reiterated his argument that the use of funds was\nimproper and illegal.\n\nAlthough the available information indicates that a majority of a quorum of the\n\nBoard gathered together at a hotel on February 3- 5, 2017, and the Board has not contested Mr.\nKraft's allegation that the District paid the expenses associated with that gathering, the Board's\noutside counsel asserted that the Board members in attendance did not discuss public business at\n\nthis event, and this office has not received any evidence contradicting that statement. As\ndiscussed above, a gathering of a majority of a quorum of public body members is subject to the\n\nsafeguards of OMA only if the members gather \" for the purpose of discussing public business.\"\nSee, e. g., Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 28092, issued March 6, 2014 (allegation that\nmembers of public body met at brewery per Facebook post was insufficient to find that an\nimproper meeting was held absent evidence that public business was discussed).\n\nAccordingly,\n\nthis office lacks sufficient evidence to conclude that the Board violated OMA when it held a non-\n\npublic gathering on February 3- 5, 2017.\n\nAssistant\n\nAttorney\n\nLetter from Robert L. Jackstadt, Tueth Keeney Cooper Moran and Jackstadt P. C., to Leah Bartelt,\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau,' Offlce of the Illinois Attorney General (November 27, 2017).\n\nThis office notes that the Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to\n\nreviewing alleged violations of the FOIA and OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7)(c) (West 2016). This\noffice does not have authority to review the District's alleged use of public funds for the retreat.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, you may contact me at (312) 814- 6437.\nV er} truly yours,\n\nLEAH BARTELT\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n50150 50207 consol\n\no\n\n2a meeting\n\nproper\n\nspd"}
{"id":1223,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-04-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50418"],"title":"City of Lincoln City Council violated OMA by failing to timely approve and properly detail meeting minutes","filename":"50418, issued April 17, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2991,"summary":"The requester alleged that the City of Lincoln's meeting agendas lacked sufficient detail regarding 'Payment of Bills' and that meeting minutes were approved late and lacked required content. The PAC determined that the agenda notice was adequate, but confirmed that the City failed to approve minutes in a timely manner and failed to include required content in those minutes.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the City of Lincoln's meeting agendas were too vague and that their meeting minutes were handled incorrectly. The Attorney General's office found that the agendas were acceptable, but agreed that the City broke the law by waiting too long to approve minutes and by leaving out information that the law requires to be in those minutes. This means the City must ensure its future meeting minutes are approved on time and contain all legally mandated details.","holding":"The City of Lincoln violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to approve meeting minutes in a timely manner and failing to include the required content in those minutes.","legal_question":"Whether the City of Lincoln's meeting agendas provided adequate notice of final action and whether the City complied with OMA requirements for the approval and content of meeting minutes.","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Lincoln City Council","requesting_party":"Mr. Blinn Bates","pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting minutes","subject_description":"The adequacy of agenda notice for 'Payment of Bills' and the timeliness and content of approved meeting minutes.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_a/50418, issued April 17, 2018.pdf","sha256":"9d4d85ec48a03e6862088a1c1bddf6abec87651bfdf255413957677766ea76dc","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting minutes","agenda notice","open meetings act","city council"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Minutes","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 17, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Blinn Bates\nWoods & Bates\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nblinn@woodsandbates.\n\ncom\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50418\nDear\n\nand Mr. Bates:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the City Council ( Council) of the City of Lincoln ( City)' s agendas for its regular meetings on\nOctober 2, 2017 and November 6, 2017 contained adequate notice of a final action taken at those\n\nmeetings, but that prior meeting minutes approved at the October 2, 2017, meeting were\napproved late and did not include the content required by OMA.\nOn November 13, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging\n\nthat the item \" Payment of Bills\" which appears on agendas of the Council does not provide\n\nadequate notice of the final action to be taken. He attached the meeting agendas for the October\n2, 2017, and November 6, 2017, meetings as examples.\nalso alleged that meeting\nminutes for Council meetings that had occurred on March 28, 2017, June 27, 2017, July 31,\n2017, August 28, 2017, August 29, 2017, and September 5, 2017 were approved at the October\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Blinn Bates\nApril 17, 2018\nPage 2\n\n2, 2017, regular Council meeting, thus were approved outside of the time limits provided by\nOMA.\nfurther alleged that the content of the minutes did not comply with OMA.'\nDETERMINATION\nAgenda Item \" Payment of Bills\"\n\nSection 2. 02( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nagenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\nordinance\n\nthat will be the subject\n\nof\n\nfinal action\n\nnot define the term \" general subject matter.\"\n\nat the\nmeeting.\" ( Emphasis added.) OMA does\nHowever, the Senate debate on House Bill No.\n\n4687, which added section 2. 02( c) to OMA as part of Public Act 97- 827, effective January 1,\n2013, indicates that the General Assembly intended this provision to ensure that agendas provide\ngeneral notice of all matters upon which a public body would be taking final action:\n\nT] here was just no real requirement as to how specific they\nneeded to be to the public of what they were going to discuss that\nwould be final action. And this just says that you have to have a *\n\ngeneral notice if you' re going to have and take final action, as\nto generally what' s going to be discussed so that —that people\n\nwho follow their units of local government know what they' re\ngoing to be acting upon. ( Emphasis added.) Remarks of Sen.\nDillard, May 16, 2012, Senate Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at\n47.\n\nIn interpreting statutes such as OMA, undefined statutory terms must be afforded\nand popular meanings[,]\"\nwhich may be gleaned from dictionaries. See,\n\ntheir \" plain, ordinary,\n\ne.g., Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, 223 111. 2d 352, 366 ( 2006).\n\nGeneral\" is defined, in relevant part, as \" relating to, determined by, or concerned with main\nelements rather than limited details.\" Merriam -Webster Online Dictionary, http:// www. merriamwebster. com/ dictionary/ general ( last visited April 17, 2018). Additionally, Black' s Law\nDictionary defines \" subject matter\" as \"[ t] he issue presented for consideration; the thing in which\na right or duty has been asserted; the thing in dispute.\" Black' s Law Dictionary ( 10th ed. 2014),\navailable at Westlaw BLACKS. Accordingly, in light of these definitions and the legislative\nhistory behind section 2. 02( c), the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that \" the\nGeneral Assembly' s use of the term ' general subject matter' signifies that a meeting agenda must\nalso alleged that the requirement of a \" speaker' s card\" for public comment violated\n\nOMA, but did not allege that he or any other person was specifically prohibited from providing public comment.\nLastly,\nalleged that the City Attorney acted inappropriately at an October 16, 2017, meeting. For\nreasons\n\nfurther explained above, this office did not request that the Council respond\n\nto these\n\nadditional\n\nallegations.\n\n\fMr. Blinn Bates\nApril\n\n17, 2018\n\nPage 3\n\nset forth the main element( s), rather than the specific details, of an item on which the public body\nintends to take final action.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45667, issued February 16,\n2017, at 4- 5.\n\nThis office has previously determined with respect to this Council' s agendas that\nthe agenda item \" Payment of Bills\" sufficiently identified the general subject matter of the final\naction taken on invoices at its meetings. See Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 49515, issued\nOctober 30, 2017, at 6. The language and legislative history of section 2. 02( c) of OMA do not\nprovide this office with a basis upon which to conclude that the Council was required to\n\nspecifically identify on the agenda each bill it approved or otherwise set forth details about those\nbills. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Council did not violate the advance notice\nrequirement of section 2. 02( c) of OMA by listing \" Payment of Bills\" on the agendas of the\nOctober 2, 2017, and November 6, 2017, Council meetings.\n\nApproval of Meeting Minutes\nSection 2. 06( b) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( b) ( West 2016)) provides, in relevant\npart:\n\nA public body shall approve the minutes of its open\n\nmeeting within 30 days after that meeting or at the public body' s\nsecond subsequent regular meeting, whichever is later. The\nminutes of meetings open to the public shall be available for public\n\ninspection within 10 days after the approval of such minutes by the\npublic body.\n\nAt its October 2, 2017, meeting, the Council approved minutes from prior\nmeetings held on March 28, 2017, June 27, 2017, July 31, 2017, August 28, 2017, August 29,\n2017, and September 5, 2017. In its answer to this office, the Council acknowledged that \"there\n\nis no doubt that the approval of some of the Council' s prior meeting minutes was not done\n\ntimely.\" 2 It is apparent that more than 30 days had elapsed and two regular meetings had\noccurred since some of these meetings. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Council\n\nviolated section 2. 06( b) of OMA by not approving meeting minutes in a timely manner.\n\n2E -mail from Blinn Bates, Woods & Bates, to Neil Olson, [ Deputy Public Access Counselor],\nPublic Access Bureau] ( November 27, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Blinn Bates\nApril 17, 2018\nPage 4\n\nContent of Minutes\n\nIn addition to the timeliness of the approval of those minutes,\nobjected to the content of the minutes:\n\nNot only are the minutes late, they leave out key details of the\nmeetings.\n\nI cannot make heads or tails the majority of what Risa\n\nRiggs ( recording secretary) is saying. The minutes are to be clear,\nprecise, where the general public could understand and know what\n\nis said and what is going on. That simply is not the situation?'\nIn its answer to this office, the Council asserted that the minutes comply with the requirements of\nOMA.\n\nSection 2. 06( a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2. 06( a) ( West 2016)) provides:\na)\n\nAll public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their\nmeetings, whether open or closed, and a verbatim record of\n\nall their closed meetings in the form of an audio or video\n\nrecording.\n\nMinutes shall include, but need not be limited\n\nto:\n\n1)\n\nthe date, time and place of the meeting;\n\n2)\n\nthe members of the public body recorded as either\npresent or absent and whether the members were\n\nphysically present or present by means of video or\naudio\n\n3)\n\nconference;\n\nand\n\na summary of discussion on all matters proposed,\ndeliberated, or decided, and a record of any votes\ntaken.\n\n3Letter from\n\nundated).\n\n\fMr. Blinn Bates\nApril 17, 2018\nPage 5\n\ndoes not appear to dispute that the minutes approved at the October 2, 2017,\n\nmeeting contain the information required by subsections 2. 06( a)( 1) and 2. 06( a)( 2). 4 Therefore,\nthis review is limited to whether the minutes contain the information required by subsection\n2. 06( a)( 3), namely, \" a summary of discussion on all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided,\nand a record of any votes taken.\"\nOMA does not further address how detailed the summaries of discussion in\n\nmeeting minutes should be, and no Illinois reviewing court appears to have addressed that issue.\n\nHowever, the Public Access Bureau has consistently concluded that one -sentence general\nstatements purporting to summarize discussion are insufficient. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 26700, issued April 9, 2015, at 5 ( statement that staff member \" spoke about the\n\npump house floors\" insufficiently described discussion).\nThis office has reviewed the approved minutes in concert with the recordings for\n\nopen sessions provided by the Council.5 Our review reflects that the summary of discussion in\nthe meetings and record of votes taken did not satisfy the requirements of section 2. 06( a)( 3), and\nprovides two examples.\n\nMarch 28, 2017, Meeting Minutes\n\nThe minutes of the March 28, 2017, Council Committee of the Whole meeting\ncontain the following summary of the discussion on the agenda item \" Logan County Electric\nConsortium Consulting Agreement\":\nMayor Neitzel said there were three businesses that made\n\npresentations. One company did not have [ sic] and left two\nbusinesses that were approved. It was decided to go with Illinois\n\n4In an e- mail dated December 20, 2017 to this office, the City Clerk stated that the July 31, 2017,\nmeeting occurred at Lincoln College, and the agenda provided by the Council also states the meeting was held at\nLincoln College. However, the July 31, 2017, minutes reflect that the meeting was held in the Council Chambers.\nAs part of the remedial action further discussed in this determination, the Council should address this discrepancy.\n\n5OMA does not require the recording of open sessions ( as opposed to closed sessions). This office\nrequested recordings for any open sessions that were recorded. In response, the City Clerk provided audio files for\nthe recordings of the March 28, 2017, Council Committee of the Whole meeting, the June 27, 2017, Council\nCommittee of the Whole meeting, the August 28, 2017, special Council meeting, the August 28, 2017, Council\n\nCommittee of the Whole meeting, and the September 5, 2017, regular Council meeting; the Clerk stated that the July\n31, 2017 special Committee of the Whole meeting was not recorded. The Clerk further stated that some of the\n\nrecordings may not have been properly recorded; this office was unable to review the recording of the June 27,\n2017, meeting.\n\n\fMr. Blinn Bates\nApril 17, 2018\nPage 6\n\nChoice which is going with ICCAN. Alderman Welch said they\nshould have looked at all three.\n\nICCAN gave the best cost.\n\nThis will be discussed again on April 25, 2017.[ 61\nThis section summarized a nearly 19 -minute long deliberation among the Council\nabout the process for selecting an electricity aggregation consultant for the City. The Mayor\nreported that the Logan County Electric Consortium, on which she served as a member,\nconsidered three applications, had eliminated one applicant from contention, and of the\n\nremaining two ( the Illinois Community Choice Aggregation Network [ ICCAN] and \" Good\nEnergy\"), had selected ICCAN. A member of the Council questioned why one applicant ( then\nidentified as \" Stone River\") had been eliminated,\n\nand thereafter other members of the Council\n\nquestioned the selection process and whether the Consortium' s decision was binding. The Mayor\ndescribed that the one applicant had been disqualified based on the manner in which it made its\n\ncost projections, and that the Council ultimately was the body to vote to approve the contract for\nthe City. In the end, the Mayor agreed to provide the application materials to the Council for its\n\nreview, and the matter was tabled until April 25, 2017. The summary does not identify all three\nbusinesses making \" presentations,\"\n\nto what body those presentations were made, and what one\n\nbusiness \" did not have.\" In addition, it does not sufficiently reflect the substance of the\ndiscussion among the Council members or the final conclusion of the discussion.\nSeptember 5, 2017, Meeting Minutes\nAs another example, the minutes of the September 5, 2017, Council meeting\n\ncontain the following summary under the agenda item \" Exclusive Franchise Municipal Solid\nWaste and Recycling Collection Proposal\":\nAlderman Bauer moved to approve the Exclusive Franchise\nMunicipal Solid Waste agreement and Alderman Keller seconded\nit. Clerk Mrs. Bateman called the roll call.\n\nThere were five ayes\n\nAlderman Bauer, Alderman Browne, Alderman Hoinacki,\nAlderman Keller and Alderman Parrott, and Alderman Welch),\nthree nays ( Alderman\n\nHoefle,\n\nAlderman\n\nHorn and Alderman\n\nParrott), and none absent; motion carried. ( Emphasis added.)\n\nAlderman Bauer moved to approve Recycling Collection\nProposal and Alderman Browne seconded it. City Clerk Mrs.\nBateman called the roll call.\n\nLincoln, Illinois,\n\nThere were eight ayes ( Alderman\n\nCity Council Committee of the Whole Meeting, March 28, 2017, Minutes 2.\n\n\fMr. Blinn Bates\nApril 17, 2018\nPage 7\n\nBauer, Alderman Browne, Alderman Hoefle, Alderman Hoinacki,\nAlderman Horn, Alderman Keller, Alderman Parrott, and\n\nAlderman Welch), zero nays, and none absent; motion carried( 1\nWith respect to the first motion, as indicated above, the approved minutes reflect\n\nthat an alderman cast both an aye and a nay vote on the first proposed motion. The recording of\nthe meeting reflects that this alderman voted against the motion. In addition, the summary does\nnot reflect key parts of the proposed motion, such as the party to be awarded the contract or the\ncontract' s term. The summary also does not reflect in any respect the nearly 20 -minute\ndeliberation among the Council members prior to the vote, in which certain members expressed\nobjections\n\nto the proposal.\n\nWith respect to the second motion summarized\n\nin this part of the minutes, our\n\nreview of the recording reflects that the minutes inaccurately reflect the motion. Rather than a\n\nmotion to approve a recycling collection agreement apart from a solid waste collection\nagreement, the motion was to direct the City Attorney to draft an ordinance regarding the\nmandatory collection of solid waste and recycling.\n\nThe descriptions above are not an exhaustive listing of all the deficiencies of the\nminutes at issue. However, these examples illustrate that the minutes do not comply with the\nminimum requirements of section 2. 06( a) of OMA because they do not sufficiently and\n\naccurately summarize the Council' s discussions and votes.\nIn accordance with the conclusions\n\nof this letter, this office requests that the\n\nCouncil review the minutes approved at the October 2, 2017, regular meeting with the available\nresources such as recordings and notes, and revise them to comply with the requirements of\nsection 2. 06( a) of OMA.\n\nPublic Comment\n\nIn addition,\n\nalleged that the Council required a \" speaker's card\" to\n\nbe filled out for a member of the public to provide public comment.\n\ndid not allege\n\nthat he or another member of the public were prevented from providing public comment because\nof the failure to complete this card, therefore this statement does not set forth facts sufficient to\nallege that a violation of OMA has occurred. The Public Access Bureau, however, is also\n\ncharged with providing advice and education with respect to OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7 et seq.\nWest 2016). The \" speaker' s card\" requires a person' s name, address, e- mail address, and the\n\nsubject of the public comment.\n\nIn binding opinion 14- 009, the Attorney General concluded that\n\nCity of Lincoln, Illinois, September 5, 2017, Minutes\n\n2.\n\n\fMr. Blinn Bates\nApril 17, 2018\nPage 8\n\nrequiring speakers to state their home addresses prior to addressing public bodies violates section\n\n2. 06( g) of OMA ( Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7). This\noffice suggests that the Council re- examine its rules for public comment, keeping in mind that\nalthough OMA does not specifically address the types of rules that a public body may adopt,\ngenerally, public bodies may only adopt those reasonable \" time, place and manner\" regulations\n\nthat are necessary to further a significant governmental interest. See, e. g., I.A. Rana Enterprises,\nInc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 ( N. D. Ill. 2009).\nLastly,\nraised additional issues related to the conduct of the City\nAttorney. The Public Access Counselor' s authority is limited to resolving disputes concerning\nthe Freedom of Information Act ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2016)) and OMA. 15 ILCS\n\n205/ 7( c) ( West 2016). Therefore, these allegations are not subject to review by this office.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 217) 782- 9078.\nVery truly yours,\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\n\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50418 o 202c proper 206a 206b minutes improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nThe Honorable Seth Goodman\nMayor\n\nCity of Lincoln\n\n700 Broadway Street\nLincoln, Illinois 62656\nsgoodman@lincolnil.\n\ngov\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Agenda notice and approval of meeting minutes","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50418/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 17, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Blinn Bates\nWoods & Bates\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nblinn@woodsandbates.\n\ncom\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50418\nDear\n\nand Mr. Bates:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the City Council (Council) of the City of Lincoln (City)' s agendas for its regular meetings on\nOctober 2, 2017 and November 6, 2017 contained adequate notice of a final action taken at those\n\nmeetings, but that prior meeting minutes approved at the October 2, 2017, meeting were\napproved late and did not include the content required by OMA.\nOn November 13, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging\n\nthat the item \" Payment of Bills\" which appears on agendas of the Council does not provide\n\nadequate notice of the final action to be taken. He attached the meeting agendas for the October\n2, 2017, and November 6, 2017, meetings as examples.\nalso alleged that meeting\nminutes for Council meetings that had occurred on March 28, 2017, June 27, 2017, July 31,\n2017, August 28, 2017, August 29, 2017, and September 5, 2017 were approved at the October\n\n2, 2017, regular Council meeting, thus were approved outside of the time limits provided by\nOMA.\nfurther alleged that the content of the minutes did not comply with OMA.'\nDETERMINATION\nAgenda Item \" Payment of Bills\"\n\nSection 2. 02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nagenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or\nordinance\n\nthat will be the subject\n\nof\n\nfinal action\n\nnot define the term \" general subject matter.\"\n\nat the\nmeeting.\" (Emphasis added.) OMA does\nHowever, the Senate debate on House Bill No.\n\n4687, which added section 2. 02(c) to OMA as part of Public Act 97- 827, effective January 1,\n2013, indicates that the General Assembly intended this provision to ensure that agendas provide\ngeneral notice of all matters upon which a public body would be taking final action:\n\nT] here was just no real requirement as to how specific they\nneeded to be to the public of what they were going to discuss that\nwould be final action. And this just says that you have to have a *\n\ngeneral notice if you' re going to have and take final action, as\nto generally what's going to be discussed so that —that people\n\nwho follow their units of local government know what they' re\ngoing to be acting upon. (Emphasis added.) Remarks of Sen.\nDillard, May 16, 2012, Senate Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at\n47.\n\nIn interpreting statutes such as OMA, undefined statutory terms must be afforded\nand popular meanings[,]\"\nwhich may be gleaned from dictionaries. See,\n\ntheir \" plain, ordinary,\n\ne.g., Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, 223 111. 2d 352, 366 (2006).\n\nGeneral\" is defined, in relevant part, as \" relating to, determined by, or concerned with main\nelements rather than limited details.\" Merriam -Webster Online Dictionary, http:// www. merriamwebster. com/ dictionary/ general (last visited April 17, 2018). Additionally, Black's Law\nDictionary defines \" subject matter\" as \"[ t] he issue presented for consideration; the thing in which\na right or duty has been asserted; the thing in dispute.\" Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014),\navailable at Westlaw BLACKS. Accordingly, in light of these definitions and the legislative\nhistory behind section 2. 02(c), the Public Access Bureau has previously determined that \" the\nGeneral Assembly's use of the term ' general subject matter' signifies that a meeting agenda must\nalso alleged that the requirement of a \" speaker's card\" for public comment violated\n\nOMA, but did not allege that he or any other person was specifically prohibited from providing public comment.\nLastly,\nalleged that the City Attorney acted inappropriately at an October 16, 2017, meeting. For\n\nset forth the main element(s), rather than the specific details, of an item on which the public body\nintends to take final action.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45667, issued February 16,\n2017, at 4- 5.\n\nThis office has previously determined with respect to this Council's agendas that\nthe agenda item \" Payment of Bills\" sufficiently identified the general subject matter of the final\naction taken on invoices at its meetings. See Ill. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 49515, issued\nOctober 30, 2017, at 6. The language and legislative history of section 2. 02(c) of OMA do not\nprovide this office with a basis upon which to conclude that the Council was required to\n\nspecifically identify on the agenda each bill it approved or otherwise set forth details about those\nbills. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Council did not violate the advance notice\nrequirement of section 2. 02(c) of OMA by listing \" Payment of Bills\" on the agendas of the\nOctober 2, 2017, and November 6, 2017, Council meetings.\n\nApproval of Meeting Minutes\nSection 2. 06(b) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(b) (West 2016)) provides, in relevant\npart:\n\nA public body shall approve the minutes of its open\n\nmeeting within 30 days after that meeting or at the public body's\nsecond subsequent regular meeting, whichever is later. The\nminutes of meetings open to the public shall be available for public\n\ninspection within 10 days after the approval of such minutes by the\npublic body.\n\nAt its October 2, 2017, meeting, the Council approved minutes from prior\nmeetings held on March 28, 2017, June 27, 2017, July 31, 2017, August 28, 2017, August 29,\n2017, and September 5, 2017. In its answer to this office, the Council acknowledged that \"there\n\nis no doubt that the approval of some of the Council's prior meeting minutes was not done\n\ntimely.\" 2 It is apparent that more than 30 days had elapsed and two regular meetings had\noccurred since some of these meetings. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Council\n\nviolated section 2. 06(b) of OMA by not approving meeting minutes in a timely manner.\n\n2E -mail from Blinn Bates, Woods & Bates, to Neil Olson, [ Deputy Public Access Counselor],\n\nContent of Minutes\n\nIn addition to the timeliness of the approval of those minutes,\nobjected to the content of the minutes:\n\nNot only are the minutes late, they leave out key details of the\nmeetings.\n\nI cannot make heads or tails the majority of what Risa\n\nRiggs (recording secretary) is saying. The minutes are to be clear,\nprecise, where the general public could understand and know what\n\nis said and what is going on. That simply is not the situation?'\nIn its answer to this office, the Council asserted that the minutes comply with the requirements of\nOMA.\n\nSection 2. 06(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2. 06(a) (West 2016)) provides:\na)\n\nAll public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their\nmeetings, whether open or closed, and a verbatim record of\n\nall their closed meetings in the form of an audio or video\n\nrecording.\n\nMinutes shall include, but need not be limited\n\nto:\n\n1)\n\nthe date, time and place of the meeting;\n\n2)\n\nthe members of the public body recorded as either\npresent or absent and whether the members were\n\nphysically present or present by means of video or\naudio\n\n3)\n\nconference;\n\nand\n\ndoes not appear to dispute that the minutes approved at the October 2, 2017,\n\nmeeting contain the information required by subsections 2. 06(a)(1) and 2. 06(a)(2). 4 Therefore,\nthis review is limited to whether the minutes contain the information required by subsection\n2. 06(a)(3), namely, \" a summary of discussion on all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided,\nand a record of any votes taken.\"\nOMA does not further address how detailed the summaries of discussion in\n\nmeeting minutes should be, and no Illinois reviewing court appears to have addressed that issue.\n\nHowever, the Public Access Bureau has consistently concluded that one -sentence general\nstatements purporting to summarize discussion are insufficient. See, e.g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC\nReq. Rev. Ltr. 26700, issued April 9, 2015, at 5 (statement that staff member \" spoke about the\n\npump house floors\" insufficiently described discussion).\nThis office has reviewed the approved minutes in concert with the recordings for\n\nopen sessions provided by the Council.5 Our review reflects that the summary of discussion in\nthe meetings and record of votes taken did not satisfy the requirements of section 2. 06(a)(3), and\nprovides two examples.\n\nMarch 28, 2017, Meeting Minutes\n\nThe minutes of the March 28, 2017, Council Committee of the Whole meeting\ncontain the following summary of the discussion on the agenda item \" Logan County Electric\nConsortium Consulting Agreement\":\nMayor Neitzel said there were three businesses that made\n\npresentations. One company did not have [ sic] and left two\nbusinesses that were approved. It was decided to go with Illinois\n\n4 In an e- mail dated December 20, 2017 to this office, the City Clerk stated that the July 31, 2017,\nmeeting occurred at Lincoln College, and the agenda provided by the Council also states the meeting was held at\nLincoln College. However, the July 31, 2017, minutes reflect that the meeting was held in the Council Chambers.\nAs part of the remedial action further discussed in this determination, the Council should address this discrepancy.\n\n5OMA does not require the recording of open sessions (as opposed to closed sessions). This office\nrequested recordings for any open sessions that were recorded. In response, the City Clerk provided audio files for\nthe recordings of the March 28, 2017, Council Committee of the Whole meeting, the June 27, 2017, Council\nCommittee of the Whole meeting, the August 28, 2017, special Council meeting, the August 28, 2017, Council\n\nCommittee of the Whole meeting, and the September 5, 2017, regular Council meeting; the Clerk stated that the July\n31, 2017 special Committee of the Whole meeting was not recorded. The Clerk further stated that some of the\n\nrecordings may not have been properly recorded; this office was unable to review the recording of the June 27,\n\nChoice which is going with ICCAN. Alderman Welch said they\nshould have looked at all three.\n\nICCAN gave the best cost.\n\nThis will be discussed again on April 25, 2017.[ 61\nThis section summarized a nearly 19 -minute long deliberation among the Council\nabout the process for selecting an electricity aggregation consultant for the City. The Mayor\nreported that the Logan County Electric Consortium, on which she served as a member,\nconsidered three applications, had eliminated one applicant from contention, and of the\n\nremaining two (the Illinois Community Choice Aggregation Network [ ICCAN] and \" Good\nEnergy\"), had selected ICCAN. A member of the Council questioned why one applicant (then\nidentified as \" Stone River\") had been eliminated,\n\nand thereafter other members of the Council\n\nquestioned the selection process and whether the Consortium's decision was binding. The Mayor\ndescribed that the one applicant had been disqualified based on the manner in which it made its\n\ncost projections, and that the Council ultimately was the body to vote to approve the contract for\nthe City. In the end, the Mayor agreed to provide the application materials to the Council for its\n\nreview, and the matter was tabled until April 25, 2017. The summary does not identify all three\nbusinesses making \" presentations,\"\n\nto what body those presentations were made, and what one\n\nbusiness \" did not have.\" In addition, it does not sufficiently reflect the substance of the\ndiscussion among the Council members or the final conclusion of the discussion.\nSeptember 5, 2017, Meeting Minutes\nAs another example, the minutes of the September 5, 2017, Council meeting\n\ncontain the following summary under the agenda item \" Exclusive Franchise Municipal Solid\nWaste and Recycling Collection Proposal\":\nAlderman Bauer moved to approve the Exclusive Franchise\nMunicipal Solid Waste agreement and Alderman Keller seconded\nit. Clerk Mrs. Bateman called the roll call.\n\nThere were five ayes\n\nAlderman Bauer, Alderman Browne, Alderman Hoinacki,\nAlderman Keller and Alderman Parrott, and Alderman Welch),\nthree nays (Alderman\n\nHoefle,\n\nAlderman\n\nHorn and Alderman\n\nParrott), and none absent; motion carried. (Emphasis added.)\n\nAlderman Bauer moved to approve Recycling Collection\n\nBauer, Alderman Browne, Alderman Hoefle, Alderman Hoinacki,\nAlderman Horn, Alderman Keller, Alderman Parrott, and\n\nAlderman Welch), zero nays, and none absent; motion carried(1\nWith respect to the first motion, as indicated above, the approved minutes reflect\n\nthat an alderman cast both an aye and a nay vote on the first proposed motion. The recording of\nthe meeting reflects that this alderman voted against the motion. In addition, the summary does\nnot reflect key parts of the proposed motion, such as the party to be awarded the contract or the\ncontract's term. The summary also does not reflect in any respect the nearly 20 -minute\ndeliberation among the Council members prior to the vote, in which certain members expressed\nobjections\n\nto the proposal.\n\nWith respect to the second motion summarized\n\nin this part of the minutes, our\n\nreview of the recording reflects that the minutes inaccurately reflect the motion. Rather than a\n\nmotion to approve a recycling collection agreement apart from a solid waste collection\nagreement, the motion was to direct the City Attorney to draft an ordinance regarding the\nmandatory collection of solid waste and recycling.\n\nThe descriptions above are not an exhaustive listing of all the deficiencies of the\nminutes at issue. However, these examples illustrate that the minutes do not comply with the\nminimum requirements of section 2. 06(a) of OMA because they do not sufficiently and\n\naccurately summarize the Council's discussions and votes.\nIn accordance with the conclusions\n\nof this letter, this office requests that the\n\nCouncil review the minutes approved at the October 2, 2017, regular meeting with the available\nresources such as recordings and notes, and revise them to comply with the requirements of\nsection 2. 06(a) of OMA.\n\nPublic Comment\n\nIn addition,\n\nalleged that the Council required a \" speaker's card\" to\n\nbe filled out for a member of the public to provide public comment.\n\ndid not allege\n\nthat he or another member of the public were prevented from providing public comment because\nof the failure to complete this card, therefore this statement does not set forth facts sufficient to\nallege that a violation of OMA has occurred. The Public Access Bureau, however, is also\n\ncharged with providing advice and education with respect to OMA. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7 et seq.\nWest 2016). The \" speaker's card\" requires a person's name, address, e- mail address, and the\n\nrequiring speakers to state their home addresses prior to addressing public bodies violates section\n\n2. 06(g) of OMA (Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 4, 2014, at 7). This\noffice suggests that the Council re- examine its rules for public comment, keeping in mind that\nalthough OMA does not specifically address the types of rules that a public body may adopt,\ngenerally, public bodies may only adopt those reasonable \" time, place and manner\" regulations\n\nthat are necessary to further a significant governmental interest. See, e. g., I.A. Rana Enterprises,\nInc. v. City ofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N. D. Ill. 2009).\nLastly,\nraised additional issues related to the conduct of the City\nAttorney. The Public Access Counselor's authority is limited to resolving disputes concerning\nthe Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2016)) and OMA. 15 ILCS\n\n205/ 7(c) (West 2016). Therefore, these allegations are not subject to review by this office.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (217) 782- 9078.\nVery truly yours,\n\nNEIL P. OLSON\n\nDeputy Public Access Counselor\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50418 o 202c proper 206a 206b minutes improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nThe Honorable Seth Goodman\nMayor\n\nCity of Lincoln\n\n700 Broadway Street\nLincoln, Illinois 62656\nsgoodman@lincolnil.\n\ngov"}
{"id":1226,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-03-28","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50424"],"title":"Winnebago Veterans Assistance violated OMA by failing to prepare minutes and removing closed session records","filename":"50424, issued March 28, 2018__1.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1760,"summary":"The PAC investigated allegations that the Veterans Assistance Commission of Winnebago County failed to prepare meeting minutes and improperly removed closed session materials. The PAC found the Commission complied regarding July 12, 2017, minutes but violated OMA by failing to keep minutes for an August 9, 2017, meeting and improperly removing closed session records.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a local Veterans Assistance Commission failed to keep proper meeting minutes and mishandled confidential closed-session records. The Attorney General's office found that while one set of minutes was handled correctly, the Commission failed to create minutes for another meeting and improperly moved sensitive closed-session documents out of their main office. The matter was closed with a reminder to the Commission to follow OMA requirements for record-keeping and storage.","holding":"The Commission violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to prepare minutes for its August 9, 2017, meeting and by improperly removing closed session materials from its main office.","legal_question":"Whether the Veterans Assistance Commission of Winnebago County violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to prepare open session minutes for specific meetings and by removing closed session minutes and verbatim recordings from its main office.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Veterans Assistance Commission of Winnebago County","requesting_party":"Joshua M. Jones (on behalf of a complainant)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The maintenance and storage of open session minutes and closed session verbatim recordings.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.7,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_f/50424, issued March 28, 2018.pdf","sha256":"7d7937b4b0da857ac1d5058d9cdc481c376c46f4d43fc06863564f7e85cf684a","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting minutes","closed session","verbatim recording","record retention"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMarch 28, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Josef Kurlinkus, Esq.\nKurlinkus Law Office, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njosef@kurlinlcuslaw.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50424\nDear\n\nand Mr. Kurlinkus:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Veterans Assistance Commission of Winnebago County ( Commission) kept\n\nminutes of its July 12, 2017, meeting in accordance with OMA, but failed to keep meetings of its\nAugust 9, 2017, Executive Board meeting and improperly removed closed session materials from\nits main office.\n\nOn November 7, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\n\nthe Public Access Bureau alleging that the Commission potentially violated OMA in connection\nwith various meetings in 2017.\nnoted that he was on paid administrative leave from\nhis position as Superintendent of the Commission. This office determined that further action was\nwarranted as to his allegations that the Commission had not prepared open session minutes for\n\nmeetings held on July 12, 2017, and August 9, 2017, and that the closed session minutes and\n\nclosed session verbatim recording from the July 24, 2017, meeting had been removed from the\n\nCommission' s main office. On November 22, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for\nReview to the Commission and asked it to provide this office with copies of the open session\nminutes of those three meetings and the closed session minutes and closed session verbatim\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield,\n100 West\n1001\n\nRandolph\n\nIllinois\n\nStreet, Chicago, Illinois\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 877) 844- 5461 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: (800) 964- 3013 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • [\n\nTY: (877) 675- 9339 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416 —\n\ne—\n\n\fMr. Josef Kurlinkus\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 2\n\nrecording from the July 24, 2017, meeting, to the extent that those materials existed. This office\nalso requested a written explanation as to whether the Committee prepared the minutes and\n\nclosed session verbatim recording in question and whether closed session materials from the July\n24, 2017, meeting have been removed from the Commission' s main office. On December 22,\n2017, the Commission provided this office with those materials. On January 4, 2018,\nsubmitted a reply.\nANALYSIS\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 111. App. 3d\n161,\n\n171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes is\n\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seg.\nWest 2016)).\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West 2016). Accordingly, this office lacked the\nauthority to review the claims\nraised that are outside the scope of those statutes,\n\nsuch as alleged violations of the Commission' s Personnel Policy and its fiduciary duties.\nAdditionally,\nraised various alleged violations from before the 60\ndays preceding his Request for Review. Section 3. 5( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West\n2016)) provides, in pertinent part:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later than 60 days after the alleged violation. If facts\n\nconcerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 -day\nperiod, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2 years\nafter the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\n\ndiligence, the request for review may be made within 60 days of\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. ( Emphasis added.)\nUnder the plain language of section 3. 5( a), a person must submit a Request for\nReview within 60 days after an alleged violation occurred unless the person did not discover\n\nfacts concerning the alleged violation within those 60 days despite utilizing reasonable diligence.\nIn this instance,\n\nprovided no indication that he did not learn about the alleged\n\nviolations from prior to the 60 days before he submitted his Request for Review at the time that\nthey occurred\n\nor\n\nthat he did not discover them\n\nwithin\n\n60 days of their\n\noccurrence\n\ndespite using\n\n\fMr. Josef Kurlinkus\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 3\n\nreasonable diligence. Therefore, his allegations from prior to the 60 days before he submitted\n\nthis Request for Review were untimely, and, as a result, this office lacked the authority to take\nfurther action on them.\n\ntimely allegations concerned meeting materials for meetings of the\nCommission and its Executive Board. Section 2. 06( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a) ( West\n\n2016)) provides, in pertinent part: \" All public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their\nmeetings,\n\nwhether\n\nopen\n\nAdditionally, section 2. 06( e) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( e)\n\nor closed[.]\"\n\nWest 2016)) provides, in pertinent part: \" No verbatim recordings shall be recorded or removed\n\nfrom the public body' s main office or official storage location, except by vote of the public body\nor by court order.\" Likewise, section 2. 06( 1) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( f) (West 2016))\nprovides, in pertinent part: \" No minutes of meetings closed to the public shall be removed from\n\nthe public body' s main office or official storage location, except by vote of the public body or by\ncourt\n\norder.\"\n\nIn its response to this office, the Commission stated that it had approved the open\n\nsession minutes of its July 12, 2017, meeting on September 13, 2017. This office has reviewed\nthe copy of the minutes that the Commission provided, confirming that the minutes exist.\n\nTherefore, the Commission did not fail to keep minutes of its July 12, 2017, meeting as\nalleged. On the other hand, the Commission acknowledged that there are no minutes of the\n\nAugust 9, 2017, Executive Board meeting.\n\nThe failure to keep minutes of this meeting violated\n\nOMA. This office cautions the Commission\n\nand Executive Board that minutes of all meetings,\n\nwhether open or closed, must be kept.\n\nAs to whether closed session materials had been removed from the Commission' s\n\nmain office, the Commission' s attorney asserted:\na.\n\nClosed session materials for the months of March through\n\nPresent were removed from the [ Commission' s] administrative\n\noffice in August 2017. All prior closed minutes remain in the\n\noffice. Due to the structure of the Commission, the ongoing\n\npersonnel issues ( specifically those involving the complainant),\nand lack of secured storage at the [ Commission]\n\nthe closed session\n\nmaterials remained in the possession of the Commission Secretary.\nb.\n\nI have made the [ Commission] aware of the need to\n\nmaintain\n\nthe minutes\n\nin a secured location on the [ Commission]\n\n\fMr. Josef Kurlinkus\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 4\n\npremises, and they are taking the necessary steps to remedy the\n\nsituation, so that they are in full compliance with the [ Act]. l\nreplied that he did not recall a Commission vote to permit off-site storage of\nminutes.\n\nThe Commission has acknowledged that certain closed session materials have\nbeen removed from the Commission's main office, and the Commission has not asserted that it\nvoted to remove those minutes or verbatim recordings. Under the plain language of sections\n\n2. 06( e) and 2. 06( 0 of OMA, the Commission is required to maintain all of its closed session\nminutes and verbatim recordings at its principal office or official storage location unless it votes\nto remove them or a court order dictates otherwise.\n\nTherefore, the Commission\n\nviolated sections\n\n2. 06( e) and 2. 06( 0 of OMA by failing to maintain closed session materials at its main office.\nThis office advises the Commission to follow through on its attorney's guidance to implement a\nplan to maintain its closed session materials in a secure location at its principal office.\n\nBecause the Office of the Public Access Counselor is also charged with providing\neducation to both the public and public officials ( 15 ILCS 205/ 7( a), ( b), ( c) ( West 2016)), this\n\noffice further notes that the Commission appears to have acknowledged an additional improper\n\npractice. In confirming that the Commission did still possess the verbatim recording of its July\n24, 2017, meeting, the Commission' s attorney stated that \"[ v] erbatim recordings are generally not\nkept after\n\napproval\n\nof\n\nthe closed\n\nsession\n\nminutes[.]\"\n\n2 Section 2. 06( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 06( c) ( West 2016)) provides:\n\nThe verbatim record may be destroyed without notification\nto or the approval of a records commission or the State Archivist\nunder the Local Records Act or the State Records Act no less than\n\n18 months after the completion of the meeting recorded but only\nafter:\n\n1) the public body approves the destruction of a particular\nrecording; and\n\nLetter from Josef R. Kurlinkus, Attorney for the Commission, to Joshua M. Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (November 29, 2017), at 2.\n\n2Letter from Josef R. Kurlinkus, Attorney for the Commission, to Joshua M. Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General,\n\nOffice of the Illinois\n\nAttorney General ( November\n\n29, 2017),\n\nat\n\n2.\n\n\fMr. Josef Kurlinkus\nMarch 28, 2018\nPage 5\n\n2) the public body approves minutes of the closed meeting\nthat meet the written\n\nminutes\n\nrequirements\n\nof subsection (\n\na) of this\n\nSection.\n\nUnder the plain language of this provision, at least 18 months must pass before a public body can\ntake steps to dispose of a verbatim recording of a closed session. This office reminds the\nCommission that it must adhere to this provision and all of the other requirements of OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVry truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50424\n\no\n\n206\n\nminutes\n\nproper\n\nimproper co\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Maintenance and storage of open session minutes and closed session recordings","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50424/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMarch 28, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Josef Kurlinkus, Esq.\nKurlinkus Law Office, LLC\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\njosef@kurlinlcuslaw.com\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50424\nDear\n\nand Mr. Kurlinkus:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Veterans Assistance Commission of Winnebago County (Commission) kept\n\nminutes of its July 12, 2017, meeting in accordance with OMA, but failed to keep meetings of its\nAugust 9, 2017, Executive Board meeting and improperly removed closed session materials from\nits main office.\n\nOn November 7, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\n\nthe Public Access Bureau alleging that the Commission potentially violated OMA in connection\nwith various meetings in 2017.\nnoted that he was on paid administrative leave from\nhis position as Superintendent of the Commission. This office determined that further action was\nwarranted as to his allegations that the Commission had not prepared open session minutes for\n\nmeetings held on July 12, 2017, and August 9, 2017, and that the closed session minutes and\n\nclosed session verbatim recording from the July 24, 2017, meeting had been removed from the\n\nCommission's main office. On November 22, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for\nReview to the Commission and asked it to provide this office with copies of the open session\nminutes of those three meetings and the closed session minutes and closed session verbatim\n\nrecording from the July 24, 2017, meeting, to the extent that those materials existed. This office\nalso requested a written explanation as to whether the Committee prepared the minutes and\n\nclosed session verbatim recording in question and whether closed session materials from the July\n24, 2017, meeting have been removed from the Commission's main office. On December 22,\n2017, the Commission provided this office with those materials. On January 4, 2018,\nsubmitted a reply.\nANALYSIS\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\n\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 111. App. 3d\n161,\n\n171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n\nAs an initial matter, the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes is\n\nlimited to alleged violations of OMA and the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seg.\nWest 2016)).\n\nSee 15 ILCS 205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2016). Accordingly, this office lacked the\nauthority to review the claims\nraised that are outside the scope of those statutes,\n\nsuch as alleged violations of the Commission's Personnel Policy and its fiduciary duties.\nAdditionally,\nraised various alleged violations from before the 60\ndays preceding his Request for Review. Section 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West\n2016)) provides, in pertinent part:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later than 60 days after the alleged violation. If facts\n\nconcerning the violation are not discovered within the 60 -day\nperiod, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2 years\nafter the alleged violation, by a person utilizing reasonable\n\ndiligence, the request for review may be made within 60 days of\nthe discovery of the alleged violation. (Emphasis added.)\nUnder the plain language of section 3. 5(a), a person must submit a Request for\nReview within 60 days after an alleged violation occurred unless the person did not discover\n\nfacts concerning the alleged violation within those 60 days despite utilizing reasonable diligence.\nIn this instance,\n\nprovided no indication that he did not learn about the alleged\n\nviolations from prior to the 60 days before he submitted his Request for Review at the time that\nthey occurred\n\nor\n\nreasonable diligence. Therefore, his allegations from prior to the 60 days before he submitted\n\nthis Request for Review were untimely, and, as a result, this office lacked the authority to take\nfurther action on them.\n\ntimely allegations concerned meeting materials for meetings of the\nCommission and its Executive Board. Section 2. 06(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a) (West\n\n2016)) provides, in pertinent part: \" All public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their\nmeetings,\n\nwhether\n\nopen\n\nAdditionally, section 2. 06(e) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(e)\n\nor closed[.]\"\n\nWest 2016)) provides, in pertinent part: \" No verbatim recordings shall be recorded or removed\n\nfrom the public body's main office or official storage location, except by vote of the public body\nor by court order.\" Likewise, section 2. 06(1) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(f) (West 2016))\nprovides, in pertinent part: \" No minutes of meetings closed to the public shall be removed from\n\nthe public body's main office or official storage location, except by vote of the public body or by\ncourt\n\norder.\"\n\nIn its response to this office, the Commission stated that it had approved the open\n\nsession minutes of its July 12, 2017, meeting on September 13, 2017. This office has reviewed\nthe copy of the minutes that the Commission provided, confirming that the minutes exist.\n\nTherefore, the Commission did not fail to keep minutes of its July 12, 2017, meeting as\nalleged. On the other hand, the Commission acknowledged that there are no minutes of the\n\nAugust 9, 2017, Executive Board meeting.\n\nThe failure to keep minutes of this meeting violated\n\nOMA. This office cautions the Commission\n\nand Executive Board that minutes of all meetings,\n\nwhether open or closed, must be kept.\n\nAs to whether closed session materials had been removed from the Commission's\n\nmain office, the Commission's attorney asserted:\na.\n\nClosed session materials for the months of March through\n\nPresent were removed from the [ Commission's] administrative\n\noffice in August 2017. All prior closed minutes remain in the\n\noffice. Due to the structure of the Commission, the ongoing\n\npersonnel issues (specifically those involving the complainant),\nand lack of secured storage at the [ Commission]\n\nthe closed session\n\nmaterials remained in the possession of the Commission Secretary.\n\npremises, and they are taking the necessary steps to remedy the\n\nsituation, so that they are in full compliance with the [ Act]. l\nreplied that he did not recall a Commission vote to permit off-site storage of\nminutes.\n\nThe Commission has acknowledged that certain closed session materials have\nbeen removed from the Commission's main office, and the Commission has not asserted that it\nvoted to remove those minutes or verbatim recordings. Under the plain language of sections\n\n2. 06(e) and 2. 06(0 of OMA, the Commission is required to maintain all of its closed session\nminutes and verbatim recordings at its principal office or official storage location unless it votes\nto remove them or a court order dictates otherwise.\n\nTherefore, the Commission\n\nviolated sections\n\n2. 06(e) and 2. 06(0 of OMA by failing to maintain closed session materials at its main office.\nThis office advises the Commission to follow through on its attorney's guidance to implement a\nplan to maintain its closed session materials in a secure location at its principal office.\n\nBecause the Office of the Public Access Counselor is also charged with providing\neducation to both the public and public officials (15 ILCS 205/ 7(a), (b), (c) (West 2016)), this\n\noffice further notes that the Commission appears to have acknowledged an additional improper\n\npractice. In confirming that the Commission did still possess the verbatim recording of its July\n24, 2017, meeting, the Commission's attorney stated that \"[ v] erbatim recordings are generally not\nkept after\n\napproval\n\nof\n\nthe closed\n\nsession\n\nminutes[.]\"\n\n2 Section 2. 06(c) of OMA (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 06(c) (West 2016)) provides:\n\nThe verbatim record may be destroyed without notification\nto or the approval of a records commission or the State Archivist\nunder the Local Records Act or the State Records Act no less than\n\n18 months after the completion of the meeting recorded but only\nafter:\n\n1) the public body approves the destruction of a particular\nrecording; and\n\nLetter from Josef R. Kurlinkus, Attorney for the Commission, to Joshua M. Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (November 29, 2017), at 2.\n\n2 Letter from Josef R. Kurlinkus, Attorney for the Commission, to Joshua M. Jones, Assistant\nAttorney General,\n\n2) the public body approves minutes of the closed meeting\nthat meet the written\n\nminutes\n\nrequirements\n\nof subsection (a) of this\n\nSection.\n\nUnder the plain language of this provision, at least 18 months must pass before a public body can\ntake steps to dispose of a verbatim recording of a closed session. This office reminds the\nCommission that it must adhere to this provision and all of the other requirements of OMA.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this matter.\n\nVry truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50424\n\no\n\n206\n\nminutes\n\nproper\n\nimproper co"}
{"id":1227,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-01-17","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50450"],"title":"Freeburg school board violated Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment outside its own rules","filename":"50450, issued January 17, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1546,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Freeburg Community High School District No. 77 Board of Education improperly restricted public comment during a meeting by requiring citizens to speak in a private conference room rather than during the public meeting. The PAC determined that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act by imposing restrictions not authorized by its own established rules.","plain_summary":"A school board forced members of the public to speak to board members in a private room instead of allowing them to speak during the public meeting. The Attorney General's office found this violated the Open Meetings Act because the board's own rules did not allow for this type of restriction. The board was cautioned to ensure future public comment rules are followed and designed to accommodate public participation.","holding":"The Board of Education violated the Open Meetings Act by imposing a restriction on public comment that was not authorized by its established and recorded rules.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by restricting public comment in a manner inconsistent with its established and recorded rules.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06(g)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Education of Freeburg Community High School District No. 77","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The board restricted public comment by requiring citizens to speak in a private conference room rather than during the public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":96.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/50450, issued January 17, 2018.pdf","sha256":"e9ce810e2be21c80f9802f6b0d94bd8c6e88795585dc1d567818ab37caeb0e15","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","school board","meeting rules","Open Meetings Act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJanuary 17, 2018\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Merry Rhoades\nKeeney, Cooper,\n\nTueth,\n\nMohan & Jackstadt, P. C.\n\n101 West Vandalia, Suite 210\nEdwardsville, Illinois 62025\nmrhoades@tuethIceeney. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50450\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Rhoades:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)). For the reasons explained below, the Public Access\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education of Freeburg Community High School District No.\n77 ( Board) violated OMA during its November 13, 2017, meeting by imposing a restriction on\npublic comment that was not authorized by its established and recorded rules.\n\nOn November 14, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review\n\nto the Public Access Bureau alleging that during its November 13, 2017, meeting, the Board\nprohibited members of the public from addressing the members of the Board publicly. Instead,\nhe claimed, the Board required members of the public \" who wanted to make a comment or\nspeak, [ to] go into a conference room alone with the School Board to make those comments.\"'\n\nOn November 17, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nBoard and requested a copy of the Board' s public comment rules, a copy of the agenda and the\nminutes from the November 13, 2017, meeting, and a detailed written response to the allegation\n\nthat the Board improperly prohibited public comment during the meeting. On November 29,\n2017, the Board provided those materials, including a complete version of its response for this\nE- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau] ( November 14, 2017).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n1001\n\nEast Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: (\n\n618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMs. Merry Rhoades\nJanuary 17, 2018\nPage 2\n\noffice' s confidential review and a redacted version for this office to forward to\nOn December 7, 2017,\n\n2\n\nsubmitted a reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\nand recorded by the public\nbody.\" ( Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of section\n\n2. 06( g), a public body must establish and record rules governing public comment, and may\nrestrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 2, 2014, at 7.\n\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that prior to its November 13, 2017,\n\nmeeting, it became aware that parents and students would be making complaints against\nthe spouse of\nand the cheerleading coach for the District. The\nBoard stated:\n\nAt the beginning of the meeting, the Board President made it clear\nthat if the complaint was about an employee of the District, then\n\nthat matter would be considered during closed session of the Board\n\nof Education. If, however, any member of the public wanted to\naddress the Board of Education on any other matter, now was the\ntime for them to present those comments.\n\nNo person requested to\n\naddress the Board of Education on any matter other than with\nrespect to complaints about employees of the Districtl3l\n\nThe meeting minutes likewise provide that during the public comment portion of the meeting,\nthe Board President, Doug Parrish, \" asked that comments regarding coaches not be said at this\ntime.\" 4 After the Board went into closed session pursuant to section 2( c)( 1) of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n120/ 2( c)( 1) (\n\nWest 2016), as amended by Public Acts 100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100-\n\n2See 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( c) ( West 2016) (\" Upon request, the public body may also furnish the Public\nAccess Counselor with a redacted copy of the answer excluding specific references to any matters at issue. The\nPublic Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer or redacted answer, if furnished, to the person\n\nsubmitting the request for review.\").\n\n3Letter from Merry Rhoades to Joshua M. Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau\nNovember 29, 2017), at 2.\n\nFreeburg Community High School District No. 77 Board of Education, Meeting, November 13,\n2017, Minutes\n\n1.\n\n\fMs. Merry Rhoades\n\nJanuary 17, 2018\nPage 3\n\n465, effective August 31, 2017), which permits closed session discussion of specific employees,\n\nmembers of the public sequentially were invited in to address the Board in private.\n\nThe Board did not argue that it properly prohibited the public from addressing its\nmembers about coaches in open session pursuant to the Board's established and recorded rules\n\ngoverning public comment. Indeed, the Board' s established and recorded public comment rules\n\ndo not provide for the Board to prohibit members of the public from publicly raising concerns\n\nabout public employees. 5 Rather, the Board argued that it properly required members of the\npublic to address the Board about concerns regarding coaches behind closed doors because of the\nheated nature of the disputes.\n\nThe Board stated that complaints about the head football coach\n\nrequired certain parents and students to be separated during the open portion of the meeting, and\nclaimed that\nsimply wanted to intimidate any person that made a complaint\nagainst his wife by requiring that the complaints be made public. i6\n\nIn his reply,\ndisputed the way that the Board characterized his\nconduct in connection with the meeting, and stated: \" I do agree that [ the Board has] the right to\ncall a closed session to speak with my wife as well as the football coach, but any comments by\nthe public, should have been allowed in a public format.\"'\n\nOMA does not restrict a public body' s discretion to allow non -board members\ninto a closed session. Nothing in OMA prohibited the Board from inviting members of the\npublic who were hesitant to voice opinions about coaches into closed session to make their\n\nremarks out of earshot of the rest of the meeting attendees. Thus, to the extent that the Board\nsought to accommodate members of the public who were unwilling to speak about the coaches in\n\nopen session, the Board had a readily available alternative to barring members of the public who\nwished to raise their concerns publicly from doing so. In any event, the Board' s established and\nrecorded public comment rules did not permit the Board to prohibit comments about coaches\n\n5See Freeburg Community High School District No. 77 Board of Education, Board Policy 2. 230:\nPublic Participation at Board of Education Meetings and Petitions to the Board ( adopted June 19, 2017). Although\n\nthe fourth of these rules permits the Board President to \" determine procedural matters regarding public participation\nnot\n\notherwise\n\ndefined in Board\n\nof Education\n\npolicy[,]\" a restriction aimed at the content of speech cannot be\n\nconstrued as procedural. See 111. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45844, issued July 27, 2017, at 3- 4 ( construing a\nsimilar rule and concluding that restricting member of the public from reading aloud a passage from a novel\ninvolved in a dispute about appropriate school subject matter was content -based rather than procedural).\n\n6Letter from Merry Rhoades to Joshua M. Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau\nNovember\n\n29, 2017), at 3.\nLetter\n\nfrom\n\nto [ Joshua]\n\nJones ( undated).\n\n\fMs. Merry Rhoades\n\nJanuary 17, 2018\nPage 4\n\nduring the public\n\ncomment\n\nportion\n\nof\n\nits November\n\n13, 2017, meeting. 8\n\nTherefore, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that by imposing an unestablished and unrecorded rule limiting public\ncomment during its November 13, 2017, meeting, the Board violated section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\nThere are no means for the Board to remedy its violation in this instance. This\noffice cautions the Board to refrain from limiting public comment at any future meeting except\npursuant to its established and recorded rules, which must tend to accommodate, rather than\n\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No.\n14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50450 o 206g pub comment improper sd\n\n8This office notes that even if the Board' s rules authorized the Board president to restrict the\ncontent of public comments, such a rule would be \" subject to strict -scrutiny\" and would have to \" serve a compelling\nstate interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose.\" LA Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F.\nSupp. 2d 912, 922- 23 ( N. D. 111. 2009).\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Public comment restriction to a private room","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50450/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nJanuary 17, 2018\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMs. Merry Rhoades\nKeeney, Cooper,\n\nTueth,\n\nMohan & Jackstadt, P. C.\n\n101 West Vandalia, Suite 210\nEdwardsville, Illinois 62025\nmrhoades@tuethIceeney. com\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50450\n\nDear\n\nand Ms. Rhoades:\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons explained below, the Public Access\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Education of Freeburg Community High School District No.\n77 (Board) violated OMA during its November 13, 2017, meeting by imposing a restriction on\npublic comment that was not authorized by its established and recorded rules.\n\nOn November 14, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review\n\nto the Public Access Bureau alleging that during its November 13, 2017, meeting, the Board\nprohibited members of the public from addressing the members of the Board publicly. Instead,\nhe claimed, the Board required members of the public \" who wanted to make a comment or\nspeak, [ to] go into a conference room alone with the School Board to make those comments.\"'\n\nOn November 17, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\n\nBoard and requested a copy of the Board's public comment rules, a copy of the agenda and the\nminutes from the November 13, 2017, meeting, and a detailed written response to the allegation\n\nthat the Board improperly prohibited public comment during the meeting. On November 29,\n2017, the Board provided those materials, including a complete version of its response for this\nE- mail from\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau] (November 14, 2017).\n\noffice's confidential review and a redacted version for this office to forward to\nOn December 7, 2017,\n\n2\n\nsubmitted a reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)) provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\nand recorded by the public\nbody.\" (Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of section\n\n2. 06(g), a public body must establish and record rules governing public comment, and may\nrestrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 2, 2014, at 7.\n\nIn its response to this office, the Board stated that prior to its November 13, 2017,\n\nmeeting, it became aware that parents and students would be making complaints against\nthe spouse of\nand the cheerleading coach for the District. The\nBoard stated:\n\nAt the beginning of the meeting, the Board President made it clear\nthat if the complaint was about an employee of the District, then\n\nthat matter would be considered during closed session of the Board\n\nof Education. If, however, any member of the public wanted to\naddress the Board of Education on any other matter, now was the\ntime for them to present those comments.\n\nNo person requested to\n\naddress the Board of Education on any matter other than with\nrespect to complaints about employees of the Districtl3l\n\nThe meeting minutes likewise provide that during the public comment portion of the meeting,\nthe Board President, Doug Parrish, \" asked that comments regarding coaches not be said at this\ntime.\" 4 After the Board went into closed session pursuant to section 2(c)(1) of OMA (5 ILCS\n120/ 2(c)(1) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts 100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100-\n\n2 See 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(c) (West 2016) (\" Upon request, the public body may also furnish the Public\nAccess Counselor with a redacted copy of the answer excluding specific references to any matters at issue. The\nPublic Access Counselor shall forward a copy of the answer or redacted answer, if furnished, to the person\n\nsubmitting the request for review.\").\n\n465, effective August 31, 2017), which permits closed session discussion of specific employees,\n\nmembers of the public sequentially were invited in to address the Board in private.\n\nThe Board did not argue that it properly prohibited the public from addressing its\nmembers about coaches in open session pursuant to the Board's established and recorded rules\n\ngoverning public comment. Indeed, the Board's established and recorded public comment rules\n\ndo not provide for the Board to prohibit members of the public from publicly raising concerns\n\nabout public employees. 5 Rather, the Board argued that it properly required members of the\npublic to address the Board about concerns regarding coaches behind closed doors because of the\nheated nature of the disputes.\n\nThe Board stated that complaints about the head football coach\n\nrequired certain parents and students to be separated during the open portion of the meeting, and\nclaimed that\nsimply wanted to intimidate any person that made a complaint\nagainst his wife by requiring that the complaints be made public. i6\n\nIn his reply,\ndisputed the way that the Board characterized his\nconduct in connection with the meeting, and stated: \" I do agree that [ the Board has] the right to\ncall a closed session to speak with my wife as well as the football coach, but any comments by\nthe public, should have been allowed in a public format.\"'\n\nOMA does not restrict a public body's discretion to allow non -board members\ninto a closed session. Nothing in OMA prohibited the Board from inviting members of the\npublic who were hesitant to voice opinions about coaches into closed session to make their\n\nremarks out of earshot of the rest of the meeting attendees. Thus, to the extent that the Board\nsought to accommodate members of the public who were unwilling to speak about the coaches in\n\nopen session, the Board had a readily available alternative to barring members of the public who\nwished to raise their concerns publicly from doing so. In any event, the Board's established and\nrecorded public comment rules did not permit the Board to prohibit comments about coaches\n\n5 See Freeburg Community High School District No. 77 Board of Education, Board Policy 2. 230:\nPublic Participation at Board of Education Meetings and Petitions to the Board (adopted June 19, 2017). Although\n\nthe fourth of these rules permits the Board President to \" determine procedural matters regarding public participation\nnot\n\notherwise\n\ndefined in Board\n\nof Education\n\npolicy[,]\" a restriction aimed at the content of speech cannot be\n\nconstrued as procedural. See 111. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45844, issued July 27, 2017, at 3- 4 (construing a\nsimilar rule and concluding that restricting member of the public from reading aloud a passage from a novel\ninvolved in a dispute about appropriate school subject matter was content -based rather than procedural).\n\n6 Letter from Merry Rhoades to Joshua M. Jones, Supervising Attorney, Public Access Bureau\nNovember\n\nduring the public\n\ncomment\n\nportion\n\nof\n\nits November\n\n13, 2017, meeting. 8\n\nTherefore, the Public\n\nAccess Bureau concludes that by imposing an unestablished and unrecorded rule limiting public\ncomment during its November 13, 2017, meeting, the Board violated section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\nThere are no means for the Board to remedy its violation in this instance. This\noffice cautions the Board to refrain from limiting public comment at any future meeting except\npursuant to its established and recorded rules, which must tend to accommodate, rather than\n\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See I11. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No.\n14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at the\nChicago address on the first page of this letter. This letter serves to close this file.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50450 o 206g pub comment improper sd\n\n8 This office notes that even if the Board's rules authorized the Board president to restrict the\ncontent of public comments, such a rule would be \" subject to strict -scrutiny\" and would have to \" serve a compelling\nstate interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose.\" LA Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F.\nSupp. 2d 912, 922- 23 (N. D. 111. 2009)."}
{"id":1228,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-02-08","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50479"],"title":"Chicago City Council violated OMA by failing to post meeting agenda 48 hours in advance","filename":"50479, issued February 8, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1602,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Chicago City Council failed to post an agenda for its November 15, 2017, meeting on its website at least 48 hours in advance. The PAC determined that the Council violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide the required public notice.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Chicago City Council did not post its meeting agenda online 48 hours before the meeting as required by law. The Attorney General's office investigated and agreed that the Council failed to meet this requirement. The Council was advised to ensure all future meeting agendas are posted online in a timely manner.","holding":"The Chicago City Council violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to post an agenda for its November 15, 2017, meeting on its website at least 48 hours in advance.","legal_question":"Did the Chicago City Council violate the Open Meetings Act by failing to post an agenda for its November 15, 2017, meeting on its website at least 48 hours in advance?","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Chicago City Council","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The failure of the Chicago City Council to post a meeting agenda on its website 48 hours prior to a public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_a/Posting-agendas-for-regular-and-special-meetings,-contents-of-discussion/50479, issued February 8, 2018.pdf","sha256":"cc2aa079b53f0186c03b35b6d7eeae9f81e73e362f83d69d6e3d94bd8e7b6fed","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["meeting notice","agenda","city council","open meetings act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 8, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jeffrey Levine\nDeputy Corporation Counsel\nLegal Counsel Division\nDepartment of Law\n\nCity of Chicago\n121 North LaSalle Street, Room 600\nChicago, Illinois 60602\n\njeffrey. levine@cityofchicago. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 50479\nDear\n\nand Mr. Levine:\n\nThis determination is issuedpursuanYto section 3. 5( e) ofthe, Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below; the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the City of;Chicago City Council ( Council) violated OMA by failing to\n\npost an agenda for its November 15, 2017, meeting on its website 48 hours in advance of the\nmeeting.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn November 14,, 2017, this office received\nRequest for Review\nagenda\nthe Council' s website or on the City Clerk' s\nLegislative Information Center website 48 hours before the Council' s November 15, 2017,\nmeeting. On November 16, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nalleging that the Council did not post\n\nan\n\nCouncil and requested that it provide a written response to\nallegation. This office\nasked the Council to confirm whether it held a i ideting on November 15; 2017; and; if so, to\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785- 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West\nRandolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • (618)312) 814. 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Minis\n629012(\n\n618j (529- 640Q. TTY:: ( 618)\n\n529- 6403 •\n\nFax_ ( 618)\n\n529- 6416\n\n\f\fMr. Jeffrey Levine\nFebruary 8, 2018\nPage 3\n\nT] here was just no real requirement as to how specific [ public\n\nbodies] needed to be to the public of what they were going to\n\ndiscuss that would be final action. And this just says that you have,\nto have a * * *\naction,\n\nas\n\nto\n\ngeneral notice, if you' re going to have and take final\n\ngenerally what' s going to be discussed so that — that\n\npeople who follow their units of local government know what\n\nthey're going to be acting upon. Remarks of Sen. Dillard, May 16,\n2012, Senate Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at 47.\n\nThe Council asserted that the agenda for its regular meetings is permanently\n\nposted on the Chicago City Clerk' s ( Clerk) website. It explained that meeting agendas are\n\ntypically also posted on the \" Meetings\" page of the Clerk' s website, but \" as a result of a technical\n\noversight,\" 1 the agenda for the November 15, 2017; meeting was postediate to the Meetings\n\npage.\nThe Council provided this office with copies ofthe \" City Council Regular Meeting\nStructure &\n\nAgenda,\" which it contends is the permanently posted agenda, and a copy of the\n\nNovember 15, 2017, meeting agenda. Both records list eighteen categories,of actions: 1. Call to order by the Mayor\n2. Call of the roll\n\n3. Determination of Quorum\n4. Pledge of Allegiance\n5. Invocation\n\n6. Public Comment\n\n7. Reports and Communications from the Mayor\n\n8. Communications from the City Clerk .,\n9. Reports of Standing Committees*\n10. Reports of Special Committees*\n11.\n\nAgreed Calendar\n\n12. Presentation of petitions, communication, resolutions, orders\nand ordinances introduced by Aldermen\n13. Correction and approval of the Journal. of the\nthe last preceding meetirigor meetings\n14. Unfinished Business\n15. Miscellaneous Business\n\n16. Ordinance setting the next regular meeting\n\n17. Roll call on omnibus'\n18. Adjournment\n\nLetter from Jeffrey Levine to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n\nNovember 27, 2017), at 1.\n\n\fMr. Jeffrey Levine\nFebruary 8, 2018\nPage 4\n\nThe committee agendas/ reports posted on the Chicago City\nCouncil Calendar list the items that may be called for a vote at the\n\nCity Council meeting and are considered to be part of the City\n\nCouncil meeting agenda. 121\n\nThis office considered and rejected a similar argument in 2013 PAC 22987. In\nthat matter, the requester alleged that the Chicago Park District Board of Commissioners took\n\nfinal action to raise fees at the Art Institute and the Museum of Science and Industry, although\n\nthose matters were not on the meeting agenda. The Board argued that those matters had\n\nappeared on agendas of the committee meetings, which had taken place in the morning before\nthe afternoon meeting of the full Board, therefore the Board had substantially complied with\nsection 2.02( c). The Attorney General rejected the argument that notice of a final action on a\nseparate committee meeting agenda was sufficient and concluded that the Board had violated\n\nOMA by taking final action on a matter without a general description of the subject matter of\n\nthat\naction appearing on the meeting agenda. I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 13- 002, issued\nApril 16, 2013, at 5.\n\nThe record that the Council considers to be its agenda does not include any\ndescription of the matters that were to be the subject of final action at the November 15, 2017,\n\nmeeting. The record displays the order of business, or sequence of matters to be discussed at a\ntypical meeting, but it does not inform the public of what specific actions were to be considered.\n\nSee Black'sbusiness\"\nLaw Dictionary ( 10th. ed.in2014), order, available at Westlaw BLACKS ( defining\norder of\n\nas \"\n\nthe sequence\n\nwhich a\n\nmeeting considers its' busiriess\"). Indeed, Rule. 3\n\nof the City Council Rules of Order and Procedure, which is cited in the \" City Council Regular\n\nMeeting Structure & Agenda,\" describes the items as the \" Order of Business.\"\n\nRules of Order\n\nand Procedure of the City Council, City of Chicago, Rule 3 ( 2015- 2019). An agenda is more\" `\nthan a mere ordering of business items, iris \"[a] list of things to be done, as items to be\n\nconsidered at a meeting, usu. arranged in order of consideration.\" Black' s Law Dictionary ( 10th\ned. 2014), agenda, available at Westlaw BLACKS. The -Council' s list does not reflect the\nspecific items to be considered at the meeting, and therefore it is not an agenda. Therefore,' even\n\nifthe Council had timely published the standard order of business for the November 15, 2017,\n\nmeeting on the \" Meetings\" page, it would not constitute an agenda as required by OMA to be\n\nposted.\n\nThe Council appears to argue that committee agendas are'incorporated by\n\nreference into the record that the Council considers its agenda. The footnote on the November\n2Chicago City Council, Regular Meeting, Agenda ( November\n\n15, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Jeffrey Levine\nFebruary 8, 2018\nPage 5\n\n15, 2017, agenda provides that \" committee agendas/ reports posted on the Chicago City Council\n\nCalendar list the items that may be called for a vote at the City Council meeting and are'\n\nconsidered to be part of the City Council meeting agenda. i3 The Council provided this office\nwith agendas for the November 13, 2017, meetings of the Committee on the Budget and\n\nGovernment Operations and the Committee on Finance. It explained in an e- mail to this office\nthat those agendas constituted the \" substantive componenti4 of the November 15, 2017, Council\nmeeting. This office reviewed the link to the November 15, 2017, agenda on the Meetings page\n\nof the City Clerk' s website, and found that the link displays only the November 15, 2017,\nagenda; it does not include any committee agendas or reports. 5 Although the Council informed\nthis office of two committee agendas the Council intended to incorporate by reference, it would\nnot be evident to the public that those agendas were considered part of the Council' s agenda,\nespecially because there were three committee agendas posted on the Clerk's Meetings website\n\nbetween the November 15, 2017, Council meeting and the preceding meeting held on November\n8, 2017. Further, as previously noted, the Attorney General has concluded that a \"[ public body]\n\nmust comply with OMA' s agenda requirements, including providing sufficient notice of,the\ngeneral subject matter of any resolution or ordinance upon which final action may be taken at the\n\npublic body] meeting, without requiring reference to other documents to determine what matters\n\nthe Board might address.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 13- 002, at 5.\n\nThe Council' s posting of its standard order of business did not providesufficient\n\nnotice to the public of the items it considered acting upon at its November 15, 2017, meeting.\nAccordingly, this office finds that the Council failed to post an agenda to its website at least 48\nhours in advance of holding its November 15, 2017, meeting. This office requests that for future\n\nmeetings, the Council post, in accordance with section 2. 02( a) of OMA, an agenda specific to its\nmeeting that sets forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the\nsubject of final action at the meeting, as required by section 2. 02( c) of OMA.\n\nChicago City Council, Regular Meeting, Agenda ( November 15, 2017).\n\n4E -mail from Jeffrey Levine to Laura Harter (November 27, 2017).\nShttps:// chicago. legistar. com/ Calendar. aspx ( last visited\n\nJanuary 12; 2018).\n\n\fMr. Jeffrey Levine\nFebruary 8, 2018\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg.state.il.us. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General,,\nPublic Access Bureau\n50479 o 202 notice improper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A city council's failure to post a meeting agenda","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50479/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 8, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jeffrey Levine\nDeputy Corporation Counsel\nLegal Counsel Division\nDepartment of Law\n\nCity of Chicago\n121 North LaSalle Street, Room 600\nChicago, Illinois 60602\n\njeffrey. levine@cityofchicago. org\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 50479\nDear\n\nand Mr. Levine:\n\nThis determination is issuedpursuanYto section 3. 5(e) ofthe, Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below; the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the City of;Chicago City Council (Council) violated OMA by failing to\n\npost an agenda for its November 15, 2017, meeting on its website 48 hours in advance of the\nmeeting.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn November 14,, 2017, this office received\nRequest for Review\nagenda\nthe Council's website or on the City Clerk's\nLegislative Information Center website 48 hours before the Council's November 15, 2017,\nmeeting. On November 16, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nalleging that the Council did not post\n\nan\n\nCouncil and requested that it provide a written response to\nallegation. This office\nasked the Council to confirm whether it held a i ideting on November 15; 2017; and; if so, to\n\nT] here was just no real requirement as to how specific [ public\n\nbodies] needed to be to the public of what they were going to\n\ndiscuss that would be final action. And this just says that you have,\nto have a * * *\naction,\n\nas\n\nto\n\ngeneral notice, if you' re going to have and take final\n\ngenerally what's going to be discussed so that — that\n\npeople who follow their units of local government know what\n\nthey're going to be acting upon. Remarks of Sen. Dillard, May 16,\n2012, Senate Debate on House Bill No. 4687, at 47.\n\nThe Council asserted that the agenda for its regular meetings is permanently\n\nposted on the Chicago City Clerk's (Clerk) website. It explained that meeting agendas are\n\ntypically also posted on the \" Meetings\" page of the Clerk's website, but \" as a result of a technical\n\noversight,\" 1 the agenda for the November 15, 2017; meeting was postediate to the Meetings\n\npage.\nThe Council provided this office with copies ofthe \" City Council Regular Meeting\nStructure &\n\nAgenda,\" which it contends is the permanently posted agenda, and a copy of the\n\nNovember 15, 2017, meeting agenda. Both records list eighteen categories,of actions: 1. Call to order by the Mayor\n2. Call of the roll\n\n3. Determination of Quorum\n4. Pledge of Allegiance\n5. Invocation\n\n6. Public Comment\n\n7. Reports and Communications from the Mayor\n\n8. Communications from the City Clerk.,\n9. Reports of Standing Committees*\n10. Reports of Special Committees*\n11.\n\nAgreed Calendar\n\n12. Presentation of petitions, communication, resolutions, orders\nand ordinances introduced by Aldermen\n13. Correction and approval of the Journal. of the\nthe last preceding meetirigor meetings\n14. Unfinished Business\n15. Miscellaneous Business\n\n16. Ordinance setting the next regular meeting\n\n17. Roll call on omnibus'\n18. Adjournment\n\nLetter from Jeffrey Levine to Laura S. Harter, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau\n\nThe committee agendas/ reports posted on the Chicago City\nCouncil Calendar list the items that may be called for a vote at the\n\nCity Council meeting and are considered to be part of the City\n\nCouncil meeting agenda. 121\n\nThis office considered and rejected a similar argument in 2013 PAC 22987. In\nthat matter, the requester alleged that the Chicago Park District Board of Commissioners took\n\nfinal action to raise fees at the Art Institute and the Museum of Science and Industry, although\n\nthose matters were not on the meeting agenda. The Board argued that those matters had\n\nappeared on agendas of the committee meetings, which had taken place in the morning before\nthe afternoon meeting of the full Board, therefore the Board had substantially complied with\nsection 2.02(c). The Attorney General rejected the argument that notice of a final action on a\nseparate committee meeting agenda was sufficient and concluded that the Board had violated\n\nOMA by taking final action on a matter without a general description of the subject matter of\n\nthat\naction appearing on the meeting agenda. I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 13- 002, issued\nApril 16, 2013, at 5.\n\nThe record that the Council considers to be its agenda does not include any\ndescription of the matters that were to be the subject of final action at the November 15, 2017,\n\nmeeting. The record displays the order of business, or sequence of matters to be discussed at a\ntypical meeting, but it does not inform the public of what specific actions were to be considered.\n\nSee Black'sbusiness\"\nLaw Dictionary (10th. ed.in2014), order, available at Westlaw BLACKS (defining\norder of\n\nas \"\n\nthe sequence\n\nwhich a\n\nmeeting considers its' busiriess\"). Indeed, Rule. 3\n\nof the City Council Rules of Order and Procedure, which is cited in the \" City Council Regular\n\nMeeting Structure & Agenda,\" describes the items as the \" Order of Business.\"\n\nRules of Order\n\nand Procedure of the City Council, City of Chicago, Rule 3 (2015- 2019). An agenda is more\" `\nthan a mere ordering of business items, iris \"[a] list of things to be done, as items to be\n\nconsidered at a meeting, usu. arranged in order of consideration.\" Black's Law Dictionary (10th\ned. 2014), agenda, available at Westlaw BLACKS. The -Council's list does not reflect the\nspecific items to be considered at the meeting, and therefore it is not an agenda. Therefore,' even\n\nifthe Council had timely published the standard order of business for the November 15, 2017,\n\nmeeting on the \" Meetings\" page, it would not constitute an agenda as required by OMA to be\n\nposted.\n\nThe Council appears to argue that committee agendas are'incorporated by\n\nreference into the record that the Council considers its agenda. The footnote on the November\n\n15, 2017, agenda provides that \" committee agendas/ reports posted on the Chicago City Council\n\nCalendar list the items that may be called for a vote at the City Council meeting and are'\n\nconsidered to be part of the City Council meeting agenda. i3 The Council provided this office\nwith agendas for the November 13, 2017, meetings of the Committee on the Budget and\n\nGovernment Operations and the Committee on Finance. It explained in an e- mail to this office\nthat those agendas constituted the \" substantive componenti4 of the November 15, 2017, Council\nmeeting. This office reviewed the link to the November 15, 2017, agenda on the Meetings page\n\nof the City Clerk's website, and found that the link displays only the November 15, 2017,\nagenda; it does not include any committee agendas or reports. 5 Although the Council informed\nthis office of two committee agendas the Council intended to incorporate by reference, it would\nnot be evident to the public that those agendas were considered part of the Council's agenda,\nespecially because there were three committee agendas posted on the Clerk's Meetings website\n\nbetween the November 15, 2017, Council meeting and the preceding meeting held on November\n8, 2017. Further, as previously noted, the Attorney General has concluded that a \"[ public body]\n\nmust comply with OMA's agenda requirements, including providing sufficient notice of,the\ngeneral subject matter of any resolution or ordinance upon which final action may be taken at the\n\npublic body] meeting, without requiring reference to other documents to determine what matters\n\nthe Board might address.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 13- 002, at 5.\n\nThe Council's posting of its standard order of business did not providesufficient\n\nnotice to the public of the items it considered acting upon at its November 15, 2017, meeting.\nAccordingly, this office finds that the Council failed to post an agenda to its website at least 48\nhours in advance of holding its November 15, 2017, meeting. This office requests that for future\n\nmeetings, the Council post, in accordance with section 2. 02(a) of OMA, an agenda specific to its\nmeeting that sets forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg.state.il.us. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General,,\nPublic Access Bureau\n50479 o 202 notice improper mun"}
{"id":1229,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-02-15","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50632"],"title":"Village of Altona Board of Trustees failed to keep adequate closed session minutes","filename":"50632, issued February 15, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1183,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Village of Altona failed to provide adequate minutes for a closed session meeting, and the PAC determined that the Board's minutes were insufficient under OMA.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Village of Altona could not provide proper minutes for a closed-door meeting. The Attorney General's office found that the Village failed to keep a sufficient written record of what was discussed, as required by law. The Village was advised to improve its recording equipment and ensure future compliance with meeting documentation rules.","holding":"The Board of Trustees of the Village of Altona violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to keep adequate written minutes of its April 6, 2017, closed session.","legal_question":"Whether the Village of Altona Board of Trustees violated section 2.06(a) of the Open Meetings Act by failing to keep adequate written minutes of a closed session.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Village of Altona Board of Trustees","requesting_party":null,"pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The Board failed to maintain adequate written minutes for a closed session meeting regarding bids for the purchase of a school building.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.1,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_a/50632, issued February 15, 2018.pdf","sha256":"212b3654b578e633455c514508d67fe837506b2611475974d7ad4889ca35d84f","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","meeting minutes","OMA","public records"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 15, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Derrick R. Appel]\nPresident, Board of Trustees\nVillage of Altona\n302 South Depot Street\n\nAltona, Illinois 61414\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50632\nDear\n\nand Mr. Appell:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Trustees ( Board) of the Village of Altona (Village) violated\n\nOMA by failing to keep adequate written minutes of its April 6, 2017, closed session.\nOn November 27, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\n\nthe Public Access Bureau alleging that during the Board' s monthly meetings from May 2017\nthrough October 2017, Village President Derrick R. Appel] indicated that he was looking into\ndisclosing the closed session minutes from the April 6, 2017, meeting, but that in a letter dated\nNovember 22, 2017, the Village informed him that no written record of the April 6, 2017, closed\n\nsession was found. The Village also stated that the closed session verbatim recording \" was of\npoor\nquality[,]\" and that the Board had elected to release the following: \" On April 6th 2017 at the\nclosed board meeting, there was discussion concerning all three bids for the purchase of the old\nAltona Grade School building. It was further discussed about what the bidder' s future plans were\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (\n100 West Randolph\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\nStreet, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n312) 814- 3000 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fThe Honorable Derrick R. Appel]\n\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 2\n\nalleged that the Board is required to document what\n\ngoing to be for the building.\"'\n\ntranspired during its April 6, 2017, closed session.\nOn December 4, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with a copy of the closed session minutes from the April\n\n6, 2017, meeting for this office' s confidential review. If no such minutes existed, this office\nasked the Board to address the allegation that it violated OMA by failing to keep written minutes\nof the closed session, and to explain whether minutes can be generated from the closed session\n\nverbatim recording.\n\nOn December 7, 2017, the Board responded that no minutes of the April 6,\n\n2017, closed session had been prepared, and that the closed session verbatim recording was\ndifficult to hear. Nonetheless, the Board stated, it asked the clerk to prepare minutes based on\n\nthat recording, and then voted to approve and disclose those minutes on December 7, 2017. On\nDecember 13, 2017,\nreplied, questioning the level of detail provided in those\nminutes.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d\n161,\n\n171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 2. 06( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a) ( West 2016)) provides:\n\nAll public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their\nmeetings,\n\nwhether\n\nopen\n\nor closed,\n\nand\n\na verbatim\n\nrecord\n\nof all\n\ntheir closed meetings in the form of an audio or video recording.\nMinutes shall include, but need not be limited to:\n1)\n\nthe date, time and place of the meeting;\n\n2)\n\nthe members of the public body recorded as either\n\npresent or absent and whether the members were physically\n\npresent or present by means of video or audio conference; and\n3)\n\na summary of discussion on all matters proposed,\ndeliberated, or decided, and a record of any votes taken.\n\nLetter\n\nfrom Kelly Scott, Altona Village Clerk, to\n\nNovember\n\n22, 2017).\n\n\fThe Honorable\n\nDerrick R. Appell\n\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 3\n\nOMA does not further address the degree of information that must be included in meeting\n\nminutes, and no Illinois reviewing court appears to have addressed the issue. The Public Access\nBureau, on the other hand, has previously concluded that \" brief, very general minutes are\ninsufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 2. 06( a) of OMA.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 40309, issued May 20, 2016, at 4.\nAlthough the Board acknowledged, in its response to this office, that it had not\n\nprepared minutes of the closed session of its April 6, 2017, meeting prior to the submission of\nRequest for Review, the Board subsequently ordered minutes to be prepared from\n\nthe closed session verbatim recording and then disclosed those minutes to the public. Under the\nplain language of section 2. 06( a)( 3) of OMA, the Board was required to include in the minutes a\n\nsummary of all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided during that closed session. Yet, the\nclosed session minutes contain just two general, vague sentences concerning the Board' s closed\nsession discussion. The closed session minutes indicate that the closed session, which pertained\n\nsolely to the old Altona Grade School building, lasted for approximately 30 minutes; the brevity\nof the Board' s closed session minutes is at odds with the apparent length of its closed session\n\ndiscussion. Minutes need not contain the level of detail of a transcript, but section 2. 06( a)\n\nexpressly requires a public body to keep minutes that summarize discussions of all matters\n\nproposed, deliberated, or decided. Rather than providing such a summary, the Board' s April 6,\n2017, minutes merely identify the topics of its closed session discussion. Because those minutes\nfail to provide a sufficient summary of all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided, this office\nconcludes that the Board violated section 2. 06( a) of OMA.\n\nOn December 8, 2017, Board President Appel] indicated to this office by\ntelephone that the sound quality of the closed session verbatim recording interfered with the\nability to draft minutes of the closed session. He also stated that the Village was working on\n\ngetting a new recording device. This office encourages the Board to do so promptly, and\nreminds\n\nthe Board to otherwise\n\nadhere to all of the requirements of OMA\n\nin the future.\n\n\fThe Honorable Derrick R. Appell\n\nFebruary 15, 2018\nPage 4\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at ( 312) 814- 8413 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50632\n\no 206 minutes\n\nimproper mun\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Closed-session minutes for a school building bid","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50632/","full_text":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 15, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Derrick R. Appel]\nPresident, Board of Trustees\nVillage of Altona\n302 South Depot Street\n\nAltona, Illinois 61414\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50632\nDear\n\nand Mr. Appell:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Village of Altona (Village) violated\n\nOMA by failing to keep adequate written minutes of its April 6, 2017, closed session.\nOn November 27, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to\n\nthe Public Access Bureau alleging that during the Board's monthly meetings from May 2017\nthrough October 2017, Village President Derrick R. Appel] indicated that he was looking into\ndisclosing the closed session minutes from the April 6, 2017, meeting, but that in a letter dated\nNovember 22, 2017, the Village informed him that no written record of the April 6, 2017, closed\n\nsession was found. The Village also stated that the closed session verbatim recording \" was of\npoor\nquality[,]\" and that the Board had elected to release the following: \" On April 6th 2017 at the\nclosed board meeting, there was discussion concerning all three bids for the purchase of the old\nAltona Grade School building. It was further discussed about what the bidder's future plans were\n\nalleged that the Board is required to document what\n\ngoing to be for the building.\"'\n\ntranspired during its April 6, 2017, closed session.\nOn December 4, 2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to provide this office with a copy of the closed session minutes from the April\n\n6, 2017, meeting for this office's confidential review. If no such minutes existed, this office\nasked the Board to address the allegation that it violated OMA by failing to keep written minutes\nof the closed session, and to explain whether minutes can be generated from the closed session\n\nverbatim recording.\n\nOn December 7, 2017, the Board responded that no minutes of the April 6,\n\n2017, closed session had been prepared, and that the closed session verbatim recording was\ndifficult to hear. Nonetheless, the Board stated, it asked the clerk to prepare minutes based on\n\nthat recording, and then voted to approve and disclose those minutes on December 7, 2017. On\nDecember 13, 2017,\nreplied, questioning the level of detail provided in those\nminutes.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public agencies exist to aid in the conduct\n\nof the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to assure that agency actions be taken\nopenly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179 III. App. 3d\n161,\n\n171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 2. 06(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a) (West 2016)) provides:\n\nAll public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their\nmeetings,\n\nwhether\n\nopen\n\nor closed,\n\nand\n\na verbatim\n\nrecord\n\nof all\n\ntheir closed meetings in the form of an audio or video recording.\nMinutes shall include, but need not be limited to:\n1)\n\nthe date, time and place of the meeting;\n\n2)\n\nthe members of the public body recorded as either\n\npresent or absent and whether the members were physically\n\npresent or present by means of video or audio conference; and\n3)\n\na summary of discussion on all matters proposed,\ndeliberated, or decided, and a record of any votes taken.\n\nOMA does not further address the degree of information that must be included in meeting\n\nminutes, and no Illinois reviewing court appears to have addressed the issue. The Public Access\nBureau, on the other hand, has previously concluded that \" brief, very general minutes are\ninsufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 2. 06(a) of OMA.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req.\nRev. Ltr. 40309, issued May 20, 2016, at 4.\nAlthough the Board acknowledged, in its response to this office, that it had not\n\nprepared minutes of the closed session of its April 6, 2017, meeting prior to the submission of\nRequest for Review, the Board subsequently ordered minutes to be prepared from\n\nthe closed session verbatim recording and then disclosed those minutes to the public. Under the\nplain language of section 2. 06(a)(3) of OMA, the Board was required to include in the minutes a\n\nsummary of all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided during that closed session. Yet, the\nclosed session minutes contain just two general, vague sentences concerning the Board's closed\nsession discussion. The closed session minutes indicate that the closed session, which pertained\n\nsolely to the old Altona Grade School building, lasted for approximately 30 minutes; the brevity\nof the Board's closed session minutes is at odds with the apparent length of its closed session\n\ndiscussion. Minutes need not contain the level of detail of a transcript, but section 2. 06(a)\n\nexpressly requires a public body to keep minutes that summarize discussions of all matters\n\nproposed, deliberated, or decided. Rather than providing such a summary, the Board's April 6,\n2017, minutes merely identify the topics of its closed session discussion. Because those minutes\nfail to provide a sufficient summary of all matters proposed, deliberated, or decided, this office\nconcludes that the Board violated section 2. 06(a) of OMA.\n\nOn December 8, 2017, Board President Appel] indicated to this office by\ntelephone that the sound quality of the closed session verbatim recording interfered with the\nability to draft minutes of the closed session. He also stated that the Village was working on\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at (312) 814- 8413 or at the Chicago address on the bottom of\nthe first page of this letter.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nJOSHUA M. JONES\n\nDeputy Bureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50632\n\no 206 minutes\n\nimproper mun"}
{"id":1230,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-04-25","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50648"],"title":"Dunlap School Board violated OMA by adding agenda items less than 48 hours before special meeting","filename":"50648, issued April 25, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1555,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Dunlap Community Unit School District No. 323 Board of Education failed to record closed sessions and improperly modified meeting agendas; the PAC found the Board violated OMA notice requirements by adding agenda items less than 48 hours before a special meeting.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a school board failed to record closed meetings and improperly changed meeting agendas. The Attorney General's office found that the board broke the law by adding new topics to a special meeting agenda less than 48 hours before the meeting started. Because the board did not take final action on those specific topics, no further corrective action was required.","holding":"The Board violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to provide 48 hours' advance notice for items added to a special meeting agenda.","legal_question":"Did the Board violate the Open Meetings Act by adding items to a special meeting agenda less than 48 hours before the meeting and by failing to record certain closed sessions?","disposition":"partial_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.02(a)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Dunlap Community Unit School District No. 323 Board of Education","requesting_party":"Jay E. Greening (counsel for requester)","pac_outcome":"Partial violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The Board added items to a special meeting agenda less than 48 hours before the meeting and was accused of failing to record closed sessions regarding superintendent employment.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.02/2.02_a/Posting-agendas-for-regular-and-special-meetings,-contents-of-discussion/50648, issued April 25, 2018.pdf","sha256":"c4be7edfb740cf3d3f1f5bf8598aa3766c3a4819a1cbe86dd0d3b963aef8da3e","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["special meeting","agenda notice","closed session","school board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 25, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Karen Disharoon\nPresident, Board of Education\n\nDunlap Community Unit School District No. 323\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nkdisharoon@dunlapcusd. net\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 50648\nDear\n\nand Ms. Disharoon:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Dunlap Community Unit School District No. 323 Board of Education (Board)\nviolated the advance notice requirements of OMA in connection with its November 28, 2017,\n\nspecial meeting. However, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Board did not otherwise\n\nviolate OMA.\n\nOn December 11, 2017,\nsubmitted this Request for Review\nalleging that the Board violated OMA by failing to make verbatim recordings of certain closed\nsession meetings in which the Board discussed the termination of the School District's\nsuperintendent.\nalso alleged that the Board improperly modified the agenda(s) for\nunidentified meetings related to the hiring of the interim superintendent. On December 28, 2017,\n\nthis office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and requested that it provide this\noffice with copies of the agendas, meeting minutes ( both open and closed), and closed session\n\nverbatim recordings for the meetings in question. This office also requested that the Board\nrespond in writing to the allegations in the Request for Review.\n\n500 South\nSecond Street,\nSpringfield,\nIllinois 62701 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\nWest Randolph\nStreet,\nChicago, Illinois,\n100\n\n60601 • (\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814-3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n618) 529- 6400\n\na,\n\nTTY: (\n\n618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: (\n\n618) 529- 6416\n\n\fThe Honorable Karen Disharoon\nApril 25, 2018\nPage 2\n\nOn January 4, 2018, the Board responded, providing copies of the requested\n\nmaterials and a written response. With respect to the first allegation, the Board provided copies\nof the verbatim audio recordings from five closed sessions where the Board discussed the\n\ntermination of the School District's superintendent. The Board asserted that it had reviewed the\nclosed session recordings in question and had no reason to believe that any portion of the\n\nmeetings was not recorded. In addition, the Board President, who was responsible for recording\n\neach of the closed sessions, confirmed that, to her knowledge, all of the referenced closed\nmeetings were recorded in their entireties. With respect to the second allegation, the Board\n\nspeculated that its November 28, 2017, special meeting was the meeting referenced in the\n\nRequest for Review. The Board asserted that, because of the need to secure an interim\n\nsuperintendent, the Board President amended the November 28, 2017, special meeting agenda\nless than 48 hours before the meeting to include additional discussion items. The Board also\ndid not submit a reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent ofbeOMA is to \" ensure\nthat the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nopenly[,]\"\n\nand that their deliberations\n\nconducted\n\nand to ensure that individuals are \" given\n\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016).\n\nAdequacy of Closed Session Verbatim Recordings\n\nSection 2( a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2( a) ( West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100-465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that \"[ alt!\nmeetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection ( c) and closed\n\nin accordance with Section 2a.\" In addition, section 2.06( a) of OMA (5 ILCS l20/2.06( a) ( West\n2016)) provides that \"[ a]Il public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their meetings, whether\n\nopen or closed, and a verbatim record of all their closed meetings in the form of an audio or\nvideo recording \"\n\nRequest for Review alleged that the Board failed to record portions of\n\nits closed session meetings where it discussed the termination ofthe School District's\n\nsuperintendent. Although\ndid not identify specific closed session meetings, the Board\nprovided the verbatim audio recordings for its October 2, 2017, October 18, 2017, November 2,\n\n2017, November 15, 2017, and November 21, 2017, meetings, wherein the Board discussed the\n\ntermination of the superintendent. The Board' s response to this office asserted that it had\n\nreviewed\nthe closed session recordings in question and had no reason to believe that any portion\nits\n\nof\n\nclosed meetings\n\nwas not recorded.\n\nSimilarly, this office' s review of the audio recordings\n\n\fThe Honorable Karen Disharoon\nApril 25, 2018\nPage 3\n\nrevealed lengthy and thorough discussions of the topic in question and provided no basis to\nconclude that the closed sessions were not recorded in their entireties. Because this office has\n\nnot received any evidence indicating that the Board failed to adequately keep verbatim\nrecordings of the closed sessions of its meetings, this office concludes that the Board did not\nviolate the verbatim recording requirement of section 2. 06( a) of OMA.\n\nAmendment of Special Meeting Agenda\n\nSection 2. 02( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( a) ( West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where the\n\nmeeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthe meeting. A public body that has a website that the full- time\nstaff of the public body maintains shall also post on its website the\nagenda of any regular meetings of the governing body of that\n\npublic body. Any agenda of a regular meeting that is posted on a\npublic body' s website shall remain posted on the website until the\nregular meeting is concluded. The requirement of a regular\nmeeting agenda shall not preclude the consideration of items not\n\nspecifically set forth in the agenda. ( Emphasis added.)\n\nSection 2.02( a) of OMA also provides that \"[ p] ublic notice of any special meeting except a\nmeeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of any rescheduled regular meeting, or of\nany reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which notice shall\nalso include the agenda[.]\"\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that, because the plain\n\nlanguage of section 2. 02(a) of OMA only authorizes consideration of items not set forth on a\nregular meeting agenda, a public body violates OMA by discussing matters during a special\nmeeting which are not listed on the agenda. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 30368, issued\nDecember 17, 2014, at 4. In this instance, the Board acknowledged that it amended the agenda\n\nfor its November 28, 2017, special meeting less than 48 hours before that meeting began and\ndiscussed the items it had added, but maintained that it did not improperly discuss those agenda\n\nitems because it did not take final action on them. In support, the Board cited Rice v. Board of\n\nTrustees ofAdams County, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1120 ( 4th Dist. 2002), in which the court stated that\na public\n\nbody may deliberate and discuss— but not take final action— on matters that do not\nmeeting agenda. Rice, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1123 (\" We find 'the consideration\n\nappear on a regular\nof\n\nitems not specifically set forth in the agenda to be in the\n\nnature of deliberations and\n\n\fThe Honorable Karen Disharoon\nApril 25, 2018\nPage 4\n\ndiscussion and not actions taken.\").\n\nHowever, the plain language of section 2. 02( a) only\n\nauthorizes \" the consideration of items\" that are not listed on a regular meeting agenda; it is\n\nirrelevant whether or not the Board voted to take action on items discussed at a special meeting\n\nwhich did not appear on the agenda. By amending the special meeting agenda to add items less\nthan 48 hours before the meeting began, the Board did not provide sufficient advance notice as\n\nrequired by section 2. 02( a) of OMA. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board held an\n\nimproper discussion during its November 28, 2017, special meeting. Nonetheless, because the\n\nBoard did not take final action in connection with any of the three added agenda items during\n\nthat special meeting, no remedial action is necessary at this time. This office reminds the Board\n\nthat a public body is limited at special meetings to discussing items listed on the agenda posted at\nleast 48 hours in advance of the meeting.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at the Springfield address on the first page of this letter.\n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50648 o 202a notice improper 206a proper sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jay E. Greening\nMiller, Hall & Triggs, LLC\n\n416 Main Street, Suite 1125\nPeoria, Illinois 61602- 1154\n\nj ay. greening@mhtlaw.\n\ncom\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Agenda items added to a special meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50648/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 25, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Karen Disharoon\nPresident, Board of Education\n\nDunlap Community Unit School District No. 323\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nkdisharoon@dunlapcusd. net\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 50648\nDear\n\nand Ms. Disharoon:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access Bureau\n\nconcludes that the Dunlap Community Unit School District No. 323 Board of Education (Board)\nviolated the advance notice requirements of OMA in connection with its November 28, 2017,\n\nspecial meeting. However, the Public Access Bureau concludes that the Board did not otherwise\n\nviolate OMA.\n\nOn December 11, 2017,\nsubmitted this Request for Review\nalleging that the Board violated OMA by failing to make verbatim recordings of certain closed\nsession meetings in which the Board discussed the termination of the School District's\nsuperintendent.\nalso alleged that the Board improperly modified the agenda(s) for\nunidentified meetings related to the hiring of the interim superintendent. On December 28, 2017,\n\nthis office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Board and requested that it provide this\noffice with copies of the agendas, meeting minutes (both open and closed), and closed session\n\nverbatim recordings for the meetings in question. This office also requested that the Board\nrespond in writing to the allegations in the Request for Review.\n\n500 South\nSecond Street,\nSpringfield,\nIllinois 62701 • (217) 782- 1090 • TTY: (217) 785 - 2771 • Fax: (217) 782- 7046\nWest Randolph\nStreet,\nChicago, Illinois,\n100\n\n60601 • (1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\nOn January 4, 2018, the Board responded, providing copies of the requested\n\nmaterials and a written response. With respect to the first allegation, the Board provided copies\nof the verbatim audio recordings from five closed sessions where the Board discussed the\n\ntermination of the School District's superintendent. The Board asserted that it had reviewed the\nclosed session recordings in question and had no reason to believe that any portion of the\n\nmeetings was not recorded. In addition, the Board President, who was responsible for recording\n\neach of the closed sessions, confirmed that, to her knowledge, all of the referenced closed\nmeetings were recorded in their entireties. With respect to the second allegation, the Board\n\nspeculated that its November 28, 2017, special meeting was the meeting referenced in the\n\nRequest for Review. The Board asserted that, because of the need to secure an interim\n\nsuperintendent, the Board President amended the November 28, 2017, special meeting agenda\nless than 48 hours before the meeting to include additional discussion items. The Board also\ndid not submit a reply.\nDETERMINATION\n\nThe intent ofbeOMA is to \" ensure\nthat the actions of public bodies be taken openly\nopenly[,]\"\n\nand that their deliberations\n\nconducted\n\nand to ensure that individuals are \" given\n\nadvance notice of and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is\ndiscussed or acted upon in any way.\" 5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016).\n\nAdequacy of Closed Session Verbatim Recordings\n\nSection 2(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/2(a) (West 2016), as amended by Public Acts\n100- 201, effective August 18, 2017; 100-465, effective August 31, 2017) provides that \"[ alt!\nmeetings of public bodies shall be open to the public unless excepted in subsection (c) and closed\n\nin accordance with Section 2a.\" In addition, section 2.06(a) of OMA (5 ILCS l20/2.06(a) (West\n2016)) provides that \"[ a]Il public bodies shall keep written minutes of all their meetings, whether\n\nopen or closed, and a verbatim record of all their closed meetings in the form of an audio or\nvideo recording \"\n\nRequest for Review alleged that the Board failed to record portions of\n\nits closed session meetings where it discussed the termination ofthe School District's\n\nsuperintendent. Although\ndid not identify specific closed session meetings, the Board\nprovided the verbatim audio recordings for its October 2, 2017, October 18, 2017, November 2,\n\n2017, November 15, 2017, and November 21, 2017, meetings, wherein the Board discussed the\n\ntermination of the superintendent. The Board's response to this office asserted that it had\n\nreviewed\nthe closed session recordings in question and had no reason to believe that any portion\n\nrevealed lengthy and thorough discussions of the topic in question and provided no basis to\nconclude that the closed sessions were not recorded in their entireties. Because this office has\n\nnot received any evidence indicating that the Board failed to adequately keep verbatim\nrecordings of the closed sessions of its meetings, this office concludes that the Board did not\nviolate the verbatim recording requirement of section 2. 06(a) of OMA.\n\nAmendment of Special Meeting Agenda\n\nSection 2. 02(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(a) (West 2016)) provides, in pertinent\npart:\n\nAn agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at the\nprincipal office of the public body and at the location where the\n\nmeeting is to be held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of\nthe meeting. A public body that has a website that the full- time\nstaff of the public body maintains shall also post on its website the\nagenda of any regular meetings of the governing body of that\n\npublic body. Any agenda of a regular meeting that is posted on a\npublic body's website shall remain posted on the website until the\nregular meeting is concluded. The requirement of a regular\nmeeting agenda shall not preclude the consideration of items not\n\nspecifically set forth in the agenda. (Emphasis added.)\n\nSection 2.02(a) of OMA also provides that \"[ p] ublic notice of any special meeting except a\nmeeting held in the event of a bona fide emergency, or of any rescheduled regular meeting, or of\nany reconvened meeting, shall be given at least 48 hours before such meeting, which notice shall\nalso include the agenda[.]\"\n\nThe Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that, because the plain\n\nlanguage of section 2. 02(a) of OMA only authorizes consideration of items not set forth on a\nregular meeting agenda, a public body violates OMA by discussing matters during a special\nmeeting which are not listed on the agenda. Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 30368, issued\nDecember 17, 2014, at 4. In this instance, the Board acknowledged that it amended the agenda\n\nfor its November 28, 2017, special meeting less than 48 hours before that meeting began and\ndiscussed the items it had added, but maintained that it did not improperly discuss those agenda\n\nitems because it did not take final action on them. In support, the Board cited Rice v. Board of\n\nTrustees ofAdams County, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1120 (4th Dist. 2002), in which the court stated that\na public\n\nbody may deliberate and discuss— but not take final action— on matters that do not\n\ndiscussion and not actions taken.\").\n\nHowever, the plain language of section 2. 02(a) only\n\nauthorizes \" the consideration of items\" that are not listed on a regular meeting agenda; it is\n\nirrelevant whether or not the Board voted to take action on items discussed at a special meeting\n\nwhich did not appear on the agenda. By amending the special meeting agenda to add items less\nthan 48 hours before the meeting began, the Board did not provide sufficient advance notice as\n\nrequired by section 2. 02(a) of OMA. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board held an\n\nimproper discussion during its November 28, 2017, special meeting. Nonetheless, because the\n\nBoard did not take final action in connection with any of the three added agenda items during\n\nthat special meeting, no remedial action is necessary at this time. This office reminds the Board\n\nthat a public body is limited at special meetings to discussing items listed on the agenda posted at\nleast 48 hours in advance of the meeting.\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter serves to close this matter. If you have\nany questions, please contact me at the Springfield address on the first page of this letter.\n\nCHRISTOPHER R. BOGGS\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50648 o 202a notice improper 206a proper sd\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Jay E. Greening\nMiller, Hall & Triggs, LLC\n\n416 Main Street, Suite 1125\nPeoria, Illinois 61602- 1154\n\nj ay. greening@mhtlaw.\n\ncom"}
{"id":1232,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-02-06","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50750"],"title":"Pleasant Township Board violated OMA by requiring public commenters to sign form","filename":"50750, issued February 6, 2019.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1975,"summary":"The PAC determined that the Pleasant Township Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting a member of the public from speaking during a meeting due to his refusal to complete a form requiring his signature and the topic of his comments.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that a township board refused to let him speak at a public meeting because he wouldn't fill out a form disclosing his topic and signature. The Attorney General's office agreed that this violated the Open Meetings Act, which guarantees the public's right to address public bodies. The board was advised to review its rules to ensure they do not discourage or restrict public participation.","holding":"The Board of Trustees of Pleasant Township violated the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during its meeting.","legal_question":"Whether a public body may require members of the public to provide their signature and the topic of their comments in writing as a condition for addressing the board during a public meeting.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Trustees of Pleasant Township","requesting_party":"Anonymous (redacted in text)","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public comment","subject_description":"The board's requirement that citizens provide a written topic and signature before being allowed to speak at a public meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/unreasonable-rules/50750, issued February 6, 2019.pdf","sha256":"ac99b060e952dd466f9ae74ba08d66fbb1eb73de360dc65cb7fc43a6300d6418","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","public meeting","township board","right to speak"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKwame Raoul\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 6, 2019\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Trygve Thomas Meade\n\nMeade Law Office, P. C.\n3106 North Main Street\n\nCanton, Illinois 61520\nfirm@meadelawpc. com\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2018 PAC 50750\nDear\n\nand Mr. Meade:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Board of Trustees ( Board) of Pleasant Township ( Township) violated OMA by\nprohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during its December 6, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nOn December 11, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging\n\nthat the Board did not allow him to address it during its December 6, 2017, meeting because he\ndid not fill out a form providing the topic he wished to speak about and his signature.' On\nalso alleged that the Board violated OMA by ( 1) not holding a public hearing at the site\n\nof a road closure, and ( 2) commingled a budget hearing with a regularly scheduled meeting. No provision of OMA\nrequires a public body to hold a meeting at the site of road closure, nor does OMA govern the commingling of\nmeetings. To the extent that the Request for Review could be construed to allege violations of procedures required\n\nby other statutes or rules, those allegations are not subject to review by the Public Access Counselor. See 15 ILCS\n205/ 7( c)( 3) ( West 2016) ( limiting the Public Access Counselor' s authority to resolve disputes to alleged violations\nof OMA and the Freedom of Information Act ( 5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. ( West 2016)).\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois\n\n62901 • (\n\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618)\n\n529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Trygve Thomas Meade\n\nFebruary 6, 2019\nPage 2\n\nDecember 21, 2017, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Township Supervisor and requested a detailed written response to\nallegations,\ntogether with copies of the minutes, any recordings of the meetings, a copy of the Board' s rules\nregarding public comment, and the public comment form.\nIn a letter dated January 16, 2018, the Township' s outside counsel submitted a\nwritten response, on behalf of the Township, and provided the Public Access Bureau with copies\n\nof the agenda and minutes of the Board's December 6, 2017, meeting, its rules regarding public\ncomment, and a copy of the sign -in form from the December 6, 2017, meeting, which contains\n\nan illegible signature and an illegible topic for discussion. The Township' s public comment rules\nprovide in pertinent part:\n\n1. Sign in sheet. Any person who wishes to make comment\nduring the relevant portion of a township meeting must write their\nname and the topic of comment on a sheet provided for that\n\npurpose prior to the meeting. If their name and topic does not\nappear on the sheet at the beginning of the meeting they may not\n\nmake any comment at that meeting. lzi\nThis office forwarded a copy of the Township' s response letter to\nJanuary 22, 2018.\n6, 2017, meeting.\n\nhe replied on\n\nalso provided this office with an audio recording of the December\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016)) provides that \" rainy\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" Indeed, the Attorney General has previously concluded that\nsection 2. 06( g) of OMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity\nfor members of the public to address public officials at open meetings.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc.\n\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language of section 2. 06( g) of OMA,\npublic comment must be permitted in accordance with the public body' s established and recorded\nrules.\n\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the nature of rules that a public\nbody may permissibly adopt, a board may adopt rules to maintain order and decorum at public\n\n2Pleasant Township, Fulton County, III., Ordinance Concerning Public Participation in Township\nMeetings, Ordinance No. 2017- 7, enacted November 1, 2017.\n\n\fMr. Trygve Thomas Meade\n\nFebruary 6, 2019\nPage 3\n\nmeetings to ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently. See Timmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp.\n2d 453, 465 ( W.D. Mich. 2008); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 0012, at 5 ( a\npublic body may promulgate reasonable \" time, place and manner\" rules aimed at preserving\norder and decorum).\n\nHowever, such rules must tend to accommodate,\n\nrather than to\n\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See IA. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City\nofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, at 923- 25 ( N.D. Ill. 2009).\nA rule that promotes order and decorum by requiring members of the public to\nsign up in advance to address a public body does not violate the first amendment to the United\nStates Constitution provided that it is reasonable in time and scope. Timmon v. Jeffries, No.\n\n1: 08—CV- 645, 2009 WL 270043, at * 3 ( W. D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2009) ( collection of sign- up forms\nimmediately before public comment portion of meeting was a permissible narrowly tailored\n\nrestriction) see also Bach v. School Board of City of Virginia Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741\nE.D. Va. 2001) ( requiring speakers to sign-up in advance of meeting is a reasonable content\nneutral regulation).\n\nHowever, an advance sign up rule that is enforced to prevent a member of\n\nthe public from addressing a public body violates OMA if it is not reasonably necessary to\npromote a significant governmental interest. I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, at 6 ( rule\nrequiring members of the public to sign up to comment five days in advance of meetings, before\nthe Board was required to post its agenda, imposed an unreasonable restriction on public\ncomment).\n\nIn this instance, the Township' s public comment rule requires a member of the\npublic who wishes to address public officials during an open meeting to write his or her name on\na sign -in sheet at the beginning of the meeting. As written, that portion of the public comment\n\nrules appears to be a reasonable rule which facilitates running a timely and orderly meeting;\nknowing how many people wish to speak and in what order to call participants may promote\n\nefficiency. However, the Township provided no information which suggests that the Board used\nits sign-up rule to run a timely and orderly meeting; rather the evidence establishes that the\nBoard used its sign- up rule for the purpose of prohibiting public comment from\nThe meeting minutes reflect that two members of the public attended the\n\nDecember 6, 2017, meeting, one of whom was\nAssistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau,\n\n3 In response to questions from an\nstated that he was the former\n\nhighway commissioner of the Township for 16 years and that the Board members knew him, but\n\nthe Township Supervisor denied him the right to address the Board because his signature was not\n\nlegible.4 This office has listened to that portion of the audio recording of the December 6, 2017,\nPleasant Township Board of Trustees, Meeting, December 6, 2017, Minutes 1.\nE- mail from\nJanuary 2, 2019).\n\nto Edie Steinberg, [ Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau]\n\n\fMr. Trygve Thomas Meade\n\nFebruary 6, 2019\nPage 4\n\nBoard meeting which concerns signing up for public comment. Early in the meeting, the\nTownship Supervisor asked persons to sign in if they desire to speak;\nand the\nSupervisor debated that requirement. Later, after announcing it was time for public input, the\nSupervisor stated \" We have a sign in sheet that has just a scribble on it. So this is not an actual\nsignature.\n\nMy opinion is that this is not a legible signature, deliberately * * *\n\nso we will\n\non.\" 5 The Township's response to this office explained that \"[ b] ecause\nfollow the rules\n\nestablished\n\nby Pleasant\n\nmove\n\nrefused to\n\nTownship in Ordinance No. 2017- 7, * * *\n\nwas\n\nnot allowed to speak. i6\n\nRather than asking the two members of the public if either had signed up to speak,\nand if so, allowing that person to address the public officials, the Board simply denied\nstatutory right to speak because his signature was illegible. The Board did not provide\nany information indicating why the need for a legible signature was necessary to promote order\nand decorum at the meeting, or to further any other significant governmental interest, especially\n\nwhen it was readily apparent that\nhad marked the sign- up sheet. Because the Board\napplied its advance sign- up rule in a manner that unreasonably restricted the right to address\npublic officials, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 06( g) of OMA during its\nDecember 6, 2017, meeting.\nIn accordance with the conclusions of this letter, the Public Access Bureau\n\nrequests that the Board provide an opportunity for the public to address it at all future meetings.\nWe remind the Board that rules which are used for the purpose of prohibiting public comment\n\nrather than accommodating the right to address public officials impermissibly restrict the public' s\nstatutory right to address the Board. Many public bodies that use sign -in sheets will also allow\ncomment from other members of the public when time permits. This office suggests that the\n\nBoard establish a Tess restrictive policy for public comment.\n\n5Pleasant Township Board of Trustees, Meeting, December 6, 2017, Audio Recording.\n6Letter from Trygve Thomas Meade to Edie Steinberg, [ Assistant Attorney General,] Office of the\nPublic Access Counselor (January 16, 2018), at 1.\nThis determination\n\nis limited to the Board' s denial of an individual' s right to address the Board\n\npursuant to its rule requiring advance sign- up by a prospective commenter at the start of a meeting; this\ndetermination does not assess the propriety of the remainder of the Board's public comment provisions. However,\nwe note that requiring a member of the public to set forth the topic of his or her comment in writing in advance of a\nmeeting may create a chilling effect on speech at public meetings. See 111. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 7\na rule requiring members of the public to provide a complete home address prior to speaking would exceed the\n\nscope of rulemaking under section 2. 06( g) because it may have a chilling effect on persons who wish to speak at\npublic meetings). Therefore, the Board may wish to review its public comment rules to ensure that they don' t\nimpermissibly restrict the public' s statutory right to address the Board.\n\n\fMr. Trygve Thomas Meade\n\nFebruary 6, 2019\nPage 5\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed.\n\nIf you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at ( 312) 814- 5201.\n\nEDIE STEINBERG\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50750 o 206g improper pub comment mun\ncc:\n\nMs. Nancy Webb\nSupervisor\n\nPleasant Township\nP. O. Box 230\nIpava, Illinois 61441\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A board's requirement for written topic and signature to speak","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50750/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nKwame Raoul\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nFebruary 6, 2019\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMr. Trygve Thomas Meade\n\nMeade Law Office, P. C.\n3106 North Main Street\n\nCanton, Illinois 61520\nfirm@meadelawpc. com\n\nRe: OMA Request for Review —2018 PAC 50750\nDear\n\nand Mr. Meade:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Board of Trustees (Board) of Pleasant Township (Township) violated OMA by\nprohibiting a member of the public from addressing the Board during its December 6, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nOn December 11, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review alleging\n\nthat the Board did not allow him to address it during its December 6, 2017, meeting because he\ndid not fill out a form providing the topic he wished to speak about and his signature.' On\nalso alleged that the Board violated OMA by (1) not holding a public hearing at the site\n\nof a road closure, and (2) commingled a budget hearing with a regularly scheduled meeting. No provision of OMA\nrequires a public body to hold a meeting at the site of road closure, nor does OMA govern the commingling of\nmeetings. To the extent that the Request for Review could be construed to allege violations of procedures required\n\nby other statutes or rules, those allegations are not subject to review by the Public Access Counselor. See 15 ILCS\n205/ 7(c)(3) (West 2016) (limiting the Public Access Counselor's authority to resolve disputes to alleged violations\nof OMA and the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/ 1 et seq. (West 2016)).\n\nDecember 21, 2017, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to\n\nthe Township Supervisor and requested a detailed written response to\nallegations,\ntogether with copies of the minutes, any recordings of the meetings, a copy of the Board's rules\nregarding public comment, and the public comment form.\nIn a letter dated January 16, 2018, the Township's outside counsel submitted a\nwritten response, on behalf of the Township, and provided the Public Access Bureau with copies\n\nof the agenda and minutes of the Board's December 6, 2017, meeting, its rules regarding public\ncomment, and a copy of the sign -in form from the December 6, 2017, meeting, which contains\n\nan illegible signature and an illegible topic for discussion. The Township's public comment rules\nprovide in pertinent part:\n\n1. Sign in sheet. Any person who wishes to make comment\nduring the relevant portion of a township meeting must write their\nname and the topic of comment on a sheet provided for that\n\npurpose prior to the meeting. If their name and topic does not\nappear on the sheet at the beginning of the meeting they may not\n\nmake any comment at that meeting. lzi\nThis office forwarded a copy of the Township's response letter to\nJanuary 22, 2018.\n6, 2017, meeting.\n\nhe replied on\n\nalso provided this office with an audio recording of the December\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016)) provides that \" rainy\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\n\nand recorded by the public body.\" Indeed, the Attorney General has previously concluded that\nsection 2. 06(g) of OMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity\nfor members of the public to address public officials at open meetings.\" Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc.\n\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language of section 2. 06(g) of OMA,\npublic comment must be permitted in accordance with the public body's established and recorded\nrules.\n\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the nature of rules that a public\nbody may permissibly adopt, a board may adopt rules to maintain order and decorum at public\n\n2 Pleasant Township, Fulton County, III., Ordinance Concerning Public Participation in Township\n\nmeetings to ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently. See Timmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp.\n2d 453, 465 (W.D. Mich. 2008); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 0012, at 5 (a\npublic body may promulgate reasonable \" time, place and manner\" rules aimed at preserving\norder and decorum).\n\nHowever, such rules must tend to accommodate,\n\nrather than to\n\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See IA. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City\nofAurora, 630 F. Supp. 2d 912, at 923- 25 (N.D. Ill. 2009).\nA rule that promotes order and decorum by requiring members of the public to\nsign up in advance to address a public body does not violate the first amendment to the United\nStates Constitution provided that it is reasonable in time and scope. Timmon v. Jeffries, No.\n\n1: 08—CV- 645, 2009 WL 270043, at * 3 (W. D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2009) (collection of sign- up forms\nimmediately before public comment portion of meeting was a permissible narrowly tailored\n\nrestriction) see also Bach v. School Board of City of Virginia Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741\nE.D. Va. 2001) (requiring speakers to sign-up in advance of meeting is a reasonable content\nneutral regulation).\n\nHowever, an advance sign up rule that is enforced to prevent a member of\n\nthe public from addressing a public body violates OMA if it is not reasonably necessary to\npromote a significant governmental interest. I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, at 6 (rule\nrequiring members of the public to sign up to comment five days in advance of meetings, before\nthe Board was required to post its agenda, imposed an unreasonable restriction on public\ncomment).\n\nIn this instance, the Township's public comment rule requires a member of the\npublic who wishes to address public officials during an open meeting to write his or her name on\na sign -in sheet at the beginning of the meeting. As written, that portion of the public comment\n\nrules appears to be a reasonable rule which facilitates running a timely and orderly meeting;\nknowing how many people wish to speak and in what order to call participants may promote\n\nefficiency. However, the Township provided no information which suggests that the Board used\nits sign-up rule to run a timely and orderly meeting; rather the evidence establishes that the\nBoard used its sign- up rule for the purpose of prohibiting public comment from\nThe meeting minutes reflect that two members of the public attended the\n\nDecember 6, 2017, meeting, one of whom was\nAssistant Attorney General in the Public Access Bureau,\n\n3 In response to questions from an\nstated that he was the former\n\nhighway commissioner of the Township for 16 years and that the Board members knew him, but\n\nthe Township Supervisor denied him the right to address the Board because his signature was not\n\nlegible.4 This office has listened to that portion of the audio recording of the December 6, 2017,\n\nBoard meeting which concerns signing up for public comment. Early in the meeting, the\nTownship Supervisor asked persons to sign in if they desire to speak;\nand the\nSupervisor debated that requirement. Later, after announcing it was time for public input, the\nSupervisor stated \" We have a sign in sheet that has just a scribble on it. So this is not an actual\nsignature.\n\nMy opinion is that this is not a legible signature, deliberately * * *\n\nso we will\n\non.\" 5 The Township's response to this office explained that \"[ b] ecause\nfollow the rules\n\nestablished\n\nby Pleasant\n\nmove\n\nrefused to\n\nTownship in Ordinance No. 2017- 7, * * *\n\nwas\n\nnot allowed to speak. i6\n\nRather than asking the two members of the public if either had signed up to speak,\nand if so, allowing that person to address the public officials, the Board simply denied\nstatutory right to speak because his signature was illegible. The Board did not provide\nany information indicating why the need for a legible signature was necessary to promote order\nand decorum at the meeting, or to further any other significant governmental interest, especially\n\nwhen it was readily apparent that\nhad marked the sign- up sheet. Because the Board\napplied its advance sign- up rule in a manner that unreasonably restricted the right to address\npublic officials, this office concludes that the Board violated section 2. 06(g) of OMA during its\nDecember 6, 2017, meeting.\nIn accordance with the conclusions of this letter, the Public Access Bureau\n\nrequests that the Board provide an opportunity for the public to address it at all future meetings.\nWe remind the Board that rules which are used for the purpose of prohibiting public comment\n\nrather than accommodating the right to address public officials impermissibly restrict the public's\nstatutory right to address the Board. Many public bodies that use sign -in sheets will also allow\ncomment from other members of the public when time permits. This office suggests that the\n\nBoard establish a Tess restrictive policy for public comment.\n\n5 Pleasant Township Board of Trustees, Meeting, December 6, 2017, Audio Recording.\n6 Letter from Trygve Thomas Meade to Edie Steinberg, [ Assistant Attorney General,] Office of the\nPublic Access Counselor (January 16, 2018), at 1.\nThis determination\n\nis limited to the Board's denial of an individual's right to address the Board\n\npursuant to its rule requiring advance sign- up by a prospective commenter at the start of a meeting; this\ndetermination does not assess the propriety of the remainder of the Board's public comment provisions. However,\nwe note that requiring a member of the public to set forth the topic of his or her comment in writing in advance of a\nmeeting may create a chilling effect on speech at public meetings. See 111. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 7\na rule requiring members of the public to provide a complete home address prior to speaking would exceed the\n\nscope of rulemaking under section 2. 06(g) because it may have a chilling effect on persons who wish to speak at\npublic meetings). Therefore, the Board may wish to review its public comment rules to ensure that they don' t\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed.\n\nIf you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at (312) 814- 5201.\n\nEDIE STEINBERG\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50750 o 206g improper pub comment mun\ncc:\n\nMs. Nancy Webb\nSupervisor\n\nPleasant Township\nP. O. Box 230\nIpava, Illinois 61441"}
{"id":1233,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-05-09","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50757"],"title":"Chicago State University Board of Trustees cleared on closed meeting recording complaint","filename":"50757, issued May 9, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2262,"summary":"The complainants alleged that the Chicago State University Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to record the entirety of a closed session meeting. The PAC determined it could not conclude a violation occurred based on the information provided.","plain_summary":"Complainants alleged that a university board improperly stopped recording a closed-door meeting. The Attorney General's office investigated but could not find sufficient evidence to prove that a violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred. Consequently, the office closed the file without taking further action.","holding":"The PAC was unable to conclude that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act regarding the recording of its closed session.","legal_question":"Whether the Chicago State University Board of Trustees violated section 2.06(a) of the Open Meetings Act by failing to maintain a complete verbatim recording of a closed session meeting.","disposition":"closed_no_further_action","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06(a)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Chicago State University Board of Trustees","requesting_party":"Unnamed complainants","pac_outcome":"Closed, no further action","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The complainants alleged that a board member ordered a technician to stop recording a closed session meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.6,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_a/50757, issued May 9, 2018.pdf","sha256":"fbe66ee590e1a508ee7f859f6f026c2eb0342f83b3db5d5505118ad026a750e7","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","verbatim recording","Open Meetings Act","university board"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMay 9, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Marshall E. Hatch\nBoard of Trustees\n\nChicago State University\n9501 South King Drive\nChicago, Illinois 60628\ncsu. edu\ntrustees@csu.\nedu\n\nRE:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review —2018 PAC 50757\n\nand Dr. Hatch:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude that Chicago State University Board of Trustees ( Board) violated\nOMA by failing to make a complete verbatim recording of the closed session portion of its April\n7, 2017, meeting.\n\nand\n\nIn their Request for Review,\nallege that the Board violated OMA by failing to record the complete\n\nclosed session portion of its April 7, 2017, meeting.\n\nSpecifically, they alleged that an unnamed\n\nBoard member ordered the technician to discontinue the recording while discussing an action\nitem. This office construed the Request for Review as alleging a violation of section 2. 06( a) of\nOMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a) ( West 2016)), which provides: \" All public bodies shall keep written\nminutes of all their meetings, whether open or closed, and a verbatim record of all their closed\n\nmeetings in the form of an audio or video recording.\"\n\n500 South\n\nSecond\n\nStreet,\n\nSpringfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217)\n\n785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217)\n\n782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\nIllinois 62901: (\n618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\n\fThe Honorable Marshall E. Hatch\n\nMay 9, 2018\nPage 2\n\nOn January 29, 2018, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to the allegation that the Board failed to record the complete\n\nclosed session portion of its April 7, 2017, meeting and to provide a copy of the closed session\nrecording. On February 8, 2018, the Board president responded by asserting that the Board\nrecorded the closed session in its entirety and only stopped the recording device to change the\nrecording medium, at which point discussion of public business ceased until the recording\nresumed.\n\nOn February 19, 2018,\nreplied by stating that a former Board member,\nNikki Zollar, told him that University personnel had been \" specifically instructed not to turn on\n\nthe recording device at the beginning of executive session.\" t Ms. Zollar also sent this office an\ne- mail stating that she attended the closed session with the intent of criticizing themanner in\nwhich Board meetings were conducted and the conduct of Board members, and discovered\n\nbetween 30 and 45 minutes after the closed session started that the recording device was not\nfunctioning. She stated that she then located the Board liaison, who began taping the closed\nsession, and that she reported the alleged failure to record the entire closed session to University\nadministrators immediately after the meeting.\nOn March 7, 2018, this office sent a copy of\nreply and Ms. Zollar' s\ne- mail to the Board, and asked that it respond to the additional information concerning the\nallegation that the Board did not record a portion of the closed session. On March 20, 2018, the\n\nBoard president responded by again denying the allegation and submitting correspondence from\nother Board members and the Board liaison who either refuted the allegation or stated that they\nwere unable to recall what transpired in closed session. The Board's vice- chairman stated, in\npertinent\n\npart:\n\nAfter the open session recessed, I walked to the conference\nroom where the executive session was to be held.\n\nAs I walked into\n\nthe room, I noticed all of the trustees were not yet present and\nneither was Bonnie Phillips, the CSU Board liaison. I recall other\n\nstaffers not privy to our discussion were present as they setup for\nthe meeting. Trustee Tiffany Harper was visibly upset, and I was\ntold that the CSU Provost and Trustee Harper had been engaged in\n\na heated argument following the open session.\nAs other trustees were trying to ascertain what had\noccurred, Trustee Zollar walked into the room and sat at one end of\n\nLetter from\nPublic\n\nAccess\n\nOfficer,\n\nOffice of the\n\nClass of \"64\", Illinois Taxpayer, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief,\n\nAttorney General ( February 19, 2018).\n\n\fThe Honorable Marshall E. Hatch\n\nMay 9, 2018\nPage 3\n\nthe long conference table, as everyone else was preparing to sit at\n\nthe other end of the table. Trustee Zollar began yelling and\nTrustee Harper continued to be upset following her encounter with\nthe Provost. * * *\n\nMs. Phillips then walked into the conference\n\nroom, and Chairman Hatch instructed the CSU employees to leave\n\nthe room — including Ms. Phillips and the sound technician, who\n\nwas sitting in front of the recording machine?'\nThe Vice -Chairman added: \"\n\nThe purpose of the executive\n\nsession was to discuss the new\n\nleadership for the university. So, from my perspective, the meeting had not yet commenced at\nthe time that Trustee Zollar began her tirade. Rather, the trustees were trying ( in vain) to calm\nboth Trustee Zollar and Trustee Harper — which lasted no more than 15 minutes. i3 In addition,\nthe Board liaison stated that there was a \" chaotic emotional\n\nscene\" when she arrived at the\n\nconference room before the closed session started. 4 She stated that she waited outside the\nconference room, and that Trustee Zollar later emerged from the room and asked her why the\nrecording device had not been activated. She said she entered the conference room and, after the\n\nBoard president stated that he was ready to begin the closed session, asked the technician to start\nthe recording device and the closed session commenced with the first item on the closed session\nagenda.\n\nDETERMINATION\nAs an initial matter, section 3. 5( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West 2016))\nprovides:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\n\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later than 60 days after the alleged violation. If\n\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60—\n\nday period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\n2Letter from Nicholas A. Gowen, Esq., Vice Chairman, Chicago State University Board of\nTrustees, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( March\n15, 2018), at 1- 2.\n\n3Letter from Nicholas A. Gowen, Esq., Vice Chairman, Chicago State University Board of\nTrustees, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General ( March\n15, 2018), at 1- 2.\nLetter from Bonnie Phillips to Dr. Marshall\nState\n\nUniversity ( March\n\n10, 2018).\n\nE. Hatch, Sr., Chairman,\n\nBoard of Trustees,\n\nChicago\n\n\fThe Honorable Marshall E. Hatch\n\nMay 9, 2018\nPage 4\n\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing\n\nreasonable diligence, the request for review may be made\nwithin 60 days of the discovery of the alleged violation. The\n\nrequest for review must be in writing, must be signed by the\nrequester, and must include a summary of the facts supporting the\nallegation.\n\nOn December 7, 2017, the requesters submitted a letter to this office alleging that\nthey recently had been informed that the Board violated OMA by either failing to record the\nentire April 7, 2017, closed session, or by destroying a portion of the recording. That submission\nwas incomplete because it was unsigned and did not include any facts supporting that allegation.\nIn a letter dated January 12, 2018, the requesters submitted a signed Request for Review\nasserting that \"[ o] ver the Christmas holiday, it was confirmed by one of the Trustees present at\nthe April 7, 2017 Regular Board meeting\" that the Board president \" ordered the technician to\ndiscontinue the recording of the closed session. i5\nHowever, in reply to the Board' s response,\n\nacknowledged that he\n\nattended the April 7, 2017, Board meeting and stated that \"[ a] fter executive session I was told by\n\nUniversity administrators that portions of the executive session[ ] had intentionally not been\ntaped. * * *\n\nAfter making additional inquiries I was informed by [ a] former Board member,\nNikki Zollar[,] that University personnel had been specifically instructed not to turn on the\nrecording device at the beginning of executive session. i6 In its supplemental response, the Board\n\nasserted that the Request for Review was not submitted within the applicable 60 -day statutory\nperiod because\nclaims he became aware of the alleged violation eight months before\nhis submission to this office. Because\nacknowledged that he discovered facts\n\nconceming the alleged violation on the date of the April 7, 2017, meeting but did not file the\n\nRequest for Review within 60 days of that discovery as required by section 3. 5( a), the Public\n\nAccess Bureau does not have authority to substantively review this matter.\nThe Public Access Counselor also is charged with providing advice and education\nwith respect to OMA to the public and to public officials. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7( a), ( b), ( c) ( West\n\n2016). In that capacity, this office notes that even if the requesters had submitted this Request\n\nfor Review before the statutory time limit for doing so expired, the limited and conflicting\nevidence provided to this office is insufficient to establish that the Board violated section 2. 06( a)\n\nof OMA. Although Ms. Zollar adamantly asserts in her e- mail that the recording device was not\n5Letter from\n\nand\n\nto Office of the\n\nAttorney General, Attorney General Lisa Madigan ( January 12, 2018).\n6Letter from\nPublic\n\nClass of \"64\", Illinois Taxpayer, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief,\n\nAccess Officer, Office of the Attorney General ( February 19, 2018).\n\n\fThe Honorable Marshall E. Hatch\n\nMay 9, 2018\nPage 5\n\nfunctioning at the beginning of the closed session, the Board president directly denied that claim\nin his response to this office. Based on this office' s review of the closed session recording, it\nbegins with a Board member signaling the start of the closed session by alluding to the closed\nsession agenda. There are no acknowledgments or complaints that unrecorded closed session\n\ndiscussions had already occurred.\n\nIt appears, however, that there may have been an argument between a Board\nmember and an administrator\n\nand that a conflict ensued in the conference room in which\n\nmembers of the Board and CSU employees gathered before the closed session formally\ncommenced.\n\nThe precise nature of the conflict and the participants\n\nare unclear— the most\n\ndescriptive account this office received indicated that Board members tried to calm two other\nBoard members who were upset.\n\nThus, the available information does not indicate that a\n\nmajority of a quorum of Board members held a deliberative discussion of public business subject\n\nto the requirements of OMA7 before the recording device for the closed session was activated.\n\nSee Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 7 (\" whether a gathering falls within\nthe definition of a meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\"); Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 ( N. D. Ill. 1982) ( A gathering does not\nconstitute a \" ineeting\" for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons\nfor or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt\nto reach accord on a specific matter of [public] business.\").\nNevertheless, this office recommends that the Board be mindful that discussions\n\nof public business among a majority of a quorum of Board members which occur after a public\n\nbody votes to enter closed session may constitute a \" meeting\" subject to the requirements of\nOMA, even if those topics were not anticipated to be part of the closed session discussion. This\n\noffice cautions the Board to refrain from any such discussions that are not authorized by the\nrelevant exceptions, to the general requirement that public bodies conduct public business '\n\nopenly, that the Board cites when it votes to enter closed session.\n\n7The requirements of OMA apply to each \" meeting\" of a public body, which section 1. 02 of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2016)) defines as:\n\nany gathering, whether in person or by video or audio conference, telephone\ncall, electronic means ( such as, without limitation, electronic mail, electronic\n\nchat, and instant messaging), or other means of contemporaneous interactive\ncommunication, of a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held\n\nfor the purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5 -member public body, a\nquorum of the members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing\npublic\n\nbusiness.\n\n\fhe Honorable Marshall E. Hatch\n\nMay 9, 2018\nPage 6\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n312) 814- 6756 or ssilverman@atg. state. il.us. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE\n\nSILVERMAN\n\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50757 0 60 days\n\nuniv\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A board member ordering a technician to stop recording a closed session","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50757/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nMay 9, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\nThe Honorable Marshall E. Hatch\nBoard of Trustees\n\nChicago State University\n9501 South King Drive\nChicago, Illinois 60628\ncsu. edu\ntrustees@csu.\nedu\n\nRE:\n\nDear\n\nOMA Request for Review —2018 PAC 50757\n\nand Dr. Hatch:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau is unable to conclude that Chicago State University Board of Trustees (Board) violated\nOMA by failing to make a complete verbatim recording of the closed session portion of its April\n7, 2017, meeting.\n\nand\n\nIn their Request for Review,\nallege that the Board violated OMA by failing to record the complete\n\nclosed session portion of its April 7, 2017, meeting.\n\nSpecifically, they alleged that an unnamed\n\nBoard member ordered the technician to discontinue the recording while discussing an action\nitem. This office construed the Request for Review as alleging a violation of section 2. 06(a) of\nOMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a) (West 2016)), which provides: \" All public bodies shall keep written\nminutes of all their meetings, whether open or closed, and a verbatim record of all their closed\n\nmeetings in the form of an audio or video recording.\"\n\n500 South\n\nSecond\n\nStreet,\n\nSpringfield,\n\nIllinois\n\n62701 • (217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: (217)\n\n785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: (217)\n\n782- 7046\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\nTTY: (312) 814- 3374 •\nFax: (312) 814- 3806\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (Illinois 62901: (618) 529- 6400 • TTY: (618) 529- 6403 • Fax: (618) 529- 6416\n\nOn January 29, 2018, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond to the allegation that the Board failed to record the complete\n\nclosed session portion of its April 7, 2017, meeting and to provide a copy of the closed session\nrecording. On February 8, 2018, the Board president responded by asserting that the Board\nrecorded the closed session in its entirety and only stopped the recording device to change the\nrecording medium, at which point discussion of public business ceased until the recording\nresumed.\n\nOn February 19, 2018,\nreplied by stating that a former Board member,\nNikki Zollar, told him that University personnel had been \" specifically instructed not to turn on\n\nthe recording device at the beginning of executive session.\" t Ms. Zollar also sent this office an\ne- mail stating that she attended the closed session with the intent of criticizing themanner in\nwhich Board meetings were conducted and the conduct of Board members, and discovered\n\nbetween 30 and 45 minutes after the closed session started that the recording device was not\nfunctioning. She stated that she then located the Board liaison, who began taping the closed\nsession, and that she reported the alleged failure to record the entire closed session to University\nadministrators immediately after the meeting.\nOn March 7, 2018, this office sent a copy of\nreply and Ms. Zollar's\ne- mail to the Board, and asked that it respond to the additional information concerning the\nallegation that the Board did not record a portion of the closed session. On March 20, 2018, the\n\nBoard president responded by again denying the allegation and submitting correspondence from\nother Board members and the Board liaison who either refuted the allegation or stated that they\nwere unable to recall what transpired in closed session. The Board's vice- chairman stated, in\npertinent\n\npart:\n\nAfter the open session recessed, I walked to the conference\nroom where the executive session was to be held.\n\nAs I walked into\n\nthe room, I noticed all of the trustees were not yet present and\nneither was Bonnie Phillips, the CSU Board liaison. I recall other\n\nstaffers not privy to our discussion were present as they setup for\nthe meeting. Trustee Tiffany Harper was visibly upset, and I was\ntold that the CSU Provost and Trustee Harper had been engaged in\n\na heated argument following the open session.\nAs other trustees were trying to ascertain what had\noccurred, Trustee Zollar walked into the room and sat at one end of\n\nLetter from\nPublic\n\nthe long conference table, as everyone else was preparing to sit at\n\nthe other end of the table. Trustee Zollar began yelling and\nTrustee Harper continued to be upset following her encounter with\nthe Provost. * * *\n\nMs. Phillips then walked into the conference\n\nroom, and Chairman Hatch instructed the CSU employees to leave\n\nthe room — including Ms. Phillips and the sound technician, who\n\nwas sitting in front of the recording machine?'\nThe Vice -Chairman added: \"\n\nThe purpose of the executive\n\nsession was to discuss the new\n\nleadership for the university. So, from my perspective, the meeting had not yet commenced at\nthe time that Trustee Zollar began her tirade. Rather, the trustees were trying (in vain) to calm\nboth Trustee Zollar and Trustee Harper — which lasted no more than 15 minutes. i3 In addition,\nthe Board liaison stated that there was a \" chaotic emotional\n\nscene\" when she arrived at the\n\nconference room before the closed session started. 4 She stated that she waited outside the\nconference room, and that Trustee Zollar later emerged from the room and asked her why the\nrecording device had not been activated. She said she entered the conference room and, after the\n\nBoard president stated that he was ready to begin the closed session, asked the technician to start\nthe recording device and the closed session commenced with the first item on the closed session\nagenda.\n\nDETERMINATION\nAs an initial matter, section 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West 2016))\nprovides:\n\nA person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\n\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the\nPublic Access Counselor established in the Office of the Attorney\nGeneral not later than 60 days after the alleged violation. If\n\nfacts concerning the violation are not discovered within the 60—\n\nday period, but are discovered at a later date, not exceeding 2\n2 Letter from Nicholas A. Gowen, Esq., Vice Chairman, Chicago State University Board of\nTrustees, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March\n15, 2018), at 1- 2.\n\n3 Letter from Nicholas A. Gowen, Esq., Vice Chairman, Chicago State University Board of\nTrustees, to Steve Silverman, Bureau Chief, Public Access Bureau, Office of the Illinois Attorney General (March\n15, 2018), at 1- 2.\nLetter from Bonnie Phillips to Dr. Marshall\nState\n\nyears after the alleged violation, by a person utilizing\n\nreasonable diligence, the request for review may be made\nwithin 60 days of the discovery of the alleged violation. The\n\nrequest for review must be in writing, must be signed by the\nrequester, and must include a summary of the facts supporting the\nallegation.\n\nOn December 7, 2017, the requesters submitted a letter to this office alleging that\nthey recently had been informed that the Board violated OMA by either failing to record the\nentire April 7, 2017, closed session, or by destroying a portion of the recording. That submission\nwas incomplete because it was unsigned and did not include any facts supporting that allegation.\nIn a letter dated January 12, 2018, the requesters submitted a signed Request for Review\nasserting that \"[ o] ver the Christmas holiday, it was confirmed by one of the Trustees present at\nthe April 7, 2017 Regular Board meeting\" that the Board president \" ordered the technician to\ndiscontinue the recording of the closed session. i5\nHowever, in reply to the Board's response,\n\nacknowledged that he\n\nattended the April 7, 2017, Board meeting and stated that \"[ a] fter executive session I was told by\n\nUniversity administrators that portions of the executive session[ ] had intentionally not been\ntaped. * * *\n\nAfter making additional inquiries I was informed by [ a] former Board member,\nNikki Zollar[,] that University personnel had been specifically instructed not to turn on the\nrecording device at the beginning of executive session. i6 In its supplemental response, the Board\n\nasserted that the Request for Review was not submitted within the applicable 60 -day statutory\nperiod because\nclaims he became aware of the alleged violation eight months before\nhis submission to this office. Because\nacknowledged that he discovered facts\n\nconceming the alleged violation on the date of the April 7, 2017, meeting but did not file the\n\nRequest for Review within 60 days of that discovery as required by section 3. 5(a), the Public\n\nAccess Bureau does not have authority to substantively review this matter.\nThe Public Access Counselor also is charged with providing advice and education\nwith respect to OMA to the public and to public officials. See 15 ILCS 205/ 7(a), (b), (c) (West\n\n2016). In that capacity, this office notes that even if the requesters had submitted this Request\n\nfor Review before the statutory time limit for doing so expired, the limited and conflicting\nevidence provided to this office is insufficient to establish that the Board violated section 2. 06(a)\n\nof OMA. Although Ms. Zollar adamantly asserts in her e- mail that the recording device was not\n5 Letter from\n\nand\n\nto Office of the\n\nfunctioning at the beginning of the closed session, the Board president directly denied that claim\nin his response to this office. Based on this office's review of the closed session recording, it\nbegins with a Board member signaling the start of the closed session by alluding to the closed\nsession agenda. There are no acknowledgments or complaints that unrecorded closed session\n\ndiscussions had already occurred.\n\nIt appears, however, that there may have been an argument between a Board\nmember and an administrator\n\nand that a conflict ensued in the conference room in which\n\nmembers of the Board and CSU employees gathered before the closed session formally\ncommenced.\n\nThe precise nature of the conflict and the participants\n\nare unclear— the most\n\ndescriptive account this office received indicated that Board members tried to calm two other\nBoard members who were upset.\n\nThus, the available information does not indicate that a\n\nmajority of a quorum of Board members held a deliberative discussion of public business subject\n\nto the requirements of OMA7 before the recording device for the closed session was activated.\n\nSee Ill. Att' y Gen. Op. No. S- 726, issued March 22, 1974, at 7 (\" whether a gathering falls within\nthe definition of a meeting as used in the Act, would depend upon the peculiar facts in each\nsituation.\"); Nabhani v. Coglianese, 552 F. Supp. 657, 661 (N. D. Ill. 1982) (A gathering does not\nconstitute a \" ineeting\" for purposes of OMA when there is \" no examining or weighing of reasons\nfor or against a course of action, no exchange of facts preliminary to a decision, [ and] no attempt\nto reach accord on a specific matter of [public] business.\").\nNevertheless, this office recommends that the Board be mindful that discussions\n\nof public business among a majority of a quorum of Board members which occur after a public\n\nbody votes to enter closed session may constitute a \" meeting\" subject to the requirements of\nOMA, even if those topics were not anticipated to be part of the closed session discussion. This\n\noffice cautions the Board to refrain from any such discussions that are not authorized by the\nrelevant exceptions, to the general requirement that public bodies conduct public business '\n\nopenly, that the Board cites when it votes to enter closed session.\n\n7 The requirements of OMA apply to each \" meeting\" of a public body, which section 1. 02 of OMA\n5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2016)) defines as:\n\nany gathering, whether in person or by video or audio conference, telephone\ncall, electronic means (such as, without limitation, electronic mail, electronic\n\nchat, and instant messaging), or other means of contemporaneous interactive\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n312) 814- 6756 or ssilverman@atg. state. il.us. This file is closed.\nVery truly yours,\n\nSTEVE\n\nSILVERMAN\n\nBureau Chief\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50757 0 60 days\n\nuniv"}
{"id":1235,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-03-01","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50791"],"title":"City of Galena violated Open Meetings Act by barring public comment","filename":"50791, issued March 1, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1506,"summary":"A citizen alleged that the Galena City Council violated the Open Meetings Act by preventing him from speaking during the public comment portion of a meeting and by discussing items not on the agenda. The PAC determined that the Council improperly prohibited public comment but did not violate the Act regarding the discussion of agenda items.","plain_summary":"A resident complained that the Galena City Council stopped him from speaking during a public meeting and discussed topics that weren't on the agenda. The Attorney General's office found that the Council broke the law by blocking the resident's right to provide public comment. However, the Council was allowed to discuss topics not on the agenda as long as they did not take final action on those items.","holding":"The Galena City Council violated the Open Meetings Act by improperly prohibiting members of the public from addressing the Council during the public comment portion of its December 11, 2017, meeting.","legal_question":"Whether a public body violates the Open Meetings Act by prohibiting public comment during a meeting and by discussing matters not specifically listed on the meeting agenda.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"City of Galena","requesting_party":"Mark Moran","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"public comment","subject_description":"The dispute concerns the right of the public to address a city council during a meeting and the scope of permissible discussion regarding agenda items.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":95.2,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/50791, issued March 1, 2018.pdf","sha256":"1fe9f0f98d4422644efc5a5b02d2acf3e26ece918b91fdf370d10bab8d983180","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","meeting agenda","city council","open meetings act"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Conduct & Participation","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMarch 1, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Terry Renner\nMayor\n\nThe City of Galena\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 50791\nDear\n\nand Mayor Renner:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Galena City Council ( Council) violated the requirements of OMA\n\nduring its December 11, 2017, meeting by improperly prohibiting members of the public from\naddressing the Council during the public comment portion of the meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn December 12, 2017, this office received\n\nRequest for\n\nReview alleging that during the public comment period of its December 11, 2017, meeting, the\n\nCouncil prevented him from speaking about \" agenda item # 17C- 0493: Discussion and possible\naction on clarification of pre -requisites for the issuance of a Building Permit for Grace Episcopal\n\nChurch Addition Project.'\" 1\n\nalso alleged that the Council' s discussion concerning\n\nagenda item 17C- 0493 included information unrelated to the agenda item. On December 18,\n\n1E -mail from\n\nDecember 11, 2017).\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Attorney General]\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • ( 217) 782- 1090 • TTY: ( 217) 785- 2771 • Fax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n1001 East Main, Carbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618)\n\n529- 6416\n\n\fMayor Terry Renner\nMarch 1, 2018\nPage 2\n\n2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Council and requested that it\nprovide a written response to\nallegation regarding the restriction on public\ncomment. This office asked the Council to provide a copy of its established and recorded rules\nregarding public comment, and the agenda, open session minutes ( draft form if necessary), and\nany audio or video recordings of the December 11, 2017, meeting. On January 3, 2018, this\noffice received the requested materials and the Council' s answer. On January 10, 2018,\nreplied.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA provides that \"[ ably person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" ( Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of section 2. 06( g), a public body must\nestablish and record rules and may restrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See Ill.\n\nAtt'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014, at 7.\nIn response to this office' s request for a copy of the Council' s established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Council submitted a copy of the City of Galena' s\nCity Council Rules of Procedures\" ( Council Rules). Section 5, \" Order of Business,\" of the\nCouncil Rules provides that public comments are \" not to exceed 15 minutes as an item nor more\nthan 3 minutes\n\nper speaker[.]\"\n\n2 The Council' s agenda for the December 11, 2017, meeting,\n\nhowever, provides a conflicting version of the public comment rules that includes a restriction on\ncomments regarding certain zoning matters. The agenda states:\nCitizens Comments\nNot to exceed 15 minutes as an agenda item\nNot more than 3 minutes per speaker\n\nNo testimony on zoning items where a public\nhearing has been conducted131\n\nWhen construing the meaning of a statutory provision, the primary objective is to\nascertain the intent of the legislature. See, e. g., DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 I11. 2d 49, 59 ( 2006).\nThe plain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent, and if that language is clear\nand unambiguous, it must be given effect.\" People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 24, 962 N. E.\n2d 444, 452 ( 2012).\n\nThe plain language of section 2. 06( g) requires that the rules governing\n\npublic comment not only be \" established\" but also \" recorded\" by the public body. Although the\n\n2City of Galena, Illinois, City Council Rules of Procedures 6 ( May 12, 1997).\n3City of Galena, Illinois City Council, Agenda Item 17C- 0487, Citizens Comments ( December 11,\n2017).\n\n\fMayor Terry Renner\nMarch 1, 2018\nPage 3\n\nCouncil asserted that the restriction on public comments about certain zoning items has been\nincluded on every regular Council agenda since May 8, 2006, it did not explain how including\nthe rule in agendas is the equivalent of establishing and recording the rule. Further, the Council\nhas not presented any evidence that the conflicting provision of the Council Rules has been\n\nrevoked or otherwise formally amended to include the rule restricting comment on certain zoning\nitems. This office cannot conclude that the version of the public comment rules as stated in the\nDecember 11, 2017, agenda has been established and recorded in accordance with section\n\n2. 06( g). Accordingly, the Council Rules govern how the public addresses public officials. See\nIll. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45126, issued April 6, 2017, at 3 ( established and recorded\n\npublic comment rule codified in village code governed rather than rule displayed during each\nmeeting).\n\nThe Council does not dispute that it prohibited\n\nfrom commenting on\n\nagenda item 17C- 0493 because there had been a public Zoning Board of Appeals hearing on that\nmatter on June 8, 2016. However, the established and recorded public comment rules as stated\n\nin the Council Rules did not permit the Council to prohibit comments about zoning matters.\nTherefore, this office concludes that the Council violated section 2. 06( g) of OMA by imposing\nan unestablished and unrecorded rule limiting public comment during its December 11, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nThere are no means for the Council to remedy its violation in this instance. This\noffice requests that the Council refrain from limiting public comment at any future meetings\nexcept pursuant to its established and recorded rules. In the event that the Council chooses to\n\namend its Council Rules to reflect the statements in its December 11, 2017, agenda regarding\npublic comment, this office notes that a public body's rules regarding public comment must tend\nto accommodate, rather than unreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See Ill.\n\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6. Because section 2. 06( g)\nis intended to ensure that members of the public have an opportunity to address public officials at\nall open meetings, this office has previously determined that rules adopted under 2. 06( g) are\ninvalid when they do not reasonably \" accommodate a speaker' s statutory right to address the\npublic body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain order and decorum at public\nmeetings.\" See Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6. It is\n\nnot apparent how a public body' s rule would promote order and decorum by prohibiting a\nmember of the public from addressing a matter simply because an opportunity for public\ncomment on the same matter was provided at a meeting of another public body.\nUnrelated Discussion Regarding Agenda Item\nIn his Request for Review,\nconcerning\n\nagenda item\n\nalleged that the Council' s discussion\n\n17C- 0493 included information unrelated to the agenda item. Although\n\n\fMayor Terry Renner\nMarch 1, 2018\nPage 4\n\nsection 2.02( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02( c) ( West 2016)) requires a public body's posted\nagenda to \" set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the\nsubject\n\nof\n\nfinal action\n\nat the\n\nmeeting[ ]\" ( emphasis added), that provision does not prohibit\n\ndiscussion of matters not on an agenda by the public body. Rice v. Board of Trustees ofAdams\nCounty, 111., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1123 ( 4th Dist. 2002) ( concluding that a public body may\n\nconsider\" items not specifically set forth on an agenda by deliberation and discussion, but may\nnot take final action without sufficient advance notice on the agenda).\n\nhas not\n\nalleged that the Council took final action on any matters that arose during its discussion of\nagenda item 17C- 0493 that were unrelated to the agenda item. Accordingly, even if the Council\ndiscussed unrelated information during its discussion of item 17C- 0493, that discussion did not\nviolate OMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg. state. il.us. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50791 o 206g pub comment improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Mark Moran\n\nCity Administrator, City of Galena\nP. O. Box 310\nGalena, Illinois 61036\nmmoran@cityofgalena.\n\norg\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"Public comment restrictions at a city council meeting","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50791/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE OF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMarch 1, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nThe Honorable Terry Renner\nMayor\n\nThe City of Galena\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nRE: OMA Request for Review — 2017 PAC 50791\nDear\n\nand Mayor Renner:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons explained below, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Galena City Council (Council) violated the requirements of OMA\n\nduring its December 11, 2017, meeting by improperly prohibiting members of the public from\naddressing the Council during the public comment portion of the meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn December 12, 2017, this office received\n\nRequest for\n\nReview alleging that during the public comment period of its December 11, 2017, meeting, the\n\nCouncil prevented him from speaking about \" agenda item # 17C- 0493: Discussion and possible\naction on clarification of pre -requisites for the issuance of a Building Permit for Grace Episcopal\n\nChurch Addition Project.'\" 1\n\nalso alleged that the Council's discussion concerning\n\nagenda item 17C- 0493 included information unrelated to the agenda item. On December 18,\n\n1E -mail from\n\nDecember 11, 2017).\n\nto Public Access [ Bureau, Office of the Attorney General]\n\n2017, this office sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Council and requested that it\nprovide a written response to\nallegation regarding the restriction on public\ncomment. This office asked the Council to provide a copy of its established and recorded rules\nregarding public comment, and the agenda, open session minutes (draft form if necessary), and\nany audio or video recordings of the December 11, 2017, meeting. On January 3, 2018, this\noffice received the requested materials and the Council's answer. On January 10, 2018,\nreplied.\n\nDETERMINATION\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA provides that \"[ ably person shall be permitted an\nopportunity to address public officials under the rules established and recorded by the public\n\nbody.\" (Emphasis added.) Under the plain language of section 2. 06(g), a public body must\nestablish and record rules and may restrict public comment only pursuant to those rules. See Ill.\n\nAtt'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 009, issued September 2, 2014, at 7.\nIn response to this office's request for a copy of the Council's established and\nrecorded rules regarding public comment, the Council submitted a copy of the City of Galena's\nCity Council Rules of Procedures\" (Council Rules). Section 5, \" Order of Business,\" of the\nCouncil Rules provides that public comments are \" not to exceed 15 minutes as an item nor more\nthan 3 minutes\n\nper speaker[.]\"\n\n2 The Council's agenda for the December 11, 2017, meeting,\n\nhowever, provides a conflicting version of the public comment rules that includes a restriction on\ncomments regarding certain zoning matters. The agenda states:\nCitizens Comments\nNot to exceed 15 minutes as an agenda item\nNot more than 3 minutes per speaker\n\nNo testimony on zoning items where a public\nhearing has been conducted131\n\nWhen construing the meaning of a statutory provision, the primary objective is to\nascertain the intent of the legislature. See, e. g., DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 I11. 2d 49, 59 (2006).\nThe plain language of the statute is the best indication of that intent, and if that language is clear\nand unambiguous, it must be given effect.\" People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 24, 962 N. E.\n2d 444, 452 (2012).\n\nThe plain language of section 2. 06(g) requires that the rules governing\n\npublic comment not only be \" established\" but also \" recorded\" by the public body. Although the\n\n2 City of Galena, Illinois, City Council Rules of Procedures 6 (May 12, 1997).\n3 City of Galena, Illinois City Council, Agenda Item 17C- 0487, Citizens Comments (December 11,\n\nCouncil asserted that the restriction on public comments about certain zoning items has been\nincluded on every regular Council agenda since May 8, 2006, it did not explain how including\nthe rule in agendas is the equivalent of establishing and recording the rule. Further, the Council\nhas not presented any evidence that the conflicting provision of the Council Rules has been\n\nrevoked or otherwise formally amended to include the rule restricting comment on certain zoning\nitems. This office cannot conclude that the version of the public comment rules as stated in the\nDecember 11, 2017, agenda has been established and recorded in accordance with section\n\n2. 06(g). Accordingly, the Council Rules govern how the public addresses public officials. See\nIll. Att' y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 45126, issued April 6, 2017, at 3 (established and recorded\n\npublic comment rule codified in village code governed rather than rule displayed during each\nmeeting).\n\nThe Council does not dispute that it prohibited\n\nfrom commenting on\n\nagenda item 17C- 0493 because there had been a public Zoning Board of Appeals hearing on that\nmatter on June 8, 2016. However, the established and recorded public comment rules as stated\n\nin the Council Rules did not permit the Council to prohibit comments about zoning matters.\nTherefore, this office concludes that the Council violated section 2. 06(g) of OMA by imposing\nan unestablished and unrecorded rule limiting public comment during its December 11, 2017,\nmeeting.\n\nThere are no means for the Council to remedy its violation in this instance. This\noffice requests that the Council refrain from limiting public comment at any future meetings\nexcept pursuant to its established and recorded rules. In the event that the Council chooses to\n\namend its Council Rules to reflect the statements in its December 11, 2017, agenda regarding\npublic comment, this office notes that a public body's rules regarding public comment must tend\nto accommodate, rather than unreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See Ill.\n\nAtt' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6. Because section 2. 06(g)\nis intended to ensure that members of the public have an opportunity to address public officials at\nall open meetings, this office has previously determined that rules adopted under 2. 06(g) are\ninvalid when they do not reasonably \" accommodate a speaker's statutory right to address the\npublic body, while ensuring that the public body can maintain order and decorum at public\nmeetings.\" See Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 6. It is\n\nnot apparent how a public body's rule would promote order and decorum by prohibiting a\nmember of the public from addressing a matter simply because an opportunity for public\ncomment on the same matter was provided at a meeting of another public body.\nUnrelated Discussion Regarding Agenda Item\n\nsection 2.02(c) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 02(c) (West 2016)) requires a public body's posted\nagenda to \" set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the\nsubject\n\nof\n\nfinal action\n\nat the\n\nmeeting[ ]\" (emphasis added), that provision does not prohibit\n\ndiscussion of matters not on an agenda by the public body. Rice v. Board of Trustees ofAdams\nCounty, 111., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1123 (4th Dist. 2002) (concluding that a public body may\n\nconsider\" items not specifically set forth on an agenda by deliberation and discussion, but may\nnot take final action without sufficient advance notice on the agenda).\n\nhas not\n\nalleged that the Council took final action on any matters that arose during its discussion of\nagenda item 17C- 0493 that were unrelated to the agenda item. Accordingly, even if the Council\ndiscussed unrelated information during its discussion of item 17C- 0493, that discussion did not\nviolate OMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. If you have any questions, please contact me at\n217) 524- 7958 or LHarter@atg. state. il.us. This letter serves to close this file.\nVery truly yours,\n\nLAURA S. HARTER\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50791 o 206g pub comment improper mun\ncc:\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Mark Moran\n\nCity Administrator, City of Galena\nP. O. Box 310\nGalena, Illinois 61036\nmmoran@cityofgalena.\n\norg"}
{"id":1236,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-05-18","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["50999"],"title":"Maine Township Board violated Open Meetings Act by destroying closed session recording without majority vote","filename":"50999, issued May 18, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":1593,"summary":"A requester alleged that the Maine Township Board of Trustees violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to obtain a majority vote to destroy a closed session verbatim recording. The PAC determined that the Board failed to follow proper procedure because only two of the five members voted to approve the destruction.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained that the Maine Township Board improperly destroyed a recording of a closed-door meeting because they didn't have enough votes to approve it. The Attorney General's office agreed, finding that the Board failed to follow the law requiring a majority vote for such actions. Because the recording was already destroyed, the Board could not fix the mistake, but they promised to follow proper procedures in the future.","holding":"The Maine Township Board of Trustees violated section 2.06(c) of the Open Meetings Act by failing to secure a majority vote to authorize the destruction of a closed session verbatim recording.","legal_question":"Whether the Maine Township Board of Trustees violated section 2.06(c) of the Open Meetings Act by authorizing the destruction of a closed session verbatim recording without a majority vote of the Board.","disposition":"violation_found","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06(c)"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Maine Township Board of Trustees","requesting_party":"kirk@illinoisleaks.com","pac_outcome":"Violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"closed session","subject_description":"The destruction of a closed session verbatim recording by the Maine Township Board of Trustees.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":97.4,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_c/50999, issued May 18, 2018.pdf","sha256":"1099b20406e41095e623e793a8d21f31af2cbc650026f87a5454f9851870e142","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["closed session","verbatim recording","meeting minutes","voting requirements"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Closed Sessions","full_text_pre_clean":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\nSTATE\n\nGENERAL\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMay 18, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMs. Laura Morask\nSupervisor\n\nMaine Township\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nlmorask@mainetown.\n\ncom\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\nDowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd.\n701 Lee Street, Suite 790\nDes Plaines, Illinois 60016- 4549\ndanieljdowd@sbcglobal. net\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50999\nDear\n\nMs. Morask, and Mr. Dowd:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings\nAct ( OMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Trustees ( Board) of Maine Township ( Township) did not\n\nfollow the proper procedure for approving the destruction of a closed session verbatim recording\nduring its November 28, 2017, meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn December 27, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that the Board violated section 2. 06( c) of OMA ( 5 ILCS\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62701 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • (\n\n312) 814- 3000 •\n\nTTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 •\n\nFax: ( 312) 814- 3806\n\n1001 East Main, Carbondale,\n\nIllinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 • Fax: ( 618) 529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Laura Morask\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nMay 18, 2018\nPage 2\n\n120/ 2. 06( c) ( West 2016)) during its November 28, 2017, meeting when only two members of the\nBoard, rather than a majority of the Board, voted to destroy the Board' s March 22, 2016, closed\nsession verbatim recording. Section 2.06( c) of OMA provides:\nc)\n\nThe verbatim record may be destroyed without notification\n\nto or the approval of a records commission or the State Archivist\n\nunder the Local Records Act or the State Records Act no Tess than\n\n18 months after the completion of the meeting recorded but only\nafter:\n\n1)\n\nthe public body approves the destruction of a\n\nparticular recording; and\n2)\n\nthe public body approves minutes of the closed\n\nmeeting that meet the written minutes requirements of\nsubsection ( a) of this Section. ( Emphasis added.)\n\nSpecifically,\nasserted that three members of the Board abstained from\nvoting, while the two remaining members and the Township Clerk ( Clerk) voted on the matter.\n\nreferenced section 80- 5( a) of the Township Code ( 60 ILCS 1/ 80- 5( a) ( West 2016)),\nwhich provides that a \" township board shall consist of the supervisor and 4 other members\nelected at large from the township[.]\"\nThe provision further states that \"[ t] he township clerk\nshall be the clerk of the township board but not a voting member, except that in the case of a tie\nvote to fill a vacancy in a township office, the clerk shall be entitled to cast one vote.\" 60 ILCS\n1/ 80- 5( a) ( West 2016).\n\nargued, in pertinent part:\n\nT] he public body did not approve the destruction but rather two\nboard members and the Clerk, who has no vote on such a matter\n\nbecause he has no vote and is not a member of the public body.\n\nWith only two members of the public body voting it is clear they\ndid not have a majority vote to destroy the record in question.\"'\nOn January 4, 2018, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond in writing to the allegation that a majority of its members did not\nvote to destroy the relevant closed session verbatim recording. In addition, this office asked the\nBoard to provide copies of the meeting agenda, minutes, and any video/ audio recording of the\nopen session portion of the November 28, 2017, meeting. On January 22, 2018, this office\n\nreceived the Board's written response and a copy of the November 28, 2017, meeting minutes;\nE- mail from\n\nto\n\nPublic\n\nAccess [ Bureau] ( December 27, 2017).\n\n\fMr. Laura\n\nMorask\n\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nMay 18, 2018\nPage 3\n\nthe Board also provided links to the Township' s website where copies of the meeting agenda and\na video recording of the meeting were posted. On January 29, 2018, this office forwarded a copy\nof the Board' s response to\nOn February 1, 2018,\nreplied by maintaining\nthat the Board did not take a majority vote to destroy the closed session verbatim recording.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is \" the public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). \"\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179111. App. 3d 161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 1. 02 of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 ( West 2016)) defines \" public body\" as\nincluding \" all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, counties,\ntownships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal\ncorporations,\n\nboards, bureaus, committees\n\nor\n\ncommissions of this\n\nState[.]\" (\n\nEmphasis added.)\n\nSection 1. 02 of OMA further provides that ' for a 5 -member public body, 3 members of the body\nconstitute a quorum and the affirmative vote of 3 members is necessary to adopt any motion,\nresolution,\n\nor ordinance,\n\nunless\n\na greater\n\nnumber\n\nis otherwise required.\" ( Emphasis added.)\n\nAs\n\nhighlighted, section 2. 06( c) of OMA provides that a public body may destroy a closed\nsession verbatim recording after 18 months have passed since the holding of the closed session,\nprovided that the public body first approves the destruction of the particular recording and\napproves written minutes of the closed session that meet the minutes requirements of section\n\n2. 06( a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( a) ( West 2016)).\nIn its response to this office, the Board confirmed that its members consist of a\nsupervisor and four trustees, all of whom are authorized to vote on Board matters. The Board\n\nalso confirmed that three trustees abstained from voting on destroying the verbatim recording;\nthe remaining trustee, Township Supervisor ( Supervisor), and Clerk voted to release the\ncorresponding closed session minutes and destroy the verbatim recording. With regard to the\n\nClerk' s vote, the Board asserted: \" Including the Clerk ( who was a Trustee at the time that the\nclosed session in question was held), was a result of a mistaken belief that the Clerk in this case\n\ncould provide the vote which would meet the 3 vote threshold required by OMA and the\nTownship Code. i2 The Board acknowledged that it destroyed the verbatim recording of the\n\n2Letter from Daniel J. Dowd, Dowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd., to Teresa Lim, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral,\n\nPublic Access Bureau (\n\nJanuary 22, 2018), at 1- 2.\n\n\fMr. Laura Morask\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\n\nMay 18, 2018\nPage 4\n\nclosed session, but stated that in the future the Township would \" retain audio cassettes of special\nmeetings indefinitely in order to ensure that it [ sic] will be available to the public after the\nminutes of a closed session are released for public inspection. i3\n\nIn this case, the Board acknowledged that it is comprised of five members and\n\nthat only two of those members, one trustee and the Supervisor, voted on the motion to authorize\n\nthe destruction of the verbatim recording at issue. The meeting minutes confirm that the Clerk\ncast the third vote to approve that motion, while the three other Board members abstained: 4 The\nBoard did not dispute that the Clerk was not a Board member at the time of the Board' s\n\nNovember 28, 2017, meeting. Because only two members of the five -member Board voted to\n\nauthorize the destruction of the March 22, 2016, closed session verbatim recording, the Board\ndid not properly approve that motion. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated\nOMA by destroying the recording without three of the five Board members affirmatively voting\nto approve the motion to authorize the destruction of the recording.\nBecause the closed session verbatim recording has been destroyed, the Board\ncannot correct the matter by re -voting on the issue. However, the Board has indicated that it is\n\ntaking remedial measures for future meetings and will begin preserving closed session verbatim\nrecordings of special meetings indefinitely. This office reminds the Board that all of its votes\nand actions, including those taken at regular meetings, must comply with the requirements of\nOMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\n\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50999 o 206c improper mun\n\n3Letter from Daniel J. Dowd, Dowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd., to Teresa Lim, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau ( January 22, 2018), at 2.\nMaine Township Board,\n\nMeeting, November 28, 2017, Minutes 4- 5.\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"A township board's destruction of a closed-session recording","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":0,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":null,"date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-50999/","full_text":"OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY\nSTATE\n\nGENERAL\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY GENERAL\n\nMay 18, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks. com\n\nVia electronic\n\nmail\n\nMs. Laura Morask\nSupervisor\n\nMaine Township\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nlmorask@mainetown.\n\ncom\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Daniel J. Dowd\nDowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd.\n701 Lee Street, Suite 790\nDes Plaines, Illinois 60016- 4549\ndanieljdowd@sbcglobal. net\n\nRE: OMA Request for Review —2017 PAC 50999\nDear\n\nMs. Morask, and Mr. Dowd:\n\nThis determination letter is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings\nAct (OMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016)).\n\nFor the reasons that follow, the Public Access\n\nBureau concludes that the Board of Trustees (Board) of Maine Township (Township) did not\n\nfollow the proper procedure for approving the destruction of a closed session verbatim recording\nduring its November 28, 2017, meeting.\nBACKGROUND\n\nOn December 27, 2017,\n\nsubmitted a Request for Review to the\n\nPublic Access Bureau alleging that the Board violated section 2. 06(c) of OMA (5 ILCS\n\n120/ 2. 06(c) (West 2016)) during its November 28, 2017, meeting when only two members of the\nBoard, rather than a majority of the Board, voted to destroy the Board's March 22, 2016, closed\nsession verbatim recording. Section 2.06(c) of OMA provides:\nc)\n\nThe verbatim record may be destroyed without notification\n\nto or the approval of a records commission or the State Archivist\n\nunder the Local Records Act or the State Records Act no Tess than\n\n18 months after the completion of the meeting recorded but only\nafter:\n\n1)\n\nthe public body approves the destruction of a\n\nparticular recording; and\n2)\n\nthe public body approves minutes of the closed\n\nmeeting that meet the written minutes requirements of\nsubsection (a) of this Section. (Emphasis added.)\n\nSpecifically,\nasserted that three members of the Board abstained from\nvoting, while the two remaining members and the Township Clerk (Clerk) voted on the matter.\n\nreferenced section 80- 5(a) of the Township Code (60 ILCS 1/ 80- 5(a) (West 2016)),\nwhich provides that a \" township board shall consist of the supervisor and 4 other members\nelected at large from the township[.]\"\nThe provision further states that \"[ t] he township clerk\nshall be the clerk of the township board but not a voting member, except that in the case of a tie\nvote to fill a vacancy in a township office, the clerk shall be entitled to cast one vote.\" 60 ILCS\n1/ 80- 5(a) (West 2016).\n\nargued, in pertinent part:\n\nT] he public body did not approve the destruction but rather two\nboard members and the Clerk, who has no vote on such a matter\n\nbecause he has no vote and is not a member of the public body.\n\nWith only two members of the public body voting it is clear they\ndid not have a majority vote to destroy the record in question.\"'\nOn January 4, 2018, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the\nBoard and asked it to respond in writing to the allegation that a majority of its members did not\nvote to destroy the relevant closed session verbatim recording. In addition, this office asked the\nBoard to provide copies of the meeting agenda, minutes, and any video/ audio recording of the\nopen session portion of the November 28, 2017, meeting. On January 22, 2018, this office\n\nreceived the Board's written response and a copy of the November 28, 2017, meeting minutes;\nE- mail from\n\nthe Board also provided links to the Township's website where copies of the meeting agenda and\na video recording of the meeting were posted. On January 29, 2018, this office forwarded a copy\nof the Board's response to\nOn February 1, 2018,\nreplied by maintaining\nthat the Board did not take a majority vote to destroy the closed session verbatim recording.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is \" the public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice\nof and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or\nacted\n\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). \"\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that\n\npublic agencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business, and that the intent of the Act\n\nis to assure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted\nopenly.\" Gosnell v. Hogan, 179111. App. 3d 161, 171 (5th Dist. 1989).\n\nSection 1. 02 of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 1. 02 (West 2016)) defines \" public body\" as\nincluding \" all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, counties,\ntownships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal\ncorporations,\n\nboards, bureaus, committees\n\nor\n\ncommissions of this\n\nState[.]\" (Emphasis added.)\n\nSection 1. 02 of OMA further provides that ' for a 5 -member public body, 3 members of the body\nconstitute a quorum and the affirmative vote of 3 members is necessary to adopt any motion,\nresolution,\n\nor ordinance,\n\nunless\n\na greater\n\nnumber\n\nis otherwise required.\" (Emphasis added.)\n\nAs\n\nhighlighted, section 2. 06(c) of OMA provides that a public body may destroy a closed\nsession verbatim recording after 18 months have passed since the holding of the closed session,\nprovided that the public body first approves the destruction of the particular recording and\napproves written minutes of the closed session that meet the minutes requirements of section\n\n2. 06(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(a) (West 2016)).\nIn its response to this office, the Board confirmed that its members consist of a\nsupervisor and four trustees, all of whom are authorized to vote on Board matters. The Board\n\nalso confirmed that three trustees abstained from voting on destroying the verbatim recording;\nthe remaining trustee, Township Supervisor (Supervisor), and Clerk voted to release the\ncorresponding closed session minutes and destroy the verbatim recording. With regard to the\n\nClerk's vote, the Board asserted: \" Including the Clerk (who was a Trustee at the time that the\nclosed session in question was held), was a result of a mistaken belief that the Clerk in this case\n\ncould provide the vote which would meet the 3 vote threshold required by OMA and the\n\nclosed session, but stated that in the future the Township would \" retain audio cassettes of special\nmeetings indefinitely in order to ensure that it [ sic] will be available to the public after the\nminutes of a closed session are released for public inspection. i3\n\nIn this case, the Board acknowledged that it is comprised of five members and\n\nthat only two of those members, one trustee and the Supervisor, voted on the motion to authorize\n\nthe destruction of the verbatim recording at issue. The meeting minutes confirm that the Clerk\ncast the third vote to approve that motion, while the three other Board members abstained: 4 The\nBoard did not dispute that the Clerk was not a Board member at the time of the Board's\n\nNovember 28, 2017, meeting. Because only two members of the five -member Board voted to\n\nauthorize the destruction of the March 22, 2016, closed session verbatim recording, the Board\ndid not properly approve that motion. Accordingly, this office concludes that the Board violated\nOMA by destroying the recording without three of the five Board members affirmatively voting\nto approve the motion to authorize the destruction of the recording.\nBecause the closed session verbatim recording has been destroyed, the Board\ncannot correct the matter by re -voting on the issue. However, the Board has indicated that it is\n\ntaking remedial measures for future meetings and will begin preserving closed session verbatim\nrecordings of special meetings indefinitely. This office reminds the Board that all of its votes\nand actions, including those taken at regular meetings, must comply with the requirements of\nOMA.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you\n\nhave any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.\nVery truly yours,\n\nTERESA LIM\n\nAssistant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n\n50999 o 206c improper mun\n\n3 Letter from Daniel J. Dowd, Dowd, Dowd & Mertes, Ltd., to Teresa Lim, Assistant Attorney\nGeneral, Public Access Bureau (January 22, 2018), at 2.\nMaine Township Board,\n\nMeeting, November 28, 2017, Minutes 4- 5."}
{"id":1237,"orig_master_id":null,"dup_master_id":null,"dup_sha256":null,"source":"PAC","sub_agency":"determination_letter","doc_type":"PAC Determination Letter","binding":0,"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-04-24","case_number":null,"request_numbers":["51302","51308"],"title":"Jasper County School Board's two-minute public comment rule did not violate OMA","filename":"51302 51308, issued April 24, 2018.pdf","rel_path":null,"word_count":2829,"summary":"The requester alleged that the Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1 Board of Education's public comment rules were unreasonable and vague, and that they were improperly applied to limit his speaking time. The PAC determined that because the requester did not provide evidence that he was improperly restricted from addressing the Board, no further action was required.","plain_summary":"A citizen complained to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Bureau that the Jasper County School Board's public comment rules were unreasonable, specifically the two-minute time limit and the board president's discretion to shorten comments. The Attorney General's office issued a formal determination concluding that the Board did not violate the Open Meetings Act, finding that the two-minute limit was a reasonable restriction to conserve time and promote orderly meetings. The case is now closed.","holding":"The PAC concluded that the Board did not violate the Open Meetings Act by enforcing its two-minute public comment rule at the January 18, 2018, meeting.","legal_question":"Whether a public body's established public comment rules violate the Open Meetings Act when a requester alleges they are vague or unreasonable but fails to demonstrate they were enforced to improperly restrict public participation.","disposition":"no_violation","primary_statute":["5 ILCS 120/2.06"],"foia_related":null,"foia_or_oma":"OMA","foia_exemption":[],"public_body":"Board of Education of Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1","requesting_party":"Mr. Kirk Allen","pac_outcome":"No violation found","pac_law_type":null,"subject_category":"meeting notice","subject_description":"The requester challenged the reasonableness of a school board's public comment policy and its application during a board meeting.","ocr_status":"ok","ocr_quality":94.8,"ocr_pending":0,"source_url":"https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/Page-Attachments/FOIAPAC/Non-Binding-PAC-Opinions/OMA/2.06/2.06_g/Reasonable-rules/51302 51308, issued April 24, 2018.pdf","sha256":"9a9124f3add47e57f7404fde4adb135444d2f704a78f075f5659412cd7a7cfa1","needs_review":0,"splice_suspect":0,"splice_method":null,"faq_tags":["public comment","school board","Open Meetings Act","speaking time"],"truncated_suspect":0,"site_category":"Meeting Notices & Agendas","full_text_pre_clean":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 24, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kirk Allen\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks.com\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick &\n\nKohn LLP\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nsrichart@hlerk. com\n\nRe: OMA Requests for Review —2018 PAC 51302; 2018 PAC 51308\nDear Mr. Allen,\n\nand Mr. Richart:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5( e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( e) ( West 2016). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Board of Education ( Board) of Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1 did\nnot violate OMA in connection with its January 18, 2018, meeting.\nOn January 19, 2018, Mr. Kirk Allen filed a Request for Review with the Public\nAccess Bureau alleging that the Board' s rules allowing two minutes for public comment and five\nminutes comment time for individuals signing up a week in advance of the meeting are\nunreasonable. Mr. Allen alleged that the wording of the rules was vague and specific terms used\n\nin the rules were undefined. He further alleged that the Board' s rule allowing the Board\npresident the discretion to shorten public comment was unreasonable.\n\nMr. Allen alleged that the\n\nBoard applied its rules to prevent him from speaking for more than two minutes at its January 18,\n2018, meeting.\n\n500 South Second Street, Springfield, Illinois 62706 • (\n\n217) 782- 1090 •\n\nTTY: ( 217) 785 - 2771 •\n\nFax: ( 217) 782- 7046\n\n100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60601 • ( 312) 814- 3000 • TTY: ( 312) 814- 3374 • Fax: ( 312) 814- 3806\nI001\n\nEast Main,\n\nCarbondale, Illinois 62901 • ( 618) 529- 6400 • TTY: ( 618) 529- 6403 •\n\nFax: ( 618)\n\n529- 6416\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nApril 24, 2018\nPage 2\n\nOn January 19, 2018,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to this\noffice alleging that at the January 18, 2018, Board meeting:\n\nAlmost every one ran out of time for speaking due to an\nunreasonably short 2 min[ ute] allowance ( unless you notify them a\nweek ahead that you would like to speak then they \" may\" allow up\n\nto 5 min). I have attended many meetings around this area and this\nis by far the shortest time per speaker I have seen and it does not\nallow people to convey their message properly because they are so\nlimited. Also the way I read rule 3[,] on the sheet they are saying\n\nthe board president has the authority to shorten the time for a\nspeaker even more if he see fit, which 1 believe is not allowed as it\n\nwould violate a person['] s civil rights if they were cut short ( on an\nalready short amount of time allowed) because the board wants to\nconserve time.\" [ I1\nOn January 24, 2018, the Public Access Bureau sent copies of the Requests for\nReview to the Board and requested that it provide a detailed written answer to the allegations\n\ntogether with a copy of the Board' s established and recorded rules for public comment and any\nrecordings of the public comment portion of the Board' s January 18, 2018, meeting. On\n\nFebruary 2, 2018, counsel for the Board provided this office with a written answer, a copy of the\nBoard' s rules for public comment, and a video recording of the January 18, 2018, meeting. On\nFebruary 5, 2018, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's answer to Mr. Allen and\nMr. Allen provided a written reply on February 5, 2018.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is \" the public policy of this State that its citizen shall be given advance notice of\nand the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 ( West 2016). \"\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public\n\nagencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people' s business, and that the intent of the Act is to\n\nassure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\nGosnell v. Hogan, 179 Ill. App. 3d 161, 171 ( 5th Dist. 1989).\n\nE- mail from\n\nto Public Access, Office of the Attorney General ( January 19, 2018).\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\n\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nApril 24, 2018\nPage 3\n\nStanding\n\nstated \"\n\nAs a preliminary matter, this office notes that the Board' s answer to this office\ndid not even attempt to make a public comment. Although\nwas\n\npresent at the meeting, the District' s rules regarding public comment were not enforced against\nhim and, therefore, he has no standing.\" 2\n\nSection 3. 5( a) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5( a) ( West\n\n2016)3 however, broadly provides that \"[ a] person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the Public Access Counselor\nestablished in the Office of the Attorney General not later than 60 days after the alleged\nviolation.\" OMA does not restrict \" standing\" to the person whose rights were most directly\n\naffected by the alleged violation. To the contrary, OMA expressly provides that any person who\nbelieves a public body has violated OMA may file a Request for Review. See also Ill. Att'y Gen.\nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37391, issued January 11, 2016, at 4. Although this office generally has not\nreviewed a public body' s rules concerning public comment absent some allegation that the public\nbody had enforced one or more rules to restrict at least one person' s right to public comment,\nhas alleged specific violations here: that he observed persons who could not complete\n\ntheir comments because the two minute time limit was enforced. Accordingly this office has\nauthority to review those allegations.\nRules for Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06( g) of OMA ( 5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06( g) ( West 2016), provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\nand recorded by the public body.\" Indeed, the Attorney General has previously concluded that\nsection 2. 06( g) of OMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity\nfor members of the public to address public officials at open meetings.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc.\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language of section 2. 06( g) of OMA,\npublic comment must be permitted in accordance with the public body' s established and recorded\nrules.\n\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that public bodies may promulgate reasonable\n2Letter from Steven M. Richart, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, to Matt\nHartman, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau ( February 2, 2018), at 1.\nSection 9. 5( a) of the Freedom\n\nof Information\n\nAct ( FOIA) ( 5 ILCS\n\n140/ 9. 5( a) ( West 2016)),\n\nto the\n\ncontrary, restricts the filing of a request for review to \"[ al person whose request to inspect or copy a public record is\ndenied by a public body[.]\" ( Emphasis added.)\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\n\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nApril 24, 2018\nPage 4\n\ntime, place, and manner\" restrictions that are narrowly -tailored and necessary to further a\n\nsignificant governmental interest. See IA. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F. Supp.\n2d 912, 922 ( N.D. Ill. 2009). For example, a public body may adopt reasonable rules governing\n\npublic comment in order to maintain decorum and ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently.\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 ( W. D. Mich. 2008); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub.\nAcc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than to\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See IA. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 459.\nThe Board' s established and recorded rules that Mr. Allen and\n\nallege\n\nare unreasonable state:\n\nThe individuals appearing before the Board are expected to follow\nthese guidelines:\n\n2. Identify him or herself and be brief. Ordinarily, such\ncomments shall be limited to 2 minutes. In unusual\n\ncircumstances, a person may be allowed to speak for more\nthan 2 minutes.\n\nA person who has given advance notice to\n\nthe Superintendent one week before the meeting may be\nallowed to speak for 5 minutes.\n3.\n\nObserve the Board President' s decision to shorten public\ncomment\n\nto conserve\n\ntime and give the maximum\n\nnumber\n\nof individuals an opportunity to speak. t41\nTwo -Minute Public Comment Time Limit\n\nIn support of the allegation that the Board' s two -minute time limitation for public\n\ncomment in Rule 2 is unreasonable, Mr. Allen alleged that he had more to say but stopped\nspeaking after he was informed by the Board that he had ten seconds remaining of his two\nminutes of speaking time. The Board asserted that its two minute per speaker time limit is a\n\nBoard Meetings\n\nJasper County Community Unit School District # 1, School Board, Public Participation at School\nPetitions to the Board ( last amended May 16, 2011).\n\nand\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nApril 24, 2018\nPage 5\n\nreasonable restriction on public comment because it \"is merely trying to conserve time, which is\na significant government interest. i5\n\nA rule that promotes order and decorum by specifying the amount of time\nmembers of the public have to address a public body does not violate the first amendment to the\n\nUnited States Constitution provided that it is reasonable in time and scope. Wright v. Anthony,\n733 F. 2d 575, 577 ( 8th Cir. 1984) ( finding that because a five- minute time limit for speakers at a\n\npublic hearing served a significant governmental interest in conserving time and in ensuring that\nothers had an opportunity to speak, the time limit did not violate the speaker' s rights under the\n\nfirst amendment to the United States Constitution); see also Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F. 2d\n1196, 1203 ( 10th Cir. 2007) ( concluding that in a public forum, a city council could impose a\nthree- minute time limitation on public comment because it was \" appropriately designed to\npromote\n\norderly\n\nand\n\nefficient\n\nmeetings.\")\n\nTherefore, the Attorney General has found that \" a\n\npublic body may legitimately prescribe reasonable time limits for public comment.\" Ill. Att' y\nGen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5.\n\nThe Delaware Attorney General, while finding that a school board placed an\nimproper restriction on the content of a member of the public' s comments to the board, observed\nthat the school\n\nboard' s \" 2 minutes per speaker * * *\n\nlimitation on time was a reasonable\n\nrestriction under the First Amendment.\" Del. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05- IB01, issued January 3,\n2005, at 5. Similarly, the Public Access Bureau has suggested that a public body wishing to\nimpose time limitations on public comment could establish a reasonable rule of \"two or three\nminutes per person per meeting, or a limit on the total amount of time spent on public comment,\n\npursuant to section 2. 06( g) of OMA.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37850, issued\nDecember 7, 2017, at 5.\n\nHere, the Board established the two -minute time limitation within Rule 2 to\n\nconserve time. The rule promotes the Board' s significant interest in holding orderly and efficient\nmeetings and encourages speakers to organize their comments before addressing the Board on\nthe topic of their choosing. The available information provides no basis from which this office\n\ncould conclude that a person would be unable to effectively address the Board in the two -minute\ntime limit provided in Rule 2. Because the Board' s rule serves to advance a significant\ngovernmental interest, is narrowly tailored to that interest, and does not interfere with alternative\nmeans of communicating with the Board, this office concludes that Board did not violate section\n\n2. 06( g) of OMA by enforcing the two -minute public comment rule at the January 18, 2018,\nmeeting.\n\n5Letter from Steven M. Richart, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, to Matt\nHartman, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (\n\nFebruary 2, 2018), at 5.\n\n\fMr. Kirk Allen\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nApril 24, 2018\nPage 6\n\nFive -Minute Public Comment Time Limit for Speakers Providing One -Week Notice\nMr. Allen also contested the portion of Rule 2 which provides that a person who\ngives one week of advance notice to the superintendent may receive five minutes of public\ncomment time. In particular, Mr. Allen alleged that newcomers to Board meetings might not be\naware of the rule.\n\nThe Attorney General has held that a county board' s enforcement of its rule\n\nrequiring 5 working days advance notice to speak at public meeting violated section 2. 06( g) of\nOMA because it \" unreasonably restrict[ ed] members of the public from exercising their statutory\nright to address the Board.\" I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30,\n\n2014, at 6. In that matter, individuals were not allowed to address the county board unless a\nboard member requested permission from the board for the member of the public to speak or the\n\nindividual provided 5 working days advance notice to the county board and identified the topic\nupon which they wished to speak. The Board' s rule here differs from the county board' s rule at\nissue in that Binding Opinion. The first part of Rule 2 allows all speakers the right to provide\n\npublic comment for two minutes— a speaker must provide one- week advance notice only if they\nwish to speak for more than two minutes. Because Rule 2 affords all speakers at least two\nminutes of public comment time, which this office has concluded is a reasonable rule under\n\nsection 2. 06( g) of OMA, the Board' s rule granting five minutes of public comment time to\nspeakers who gave one week notice is not unreasonable when it is applied in a content -neutral\nmanner\n\nMr. Allen's initial objection was that the rule allowing for the opportunity to\nspeak for five minutes may not have been known to individuals who had not attended previous\n\nBoard meetings. However, the rule was established and recorded by the Board and was last\namended in May 2011. Mr. Allen has not suggested that the rule was unavailable to anyone who\nwished to review it before the January 18, 2018, meeting.\nIn addition, Mr. Allen alleged that the Board' s Rule 2 is unreasonable because it is\n\nvague and has undefined terms. Specifically, he cited to Rule 2' s use of the terms \" ordinarily,\"\ni] n unusual circumstances,\" and \" may be allowed\" as the basis for his assertion that the rule is\nunreasonable. With respect to the \" may be allowed\" provision in Rule 2, Mr. Allen asserted that\nthe rule does not guarantee that a person who has given one week advance notice will be\n\nafforded five minutes of public comment time. Similarly, Mr. Allen alleged that Rule 3 is\nunreasonable because it grants the Board president discretion to shorten public comment time.\n\nHowever, based on this office' s review of the recording of the public comment period, the Board\ndid not interfere with or prohibit\nany person from addressing the Board\n\nat\n\nthe\n\nJanuary 18, 2018,\n\n\fr.\nKirk Allen\n\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nApril 24, 2018\nPage 7\n\nmeeting based on those portions of Rule 2 or any portion of Rule 3. The Public Access Bureau\n\nhas consistently declined to review a public body's established and recorded rule unless a\nmember of the public attempted to address public officials during an open meeting and was\n\nimproperly restricted from commenting based on the public body' s enforcement of the rule. See,\n\ne. g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47847, issued May 22, 2017 ( allegation that public\ncomment rules violate OMA insufficient to merit further action absent facts indicating that the\n\nrules were enforced to improperly restrict any member of the public from addressing public\n\nofficials). Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau makes no determination with respect to these\nallegations.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at ( 217) 782- 9054.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nIvIAITIIA'\n\nMAN\n\nAs stant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n51302 51308 o 206g proper\n\npub\n\ncomment\n\nsd\n\n\f","full_text_pre_reocr":null,"plain_summary_pre_resummarize":null,"card_headline":"School board's public comment policy and its enforcement","full_text_pre_backfill":null,"disposition_pre_fix":null,"human_verified":1,"disposition_pre_audit_fix":null,"plain_summary_pre_audit_fix":null,"human_verified_pre_audit_fix":"0","date_issued_pre_fix":null,"year_pre_fix":null,"site_dup_of":null,"site_url":"/opinions/letter-51302/","full_text":"FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nSTATE\n\nOF ILLINOIS\n\nLisa Madigan\nATTORNEY\n\nGENERAL\n\nApril 24, 2018\n\nVia electronic mail\nMr. Kirk Allen\n\nkirk@illinoisleaks.com\nVia electronic mail\n\nVia electronic mail\n\nMr. Steven M. Richart\nHodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick &\n\nKohn LLP\n\n[street address redacted for site publication -- see original PDF]\nsrichart@hlerk. com\n\nRe: OMA Requests for Review —2018 PAC 51302; 2018 PAC 51308\nDear Mr. Allen,\n\nand Mr. Richart:\n\nThis determination is issued pursuant to section 3. 5(e) of the Open Meetings Act\n\nOMA) (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(e) (West 2016). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes\n\nthat the Board of Education (Board) of Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1 did\nnot violate OMA in connection with its January 18, 2018, meeting.\nOn January 19, 2018, Mr. Kirk Allen filed a Request for Review with the Public\nAccess Bureau alleging that the Board's rules allowing two minutes for public comment and five\nminutes comment time for individuals signing up a week in advance of the meeting are\nunreasonable. Mr. Allen alleged that the wording of the rules was vague and specific terms used\n\nin the rules were undefined. He further alleged that the Board's rule allowing the Board\npresident the discretion to shorten public comment was unreasonable.\n\nMr. Allen alleged that the\n\nBoard applied its rules to prevent him from speaking for more than two minutes at its January 18,\n2018, meeting.\n\nOn January 19, 2018,\nsubmitted a Request for Review to this\noffice alleging that at the January 18, 2018, Board meeting:\n\nAlmost every one ran out of time for speaking due to an\nunreasonably short 2 min[ ute] allowance (unless you notify them a\nweek ahead that you would like to speak then they \" may\" allow up\n\nto 5 min). I have attended many meetings around this area and this\nis by far the shortest time per speaker I have seen and it does not\nallow people to convey their message properly because they are so\nlimited. Also the way I read rule 3[,] on the sheet they are saying\n\nthe board president has the authority to shorten the time for a\nspeaker even more if he see fit, which 1 believe is not allowed as it\n\nwould violate a person['] s civil rights if they were cut short (on an\nalready short amount of time allowed) because the board wants to\nconserve time.\" [ I1\nOn January 24, 2018, the Public Access Bureau sent copies of the Requests for\nReview to the Board and requested that it provide a detailed written answer to the allegations\n\ntogether with a copy of the Board's established and recorded rules for public comment and any\nrecordings of the public comment portion of the Board's January 18, 2018, meeting. On\n\nFebruary 2, 2018, counsel for the Board provided this office with a written answer, a copy of the\nBoard's rules for public comment, and a video recording of the January 18, 2018, meeting. On\nFebruary 5, 2018, this office forwarded a copy of the Board's answer to Mr. Allen and\nMr. Allen provided a written reply on February 5, 2018.\nDETERMINATION\n\nIt is \" the public policy of this State that its citizen shall be given advance notice of\nand the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public body is discussed or acted\nupon\n\nin any way.\"\n\n5 ILCS 120/ 1 (West 2016). \"\n\nThe Open Meetings Act provides that public\n\nagencies exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business, and that the intent of the Act is to\n\nassure that agency actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.\"\n\nStanding\n\nstated \"\n\nAs a preliminary matter, this office notes that the Board's answer to this office\ndid not even attempt to make a public comment. Although\nwas\n\npresent at the meeting, the District's rules regarding public comment were not enforced against\nhim and, therefore, he has no standing.\" 2\n\nSection 3. 5(a) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 3. 5(a) (West\n\n2016)3 however, broadly provides that \"[ a] person who believes that a violation of this Act by a\npublic body has occurred may file a request for review with the Public Access Counselor\nestablished in the Office of the Attorney General not later than 60 days after the alleged\nviolation.\" OMA does not restrict \" standing\" to the person whose rights were most directly\n\naffected by the alleged violation. To the contrary, OMA expressly provides that any person who\nbelieves a public body has violated OMA may file a Request for Review. See also Ill. Att'y Gen.\nPAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37391, issued January 11, 2016, at 4. Although this office generally has not\nreviewed a public body's rules concerning public comment absent some allegation that the public\nbody had enforced one or more rules to restrict at least one person's right to public comment,\nhas alleged specific violations here: that he observed persons who could not complete\n\ntheir comments because the two minute time limit was enforced. Accordingly this office has\nauthority to review those allegations.\nRules for Public Comment\n\nSection 2. 06(g) of OMA (5 ILCS 120/ 2. 06(g) (West 2016), provides that \"[ a] ny\nperson shall be permitted an opportunity to address public officials under the rules established\nand recorded by the public body.\" Indeed, the Attorney General has previously concluded that\nsection 2. 06(g) of OMA \" requires that all public bodies subject to the Act provide an opportunity\nfor members of the public to address public officials at open meetings.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc.\nOp. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5; see also Ill. Att' y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14009, issued September 4, 2014, at 4. Under the plain language of section 2. 06(g) of OMA,\npublic comment must be permitted in accordance with the public body's established and recorded\nrules.\n\nAlthough OMA does not specifically address the types of public comment rules\nthat a public body may adopt, courts have clarified that public bodies may promulgate reasonable\n2 Letter from Steven M. Richart, Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, to Matt\nHartman, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau (February 2, 2018), at 1.\nSection 9. 5(a) of the Freedom\n\nof Information\n\nAct (FOIA) (5 ILCS\n\n140/ 9. 5(a) (West 2016)),\n\nto the\n\ncontrary, restricts the filing of a request for review to \"[ al person whose request to inspect or copy a public record is\n\ntime, place, and manner\" restrictions that are narrowly -tailored and necessary to further a\n\nsignificant governmental interest. See IA. Rana Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 630 F. Supp.\n2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2009). For example, a public body may adopt reasonable rules governing\n\npublic comment in order to maintain decorum and ensure that meetings are conducted efficiently.\nTimmon v. Wood, 633 F. Supp. 2d 453, 465 (W. D. Mich. 2008); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub.\nAcc. Op. No. 14- 009, at 4. However, such rules must tend to accommodate, rather than to\nunreasonably restrict, the right to address public officials. See IA. Rana Enterprises, Inc., 630 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 923- 25; Timmon, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 459.\nThe Board's established and recorded rules that Mr. Allen and\n\nallege\n\nare unreasonable state:\n\nThe individuals appearing before the Board are expected to follow\nthese guidelines:\n\n2. Identify him or herself and be brief. Ordinarily, such\ncomments shall be limited to 2 minutes. In unusual\n\ncircumstances, a person may be allowed to speak for more\nthan 2 minutes.\n\nA person who has given advance notice to\n\nthe Superintendent one week before the meeting may be\nallowed to speak for 5 minutes.\n3.\n\nObserve the Board President's decision to shorten public\ncomment\n\nto conserve\n\ntime and give the maximum\n\nnumber\n\nof individuals an opportunity to speak. t41\nTwo -Minute Public Comment Time Limit\n\nIn support of the allegation that the Board's two -minute time limitation for public\n\ncomment in Rule 2 is unreasonable, Mr. Allen alleged that he had more to say but stopped\nspeaking after he was informed by the Board that he had ten seconds remaining of his two\nminutes of speaking time. The Board asserted that its two minute per speaker time limit is a\n\nBoard Meetings\n\nJasper County Community Unit School District # 1, School Board, Public Participation at School\n\nreasonable restriction on public comment because it \"is merely trying to conserve time, which is\na significant government interest. i5\n\nA rule that promotes order and decorum by specifying the amount of time\nmembers of the public have to address a public body does not violate the first amendment to the\n\nUnited States Constitution provided that it is reasonable in time and scope. Wright v. Anthony,\n733 F. 2d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that because a five- minute time limit for speakers at a\n\npublic hearing served a significant governmental interest in conserving time and in ensuring that\nothers had an opportunity to speak, the time limit did not violate the speaker's rights under the\n\nfirst amendment to the United States Constitution); see also Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F. 2d\n1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that in a public forum, a city council could impose a\nthree- minute time limitation on public comment because it was \" appropriately designed to\npromote\n\norderly\n\nand\n\nefficient\n\nmeetings.\")\n\nTherefore, the Attorney General has found that \" a\n\npublic body may legitimately prescribe reasonable time limits for public comment.\" Ill. Att' y\nGen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30, 2014, at 5.\n\nThe Delaware Attorney General, while finding that a school board placed an\nimproper restriction on the content of a member of the public's comments to the board, observed\nthat the school\n\nboard's \" 2 minutes per speaker * * *\n\nlimitation on time was a reasonable\n\nrestriction under the First Amendment.\" Del. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 05- IB01, issued January 3,\n2005, at 5. Similarly, the Public Access Bureau has suggested that a public body wishing to\nimpose time limitations on public comment could establish a reasonable rule of \"two or three\nminutes per person per meeting, or a limit on the total amount of time spent on public comment,\n\npursuant to section 2. 06(g) of OMA.\" Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 37850, issued\nDecember 7, 2017, at 5.\n\nHere, the Board established the two -minute time limitation within Rule 2 to\n\nconserve time. The rule promotes the Board's significant interest in holding orderly and efficient\nmeetings and encourages speakers to organize their comments before addressing the Board on\nthe topic of their choosing. The available information provides no basis from which this office\n\ncould conclude that a person would be unable to effectively address the Board in the two -minute\ntime limit provided in Rule 2. Because the Board's rule serves to advance a significant\ngovernmental interest, is narrowly tailored to that interest, and does not interfere with alternative\nmeans of communicating with the Board, this office concludes that Board did not violate section\n\nFive -Minute Public Comment Time Limit for Speakers Providing One -Week Notice\nMr. Allen also contested the portion of Rule 2 which provides that a person who\ngives one week of advance notice to the superintendent may receive five minutes of public\ncomment time. In particular, Mr. Allen alleged that newcomers to Board meetings might not be\naware of the rule.\n\nThe Attorney General has held that a county board's enforcement of its rule\n\nrequiring 5 working days advance notice to speak at public meeting violated section 2. 06(g) of\nOMA because it \" unreasonably restrict[ ed] members of the public from exercising their statutory\nright to address the Board.\" I11. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 14- 012, issued September 30,\n\n2014, at 6. In that matter, individuals were not allowed to address the county board unless a\nboard member requested permission from the board for the member of the public to speak or the\n\nindividual provided 5 working days advance notice to the county board and identified the topic\nupon which they wished to speak. The Board's rule here differs from the county board's rule at\nissue in that Binding Opinion. The first part of Rule 2 allows all speakers the right to provide\n\npublic comment for two minutes— a speaker must provide one- week advance notice only if they\nwish to speak for more than two minutes. Because Rule 2 affords all speakers at least two\nminutes of public comment time, which this office has concluded is a reasonable rule under\n\nsection 2. 06(g) of OMA, the Board's rule granting five minutes of public comment time to\nspeakers who gave one week notice is not unreasonable when it is applied in a content -neutral\nmanner\n\nMr. Allen's initial objection was that the rule allowing for the opportunity to\nspeak for five minutes may not have been known to individuals who had not attended previous\n\nBoard meetings. However, the rule was established and recorded by the Board and was last\namended in May 2011. Mr. Allen has not suggested that the rule was unavailable to anyone who\nwished to review it before the January 18, 2018, meeting.\nIn addition, Mr. Allen alleged that the Board's Rule 2 is unreasonable because it is\n\nvague and has undefined terms. Specifically, he cited to Rule 2's use of the terms \" ordinarily,\"\ni] n unusual circumstances,\" and \" may be allowed\" as the basis for his assertion that the rule is\nunreasonable. With respect to the \" may be allowed\" provision in Rule 2, Mr. Allen asserted that\nthe rule does not guarantee that a person who has given one week advance notice will be\n\nafforded five minutes of public comment time. Similarly, Mr. Allen alleged that Rule 3 is\nunreasonable because it grants the Board president discretion to shorten public comment time.\n\nHowever, based on this office's review of the recording of the public comment period, the Board\ndid not interfere with or prohibit\nany person from addressing the Board\n\nmeeting based on those portions of Rule 2 or any portion of Rule 3. The Public Access Bureau\n\nhas consistently declined to review a public body's established and recorded rule unless a\nmember of the public attempted to address public officials during an open meeting and was\n\nimproperly restricted from commenting based on the public body's enforcement of the rule. See,\n\ne. g., Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 47847, issued May 22, 2017 (allegation that public\ncomment rules violate OMA insufficient to merit further action absent facts indicating that the\n\nrules were enforced to improperly restrict any member of the public from addressing public\n\nofficials). Accordingly, the Public Access Bureau makes no determination with respect to these\nallegations.\n\nThe Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does\n\nnot require the issuance of a binding opinion. This file is closed. If you have any questions,\n\nplease contact me at (217) 782- 9054.\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nIvIAITIIA'\n\nMAN\n\nAs stant Attorney General\nPublic Access Bureau\n51302 51308 o 206g proper\n\npub\n\ncomment\n\nsd"}