Springfield Police Department failed to justify withholding security camera footage under 7(1)(v)

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Dear and Mr. Hampleman:

This determination is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2024)).

On November 14, 2024, submitted a FOIA request to the Springfield Police Department ( Department) seeking a copy of footage from the camera located on the south side of the main police building covering the main entrance on September 9, 2024, between 12 p.m. and 4 p.m. On November 15, 2024, the Department denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)(v) of FOIA1 and cited the court's opinion in Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App ( 1st) 192028. On November 21, 2024, this office received Request for Review challenging the denial.

On December 10, 2024, this office forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Department and asked it to provide a copy of the withheld footage, together with a detailed

DETERMINATION

All records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying." 5 ILCS 140/ 1.2 (West 2022); see also Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). A public body that withholds records " has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence" that the records are exempt from disclosure. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). The exemptions from disclosure are to be narrowly construed. Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407 (1997).

Section 7(1)(v) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:

Vulnerability assessments, security measures, and response policies or plans that are designed to identify, prevent, or respond to potential attacks upon a community's population or systems, facilities, or installations, the destruction or contamination of which would constitute a clear and present danger to the health or safety of the community, but only to the extent that disclosure could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the measures or the safety of the personnel who implement them or the public. Information exempt under this item may include such things as details pertaining to the mobilization or deployment of personnel or equipment, to the operation of communication systems or protocols, or to tactical operations. Emphasis added.)

By its plain language, section 7(1)(v) applies to records that are devised and crafted to identify, prevent, or respond to potential attacks. The legislative history behind the exemption further confirms that the exemption concerns records involved in homeland security and emergency preparations rather than routine monitoring. See Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 48212, issued November 2, 2017, at 7 (quoting House Sponsor James H. Meyer explaining that the bill "exempts documents prepared for emergency and security procedures from being disclosed from homeland security where that would be compromised.").

In Chicago Sun-Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the Chicago Transit Authority ( CTA) met its burden of demonstrating that video recordings of a train platform from several camera angles fell within The Public Access Bureau has previously concluded that a public body could properly withhold records listing the locations of all of its cameras and other details about them pursuant to section 7(1)(v) because "[ d]isclosure of these locations would allow the entire network of cameras to be pieced together, undermining the effectiveness of the system by revealing areas where surveillance cameras are highly concentrated and exposing areas that are not covered by surveillance cameras." Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 62247, issued April 20, 2020, at 2-3 (noting that the cameras were funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to reduce crime and protect critical infrastructure); see also Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 65558, issued September 30, 2022, at 4 (determining that office of emergency management had established that disclosure of all surveillance footage of looting incidents that occurred on a certain date at 20 specified times and block locations in downtown Chicago could jeopardize overall effectiveness of its security network).

By contrast, this office has previously concluded that routine surveillance footage and other videos that are not used for homeland security purposes or emergency preparations do not fall within the scope of section 7(1)(v). See, for example, Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 72032, issued October 20, 2022, at 4 (dispatch center did not establish that interior security cameras were intended for a homeland security purpose and thus camera footage did not fall within the scope of section 7(1)(v)); Ill. Att'y Gen. PAC Req. Rev. Ltr. 70528, issued November 29, 2021, at 8 (footage of room improperly withheld pursuant to section 7(1)(v) because village failed to show that "the camera was installed for the purpose of identifying, preventing, or responding to potential attacks, rather than for the purpose of video recording meetings held in that room.").

In its denial letter to the Department stated that the camera at issue "is a security camera for Municipal Center East which houses the Springfield Police Department, The Department' s answer to this office argued that the footage is comparable to the platform footage at issue in Chicago Sun-Times. The Department reiterated that the "footage requested covers the main entrance of a municipal building that houses critical City functions, including the police department, city officials, and city employees." 5 The Department contended that, like the platform footage in Chicago Sun- Times, the footage of the entrance " would expose the cameras' positioning, fields of view, and blind spots, allowing bad actors to exploit these vulnerabilities." 6 The Department further contended that the footage captured an active protest against the police department and City officials, which could be exploited or "facilitate targeted criminal acts[,]" thus jeopardizing the safety of protesters and City personnel. 7 Additionally, the Department argued that the "camera system is part of a broader effort to ensure public safety, funded and designed for security purposes." 8 Having reviewed the footage and the Department' s response, the Department did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the camera is used as a security measure that is The Public Access Counselor has determined that resolution of this matter does not require the issuance of a binding opinion. This letter shall serve to close this matter. If you have any questions, please contact me at the Chicago address listed on the first page of this letter.

Very truly yours, TERESA LIM Deputy Bureau Chief Public Access Bureau 84026 f 71v improper pd