Basis for Withholding Police Officer Witness Questionnaires

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Dear Mr. Blaisdell and Ms. Callaway:

This binding opinion is issued by the Attorney General pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2024)). For the reasons discussed below, this o8ce concludes that Cook County State's Attorney's O8ce (State's Attorney's O8ce) improperly redacted questionnaires responsive to Mr. Max Blaisdell's August 11, 2025, FOIA request.

On that date, Mr. Blaisdell, on behalf of the Invisible Institute, submitted a FOIA request to the State's Attorney's O8ce via its online FOIA portal seeking copies of "records su8cient to show: - all law enforcement o8cers or other law enforcement experts who have been identiDed as potentially requiring disclosure via the Brady/Giglio Form (meaning a yes answer was written in response on one of the included questions) from July 8, 2025 through the date this request is processed."' On August 14, 2025, the State's Attorney's O8ce responded to arrested, charged with, or convicted of a criminal oLense; and (iii) the section for "Additional Information" (except for the one questionnaire in which this section is blank).? The State's Attorney's O8ce cited sections 2.15(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA as its bases for the redactions,’ and also claimed that the requested records are not public records or otherwise available, providing an outdated citation to a provision of the Department of State Police Law.‘ On September 4, 2025, Mr. Blaisdell submitted the above-referenced Request for Review contesting the State's Attorney's O8ce's redactions to the four police o8cer witness questionnaires.°> He asserted:

The records at issue are Brady/Giglio disclosure questionnaires completed by law enforcement o8cers and experts for use in criminal proceedings. These forms are not private "rap sheets" or general "criminal history reports," but rather sworn attestations by public o8cials about professional misconduct, credibility, and disciplinary history. Such information is created and maintained for the purpose of informing courts, defense counsel, and prosecutors, and thus falls squarely within the scope of public business. !6 Mr. Blaisdell additionally asserted: "These records concern the professional honesty and integrity of law enforcement o8cers who testify in court—a matter of profound public interest and accountability."”

On November 7, 2025, the Public Access Bureau extended the time within which to issue a binding opinion by 30 business days, to December 24, 2025, pursuant to section 9.5(f) of FOIA."

On December 5, 2025, an Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in the Public Access contacted the State's Attorney's O8ce to clarify its citations of section 2.15(b) of FOIA and section 55a(5)(c) of the Department of State Police Law.'® In a December 8, 2025, telephone 8E-mail from Matthew G. Goodman, Assistant Attorney General, Public Access Bureau, O8ce of

ANALYSIS

In section 1 of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2024)), "it is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the aLairs of government and the o8cial acts and policies of those who represent them as public o8cials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act." Under FOIA, "[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt." 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024).

Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[p]ersonal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information." Section 7(1)(c) deDnes "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"

as "the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information." The exemption expressly provides, however, that "[t]he disclosure of The State's Attorney's O8ce's amended answer to this o8ce contended, in relevant part:

The names of individuals writing complaints are exempt from disclosure because this information is highly personal and there is no public interest in the name of the individual. Release of the names may cause those individuals to be targeted for harassment or threats if other individuals are unhappy that complaints were made. Moreover, if these names are disclosed, future citizens may be reluctant to express their concerns for fear that their names will be made public. Also, because the contents of the complaints are provided, the entities and public are made aware of the complaints alleged.!?"]

The State's Attorney's O8ce's argument for the applicability of section 7(1)(c)

does not align with the contents of the records at issue or the disputed redactions. Mr. Blaisdell did not seek, and the State's Attorney's O8ce did not redact, the names of private citizens who wrote complaints. The records at issue are questionnaires consisting of answers by police o8cers to questions concerning their credibility as witnesses in criminal proceedings. The completed questionnaires contain information about whether the police o8cers had been arrested, charged with or convicted of a criminal oLense, as well as whether they had been disciplined, investigated, or subject to a complaint. The State's Attorney's O8ce did not address why the o8cers’ names or the information bearing on their suitability as witnesses would fall within the scope of section 7(1)(c). Because the deDnition of "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" in section 7(1)(c) expressly excludes information that bears on the public duties of public employees, it is unnecessary for this o8ce to balance the police o8cers’ right to privacy against the public interest in disclosure of their names and the other redacted material. See Gekas v. Williamson, 393 Ill. App. 3d 573, 586 (2009) (concluding that unfounded complaints alleging that a police o8cer "committed misconduct in his capacity as a deputy sheriL are ‘information that bears on [his] public duties,’ and the disclosure of such information 'shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.'"). Accordingly, this o8ce concludes that the State's Attorney's O8ce improperly redacted the questionnaires pursuant to section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[p]reliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated, except that a speciDc record or relevant portion of a record shall not be exempt when the record is publicly cited and identiDed by the head of the public body." The "intended to protect the communications process and encourage frank and open discussion among agency employees before a Dnal decision is made." Harwood, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 248. The Illinois Appellate Court has stated that "purely factual material" is not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f) unless the factual material is "inextricably intertwined" with predecisional discussions. Watkins v. McCarthy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, § 36 (quoting Enviro Tech International, Inc., v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 371 F.3d 370, 374-75 (7th Cir. 2004)).

The State's Attorney's O8ce asserted that it properly redacted the questionnaires pursuant to section 7(1)(f) without providing any analysis or further explanation.” On that basis alone, the State's Attorney's O8ce failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the information it redacted from the questionnaires is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f). Nonetheless, this o8ce conDdentially reviewed the questionnaires and conDrmed that the redacted material is purely factual in nature. Noting that purely factual information is not exempt from disclosure pursuant to this exemption, the court in State Journal-Register v.

University of Illinois SpringDeld, 2013 IL App (4th) 120881, § 27, advised that "[Tactual information includes that which is collected within investigative reports, such as a8davits of witnesses and investigator's interviews[.]" In that case, the court concluded that witness statements did not fall within the scope of section 7(1)(f), "despite [the public body's] reliance on the documents prior to making its decision[,]" because they "contain factual accountings of the events by witnesses, [and] are capable of standing alone, with no evidence they are ‘inextricably intertwined' with the predecisional process.” State Journal-Register, 2013 IL App (4th) 120881, q 30.

Because the redacted portions of the questionnaires are purely factual and because the State's Attorney's O8ce's did not demonstrate that disclosure would expose a predecisional deliberative process, this o8ce concludes that the State's Attorney's O8ce did not sustain its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the redacted portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.

Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:

Communications between a public body and an attorney or auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising Communications protected by the attorney-client privilege are within the scope of section 7(1)(m). People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1997). A party asserting that a communication to an attorney is protected by the attorney-client privilege "must show that (1) a statement originated in conDdence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was made to an attorney acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or services;

and (3) it remained conDdential." (Emphasis added.) Cangelosi v. Capasso, 366 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228 (2006). Documents protected by the attorney-client privilege must contain conDdential communications in which legal advice is requested or provided. See Chicago Trust Co. v. Cook County Hospital, 298 Ill. App. 3d 396, 408-09 (1998) (Dnding the attorney-client privilege inapplicable because the documents at issue did not show that the client was seeking legal advice). A public body that withholds records as attorney-client privileged under section 7(1)(m) "can meet its burden only by providing some objective indicia that the exemption is applicable under the circumstances." (Emphasis in original.) I/linois Education Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 470 (2003).

Additionally, the work-product doctrine set out in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2) provides that "[m]aterial prepared by or for a party in preparation for trial is subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney." A public body asserting that records are privileged attorney work- product must demonstrate that the records "'reveal the shaping process by which the attorney has arranged the available evidence for use in trial as dictated by his training and experience[.]' [Citation.|" Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 359 (1966). However, "[a]ny relevant material generated in preparation for trial which does not disclose 'conceptual data’ is freely discoverable under Rule 201(b)(2)."| Holland v. Schwan's Home Services, Inc., 2013 IL App (Sth) 110560, 4 205 (quoting Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 196 (1991)); see also Monier, 35 Ill. 2d at 360 (characterizing as "conceptual data" the "memoranda made by counsel of his impression of a prospective witness, as distinguished from verbatim statements of such witness, trial briefs, documents revealing a particular marshalling of the evidentiary facts for presentment at the trial, and similar documents which reveal the attorney's 'mental processes' in shaping his theory of his client's cause[.]").

The State's Attorney's O8ce explained its redaction of the questionnaires under section 7(1)(m) as follows:

Attorneys’ notes, recommendations, and work product created over the course of investigative deliberations have also been redacted in their entirety as attorney-client privileged work product consistent with Section 7(1)(m) of the FOIA.

protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine. This includes handwritten notes, preliminary memoranda, research, and internal analyses generated over the course of the SAO's prosecution of this case. This analysis is conDdential attorney work product and has been redacted pursuant to Section 7(1)(m).!3!

The State's Attorney's O8ce's assertions that the responsive records are attorney- client privileged communications and/or attorney work-product are conclusory and misplaced. The State's Attorney's O8ce has not provided any factual basis or supporting legal authority for the propositions that the questionnaires are either: (1) communications with an attorney acting as a legal advisor and relating to legal advice; or (2) materials created in preparation for trial that would reveal the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of attorneys in the State's Attorney's O8ce. Although, as the questionnaires reTect, a police o8cer may be called as a witness in a criminal prosecution, or communicate with the State's Attorney's O8ce about potential criminal charges or testimony, the State's Attorney's O8ce does not represent the police o8cers or their police departments or provide them with conDdential legal advice in connection with those proceedings. Accordingly, the questionnaires are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.

Similar to its explanation under section 7(1)(c), the State's Attorney's O8ce's mischaracterizes the contents of the records when asserting that the questionnaires are attorney work-product within the scope of section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. The State's Attorney's O8ce redacted factual information provided by police o8cers, not conceptual items such as preliminary memoranda prepared by attorneys, attorney opinions about the o8cers' credibility or value as a witness, or any other internal analysis of the o8cers who provided the information in the questionnaires. The redacted information does not contain or reTect any attorney's theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans. Therefore, this o8ce concludes that the State's Attorney's O8ce did not sustain its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the redacted information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

After full examination and giving due consideration to the information submitted, the Public Access Counselor's review, and the applicable law, the Attorney General Dnds that:

1) On August 11, 2025, Mr. Max Blaisdell, on behalf of the Invisible Institute, submitted a FOIA request to the Cook County State's Attorney's O8ce seeking copies of witness questionnaires containing answers by police o8cers.

and 7(1)(c) of FOIA. The State's Attorney's O8ce also claimed that the requested records are not public records or otherwise available, citing a former provision of the Department of State Police Law (20 ILCS 2605/55a(5)(c)).

3) On September 8, 2025, Mr. Blaisdell submitted the above-referenced Request for Review contesting the State's Attorney's O8ce's redaction of the four questionnaires.

4) On September 17, 2025, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for Review to the State's Attorney's O8ce and asked it to provide unredacted copies of the contested questionnaires for this o8ce's conDdential review. This o8ce also asked the State's Attorney's O8ce to provide a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for redacting those records.

5) On September 22, 2025, the State's Attorney's O8ce furnished the requested materials to this o8ce.

6) On September 23, 2025, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the State's Attorney's O8ce's written answer to Mr. Blaisdell and notiDed him of his right to reply.

7) On September 29, 2025, Mr. Blaisdell replied.

8) On November 7, 2025, the Public Access Bureau extended the time within which to issue a binding opinion by 30 business days pursuant to section 9.5(f) of FOIA. Accordingly, the Attorney General may properly issue a binding opinion with respect to this matter.

9) On December 11, 2025, the State's Attorney's O8ce issued an amended answer to Mr. Blaisdell and to this o8ce, asserting that the redacted information is exempt only pursuant to sections 7(1)(c), 7(1)(f), and 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

10) The records at issue in this Request for Review consist of four police o8cer witness questionnaires with the following information redacted: (i) the police o8cer's name; (11)

the police o8cer's answer to the question pertaining to whether they had ever been arrested, charged with, or convicted of a criminal oLense; and (iii) a section for "Additional Information."

11) Section 7(1)(c) exempts from disclosure "[p]ersonal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Section 7(1)(c) expressly provides that "[t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and o8cials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy."

not met its burden of proving that the redacted information is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(c) of FOTA.

13) Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA exempts from inspection and copying, in relevant part, "[p]reliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated[.]" Purely factual information is not within the scope of this exemption unless it is inextricably intertwined with predecisional deliberative material.

14) The redacted portions of the questionnaires are purely factual in nature, and the State's Attorney's O8ce did not demonstrate that disclosure would expose the substance of predecisional deliberations. Accordingly, this o8ce concludes that the State's Attorney's O8ce has not met its burden of proving that the redacted information is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(f) of FOIA.

15) Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[c]ommunications between a public body and an attorney or auditor representing the public body that would not be subject to discovery in litigation, and materials prepared or compiled by or for a public body in anticipation of a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding upon the request of an attorney advising the public body, and materials prepared or compiled with respect to internal audits of public bodies." In addition to the attorney-client privilege, the section 7(1)(m) exemption encompasses the work-product doctrine, which protects the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of a party's attorney.

16) The questionnaires at issue do not contain or reference any legal advice sought by police o8cers or given by the State's Attorney's O8ce, or reveal the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the State's Attorney's O8ce. Accordingly, this o8ce concludes that the State's Attorney's O8ce has not met its burden of proving that the redacted information is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the Attorney General that the Cook County State's Attorney's O8ce improperly redacted the questionnaires responsive to Max Blaisdell's August 11, 2025, Freedom of Information Act request. Accordingly, the State's Attorney's O8ce is hereby directed to take immediate and appropriate action to comply with this opinion by providing Mr. Blaisdell with unredacted copies of the questionnaires.

This opinion shall be considered a Dnal decision of an administrative agency for the purposes of administrative review under the Administrative Review Law. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2024). An aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of the decision by Dling a complaint for administrative review with the Circuit Court of Cook or Sangamon County within Very truly yours,

KWAME RAOUL ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:

R. Douglas Rees Chief Deputy Attorney General that he has served a copy of the foregoing Binding Opinion (Public Access Opinion 25-015)

upon:

Mr. Max Blaisdell Invisible Institute 5534 South Dorchester Avenue, Unit 1 Chicago, Illinois 60637 [email protected] Ms. Charita Callaway FOIA O8cer Cook County State's Attorney's O8ce 50 West Washington Street Chicago, Illinois 60602 [email protected] by causing a true copy thereof to be sent electronically to the addresses as listed above and by causing to be mailed a true copy thereof in correctly addressed, prepaid envelopes to be deposited in the United States mail at Chicago, Illinois on December 23, 2025.

\ (Pyne Josh M. fohes Bureau Chief Joshua M. Jones Bureau Chief Public Access Bureau, Chicago O8ce of the Attorney General 115 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 814-8413