Disclosure of Village Clerk's Termination Letter

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Dear Ms. Vucsko and Mr. Miller:

This binding opinion is issued by the Attorney General pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2024)). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes that the Village of Thomasboro (Village) improperly withheld the termination letter responsive to Ms. Tania Vucsko's August 11, 2025, FOIA request.

On that date, Ms. Vucsko submitted a FOIA request to the Village via e- mail seeking "a complete and unredacted copy of the termination letter issued by the Mayor of the Village of Thomasboro to the Village Clerk, Tana Ward, dated August 7th, 2025."! On August 18, 2025, the Village denied the request” pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA? based on On August 19, 2025, Ms. Vucsko submitted a follow-up FOIA request to the Village via e-mail seeking a copy of the same termination letter as well as copies of any supplemental documents related to the termination or separation of the Village Clerk.? On August 26, 2025, the Village denied the request, relying on the same exemptions it asserted in response to Ms. Vucsko's August 11, 2025, FOIA request.’

On September 21, 2025, Ms. Vucsko submitted Requests for Review challenging the Village's responses to each FOIA request, including the applicability of the exemptions the Village asserted to deny the termination letter.‘ The Public Access Bureau opened a Request for Review concerning the denial of the termination letter in response to the August 11, 2025, FOIA request (2025 PAC 89395), and a separate Request for Review concerning the denial of any records responsive to the August 19, 2025, FOIA request (2025 PAC 89397).

On September 30, 2025, the Public Access Bureau sent the Village's attorney a copy of each Request for Review and a consolidated inquiry letter that requested the Village provide unredacted copies of all withheld records for this office's confidential review, as well as a detailed written explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions.'! On October 8, 2025, the Village e-mailed this office'* an unredacted copy of the On November 20, 2025, the Public Access Bureau extended the time within which to issue a binding opinion to January 8, 2026, pursuant to section 9.5(f) of FOIA.!” This binding opinion addresses only the denial of the termination letter sought by Ms. Vucsko in the FOIA request that underlies 2025 PAC 89395.

ANALYSIS

It is the public policy of the State of Illinois that "all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent them as public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of" FOIA. 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2024). Under FOIA, "[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt." 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024).

Section 7.5(q) of FOIA and the PRRA To withhold the letter pursuant to the PRRA, the Village cited section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, which exempts from disclosure "[i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law." The more specific exemption, however, is section 7.5(q) of FOIA,'* which exempts from disclosure "{i]jnformation prohibited from being disclosed by the Personnel Record Review Act." The be specifically prohibited." (Emphasis in original.) Better Government Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 386 Ill. App. 3d 808, 816 (2008).

In its response to this office, the Village noted that section 7(1) of the PRRA provides that "[a]n employer...shall not divulge a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other disciplinary action to a third party... without written notice as provided in this [S]ection."!? The Village asserted:

[T]he purpose behind the Personnel Record Review Act is to facilitate the review of personnel records regarding the employee themself. This is reflected in 820 ILCS 40/2(a)(1) which states that upon written request from the employee to inspect, copy, and receive copies of, in relevant part, 'any personnel documents which are, have been, or are intended to be used in determining...

discharge, or other disciplinary action.’ Thus, the Act precludes release of the termination letter to a third party and release of the termination letter would need to be pursued by Ms. Ward herself under the Personnel Record Review Act as opposed to the Freedom of Information Act.!?°!

The Village also excerpted section 5 of the PRRA,”! which states:

Personnel Record Inspection by Representative. An employee who is involved in a current grievance against the employer may designate in writing a representative of the employee's union or collective bargaining unit or other representative to inspect the employee's personnel record which may have a bearing on the resolution of the grievance, except as provided in Section 10. The employer shall allow such a designated representative to inspect that employee's personnel record in the same manner as provided under Section 2.

The Village then argued that "[i]n such cases, personnel records such as a termination letter could be released to a third party. It is our position that since Ms. Ward never offered a The Village's reliance on the aforementioned provisions of the PRRA is misplaced. The plain language of section 7(1) of the PRRA merely requires a public body to give notice to an employee when disclosing "a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other disciplinary action to a third party." To the extent the termination letter constitutes a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other disciplinary action within the scope of section 7(1) of the PRRA, that provision does not require the employee's consent before that information may be disclosed. In fact, section 7(2) of the PRRA” states that "written notice to the employee shall be by first-class mail to the employee's last known address and shall be mailed on or before the day the information is divulged" (emphasis added), indicating that the requirement to provide notice does not toll the deadline for responding to a request until the employee has had a reasonable opportunity to obtain and respond to the notice. The PRRA specifically authorizes employers to use this procedure to notify employees when records of disciplinary action are requested under FOJA. 820 ILCS 40/7(4) (West 2024) ("An employer who receives a request for records of a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other disciplinary action in relation to an employee under the Freedom of Information Act may provide notification to the employee in written form as described in [section 7(2)] or through electronic mail, if available.")

Moreover, section 2(a)(1) of the PRRA”TM simply provides an employee with the right to review certain personnel records pertaining to the employee; it has no bearing on the availability of personnel records to third parties pursuant to FOIA. Similarly, section 5 of the PRRA permits an employee to designate a representative to inspect certain personnel records of the employee; no language in the provision could be construed as prohibiting disclosure of a termination letter pursuant to FOIA.

The PRRA prohibits disclosure of personnel records in only two instances, neither of which the Village cited in its response to the FOIA request or to this office, and neither of which are applicable to the termination letter. Section 11 of the PRRA”> provides that "[t]his Act shall not be construed to diminish a right of access to records already provided by law, provided that disclosure of performance evaluations under the Freedom of Information Act shall Accordingly, this office concludes that the Village has not sustained its burden of demonstrating that the requested letter is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(a) or section 7.5(q) of FOIA and the PRRA.

Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[p]ersonal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Section 7(1)(c) defines "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" as "the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information." However, the exemption also expressly provides that "[t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy." (Emphasis added.) The Attorney General has previously concluded that "[p]ublic records that concern a public employee's separation from employment with a public body directly bear on the public duties of that employee, if not also the employee's supervisor(s) and/or other public employees." See III. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 25-010, issued August 11, 2025, at 7.

In its response to this office, the Village argued that "[w]hile the reason for termination of a Village official may be in the public interest, our position is that the personal privacy of Ms. Ward regarding the purpose of her termination would outweigh the public interest in knowing precisely why she was terminated."*’ In her reply, Ms. Vucsko argued that the Village misapplied section 7(1)(c) because it failed to account for the exception set forth in the exemption for information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials.”* Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[r]ecords relating to a public body's adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases; however, this exemption shall not extend to the final outcome of cases in which discipline is imposed." While FOIA does not define "adjudication," the Illinois Appellate Court has construed the term for purposes of section 7(1)(n) as a "formalized legal process that results in a final and enforceable decision." Kalven v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 121846, § 13 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 42 (7th ed.

1999)), overruled in part on other grounds by Perry v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2018 IL 122349. The court also emphasized that "the phrase 'related to' [in section 7(1)(n)] must be read narrowly." Kalven, 2014 IL App (Ist) 121846, § 22.

In its response to this office, the Village argued that "the termination letter relates to the ‘adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases' because it includes the reasoning behind the ultimate termination and not merely the 'final outcome’ of the termination."”” Ms. Vucsko's reply*? contended that the Village did not conduct an adjudication pertaining to the Village Clerk's dismissal. Indeed, the Village provided no facts supporting the assertion that it conducted an adjudication of the matter that resulted in the termination letter, as opposed to a more informal decision-making process. See Ill. Att'y Gen. Pub. Acc. Op. No. 13- 011, issued June 11, 2013, at 8 (city failed to prove records pertaining to an employee's disciplinary suspension were exempt under section 7(1)(n) where there was no indication that the matter culminated in an adjudicatory proceeding). Accordingly, the Village did not meet its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the termination letter is exempt pursuant to section 7(1)(n) of FOIA.

After full examination and giving due consideration to the information submitted, the Public Access Counselor's review, and the applicable law, the Attorney General finds that:

1) On August 11, 2025, Ms. Tania Vucsko submitted a FOIA request to the Village of Thomasboro seeking a copy of the Village Clerk's termination letter of August 7, 2025.

2) On August 18, 2025, the Village denied the request pursuant to section 7(1)(a) of FOIA in connection with various State statutes, including the PRRA, as well as sections 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(n) of FOIA.

3) On September 21, 2025, Ms. Vucsko submitted the Request for Review at issue contesting the withholding of the termination letter. Ms. Vucsko's Request for Review was timely filed and otherwise complies with the requirements of section 9.5(a) of FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) (West 2024)).

4) On September 30, 2025, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Request for Review to the Village together with a letter asking for an unredacted copy of the termination letter for this office's confidential review. The letter also requested a detailed explanation of the factual and legal bases for the applicability of the specific exemptions under which the Village withheld the letter.

5) On October 8, 2025, and October 9, 2025, the Village furnished the requested materials to this office. The Village's written response asserted that the requested termination letter was exempt from disclosure pursuant to only the PRRA and sections 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(n) of FOIA.

6) On October 10, 2025, this office forwarded a copy of the Village's response letter to Ms. Vucsko. On October 12, 2025, Ms. Vucsko submitted a written reply.

7) On November 20, 2025, the Public Access Bureau extended the time within which to issue a binding opinion 30 business days, to January 8, 2026. Accordingly, the Attorney General may properly issue a binding opinion with respect to this matter.

8) Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law." More specifically, section 7.5(q) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[i]nformation prohibited from being disclosed by the Personnel Record Review Act."

9) Because no provision of the PRRA prohibited the Village from disclosing the termination letter, the Village failed to prove that section 7(1)(a) or section 7.5(q) of FOIA applies.

considered an invasion of personal privacy."

11) Because the termination letter concerns the performance of public duties by a public employee or official and not private affairs, section 7(1)(c) of FOIA does not apply.

12) Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[r]ecords relating to a public body's adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases; however, this exemption shall not extend to the final outcome of cases in which discipline is imposed."

13) Because the Village did not demonstrate that the termination letter related to an "adjudication," the Village did not prove that the record is exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(n) of FOIA.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the Attorney General that the Village of Thomasboro has violated FOIA by improperly withholding the termination letter responsive to Ms. Vucsko's FOJA request. Accordingly, the Village is hereby directed to take immediate and appropriate action to comply with this opinion by disclosing an unredacted copy of the termination letter in a supplemental response to Ms. Vucsko's request.

This opinion shall be considered a final decision of an administrative agency for the purposes of administrative review under the Administrative Review Law. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2024). An aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of the decision by filing a complaint for administrative review with the Circuit Court of Cook County or Sangamon County within 35 days of the date of this decision naming the Attorney General of Illinois and Ms. Tania Vucsko as defendants. See 5 ILCS 140/11.5 (West 2024).

Sincerely,

KWAME RAOUL ATTORNEY GENERAL

R. Douglas Ree Chief Deputy Attorney General that she has served a copy of the foregoing Binding Opinion (Public Access Opinion 25-016)

upon:

Ms. Tania Vucsko 300 South Jacobsen Drive Thomasboro, Illinois 61878 [email protected] Mr. Marc R. Miller Miller and Hendren 2504 Galen Drive, Suite 101 Champaign, Illinois 61821 [email protected] by causing a true copy thereof to be sent electronically to the addresses as listed above and by causing to be mailed a true copy thereof in correctly addressed, prepaid envelopes to be deposited in the United States mail at Chicago, Illinois on December 31, 2025.

Leah Bartelt ' Public Access Counselor Leah Bartelt Public Access Counselor Office of the Attorney General 115 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 814-6437