Madison County Sheriff's Office violated FOIA by withholding restraint chair incident reports

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Dear Ms. Hauck and Mr. Livingstone:

This binding opinion is issued pursuant to section 9.5(f) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/9.5(f) (West 2025 Supp.)). For the reasons discussed below, this office concludes that the Madison County Sheriffs Office (Sheriffs Office) violated the requirements of FOIA by improperly denying Ms. Grace Hauck's FOIA request.

BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2026, Ms. Hauck submitted a FOIA request to the Sheriffs Office on behalf of the Illinois Answers Project seeking copies of "all incident reports pertaining to the use Though an individual is/has been in custody they still have a certain expectation of privacy. Information relative [to] this request will be exempted per the below:

7(1)(b)- Private Information such as SSN, Phone Number(s), Addresses, DL numbers are protected from release 7(1)(c) - Releasing the records constitutes an unreasonable Invasion of Personal Privacy of those involved. Release of records [in] which personal privacy outweighs the public interest are exempt.[3l On June 30, 2026, Ms. Hauck submitted the above-referenced Request for Review disputing the Sheriffs Office's denial.4 Specifically, she questioned the Sheriffs Office's rationale for denying the request by explaining that the Sheriffs Office previously furnished the same types ofrecords for years 2019-2023 with only the detainees' identifying information redacted. 5 Ms. Hauck attached to her Request for Review copies of the records responsive to her previously-submitted FOIA requests. Since obtaining those records, she explained, "the Illinois Answers Project published a storyl6l revealing that staff at Madison County Jail were restraining people in chairs for prolonged periods of time. The story revealed that Madison County violated county policies, state standards and manufacturer guidelines." 7 Ms. Hauck argued that the Sheriffs Office's improperly applied section 7(1 )( c) because:

On July 10, 2026, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Madison County State's Attorney's Office as legal counsel for the Sheriffs Office.9 The Public Access Bureau enclosed a letter asking for unredacted copies of the requested reports for this office's confidential review, together with a detailed written explanation of the legal and factual bases for the applicability of sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) ofFOIA. 10 The letter specifically asked the State's Attorney's Office to "please address why redaction of select portions of the reports would not ameliorate any privacy concerns." 11 On July 27, 2026, the Sheriffs Office provided this office with the records at issue and its written response. 12 In addition to sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c), the Sheriffs Office asserted that the records were exempt from disclosure under section 7(1 )(b-5) of FOIA. 13 Later that same day, this office forwarded a copy of Sheriffs Office's answer to Ms. Hauck and notified her of her opportunity to reply.14 On September 2, 2026, Ms. Hauck's legal counsel, Ms. Shelley Geiszler, submitted a reply on her behalf. 15 On September 22, 2026, the Sheriff's Office On August 29, 2026, the Public Access Bureau extended the time within which to issue a binding opinion by 30 business days, to October 13, 2026, pursuant to section 9.5(f) of FOIA. 20

ANALYSIS

Section 1 of FOIA 21 declares that "it is the public policy of the State of Illinois that access by all persons to public records promotes the transparency and accountability of public bodies at all levels of government." Under FOIA, "[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it is exempt." 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2024). The Illinois Supreme Court has "on several occasions, held that the exceptions to disclosure set forth in the FOIA are to be read narrowly so as not to defeat the FOIA's intended purpose." Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 416 (2006).

Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[p]rivate information, unless disclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order." Section 2( c-5) of FOIA 22 defines "private information" in relevant part as:

In its response to this office, the Sheriffs Office stated that "driver's license numbers, personal telephone numbers, and home addresses are redactable[.]"23 Because those discrete pieces of information fall within the plain language of the definition of "private information," the Sheriffs Office may properly redact them pursuant to section 7(1)(b) of FOIA. As the Sheriffs Office acknowledged, however, "to the extent there exists other non-exempt information remaining in the record, such information must be produced." 24 Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[p]ersonal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information." Section 7(1)(c) defines "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" as "the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information." Section 7(1)(c) contains an exception which provides that "[t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy."

A public body's assertion that the release of information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 v. Department of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, 196 (2001). The General Assembly's use of the language "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[]" evinces a "stricter standard to claim exemption" than a mere "invasion" or "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[,]" which the public body possessing the records bears the burden of sustaining. (Emphasis in original.) Schessler v. Department of Conservation, 256 Ill. App. 3d 198, 202 (1994).

To ameliorate an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy concern, identifying information of the subject of a report, as well as narrative sections of a report which discusses details of the incident and other highly personal information, have been considered information exempt under Section 7(1)(c). [Citation.] However, descriptions of activities which bear on the public duties of public employees may be disclosable. [28l In her reply to the Sheriffs Office's response, counsel for Ms. Hauck argued that any concerns related to privacy could be resolved by redacting the names and other identifying information of the detainees involved. 29 She also contended that:

There is a significant public interest in whether the Sheriffs Office's use of restraint chairs complies with county policies, state standards, and manufacturer guidelines. The redacted records would allow the public and our client to understand whether the Sheriffs Office and the Madison County Jail are complying with these standards and guidelines, and the records are the only way for the public to monitor compliance. [Citation.] This public The resolution of a personal privacy exemption claim involves weighing four factors: "(l) the [requester's] interest in disclosure, (2) the public interest in disclosure, (3) the degree of invasion of personal privacy, and ( 4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested information." National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 (2010).

Under the first and second factors, Mr. Hauck's personal interest in disclosure of the records is the same as her interest in disseminating information to the public as a reporter with Illinois Answers Project. Therefore, her personal interest aligns with the public interest in the disclosure of information concerning whether the Sheriffs Office's use of restraint chairs complies with county policies, State standards, and manufacturer guidelines.

There is a compelling public interest in the disclosure of records that shed light on the manner that law enforcement officials perform their public duties. See Gekas v. Williamson, 393 Ill. App. 3d 573, 585-86 (2009) (noting that section 1 of FOIA31 recognizes that the public has a "'duty"' to monitor government and holding that the public is entitled to access complaints against deputies that were deemed to be unfounded by a sheriffs office "to ensure it is being conducted in the public interest"). There is a particularly high level of public interest in restraint practices in local jails such as the Madison County Jail, to shed light on whether the Sheriffs Office is using restraint chairs in an appropriate manner. This office's review of the contested records confirmed that they document the underlying reasons and circumstances for the use of the restraint chairs, which the public has legitimate interest in knowing. The Sheriffs Office's response focused on the identities of the subjects and details surrounding any mental health crises they may have had, but, critically, the incident reports also document how public employees conducted their public duties with respect to decisions and procedures concerning the use of restraint chairs. As noted above, the Sheriffs Office acknowledged that descriptions of activities that bear on the public duties of public employees may be disclosable.32 As to the third factor-the degree of invasion of personal privacy- the Sheriffs Office asserted in its written response that it withheld the contested records in order to protect the This office's review of the incident reports confirmed that the narrative sections can be disclosed without revealing the identities of the subjects because the individually- identifying information can be separated from the non-individually identifying information. As explained above, Ms. Hauck also confirmed for this office that she would accept copies of the reports with individually-identifying information of the subjects redacted. With respect to the remainder of the information in the reports, the information concerning the subjects who were confined to restraint chairs is not particularly graphic or otherwise comparable to the highly personal details about the alleged sex offense and victim's hospital treatment in the non-binding determination letter cited by the Sheriffs Office.

Lastly, there is no indication that Ms. Hauck has alternative means of obtaining the contested records.

Taking all the factors into account, this office concludes that the public interest in disclosure of the de-identified information Ms. Hauck seeks concerning the Sheriffs Office's use ofrestraint chairs outweighs the subjects' right to privacy. Thus, the Sheriffs Office has not sustained its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the records at issue are exempt from disclosure in their entireties pursuant to section 7(1 )( c) of FOIA. The personally- identifying information of the subjects, however, may be redacted pursuant to section 7(l)(c) given Ms. Hauck's consent to those redactions and because the subjects' right to privacy outweighs the public interest in disclosure of their identities. This redactable information includes the subjects' names, inmate numbers, home addresses, and birth dates.

In its written response to this office, the Sheriffs Office argued that the section 7(1)(b-5) exemption authorizes withholding the incident reports in their entireties.34 The Sheriffs Office contended that the "incident reports at issue document the precipitating cause for the use of the restraint chair, and they are specifically designed to alert jail officers about a specific detainee's mental health crisis or mental health issue. "35 The Sheriffs Office also stated that "the reports note whether the subject admitted feelings of suicide or homicide, or whether the subject actually engaged in harmful behavior such as an attack on deputies, self-harm, or self-mutilation. "36 Further, the Sheriffs Office asserted, "[t]he reports effectively warn officers about the potential and proclivity for future behavior, and they suggest methods and frequency of observation and/or signal to officers that heightened interaction sensitivity or de-escalation attempts may be warranted as a result of the subject's proclivity to act harmfully to themselves or others." 37 In her reply to the Sheriffs Office's response, counsel for Ms. Hauck argued that while "the reports could be used to alert jail officers about an individual's mental health crisis," they were not "specifically designed to provide information to one or more law enforcement agencies regarding the physical or mental status of one or more individual subjects."38 (Emphasis in original.) Rather, the reply argued, "these reports appear 'specifically designed' to In its response to that reply, the Sheriffs Office asserted that Ms. Hauck had referenced outdated versions of its restraint policies, and argued that "the former policy and the revised policy do show that the reports are 'specifically designed' to provide information to law enforcement agencies regarding the physical or mental status of a subject. "44 (Emphasis in original.) The Sheriffs Office acknowledged, 45 however, that the pertinent language of its "Use of Restraints" policy46 was unchanged; this policy expressly ties the creation ofreports on the use ofrestraints to an Illinois Administrative Code provision referenced above47 that requires the creation of the reports for the purpose of upholding county jail standards.

In construing a statute, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Southern Illinoisan, 218 Ill. 2d at 415 (2006). "[T]he surest and most reliable indicator of' legislative intent "is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning." Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois, 2017 IL 120343, ~ 24. "If the language of a statute is ambiguous," a By its plain language, section 7(1)(b-5) applies only to information "specifically designed" to inform law enforcement agencies about the physical or mental status of subjects. The scope of what records are "specifically designed" for that purpose, however, is not evident from the plain language of the statute. To resolve this ambiguity, this office looks to the legislative history behind the exemption.

The legislative history of section 7( 1 )(b-5) reveals that the exemption "seeks to protect medical records as it pertains to emergency dispatching for law enforcement agencies to better serve those that they're ... responding to and to be made aware of special concerns, disabilities an individual may have so they could respond and act appropriately when trying to assist them. "48 In response to a question about the purpose of the bill that eventually created the exemption, one of the House sponsors, Representative Dan Brady, explained:

The initiative is that of one of my local law enforcement agencies. And what it would do is that if a family would voluntarily share information to that law enforcement agency for means of dispatching, for instance, if the individual might have autism. They may ... the individual might have some other type of disability that the law enforcement agency would share only with responding emergency crew or law enforcement that that information under the Freedom of Information Act would not be shared with any other individual[.]l49l When asked to explain further, Representative Brady advised: "[W]e're just trying to make sure that when the families [that] voluntarily give this information are being told from the program that this information will not be shared [except] with law enforcement officials for the protection and safety of the individuals they may be responding to to render help, that that's in fact the situation. 1150 The legislative history thus clarifies that the purpose of the exemption is to allow family members to confidentially share sensitive information about their loved ones' disabilities or other pertinent physical or mental conditions so that law enforcement officers and emergency responders may account for them when responding to incidents involving those individuals.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

After full examination and giving due consideration to the information submitted, the Public Access Counselor's review, and the applicable law, the Attorney General finds that:

1) On June 22, 2026, Ms. Grace Hauck submitted a FOIA request to the Madison County Sheriffs Office on behalf of the Illinois Answers Project seeking copies of incident reports pertaining to the use of restraint chairs at Madison County Jail in 2024 and 2025.

2) On June 23, 2026, the Sheriffs Office responded by denying the request in its entirety under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

4) On July 10, 2026, the Public Access Bureau sent a copy of the Request for Review to the Sheriffs Office. The Public Access Bureau also sent the Sheriffs Office a letter asking for umedacted copies of the responsive records for this office's confidential review, and a detailed written explanation of the legal and factual bases for the applicability of the asserted exemptions.

5) On July 27, 2026, the Sheriffs Office provided this office with umedacted copies of the responsive incident reports and its written answer, in which it additionally asserted the section 7(1)(b-5) exemption.

6) On July 27, 2026, the Public Access Bureau forwarded a copy of the Sheriffs Office's answer to Ms. Hauck and notified her of her opportunity to reply. On September 2, 2026, counsel for Ms. Hauck submitted a written reply. On September 22, 2026, the Sheriffs Office submitted an unsolicited response to that reply. On September 23, 2026, Ms. Hauck confirmed for this office that she did not dispute the redaction of detainees' names.

7) On August 29, 2026, this office extended the time within which to issue a binding opinion by 30 business days, to October 13, 2026. Accordingly, the Attorney General may properly issue a binding opinion with respect to this matter.

8) Section 7(1 )(b) exempts from disclosure "[p ]rivate information, unless disclosure is required by another provision of this Act, a State or federal law or a court order." Section 2(c-5) of FOIA defines "private information" to include driver's license numbers, home or personal telephone numbers, and home addresses ( except as otherwise provided by law or when compiled without possibility of attribution to any person).

9) The Sheriffs Office has sustained its burden of proving that driver's license numbers, home or personal telephone numbers, and home addresses are exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 7(1 )(b ).

10) Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[p]ersonal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information." Section 7(1 )( c) defines "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" as "the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information." Section 7(1)(c) contains an exception which provides that "[t]he disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy."

12) Disclosure of the incident reports with the identifying information of the subjects redacted would not cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of any subject's personal privacy. The compelling public interest in disclosure of information concerning the reasons for the use of restraint chairs in county jails outweighs any privacy interests once the names of the subjects of the reports have been redacted. Moreover, the incident reports pertain to the performance of public duties by public employees or officials. Therefore, the Sheriffs Office did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that section 7(1)(c) of FOIA exempts the entireties of the records from disclosure.

13) Section 7(1)(b-5) of FOIA exempts from disclosure "[f]iles, documents, and other data or databases maintained by one or more law enforcement agencies and specifically designed to provide information to one or more law enforcement agencies regarding the physical or mental status of one or more individual subjects."

14) The incident reports are not specifically designed to alert law enforcement agencies to information about the mental or physical status of subjects they may encounter. Instead, the incident reports document the use of restraint chairs within the county jail in accordance with Illinois Administrative Code provisions that require such documentation. Section 7(1)(b-5) is intended to protect information shared by family members about loved ones' disabilities or other sensitive conditions to enable law enforcement officers and emergency responders to account for these considerations. Because the incident reports do not contain such information or otherwise document the physical or mental status of subjects for the specific purpose of alerting law enforcement officers and emergency responders to disabilities or other sensitive conditions, the Sheriffs Office did not sustain its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the incident reports are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the section 7(1)(b-5) exemption.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the Attorney General that the Sheriffs Office violated the requirements of FOIA by improperly denying the incident reports responsive to Ms. Hauck's Freedom oflnformation Act request. Accordingly, the Sheriffs Office is hereby directed to take immediate and appropriate action to comply with this opinion by providing Ms. Hauck and the Illinois Answers Project with copies of the reports, subject only to permissible redactions of the discrete information described above.

Very truly yours,

KWAMERAOUL ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:

12--✓ R. Douglas Rees Chief Deputy Attorney General that he has served a copy of the foregoing Binding Opinion (Public Access Opinion 26-011)

upon:

Ms. Grace Hauck State Investigative Reporter Illinois Answers Project 223 West Jackson Boulevard, Suite 300 Chicago, Illinois 60606 [email protected] Mr. David K. Livingstone Assistant State's Attorney Madison County State's Attorney's Office 157 North Main Street, Suite 402 Edwardsville, Illinois 62025 [email protected] by causing a true copy thereof to be sent electronically to the addresses as listed above and by causing to be mailed a true copy thereof in correctly addressed, prepaid envelopes to be deposited in the United States mail at Chicago, Illinois on September 30, 2026.

Bureau Chief d:k Joshua M. Jones Bureau Chief Public Access Bureau, Chicago Office of the Attorney General 115 South LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 814-8413